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The proposed fifth methodology requires policy analysts to be philosophically reflective, and thus able not only to identify their own and others epistemological and ontological predispositions, but also to understand and accept the strengths and weaknesses of the contending methodologies for their performance as policy analysts. In essence, this requires them to embrace the following propositions. First, adept policy analysts would be epistemologically and ontologically sophisticated enough to accept that what constitutes “good” policy analysis is an essentially contested concept, clarifiable through constructive discourse. Thus, they would actively seek insights into what might work in particular policy situations by engaging with those who hold different philosophical dispositions. They therefore would see such constructive discourse as normal, even if it has the propensity to create conflict, and, most certainly, as necessary, in order to create creative opportunities for policy analysts to engage with those holding contending philosophical perspectives to find solutions to policy problems and issues. Second, adept policy analysts would be skeptical of any empirical generalizations about the causation and consequences of, and solutions to, policy problems and issues. These they would treat only as preliminary working hypotheses. They would thus seek to deepen their understanding by engaging in acts of ideation with those who hold different philosophical dispositions, which would allow the perspectives reciprocity needed for a reflexive interpretation to emerge that would ensure an appropriate contextualization of meaning. Third, adept policy analysts would learn how to comprehend and evaluate the intended meaning of the contending arguments based on a diversity of epistemological and ontological perspectives. They would settle in their own minds competing epistemological and ontological truth-claims with consistency and without recourse to intentional activities and motivated processes that enable self-deception or self-delusion. They would thereby confront unpleasant truths or issues rather than resort to the mental states of ignorance, false belief, unwarranted attitudes, and inappropriate emotions (Haight, 1980). They would accept that the best policy outcomes that can be expected from constructive discourses are sets of achievable policy aspirations, implementable strategies, and a tolerable level of policy conflict. They would see view good policy analysis as an iterative process that involves learning-by-doing and learning-from-experience about what is the right thing to do and how to do things right. Conclusion In a world characterized by profound diversity of opinion grounded in equally profound philosophical differences, the interrogation of the social world requires a series of conceptual and analytical tools. These relate not only to epistemology and ontology, but also to methodology, and thus theory and method of inquiry. Furthermore, these various tools are logically interconnected: epistemology shapes ontology, epistemology and ontology together shape methodology, and methodology shapes both theory and method. Adept policy analysts must be critically reflective before they seek to describe, explain, understand, judge, and address policy problems and issues by drawing upon theories and methods grounded in only one of these contending (fundamentally flawed) methodological families. The broad conclusion drawn, then, is that policy analysts need: • to avoid epistemological and ontological arrogance; • to seek out and engage with those who disagree with their philosophical dispositions; • to treat all truth-claims skeptically, accepting that there are multiple standards by which they could be justified, particularly if they come from any ascendant epistemic community (whether grounded in naturalism or hermeneutics); and • to settle competing epistemological and ontological asseverations with consistency and without recourse to the self-deception or self-delusion that permits them to avoid unpleasant truths about their informing intellectual discipline.
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Dixon and Dogan 4—John Dixon Public Management @ Plymouth and Rhys Dogan Politics @ Plymouth [“The Conduct of Policy Analysis: Philosophical Points of Reference” Review of Policy Research 21 (4)]
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The proposed methodology requires policy analysts to be philosophically reflective and thus able not only to identify their own and others epistemological and ontological predispositions, but also to understand and accept the strengths and weaknesses of the contending methodologies adept policy analysts would be epistemologically and ontologically sophisticated enough to accept that what constitutes “good” policy analysis is an essentially contested concept, Thus, they would actively seek insights by engaging with those who hold different philosophical dispositions They therefore would see such constructive discourse as normal, even if it has the propensity to create conflict policy analysts would be skeptical of any empirical generalizations about the causation and consequences of, and solutions to, policy problems and issues They would deepen their understanding by engaging in acts of ideation with those who hold different philosophical dispositions dept policy analysts would learn how to comprehend and evaluate the intended meaning of the contending arguments based on a diversity of epistemological and ontological perspectives They would settle in their own minds competing epistemological and ontological truth-claims with consistency and without recourse to intentional activities and motivated processes that enable self-deception They would thereby confront unpleasant truths or issues rather than resort to the mental states of ignorance, false belief tools are logically interconnected: epistemology shapes ontology, epistemology and ontology together shape methodology, and methodology shapes both theory and method policy analysts need: • to avoid epistemological and ontological arrogance to seek out and engage with those who disagree with their philosophical dispositions; to treat all truth-claims skeptically, accepting that there are multiple standards by which they could be justified, particularly if they come from any ascendant epistemic community
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Policy analysis should include competing epistemologies, ontologies, and assumptions—they can’t sever out of the criticism.
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This realignment of debate also would contribute to a more engaged IR scholarship if it led scholars to recognize that they themselves act as agents in such communicative interactions. They might then become more inclined to acknowledge concerns, not only regarding explanation and research design, but also for policy relevance and constitutional design. Deliberate reflection on constitutional design- confronting and acknowledging the inevitable implications of any scholarly arguments for policy practices-is necessary because every theoretical and empirical argument offers a normative or policy lesson. For example, economists have recognized that classical theories "teach" students to behave in accord with their precepts. Robert Frank and his colleagues (1993) have argued that exposure to contemporary economic theory itself constitutes agents to act more selfishly; indeed, they found students enrolled in economics courses come to behave in an increasingly "self-help" manner. In the IR context, Wendt (1999:377) himself argues "that problem-solving theory has the practical effect in the real world of helping to reproduce the status quo" and suggests that "realism, despite its claim of objectivity" is best seen in this light as "a normative as well as scientific theory."
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Widmaier 4—an Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Joseph's University, an Australian Research Council Future Fellow in the Centre for Governance and Public Policy and at the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University [Sep., 2004, Wesley W. Widmaier, “Theory as a Factor and the Theorist as an Actor: The "Pragmatist Constructivist" Lessons of John Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith,” International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 427-445, accessed through JSTOR]
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This realignment of debate would contribute to a more engaged IR scholarship if it led scholars to recognize that they themselves act as agents in such communicative interactions They might then become more inclined to acknowledge concerns but also for policy relevance Deliberate reflection on constitutional design- confronting and acknowledging the inevitable implications of any scholarly arguments for policy practices-is necessary because every theoretical and empirical argument offers a normative or policy lesson economists have recognized that classical theories "teach" students to behave in accord with their precepts exposure to contemporary economic theory itself constitutes agents to act more selfishly they found students enrolled in economics courses come to behave in an increasingly "self-help" manner. In the IR context problem-solving theory has the practical effect in the real world of helping to reproduce the status quo and suggests that "realism, despite its claim of objectivity" is best seen in this light as "a normative as well as scientific theory."
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Focusing on constitutive theory instead of policy application generates social change—their framework is academically bankrupt.
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From the environmental security perspective, policies should be targeted at both human behavior and natural processes, as each of these contribute to environmental insecurity for humans. Human behaviors that contribute to environmental insecurity include things such as high consumption patterns (Barnett 2001; Princen, Maniates, and Conca 2002) and high population levels9 (Pirages 1997; Worku 2007). Natural processes discussed in this discourse include natural disasters or biophysical alterations such as changes in precipitation levels, the growth or decline of species populations, or changes in levels of pathogenic microorganisms (Pirages and DeGeest 2004). It is important to note that many of these natural processes can also be worsened by human behaviors such as consumption and population growth. However, despite the potential contributions that humans make to processes that lead to environmental insecurity, there is a different degree of intentionality in the environmental security discourse when compared with the environmental conflict discourse. In the environmental conflict discourse, humans have a high degree of intentionality. This means that segments of society knowingly come into violent contact with each other because of the presence or absence of a resource. From an environmental security perspective, humans are rarely seen as intentionally contributing to the insecurity of others. Rather, they act in ways that are consistent with the practices of their societies. Scholars working within the environmental security discourse are likely to advocate policies that deal with not only the short-term instances of environmental insecurity but also the longer-term strategies for combating processes of environmental change. These policies must prioritize human security over national security, meaning that the security of humans must be the main concern of security policy. This is in contrast to policies advocated within the environmental conflict discourse, which tend to have direct links to the security of states themselves either over or in conjunction with the security of individuals. Environmental security policies will often involve direct action of states but will also have a role for other actors. According to this storyline, states have a responsibility to protect the security of their populations, but in some cases this will mean allocating authority to achieve this objective to other actors—either above or below the state.10 The environmental security discourse focuses on a wide variety of threats to humans due to environmental change. Policy making will be directed at vulnerable populations where vulnerability is seen to stem from both human behaviors and natural processes. This may require a portfolio of governance mechanisms at different scales, ranging from the local to the global, and involving both state and nonstate actors. It may include policies aimed at minimizing human activities that lead to environmental degradation as well as enhancing the ability of human populations to adapt to environmental change. In sum, the environmental security and environmental conflict discourses represent two distinct ways of conceptualizing the relationship between security and the environment. We contend that the environmental conflict discourse is more than simply a part of the broader environmental security discourse. As discussed above, each has its own storylines or narratives about these issues. Those who use an environmental security discourse introduce a broad range of threats and vulnerabilities into their analysis of environmental change, focus on the negative effects to human populations, and envision a broad array of policy solutions. In contrast, the environmental conflict discourse uses a narrower set of storylines to describe the link between security and the environment (emphasizing conflict), privileges the security of the state over human populations, and proposes a more limited set of policy solutions aimed at avoiding conflict over resources rather than eliminating the sources of resource scarcity in the first place.
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Detraz and Betsill 9—Nicole Detraz Poli Sci @ Memphis and Michele Betsill Poli Sci @ Colorado St. [“Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts” International Studies Perspectives 10 p. 307-308]
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From the environmental security perspective, policies should be targeted at both human behavior and natural processes, as each of these contribute to environmental insecurity for humans Human behaviors that contribute to environmental insecurity include high consumption patterns In the environmental conflict discourse, humans have a high degree of intentionality. This means that segments of society knowingly come into violent contact with each other because of the presence or absence of a resource Scholars working within the environmental security discourse are likely to advocate policies that deal with not only the short-term instances of environmental insecurity but also the longer-term strategies for combating processes of environmental change. These policies must prioritize human security over national security, meaning that the security of humans must be the main concern of security policy This is in contrast to policies advocated within the environmental conflict discourse, which tend to have direct links to the security of states themselves either over or in conjunction with the security of individuals the environmental conflict discourse uses a narrower set of storylines to describe the link between security and the environment emphasizing conflict), privileges the security of the state over human populations, and proposes a more limited set of policy solutions aimed at avoiding conflict over resources rather than eliminating the sources of resource scarcity in the first place
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The aff is about environmental conflict, not environmental security– they privilege resource scarcity and national security. Only our alternative recognizes the role of consumption.
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A security dialog is an understandable choice for those who wish to raise the profile of climate change on the global agenda. As mentioned earlier, the inclusion of environmental concerns into security debates was designed to raise the environment into the area of ‘‘high politics.’’ Many scholars and policy makers view climate change as an issue worth all of the attention that is typically bestowed on traditional security issues. In fact, many are convinced of the security implications of climate change—although how security is defined varies. At the same time, there are others who question whether framing climate change as a security issue is beneficial. In a field that is marked by complexity, adding security to the debate may only serve to confuse matters. As discussed throughout this paper, discourses have implications for the way a problem like climate change is defined and the range of policy options that are considered. Ultimately, we believe that a discursive shift to the environmental conflict perspective, even if limited to the Security Council, would be counterproductive in the development of a global response to climate change. Our primary concern is that a shift to the environmental conflict discourse would result in a narrowing of policy options focused on a particular form of adaptation—avoiding conflict—and that other issues of human security as well as adaptation and mitigation strategies for addressing those issues could fall off the agenda. One of the problems of relying on the environmental conflict discourse to understand the security implications of climate change is that the climate issue is different than most other issues discussed in the literature that links conflict and the environment. Climate change is a more abstract phenomenon than many other environmental issues and will be experienced in different ways. While there is some variation in the time horizon expected for climate change, the pace will be relatively slow but the impacts will spread to a variety of environmental arenas, including water availability, food availability, and so on. (IPCC 2007). This means that climate change is more likely to act as a threat multiplier than as a primary source of insecurity. This presents different issues than those often tackled by the existing environmental conflict cases, which tend to be focused on only one ‘‘resource’’ at a time.17 According to Purvis and Busby (2004:68), ‘‘the connection between climate change and the outbreak of violence will unlikely be as strong as when natural resources can be exploited for quick financial reward.’’ None of this is to suggest that environmental conflict is unlikely to occur as a result of climate change. On the contrary, there is a possibility that groups in society will conflict over resources if climate change results in resource scarcity.18 Our point is that this is only one concern in the climate change debate and quite probably not the most pressing concern. Another issue with the environmental conflict discourse is the tendency to locate the authority for solutions and action in the military apparatus of states. Allenby (2000:13) claims that the national security community in most countries is conservative, insular, heavily focused on military threats and challenges, secretive, and powerful; it also tends to focus on short-term, obvious problems. Culturally, such security communities are among the least likely to embrace environmental considerations, and, when they do so, only in a mission-oriented context. Scholars have long questioned whether armed forces are capable of meeting the challenges posed by environmental change (Barnett 2003). Liotta and Shearer (2007:133) argue against the idea that climate change in particular should be met with a militarized response: ‘‘The problems are too broadly distributed and the consequences are too deeply penetrating for such an approach to be successful.’’ These positions point out the tendency of militarized solutions to be narrowly defined and potentially top-down. If climate change requires a behavioral shift to achieve lasting solutions, then narrowly defined militarized solutions are unlikely to be sufficient responses. These problems are in addition to the fact that militaries around the world are responsible for major environmental damage, both through wartime and peacetime activities (Paterson 2001; Liotta and Shearer 2007). It may be counterproductive to depend on the military apparatus of states as a potential solution to environmental problems when they are simultaneously contributing to those same problems. Lastly, a shift to the environmental conflict discourse may lead to the continuation of the status quo—meaning that those who are currently advantaged in society will suffer much less from the impacts of climate change as well as the strategies for mitigating climate change and vice versa. Norda°s and Gleditsch (2007:635) claim that the security scenarios may well be constructed with the benign intention of arousing the world to greater attention to a global issue. But they could also lead to greater emphasis on a national security response to whatever degree of climate change is seen as unavoidable. This would not be helpful to the primary victims of climate change. This is true both in terms of states and segments of society. IPCC reports have claimed that the negative impacts of climate change are expected to fall disproportionately on poor countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Biermann and Dingwerth 2004; Park 2005). Additionally, there are different levels of vulnerability to climate change. Those impacted most are likely to be those who depend on natural resources and ecosystem services for their livelihoods (Barnett and Adger 2007). This includes agricultural-based economies in particular. If climate change is understood as a security issue tied to potential for conflict, then these poor states are likely to be seen as a military threat first and foremost. This may result in military strategies, like ecological intervention, rather than more humanitarian strategies to help those suffering from environmental insecurity. A related concern is the potential for disadvantaged populations within states to be targeted differently for climate change solutions. Paterson (1996) suggests that as countries are hit by the negative impacts of climate change, existing ethnic, religious, or other divides may play a role in decision-making processes, and governments may favor dominant groups in decisions. Nondominant groups could be classified as the ‘‘aggressor’’ in an environmental conflict situation and therefore become targets of environmental conflict solutions implemented by the state.
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Detraz and Betsill 9—Nicole Detraz Poli Sci @ Memphis and Michele Betsill Poli Sci @ Colorado St. [“Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts” International Studies Perspectives 10 p. 313-314]
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a shift to the environmental conflict discourse would result in a narrowing of policy options focused on a particular form of adaptation avoiding conflict other issues of human security as well as adaptation and mitigation strategies for addressing those issues could fall off the agenda. climate issue is different than most other issues discussed in the literature that links conflict and the environment limate change is a more abstract phenomenon and will be experienced in different ways Another issue with the environmental conflict discourse is the tendency to locate the authority for solutions and action in the military apparatus of states the national security community in most countries is conservative, insular, heavily focused on military threats and challenges, secretive, and powerful; it also tends to focus on short-term, obvious problems The problems are too broadly distributed and the consequences are too deeply penetrating for such an approach to be successful These point out the tendency of militarized solutions to be narrowly defined and top-down. a shift to the environmental conflict discourse may lead to the continuation of the status quo—meaning that those who are currently advantaged in society will suffer much less from the impacts of climate change as well as the strategies for mitigating climate change Nondominant groups could be classified as the ‘‘aggressor’’ in an environmental conflict situation and therefore become targets of environmental conflict solutions implemented by the state
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Climate conflict framing focuses on narrow adaptation and militaristic preparation versus poor-states.
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Security: The war of all against nothing The third case study involves the UN Security Council debate on climate change in 2007. This represents an extreme case, since here securitization is most likely to result in exceptional measures. At first sight, the discourse here follows the script of securitization in the Copenhagen School’s sense, articulating climate change as a source of conflict among states. However, our analysis, as illustrated in Figure 2, reveals a much more fine-grained picture. To be precise, it actually presents two different versions of securitization, drawing on two different antagonisms. On the one hand, there is an antagonism constructed between first-order threats—that is, the direct impacts of a changing climate—and all vulnerable regions, countries or communities. The security framing here is one of human security, as climate change threatens the livelihoods, food supplies, water security, etc. of the vulnerable. On the other hand, these hot spots or zones of crisis can become a source of danger themselves. The human insecurity in vulnerable regions, then, is articulated with what could be called a neo-Malthusian ‘climate-conflict discourse’ (Trombetta, 2008; Detraz and Betsill, 2009). This states, on the one hand, that vulnerable regions suffering from the impacts of climate change will be conflict-prone, as ‘they lack the knowledge, capacity and resources to deal with it’ (Heller in UN Security Council, 2007b: 19). Environmental degradation and the resulting scarcity of resources are understood as an additional and novel driver for conflicts (see Appendix). Taken together, these ideas constitute a security discourse in which ‘the vulnerable are becoming dangerous’ (Oels, 2012)—that is, a threat for national security in the Western world or even for international security. The vulnerable thus become the dangerous enemies in the sense of the logic of security. And this clearly implies the adoption of a preemptive logic and the exceptional measures of interstate conflict and military intervention. Yet, even in the security field, preemptive or other security measures, which can be found for example in disaster management (see Figure 2), only play a minor role. The reason for this is that the two articulations of climate change and security are heavily permeated by a different storyline, one that follows the logic of apocalypse (the fantasmatic dimension presented in Figure 2). Also in this case most articulations stress the universality of the threat, resulting in an antagonistic frontier between humanity and dangerous climate change that is characteristic for the apocalypse (see above). And this explains why an exceptional rhetoric in the case of climate change is not linked with the adoption of exceptional measures. While the climate/humanity antagonism is still most dominantly couched in metaphors of war (see Appendix), the unification of humanity implies that this particular war is fought against an entirely spectral enemy: ‘this is not a struggle against anyone’ (Weisleder in UN Security Council, 2007b: 32). And this war of all against nothing is the crucial point for the logic of apocalypse that connects security and risk in this particular case and thus excludes exceptional measures—because ‘our conflict is not being fought with guns and missiles but with weapons from everyday life—chimney stacks and exhaust pipes’ (Pita in UN Security Council, 2007b: 8). The antagonism created by a logic of apocalypse does not just replace or transform the other security articulations: it also links them in crucial ways. As Figure 2 shows, the most prominent demand articulated in the discourse is prevention. And as second-order threats like ‘uncontrollable migratory flows’ (see Figure 2) mainly evolve under conditions of an apocalyptic climate change, mitigation becomes the best measure of conflict prevention. Again, there is a dichotomization between a linear development (e.g. normal migratory patterns) and a state of chaos. Therefore, also the climate-security discourse heavily promotes the political machinery of the UN Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol (Churkin in UN Security Council, 2007b: 17)—just as ‘appropriate incentives, public–private partnerships, low-carbon emitting technologies and innovative solutions’ (Kryzhanivskyi in UN Security Council, 2007b: 4). At the same time, also adaptation becomes a form of conflict prevention, as it lessens the direct impacts of climate change on the vulnerable. The discourse thus articulates a risk-management approach similar to that in the field of adaptation, which revolves around the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and community (see, for example, Hill in UN Security Council, 2007b: 6; (Koenders in UN Security Council, 2007a: 22). The hegemonic discourse here takes up the calls for supporting the vulnerable with adaptation and constructs a responsibility on the part of the West (see Appendix and Figure 2). This responsibility is transformed into a pastoral relation, taking the form of government at a distance through empowerment, stakeholder participation and self responsibilization of local communities. Also in the field of global security governance we can see the impacts of the ‘banality of the apocalypse’ (De Goede and Randalls, 2009: 872). Even though climate change is commonly seen as one of the major threats to international peace and security, this does not result in the adoption of exceptional measures—not in preemptive geo-engineering, not in a global climate response force, not in military pre-warning systems, etc. Rather, the (political) machine of mitigation governance and the preparedness of the vulnerable become the cornerstones of a broadened security agenda. Conclusion The starting point of this article was the paradoxical simultaneity of the logic of risk and the logic of security in global discourses of climate change. Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony, we have argued that risk and security have been articulated in a way that may be termed the logic of apocalypse: creating a universal threat for the entire planet, radically undermining the possibility of a future as such, mobilizing religious apocalyptic imageries and emphasizing an antiepistemology. Our empirical analysis in three cases—those of mitigation, adaptation and the security sector—reveals that this logic is deeply ingrained in global discourses of climate change. Yet, apocalypse is the hegemonic way of articulating climate change as a security problem. And, following our theoretical argument, this logic of apocalypse results coherently in practices of risk management: mitigation as precautionary risk management, adaptation as investing in preparedness, and security not as preemption but as a combination of the former two. In the face of the apocalypse, politicians seem to be too small and ‘human’ to resolve the dawning crisis—hence, responsibility is handed over to the arcane and obscure practices and rationalities of risk management. To conclude, we suggest that our study be read as outlining a contribution to critical security studies that might be termed the security paradox. It may indeed be a recurrent pattern that securitization, as the Copenhagen School holds, results in exceptional measures. However, there are definitely some cases in which securitization is so overwhelming that it prompts a counterintuitive result: the greater and more apocalyptic the perceived threat, the greater the resulting distrust in political actors and exceptional measures, and thus the smaller and technocratic the political measures; here, securitization is so exaggerated that it prompts the opposite: routine and micropractices of risk management. By contrast, for those working in the Foucauldian tradition, this piece could draw attention to the fact that even the most mundane practices of risk management are politically supported and discursively sustained by images of an overwhelming apocalyptic threat. In other words, our work supports the emerging insight that risk and security are two sides of the same coin—rather than two very different animals.
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Methmann and Rothe 12—Chris Methmann, Research Associate Poli Sci Inst. @ Hamburg and Delf Rothe IR PhD Candidate @ Hamburg [“Politics for the day after tomorrow: The logic of apocalypse in global climate politics” Security Dialogue 43 p. 334-337]
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Security: The war of all against nothing The security framing here is one of human security, as climate change threatens the livelihoods, food supplies, water security these ideas constitute a security discourse in which ‘the vulnerable are becoming dangerous’ a threat for national security in the Western world or even for international securit The vulnerable thus become the dangerous enemies in the sense of the logic of security. this clearly implies the adoption of a preemptive logic and the exceptional measures of interstate conflict and military intervention most articulations stress the universality of the threat, this war of all against nothing is the crucial point for the logic of apocalypse that connects security and risk in this particular case and thus excludes exceptional measures The antagonism created by a logic of apocalypse does not just replace or transform the other security articulations: it also links them in crucial ways responsibility is transformed into a pastoral relation, taking the form of government at a distance through empowerment, stakeholder participation in the field of global security governance we can see the impacts of the ‘banality of the apocalypse’ climate change is commonly seen as one of the major threats to international peace and security, this does not result in the adoption of exceptional measures Rather, the (political) machine of mitigation governance and the preparedness of the vulnerable become the cornerstones of a broadened security agenda responsibility is handed over to the arcane and obscure practices and rationalities of risk management the greater and more apocalyptic the perceived threat, the greater the resulting distrust in political actors and exceptional measures, and thus the smaller and technocratic the political measures
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Climate security discourse authorizes technocratic top-down politics.
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‘Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military–police measures in purported response to an existential danger.89
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Ahmed 11—Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is an international security analyst. He is Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of IR, University of Sussex, where he obtained his DPhil. [“The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011, Taylor and Francis Online]
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By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’ states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military–police measures in purported response to an existential danger
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The aff’s method reduces global crises to their symptoms—that undercuts solvency and spurs conflict.
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The modern day China ‘threat’ to the United States is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which, to a significant extent, have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security. This is an increasingly acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the literature.121 The purpose of this article has been to expose how ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have always been contingent upon subjective interpretation. The three case studies chosen represent those moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at which China has been perceived as most threatening to American security. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras. The nature of each was very different and they emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the nineteenth century and from ‘great power’ rivalry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most effectively demonstrate how China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon.
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Turner 13—Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]
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The modern day China ‘threat’ to the U S is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security. ‘threats’ from China towards the U S have always been contingent upon subjective interpretation. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon
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The affirmative’s discourse of a China threat influences policy formulation at every stage. The only way to achieve a coherent China foreign policy is to interrogate the role of discourse in policy making. The K is prior to solvency
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By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.
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McClintock 9—chaired prof of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at UW–Madison. MPhil from Cambridge; PhD from Columbia (Anne, Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, Small Axe Mar2009, Issue 28, p50-74)
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the U S has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence which the US has committed after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the U S has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. The war on terror is “a consensual hallucination,” the US can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.
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Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy—the most powerful nation sees threats everywhere, legitimizing constant war.
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It is important to highlight the way performativity's idea of reiteration calls attention to changes in historically established imaginative geographies. While US foreign policy has been traditionally written in the context of identity/difference expressed in self/other relationships (Campbell, 1992), we detect in recent strategic performances a different articulation of America's relationship to the world. Signified by the notion of integration we identify elements in the formation of a new imaginative geography which enable the US to draw countries into its spheres of influence and control. We show how integration (and its coeval strategies of exclusion) has been enunciated over the last 15 years through popular-academic books, think-tank documents, policy programmes and security strategies, as well as popular geopolitical sources. This concept of integration, we argue, is enacted through a number of practices of representation and coercion that encourage countries to adopt a raft of US attitudes and ways of operating or else suffer the consequences. As such, we are witnessing the performance of a security problematic that requires critical perspectives to move beyond a simple ideal/material dichotomy in social analysis in order to account for more complex understandings of opposition, including the emergence of new, mobile geographies of exclusion.
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Campbell et al. 7—David Campbell, Geography @ Durham [“Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of current US strategy” Political Geography 26 (4) doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.12.002 (Other Authors: Luiza Bialasiewicz, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey and Alison J. Williams)]
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we detect in recent strategic performances a different articulation of America's relationship to the world Signified by elements of a new imaginative geography which enable the US to draw countries into its spheres of influence and control integration (and its coeval strategies of exclusion) has been enunciated through think-tank documents, policy programmes and security strategies This concept of integration is enacted through practices of representation and coercion that encourage countries to adopt a raft of US attitudes and ways of operating or else suffer the consequences
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The discourse of American leadership is rooted in the construction and demonization of dangerous others. Their advantage produces the threat that it names.
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It is generally assumed by most theorists, most policymakers, and practitioners, that peace has an ontological stability enabling it to be understood, defined, and thus created. Indeed, the implication of the void of debate about peace indicates that it is generally thought that peace as a concept is so ontologically solid that no debate is required. There is clearly a resistance to examining the concept of peace as a subjective ontology, as well as a subjective political and ideological framework. Indeed, this might be said to be indicative of “orientalism,” in impeding a discussion of a positive peace or of alternative concepts and contexts of peace.18 Indeed, Said’s humanism indicates the dangers of assuming that peace is universal, a Platonic ideal form, or extremely limited. An emerging critical conceptualization of peace rests upon a genealogy that illustrates its contested discourses and multiple concepts. This allows for an understanding of the many actors, contexts, and dynamics of peace, and enables a reprioritization of what, for whom, and why, peace is valued. Peace from this perspective is a rich, varied, and fluid tapestry, which can be contextualized, rather than a sterile, extremely limited, and probably unobtainable product of a secular or nonsecular imagination. It represents a discursive framework in which the many problems that are replicated by the linear and rational project of a universal peace (effectively camouflaged by a lack of attention within IR) can be properly interrogated in order to prevent the discursive replication of violence.19 This allows for an understanding of how the multiple and competing versions of peace may even give rise to conflict, and also how this might be overcome. One area of consensus from within this more radical literature appears to be that peace is discussed, interpreted, and referred to in a way that nearly always disguises the fact that it is essentially contested. This is often an act of hegemony thinly disguised as benevolence, assertiveness, or wisdom. Indeed, many assertions about peace depend upon actors who know peace then creating it for those that do not, either through their acts or through the implicit peace discourses that are employed to describe conflict and war in opposition to peace. Where there should be research agendas there are often silences. Even contemporary approaches in conflict analysis and peace studies rarely stop to imagine the kind of peace they may actually create. IR has reproduced a science of peace based upon political, social, economic, cultural, and legal governance frameworks, by which conflict in the world is judged. This has led to the liberal peace framework, which masks a hegemonic collusion over the discourses of, and creation of, peace.20 A critical interrogation of peace indicates it should be qualified as a specific type among many.
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Richmond 7 [Oliver P. Richmond, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, Alternatives 32 (2007), 247–274]
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It is generally assumed that peace has an ontological stability enabling it to be understood and thus created the implication of the void of debate about peace indicates it is thought that peace is so ontologically solid that no debate is required. There is clearly a resistance to examining the concept of peace as a subjective ontology as well as a and ideological framework this might be said to be indicative of “orientalism in impeding a discussion of positive peace An emerging critical conceptualization of peace rests upon a genealogy that illustrates its contested discourses and multiple concepts. This allows for an understanding of the many actors, contexts, and dynamics of peace, and enables a reprioritization of what, for whom, and why, peace is valued Peace from this perspective is a rich and fluid tapestry, which can be contextualized, rather than a sterile, extremely limited, and probably unobtainable product of imagination It represents a discursive framework in which the many problems that are replicated by the linear and rational project of a universal peace effectively camouflaged by a lack of attention can be properly interrogated in order to prevent the discursive replication of violence This allows for an understanding of how the multiple and competing versions of peace may even give rise to conflict, and also how this might be overcome peace is discussed in a way that nearly always disguises the fact that it is essentially contested. This is often an act of hegemony thinly disguised as benevolence, or wisdom many assertions about peace depend upon actors who know peace then creating it for those that do not, through the implicit peace discourses that are employed to describe conflict and war in opposition to peace Where there should be research agendas there are often silences. contemporary approaches rarely stop to imagine the kind of peace they may actually create. IR has reproduced a science of peace based upon political, social, economic, cultural, and legal governance frameworks by which conflict in the world is judged. This has led to the liberal peace framework, which masks a hegemonic collusion over the discourses of, and creation of, peace A critical interrogation of peace indicates it should be qualified as a specific type among many
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Their hegemonic approach to peace will produce error replication—the very discourse used to describe their advantages causes violence. We must open the framework of what constitutes peace to critical interrogation
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The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both Kagan and Barnett, is similarly at the heart of the current administration's foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered:
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Campbell et al. 7—David Campbell, Geography @ Durham [“Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of current US strategy” Political Geography 26 (4) doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.12.002 (Other Authors: Luiza Bialasiewicz, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey and Alison J. Williams)]
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The concept of integration is at the heart of the current administration's policies Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered
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The aff’s discourse of integration and leadership rehashes the geographies of exclusion and containment in nicer sounding terms. Construct of dangerous other versus stable and peaceful United States confirms the material and moral hierarchies of the dominant U.S. identity.
| 332 | 273 | 153 | 52 | 39 | 24 | 0.75 | 0.461538 |
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Where do human rights fit into this realist picture of security? Realist proponents of national security do not deny the existence of human rights norms such as those embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But crucially, realism argues that they are norms which are not binding on states when they collide with other interests (such as trade or national security). Hans J. Morgenthau, the godfather of realism, argued that ‘the principle of the defense of human rights cannot be consistently applied in foreign policy because it can and must come in conflict with other interests that may be more important than the defense of human rights in a particular circumstance’.9 Realists also point to the centrality of states in implementing human rights standards and the weak or nonexistent enforcement machinery. As a leading representative of the US delegation at San Francisco made clear, ‘”We the peoples” means that the peoples of the world were speaking through their governments’.10 Amnesty International’s annual report is a constant reminder that realist thinking on human rights is part of the fabric of contemporary international society. A recent report summarized its findings against the backdrop of the war on terror as follows: ‘Governments have spent billions to strengthen national security and the “war on terror”. Yet for millions of people, the real sources of insecurity are corruption, repression, discrimination, extreme poverty and preventable diseases’.11 This is nothing new. Driven by expediency and self-interest, governments have long trampled on their citizens’ rights in order to maintain the power and privilege of an elite few. In the language of International Relations theory, what Amnesty is describing is the problem of statism, by which is meant the idea that the state should be the sole source of loyalty and values for its citizens.12 Amnesty claims that the majority of states routinely fail to deliver even basic rights to their citizens. Governments or agencies acting on their behalf routinely imprison without trial, torture and/or kill individuals who challenge the regime. The Westphalian practice of statism infects international bodies such as the United Nations. Amnesty International points to the ‘realpolitik’ in the General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights that it charges as being ‘almost irrelevant to the protection of victims in Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo’.13 It is not unusual to find that no state has tabled a condemnatory resolution at the UN General Assembly even after it has been presented with evidence of gross human rights violations. Consistent with the charge of statism is the argument that the UN is merely an arena for raison d’état, a kind of global Westphalian system where the language for the conduct of international relations has changed but the interests remain the same. Human rights in this context have represented, in the words of Norman Lewis, ‘nothing more than an empty abstraction whose function was the legitimation and perpetuation of the given system of power relations, domestically and internationally’.14
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Dunne & Wheeler 4 [Tim Dunne, University of Exeter, UK, Nicholas J. Wheeler, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, “‘We the Peoples’: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice”, International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1, 9-23, http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1972/1/We%2520the%2520Peoples.pdf]
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Where do human rights fit into this realist picture of security? Realist proponents of national security do not deny the existence of human rights norms But realism argues that they are norms which are not binding on states when they collide with other interests such as security the godfather of realism, argued that ‘the principle of the defense of human rights cannot be consistently applied in foreign policy because it can and must come in conflict with other interests that may be more important than the defense of human realist thinking on human rights is part of the fabric of contemporary international society Governments have spent billions to strengthen national security and the “war on terror”. Yet for millions of people, the real sources of insecurity are corruption, repression, discrimination, extreme poverty and preventable diseases’ This is nothing new governments have long trampled on their citizens’ rights in order to maintain the power and privilege of an elite few. the majority of states routinely fail to deliver even basic rights to their citizens. Governments or agencies acting on their behalf routinely imprison without trial, torture and/or kill individuals who challenge the regime. Consistent with the charge of statism is the argument that the UN is merely an arena for a system where the language for the conduct of international relations has changed but the interests remain the same. Human rights in this context have represented nothing more than an empty abstraction whose function was the legitimation and perpetuation of the given system of power relations, domestically and internationally’
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Depictions of human rights catastrophe legitimize realism
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The concern for and promotion of human rights has increasingly assumed an international dimension in the post-War period.2 The Westphalian principles are not the only values advanced by the UN Charter. To be sure, the Charter also mentions human rights among the purposes of the organization, along with the maintenance of international peace and security, and a growing body of human rights regime has accumulated since the enactment of the Charter. This trend is best reflected emerged a body of legal in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two UN Covenants and other universal and regional Human Rights Conventions and mechanisms. As a result of the development of such a normative international order, and increasing pace of interdependence and globalization eroding the traditional distinctions between domestic and international affairs, coupled with the activities of powerful NGOs, the issues of human rights have found their way into international politics. Consequently, there norms and mechanisms as well as political instruments, ranging from human rights diplomacy to humanitarian intervention and international war crimes tribunals, which regulate the governments’ treatment of their citizens.3 Though very fragile, they provide a ground to put the domestic conduct of the governments under the scrutiny by individuals, domestic and international non-governmental organizations, other states and international organizations. Despite the tension to be discussed below, human rights—especially the violation of them- has become a legitimate concern to the international society, a process which has been provided with added impetus in the post-Cold War era.4 The end of the Cold War and the emerging international system were characterized by the increasing possibilities for international cooperation, especially at a time where destabilizing effects of the end of the Cold War have increased the need for international protection and promotion of human rights. Growing activities on the part of secessionist and nationalist movements created a growing need for the protection of human and particularly minority rights. Against this setting, the emerging multi-centric international system and a global wave of democratization have enabled human rights groups to mobilize liberal states and international organizations to incorporate the promotion of human rights into their agenda. This process was also reinforced and complemented by the expanding ideas in the post-Cold War era that the traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention cannot be interpreted in their absolute sense and therefore the international community may override these norms under certain conditions. The widely cited Vienna Declaration (1993) adapted by the UN World Conference on Human Rights, thus, stated that the protection and promotion of human rights is the primary responsibility of governments and a legitimate concern of the international community. Nonetheless, the reality remains there. Although respect for human rights is a stated concern of the international community and an international system for protection of human rights has been set up, its implementation and enforcement is far from being effective. Despite the attempts towards international standard setting, the violations of basic human rights are still the case on many parts of the globe. Similar to the weakness of other international regimes in general, this emerging body of international human rights regime still lacks effective and consistent enforcement mechanisms. In response to this picture, there is a growing belief that inclusion of human rights concerns into foreign policy making of individual states will contribute to the betterment of the status of human rights globally, especially to more effective implementation of the existing human rights regimes. Since progress toward fulfillment of human rights is to a large extent conditional upon the compliance of the states to the internationally agreed norms, in the absence of domestic dynamics for change, the external pressure put on the governments by the international community remains a suitable avenue available to advance human rights.
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Kardas 5 [Saban Kardas, Ph.D. Student University of Utah Department of Political Science, working paper no. 31, “Human Rights Policy and International Relations: Realist Foundations Reconsidered”, December 6, 2005, http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/working/2005/31-kardas-2005.pdf]
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promotion of human rights has increasingly assumed an international dimension Westphalian principles mentions human rights among the purposes of the organization, along with the maintenance of international peace and security the issues of human rights have found their way into international politics there norms and mechanisms as well as political instruments which regulate the governments’ treatment of their citizens Though very fragile, they provide a ground to put the domestic conduct of the governments under the scrutiny by individuals, domestic and international non-governmental organizations, other states and international organizations human rights—especially the violation of them- has become a legitimate concern to the international society, a process which has been provided with added impetus The end of the Cold War and the emerging international system were characterized by the increasing possibilities for international cooperation, especially at a time where destabilizing effects of the end of the Cold War have increased the need for international protection and promotion of human rights. Growing activities on the part of secessionist and nationalist movements created a growing need for the protection of human and particularly minority rights. Against this setting, the emerging multi-centric international system and a global wave of democratization have enabled human rights groups to mobilize liberal states and international organizations to incorporate the promotion of human rights into their agenda The Vienna Declaration stated that the protection and promotion of human rights is the primary responsibility of governments and a legitimate concern of the international community Although respect for human rights is a stated concern of the international community and an international system for protection of human rights has been set up, its implementation and enforcement is far from being effective the violations of basic human rights are still the case on many parts of the globe this emerging body of international human rights regime still lacks effective and consistent enforcement mechanisms
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The aff securitizes human rights—however government methods for solving it fail turning the case
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A critical security approach to human rights opens with a fundamental belief in the indivisibility of security and human rights. How does this ‘indivisibility’ play out in practice? The human security discourse would maintain, for example, that there can be no security for the individual if their right to life is being threatened by their government. Similarly, security is absent when an individual is denied the rights to subsistence, such as food, clothing and housing. If security is defined as protection from harm, then it is clear that the infringement of fundamental rights signifies the presence of insecurity.25 Just as its prescriptive orientation emphasizes indivisibility, the human security discourse recognizes the multidimensionality of the sources of harm. There are military and non-military producers of harm, national and transnational, private and public. Harm can be the outcome of intentional acts (employers using child labour) as well as unreflective acts (children in the West buying a football that has been manufactured by slave labour in India). Rights may be secured by one agent while simultaneously being threatened by another. For example, the citizens of a social democratic society may have all their human rights protected by the state, but that does not necessarily mean their community has security. It could, for example, have borders that are contiguous with a predatory state committed to an expansionist foreign policy. Another threat could be transnational and unintentional, such as that posed by high levels of radioactivity caused by an accident in a nuclear power station (for example, the disaster at Chernobyl). We would argue that the interdependence between security and human rights is at its strongest when the focus is upon what Henry Shue, and later R.J. Vincent, referred to as ‘basic rights’.26 ‘Security from violence’ and ‘subsistence’ were defined by Shue as the key basic rights. On the surface, this might seem to rely on a narrow definition of rights but we define subsistence as covering a range of economic and social rights (such as work, property, social security) while security from violence includes many civil and political rights (protection from torture, racial hatred, slavery and asylum).
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Dunne and Wheeler 4 [Tim Dunne, University of Exeter, UK, Nicholas J. Wheeler, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, “‘We the Peoples’: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice”, International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1, 9-23, http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1972/1/We%2520the%2520Peoples.pdf]
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A critical security approach to human rights opens with a fundamental belief in the indivisibility of security and human rights. How does this ‘indivisibility’ play out in practice? The human security discourse would maintain that there can be no security for the individual if their right to life is being threatened by their government security is absent when an individual is denied the rights to subsistence If security is defined as protection from harm, then it is clear that the infringement of fundamental rights signifies the presence of insecurity We would argue that the interdependence between security and human rights is at its strongest when the focus is upon basic rights’
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And this turns the case- security can never be achieved when ones’ rights are being threatened
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Yet while public diplomacy has historically operated as a mystifying smoke screen, for all its absurdities and contradictions, we cannot wish the term away. As Kennedy and Lucas demonstrate, public diplomacy is emerging as "a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order," arguably as prominent as it was during the cold war. If the resonances between the cold war and present-day public diplomacy are readily apparent, the differences are also striking. During the cold war, the government’s official disseminators of overseas propaganda, the United States Information Agency and the Voice of America, were for export only; it was illegal to distribute and broadcast their programs and bulletins within the United States. Yet today, Kennedy and Lucas argue, global media and technology have made public diplomacy an open communication forum. Any consideration of public diplomacy must take into account the greater difficulty of the U.S. government to separate the domestic public from overseas audiences for American propaganda. Moreover, if the state and civil society lines of cold war public diplomacy were often deliberately blurry, through technologies of the Internet and expanded corporate power, public diplomacy has taken on unprecedented shape-shifting characteristics. Halliburton, CNN, and Microsoft all circulate as "America" with more authority than state agencies. While the "fake news" of the Bush administration recently revealed by the New York Times has plenty of cold war precedents, such "public diplomacy," as the authors contend, is rendered at once "more global by communications technology but also more local by interventions in selected conflicts." For Kennedy and Lucas, these current efforts in public diplomacy, even more unaccountable and amorphous than their cold war predecessors, not only trace the contours of the new imperium, but they shape the conditions of knowledge production and the terrain on which American studies circulates. [End Page 337] The urgency of the authors’ questions about "the conditions of knowledge-formation and critical thinking…in the expanding networks of international and transnational political cultures" was impressed upon me when I recently spoke to a group of deans and directors of international study abroad programs. Most had worked in the field for nearly two decades. Many worked at underfunded institutions. As they contended with the retrenchment and possible collapse of their programs, two possible paths of salvation were presented to them. The first was partnership with countries entering the "competition" for the George W. Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge Corporation. The program, administered by the State Department, was established in 2003 ostensibly as a poverty reduction program through funding growth and development initiatives. Its funding priorities, as its critics have noted, are closely tied to U.S. security interests and do not favor the programs that would promote sustainability. Particularly jarring was the language of assessment used in the competitive application process. If "transparency" seems an ironic request from the secretive Bush administration, the standard of former adherence to World Bank and IMF dictates as a criterion of eligibility seemed an especially harsh case of tough love. The second possibility for funding dangled before the audience appeared even more sinister. The real money, a fund-raising expert told the gathering, is in the Gulf states. Don’t believe a thing you hear in the media, the educators were instructed, about how negatively people in the Middle East perceive Americans. Rest assured, the speaker continued, the moneyed elite from the Gulf states keenly desire degrees from American universities, and they can afford your tuition. At a moment when journalists and scholars are denied visas and entry into the country, making it impossible for many Middle Eastern scholars to attend the American Studies Association meeting (as occurred in 2004 to name just one example), knowledge production is indeed proceeding apace, as Kennedy and Lucas suggest, "by the new configurations of U.S. imperialism." Hence, one critical task for American studies scholars is to engage with the legacies of the institutional relationships between public diplomacy and American studies as a field, and the contemporary reshaping of these relationships in conditions not of our choosing. Kennedy and Lucas’s sobering portrait of the challenges faced by practitioners of American studies make all the more urgent their invocation of John Carlos Rowe’s call for the international field of American studies to devote its attention to the critical study of the circulation of America. Invoking Rowe, Kennedy and Lucas propose collaborations with related disciplines in a critical American studies. Such collaborations are crucial in the foregrounding and tracking of processes of U.S. empire, and offer an important alternative to [End Page 338] attempts to "internationalize" American studies that manifest themselves as a "distorted mirror of neoliberal enlargement." Following Kennedy and Lucas’s call for collaboration with other fields, I want to return to the story of Duke Ellington in Iraq as a means of decentering the "American" in critical American studies. I first want to emphasize the difficulty of constructing even the most rudimentary context for the story of Ellington in Iraq. Despite the fine work of such scholars as Douglas Little and Melani McAlister on the United States and the Middle East, along with excellent work by Iraqi specialists, it is an understatement to say that the story of Iraq has been very much on the periphery for Americanists interested in the global dimensions of U.S. power.6 Yet, when the Duke Ellington orchestra visited Iraq, the United States was already deeply implicated in the unfolding events in Iraq and the region. Not only had the Ellington band stumbled into the 1963 Iraqi crisis, but the experience reprised that of Dave Brubeck and his quartet, who had been in Iraq on the eve of the coup in 1958 that had brought Abd al-Karim Qassim to power. With surprising frequency, the State Department sent jazz musicians to tense situations in countries and regions that have been neglected by historians yet were constantly in the news as the U.S. went to war with Iraq in 2003. To mention only the examples from the Middle Eastern and adjoining states, in addition to Brubeck’s and Ellington’s Iraqi performances, Dizzy Gillespie toured Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1956; Dave Brubeck toured Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran in 1958; and Duke Ellington visited those same countries in 1963. The tumultuous history of U.S.–Iraqi relations simply vanishes in the still-dominant bipolar emphasis on U.S.–Soviet conflict. It drops out, as well, within the more neglected frame of anticolonialism. As Rashid Khalidi has pointed out, "there had never been a state, empire, or nation of Iraq before British statesmen created it in the wake of World War I."7 Yet if Iraq, along with other Gulf states, lacks the same history of colonization and decolonization shared by Asia and Africa, it remains a central terrain for contemporary struggles over who controls the resources of the formerly colonized world. If we, as Americanists, examine public diplomacy in this context of the consolidation of U.S. hegemony in its quest for control over resources, the work of specialists on Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and Latin America as well, where U.S. imperialism had long beleaguered formally independent states, will be crucial for such an endeavor. An account of U.S. public diplomacy and empire in Iraq can be constructed only through engaging fields outside the sphere of American studies. Political scientist Mahmood Mamdani locates the roots of the current global crisis in [End Page 339] U.S. cold war policies. Focusing on the proxy wars of the later cold war that led to CIA support of Osama Bin Laden and drew Iraq and Saddam Hussein into the U.S. orbit as allies against the Iranians, Mamdani also reminds us of disrupted democratic projects and of the arming and destabilization of Africa and the Middle East by the superpowers, reaching back to the 1953 CIA-backed coup ousting Mussadeq in Iran and the tyrannical rule of Idi Amin in Uganda. For Mamdani, the roots of contemporary terrorism must be located in politics, not the "culture" of Islam. Along with the work of Tariq Ali and Rashid Khalidi, Mamdani’s account of the post–1945 world takes us through those places where U.S. policy has supported and armed military dictatorships, as in Pakistan and Iraq, or intervened clandestinely, from Iraq and throughout the Middle East to Afghanistan and the Congo. For these scholars, these events belong at the center of twentieth-century history, rather than on the periphery, with interventions and coups portrayed as unfortunate anomalies. These scholars provide a critical history for what otherwise is posed as an "Islamic threat," placing the current prominence of Pakistan in the context of its longtime support from the United States as a countervailing force against India.8 Stretching across multiple regions, but just as crucial for reading U.S. military practices in Iraq, Yoko Fukumura and Martha Matsuoka’s "Redefining Security: Okinawa Women’s Resistance to U.S. Militarism" reveals the human and environmental destruction wrought by U.S. military bases in Asia through the living archive of activists who are demanding redress of the toxic contamination and violence against women endemic to base communities.9 Attention to the development of exploitative and violent sex industries allows us to place such recent horrors as the abuse, torture, and debasement at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in a history of military practices.10 Taken together, these works are exemplary, inviting us to revisit the imposition of U.S. power in East and South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, regions where the instrumental role of U.S. power in the creation of undemocratic military regimes has often been overlooked. That none of these works has been produced by scholars who were trained in American studies is perhaps not accidental, but rather symptomatic of a field still shaped by insularity despite increasing and trenchant critiques of this insularity by such American studies scholars as Amy Kaplan and John Carlos Rowe.11 In recommending that American studies scholars collaborate with those in other fields and areas of study and by articulating warnings about how easily attempts to "internationalize" can hurtle down the slippery slope of neoliberal expansion, Kennedy and Lucas join such scholars in furthering the project of viewing U.S. hegemony from the outside in. They [End Page 340] expose the insularity that has been an abiding feature of U.S. politics and public discourse.
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Eschen 5 [Penny Von Eschen, Associate Prof of History at UMich, 2005, “Enduring Public Diplomacy,” American Quarterly 57.2 pg. 335-343. Muse]
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public diplomacy has historically operated as a mystifying smoke screen Kennedy and Lucas demonstrate, public diplomacy is emerging as "a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order public diplomacy has taken on unprecedented shape-shifting characteristics. Halliburton, CNN, and Microsoft all circulate as "America" with more authority than state agencies current efforts not only trace the contours of the new imperium, but they shape the conditions of knowledge production and the terrain on which American studies circulates a moment when journalists and scholars are denied visas and entry into the country, making it impossible for Middle Eastern scholars to attend the American Studies Association meeting knowledge production is proceeding apace by the new configurations of U.S. imperialism one critical task for scholars is to engage with the legacies of the institutional relationships between public diplomacy and American studies as a field, and the contemporary reshaping of these relationships in conditions not of our choosing If we examine public diplomacy in this context of the consolidation of hegemony in its quest for control over resources attempts to "internationalize" can hurtle down the slippery slope of neoliberal expansion, Kennedy and Lucas join such scholars in furthering the project of viewing U.S. hegemony from the outside in. They expose the insularity that has been an abiding feature of U.S. politics and public discourse.
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Soft power is a realist tool used to justify transforming an unstable world to mirror our interests
| 10,953 | 99 | 1,528 | 1,697 | 17 | 228 | 0.010018 | 0.134355 |
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The neoconservative case for American power, as set forth in the Project for a New American Century, is a straightforward geopolitical argument alongside a Wilsonian argument for ‘benevolent global hegemony’ to spread democracy. The former is relatively easy to deal with; since it does not claim legitimacy it is plain geopolitics. The latter dominates in policy speeches and is a harder nut to crack because it resonates with a wider constituency that shares the liberal case for hegemony. Many liberals (not only Americans) also endorse strong American power. According to Michael Ignatieff, it is the ‘lesser evil’ (2004). According to Paul Berman, in response to terrorism war is just (2003). It resonates with a long standing idea that spreading democracy is an ‘American mission’ (Smith, 1994).
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Pieterse 7—Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) [“Political and Economic Brinkmanship,” Review of International Political Economy 14: 3 p 467-468]
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The neoconservative case for American power is a straightforward geopolitical argument alongside a Wilsonian argument for ‘benevolent global hegemony’ The latter dominates in policy speeches and is a harder nut to crack because it resonates with a wider constituency that shares the liberal case for hegemony It resonates with a long standing idea that spreading democracy is an ‘American mission’
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We must be especially critical of couching hegemony in liberal terms. The hidden transcript of american security elites creates imperialist and devstating outcomes.
| 801 | 165 | 397 | 126 | 23 | 60 | 0.18254 | 0.47619 |
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American military posture and action on the ground, then, do not merely fail to implement a well intentioned project because the real world is messy and chaotic, but are in fundamental respects designed to achieve the reverse of the liberal mission. Real time hegemonic operations are schizophrenic double acts: establishing order while following a ‘politics of tension’. The security institutions are layered in formal and informal cultures and overt and covert operations (Baer, 2003). Liberal hegemony is about bringing stability while security insiders may be concerned with producing instability as part of a strategy of tension.
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Pieterse 7—Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) [“Political and Economic Brinkmanship,” Review of International Political Economy 14: 3 p 474]
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American military posture and action on the ground, then, do not merely fail to implement a well intentioned project because the real world is messy but are in fundamental respects designed to achieve the reverse of the liberal mission. Real time hegemonic operations are schizophrenic double acts establishing order while following a ‘politics of tension’. The security institutions are layered in formal and informal cultures and overt and covert operations Liberal hegemony is about bringing stability while security insiders may be concerned with producing instability as part of a strategy of tension
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Liberal intention to use hegemony for awesome produces neoconservative results
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Members of the Bush Administration are fond of drawing analogies between the America of the early cold war and the America of the present, especially to emphasize the material preponderance of the United States at both historical moments and to underline the special responsibility that the nation bore and continues to bear in the execution of its power.65 Yet, even as the U.S. government promotes the assumption that "public diplomacy helped win the cold war, and it has the potential to win the war on terror," it has established a framework for the waging of the contemporary battle that is very different from that promoted fifty years ago.66 In both instances, a "war of ideas" is evoked to frame a bipolar clash of civilizations and promote a national ideal of liberal democracy, yet the combination of value and security in each instance is shaped by different geostrategic frameworks of "national security." During the cold war the (publicly stated) regulatory paradigm was that of "containment," which functioned to segment publics and information; in the war on terror the leading paradigm is "integration," which seeks to draw publics into an American designed "zone of peace." The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that "ridding the world of terrorism is essential to a broader purpose. We strive to build an international order where more countries and peoples are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with our partners."67 Both paradigms, however, conceal strategic tensions. For many inside and outside U.S. administrations in the 1950s, containment pointed toward coexistence with the Soviet bloc and its captive peoples, precluding the extension of freedom through "liberation." For many inside and outside the current administration, "integration" does not provide a solution for long-term war with rogue states and tyrants, a war that has to be waged by and for a U.S. "preponderance of power."
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Kennedy and Lucas 5—Liam Kennedy, American Studies @ University College (Dublin) and Scott Lucas, American Studies @ Birmingham [“Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy,” American Quarterly 57.2 MUSE]
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a "war of ideas" is evoked to frame a bipolar clash of civilizations and promote a national ideal of liberal democracy, yet the combination of value and security in each instance is shaped by different geostrategic frameworks of "national security." During the cold war the (publicly stated) regulatory paradigm was that of "containment," which functioned to segment publics in the war on terror the leading paradigm is "integration," which seeks to draw publics into an American designed "zone of peace
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Soft power and integration are just the flip side of the brutality of imperial containment and security.
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And where, again, does this power for benevolent goodwill reside? In the post-war period, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it is the United States that sees itself increasingly as the vanguard of human emancipation, John Winthrop's 'city upon a hill'. This is also its rightful place, having emerged from a unique tradition (political, social, cultural and religious), which has brought it to its current position of freedom and leadership. And so it is the US, sometimes in the guise of multilateralism, most recently not as much, that exercises the most power globally. The liberal, democratic-capitalist political system is triumphant. How, then, does one interrogate American intervention in the world according to its own standards? How does one hold the US accountable precisely for the goodwill it professes? Can the US hold itself accountable in any meaningful sense?
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Shaikh 7—Nermeen Shaikh, @ Asia Source [Development 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” palgrave-journals]
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it is the U S that sees itself as the vanguard of human emancipation And so it is the US in the guise of multilateralism, that exercises the most power globally. The liberal, democratic-capitalist political system is triumphant Can the US hold itself accountable in any meaningful sense
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Benign imperialism—faith in moderate multilateralism prevents questioning imperial domination.
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The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US slate means that it is critically important to analyse the research output from key experts within the community. This is particularly the case because of the aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism ‘knowledge’ generated by academic experts. Running throughout the core literature is a positivist assumption, explicitly slated or otherwise, that the research conducted is apolitical and objective (see for example, Hoffman. 1992: 27; Wilkinson. 2003). There is little to no reflexivity on behalf of the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. This relocation of academic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a manner which privileges their nonpartisan input: Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism in the Middle East…It has been the Terrorism Panel’s practice, in the interests of objectivity and gathering all the facts, to pair classified briefings and open briefings…This way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and other institutions... (Saxton, 2000, emphasis added) The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent’ and as providing ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’ has significance for its contribution to the policymaking process in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core experts lend to insulate the broad direction of US policy from critique. Indeed, as Alexander George noted, it is precisely because ‘they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and scholarship’ that expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’ the claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77). Given this, it becomes vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman, 1982; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky, 1991; George, 1991b; Jackson, 2007g), this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. Examining this aspect of research is important, given that the ‘threat’ from this form of terrorism has led the US and its allies to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security, with profound consequences for the human security of people in the region. Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise much of the field’s research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply replicate official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated primarily through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources, combined with the frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to insulate from critique those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. In particular, the experts overwhelmingly ‘silence’ the way terrorism is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions in the South. That is. ‘counterterrorism’ campaigns executed or supported by Washington often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl, 2006: 18-19). These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter the illusion of ‘objectivity’. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particular ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various ‘war(s) on terror’. After setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US slate.
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Raphael 9 [Sam, IR, Kingston University, Critical terrorism studies, ed. Richard Jackson, 50-51] ellipses in original
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the aura of objectivity surrounding terrorism ‘knowledge’ generated by experts Running throughout the literature is a positivist assumption that the research is apolitical and objective There is little to no reflexivity on behalf of the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism This relocation of academic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power who distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent’ has significance for policymaking in the US experts insulate direction of US policy from critique precisely because ‘they clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity that expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’ the claims made by US policymakers given that the ‘threat’ from terrorism has led the US to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security, with profound consequences for the human security claims made by key terrorism experts simply replicate official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated primarily through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources, combined with the frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. the field tends to insulate from critique those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. experts ‘silence’ the way terrorism is used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions ‘counterterrorism’ campaigns deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence the core figures in terrorism studies shatter the illusion of ‘objectivity the research can be seen to serve a very particular ideological function for US foreign policy. it served the interests of US power through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions under the rubric of war(s) on terror’
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Aff terror claims are neither objective or true—dominant experts rely on politicized research, policymakers exclude critique for political motives and limit the sources of knowledge experts use
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Employing a discourse analytic approach, this paper examines the silence on state terrorism within the mainstream terrorism studies literature. An analysis of more than a hundred academic texts on terrorism, many by established ‘terrorism experts’, reveals that state terrorism is noticeable mainly for its absence. In some cases, state terrorism is simply defined out of the analysis by the employment of an actor-based definition: terrorism, it is argued, is a kind of violence performed solely by non-state actors. In other cases, the possibility of state terrorism is acknowledged but is then given a cursory treatment or simply ignored as a serious subject of research. Following this textual analysis, the main finding—the silence on state terrorism within terrorism studies—is subjected to both a first and second order critique. A first order or immanent critique uses a discourse’s internal contradictions, mistakes and misconceptions to criticise it on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. In this case, the absence of state terrorism is criticized for its illogical actor-based definition of terrorism, its politically biased research focus and its failure to acknowledge the empirical evidence of the extent and nature of state terrorism, particularly that practiced by Western liberal states and their allies. A second order critique entails reflecting on the broader political and ethical consequences—the ideological effects—of the representations enabled by the discourse, and the ways in which the discourse functions as a political technology. It is argued that the absence of state terrorism from academic discourse functions to promote particular kinds of state hegemonic projects, construct a legitimizing public discourse for foreign and domestic policy, and deflect attention from the terroristic practices by Western states and their allies. Importantly, the exposure and destabilisation of this dominant terrorism knowledge opens up critical space for the articulation of alternative and potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice. Introduction Terrorism studies, once a fairly minor sub-field of security studies, has now expanded to become a stand-alone field with its own dedicated journals, research centres, leading scholars and experts, research funding opportunities, conferences, seminars, and study programmes. It is in fact, one of the fastest expanding areas of research in the English-speaking academic world, with literally thousands of new books and articles published over the past few years,1 significant investment in terrorism-related research projects, and increasing numbers of postgraduate dissertations and undergraduate students.2 A perennial criticism of this voluminous output however, has been the neglect of ‘state terrorism’ as a subject for systematic and sustained research, a problem noted during the Cold War but which seems to have become even more acute since September, 2001.3 To many observers this neglect is somewhat puzzling given that the genealogy of the term ‘terrorism’ has its earliest roots in the deployment of violence by states to terrify and intimidate civilian populations, states have employed terrorism far more extensively than non-state actors over the past two centuries, state terrorism is far more lethal and destructive than non-state terrorism and the employment of terror against civilians by states continues unabated in a great many countries today. The purpose of this paper is to explore this puzzle through the prism of discourse analysis, a form of critical theorising aimed in part at understanding and describing the relationship between knowledge, power, and politics. Taking as its starting point that knowledge and its production is never a purely neutral exercise but always works for someone and for something, this paper seeks to excavate the ideological effects of the discourse on state terrorism (or, more accurately, the silence within the discourse) in the terrorism studies field. It argues that the way in which state terrorism is constructed as a (non)subject both distorts the field as an area of scholarly research, and more importantly, reifies dominant structures of power and enables particular kinds of elite and state hegemonic projects. The argument proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I briefly outline the methodological approach employed in the analysis. This is followed by a discussion of the main findings of the discourse analysis—a description of the ways in which the subject of state terrorism is (and is not) discursively constructed and deployed within the broader terrorism studies literature. The third section subjects these findings to a first and second order critique as a means of exploring the effects of the discourse on knowledge, power and politics. Specifically, I deconstruct and dismiss the most common arguments for not including state terrorism as a valid object of study within the field of study, as well as illuminate and describe the political and ideological effects of its non-inclusion. Finally, in the conclusion to the paper, I argue that there are important analytical and normative reasons for taking state terrorism seriously and incorporating its systematic analysis into existing research programmes. Analysing the Discourse of State Terrorism As stated above, the analytical approach employed in this study falls broadly under the mantle of discourse analysis.4 A form of critical theorising, discourse analysis aims primarily to illustrate and describe the relationship between textual and social and political processes. In particular, it is concerned with the politics of representation—the manifest political or ideological consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another. In this case, I am concerned with the ways in which state terrorism is represented—or not represented, which is itself a kind of representation—as a subject within the field of terrorism studies. Although discourse theorising is employed within a range of different epistemological paradigms—poststructuralist, postmodernist, feminist, and social constructivist—it is predicated on a shared set of theoretical commitments. Broadly speaking, these include:5 an understanding of language as constitutive or productive of meaning; an understanding of discourse as structures of signification which construct social realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational positions within a system of signification;6 an understanding of discourse as being productive of subjects authorised to speak and act, legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices and importantly, common sense within particular social groups and historical settings; an understanding of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of representation; and an understanding of discourse as historically and culturally contingent, inter-textual, open-ended, requiring continuous articulation and re-articulation and therefore, open to destabilisation and counter-hegemonic struggle. On this epistemological foundation and adopting an interpretive logic rather than a causal logic, the discourse analytic technique employed in this paper proceeded in two main stages. The first stage entailed an examination of a large number of texts from within the terrorism studies field.7 As such, the primary units of analysis or ‘data’ for this research were more than 100 mainstream academic books, articles in the main terrorism studies and international relations journals, conference papers presented at ISA and APSA, and reports and websites from think-tanks and research institutions. Each text was examined initially to see if it contained the terms ‘state terrorism’ or ‘state terror’. Texts that did contain these terms were then examined to see how they were constructed as a discursive formation and subject of knowledge, how they were deployed within broader narratives, and how state terrorism was positioned as a subject in relation to non-state terrorism. Employing a ‘grounded theory’ approach, the analysis was considered complete when the addition of new texts did not yield any new insights or categories. The second stage of the research involved subjecting the findings of the textual analysis to both a first and second order critique. A first order or immanent critique uses a discourse’s internal contradictions, mistakes, misconceptions, and omissions to criticise it on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. The point of this form of internal critique is not necessarily to establish the ‘correct’ or ‘real truth’ of the subject beyond doubt, but rather to destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the inherently contested and political nature of the discourse. A second order critique entails reflecting on the broader political and ethical consequences—the ideological effects—of the representations and more importantly in this case, the silences, enabled by the discourse. Specifically, it involves an exploration of the ways in which the discourse functions as a ‘symbolic technology’8 that can be wielded by particular elites and institutions, to: structure the primary subject positions, accepted knowledge, commonsense and legitimate policy responses to the actors and events being described; exclude and de-legitimise alternative knowledge and practice; naturalise a particular political and social order; and construct and sustain a hegemonic regime of truth. A range of specific discourse analytic techniques are useful in second order critique: genealogical analysis, predicate analysis, narrative analysis, and deconstructive analysis.9 It is crucial to recognise that discourses are significant not just for what they say but also for what they do not say; the silences in a discourse can be as important, or even more important at times, than what is openly stated. This is because silence can function ideologically in any number of ways. For example, silence can be a deliberate means of distraction or misdirection from uncomfortable subjects or contrasting viewpoints, the suppression or de-legitimisation of alternative forms of knowledge or values, the tacit endorsement of particular kinds of practices, setting the boundaries of legitimate knowledge, or as a kind of disciplining process directed against certain actors—among others. In other words, the silences within a text often function as an exercise in power; revealing and interrogating those silences therefore, is an important part of first and second order critique. Lastly, it is important to note that when we examine a discourse as a broad form of knowledge and practice, it is never completely uniform, coherent, or consistent; it always has porous borders and often contains multiple exceptions, inconsistencies, and contradictions by different speakers and texts. Many of the terrorism scholars discussed in this paper for example, upon a close reading of their individual texts, often express more nuanced arguments than are necessarily presented here. The important point is not that each text or scholar can be characterised in the same uniform way, or even that these scholars agree on a broad set of knowledge claims. It is rather, that taken together as a broader discourse and a body of work that has political and cultural currency, the narratives and forms of the discourse function to construct and maintain a specific understanding of, and approach to, ‘terrorism’ and ‘state terrorism’ and that this knowledge has certain political and social effects.
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Jackson 8 [Richard Jackson, IR, Aberystwyth University PhD, University of Canterbury, “The Ghosts of State Terror,” 2008, http://users.aber.ac.uk/mys/csrv/ghost%20of%20state%20terror-richard%205.pdf]
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terrorism, it is argued, is performed solely by non-state actors critique expose the perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address the absence of state terrorism is criticized for its illogical actor-based definition of terrorism, its politically biased research focus and its failure to acknowledge the empirical evidence of the extent of state terrorism, practiced by Western states critique entails reflecting on the broader political and ethical consequences of the representations enabled by the discourse, and the ways in which the discourse functions as a political technology the absence of state terrorism from discourse functions to promote particular kinds of state hegemonic projects construct a legitimizing public discourse for foreign and domestic policy and deflect attention from the terroristic practices by Western states the exposure of this dominant terrorism knowledge opens up critical space for the articulation of alternative emancipatory forms of knowledge knowledge is never a purely neutral exercise but always works for someone and for something, this paper seeks to excavate the ideological effects of the discourse in the terrorism studies field the way in which state terrorism is constructed as a (non)subject both distorts the field and reifies dominant structures of power and enables particular kinds of elite and state hegemonic projects. critical theorising is concerned with the politics of representation the manifest political or ideological consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another I am concerned with the ways in which state terrorism is represented—or not represented, which is itself a kind of representation discourse construct social realities particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational positions within a system of signification discourse legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices an understanding of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of representation critique destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the political nature of the discourse critique entails reflecting on the broader consequences— of the representations and the silences, enabled by the discourse it involves an exploration of the ways in which the discourse functions as a ‘symbolic technology that can be wielded by elites to structure accepted knowledge and legitimate policy responses de-legitimise alternative knowledge naturalise a particular social order; and construct hegemonic regime of truth silences can be more important than what is openly stated. silence can be , the suppression of alternative forms of knowledge or as a kind of disciplining silences function as an exercise in power interrogating those silences is an important part of critique when we examine a discourse as a broad form of knowledge it is never completely uniform terrorism scholars for example, express more nuanced arguments than are necessarily presented here The important point is not that each text scholar can be characterised in the same uniform way It is rather, that taken together as a broader discourse and a body of work that has political and cultural currency, the narratives and forms of the discourse function to construct and maintain a specific understanding of, and approach to, ‘terrorism’ and that this knowledge has certain political and social effects
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Terror discourse constructs dominant knowledge projects that shape policy—this excludes alternate forms of knowledge—terror discourse has broader political currency which must be interrogated
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Each of these critiques goes some way to explain the shortcomings in ‘terrorism research’, although the argument that funding is not available for projects critical of the status quo is perhaps overstated.30 It will always be difficult to obtain reliable data on clandestine violence, so that scholars will inevitably be tempted to draw heavily on secondary sources or build elaborate theories on very little, and often dubious, information.31 Equally, given prevailing power structures, the embeddednes of researchers within them, and the shock that terroristic tactics typically seek to induce, it will arguably always be tempting to demonize the ‘terrorist other’. However, what most of the critiques overlook is the crucial fact that, beyond these inherent difficulties, many of the observed shortcomings can be traced back to the dominance in ‘terrorism research’ of what Robert Cox famously called a ‘problem-solving’ approach: one that ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’.32 This is not to say that ‘terrorism research’ has been devoid of ‘critical’ voices, if ‘critical’ is defined, with Cox, as ‘not tak[ing] institutions and social and power relations for granted but call[ing] them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing’,33 and, significantly, exploring the extent to which the status quo contributes to the ‘problem of terrorism’. Crelinsten, who takes an explicitly ‘critical’ approach,34 is a long-standing member of the editorial board of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence, as are Weinberg and Crenshaw, who are ‘critical’ in the (loose) sense of problematizing existing dichotomies, historicizing political violence and moving beyond a state-centric security approach.35 Silke, Horgan, Schmid and Jongman can also be considered ‘critical’ in that they are explicitly self-reflexive about assumptions, methodologies and the shortcomings of ‘terrorism research’.36 However, if we consider the typical characteristics of a ‘problemsolving’ or ‘traditional’ approach,37 we find that many of these both dominate ‘terrorism research’ (including many of the contributions of Silke’s ‘one-timers’)38 and can be directly linked to the shortcomings witnessed in this research. In its most ‘uncritical’ manifestation – and it must be emphasised that few scholars are wholly uncritical in a Coxian sense – a ‘problem-solving’ approach does not question its framework of reference, its categories, its origins or the power relations that enable the production of these categories.39 It is statecentric, takes security to mean the security of the state rather than that of human beings, on the assumption that the former implies the latter, and sees security in narrow military or law-and-order terms, as opposed to the wider conception of human security, as for instance developed by critical security studies.40 It is ahistorical and ignores social and historical contexts; if it did not, it would have to account for the historical trajectory of the state, which would undermine the state’s claim to being uniquely legitimate. The problem-solving approach is positivist and objectivist, and seeks to explain the ‘terrorist other’ from within state-centric paradigms rather than to understand the ‘other’ inter-subjectively using interpretative or ethnographic methods. It divides the world sharply into dichotomies (for instance, between the legitimate and ‘good’ state, and the illegitimate and ‘evil’ ‘terrorists’). It posits assumptions based on these dichotomies, often without adequately exploring whether these assumptions are borne out in practice. It sees interests as fixed, and it regards those opposed to the status quo as the problem, without considering whether the status quo is part of the problem and transformation of both sides is necessary for its solution. Not only can many of these characteristics be found in more or less diluted form in ‘terrorism research’41 – a legacy of the field’s origins as a sub-field within ‘traditional’ security and strategic studies – but these ‘problem-solving’ characteristics can also be shown to contribute directly to its observed shortcomings. The reported lack of primary data, the dearth of interviews with ‘terrorists’ and the field’s typical unwillingness to ‘engage subjectively with [the terrorist’s] motives’,42 is in part fuelled by the field’s over-identification with the state, and by the adoption of dichotomies that depict ‘terrorism’ as ‘an unredeemable atrocity like no other’, that can only be approached ‘with a heavy dose of moral indignation’, although other factors, such as security concerns, play a role too.43 Talking with ‘terrorists’ thus becomes taboo, unless it is done in the context of interrogation.44 Such a framework also makes it difficult to enquire whether the state has used ‘terroristic’ methods. If the state is the primary referent, securing its security the main focus and its hegemonic ideology the accepted framework of analysis, ‘terrorism’, particularly if defined in sharp dichotomies between legitimate and illegitimate, can only be logically perpetrated by insurgents against the state, not by state actors themselves. State actors are engaged in counterterrorism, which is logically depicted as legitimate, or at least, ‘justifiable’ given the ‘terrorist threat’ and the field’s focus on shortterm ‘problem-solving’. Where ‘traditional terrorism studies’ do focus on state terrorism, it is in the context of the ‘other’: the authoritarian or totalitarian state that is the nemesis if not the actual ‘enemy’ of the liberal democratic state.45 The observed disregard for historical context and wider sociopolitical dynamics46 can similarly be traced to the ahistorical propensity of ‘problem-solving’ approaches and their state-centric understanding of security. The typical focus is thus on violent acts against the state, and the immediate ‘terrorist’ campaign, not on how these acts relate to a wider constituency and its perception of human security, history and the state, or what role the evolution of the state has played in creating the conditions for oppositional violence.47 The lack of critical and theoretical reflection48 can be linked to the ‘problem-solving’ tendency to be short-termist and practical, and to deal in fixed categories and dichotomies that privilege the state and its dominant ideological values. From such a standpoint, scholars would not readily explore how ‘terrorism’ discourse is produced and how it is used to marginalize alternative conceptions, discredit oppositional groups, and legitimize counter-terrorism policies that transgress international law.49 Nor would they be particularly likely to consider how the development of the modern state or the international system might have contributed to the evolution of ‘terrorism’, or how theories of the state and the international system can help illuminate the ‘terrorism’ phenomenon. Drawing on cognate theories more broadly is similarly discouraged since ‘terrorism’ is framed as an exceptional threat, unique and in urgent need of a practical solution.50 The state-centricity, inflexibility and dichotomous nature of such a framework also makes it easier to recycle unproven assumptions, such as the notion that ‘religious terrorism’ is not concerned with constituencies and knows no tactical constraints against killing ‘infidels’, 51 without having to test these assumptions empirically across different samples. It thus becomes possible to argue, for instance, that negotiating with ‘terrorists’ encourages further ‘terrorism’ without need for empirical proof – a point already observed by Martha Crenshaw in 198352 – or to insist that ‘terrorists’ inherently lack legitimacy without reflection on whether the state lacks legitimacy in the experience of those who support the ‘terrorists’.53 The combined result of these tendencies is often a less than critical support (whether tacit or explicit) for coercive counterterrorism policy without adequate analysis of how this policy contributes to the reproduction of the very terrorist threat it seeks to eradicate.
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Gunning 7—Joroen Gunning, Deputy Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence @ Aberystywh (Wales) [“Government and Opposition”, Blackwell Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, p. 369-375]
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scholars will inevitably be tempted to draw heavily on secondary sources or build elaborate theories on very little dubious, information prevailing power structures, the embeddednes of researchers within them, and the shock that terroristic tactics typically seek to induce, it will always be tempting to demonize the ‘terrorist other’ shortcomings can be traced back to the dominance in ‘terrorism research’ of a ‘problem-solving’ approach: one that ‘takes the world as it finds as the given framework for action’ It is statecentric, takes security to mean the security of the state rather than that of human beings and sees security in narrow military or law-and-order terms, as opposed to the wider conception of human security It is ahistorical and ignores social and historical contexts; if it did not, it would have to account for the historical trajectory of the state, which would undermine the state’s claim to being uniquely legitimate The problem-solving approach is positivist and objectivist, and seeks to explain the ‘terrorist other’ from within state-centric paradigms rather than to understand the ‘other’ inter-subjectively using interpretative or ethnographic methods. It divides the world sharply into dichotomies tween the legitimate and ‘good’ state, and the illegitimate and ‘evil’ ‘terrorists these ‘problem-solving’ characteristics can also be shown to contribute directly to its observed shortcomings. The reported lack of primary data the dearth of interviews and the field’s typical unwillingness to ‘engage subjectively with motives’, State actors are engaged in counterterrorism, which is logically depicted as legitimate, or at least, ‘justifiable’ given the ‘terrorist threat’ and the field’s focus on shortterm ‘problem-solving’ The lack of critical and theoretical reflection can be linked to the ‘problem-solving’ tendency to be short-termist and practical, and to deal in fixed categories and dichotomies that privilege the state and its dominant ideological values The state-centricity, inflexibility and dichotomous nature of such a framework also makes it easier to recycle unproven assumptions, such as the notion that ‘religious terrorism’ is not concerned with constituencies and knows no tactical constraints against killing ‘infidels’ without having to test these assumptions empirically across different samples The result of these tendencies is support for coercive counterterrorism policy without adequate analysis of how this policy contributes to the reproduction of the very terrorist threat it seeks to eradicate
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Discourse of terrorism in IR constructs the world in absolute dichotomies between legitimate state violence and illegitimate political violence. The problem-solving policy approach of this type of knowledge reproduces the issues that drive the violence responsible for the aff impacts.
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From this perspective, it is irrelevant to discuss whether the Middle East should be regarded as a region like all the others, as it is the case in the IR mainstream, or as a region like no other, as the essentialists would claim. Rather, regions should be seen as social constructions that are produced through specific discursive practices just like the international system and its various actors. Instead of discussing what the Middle East is, the relational conception of culture regards the Middle East as an imaginary region, where, first and foremost, it is important to focus on how the Middle East has been constructed through discursive practices and how this has extensive consequences on its international relations.
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Valbjørn 4—Morten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus [Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict, “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 63-4]
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it is important to focus on how the Middle East has been constructed through discursive practices and how this has extensive consequences on its international relations
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The discourse of Middle Eastern instability upholds orientalist hierarchies. They construct a peaceful west versus an irrational and unstable east.
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A major methodological problem in the study of Western images of the non-Western other is how precisely such images surface in discourse. Much post-structuralist theorizing, preeminently concerned with texts and self--other contrasts, pays scant attention to the concrete manifestations of images as they are evoked, negotiated, and adapted in talk and in writing. In the modern media, self-other divides cannot be taken for granted. Powerful as they are, such divides are not immune to interrogation and challenge; in fact, their viability partially depends on their adaptive capacity in the face of new arguments and new developments. Critical discourse analysis is an approach intended to reveal the subtle linguistic re-creation and negotiation of self-other oppositions against a background of commonsense reasonings. In following one strand of this tradition, I will inquire here into the workings of a set of metaphors commonly brought into association with the Arab-Islamic world. Since the 1970S regular media hypes about the dangers of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and (nuclear) war have suggested the Middle East to be a 'powder keg' where problems are 'explosive', or a 'volcano' where crises reach a 'boiling point'. In associating the domains of physics and nature with a political situation, these crisis metaphors give expression to a fear of a Middle East out of control.
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Teffelen 95—Toine van Teffelen, Prof. in Discourse Analysis @ Birzeit Univ [The Decolonization of imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Power, p. 113-8]
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media hypes about the dangers of fundamentalism and (nuclear) war have suggested the Middle East to be a 'powder keg' where crises reach a 'boiling point' these crisis metaphors give expression to a fear of a Middle East out of control
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Crisis representations of the Middle East naturalize imperialist orientalism. They depict the West as a rational source of security and oriental others as irrational, dangerous, and in need of intervention.
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The political economies of contemporary conflicts have also been the object of analyses influenced by critical theory and post-structuralism. Mark Duffield, in particular, has identified shadow trade in the developed world as a form of really existing development taking place outside the formal structures of the global economy, from which large parts remain excluded. Much of this literature has also emphasized the need to distinguish between different kinds of economies that exist in the same environment, for instance the combat economy of the warlords, the shadow economy of the mafiosi and the coping economy of ordinary citizens (Pugh, Cooper & Goodhand, 2004). A key feature in this work, however, has been a concern with the way in which weak and failed states have been incorporated into a discourse that has re-inscribed underdevelopment as the source of multiple instabilities for the developed world – what Luke & Ó Tuathail (1997) term ‘the virus of disorder’. Duffield’s work, in particular, has identified the processes by which the securitization of underdevelopment has underpinned the new ‘liberal peace’ aid paradigm, centred around the restoration of order through the application of neoliberalism and the formal accoutrements of democracy and civil (but not economic) rights (Duffield, 2001). Indeed, for Duffield, development has become a form of biopolitics concerned with addressing the putative threats posed to effective states by transborder migratory flows, shadow economies, illicit networks and the global insurgent networks of ineffective states (Duffield, 2005). And, in contrast to the Cold War, the geopolitics of effective states is concerned less with arming Third World allies and more with transforming the populations inside ineffective states. In this view, development represents a ‘security mechanism that attempts through poverty reduction, conditional debt cancellation and selective funding to insulate [developed] mass society from the permanent crisis on its borders’ (Duffield, 2005: 157).
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Cooper 5—Neil Cooper, Peace Studies @ Bradford [“Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy” Security Dialogue 36 (4) p. 471]
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Much of this literature has also emphasized the need to distinguish between the combat economy of the warlords and the coping economy of ordinary citizens A key feature in this work, however, has been a concern with the way in which weak and failed states have been incorporated into a discourse that has re-inscribed underdevelopment as the source of multiple instabilities for the developed world ‘the virus of disorder’ the processes by which the securitization of underdevelopment has underpinned the new ‘liberal peace’ aid paradigm, centred around the restoration of order through the application of formal accoutrements of democracy and civil (but not economic) rights development has become a form of biopolitics concerned with addressing the putative threats posed to effective states development represents a ‘security mechanism that attempts through selective funding to insulate [developed] mass society from the permanent crisis on its borders’
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Failed state discourse frames the Global South as the source of violence. This colonizes our understanding of international society with demonized stereotypes that justify oppression.
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Abu Nasr Farabi expressed a comparably sceptical view of scientific determinism when he argued that ‘every demonstration is . . . the cause of the scientific knowledge acquired thereby, but not all demonstration conveys the knowledge of the cause of the thing’s existence’.4 Although I am oversimplifying, it is probably correct to say that the ultimate argument of both men is that one must not presume that there exists a sphere of human relations that is somehow detached from a manufactured context—historical, economic, philosophical, traditional, ideational, political or other. All human facts, Gadamer and Farabi agree, are invented, objectified, internalised and ultimately introjected.5 Although this brief sketch may make the ideas of both thinkers appear commonsensical enough to accept, we too often continue to assume that facts are somehow detached from a manufactured context, that they exist on their own without a historical background and ontological present signifying them.6 Notions of unchangeable laws of nature or a-historical continuity constrain our capacity for understanding that facts are socially engineered, that they are elastic, relative, differentiated.7 To some ‘postmodern’ and ‘critical theorists’, this may seem unchallengeable. But if we switch our focus away from these approaches to the reality of contemporary international relations studies in general, and to analyses of West Asia in particular, we see that the majority of scholars take ‘facts’ for granted, that they fail to focus on the social engineering of world politics.8 One serious consequence of the absence of critical approaches in my empirical field of study is that the image of Iran as a country in the grip of enigmatic, hostile revolutionaries led by intransigent, retroactive Mullahs is surprisingly salient. Part of the problem, I will argue in the following paragraphs, is that the Islamic Republic has occupied a prominent place in the imagination of influential neo-conservative strategists with direct links to the decision-making process in Washington and immense resources to influence the public discourse in the USA.9 Together with their allies in the Likud party in Israel (some of them are now members of Kadima), that neo-conservative coterie has manufactured an image of Iran which has made the country’s ‘irrational nature’ an established fact among influential strata of international society.10 The missing link in that cause–effect relationship is the role of a specific context (in our case neo-conservatism) in the production of reality (in our case the image of Iran as an international pariah governed by irrational religious zealots), a dialectic which both Farabi and Gadamer well understood. It would be a mistake to underestimate that dialectic, especially with regard to Iran’s nuclear file. For is the ideological representation of Iran not governed by the strategy to expel from competing realities the notion of a Third World country that is attempting to exercise its right to national development; to contain the view that Iranians are as rational as the Japanese, Germans or other nations who have developed a nuclear energy programme? The answer is yes, in my opinion, which explains my focus on the neo-conservative habitat of producing the image of Iran as an ‘international pariah’ in the following paragraphs. I am not so much interested in quantifying the proliferation of anti-Iranian discourses in neoconservative circles. It is rather more central, I think, to account for the way Iran is spoken about, to analyse who does the speaking, to explore the institutions which codify people to speak about the country, and to understand the political culture that signifies and legitimates the things that are said. What is at issue in this article, in short, is the overall discursive representation of Iran by neo-conservative ideology, the way in which Iran is ‘translated’ to us by an exalted, cumbersome, coterie of activists with an overtly and self-consciously anti-Iranian agenda.11 No manufacturing of consent, no engineering of facts, no ideological effort to ‘produce’ reality, no campaign to transform a specific political consciousness can function if, through a pattern of institutions, functionaries and media outlets, it does not constitute an overall strategy. And, inversely, no such strategy can achieve lasting effects if it is not based on a consensus serving, not as a headquarters, conspiracy or a predetermined, static outcome, but as the smallest common denominator among its adherents. With regard to Iran that consensus is constituted by influential, idea-producing conglomerates established by neo-conservative functionaries and activists with close links to Jewish lobbying organisations and likeminded parties in Israel. These all adhere to a common interest: to subvert the Iranian state and, by extension, to recode Iranian behaviour in accordance with US and Israeli interests in West Asia and beyond.12 Let me start exploring some of the strategies pursued to that end from a comparative perspective by sketching the involvement of neo-conservative functionaries in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.13 It is no secret that there are strong ideological and institutional links between the neo-conservative coterie surrounding the White House and various parties in Israel.15 ‘No lobby has managed to divert US foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest’, write John J Mearsheimer, Professor at the University of Chicago, and Stephen Walt, dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, ‘while simultaneously convincing Americans that US and Israeli interests are essentially the same’.16 One oft-cited example of this nexus is a paper authored by Douglas Feith (among others), who was US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from July 2001 until August 2005. The paper bears the curious title, ‘A clean break: a new strategy for securing the realm’. Produced in July 1996 by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, a think-tank based in Washington, DC and Jerusalem, the paper urges Israel to reconsider its strategic posture. The report advocates the ‘principle of pre-emption, rather than retaliation alone’. It suggests that Israel work with ‘moderate’ regimes such as Jordan and Turkey in order to ‘contain, destabilise, and roll back some of its most dangerous threats’. In addition, it recommends that Israel ‘focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq—an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right—as a means of foiling Syria’s regional ambitions’. Historically valuable, if viewed within the context of the current situation in Iraq, the paper also suggests that Israel support Jordan in advocating restoration of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq.17 The list of functionaries involved in the production of the paper reads like a who’s who of the neo-conservative cabal (it will become clear later that the same people are involved in the campaign against Iran). Apart from Douglas Feith, the list includes Richard Perle, one of the central advocates of the Iraq war and until recently chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board; Charles Fairbanks Jr, a personal friend of Paul Wolfowitz; David Wurmser formerly of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and ex-special assistant to John Bolton at the State Department; and his wife Meyrav Wurmser, who runs the Hudson Institute and directed the Washington office of the Middle East Media Research Institute. (Memri is an invention of Col Yigal Carmon, who spent 22 years in Israeli intelligence and later served as counter-terrorism advisor to former Israeli prime ministers Yitzak Shamir and Yitzak Rabin.)18 In July 1996 the then prime minister of Israel, Binyamin Netanyahu, presented the central strategic tenets of the ‘Clean Break’ paper to the US Congress. The case for an invasion of Iraq was followed up by the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the Project for a New American Century. JINSA’s board of advisors included Vice President Dick Cheney, former US ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, and Douglas Feith before they entered the Bush administration. Leading neoconservatives such as Richard Perle, Michael Ledeen, Stephen Bryen, Joshua Muravchik and former CIA director James Woolsey continue to be members of the board at the time of writing. The Project for a New American Century’s declared goal is ‘to promote American global leadership’.19 It is chaired by William Kristol, editor of the rightwing Weekly Standard. Already by January 1998 the Project had sent a letter to then US president Bill Clinton advocating a ‘strategy for removing Saddam’s regime from power’ and demanding a ‘full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts’ to that end. This appeal was followed by a letter to congressional leaders Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott in May 1998, urging that ‘US policy should have as its explicit goal removing Saddam Hussein’s regime from power and establishing a peaceful and democratic Iraq in its place’. Out of the 17 signatories to the two letters, 11 have held posts in the Bush administration since the invasion of Iraq was launched in March 2003. Elliot Abrams, who had orchestrated the Iran— Contra operation, when the Reagan administration scandalously used the proceeds of arms sales to Iran (despite its own embargo) to circumvent a congressional prohibition on funding Nicaraguan rebels, was recruited as Senior Director for Near East, Southwest Asian and North African Affairs on the National Security Council advancing Bush’s strategy of advancing democracy abroad.20 Richard Armitage was named Deputy Secretary of State; John Bolton, Under Secretary, Arms Control and International Security (promoted to US Ambassador to the UN); Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Zalmay Khalilzad, Special Presidential envoy to Afghanistan and ‘Ambassador-at-large for Free Iraqis’ (promoted to US Ambassador to Iraq); Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board; Peter W Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs; Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence; William Schneider, Jr, chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board; Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense (promoted to Director of the World Bank); and Robert B Zoellick, the US Trade Representative (promoted to US Deputy Secretary of State).21 It would be naı¨ve to assume that the institutionalisation of the neoconservative nexus in a myriad of think-tanks and lobbying organisations did not create the structural platform to advocate the case for war against Iraq. Let me put forward a general hypothesis here. Neo-conservatism does not refuse aggression. On the contrary, it habituates us to accept war as rational; it puts into operation an entire machinery for producing ‘true’ facts in order to legitimate militaristic foreign policies. Not only do neo-conservatives speak of war and urge everyone to do so; they also present an ‘aestheticised’ version of war. Via neo-conservatism then, justice, patriotism, morality, even chivalry, find an opportunity to deploy themselves in the discourse of war. Not, however, by reason of some naturally positive property immanent to war itself, but by virtue of the properties neo-conservatism and other militaristic ideologies ascribe to it. Let me turn to explaining how a comparable ‘Kriegskontext’ with the same ‘eponymous heroes’ is manufactured with regard to Iran.22 One newly established link in the chain of neo-conservative think-tanks tied to Jewish lobbying organisations advocating confrontation with Iran is the Coalition for Democracy in Iran (CDI). Founded in 2002 by Michael Ledeen and Morris Amitay, who used to be executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the organisation aims to foster political support for regime change in the Islamic Republic. Members include Raymond Tanter of the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs (WINEA), itself an invention of AIPAC, Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy (CSP) and Rob Sobhani, who has close personal and political links to the son of the deposed Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi. Ledeen, Amitay and Sobhani joined forces at the AEI in May 2003 in a seminar entitled ‘The Future of Iran: Mullahcracy, Democracy, and the War on Terror’, co-sponsored by the Hudson Institute and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies . All three have connections with the media agency Benador Associates, which manages both their op-ed placements and television appearances. Eleana Benador represents Richard Perle, James Woolsey, Charles Krauthammer, Martin Kramer and other neo-conservative advocates. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies also supports the Alliance for Democracy in Iran (ADI), which is backed by prominent political strategists such as Jerome Corsi. Whereas the CDI and ADI support the restoration of the monarchy in Iran, the Iran Policy Committee (IPC) acts as a lobbying organisation for the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which is listed as a terrorist organisation by the US State Department and the European Union. Those readers who are familiar with Fox News and its propensity for readymade, formulaic analysis by former members of the US armed forces will recognise some of the supporters of the IPC: Lt Col Bill Cowan, US Marine Corps (ret); Lt Gen Thomas McInerney USAF (ret); Maj Gen Paul E Valley, US Army (ret); Capt Charles T Nash, US Navy (ret); and Lt Gen Edward Rowny, US Army (ret). Other IPC members are also familiar faces: the aforementioned Raymond Tanter; Clare Lopez, a former CIA analyst; and Jim Atkins, US ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the presidency of Richard Nixon. Creating more and more interlinked foundations, think-tanks, and other institutional platforms tied to the neo-conservative cabal has served its political purpose. In the US Congress the Iranian government has been targeted by several bills, including the Iran Freedom and Support Act, sponsored by Senators Rick Santorum (R-Penn.) and John Cornyn (R-Texas), and a comparable bill proposed by Rep Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Florida Republican and strident anti-Castro campaigner. Funding of $3 million for Iranian opposition activities was inserted by Congress in the 2005 budget on the initiative of Sen Sam Brownback, a Kansas Republican and a member of the Institute on Religion and Public Policy which has recently launched its in-house ‘Iran Project’. This is aimed at enhancing ‘the understanding of Iran’s policy-making process and politico-Islamist system’.24 The aforementioned Santorum, moreover, advocated regime change in an address to the National Press Club concerning ‘Islamic fascism’ in July 2006, stating that ‘every major Islamic leader has openly identified the US as its enemy’.25 Influence on the levers of power in Washington is not only secured through lobbying efforts. There is also persuasive evidence for covert activity. In August 2004 it was revealed that classified documents, including a draft National Security Presidential Directive devised in the office of then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith was shared with AIPAC and Israeli officials. The document set a rather more aggressive US policy towards Iran and was leaked by Lawrence Franklin, an ‘expert’ on Iran who was recruited to Feith’s office from the Defense Intelligence Agency.26 An FBI counter-intelligence operation revealed that the same Franklin had repeated meetings with Naor Gilon, the head of the political department at the Israeli embassy in Washington, and with other officials and activists tied to the Israeli state and Jewish lobbying organisations. Franklin was sentenced to 12 years and seven months in jail in January 2006 for disclosing classified information to Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman. Both were members of AIPAC.27 Douglas Feith himself has longstanding links to Zionist pressure groups. The Zionist Organisation for America (ZOA), for instance, honoured him and his father for their service to Israel and the Jewish people in 1997. He is also cofounder of One Jerusalem, a Jerusalem-based organisation whose ultimate goal is securing ‘a united Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel’.28 A second co-founder of this organisation is David Steinmann, who is chairman of JINSA (see above). He is also a board member of the Center for Security Policy (CSP) and chairman of the executive committee of the Middle East Forum. Two other co-founders of One Jerusalem are directly tied to the Likud Party: Dore Gold was a top advisor to former prime minister Ariel Sharon and Natan Sharansky was Israel’s minister of diaspora affairs from March 2003 until May 2005 (he resigned from the cabinet in April 2005 to protest against plans to withdraw Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip). Let me sketch now how the neo-conservative machinery works within a specific political context, namely Iran’s ninth presidential elections in June 2005. Here, the strategy to inject the public discourse with false facts and predictions was evident before, during and after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. ‘Any normal person familiar with the Islamic republic knows that these are not elections at all’, wrote Michael Ledeen of the AEI in an article entitled ‘ When is an election not an election’. ‘They are a mise en sce`ne, an entertainment, a comic opera staged for our benefit. The purpose of the charade’, Ledeen claimed, ‘is to deter us from supporting the forces of democratic revolution in Iran’.29 Kenneth Timmerman reiterated the neoconservative message in an article for the National Review Online entitled ‘Fake election, real threats’, which was reprinted by the Washington Times. Citing Abolhassan Banisadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic, who fled into exile and has not been in Iran for nearly 30 years, Timmerman predicted that no more than 27% of eligible voters in Iran would participate in the elections (his estimate missed the real turnout by over 34%).30 Danielle Pletka, vice president for foreign and defence policy studies at the AEI, made a similarly misleading prophecy. In ‘Not our man in Iran’, she argued that Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was handpicked by the ‘machinations of the mullahs’ to win the election. (Rafsanjani lost, of course, having received seven million votes fewer than Ahmadinejad.31) Other articles by Nir Boms, vice president of the Center for Freedom in the Middle East and former academic liaison at the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC; by Elliot Chodoff, a major in the reserves of the Israeli army; and by Abbas Milani and Michael McFaul, who direct the Project on Iranian Democracy at the conservative Hoover Institution in California, were similarly misleading. The campaign to trivialise the democratic process in Iran before and during the elections served a dual, interdependent purpose: rendering the ninth presidiency of the Islamic Republic illegitimate a priori and, by extension, representing Iran as an irrational actor, as a country where there is no regulatory context in which decision makers and others operate. Such manipulation helps produce the image of Iran as a ‘rogue’ country which, in turn, serves the important function of legitimating diplomatic and, potentially, military aggression. The strategy has appeared to be at least partially successful. After the election leading journalists, including John Simpson of the BBC, alleged that Ahmadinejad had been one of the students responsible for holding US diplomatic staff captive between 1979 and 1980.32 This rather apocryphal claim was rejected by the CIA only after it had its impact on global public opinion. Crucially it minimised the diplomatic power of the Ahmadinejad administration before its first serious engagement with the international community at the United Nations in September 2005. (All this happened before Ahmadinejad’s excessive tirades against Zionism in general and the Israeli state in particular.) Let me add in parenthesis that tracing the impact of neo-conservatism on the way Iran is portrayed is not, of course, to defend the political process in Iran. The Islamic Republic has not constituted a representative democracy at this stage of its development,33 and I don’t think that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s raucous and bellicose posture in general and his abominably limited understanding of the history of the holocaust is representative of the political culture of the country. Yet it should also be added emphatically here that neo-conservative activists favour this type of West Asian politician. ‘There are benefits to having an enemy that openly bares its teeth’, suggests Daniel Pipes in this regard, ‘for Westerners, it clarifies the hostility of the regime much more than if it subtly spun webs of deceit’.34 ‘Let us state the obvious’, writes Reuel Marc Gerecht of the AEI in a similarly congratulatory mood: ‘The new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is a godsend.’35 Ilan Berman, the author of Tehran Rising: Iran’s Challenge to the United States agrees: ‘Thank goodness for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.’36 The Muslim democrat, I am in no doubt, is anathema to the neo-conservative Weltanschauung. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad unconsciously serves neoconservative interests because he has made it that much easier to portray Iran as a monolithically irrational, even fascist country.37 In another parallel to the way Iraq was portrayed before the invasion,38 likening Iran to absolute evil—in contemporary world politics always epitomised by Nazi Germany—has become a central pillar of the neo-conservative campaign to discredit the country. Ahmadinejad ‘has cast himself as Adolf Hitler reincarnated’ writes George Melloan in a column for the Wall Street Journal representatively.39 Moreover, by adopting a retroactive political discourse permeated by a static notion of Shia-millenial symbolism and imagery as a means to appeal to the (neo)conservative factions of Iranian society and especially the orthodox clergy, Ahmadinejad has further inhibited Iran’s bargaining power with regard to the nuclear issue. It should not come as a surprise that the neoconservative apparatus feeeds on Ahmadinejad’s anachronistic rhetoric, knitting his abominations closely together in one thoroughly anti-Iranian episteme: ‘So a Holocaust-denying, virulently anti-Semitic, aspiring genocidist, on the verge of acquiring weapons of the apocalypse’, writes Charles Krauthammer, ‘believes that the end is not only near but nearer than the next American presidential election . . . This kind of man, ‘Krauthammer continues, ‘would have, to put it gently, less inhibition about starting Armageddon than a normal person’.40 ‘There is a radical difference between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other governments with nuclear weapons [sic]’, Princeton emeritus Professor Bernard Lewis agrees. ‘This difference is expressed in what can only be described as the apocalyptic worldview of Iran’s present rulers . . .Mr Ahmadinejad and his followers clearly believe’, Lewis emphasises, ‘that the terminal struggle has already begun . . . It may even have a date, indicated by several references by the Iranian president to giving his final answer to the US about nuclear development by Aug 22 [2006]’. ‘This year’, we are told, ‘Aug 22 corresponds, in the Islamic calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab of the year 1427. This, by tradition, is the night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of the prophet Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq, first to the ‘‘farthest mosque,’’ usually identified with Jerusalem, and then to heaven and back (cf Koran XVII.1).’ Lewis delves even deeper into the realms of ideological mythology when he tells us that ‘it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind’ that 22 of August ‘might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world’.41 The same theme was picked up by Kenneth Timmerman: ‘As the world prepares to confront an Iranian regime that continues to defy the International Atomic Energy Agency over its nuclear programs . . .we must listen to what Iran’s leaders say as we watch what they do. A religious zealot with nuclear weapons is a dangerous combination the world cannot afford to tolerate.’42 Timmerman heads the so called Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI) and is a member of the Committee on the Present Danger.43 The latter organisation issued a policy paper in January 2006 calling for more sanctions against Iran and lobbys the Bush administration to ‘energetically assist’ dissidents to bring about the downfall of the Iranian state.44 Much too occasionally the neo-conservative campaign to present Iran as an irrational polity receives setbacks.45 In May 2006 bloggers and investigative journalists exposed as wholly invented a story by Amir Taheri, whose opinion pieces are managed by Benador Associates (see above).46 In an article for the National Post of Canada (founded by the media mogul Conrad Black and now owned by the Asper family), Taheri had claimed that a new law would require Iranian Jews to ‘be marked out with a yellow strip of cloth sewn in front of their clothes while Christians will be assigned the colour red. Zoroastrians end up with Persian blue as the colour of their zonnar.’47 Accordind to Taheri ‘the new codes would enable Muslims to easily recognise non-Muslims so that they can avoid shaking hands with them by mistake and thus becoming najis (unclean)’.48 To reiterate the message, the article ran alongside a 1935 photograph of a Jewish businessman in Berlin with a yellow, six-pointed star sewn on his overcoat. The National Post was forced to retract the bogus piece and apologise publicly. But by then the New York Post, part of the media empire controlled by Rupert Murdoch, the Jerusalem Post, which also featured a photo of a yellow star from the Nazi era over a photo of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the New York Sun had picked up the story.49 In another New York Post column in 2005 Taheri claimed that Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Javad Zarif, was one of the students involved in the capture of US diplomats in Tehran between 1979 and 1980. The story was retracted after Dwight Simpson, a professor at San Francisco State University, wrote to the newspaper explaining that the allegation was ‘false’. On the day of the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran Zarif was a ‘graduate student in the Department of International Relations of San Francisco State University. He was my student’, Simpson told the editors, ‘and he served also as my teaching assistant’.50 Worringly Amir Taheri was among a group of ‘experts’ on Iran and the region invited to the White House for a meeting with Tony Blair and George W Bush in May 2006.51 <<Not surprisingly AIPAC has made fears about Iran’s nuclear energy programme a central pillar of its congressional agenda. At its largest ever policy conference in May 2005 AIPAC presented a Disney-inspired multimedia tour aimed at fostering the argument that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Similarly the American Jewish Committee (AJC) has taken out fullpage advertisements in influential US newspapers since April 2006 entitled ‘A nuclear Iran threatens all’, depicting radiating circles on an Iran-centred map to show the potential reach of the missiles. ‘Suppose Iran one day gives nuclear devices to terrorists’ the ad reads. ‘Could anyone anywhere feel safe?’.52 The same message is reiterated by ‘native informants’; old ones like Manuchehr Ghorbanifar, arms dealer and a central player in the Iran— Contra scandal who recently met envoys from the Pentagon in Rome;53 and new ones like Amir Abbas Fakhravar, who advocated the policy of ‘regime change’ in his testimony to a Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2006.54 In an interview with the Sunday Telegraph in the same month, Fakhravar reverted to the other neo-conservative themes explored above, stating that the ‘world has to do something—whatever it takes—so that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does not become another Hitler’.55 Sitting safely in his office at the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies, Fakhravar even promotes military action against Iran: ‘Whatever the world does against the Iranian regime’, he assures us, much in the same way Iraqi exiles did in the build-up to the Iraq war, ‘the Iranian people will be supportive’.56 The theme to equate Iran with Nazi Germany, which is central to the neoconservative propaganda against the country, has already entered the political consciousness of decision makers in western Europe and the USA. The prolific investigative journalist of the Inter Press Service, Jim Lobe, recently reported that Senator John McCain had likened the nuclear standoff with Iran to the situation in Europe in the 1930s.57 Angela Merkel, leader of the ‘Grosse Koalition’ between the conservative Christian Democratic Union and the centre-left Social Democratic Party in Germany appears to adhere to a similar view: ‘Looking back to German history in the early 1930s when National Socialism was on the rise, there were many outside Germany who said ‘‘It’s only rhetoric—don’t get excited’’’, Merkel told policy makers at the 2006 Munich security conference.58 ‘There were times when people could have reacted differently and, in my view, Germany is obliged to do something at the early stages . . .We want to, we must prevent Iran from developing its nuclear programme.’59 Another prominent policy maker to employ that threat scenario is Newt Gingrich, who argued that Iran could be planning for a pre-emptive nuclear electromagnetic pulse attack on the USA that would turn one third of the country ‘back to a 19th century level of development’.60 Gingrich, it should be added, is a member of the Senior Advisory Board of the United States Commission on National Security/21 Century. The Commission has produced a series of policy recommendations that discuss US national security challenges up to 2025. Questioned at the theoretical level, neo-conservatism is not ordered in accordance with a unifying headquarters or conspiracy.61 Contemporary neoconservatism should be understood rather as an ideological space open in three dimensions. In one of these we have already situated the neo-conservative functionary, for whom writing the script, the speech, the terminology of a specific political discourse is central (eg the ‘axis of evil’ invented by David Frum). In a second dimension we may situate the decision maker, neoconservatism’s public face, who proceeds by relating diversified but consensual discourses in such a way that they are then able to claim causal validity and strategic value (eg Richard Perle, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, etc). These two dimensions are largely empirical in that they are part of the day-to-day affairs of politics in Washington, DC (and in the ‘think-tank belt’ scattered around Dupont Circle for that matter). The third dimension, in my opinion, is that of strategic value, which develops as a long-term state interest out of the latter; it forms a salient grand strategy and is hence not easily discarded or altered. It is here that we meet the legitimation of war; its translation from the empirical realms of day-to-day politics into theorised reality; it is this realm that is least transparent, causal, ontological. What evidence is available to us today if we seek to explore Iran’s position in that third dimension? Let me frame this question with two political realities that define Iran’s place in the strategic imagination of contemporary neo-conservatives. First, the ‘global war on terror’ and the Bush doctrine of pre-emption have emerged as the primary institutions of US foreign policy, advocating military intervention against potential adversaries even if they are not considered an immediate threat to US national security.62 According to Norman Podhoretz, who was editor-in-chief of the influential neo-conservative magazine Commentary between 1960 and 1995, the ‘global war on terror’ is instrumental in producing a ‘new species of imperial mission for America, whose purpose would be to oversee the emergence of successor governments in the [West Asian] region more amenable to reform and modernisation than the despotisms now in place.’ ‘After taking Baghdad’, Podhoretz prophesied, ‘we may willy-nilly find ourselves forced by the same political and military logic to topple five or six or seven more tyrannies in the Islamic world’.63 The pre-emptive strategic doctrine, which was announced in June 2002 by President Bush at the military academy at West Point, provides the political legitimacy for such an agenda. Setting out an interventionist framework for US foreign policy, Bush declared that the country will confront ‘evil and lawless regimes’, if necessary, by military force.64 The US National Security Strategy published three months later institutionalised the ‘Bush doctrine’. According to its authors, the USA ‘has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat . . . The greater the threat . . . the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.’65 There is enough evidence to conclude that Iran is on that target list. First, there is the circumstantial evidence, eg the repeated warnings by Seymour Hersh, Scott Ritter, Robert Fisk and others that the war on Iran is already on its way, or the reports leaked to the Sunday Times that ‘under the American plans Britain would be expected to play a supporting role, perhaps by sending surveillance aircraft or ships and submarines to the Gulf or by allowing the Americans to fly from Diego Garcia’.66 Second, there is the ‘factual’ evidence exemplified by the classified version of the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 4,67 leaked to the Washington Post. This broke with 50 years of US counter-proliferation efforts by authorising pre-emptive strikes on states and terrorist groups that are close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction or the long-range missile capable of delivering them. In a leaked, top-secret appendix the directive named Iran, Syria, North Korea (and Libya) among the countries that are the central focus of the policy.68 Moreover, NSPD 17 also sets out to respond to a WMD threat with nuclear weapons. This nuclear ‘first strike’ policy is reiterated in presidential directive NSPD 35 (Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorisation), issued in May 2004, the Nuclear Posture Review in January 2002 and the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations published in March 2005. In addition, US Senate Joint Resolution 23 (‘Authorisation for Use of Military Force’) empowers the president ‘to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States’ without consulting Congress.69 There are even calls to change international law to legitimate the policy of pre-emption. In another similarity to the Iraq war, when scholars such as Fouad Ajami covered the invasion with an ‘academic canopy’, Harvard Law professor Alan Dershowitz argues that ‘by deliberately placing nuclear facilities in the midst of civilian population centres, the Iranian government has made the decision to expose its civilians to attacks . . . if all else fails . . . Israel, or the United States, must be allowed under international law to take out the Iranian nuclear threat before it is capable of the genocide for which it is being built.’70 Second, Iran was mentioned 16 times in the new National Security Strategy (NSS) of the USA, a ‘wartime document’ that uses such emotionally charged phrases as ‘tyrannical regime’, ‘ally of terror’, which ‘harbor[s] terrorists,’ and is an ‘enemy of freedom, justice, and peace’ to describe the Islamic Republic.71 Moreover, despite a 1981 treaty of non-interference in domestic Iranian affairs, the NSS spells out a policy of subversion against the Iranian state, as a means to ‘protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct’.72 To that end, the US State Department has established an in-house ‘Iran Desk’ and ‘Iran watch units’ in Dubai as well as in US embassies in the vicinity of Iran, and a $75 million programme aimed at ‘expanding broadcasting into the country, funding nongovernmental organisations and promoting cultural exchanges’.73 This policy of subversion is further diversified by a parallel process probing tensions between Iran’s ethnic minorities and the central government in Tehran. A research project to this end was implemented by the Marine Corps Intelligence, which focuses on ‘crises and predeployment support to expeditionary warfare’.74 This strand of current US policies vis-a`-vis Iran, unsurprisingly, is overwhelmingly endorsed by neo-conservative functionaries and is exemplified by an AEI conference in October 2005 entitled ‘Another case for Federalism’ and chaired by Michael Ledeen. ‘The ‘‘Iranian’’ people have no connection to a glorious past’, we are told much in that same spirit, ‘and thus no foundation for a flourishing future’.75 Michael Rubin agrees: ‘Iran is more an empire than a nation . . .When the Islamic Republic collapses’, we are reassured, ‘a strong unified Iran will be a force for stability and a regional bulwark against the Islamism under which the Iranian people now chafe’.76 ‘To the extent that the different nationalities each have their own identities and oppose the essentially Persian regime’, Edward Luttwak joins the chorus, ‘they are likely to applaud external attacks on the nuclear installations rather than rally to the defense of their rulers’.77 Luttwak ignores, of course, that both President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei are ‘Iranian-Azeri’, that is, members of the largest minority community populating the country. In conclusion, I would like to discuss at least three central concerns with regard to the preceding analysis. First, is a military attack on Iran imminent? I doubt that the political establishment in Washington has been won over on this one yet. The Democrats’ resurgence in the mid-term elections in November 2006, Donald Rumsfeld’s and John Bolton’s departure from the Pentagon and the UN, respectively, the continuing disaster in Iraq and the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan indicate that Republican neoconservatism represented by the Bush administration is facing profound challenges. Moreover, the USA is facing a legitimacy crisis in the international arena, and in the geostrategic modifications engendered by an increasingly ‘multipolar’ world order. Hence Russia’s efforts to reassert its role in Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus exemplified by joint military exercises with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation in August 2006 and the coercive ‘energy politics’ pursued by Gazprom. Hence China’s increasingly assertive role in East Asia and its recent multibillion-dollar investments in Africa. Hence Iran’s successful strategy to mobilise support in Asia, Latin America and Africa which has been recently re-emphasised by President Ahmadinejad’s calls for ‘Asian Unity’ in his speech to the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, which comprises Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. negotiate in good faith? It would be easier to act sooner rather than later. Yes, there would be repercussions—and they would be healthy ones, showing a strong America that has rejected further appeasement.87 Hence also his repeated calls for a strategic partnership with leftist governments, most prominently those of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Fidel Castro in Cuba and Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Iran’s diplomatic initiatives in Africa. Moreover, containing Iran or marginalising the country from the ‘international community’ appears to be futile because, parallel to Iran’s involvement in prominent international institutions such as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the UN, the country is also a vocal member of a range of other, lesser known intergovernmental organisations: the Developing Eight (D-8) comprising Egypt, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey, the Economic Co-operation Organisation, including Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan and the G-77, which was founded in 1964 to lobby the UN on behalf of developing nations and has grown to include 133 countries. Iran’s diplomatic manoeuvring space is significantly enhanced by involvement in these organisations because they create effective outlets to counter the communicative power of the US state, dissecting its efforts to mobilise political and public opinion against the country—especially with regard to the nuclear issue. In the light of these currents of contemporary world politics, legitimating another military aggression in West Asia internationally will be difficult indeed. These constraining international factors do not mean, of course, that neoconservatives will not continue to work towards military aggression against Iran. This brings us to a second question: are there no competing narratives in the USA? Let there be no misunderstanding in this regard. I do not claim that neo-conservatism has a total grip on the political culture in the USA. This is quite impossible in a pluralistic democracy. But there is no escaping the fact that neo-conservatives have a strong influence on the levers of power in Washington. This has been repeatedly lamented by former high-ranking officials. For example, Graham Fuller, a former Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council for long-range forecasting at the CIA, concedes that ‘Efforts to portray Iran with some analytical balance have grown more difficult, crowded out by inflamed rhetoric and intense pro-Israeli lobbying against Tehran in Congress’.78 Stephen Walt and John J Mearsheimer are equally critical. In an emphatic article published by the London Review of Books they argue that ‘the thrust of US policy in the region derives almost entirely from domestic politics, and especially the activities of the ‘Israel Lobby’. Walt and Mearsheimer define that lobby as ‘the loose coalition of individuals and organisations who actively work to steer US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction’.79 I agree with Walt and Mearsheimer that there is no such thing as a neo-conservative headquarters, manifesto, conspiracy or even party. There are Republican and Democrat sympathisers, Jewish and non-Jewish functionaries, Christian fundamentalists and Muslim collaborators (and ‘entertainers’ such as Glenn Beck, whose primetime show on CNN is openly anti-Islamic, and anti-Iranian for that matter).80 But the empirical evidence suggests that the pervasive concentration of neo-conservative think-tanks and activists—the neoconservative apparatus—constitutes a consensus providing an image of Iran as an international ‘pariah’. Along with this image goes a ‘macro-culture’. This is the overarching habitat I have explored at the beginning of this article in relation to the ideas of Gadamer and Farabi; the place where the image of Iran as an international threat is implanted. For what gives the country its negative image in the ‘West’ is not its own ontological content but the act of institution, an installation, a consecration that gives significance to what has, in itself, a neutral content.81 It is within that very tight-knit, ubiquitous neo-conservative habitat that the invasion of Iraq was made possible and it is within a similarly pervasive Kriegskontext that the idea of military intervention against Iran is cultivated. What is at stake in revealing neo-conservative propaganda is not to undifferentiate US foreign policies. I am not suggesting a monocausal link between neo-conservatism and hostiltity towards Iran, no automatism, no inevitable political outcome. What I have hoped to explore in this article, rather, is the nihilistic international agenda that neo-conservatism promotes: the social engineering of a militaristic ideology which has secured a place in that ferosciously contested space we may call ‘international political culture’. Consider the comments of Patrick Clawson at a symposium organised by the militant FrontPageMag.com in July 2005. Clawson, deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East policy, bluntly advocated covert operations in order to sabotage nuclear facilities in Iran: ‘Accidents are known to happen (remember Three Mile Island or Chernobyl). If there were to be a series of crippling accidents at Iranian nuclear facilities . . . that would set back the Iranian program.’82 Consider also neo-conservative writings during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in summer 2006.83 ‘No one should have any lingering doubts about what’s going on in the Middle East’ Michael Ledeen proclaimed. ‘It’s war [and] there is a common prime mover, and that is the Iranian mullahcracy, the revolutionary Islamic fascist state that declared war on us 27 years ago and has yet to be held accountable’.84 ‘All of us in the free world owe Israel an enormous thank-you for defending freedom, democracy and security against the Iranian cat’s-paw wholly-owned terrorist subsidiaries Hezbollah and Hamas’, echoed Larry Kudlow.85 ‘They are defending their own homeland and very existence, but they are also defending America’s homeland as our frontline democratic ally in the Middle East’.86 William Kristol strengthened the plot: What’s happening in the Middle East isn’t just another chapter in the Arab— Israeli conflict. What’s happening is an Islamist— Israeli war . . . Better to say that what’s under attack is liberal democratic civilization, whose leading representative right now happens to be the United States . . . Communism became really dangerous when it seized control of Russia. National socialism became really dangerous when it seized control of Germany. Islamism became really dangerous when it seized control of Iran . . . The right response is renewed strength—in supporting the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, in standing with Israel, and in pursuing regime change in Syria and Iran. For that matter, we might consider countering this act of Iranian aggression with a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Why wait? Does anyone think a nuclear Iran can be contained? That the current regime will Ultimately, then, neoconservative functionaries inscribe the narrative of war in international relations; they inscribe it in institutions (eg the Committee on the Present Danger), language (eg the ‘axis of evil), mindsets (eg ‘Why do they hate us?’), and policies (eg the doctrine of pre-emption). This strategy transforms other countries into replaceable variables. To be more precise, pre-emption and the ‘war on terror’ are made into versatile ideological agents that can be employed to legitimate military aggression globally—not only in the Iraqi, Iranian, Venezuelan or Syrian context, but also with regard to other conflict scenarios (China-Taiwan, Russia-Chechnya, etc.). Thus, from the neo-coservative perspective, Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and others are just episodes in the same neo-conservative project, namely the ‘Fourth World War’ invented by Eliot Cohen and popularised by ex-CIA director James Woolsey. Even if we sucessfully avert one crisis, neoconservatives are always busy planning the next. In essence that political strategy is reassuringly mimetic: once a specific war project has bedded in, its supposed chivalry is loudly trumpeted, bundled up in a morally righteous and infallible narrative—in essence the legitimation of US neo-imperialism—and stitched into the political fabric of contemporary America. It is in this sense that neo-conservatism reveals itself as war—a war continued by other means. The perverse irony of this malicious ideology is that it makes us think that it serves the liberation of mankind.
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Adib-Moghaddam 7 (Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, 4/1/2007, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, “Manufacturing war: Iran in the neo-conservative Imagination” Third World Quarterly, 28:3, EBSCOhost)
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one must not presume that there exists a sphere of human relations that is somehow detached from a manufactured context historical political or other All human facts are invented objectified internalised and ultimately introjected we too often continue to assume that facts are detached from a manufactured context without a historical background and ontological present signifying them Notions of unchangeable laws of nature constrain our capacity for understanding that facts are socially engineered that they are elastic relative differentiated if we switch our focus to analyses of West Asia the majority of scholars take ‘facts’ for granted they fail to focus on the social engineering of world politics One consequence of the absence of critical approaches in my empirical field of study is that the image of Iran as a country in the grip of enigmatic hostile revolutionaries led by intransigent retroactive Mullahs is surprisingly salient Part of the problem is that the Islamic Republic has occupied a prominent place in the imagination of neo-conservative strategists with direct links to the decision-making process in Washington and immense resources to influence the public discourse in the USA that neo-conservative coterie has manufactured an image of Iran which has made the country’s ‘irrational nature’ an established fact among influential strata of international society It is more central to account for the way Iran is spoken about and to understand the political culture that signifies and legitimates the things that are said What is at issue is the overall discursive representation of Iran by neo-conservative ideology the way in which Iran is ‘translated’ to us by an exalted cumbersome coterie of activists with an overtly and self-consciously anti-Iranian agenda no engineering of facts no ideological effort to ‘produce’ reality can function if through a pattern of institutions it does not constitute an overall strategy inversely no such strategy can achieve lasting effects if it is not based on a consensus serving as the smallest common denominator among its adherents These all adhere to a common interest: to subvert the Iranian state and to recode Iranian behaviour in accordance with US and Israeli interests in West Asia and beyond Neo-conservatism habituates us to accept war as rational it puts into operation an entire machinery for producing ‘true’ facts in order to legitimate militaristic foreign policies The campaign to trivialise the democratic process in Iran served a dual purpose rendering the presidiency of the Islamic Republic illegitimate a priori and representing Iran as an irrational actor where there is no regulatory context in which decision makers and others operate Such manipulation helps produce the image of Iran as a ‘rogue’ country which serves the important function of legitimating military aggression Ultimately neoconservative functionaries inscribe the narrative of war in international relations they inscribe it in institutions language mindsets and policies This strategy transforms other countries into replaceable variables pre-emption and the ‘war on terror’ are made into versatile ideological agents that can be employed to legitimate military aggression globally not only in the Iraqi Iranian or Syrian context but also with regard to other conflict scenarios China-Taiwan Russia-Chechnya etc. from the neo-coservative perspective Lebanon Palestine Afghanistan Iraq Iran and others are just episodes in the same neo-conservative project namely the ‘Fourth World War’ Even if we sucessfully avert one crisis neoconservatives are always busy planning the next
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Rhetoric of Iranian hostility and proliferation is deployed within a neoconservative regime of truth to legitimize war with Iran. Paying attention to how Iran is represented is the first obligation of nuclear policymakers.
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In 1993, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington racialized the future of global conflict by declaring that “the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics” (Huntington 1993:22). He declared that the fault line will be drawn by crisis and bloodshed. Huntington’s end of ideology meant the West is now expected to confront the Confucian-Islamic “other.” Huntington intoned “Islam has bloody borders,” and he expected the West to develop cooperation among Christian brethren, while limiting the military strength of the “Confucian-Islamic” civilizations, by exploiting the conflicts within them. When the walls of communism fell, a new enemy was found in Islam, and loathing and fear of Islam exploded with September 11. The new color line means “we hate them not because of what they do, but because of who they are and what they believe in.” The vehement denial of racism, and the fervent assertion of democratic equality in the West, are matched by detestation and anger toward Muslims, who are not European, not Western, and therefore not civilized. Since the context of “different” and “inferior” has become not just a function of race or gender, but of culture and ideology, it has become another instrument of belief and the selfrighteous racism of American expansionism and “new imperialism.” The assumed superiority of the West has become the new “White Man’s Burden,” to expand and to recreate the world in an American image. The rationalization of this expansion, albeit to “protect our freedoms and our way of life” or “to combat terrorism,” is fueled by racist ideology, obscured in the darkness behind the façade of inalienable rights of the West to defend civilization against enemies in global culture wars. At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with Orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption. Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the Orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, Orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, Orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States. Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point. Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoic-ing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each...will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim com-munity” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, “...we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN 2006). Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.
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Batur 7 [Pinar, PhD @ UT-Austin— Prof. of Sociology @ Vassar, The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide, Handbook of The Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 447-9]
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Huntington racialized the future of global conflict by declaring that “the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics Huntington intoned “Islam has bloody borders,” and he expected the West to develop cooperation among Christian brethren The vehement denial of racism and the fervent assertion of democratic equality in the West are matched by detestation and anger toward Muslims who are not European not Western and therefore not civilized. The assumed superiority of the West has become the new “White Man’s Burden,” to expand and to recreate the world in an American image The rationalization of this expansion albeit to “protect our freedoms and our way of life” or “to combat terrorism,” is fueled by racist ideology obscured in the darkness behind the façade of inalienable rights of the West to defend civilization against enemies in global culture wars Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with Orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern Islamic societies as static irrational savage fanatical and inferior to the peaceful rational scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West Orientalist thought racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 90s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other Lewis, cautions that “it is far from certain that Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims unlike others seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster Lewis views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded Annihilation, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality both ideologically and physically but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process that it can conclude only in ultimate domination War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency
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The threat of Iranian nuclear acquisition is rooted in a racist description of the world that seeks to universalize the American vision of control—this ensures genocide and unending war
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My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87
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Burke 7—Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney [“Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse]
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war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy it is the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is it drives out every other possibility of revealing
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Enframing of national security is a pre-requisite to macropolitical violence
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All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up5 The 'real worlders' use a variety of tactics to delegitimise those forms of theorising which they see as either useless or downright dangerous to international politics. These range from ridicule, attempts at incorporation, scare-mongering and claiming that such theories are the product of 'juvenile' whims, fads and fashions. The charitable interpretation of these manoeuvrings is that they are instigated by a sense of fear, with the 'real worlders' insisting that the 'theorists' and the plethora of theories do not relate to what is 'really' going on in the world and thus the 'bodies keep piling up' while the 'theorists' make nice points. Conversely, the 'theorists' accuse the 'real worlders' of being complicit in the construction of a world in which the 'bodies keep piling up' and the resistance to criticism simply reflects their institutional and, sometimes, public power as well as their intellectual weaknesses. Perhaps it is not surprising that we are having these debates about theory as 'the practice of theory has been deeply affected by the debate about modernism versus postmodernism and the attendant questions of a social theory which can foster human autonomy and emancipation' (Marshall, 1994, p. 1). But what is the future for the discipline and practice of international politics if such a debate has the effect of bringing out the worst in people and which is often conducted within a spirit of 'jousting' verging on the hostile? Richard Ashley's contribution to this volume attests somewhat to the futility of and angst felt by many who are party to and witness to these debates with his comments that there is little point in offering arguments to a community 'who have repeatedly shown themselves so proficient at doing what it takes not to hear'. In a paradigmatically masculinist discipline such as international relations perhaps the sport of intellectual jousting and parodies of bar room brawling is functionally inevitable. Maybe the concentration on wars, foreign policy, practices of diplomacy and the imageries of 'us' and 'them' that goes along with all of that fosters a 'winners' and 'losers' mentality. So the 'theorists' do battle with the 'real worlders' and the 'modernists' do battle with the 'post- modernists'. So who wins? Perhaps nobody wins with the possible exception of the publishers, especially in the context of contemporary academic life, where an academic's value is measured by the quantity of publications. If research produced in International Relations departments is to be of use besides advancing careers and increasing departmental budgets then it surely has something to do with making sense of events in the world, at the very least. In that endeavour it will be of supreme importance what counts as an appropriate event to pay attention to and who counts as a 'relevant' theorist, which in turn fundamentally depends on what we think theory is and how it relates to the so-called 'real world'. International politics is what we make it to be, the contents of the 'what' and the group that is the 'we' are questions of vital theoretical and therefore political importance. We need to re-think the discipline in ways that will disturb the existing boundaries of both what we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world. The bodies do keep piling up but I would suggest that having a plethora of theories is not the problem. My fear is that statements such as 'all these theories yet the bodies keep piling up' might be used to foster a 'back to basics' mentality, which, in the context of international relations, implies a retreat to the comfort of theories and understanding of theory which offers relatively immediate gratification, simplistic solutions to complex problems and reifies and reflects the interests of the already powerful.
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Zalewski 96—Marysia Zalewski, Women’s Studies @ Queens (Belfast) [International Theory: Postivism and Beyond eds. Smith, Booth and Zalewksi p. 351-352]
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The 'real worlders' use a variety of tactics to delegitimise those forms of theorising which they see as useless These range from ridicule, attempts at incorporation, scare-mongering and claiming that such theories are the product of 'juvenile' whims, fads and fashions these manoeuvrings are instigated by fear insisting that the 'theorists' do not relate to what is 'really' going on in the world and thus the 'bodies keep piling up' concentration on wars, foreign policy, practices of diplomacy and the imageries of 'us' and 'them' that goes along with all of that fosters a 'winners' and 'losers' mentality International politics is what we make it to be, the contents of the 'what' and the group that is the 'we' are questions of vital theoretical and therefore political importance. We need to re-think the discipline in ways that will disturb the existing boundaries of both what we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world having a plethora of theories is not the problem statements such as 'all these theories yet the bodies keep piling up' might be used to foster a 'back to basics' mentality which implies a retreat to the comfort of theories which offers immediate gratification, simplistic solutions to complex problems and reifies and reflects the interests of the already powerful
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Claiming impacts of policy outcome outweigh theoretical assumptions produces policy failure—their impact calculus reproduces the concerns of dominant actors.
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Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of ‘deniability’ the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, ‘stuff happens’. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning.
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Pieterse 7—Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) [“Political and Economic Brinkmanship,” Review of International Political Economy 14: 3 p 473]
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The American military represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo reasons, internecine battles and projects That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically immune That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable this is the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis
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Prefer our evidence—the Aff is epistemologically bankrupt. Their evidence is manufactured and distorted by the threat industry.
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In fact, the military is actually pretty good at developing worst-case contingency response plans for any number of foreseeable or crazy crises, using the operations -- or "3" -- planning staffs at combatant commands and in the Joint Staff. But the Pentagon's budgetary and programmatic managers did not plan in advance of sequestration, and now they find themselves scrambling to finish the job. In September, Defense Department comptroller Robert Hale said, "We will wait as long as we can to begin this process." Last week, he defended the lack of planning: "If we'd done this six months ago, we would have caused the degradation in productivity and morale that we're seeing now among our civilians." History will judge whether or not the Pentagon gambled correctly, if the already once-delayed sequestration is triggered as scheduled this Friday.
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Zenko 2/26—Micah Zenko is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations [February 26, 2013, “Most. Dangerous. World. Ever.” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/26/most_dangerous_world_ever?wp_login_redirect=0]
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the military is actually pretty good at developing worst-case contingency response plans for any number of foreseeable or crazy crises But the Pentagon's budgetary and programmatic managers did not plan in advance of sequestration, and now they find themselves scrambling to finish the job
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Military empirically hypes threats
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More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what “politics,” locally as well as globally, is about. It is here that the “emergence” characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The “subjects” of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian “biopower” ways.
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Dillon and Reid 2K [Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency, By: Michael Dillon, Julian Reid, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 03043754, Jan-Mar 2000, Vol. 25, Issue 1]
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Policy domains reify problematization by turning contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of expertise the market for discourse is prescribed and policed Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy and for policy science in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors Reproblematization is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of assumptions Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The “subjects” of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has evolved in biophilosophical ways
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There is no status Quo—our evidence indicates their 1AC harms and solvency claims are just random factoids politically constructed to make the plan appear to be a good idea. They take a snapshot of a dynamic status quo and attempt to portray it as a static universality. This is analogous to the way status quo politicians use the absence of declared conflict to promote a FALSE image of peace.
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The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.
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Friis 2K [Karsten Friis, UN Sector at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” 2000, http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2]
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The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. The Other is objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order just as important. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices a liminar can for instance be people but also representations of competing world-pictures. liberals” within a group conflict are the first ones to go”. liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression ethnic cleansing and expatriation. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, or it must be forced out . A liminar may also become an Othe Securitization was not considered a political move . It was a necessity: it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order it implies making the world match the map that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust and not only a victory on the battlefield the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur succeeded in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural where truth is never questioned
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Securitization is a precondition to genocide- their advantage descriptions will be used to justify massive violence
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By the 1950s, a large number of people had come to believe that the killing of much or all of the world’s population would result from global nuclear war. This idea was promoted by the peace movement, among which the idea of ‘overkill’ - in the sense that nuclear arsenals could kill everyone on earth several times over - became an article of faith. Yet in spite of the widespread belief in nuclear extinction, there was almost no scientific support for such a possibility. The scenario of the book and movie On the Beach,[2] with fallout clouds gradually enveloping the earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific evidence is that fallout would only kill people who are immediately downwind of surface nuclear explosions and who are heavily exposed during the first few days. Global fallout has no potential for causing massive immediate death (though it could cause up to millions of cancers worldwide over many decades).[3] In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace movement have left unaddressed the question of whether nuclear war inevitably means global extinction. The next effect to which beliefs in nuclear extinction were attached was ozone depletion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scares about stratospheric ozone developed, culminating in 1982 in the release of Jonathan Schell’s book The Fate of the Earth.[4] Schell painted a picture of human annihilation from nuclear war based almost entirely on effects from increased ultraviolet light at the earth’s surface due to ozone reductions caused by nuclear explosions. Schell’s book was greeted with adulation rarely observed in any field. Yet by the time the book was published, the scientific basis for ozone-based nuclear extinction had almost entirely evaporated. The ongoing switch by the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union from multi-megatonne nuclear weapons to larger numbers of smaller weapons means that the effect on ozone from even the largest nuclear war is unlikely to lead to any major effect on human population levels, and extinction from ozone reductions is virtually out of the question.[3] The latest stimulus for doomsday beliefs is ‘nuclear winter’: the blocking of sunlight from dust raised by nuclear explosions and smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks. This would result in a few months of darkness and lowered temperatures, mainly in the northern mid-latitudes.[5] The effects could be quite significant, perhaps causing the deaths of up to several hundred million more people than would die from the immediate effects of blast, heat and radiation. But the evidence, so far, seems to provide little basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction. The impact of nuclear winter on populations nearer the equator, such as in India, does not seem likely to be significant. The most serious possibilities would result from major ecological destruction, but this remains speculative at present. As in the previous doomsday scenarios, antiwar scientists and peace movements have taken up the crusading torch of extinction politics. Few doubts have been voiced about the evidence about nuclear winter or the politics of promoting beliefs in nuclear extinction. Opponents of war, including scientists, have often exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schell continually bends evidence to give the worst impression. For example, he implies that a nuclear attack is inevitably followed by a firestorm or conflagration. He invariably gives the maximum time for people having to remain in shelters from fallout. And he takes a pessimistic view of the potential for ecological resilience to radiation exposure and for human resourcefulness in a crisis. Similarly, in several of the scientific studies of nuclear winter, I have noticed a strong tendency to focus on worst cases and to avoid examination of ways to overcome the effects. For example, no one seems to have looked at possibilities for migration to coastal areas away from the freezing continental temperatures or looked at people changing their diets away from grain-fed beef to direct consumption of the grain, thereby greatly extending reserves of food. Nuclear doomsdayism should be of concern because of its effect on the political strategy and effectiveness of the peace movement. While beliefs in nuclear extinction may stimulate some people into antiwar action, it may discourage others by fostering resignation. Furthermore, some peace movement activities may be inhibited because they allegedly threaten the delicate balance of state terror. The irony here is that there should be no need to exaggerate the effects of nuclear war, since, even well short of extinction, the consequences would be sufficiently devastating to justify the greatest efforts against it. The effect of extinction politics is apparent in responses to the concept of limited nuclear war. Antiwar activists, quite justifiably, have attacked military planning and apologetics for limited nuclear war in which the effects are minimized in order to make them more acceptable. But opposition to military planning often has led antiwar activists to refuse to acknowledge the possibility that nuclear war could be ‘limited’ in the sense that less than total annihilation could result. A ‘limited’ nuclear war with 100 million deaths is certainly possible, but the peace movement has not seriously examined the political implications of such a war. Yet even the smallest of nuclear wars could have enormous political consequences, for which the peace movement is totally unprepared.[6] The peace movement also has denigrated the value of civil defence, apparently, in part, because a realistic examination of civil defence would undermine beliefs about total annihilation. The many ways in which the effects of nuclear war are exaggerated and worst cases emphasized can be explained as the result of a presupposition by antiwar scientists and activists that their political aims will be fulfilled when people are convinced that there is a good chance of total disaster from nuclear war.[7] There are quite a number of reasons why people may find a belief in extinction from nuclear war to be attractive.[8] Here I will only briefly comment on a few factors. The first is an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the population of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. This is quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World. The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world. Symptomatic of this orientation is the belief that, without Western aid and trade, the economies and populations of the Third World would face disaster. But this is only Western self-centredness. Actually, Third World populations would in many ways be better off without the West: the pressure to grow cash crops of sugar, tobacco and so on would be reduced, and we would no longer witness fresh fish being airfreighted from Bangladesh to Europe. A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I disagree, both morally and politically, with the stance that preventing nuclear war has become the most important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war. Nuclear war may be the greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor, nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues are more pressing. In political terms, to give precedence to nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in major social institutions, including the state, capitalism, state socialism and patriarchy. If war is deeply embedded in such structures - as I would argue[9] - then to try to prevent war without making common cause with other social movements will not be successful politically. This means that the antiwar movement needs to link its strategy and practice with other movements such as the feminist movement, the workers’ control movement and the environmental movement. A focus on nuclear extinction also encourages a focus on appealing to elites as the means to stop nuclear war, since there seems no other means for quickly overcoming the danger. For example, Carl Sagan, at the end of an article about nuclear winter in a popular magazine, advocates writing letters to the presidents of the United States and of the Soviet Union.[10] But if war has deep institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of success. This has been amply illustrated by the continual failure of disarmament negotiations and appeals to elites over the past several decades.
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Martin 84 [Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modeling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, and a member of SANA 5-16-84 http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html]
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people had come to believe that the killing of much or all of the world’s population would result from global nuclear war Yet there was no scientific support fallout clouds gradually enveloping the earth is fiction fallout has no potential for causing massive death scares about ozone developed, culminating in Schell by the time the book was published, the scientific basis for ozone-based nuclear extinction had almost entirely evaporated ‘nuclear winter’ seems to provide little basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction ecological destruction, remains speculative at present antiwar scientists and peace movements have taken up the crusading torch of extinction politics scientists, have exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schell continually bends evidence Nuclear doomsdayism should be of concern because of its effect on political strategy peace movement activities may be inhibited because they allegedly threaten the delicate balance of state terror why people find a belief in extinction an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the U S quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world. nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I disagree, morally and politically concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war to give precedence to nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in major social institutions, If war is deeply embedded then to try to prevent war without making common cause with other social movements will not be successful politically nuclear extinction encourages a focus on elites But if war has institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of success
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Structural violence outweighs—focus on nuclear impacts destroys peace movements and causes paralysis and oppression—nuke war won’t cause extinction—their authors are biased hacks trying to preserve their power through a politics of extinction
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The strategic doctrines discussed in the preceding pages and others which have not been discussed have to be recognized both as provocations and potentials for war as well as preservers of peace. There can be no denial that in a system based on nation states where size and resources, development of technologies are of critical importance, expansionism is inherent in the system. Therefore, the threat perception arises from security problems which are the products of nation states system. The balance of power realm of new weapon system, ideological passions and miscalculations and misperceptions along with other factors determine the nature of international climate for war and peace, and the nuclear weapons have been the pyramidical culmination of the progression of all the determinants of war and peace which are euphemistically called defense and security. The real difference between the past and the present is that the nuclear weapons can destroy the whole humanity in a short time. This was not the position before, no matter how big and long wars were fought. But it is also a fact that nuclear powers have not fought a single war since 1945. Suppose for a moment all the nuclear weapons by some magic disappeared. How much would the whole world be saved from wars and large scale annihilation? The second World War took a toll of 50 million people. A third world war without nuclear weapons may not take less than 100 million people at the least. A world free from nuclear weapons while other things remaining the same is likely to produce some other kinds of weapons because the global system of inequalities, insecurity of nations, pressure of technologies etc. will inevitably lead to the discovery of weapons probably million times deadlier than the nuclear weapons. The world would never be safe even without the nuclear weapons. The peace movements have been making this mistake of not linking issues of elimination of nuclear weapons with the causes which in the first instance culminated in the production of nuclear weapons.
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Sethi 89 [JD Sethi, Gandhian critique of western peace movements, 1989. p. 173-174 (the poor English in this card is from the original)]
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in a system based on nation states where size and resources expansionism is inherent in the system threat perception arises from security problems which are the products of nation states system. The balance of power realm of new weapon system ideological passions and miscalculations and misperceptions along with other factors determine the nature of international climate for war and peace nuclear weapons have been the pyramidical culmination of the progression of all the determinants of war and peace which are euphemistically called defense and security Suppose nuclear weapons by some magic disappeared. How much would the world be saved . A world free from nuclear weapons while other things remaining the same is likely to produce some other kinds of weapons because the global system of inequalities, insecurity of nations, pressure of technologies etc. will inevitably lead to the discovery of weapons probably million times deadlier than the nuclear weapons.
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Failure to challenge the systems of thought that produce violent militarism means reducing nukes only results in weapons a million times more deadly
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At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack. I didn’t get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios." There’s a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. An extension of the precautionary principle, it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons. First, it’s only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes. Second, it’s based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. Third, it can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don’t build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. If we allow flights near Iceland’s volcanic ash, planes will crash and people will die. If we don’t, organs won’t arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. If we don’t invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East, leading to widespread violence and death. Of course, not all fears are equal. Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else; technology is hard to understand and therefore scary; nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons; our children need to be protected at all costs; and annihilating the planet is bad. Basically, any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking. Fourth and finally, worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don’t know -- and what we can imagine. Remember Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s quote? "Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don’t know we don’t know." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Ignorance isn’t a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination, it can be a call to action. Even worse, it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. You can’t wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential to cause dangerous escalation. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities. Risk assessment is devalued. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can’t know what’s likely to go wrong, let’s speculate about what can possibly go wrong. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA, which we make fun of when we’re not appalled that they’re harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first graders off airplanes. You can’t be too careful! Actually, you can. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile; does he want to turn off all the planet’s television broadcasts because they’re radiating into space? It isn’t hard to parody worst-case thinking, and at its extreme it’s a psychological condition. Frank Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public, the government and institutions should organize their life. It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized -- even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. When someone is proposing a change, the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. But worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn’t really a principle; it’s a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don’t need to refute counterarguments, there’s no point in listening to them.
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Schneier 10 [Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist and author, MA CS American University, 3/13/10, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/worst-case_thin.html]
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There’s a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making it’s only half of the cost-benefit equation By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes it’s based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don’t build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. . If we don’t invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don’t know Ignorance isn’t a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination, it can be a call to action it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts You can’t wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential to cause dangerous escalation The undercurrent is our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities Risk assessment is devalued. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public should organize their life. It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn’t really a principle; it’s a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don’t need to refute counterarguments, there’s no point in listening to them.
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Worst case predictions cause worst case policy making—recognition of our ignorance makes us more secure than their fatalistic scenario planning
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We have seen the enemy, and he is powerful. That’s a recurring motif of contemporary political discourse, as generalized fear mutates for many into a fixation on a ferocious foe. Partisan rhetoric has turned increasingly alarmist. President Obama has difficulty getting even watered-down legislation passed, yet he is supposedly establishing a socialist state. The Tea Party is viewed as a terrifying new phenomenon, rather than the latest embodiment of a recurring paranoid streak in American politics. Osama bin Laden is likely confined to a cave, but he’s perceived as a threat large enough to justify engaging in torture. According to one school of thought, this tendency to exaggerate the strength of our adversaries serves a specific psychological function. It is less scary to place all our fears on a single, strong enemy than to accept the fact our well-being is largely based on factors beyond our control. An enemy, after all, can be defined, analyzed and perhaps even defeated. The notion that focusing our anger on a purportedly powerful foe helps mitigate our fears was first articulated by cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker in his 1969 book Angel in Armor. It has now been confirmed in a timely paper titled “An Existential Function of Enemyship,” just published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. A research team led by social psychologist Daniel Sullivan of the University of Kansas reports on four studies that suggest people are “motivated to create and/or perpetually maintain clear enemies to avoid psychological confrontations with an even more threatening chaotic environment.” When you place their findings in the context of the many threats (economic and otherwise) people face in today’s world, the propensity to turn ideological opponents into mighty monsters starts to make sense. In one of Sullivan’s studies, conducted during the 2008 presidential campaign, a group of University of Kansas undergraduates were asked whether they believed enemies of their favored candidate (Obama or John McCain) were manipulating voting machines in an attempt to steal the election. Prior to considering such conspiracy theories, half were asked to consider the truth of statements such as “I have control over whether I am exposed to a disease,” and “I have control over how my job prospects fare in the economy.” The other half were asked to assess similar statements on relatively unimportant subjects, such as “I have control over how much TV I watch.” Those who were forced to contemplate their lack of control over significant life events “reported a stronger belief in opponent-led conspiracies,” the researchers report. In another study, the student participants were randomly assigned to read one of two essays. The first stated that the U.S. government is well-equipped to handle the economic downturn, and that crime rates are declining due to improved law enforcement. The second reported the government is not at all competent to cope with the recession, and crime rates are going up in spite of the authorities’ best efforts. They were then presented with a list of hypothetical events and asked to pick the most likely cause of each: A friend, an enemy, or neither (that is, the event happened randomly). Those “informed” that the government was not in control were more likely to view a personal enemy as responsible for negative events in their lives. In contrast, those told things are running smoothly “seemed to defensively downplay the extent to which enemies negatively influence their lives,” the researchers report. These studies suggest it’s oddly comforting to have someone, or something, you can point to as the source of your sorrows. This helps explain why Americans inevitably find an outside enemy to focus on, be it the Soviets, the Muslims or the Chinese. Given that society pays an obvious price for such illusions, how might we go about reducing the need for “enemyship?” “If you can somehow raise people’s sense that they have control over their lives and negative hazards in the world, their need to ‘enemize’ others should be reduced,” Sullivan said in an e-mail interview. “In our first study, for instance, we showed that people who feel dispositionally high levels of control over their lives did not respond to a reminder of external hazards by attributing more influence to an enemy. Any social structure or implementation that makes people feel more control over their lives should thus generally reduce (though perhaps not completely eliminate) the ‘need’ or tendency to create or attribute more influence to enemy figures. “In our third study, we showed that if people perceived the broader social system as ordered, they were more likely to respond to a threat to personal control by boosting their faith in the government, rather than by attributing more influence to an enemy. So, again, we see that the need to perceive enemies is reduced when people are made to feel that they are in control of their lives, or that there is a reliable, efficient social order that protects them from the threat of random hazards. “One could imagine, then, that circumstances which allow all citizens to be medically insured, or to have a clear sense of police protection, could reduce the tendency to seek out enemy figures to distill or focalize concerns with random, imminent threats.” Sullivan also offers two more personal potential solutions. “If people have such inherent needs for control and certainty in their lives, they should try to channel those needs as best they can into socially beneficial pursuits,” he says. “Lots of people pursue science, art and religion —just to give a few examples —as means of boiling down uncertainty about the world into clear systems of rules and engagement with reality, creating small domains for themselves in which they can exert a sense of mastery. Insofar as these pursuits don’t harm anyone, but still provide a sense of control, they can reduce the need for enemyship. “A final solution would be to encourage people to simply accept uncertainty and lack of control in their lives,” he adds. “Some meaning systems —Taoism for example —are rooted in this idea, that people can eventually accept a certain lack of control and eventually become resigned to this idea to the extent that they no longer react defensively against it.” So there, at least, is a practical place to begin: Less MSNBC and more meditation.
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Jacobs 10 [Tom Jacobs, Professional Journalist for 20 years, 3-8-10 http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-comforting-notion-of-an-all-powerful-enemy-10429/]
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the enemy is powerful a recurring motif of contemporary political discourse as generalized fear mutates for many into a fixation on a ferocious foe. Partisan rhetoric has turned increasingly alarmist this tendency to exaggerate the strength of our adversaries serves a specific psychological function It is less scary to place all our fears on a single, strong enemy than to accept the fact our well-being is largely based on factors beyond our control. An enemy can be defined, analyzed and perhaps defeated. A research team led by social psychologist Sullivan of the University of Kansas reports on four studies that suggest people are “motivated to create and/or perpetually maintain clear enemies to avoid psychological confrontations with an even more threatening chaotic environment When you place their findings in the context of the many threats people face in today’s world, the propensity to turn ideological opponents into mighty monsters starts to make sense it’s oddly comforting to have someone you can point to as the source of your sorrows. This helps explain why Americans inevitably find an outside enemy to focus on, be it the Soviets, the Muslims or the Chinese. Given society pays an obvious price for such illusions, how might we go about reducing the need for “enemyship?” the need to perceive enemies is reduced when people are made to feel that they are in control of their lives, or that there is a reliable, efficient social order that protects them from the threat of random hazards. “One could imagine, then, that circumstances which allow all citizens to be medically insured, or to have a clear sense of police protection, could reduce the tendency to seek out enemy figures to distill or focalize concerns with random, imminent threats.” If people have such inherent needs for control and certainty in their lives, they should try to channel those needs as best they can into socially beneficial pursuits,” he says. “Lots of people pursue science, art and religion —just to give a few examples —as means of boiling down uncertainty about the world into clear systems of rules and engagement with reality, creating small domains for themselves in which they can exert a sense of mastery. Insofar as these pursuits don’t harm anyone, but still provide a sense of control, they can reduce the need for enemyship. “A final solution would be to encourage people to simply accept uncertainty and lack of control in their lives .” So there, at least, is a practical place to begin: Less MSNBC and more meditation.
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The most recent psychological evidence confirms our K- the affirmatives enemy creation is not based on objective reality, but a paranoid need for certainty. Rejecting their media doomsaying in favor of acceptance of uncertainty solves better
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The class involving social and cognitive psychology has its roots in the empirical, experimental tradition. The insights especially relevant to peace arise from research on perception and attribution. How do we perceive the outer world, especially other persons, and why do our perceptions sometimes differ from those of others—and from reality? What do we attribute to others—that is, what motivations do we assume in them, and what explanations do we come up with for their behavior? How does cognitive functioning restrict people’s abilities to comprehend complexity and to achieve what is in their own best interests? There is an enormous body of research on these kinds of questions, some of which is highly applicable to peace. In important respects the behavior of nations resembles the behavior of individuals, and research on the latter sheds light on the former. A few elementary examples will illustrate the applicability: • In complex situations involving two parties, each of which perceives the other’s overall goals to be threatening or illegitimate, each party is likely to interpret ambiguous behavior by the other as hostile. Behavior suggesting aggressiveness is more noticeable than behavior suggesting peaceableness, and once noticed, the former is likely to be interpreted in the most hostile terms that the evidence can reasonably sustain; • In situations of mutual antagonism, each hostile act by one party tends to reinforce the other’s perception of hostility. As a consequence of repeated reinforcement, a strong expectation of hostility may be built up. Peaceful initiatives then must overcome entrenched attitudes, which can often be done only with great difficulty; • Cognitive limitations on information processing tend to produce images of the other party that are considerably oversimplified versions of the reality. In an emotional context of anxiety, the simplifications made will be those consistent with fear; • Costly or difficult actions that one takes in the name of defense tend to reinforce one’s presumption that the other party is hostile because it becomes too emotionally difficult to admit to oneself that one’s assumptions might have been wrong and that all that cost may have been unnecessary; • Aggressive individuals who have climbed to the top in highly competitive government hierarchies are likely to attribute aggressive characteristics to their counterparts in other government hierarchies; • Entrenched perceptions and attitudes become part of national leaders’ and whole populations’ definitions of reality. Perceptions become so interwoven with the entire "inner map" of the•way-things-are that they become very difficult to change. Such ideas arising from empirical research (presented here in simplified form) shed much light on international behavior. Although they do not lead to easy answers for creating peace, their accumulated power can add up to an enormously potent diagnosis of situations where peace is threatened. An accurate diagnosis can tell us in which directions work to change the situation can be most effective and should be pursued, as well as which directions are likely to be least effective. In some cases, the converse of the ideas are equally true and can help sustain peace. For example, two nations in a long-standing state of stable peace remain so in part because peaceful expectations have become interwoven into leaders’ and populations’ definitions of reality.
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Smoke and Harman 87 [Richard Smoke BA Harvard magna cum laude, PhD MIT, Prof. @ Brown, Winner Bancroft Prize in History, and Willis Harman M.S. in Physics and Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University, Paths To Peace, 1987 p.82-3]
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cognitive psychology has its roots in the empirical, experimental tradition How do we perceive the world, especially other persons, and why do our perceptions sometimes differ In important respects the behavior of nations resembles the behavior of individuals In complex situations involving two parties, each of which perceives the other’s overall goals to be threatening or illegitimate, each party is likely to interpret ambiguous behavior by the other as hostile. Behavior suggesting aggressiveness is more noticeable than behavior suggesting peaceableness, and once noticed, the former is likely to be interpreted in the most hostile terms that the evidence can reasonably sustain each hostile act by one party tends to reinforce the other’s perception of hostility. As a consequence of repeated reinforcement, a strong expectation of hostility may be built up Cognitive limitations on information processing tend to produce images of the other party that are considerably oversimplified versions of the reality. simplifications made will be those consistent with fear; Aggressive individuals who have climbed to the top in highly competitive government hierarchies are likely to attribute aggressive characteristics to their counterparts in other government hierarchies Such ideas arising from empirical research shed light on international behavior their accumulated power can add up to an enormously potent diagnosis of situations where peace is threatened
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The “facts” they base their world view on are tainted by hostile cognitive filters—if it’s true empirical social science methodology works, vote negative
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The twentieth century’s death-toll through genocide is somewhere over sixty million and still rising.* Yet most scholars and laypersons alike have preferred to focus on more salubrious topics. If they think about genocide at all, they view it as an unfortunate interruption of the real structural tendencies of the twentieth century—economic, social and political progress. Murderous ethnic and political cleansing is seen as a regression to the primitive—essentially anti-modern—and is committed by backward or marginal groups manipulated by clever and dangerous politicians. Blame the politicians, the sadists, the terrible Serbs (or Croats) or the primitive Hutus (or Tutsis)—for their actions have little to do with us. An alternative view—often derived from a religious perspective—sees the capacity for evil as a universal attribute of human beings, whether ‘civilized’ or not. This is true, yet capacity for evil only becomes actualized in certain circumstances, and, in the case of genocide, these seem less primitive than distinctly modern. [end page 18] In fact, most of the small group of scholars studying the most notorious twentieth-century cases of genocide and mass killing—Armenia, the Nazi ‘Final Solution’, Stalinism, Cambodia, Rwanda— have emphasized the modernity of the horror. Leo Kuper essentially founded genocide studies by noting that the modern state’s monopoly of sovereignty over a territory that was, in reality, culturally plural and economically stratified created both the desire and the power to commit genocide.1 Roger Smith has stressed that genocide has usually been a deliberate instrument of modern state policy.2 Some emphasize the technology available to the perpetrators: modern weapons, transport and administration have escalated the efficiency of mass, bureaucratic, depersonalized killing.3 However, Helen Fein detects modern ideological goals, as well as technological means, for ‘The victims of twentieth century premeditated genocide . . . were murdered in order to fulfil the state’s design for a new order.’4 She stresses the genocidal potential of modern ‘myths’ or ‘political formulae’—ideologies of nation, race and class.
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Mann 99 — Michael Mann, Professor of Sociology at the University of California-Los Angeles, holds a D.Phil. in Sociology from Oxford University, 1999 (“The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing,” New Left Review, Issue 235, May-June, Available Online at http://www.upf.edu/materials/fhuma/genocidis/docs/mann2.pdf, Accessed 11-10-2011, p. 18-21)
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The twentieth century’s death-toll through genocide is somewhere over sixty million
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Democracy makes genocide possible, it doesn’t prevent it.
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Whatever the explicit position on forcible democratisation Democratic Peace scholars take, Democratic Peace research has nevertheless contributed to pave the intellectual ground for democratic ‘triumphalism’.106 Though scholarship has produced a wide array of complex studies, debating context conditions, modifications and flaws of Democratic Peace (research), interested political actors only take up the ‘good news’, simplify and instrumentalise these for political purposes. In search for an adequate response to such instrumentalisation, it is an important step that public reflexion upon scholarly responsibility in this field has recently been growing.107
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Geis and Wagner 11 — Anna Geis, Senior Researcher at the Goethe University Frankfurt, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Hamburg, and Wolfgang Wagner, Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, holds an M.A. from the University of Tübingen and a Ph.D. from Goethe University Frankfurt, 2011 (“How far is it from Königsberg to Kandahar? Democratic peace and democratic violence in International Relations,” Review of International Studies, Volume 37, Issue 4, October, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Cambridge Journals Online)
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Democratic Peace research has contributed to pave the intellectual ground for democratic ‘triumphalism’ interested political actors only take up the ‘good news’, simplify and instrumentalise these for political purposes
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The discourse of democratic exceptionalism relies on false binaries that intensify conflicts.
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It is commonplace to draw distinctions between the various strands of liberal thought. This made a great deal of sense during the 1980s when neo-liberal institutionalists sought to make liberalism compatible with social scientific methods of inquiry.6 In so doing, a space was opened up for normative liberals to re-assert a values based version of liberalism which centred on the claim that democratic states were more peace-prone. I would argue that this distinction is no longer relevant. Post- 9/11, many former liberal regime theorists (such as Robert Keohane and Ann-Marie Slaughter) have grafted onto their once positivist approach a strong normative distinction between liberal and illiberal regimes.7 In place of the distinction between positivist and normative conceptions of liberalism, the main fault-line in relation to the war on terror has been between defensive and offensive variants.8 Pre-9/11, the dominant narrative inside liberalism was about the pacific character of liberal states. Post-9/11, a significant number of influential liberals have defended the right of Western states to wage war on terrorist groups and those that allegedly harbour them. The legal basis for such action has been contested in institutions as varied as the UN Security Council, parliaments, and domestic courts where the validity of the use of force against Iraq has been vigorously debated. Such as tendency for legal discourse to be at its most universalist at the hour when statecraft is at its most brutal was one that Martin Wight identified over four decades ago.
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Dunne 9 [Tim, International Relations Prof-Oxford, “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars,” International Relations, March, http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/pdf_extract/23/1/107?rss=1]
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It is commonplace to draw distinctions between the various strands of liberal thought. Post- 9/11, many former liberal regime theorists have grafted onto their once positivist approach a strong normative distinction between liberal and illiberal regimes the distinction between positivist and normative conceptions of liberalism the war on terror Pre-9/11 dominant narrative was about the pacific character of liberal states. Post liberals defended the right of Western states to wage war on terrorist groups and those that allegedly harbour them. The legal basis has been contested in institutions
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Liberal theorists no longer claim democracy creates peace—post 9/11 democracies have defended their right to wage war against aggressors
| 1,570 | 137 | 598 | 244 | 19 | 88 | 0.077869 | 0.360656 |
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The blurring of several post-9/11 interventions with the ‘war on terror’ has highlighted an important tension in the liberal understanding of international order. On the one hand, international institutions are designed to be procedurally liberal, meaning that membership is not restricted to democratic states, and collective action requires the consent of legitimate institutions (however imperfectly expressed). The expectation of a liberal order defined by pluralist principles is that all states have an interest in, and an obligation to obey, the rules. There is empirical evidence that liberal publics strongly buy into the importance of procedural correctness. One of the striking features of the polling data acquired in the UK prior to the 2003 Iraq War was the astonishing ‘bounce’ in favour of military action if it was backed by a UN Security Council resolution. In one poll, 76 per cent preferred multilateral action, as against 32 per cent who favoured war in circumstances when the US launched a war but the Security Council did not authorize it.19 The unipolar moment coincided with a shift towards substantive liberal norms to do with democratic entitlement, good governance and the responsibility of states for ensuring terrorist groups acting inside their borders were either contained or eradicated. These emergent substantive norms can be invoked to justify military interventions – against tyrannical states committing human rights violations (Kosovo 1999) or failing states unable to control terrorist networks (Afghanistan 2001 to the present). In the absence of the UN being able to act militarily, as was envisaged by the framers of the Charter, the consequence of this shift towards substantive liberal norms in international society is to place significant power in the hands of those states and alliances who have the capacity to act militarily. Such inequities are thrown into even sharper relief when, in the case of Iraq, the US and the UK brazenly circumvented the will of the very institution tasked with legitimating forcible action. The flexibility with which democratic wars are conducted by coalitions of powerful liberal states operating alongside military forces from authoritarian regimes adds weight to those who are sceptical about how far democratic ideals animate foreign policy behaviour. It is uncertain why democracies should be so sensitive to regime type when engaged in long-run institution building (such as NATO or the EU), yet so indifferent to regime type when constructing war-fighting coalitions. How can it be defensible to fight unjust enemies while standing shoulder to shoulder with unjust friends?
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Dunne 9 [Tim, International Relations Prof-Oxford, “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars,” International Relations, March, http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/pdf_extract/23/1/107?rss=1]
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post-9/11 interventions with the ‘war on terror’ has highlighted an important tension in the liberal understanding of international order. On the one hand, international institutions are designed to be procedurally liberal, meaning that membership is not restricted to democratic states, and collective action requires the consent of legitimate institutions The unipolar moment coincided with a shift towards substantive liberal norms to do with democratic entitlement, good governance and the responsibility of states for ensuring terrorist groups were eradicated In the absence of the UN being able to act militarily, as was envisaged by the framers of the Charter, the consequence of this shift towards substantive liberal norms in international society is to place significant power in the hands of those states and alliances who have the capacity to act militarily The flexibility with which democratic wars are conducted by coalitions of powerful liberal states operating alongside military forces from authoritarian regimes adds weight to those who are sceptical about how far democratic ideals animate foreign policy behaviour
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Post-Cold War democracies have worked side-by-side with authoritarian regimes to invade countries
| 2,660 | 98 | 1,134 | 409 | 12 | 167 | 0.02934 | 0.408313 |
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An engagement with the question of liberalism and violence must include consideration of the democratic peace thesis, famously described by Jack Levy as ‘the closest thing we have to an empirical law in international politics’.13 The strong version of the theory claims that democracies are more peaceful in general: in other words, there are checks on the executive which diminish the war-proneness of the state. Democracies are defensive in character ‘all the way down’ to the level of rational citizens, who oppose war because it endangers their lives and is a waste of economic resources. This rational aversion to war becomes embedded in the political order of the liberal state such that democracies are ‘least prone’ to war. The puzzle with this monadic democratic peace theory is that it does not account for why strong democracies do not go to war against weak democracies when the anticipated benefi ts are high and the costs very low. To address these weaknesses, advocates of the general hypothesis that democracies are peace-prone have emphasized cultural factors inherent in open societies, such as the emphasis upon mediation, dialogue and compromise. The logic of this position is that war is still possible, though the likelihood is significantly reduced because of domestic institutions and characteristics. The potential pacifying role of public opinion plays a key role here; a liberal public will constrain the illiberal temptation of ‘executive power’ during periods when there is an alleged threat to the security of the state. What is unclear about this monadic cultural explanation is under what circumstances liberal states can engage in wars of self-defence or wars against what Kant called ‘unjust enemies’. How do we know when a breach of the general peace prone status quo is acceptable and when it is a betrayal of democratic principles? In answering this question it is useful to engage with advocates of the democratic peace who believe that democracies are only peace-prone in relation to other democracies, the weaker version of the thesis (the so-called dyadic explanation). In relation to illiberal states, democracies are as war-prone as any other regime type. While war might have become unthinkable between democracies, the dyadic explanation allows for the fact that war remains an instrument of statecraft in relation to authoritarian regimes that are unpredictable, unjust and dangerous. The most convincing account of the dyadic theory comes from constructivism. Inter-democratic peace emerges because democracies project the same preferences and intentions onto other democratic regimes. Without the fear of aggression, cooperation becomes possible across a range of issue areas, from the technical to the substantive. In structural theoretical terms, proponents of dyadic theory believe that the logic of anarchy does not apply to those who have contracted a separate peace.15 This variant of the literature is particularly germane for considering the relationship between liberalism and terrorism. No liberal theorist believes there is a duty to include authoritarian enemies – be they states or terrorist networks – in the pacific union: they do not share ‘our values’ and their states are illegitimate because they lack the consent of the governed. Yet, beyond the exclusion of non-democracies, there is no agreement on how liberal states should engage with ideological enemies. Democratic peace theory provides powerful openings into the relationship between domestic institutions and values, and foreign-policy outcomes. From the vantage point of international history after the Cold War, however, both variants of the theory are in need of revision. The monadic variant cannot explain the war-like interventions on the part of liberal states in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Looked at from a vantage point outside the liberal zone, the monadic claim to peace-proneness appears to be illusory. The dyadic account has greater immunity to the several post-Cold War cases in which liberal states have resorted to war. As we have seen, there is no particular claim to peace-proneness in relations between democracies and authoritarian regimes. That said, the dyadic variant is challenged by two factors. First, in the period since 1990, the incidence of initiating inter-state war has been lower among authoritarian states than among democracies, casting doubt on Risse’s claim that democratic states are ‘defensively motivated’. Second, given the centrality of regime type to the democratic peace thesis, there remains the puzzle how and why democracies have varied so significantly in their response to ‘new threats’ such as international terrorism. In short, why do anti-militaristic norms of ‘civilian power’ frame the response by certain liberal states to foreign policy threats, while others are quick to resort to force and demonstrate effective war-fighting capability? To begin to address these questions requires a rethinking of the relationship between liberalism and international terrorism – specifically, the institutional and social processes by which war is produced and legitimated
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Dunne 9 [Tim, International Relations Prof-Oxford, “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars,” International Relations, March, http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/pdf_extract/23/1/107?rss=1]
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democratic peace thesis claims democracies are more peaceful in general Democracies are defensive all the way down’ to citizens who oppose war because it endangers their lives and is a waste of economic resources The puzzle with this theory is that it does not account for why strong democracies do not go to war against weak democracies when the anticipated benefi ts are high and the costs very low it is useful to engage with advocates of the democratic peace who believe that democracies are only peace-prone in relation to other democracies In relation to illiberal states, democracies are as war-prone as any other regime type Looked at from a vantage point outside the liberal zone, the monadic claim to peace-proneness appears to be illusory there is no particular claim to peace-proneness in relations between democracies and authoritarian regimes since 1990 incidence of initiating inter-state war has been lower among authoritarian states than among democracies given the centrality of regime type to the democratic peace thesis, there remains the puzzle how and why democracies have varied so significantly in their response to ‘new threats’ such as international terrorism. In short, why do anti-militaristic norms of ‘civilian power’ frame the response by certain liberal states to foreign policy threats, while others are quick to resort to force and demonstrate effective war-fighting capability?
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Democratic peace theory incorrect-- democracies are more likely to go to war than authoritarian states-- post Cold war proves
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The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. This task is accomplished through educational activity, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333). According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual-moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party—a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125-205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination—for example, in the case of gender—to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security-related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks”—members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994: 196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role—a significant one at that—in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society. CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’etat the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing—even if they are self-consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures—can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well-worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist façade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture …. As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also COrtright 1993: 5-13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naïve to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays—in all senses—to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.
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Jones 99 [Richard Wyn Jones, Professor International Politics at Aberystwyth University, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 1999, p. 155-163]
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The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony This task is accomplished through educational activity because, every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies They illustrate ideas are important change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality One clear example the peace movement of the 1980s the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals encouraged and drew strength from peace activism Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy tandem can be witnessed in the fate of common security Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic However, common security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process it did have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior The most dramatic impact was felt in the Soviet Union a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security This group, then influenced Gorbachev. new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role in making the world a better and safer place it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’etat the prism through which problems are viewed . If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation theoretical implications involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing can become “a force for the direction of action.” social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist façade. proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security the approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” Adorno argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against through their educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Caldicott and Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War Kristensen highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.
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Spillover from criticism is empirically proven. The role of the judge should be an intellectual whose goal is to destabilize the security regimes through critical interrogation of the status quo.
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To take this discussion one step further, we need to ask ourselves, as researchers and as a collective, what the claim of being ‘critical’ and representing a ‘collective intellectual’ entails for our engagement with the political. This question naturally can be extended to all CASE scholars. First, what do we mean by ‘critical’? Are not all theories by definition critical (of other theories)? In virtue of which principle, as a networked collective, would we allow ourselves to be self-labelled as critical? What is so critical about the general perspective we are collectively trying to defend here? From the Kantian perspective to the post-Marxist Adornian emancipatory ideal, from Hockheimer’s project to the Foucaldian stance toward regimes of truth, being critical has meant to adopt a particular stance towards taken-for-granted assumptions and unquestioned categorizations of social reality. Many of these critical lines of thought have directly or indirectly inspired this critical approach to security in Europe. Being critical means adhering to a rigorous form of sceptical questioning, rather than being suspicious or distrustful in the vernacular sense of those terms. But, it is also to recognize one-self as being partially framed by those regimes of truth, concepts, theories and ways of thinking that enable the critique. To be critical is thus also to be reflexive, developing abilities to locate the self in a broader heterogeneous context through abstraction and thinking. A reflexive perspective must offer tools for gauging how political orders are constituted. This effort to break away from naturalized correspondences between things and words, between processes framed as problems and ready-made solutions, permits us to bring back social and political issues to the realm of the political. Being critical therefore means, among other things, to disrupt depoliticizing practices and discourses of security in the name of exceptionality, urgency or bureaucratic expertise, and bring them back to political discussions and struggles. This goal can partly be achieved through a continuous confrontation of our theoretical considerations with the social practices they account for in two directions: constantly remodelling theoretical considerations on the basis of research and critical practice, and creating the possibilities for the use of our research in political debate and action. This raises questions about the willingness and modalities of personal engagement. While critical theories can find concrete expressions in multiple fields of practice, their role is particularly important in the field of security. Since engaging security issues necessarily implies a normative dilemma of speaking security (Huysmans, 1998a), being critical appears as a necessary moment in the research. The goal of a critical intellectual is not only to observe, but also to actively open spaces of discussion and political action, as well as to provide the analytical tools, concepts and categories for possible alternative discourses and practices. However, there are no clear guidelines for the critical researcher and no assessment of the impact of scholarship on practice – or vice versa. Critical approaches to security have remained relatively silent about the role and the place of the researcher in the political process, too often confining their position to a series of general statements about the impossibility of objectivist science.19 The networked c.a.s.e. collective and the manifesto in which it found a first actualization may be a first step toward a more precisely defined modality of political commitment while working as a researcher. Writing collectively means assembling different types of knowledge and different forms of thinking. It means articulating different horizons of the unknown. It is looking at this limit at which one cannot necessarily believe in institutionalized forms of knowledge any longer, nor in the regimes of truth that are too often taken for granted. It is in this sense that being critical is a question of limits and necessities, and writing collectively can therefore help to critically define a modality for a more appropriate engagement with politics.
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C.A.S.E. Collective 6 [Security Dialogues 37.4, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” Sage Political Science, p. 464]
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Being critical means adhering to a rigorous form of sceptical questioning, A reflexive perspective must offer tools for gauging how political orders are constituted. This effort to break away from processes framed as problems and ready-made solutions, permits us to bring back social and political issues to the realm of the political. Being critical therefore means to disrupt discourses of security in the name of urgency or expertise This goal can partly be achieved through a continuous confrontation of our theoretical considerations creating the possibilities for the use of research in political debate critical theories is particularly important in the field of security being critical appears as a necessary moment in the research. The goal of a critical intellectual is to actively open spaces of discussion and political action, for possible alternative discourses and practices. It means articulating different horizons of the unknown. one cannot believe in institutionalized forms of knowledge any longe being critical is a question of limits and necessities, and a more appropriate engagement with politics.
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Critical intellectual distance to security discourse repoliticizes the objectives of security discourse. Your ballot interrogates who and what are deemed as worthy objects of security discourse.
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Dalby understands "dissident security discourses" as having different geographical frameworks that look, with equal measure, both within and beyond the state. These critical approaches erode state-centered parochialism. Once overcome, people and cultures-united by common concern-can take priority over states and borders. To this we can add a more sociological perspective. Kevin Clements, for example, claims that: "Linking security explicitly to community building and the enlargement of safe spaces provides individuals, social movements, and political leaders with important criteria for determining whether or not behavior is likely to enhance or diminish net security." Addressing the problem of inequity, Clements asks if there can be "any real security for anyone in a world that is so radically divided into rich and poor?" Likewise, Ken Booth claims that "the trouble with privileging power and order is that they are at somebody else’s expense (and are therefore potentially unstable)." According to Booth, "emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security." This emancipatory vision introduces security theorizing to a new philosophical domain that poses questions of ethics, reciprocal rights, individual responsibility, and universal ideals. New security interpretations change the "what" question. Rather than limiting security to orthodox questions of armed conflict, it instead expands to include social, economic, environmental, political, and even health issues. Likewise, new interpretations alter the "who" question. The state no longer dominates; it becomes only one of several referents for security. These changes also help us shift from negative (reactive) approaches to positive (proactive) approaches for real security. Security has moved towards a more universal understanding. Expanding the security agenda makes human collectives more interdependent around a host of indivisible issues that threaten well being. Decoupling security from the state helps legitimize alternative social groupings. Identifiable common interests emerge when we reclaim security from militarism and attach it instead to basic needs and survival. Increasing interdependence has now become the fundamental organizing principle of the increasingly "dense" international system, eroding sovereignty and state authority in both domestic and international affairs. Thus, reclaiming security creates a normative framework for connecting people on issues common to human well being. It endorses an ecologically sustainable approach to meeting the basic needs of all people. (Continued)The process of reclaiming security undermines the dominant discourse. But expanding security’s meaning holds value only if it actually alters practice. We should beware of the danger that new concepts of security might be coopted by the dominant paradigm, and thus do more to legitimize than to challenge the status quo. This has already happened to notions of economic security; environmental security could well be next. Thus, we need practical strategies to make the reclamation of security into a concrete reality.
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Barnett 97 [Jon Barnett postgraduate student at the Centre for Resource & Environmental Studies, Australian National University, now has a PhD and teaches at the Univ. of Melbourne, Peace Review, Sep 1997.Vol.9, Iss. 3; pg. 405-411]
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Dalby understands "dissident security discourses" as having different geographical frameworks that look, with equal measure, both within and beyond the state critical approaches erode state-centered parochialism. Once overcome, people and cultures-united by common concern-can take priority over states and borders. Clements asks if there can be "any real security for anyone in a world that is so radically divided into rich and poor?" "the trouble with privileging power and order is that they are at somebody else’s expense therefore potentially unstable)." emancipation, not power or order, produces true security New security interpretations change the "what" question. Rather than limiting security to orthodox questions of armed conflict, it instead expands to include social, economic, environmental, political, and even health issues. Likewise, new interpretations alter the "who" question. The state no longer dominates; it becomes only one of several referents for security. These changes also help us shift from negative (reactive) approaches to positive (proactive) approaches for real security. to basic needs and survival reclaiming security creates a normative framework for connecting people on issues common to human well being. It endorses an ecologically sustainable approach to meeting the basic needs of all people The process of reclaiming security undermines the dominant discourse. But expanding security’s meaning holds value only if it actually alters practice. We should beware of the danger that new concepts of security might be coopted by the dominant paradigm and thus do more to legitimize than to challenge the status quo. This has already happened to notions of economic security; environmental security could well be next. Thus, we need practical strategies to make the reclamation of security into a concrete reality
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Our alternative expands the notion of security to include positive elements like concern for structural violence. This re-framing of security is essential to human survival and solves any aff offense
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These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on tei-ror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1
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Burke 7—Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4]
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frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in Middle East the meaning of powerful political concepts all have histories ; and they are developed in concrete struggles over power it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political power and their consequent worldly effects
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Including their mainstream liberal option ward offs kritik of the discourses that ground u.s. foreign policy.
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Nowadays, matters of ‘peace and security’, as well as ‘security and develop- ment’, are considered closely related. These nexuses have been referred to as ‘mergings’.11 Such mergings lie at the core of new research agendas in security studies. Indeed, by extending the field of security to new social fields, such as peace and development, they allow for new research agendas within security studies. However, before exploring the possibility of com- mon research directions between critical peace research, development studies and CASE, we need to critically engage the notion of ‘merging’ that participates in the widening of the contemporary security agenda. The question of the ‘widening of the field of security’ has given rise to fierce debates. The implicit argument of many of the ‘wideners’ is that by securitiz- ing new issues such as peace and development, one encourages politicians to deal with them in a positive way. However, such an approach might be problematic. The widening of the security agenda, when justified by a concern to free people from fear and threat, might run into what we have called the ‘security trap’. Talking about a ‘security trap’ refers both to the non- intentional dimension of the consequences of widening and to the fact that these consequences might conflict with the underlying intention. It refers to the fact that one cannot necessarily establish a feeling of security, understood as a feeling of freedom from threat, simply by securitizing more issues or by securitizing them more.
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C.A.S.E. Collective 6 [Security Dialogues 37.4, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” Sage Political Science, p. 460]
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the ‘widening of security’ approach might be problematic. widening when justified by a concern to free people from fear and threat, might run into the ‘security trap’ these consequences conflict with the underlying intention one cannot necessarily establish a feeling of security simply by securitizing issues
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Even if their intent is to demilitarize via arms control—their discourse of national security depoliticizes the structural-representational questions that generate violence.
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The underlying logic here is the self-fulfilling prophecy: by treating the Other as if he is supposed to respond a certain way Alter and Ego will eventually learn shared ideas that generate those responses, and then by taking those ideas as their starting point they will tend to reproduce them in subsequent interactions. Identities and interests are not only learned in interaction, in other words, but sustained by it. The mass of relatively stable interactions known as “society” depends on the success of such self-fulfilling prophecies in ever day life.’ Although he does not distinguish between the behavioral and construction effects of interaction, this idea is nicely captured by what Morton Deutsch calls “the crude law of social relations”: “[t]he characteristic processes and effects elicited by any given type of social relation tend also to induce that type of social relation,”44 to which we might add “mediated by power relations.” From the “Crude Law” can be drawn the conclusion that the most important thing in social life is how actors represent Self and Other. These representations are the starting point for interaction, and the medium by which they determine who they are, what they want, and how they should behave. Society, in short, is “what people make of it,” and as corporate “people” this should be no less true of states in anarchical society. Which brings us to the question of how states might learn the egoistic conceptions of security that underpin Hobbesian cultures. We have already shown how states might become egoists through natural selection and imitation. They might also do so through learning. The key is how Alter and Ego represent themselves in the beginning of their encounter, since this will determine the logic of the ensuing interaction. If Ego casts Alter in the role of an object to be manipulated for the gratification of his own needs (or, equivalently, takes the role of egoist for himself), then he will engage in behavior that does not take Alter’s security needs into account in anything but a purely instrumental sense. If Alter correctly reads Ego’s “perspective” he will “reflect” Ego’s “appraisal” back on himself, and conclude that he has no standing or rights in this relationship. This will threaten Alter’s basic needs, and as such rather than simply accept this positioning Alter will adopt an egoistic identity himself (egoism being a response to the belief that others will not meet one’s needs), and act accordingly toward Ego. Eventually, by repeatedly engaging in practices that ignore each other’s needs, or practices of power politics, Alter and Ego will create and internalize the shared knowledge that they are enemies, locking in a Hobbesian structure. The self-fulfilling prophecy here, in other words, is “Realism” [sic] itself.50 If states start out thinking like “Realists” then that is what they will teach each other to be, and the kind of anarchy they will make.
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Wendt 99—Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale [1999, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 331-2]
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The underlying logic here is the self-fulfilling prophecy by treating the Other as if he is supposed to respond a certain way Alter and Ego will eventually learn shared ideas that generate those responses, and then by taking those ideas as their starting point they will tend to reproduce them in subsequent interactions. Identities and interests are not only learned in interaction but sustained by it the most important thing in social life is how actors represent Self and Other. These representations are the starting point for interaction Society is “what people make of it,” and as corporate “people” this should be no less true of states in anarchical society states might become egoists learning The key is how Alter and Ego represent themselves in the beginning of their encounter, since this will determine the logic of the ensuing interaction. If Ego casts Alter in the role of an object to be manipulated then he will engage in behavior that does not take Alter’s security needs into account If Alter correctly reads Ego’s “perspective” he will “reflect” Ego’s “appraisal” back on himself, and conclude that he has no standing or rights in this relationship Alter will adopt an egoistic identity himself Eventually, by repeatedly engaging in practices that ignore each other’s needs Alter and Ego will create and internalize the shared knowledge that they are enemies The self-fulfilling prophecy is “Realism” itself If states start out thinking like “Realists” then that is what they will teach each other to be
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Realism is self-constitutive—states create the rules of the international system, if they act differently, the system adapts.
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Perhaps the most consequential difference between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, on the one hand, and social constructivism, on the other, has to do with the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. The distinction goes back to a seminal article by John Rawls.(n93) Searle offers an easier point of entry. Let us begin with a simple illustration. We can readily imagine the act of driving a car existing prior to the rule that specified "drive on the right(left)-hand side of the road." In an account perfectly consistent with neo-utilitarianism, the rule would have been instituted as a function of increased traffic and growing numbers of fender-benders. Specifying which side of the road to drive on is an example of a regulative rule; as the term implies, it regulates an antecedently existing activity. To this rule were soon added others, such as those requiring licenses, yielding at intersections, imposing speed limits, and forbidding driving while under the influence of alcohol. Now imagine a quite different situation: playing the game of chess. "It is not the case," Searle notes sardonically, "that there were a lot of people pushing bits of wood around on boards, and in order to prevent them from bumping into each other all the time and creating traffic jams, we had to regulate the activity. Rather, the rules of chess create the very possibility of playing chess. The rules are constitutive of chess in the sense that playing chess is constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules."(n94) Regulative rules are intended to have causal effects--getting people to approximate the speed limit, for example. Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organized social activity--that is to say, they specify what counts as that activity. This basic distinction permits us to identify an utterly profound gap in neoutilitarianism: it lacks any concept of constitutive rules. Its universe of discourse consists entirely of antecedently existing actors and their behavior, and its project is to explain the character and efficacy of regulative rules in coordinating them. This gap accounts for the fact that, within their theoretical terms, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are capable of explaining the origins of virtually nothing that is constitutive of the very possibility of international relations: not territorial states, not systems of states, not any concrete international order, nor the whole host of institutional forms that states use, ranging from the concept of contracts and treaties to multilateral organizing principles. All are assumed to exist already or are misspecified. Why is this the case, and is it inherent to the enterprise? The reason is not difficult to decipher: neo-utilitarian models of international relations are imported from economics. It is universally acknowledged that the economy is embedded in broader social, political, and legal institutional frameworks that make it possible to conduct economic relations--which are constitutive of economic relations. Modern economic theory does not explain the origins of markets; it takes their existence for granted. The problem arises because, when neo-utilitarian models are imported into other fields, they leave those constitutive frameworks behind. This problem appears not to matter for some (as yet unspecified) range of political phenomena, domestic and international, which has been explored by means of microeconomic models and the microfoundations of which are now far better understood than before. But there are certain things that these models are incapable of doing. Accounting for constitutive roles--which they were not responsible for in economics--is among the most important.(n95) Nor can this defect be remedied within the neo-utilitarian apparatus. Alexander James Field has demonstrated from within the neoclassical tradition, and Robert Brenner the neo-Marxist, that marginal utility analysis cannot account for the constitutive rules that are required to generate market rationality and markets(n96)--an insight that Weber had already established at the turn of the century(n97) and Polanyi demonstrated powerfully a half century ago.(n98) The terms of a theory cannot explain the conditions necessary for that theory to function, because no theory can explain anything until its necessary preconditions hold. So it is with modern economic theory.
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Ruggie 98—Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University [Autumn 1998, John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52.4, Ebsco]
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Perhaps the most consequential difference between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, on the one hand, and social constructivism has to do with the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules We can readily imagine the act of driving a car existing prior to the rule that specified "drive on the right(left)-hand side of the road Specifying which side of the road to drive on is an example of a regulative rule Now imagine a quite different situation: playing the game of chess the rules of chess create the very possibility of playing chess Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organized social activity This basic distinction permits us to identify an utterly profound gap in neoutilitarianism: it lacks any concept of constitutive rules Its universe of discourse consists entirely of antecedently existing actors and their behavior neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are capable of explaining the origins of virtually nothing that is constitutive of the very possibility of international relations All are assumed to exist already neo-utilitarian models of international relations are imported from economics Modern economic theory does not explain the origins of markets; it takes their existence for granted. The problem arises because, when neo-utilitarian models are imported into other fields, they leave those constitutive frameworks behind Nor can this defect be remedied within the neo-utilitarian apparatus marginal utility analysis cannot account for the constitutive rules that are required to generate market rationality and markets The terms of a theory cannot explain the conditions necessary for that theory to function, because no theory can explain anything until its necessary preconditions hold
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Realism can’t be inevitable—there is no constitutive rule to explain how states became realist. Just because they act realist now doesn’t make it inevitable.
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Given the claimed inevitability of realism’s description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man’s true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson’s supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson’s presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism’s scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter’s transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman’s thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger’s mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. 74 History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so. This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.
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Kraig 2 [Robert Alexander Kraig is Wisconsin state political director for Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is also an instructor in the Communication Department at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5.1 (2002) 1-30]
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Given the claimed inevitability of realism’s description one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy realists, argue that human nature is repeatedly violated Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power "Every era has its incorrigible idealists When they somehow gain power , Machiavellians who understand man’s true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete the realist/idealist dichotomy dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Wilson Wilson’s idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II . Despite convincing refutations by leading historians realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established The science of i r claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics Realism’s a radically empirical science Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing is its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, , is fate. All who dare to challenge the order will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. Yet a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences Those who do not see this are amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is self-determining Society as social contract is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order democratic forms lose a great deal of their value Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism Careful and balanced academic critiques are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. History is replete with ideals that, matured into new social realities However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so
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Purported objectivity and inevitability of realism sanctions mass violence—human history disproves this kind of determinism.
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With the end of the Cold War, neither Classical Realism nor Neorealism proved useful in explaining the behavior of the major states, especially that of the former Soviet Union. According to the predictions inferred from the theories, states are not supposed to contract their international power position voluntarily, as did the Soviets. Realists had a great deal of difficulty explaining Gorbachev’s "new thinking" on foreign affairs--Classical Realists because they assumed states wanted to expand their power as a constant, and Neorealists because there had been no structural changes that could [End Page 232] explain the collapse of the Soviet empire. Ideas, it seemed, were more important than either of the Realisms had recognized. The new information emerging from the archives of the former communist countries, although incomplete to say the least, directly challenged the idea that ideology was not important in decision-making in those countries. For example, Stalin, long described by many as the supremely cautious power realist, appears to have given North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung permission to strike south in 1950 as part of a regional plan to spread communist ideology in the midst of the "crisis of capitalism." The move was not, as Realists had assumed, merely to gain territorial control for security reasons. If one consults the new documentation, Stalin was genuinely interested in spreading communist revolution. In response to these failures of Realist theory, new works appeared that moved away from the rationalist, structuralist paradigm of Neorealism. They brought back factors such as culture, ideology, and human agency more generally in ways that had been downplayed or ignored by both Classical and Neorealist theory for years. 1 Although the new Culturalists have made some creative theoretical critiques of Realism, their efforts have been criticized for a paucity of detailed empirical work. Stephen Morris chimes into this debate with his recent book, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War. With the skills of an historian and the social science perspective of a political scientist, Morris has written one of the first Culturalist theoretical studies that includes impressive empirical detail, especially that obtained from the archives of the former Soviet Union. Drawing threads from secondary sources, public materials, and newly available archival information, Morris weaves a complicated tale of relations among the communist states of the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. He believes the primary challenge for Neorealists is to explain explaining why the weaker states in the Sino-Soviet, Sino-Vietnamese, and Viet-Cambodian relationships acted in ways that ran against their basic security interests when the contradictions were obvious. Why, for example, did the Cambodians disregard their huge military disparity vis-à-vis the Vietnamese? His sensible answer is that rationalist or structuralist assumptions do not capture the complicated mixture of received political cultures; the simultaneously fanatical and paranoid fervor of newly victorious and highly ideological regimes; and the historical rivalries and hatreds that even [End Page 233] communist internationalism could never completely overcome. These qualities, which characterized the regimes in Phnom Penh and Hanoi in the 1970s, and Beijing in an earlier period, do not fit easily into Realist theory. In other words, highly ideological, revolutionary regimes do not always act in the rationalist ways ascribed to them by the Realists. Morris then offers a broad definition of political culture as an alternative approach to understanding these phenomena. Clearly in the new Culturalist camp, Morris does not believe that Classical Realism and Neorealism are wrong, but rather that they are incomplete. Cultural and ideological factors must also be considered to explain state behavior.
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Macdonald 2k—Associate Professor of Political Science at Colgate University [2000, Douglas J. Macdonald, “Making Realism Face the Facts,” SAIS Review 20.2, Project Muse]
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With the end of the Cold War, neither Classical Realism nor Neorealism proved useful in explaining the behavior of the major states According to the predictions inferred from the theories, states are not supposed to contract their international power position voluntarily as did the Soviets. Realists had a great deal of difficulty explaining Gorbachev’s "new thinking" Neorealists because there had been no structural changes that could explain the collapse of the Soviet empire. Ideas, it seemed, were more important than either of the Realisms had recognized new information emerging from the archives of the former communist countries directly challenged the idea that ideology was not important in decision-making in those countries Stalin, long described by many as the supremely cautious power realist, appears to have given North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung permission to strike south in 1950 as part of a regional plan to spread communist ideology new works appeared that moved away from the rationalist, structuralist paradigm of Neorealism. They brought back factors such as culture, ideology, and human agency their efforts have been criticized for a paucity of detailed empirical work. Stephen Morris has written one of the first Culturalist theoretical studies that includes impressive empirical detail especially that obtained from the archives of the former Soviet Union Morris believes the primary challenge for Neorealists is to explain explaining why the weaker states in the Sino-Soviet, Sino-Vietnamese, and Viet-Cambodian relationships acted in ways that ran against their basic security interests when the contradictions were obvious His sensible answer is that rationalist or structuralist assumptions do not capture the complicated mixture of received political cultures; the simultaneously fanatical and paranoid fervor of newly victorious and highly ideological regimes These qualities do not fit easily into Realist theory
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Realism can’t explain numerous actions—empirical evidence proves identity and culture influenced decisions.
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Morgenthau’s state-centric theory is clearly set, but it is not to say he envisages it as being pre-destined and unchangeable. The political, cultural and strategic environment will largely determine the forms of power a state chooses to exercise, just as the types of power which feature in human relationships change over time. In addition, Realists should not be wedded to a perennial connection between interest and the nation-state which is ‘a product of history, and therefore bound to disappear’[19]. Later (in 1970) Morgenthau anticipated that the forces of globalization would render the nation-state no longer valid: “the sovereign nation-state is in the process of becoming obsolete”[20]. He stresses that a final task that a theory of international relations can and must perform is to prepare the ground for a new international order radically different from that which preceded it[21]. Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism is both a critique of traditional realism and a substantial intellectual extension of a theoretical tradition which was in danger of being outflanked by rapid changes in the contours of global politics[22]. The international system (anarchy) is treated as a separate domain which conditions the behavior of all states within it. Paradoxically, with the advent of neo-realism, the scope and flexibility of Realism have significantly diminished. The theory has become deterministic, linear, and culturally poor. For neo-realists, culture and identity are (at best) derivative of the distribution of capabilities and have no independent explanatory power. Actors deploy culture and identity strategically, to further their own self-interests[23]. Nevertheless, it is wrong to assert that neo-realist perspectives do not acknowledge the importance of social facts. Gilpin has developed a compelling argument about war and change[24]. While his book is built on (micro)economic premises, he does not neglect sociological insights as necessary for understanding the context of rational behavior. "Specific interests or objectives that individuals pursue and the appropriateness of the means they employ are dependent on prevailing social norms and material environment…In short, the economic and sociological approaches must be integrated to explain political change"[25]. Waltz was implicitly talking about identity when he argued that anarchic structures tend to produce “like units”[26]. He allows for what he calls ‘socialization’ and ‘imitation’ processes. Stephen Krasner suggested that regimes could change state interests[27]. Regimes are an area where knowledge should be taken seriously. If regimes matter, then cognitive understanding can matter as well[28]. Realism is not necessarily about conflict; material forces may as well lead to cooperation. However, the minimalist treatment of culture and social phenomena increasingly proved neo-realism as losing ground empirically and theoretically. It was the suspicion that the international system is transforming itself culturally faster than would have been predictable from changes in military and economic capabilities that triggered the interest in problems of identity[29]. Reconstruction of the theory was vital in order to save Realism from becoming obsolete. The realization of this fact has triggered a shift in Realist thinking and gave way to the emergence of a ‘constructivist’ re-incarnation of Realism. Friedrich Kratochwil has once observed that no theory of culture can substitute for a theory of politics[30]. At least, nobody has ventured to accomplish such an enterprise so far. To disregard culture in politics, it seems obvious today, is inappropriate, not to say foolish. There remain opportunity costs incurred by Realism in its asymmetric engagement with cultural phenomena. Thus, Realism, notwithstanding its concern with parsimony, should make a serious commitment to building analytical bridges which link identity- and culture-related phenomena to its explanatory apparatus (like anarchy, sovereignty, the security dilemma, self-help, and balancing)[31]. Alexander Wendt in his seminal article “Anarchy Is What States Make of It” has masterfully shown how power politics is socially constructed[32]. Salus populi supreme lex. This classical metalegal doctrine of necessity is associated with raison d’etat, the right of preservation, and self-help. Wendt is convinced that the self-help corollary to anarchy does enormous work in Realism, generating the inherently competitive dynamics of the security dilemma and collective action problem[33]. What misses the point, however, is that self-help and power politics follow either logically or causally from anarchy. They do not; rather, they are just among other institutions (albeit significant ones) possible under anarchy. Consequently, provided there is relatively stable practice, international institutions can transform state identities and interests. Let me focus on two concrete security issues - the security dilemma and nuclear deterrence - to illustrate the point. A central tenet of Realism, the security dilemma[34], arises for the situation when “one actor’s quest for security through power accumulation ... exacerbates the feelings of insecurity of another actor, who in turn will respond by accumulating power”[35]. As a result of this behavior, a vicious circle or spiral of security develops, with fear and misperception exacerbating the situation[36]. Nevertheless, security dilemmas, as Wendt stresses, are not given by anarchy or nature[37]. Security dilemmas are constructed because identities and interests are constituted by collective meanings which are always in process. This is why concepts of security may differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other. Because deterrence is based on ideas about threat systems and conditional commitments to carry out punishment, it has proved particularly congenial to the strategic studies scholarship within the Realist tradition[38]. Deterrence is a conditional commitment to retaliate, or to exact retribution if another party fails to behave in a desired, compliant manner. Thus defined, deterrence has been invoked as the primary explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear case, in contrast to chemical weapons, for example, is definitely problematic for challenging traditional deterrence theory because it is widely felt that the tremendous destructive power of thermonuclear weapons does render them qualitatively different from other weapons. Yet, the patterns of the non-use of nuclear weapons cannot be fully understood without taking into account the development of norms that shaped these weapons as unacceptable. By applying social constructivist approach, it is possible to emphasize the relationship between norms, identities, and interests and try to provide a causal explanation of how the norms affect outcomes[39]. Norms shape conceptualizations of interests through the social construction of identities. In other words, a constructivist account is necessary to get at ‘what deters,’ and how and why deterrence ‘works’ [40]. International relations theory cannot afford to ignore norms. Demonstrating the impact of norms on the interests, beliefs, and behavior of actors in international politics does not and must not invalidate Realism. Rather, it points to analytical blind spots and gaps in traditional accounts. In so doing, it not only casts light into the shadows of existing theory but raises new questions as well.[41] However, with all the ‘constructivist’ adjustments made (which are absolutely credible), it is important to keep in mind ‘pure rationalist’ tools as well. Krasner points out that whenever the cost-benefit ratio indicates that breaking its rules will bring a net benefit that is what states will do[42]. Wendt introduces a correction that instrumentalism may be the attitude when states first settle on norms, and "continue(s) to be for poorly organized states down the road"[43]. States obey the law initially because they are forced to or calculate that it is in their self-interest. Some states never get beyond this point. Some do, and then obey the law because they accept its claims on them as legitimate[44]. This is truly an excellent observation. The problem here, however, could be that even when states remove the option of breaking the law from their agenda, this already implies that benefits overweight costs. And even if this is not the case, how can we know where exactly this point is, beyond which states respect law for law’s sake? Furthermore, states that supposedly have stepped over this point might break the law, when it has become least expected, if they consider this of their prime interest. Powerful illustration of this is France, which resumed its nuclear testing to the great surprise of the world[45]. Another interesting example is the case of NATO. Traditional alliance theories based on Realist thinking provide insufficient explanations of the origins, the interaction patterns, and the persistence of NATO. The ‘brand new’ interpretation is that the Alliance represents an institutionalized pluralistic community of liberal democracies. Democracies not only do not fight each other, they are likely to develop a collective identity facilitating the emergence of cooperative institutions for specific purposes[46]. Thus presented, old questions get revitalized. Why is NATO the strongest among the other post-Cold War security institutions—as compared to, the WEU, not even to mention the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy? Why is not the OSCE given a chance to turn into a truly pluralistic European ‘Security Architecture’? Why was NATO so eager to bomb Kosovo, which was a clear breach of international law? Because it is ‘an institutionalized pluralistic community of liberal democracies’? Or yet because it is a predominantly military organization? Why do public opinion polls in Russia[47] repeatedly show that NATO is an aggressive organization (and which can also be observed in official rhetoric, as in the national security conception and the military doctrine[48])? All these questions suggest that to claim that Realist explanation of NATO existence can be thrown into a dustbin is at minimum inappropriate. Social sciences do not evolve via scientific revolutions, as Thomas Kuhn argues is the case for the natural sciences. Not paradigm shifts but rather style and fashion changes are what characterize social science[49]. Thus posed, paradigm development promises Realism a bright future. In this respect, recent success of constructivism has, metaphorically speaking, breathed in a new life into Realism. Realism is in much debt to constructivism for being revitalized. Yet, paying full credit to the contribution of constructivism, it should be noted that to a large extent constructivists take off from the Realist positions.
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Niarguinen 1 [Dmitri Niarguinen, Rubikon, E-journal, ISSN 1505-1161, December, 2001, http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum.htm]
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The political environment will determine the forms of power a state chooses to exercise Realists should not be wedded to a perennial connection between interest and the nation-state Morgenthau anticipated that the forces of globalization would render the nation-state no longer valid: that a final task is to prepare the ground for a new international order radically different from that which preceded Waltz’s neo-realism is both a critique of traditional realism which was in danger of being outflanked by rapid changes in the contours of global politics Paradoxically, with the advent of neo-realism, the scope and flexibility of Realism have significantly diminished. The theory has become deterministic, linear, and culturally poor. economic and sociological approaches must be integrated to explain political change If regimes matter, then cognitive understanding can matter as well Realism is not necessarily about conflict However, the minimalist treatment of culture and social phenomena increasingly proved neo-realism as losing ground empirically and theoretically Reconstruction of the theory was vital in order to save Realism from becoming obsolete To disregard culture in politics is inappropriate, not to say foolish There remain opportunity costs incurred by Realism in its asymmetric engagement with cultural phenomena Realism, hould make a serious commitment to building analytical bridges which link identity security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature Security dilemmas are constructed because identities and interests are constituted by collective meanings which are always in process Demonstrating the impact of norms does not invalidate Realism. Rather, it points to analytical blind spots in traditional accounts. it not only casts light into the shadows of existing theory but raises new questions
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The alternative enriches and sustains realism—recognizing the social and psychological basis of enemy discourse is crucial to overcome security dilemmas and ameliorate realism’s blind spots—ensures a more authentic engagement with realism
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Thus, it can be argued that what we observe is the continuity of the process rather than a radical change. Put bluntly, if Realism is constructed and then is being analyzed in sociological and psychological terms, it does not cease being Realism. Constructivists have just built another layer (of culture and ideas) onto the material base of Realism. This is why constructivism has enriched rather than overthrown Realist theory. For the genuine link between constructivism and Realism to be taken seriously, certain elaborations are in order. It is tempting, and, indeed, has been common practice to polarize and dichotomize two grand standpoints: positivism and reflectivism. While positivism has been a dominant notion for at least two centuries now, reflectivism seems to be increasingly gaining momentum and may, over time, switch the pendulum to the other extreme. The tendency is out there: under the banner of reflectivism, scholars receive an opportunity to criticize everything which has a grain of rationality. This might lead to either ‘Sokal-hoax’ type incidents[50] or to a new dogma. In the light of strict positivist/reflectivist dichotomy, hard-core rigid Realism is rightly accused of being blind and stumble. To the same degree may hyper-reflectivism be accused of being chaotic, utopian and irrelevant[51]. Instead of this black-and-white division, we are much more flexible to view things in the shades of gray. To operate on the rationalist/reflectivist continuum then would rather be a virtue than a vice. It is thus important to move from instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalitaet) to value-rationality (Wertrationalitaet).[52] Equally is it important to stay away from pure ideas of reflectivism, which like Sirens in Homer’s Odyssey are luring scholars onto the rocks. As Alexander Wendt has indicated, ideas, after all, are not all the way down. To counter an argument that reflectivism and positivism are epistemologically incompatible, it is plausible to say that much cooperation is possible on the ontological basis alone. Indeed, neither positivism, nor reflectivism tells us about the structure and dynamics of international life. The state of the social sciences of international relations is such that epistemological prescriptions and conclusions are at best premature[53]. With all my attachment to Realism, there are certain pitfalls to be aware of and to avoid. What I do not argue about is Realism being an all-encompassing thought trespassing all possible borders and conquering both terra incognita and terra cognita. In a world full of anomalies, Realism is neither sufficiently established nor sufficiently precise to be treated as a sacrosanct paradigm to which other lines of argumentation must defer[54]. Moreover, it is a matter of attitude. Neoliberalists could claim with the same success that constructivism, for example, is doing a great job on their behalf[55]. Also, there is scholarship working on the extreme polar of reflectivism. Being appealing and powerful, it is unbridgeable epistemologically with Realism not only at the extreme positivist polar but even on the ‘gray territory’. To disregard or downplay this school would be, to say the least, inadequate. Having acknowledged this, however, it is tempting to illustrate on the example of the English School of Realism how indeed far Realism can stretch[56]. For the English School, international system is a ‘society’ in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to shared norms and rules in a variety of issue areas. Material power matters, but within a framework of normative expectations embedded in conventional and customary international law. Sociological imaginary is strong in the English School: it is not a great leap from arguing that adherence to norms is a condition of participation in a society to arguing that states are constructed, partly or substantially, by these norms[57]. The English School thinkers encourage us to think about international relations as a social arena whose members—sovereign states—relate to each other not only as competitors for power and wealth, but also as holders of particular rights, entitlements, and obligations. In terms of method, they emphasize the importance of a historical approach. Michael Walzer and John Vincent are particularly concerned with the relationship between human rights and the rights of sovereign states[58]. They seek ways in which to reconcile the society of states with cosmopolitan values. Terry Nardin, building his theory on the ideas of political philosopher Michael Oakenshott, argues that international society is best seen as a practical association made up of states each devoted to its own ends and its own conception of the good. The common good of this inclusive community resides not in the ends that some, or at times most, of its members may wish collectively to pursue but in the values of justice, peace, security, and co-existence, which can only be enjoyed through participation in a common body of authoritative practices.[59] Martin Wight’s triptych of international thought is extremely eclectic, not simply because of his refusal to delineate these ‘traditions’ with any philosophical or analytic precision, but also because of his personal reluctance either to transcend them or to locate his own views consistently with the parameters of any single one[60]. Wight has written widely about the cultural and moral dimensions of international relations, and his work is a constant reminder that what may appear to be new disputes in the field about contemporary issues are in fact extensions and manifestations of very old arguments, although couched in a different idiom. It is now acknowledged that the English School is an underutilized research resource and deserves a prominent role in international relations because of its distinctive elements: methodological pluralism, historicism, and its inter-linkage of three key concepts: international system, international society, and world community.[61] International system, thus, is associated with recurrent patterns of behavior that can be identified using positivist tools of analysis. By contrast, international society needs to be explored using hermeneutic methods that focus on the language that lies behind the rules, institutions, interests, and values that constitute any society. Finally, world community can only meaningfully be discussed by drawing on critical theory. To refigure the value of Realism in a period of rapid systemic change means to interpret it as an ongoing discursive struggle that cuts across the traditional theory-practice, and other synchronic and scholastic antinomies of world politics. It gives notice of how Realism in its universalistic philosophical form and particularistic state application has figuratively and literally helped to constitute the discordant world it purports to describe[62]. This is an attempt to open up the hermeneutic circle, to enlarge the interpretive community, “to break out of the prison-house of a reductive vocabulary that has so attenuated the ethico-political dimension of realism”[63]. Thus, it is important to consider the paradox that the power of Realism lies not in its immanence but in its distance from reality, from realities of contingency, ambiguity, and indeterminacy that Realism tries to keep at bay. *** It is often argued that globalization - the growth of transnational economic forces, combined with a growing irrelevance of territorial control to economic growth and the international division of labor - rendered Realism obsolete, with the end of the Cold war as a fatal blow for the theory. Has, indeed, Realism become anachronistic? If it were a monolithic rigid theory, the answer would probably be ‘yes.’ I have argued, however, that Realism is not homogeneous; rather, it has an irreducible core which is able to create flexible incarnations. At minimum, Realism offers an orienting framework of analysis that gives the field of security studies much of its intellectual coherence and commonality of outlook[64]. This is true even if Realism stays on the extreme polar of positivism. However, positivism/rationalism in a pure form is of little value. In the words of the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, “the approach of ‘rational behavior,’ as it is typically interpreted, leads to a remarkably mute theory…”[65]. Realism needs not be predestined to remain stagnant[66]. At maximum, thus, when Realism operates in the shades of gray between positivism and reflectivism, its strength is paramount. Consequently, there are good reasons for thinking that the twenty-first century will be a Realist century[67]. Once again I want to stress that Realism should not be perceived as dogmatic. And this is why we do need reflectivist approaches to problematize what is self-evident, and thus to counterbalance naive Realism[68]. In doing so, however, we are more flexible in keeping the ‘middle ground’ and not in sliding to the other extreme. As Wendt believes, in the medium run, sovereign states will remain the dominant political actors in the international system[69]. While this contention is arguable, it is hardly possible to challenge his psychological observation, …Realist theory of state interests in fact naturalizes or reifies a particular culture and in so doing helps reproduce it. Since the social practices is how we get structure—structure is carried in the heads of agents and is instantiated in their practices—the more that states think like “Realist” the more that egoism, and its systemic corollary of self-help, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy[70]. Even strong constructivists admit that we cannot do away with Realism simply because it is “a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics”[71]. Ergo, ita est.
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Niarguinen 1 [Dmitri Niarguinen, Rubikon, E-journal, ISSN 1505-1161, December, 2001, http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum.htm]
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what we observe is the continuity of the process rather than a radical change Constructivists have built another layer onto the material base of Realism This is why constructivism has enriched rather than overthrown Realist theory is tempting to polarize and dichotomize two grand standpoints hard-core rigid Realism is rightly accused of being blind and stumble To the same degree may hyper-reflectivism be accused of being chaotic, utopian and irrelevant ]. Instead of this black-and-white division, we are much more flexible to view things in the shades of gray. To refigure the value of Realism in a period of rapid systemic change means to interpret it as an ongoing discursive struggle that cuts across the traditional theory-practice, and other synchronic and scholastic antinomies of world politics. This is an attempt to open up the hermeneutic circle Realist theory of state interests in fact naturalizes or reifies a particular culture and in so doing helps reproduce it. Since the social practices is how we get structure—structure is carried in the heads of agents and is instantiated in their practices—the more that states think like “Realist” the more that egoism, and its systemic corollary of self-help, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy[70]. Even strong constructivists admit that we cannot do away with Realism simply because it is “a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics
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Realism is only as inevitable as they make it—their overly reductive and inflexible use of realism shuts off critical reflection
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Guzzini observes that realism cannot offer a proper understanding of world politics. He argues that attempts ‘to save realism as the discipline’s identity defining theory’ have failed because currently there is no work that provides a meta-theoretically coherent realism. Guzzini therefore posits that realist scholars face a fundamental dilemma. They can update the practical knowledge of a diplomatic culture, rather than science, and thereby risk losing scientific credibility. Alternatively, they can cast realist rules and culture into a scientific mould, but this will distort the realist tradition. Guzzini concludes that ‘despite realism’s several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action’. Guzzini presents a powerful and illuminating argument, but his analysis raises some questions. First, Guzzini’s argument is basically another distortion of the evolution of IR. While Guzzini claims that IR dates back to the 1940s and attributes its establishment to Morgenthau, there is evidence that the discipline is much older and emerged as part of political science long before the US became a superpower. Second, Guzzini has placed too much emphasis on a symbiotic relationship between the American foreign policy establishment and the evolution of IR. Even Morgenthau, the so-called ‘founding father’ of IR, was opposed to the US involvement in Vietnam. Third, Guzzini has overemphasised the identification of IR with realism. His attempt to identify realism with IR has made it difficult for him to consider the works of theorists like Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett on the ‘democratic peace’ thesis. Indeed, what Guzzini has done is provide a reconstructed and partially distorted history of IR, which can be denigrated and maligned much more easily by post-structuralists, post-modernists, feminists and critical theorists.
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Makinda 99 [Samuel M. Makinda, School of Politics and International Studies Murdoch University Australian Journal of International Affairs, Nov 1999, Vol. 53, Issue 3 p.334]
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Guzzini observes realism cannot offer a proper understanding of world politics He argues that attempts ‘to save realism as the discipline’s identity defining theory’ have failed because there is no work that provides a meta-theoretically coherent realism Guzzini concludes that realism can still powerfully enframe action’ Guzzini’s argument is basically another distortion of the evolution of IR Guzzini has placed too much emphasis on a symbiotic relationship between American foreign policy and the evolution of IR Guzzini has overemphasised the identification of IR with realism to identify realism with IR has made it difficult to consider the works of theorists on the ‘democratic peace’ thesis what Guzzini has done is provide a reconstructed and partially distorted history of IR, which can be denigrated and maligned much more easily by critical theorists.
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Guzinni’s conclusions are based on a warped understanding of IR that overemphasizes realism
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This is a stimulating work which, for all the excellence of some of its individual components, nevertheless does not add up to a convincing whole. Guzzini’s interpretation of realism as ‘the attempt to translate the rules of the diplomatic practice of the nineteenth century into scientific rules of social science which developed mainly in the US’ (p. 11) is plausible enough but his treatment of the historical assimilation is questionable. He repeats the tired old myth that there was an interwar ‘debate’ between idealism and realism (p. 32). Not only do scholars investigating the period find little evidence for such a debate, but they also have considerable difficulty in separating the idealists from the realists (see for example the essays in David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., Thinker of the twenty-year crisis: inter-war realism reassessed, 1995). Was Chamberlain an idealist or a realist? E. H. Carr, as Guzzini is aware, gave different answers to this question in consecutive editions of his Twenty-year crisis. Certainly, if we accept Guzzini’s summary that ‘in short, idealism holds that through reason alone mankind can overcome the state of nature in inter-state relations’ (p. 17) we will be hard pressed to identify very many idealists at all. This is important because Guzzini wishes to resurrect the Kuhnian notion of ‘paradigms’ in suggesting that there was a paradigmatic shift from idealism to realism as the dominant paradigm after the Second World War. I doubt whether realism has ever enjoyed quite the unchallenged status that Guzzini ascribes to it, certainly nothing that would approach the Kuhnian state of ‘normal science.’ Hans Morgenthau--whose Politics among nations is described by Guzzini as ‘the paradigmatic text of the emerging US social science’ (p. 16)--had numerous detrators both within academe and in the broader policy-shaping networks. Guzzini sees the academic community as the ‘binding link’ between ‘the internal conceptual debates and the external context of realist thought’, describing this approach as ‘a historical sociology of a fairly limited kind’ (p. 2). It is, indeed, so limited as to hardly warrant the description at all. Guzzini has very little to tell us about the links between academe and government. Chapter two introduces Morgenthau and E. H. Carr as ‘the fouding fathers of the new descipline’ (p. 16) but in chapter four where Guzzini explores the formation of US foreign policy it is George Kennan who emerges as the most significant figure. To say merely that ‘realist thought developed in parallel with US foreign policy formulations’ (p. 49) is to side-step too many important questions. Guzzini acknowledges that the growth of hegemonic stability theory ‘epitomized again the close link between US foreign policy concerns and the research interests of the academia in international relations’ (p. 142) but if this ‘close link’ amounts to little more than trailing in the wake of the twists and turns of US foreign policy the discipline can hardly be worthy of its grandiose title. The absence of any attempt to explore these linakages helps to explain the self-contained feel of the individual chapters.
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Rologas 2K [Mitchell Rologas, University of St Andrews International Affairs, Jan 2K, Vol. 76, Issue 1 p. 141]
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This is a work which, for excellence of its components, does not add up to a convincing whole Guzzini’s interpretation of realism ) is plausible but his treatment of the historical assimilation is questionable. He repeats the tired myth that there was an interwar ‘debate’ between idealism and realism Guzzini wishes to resurrect the Kuhnian notion of ‘paradigms’ in suggesting that there was a paradigmatic shift from idealism to realism I doubt whether realism has ever enjoyed the unchallenged status that Guzzini ascribes to it Morgenthau- )--had numerous detrators both within academe and in the broader policy-shaping networks. Guzzini has very little to tell us about the links between academe and government
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Guzinni incorrectly credits realism as an unchallenged theory
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The problem runs deeper than the issue of finding new ways to regulate the market or imposing legally binding global green house gas emission reduction targets. The real crisis lies in the set of assumptions about human nature that governs the behavior of world leaders--assumptions that were spawned during the Enlightenment more than 200 years ago at the dawn of the modern market economy and the emergence of the nation state era.
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Rifkin 10—a senior lecturer at the Wharton School’s Executive Education Program at the University of Pennsylvania—the world’s #1 ranked business school, author, an advisor to the European Union since 2002, the founder and chairperson of the Third Industrial Revolution Global CEO Business Roundtable [January 11, 2010, Jeremy Rifkin, “‘The Empathic Civilization’: Rethinking Human Nature in the Biosphere Era,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/the-empathic-civilization_b_416589.html]
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The problem runs deeper than the issue of finding new ways to regulate the market or imposing legally binding global g h g emission reduction targets The real crisis lies in the set of assumptions about human nature that governs the behavior of world leaders
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This is a link—the assumption that humans are self-interested guarantees extinction and is disproven by recent scientific evidence—the communications revolution enables the creation of a cosmopolitan identity.
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This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, othemess and violence in ways that for many appear like enduring political facts, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed; they condition politics as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very possibility of the present. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination has conceived and thought security, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance.
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Burke 7—Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 68-9]
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an exercise in thinking challenges the continuing power of political ontologies that connect security othemess and violence in ways that appear like enduring political facts, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, arise not merely from collective acts they condition politics as such forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very possibility of the present. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination has conceived and thought security
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Conflicts appear inevitable because we allow security to constitute our world.
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Second, Schmitt’s odd periodization obscures the fundamental changes to traditional European interstate relations generated by the emergence of the modern nation-state. As Bobbitt has succinctly observed, the appearance of the nation-state was accompanied by the strategic style of total war. If the nation governed the state, and the nation’s welfare provided the state’s reason for being, then the enemy’s nation must be destroyed—indeed, that was the way to destroy the state. . . . [F]or the nation-state it was necessary to annihilate the vast resources of men and material that a nation could throw into the field . . . . 36 It was the idea of a “nation in arms” that not only posed a direct threat to earlier absolutist images of “king’s wars,” but also opened the door to many pathologies of modern warfare: the full-scale mobilization of the “nation” and subsequent militarization of society, and killing of “enemy” civilians. The European nation-state and total war may represent two sides of the same coin.37 Of course, for Schmitt’s purposes it is useful that the idea of the “nation in arms” first takes the historical stage in the context of the French Revolution and its commitment to universalistic ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity.38 Nation-state-based democracy is indeed a normatively ambivalent creature, resting on an uneasy synthesis of universalistic liberal democratic ideals with historically contingent notions of shared cultural identity, language, history, and ethnos.39 Although Schmitt and his followers predictably try to link the horrors of modern warfare to the growing significance of universalistic liberal-democratic ideals, a more persuasive empirical case can be made that those horrors can be traced to highly particularistic and exclusionary ideas of national identity, according to which the “other”—in this case, outsiders to the “national community”—came to be perceived as representing life-and-death foes in the context of crisis-ridden industrial capitalism and the increasingly unstable interstate system of the nineteenth century. Such ideas of national identity ultimately took the disastrous form of the “inflamed nationalism and ethnic truculence” that dominated European politics by the late nineteenth century and ultimately culminated in World War I.40 Nationalism and ethnic truculence played a key role in the destruction of the traditional European balance of power system since they required a fundamental reshuffling of state borders in accordance with “national identity”; of course, this question had been of marginal significance in the absolutist interstate system. In this context as well, one of Schmitt’s heroes, Bismarck, in reality played a role very different from that described by Schmitt in Nomos der Erde: “the last statesman” of the jus publicum europaeum not only helped forge a unified German nation-state, but in order to do relied on total warfare while undermining the traditional European system of states, in part because it rested on state forms (e.g., the diverse, polyglot Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires) fundamentally distinct from the modern nation-state.41 On this matter as well, Schmitt’s analysis is either openly misleading or revealingly silent. Perhaps his own unabashed enthusiasm for rabid ethnonationalism in the context of National Socialism helps explain this silence.42
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Scheuerman 4 [William Scheuerman, Political Science at Indiana, “International Law as Historical Myth,” Constellations, 11 (4) p. 546-547]
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Schmitt’s odd periodization obscures the fundamental changes to traditional European interstate relations generated by the emergence of the modern nation-state the appearance of the nation-state was accompanied by the strategic style of total war If the nation governed the state, and the nation’s welfare provided the state’s reason for being, then the enemy’s nation must be destroyed the idea of a “nation in arms opened the door to many pathologies of modern warfare: the full-scale mobilization of the “nation” and subsequent militarization of society, and killing of “enemy” civilians. Although Schmitt and his followers predictably try to link the horrors of modern warfare to the growing significance of universalistic liberal-democratic ideals a more persuasive empirical case can be made that those horrors can be traced to highly particularistic and exclusionary ideas of national identity according to which the “other” came to be perceived as representing life-and-death foes in the context of crisis-ridden industrial capitalism and the increasingly unstable interstate system of the nineteenth centur one of Schmitt’s heroes, Bismarck, played a role very different from that described by Schmitt not only helped forge a unified German nation-state, but in order to do relied on total warfare while undermining the traditional European system of states his own unabashed enthusiasm for rabid ethnonationalism in the context of National Socialism helps explain this silence
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Enmity creates absolute foes that drive unlimited conflict.
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According to the concluding chapters of the Nomos der Erde, it is the United States that inherits the imperial mantle of the British “sea-power” by combining universalistic liberalism with dreams of global economic domination. In altogether unambiguous terms, Schmitt makes the rise of the US from a regional to global power primarily responsible for the re-moralization of warfare that occurred in the twentieth century and allegedly prepared the way for its innumerable wartime atrocities. It is the Americans, he repeatedly underscores in the work’s final chapters, who have initiated a series of moralistic regressions in international law that fall behind the great intellectual accomplishments of Thomas Hobbes and the jus publicum europaeum. They fail to acknowledge the dangers of crude moralistic conceptions of warfare and embrace a discriminatory conception of war. Consequently, they plunge international relations back into civil war, in which the carefully constructed civilizing achievements of the jus publicum europaeum are irresponsibly discarded. Just as significant, the United States discards the European preference for regionalism in international law—in Schmitt’s terminology, a sufficiently homogeneous Raum-based system of interstate relations—for the liberalistic fiction of a heterogeneous universal global system of legality that represents a cloak for US world domination. Schmitt offers a fascinating and oftentimes perceptive account of why the idiosyncrasies of American political development rendered the US susceptible to such intellectual mistakes, but his real focus, of course, is more than the messianic excesses of US political and legal thinking. In the final analysis, it is the busybody interventionist liberalism of the United States Schmitt considers culpable for the destruction of the basically pacific European system of jus publicum europaeum. At times offering little more than a warmed-over version of his Nazi era claim that Hitler was waging a defensive war against the universalistic (and thereby for Schmitt necessarily imperialistic) United States,20 a central theme of Nomos der Erde is that the United States—and not, of course, Germany—posed the greatest threat to world peace in the twentieth century. II. Separating the Wheat from the Chaff Schmitt’s apology for Germany’s troubled role in mid-century international politics might legitimately lead a politically and historically sensible reader to recoil in disgust from Nomos der Erde. Nonetheless, Schmitt’s stylized vision of the jus publicum europaeum initially appears to rest on solid historical evidence. As Theodore Rabb has noted, “there is general scholarly agreement that war become ‘milder’ and ‘more civilized’ in the late seventeenth century, and that particular credit must go to the improvement of discipline, military academies, and the creation of standing armies.”21 As Schmitt argues in Nomos der Erde, the rationalization of the modern state apparatus went hand-in-hand with a relative domestication of warfare, and the “decline of religion as a stimulus to violence,” 22 widely noted by historians of this period, might be taken as empirical support for Schmitt’s claim that only a “de-moralized” concept of war can minimize its potential horrors. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European states typically engaged in “delimited warfare, fought with limited means for limited objects,” resulting in a substantial improvement in the military treatment of civilians during wartime.23 “More and more, then, soldiers were now hemmed in by clearly defined official criteria and requirements against which their actions could be judged.”24 A common European aristocratic ethos in the officer corps facilitated the movement away from the horrors of earlier religiously based political conflict, as wars increasingly became akin to aristocratic duels.25 Of course, as Schmitt himself concedes, the relative civility of European interstate relations operated alongside terrible acts of violence committed against non- European peoples. In addition, the development of the modern state apparatus, improvement of military discipline, and rise of professionalized standing armies ultimately helped bring about unprecedented capacities for organized state violence, even if such violence was no longer typically unleashed against fellow Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.26 This is by no means the only oversight in Schmitt’s account, however. He conveniently downplays inconvenient historical events that mesh poorly with his nostalgic gloss. For example, in the Seven Years War (1756–63), one of Schmitt’s own paradigmatic examples of an absolutist “land-power,” Prussia, lost 180,000 soldiers and one-ninth of the country’s entire population; Frederick himself conceded that his subjects “had nothing left except the miserable rags which covered their nakedness.”27 Armies still spread terrible diseases: in 1771, soldiers returning from battles with Turks on the south Russian steppe spread a plague that killed 60,000 in Moscow, 14,000 in Kiev, and 10,000 in the Ukraine.28 A closer look at the jus publicum europaeum quickly suggests that this “golden age” not only permitted and perhaps even required the exploitation, enslavement, and slaughter of non-Europeans around the globe, but that it still engendered significant misery for those living on the European continent itself.
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Scheuerman 4 [William Scheuerman, Political Science at Indiana, “International Law as Historical Myth,” Constellations, 11 (4) p. 542-544]
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it is the liberalism of the U S considers culpable for the destruction of the basically pacific European system o jus publicum europaeum offering little more than a warmed-over version of his Nazi era claim that Hitler was waging a defensive war against the universalistic U S the relative civility of European interstate relations operated alongside terrible acts of violence committed against non- European peoples the development of military discipline professionalized standing armies helped bring about unprecedented capacities for organized state violence even if such violence was no longer typically unleashed against fellow Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Schmitt’s account downplays inconvenient historical events in the Seven Years War one of Schmitt’s own paradigmatic examples Prussia, lost one-ninth of the country’s entire population A closer look at the jus publicum europaeum quickly suggests that this “golden age” required the exploitation, enslavement, and slaughter of non-Europeans around the globe it still engendered significant misery for those living on the European continent itself.
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Emnity creates more destructive wars than liberal humanitarianism.
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Schmitt holds the universalistic aspirations of liberal international law responsible for the brutalities of total war: universalism engenders a self-righteous brand of pseudo-humanitarianism blind to the terrible dangers of state violence waged under the banner of a (fictional) singular humanity. Blurring any meaningful distinction between legality and morality, those who dare to oppose the liberal international community are demonized and accordingly subjected to fire bombings (e.g., Dresden) and even atomic bombs (e.g., Hiroshima and Nagasaki). Liberal international law rests on a false universalism not only because self-interested great powers (e.g., Great Britain and the United States) typically interpret and enforce it, but also because its humanitarian rhetoric masks their pursuit of global economic domination: Schmitt shares with orthodox Marxist critics of international law the idea of a necessary kinship between universalistic international law and global free-market capitalism.1 The apex of liberal self-righteousness is the assertion that liberal wars no longer even deserve to be described as such. Although their technological superiority permits them to kill civilians in any corner of the globe, liberal states purportedly undertake “police action” (or, in present-day parlance, humanitarian intervention) for the sake of enforcing international law, whereas only outcast states who dare to challenge liberal hegemony allegedly continue to engage in barbaric wars. The exclusionary character of liberal universalism is thereby taken to its logical conclusion: liberal international law requires what Schmitt describes as a discriminatory concept of war. Only a short step beyond this conceptual move is the widespread real-life liberal tendency to ignore or at least downplay civilian casualties in humanitarian interventions undertaken against pariah states. Little imagination is required to understand the potential appeal of this diagnosis at an historical juncture when the world’s most well-armed liberal state, the United States, self-righteously claims the right to intervene unilaterally in accordance with its own idiosyncratic interpretation of both international law and the interests of humanity—despite the opposition of both the United Nations and global civil society to President Bush and his radical right-wing foreign policy.2 Indeed, anyone familiar with Schmitt’s work on international law occasionally finds herself wondering whether the White House playbook for foreign policy might not have been written by Schmitt or at least by one of his followers.3 Nor should it come as a surprise that a sophisticated body of unabashedly liberal political thought—I am thinking of realism à la Hans Morgenthau and his followers—has tried to build on some of Schmitt’s more perceptive insights about the special dangers of an international system dominated by great powers like the United States.4 Readers of this journal, however, hardly need a reminder of the normative flaws of Schmitt’s assault on liberal international law. Notwithstanding the seeming plausibility of Schmitt’s diagnosis, its basic conceptual weaknesses are no less self-evident. What is the normative standpoint of Schmitt’s critique? Much of the surprising pathos of his attack on liberal international law derives from the fact that he implicitly contrasts its self-understanding to less-than-attractive legal and political realities: despite its purported humanitarianism, liberal international law engenders unparalleled brutality. Even though his hostility to modern universalism prevents him from admitting as much, Schmitt’s apparent outrage against the murderousness of recent international politics5 implicitly presupposes characteristically modern norms of universal equality and reciprocity. Of course, Schmitt is no closet universalist. Yet why are brutal air warfare and the discriminatory concept of war problems in the first place unless Schmitt’s argument rests at least implicitly on some (implicitly humanitarian) concern about the basic equality and value of all human life?6 Pace Schmitt, the universalistic core of liberal international law can be plausibly interpreted as an immanent normative motor which allows us to criticize and subsequently reform the sad realities of the existing international system according to its own internal normative criteria. However accurate Schmitt’s description of those realities, what his account obscures is the core normative achievement of universalistic international law, namely the fact that it offers internal standards for critically diagnosing and ultimately obliterating the political and legal pathologies described by him.
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Scheuerman 4 [William Scheuerman, Political Science at Indiana, “International Law as Historical Myth,” Constellations, 11 (4) p. 537-538]
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What is the normative standpoint of Schmitt’s critique Much of the pathos of his attack on liberal international law derives from the fact that he implicitly contrasts its self-understanding to less-than-attractive political realities Schmitt’s apparent outrage against the murderousness of recent international politics implicitly presupposes modern norms of universal equality and reciprocity why are brutal air warfare and the discriminatory concept of war problems unless Schmitt’s argument rests implicitly on humanitarian) concern about the basic equality and value of all human life what his account obscures is the core normative achievement of universalistic international law, namely the fact that it offers internal standards for critically diagnosing the political and legal pathologies described by him
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Their impact is circular. Our explicit use of liberal standards is better than their implicit use.
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The most revealing divergence between Schmitt’s Nomos der Erde and recent research on the history of international relations lies elsewhere, however. As noted, Schmitt argues that the golden age of the jus publicum europaeum only came to a conclusion at the outset of the twentieth century, as the United States exploded onto the world scene and unleashed its deadly brand of messianic universalism on unsuspecting European victims. At the end of the eighteenth century, French revolutionary armies posed a major challenge to the traditional state system, Schmitt concedes, but far-sighted nineteenth-century European statesmen (e.g., political reactionaries like Metternich and Bismarck) were ultimately able to counter the French revolutionary challenge and stabilize the traditional jus publicum europaeum. In the twentieth century, however, the political leaders of a weakened European order failed to accomplish the same task, and sound continental European ideals of international law were not only consequently discarded, but Europe itself was soon rendered subservient to American power. Schmitt’s historical periodization of the rise and fall of the jus publicum europaeum constitutes a key building block for his book’s deeply rooted anti-Americanism, according to which the United States—as that world power which systematically synthesizes awesome military power with liberal universalism—not only played a decisive role in destroying a sound Hobbesian system of European interstate relations, but now menaces humanity to a greater degree than recent totalitarian dictatorships. The anti-American thrust of the overall argument probably only works if Schmitt can plausibly link the emergence of the United States as a global power to the decline of the jus publicum europaeum: situating both events at the outset of the twentieth century allows him to do so. Not surprisingly, this periodization is the most idiosyncratic feature of Schmitt’s account. Most historians of international relations suggest that key features of the traditional European state system were in shambles long before the appearance of the United States as a major player in global politics. They also interpret the resurgence of total warfare, where civilians are subjected to horrible state violence, as occurring before World War I. This is a complicated and by no means uncontroversial historical question, but two issues in the recent literature are particularly revealing in the context of Schmitt’s argument. First, much of this historical literature works to underline the highly selective and crudely partisan character of Schmitt’s analysis of the resurgence of total war. The standard interpretation is that the trend towards total warfare—characterized in this context by a full-scale mobilization of society for warfare, as well as the blurring of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants—occurred in quite different political contexts in the nineteenth century. Thus, it is tendentious to see the roots of total warfare in liberal international law let alone a specifically messianic American version of liberalism. According to Schmitt, for example, Bismarck represented the “last statesman of European international law,” a lonely heroic fighter who struggled to ward off dangerous non-European threats to traditional European great power politics.32 Yet some of the recent literature describes Bismarck as a far more complex figure, and arguably a destabilizing one in relation to the European state system, in part because of his pivotal role in the emergence of a distinct style of warfare that revolutionized European political affairs. In fact, one of the forerunners to the terrible world wars of the twentieth century was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, in which Prussia reaped the benefits of mass mobilization and lightning-fire technologies, stunning its military rivals on the continent and spurring them to imitate Prussian military innovations. As Philip Bobbitt has pointed out, Prussia led the way in Europe in militarizing every aspect of society while exploiting technological innovations—the railways, telegraphs, and the standardization of machine tools—in order to bring about “dizzying increases in the speed and mobility of military dispositions.” 33 Schmitt is right to see a foreshadowing of more recent forms of warfare in the US Civil War.34 However, he ignores the fact that recent total war builds at least as clearly on the militarization of Prussian society that accompanied Germany’s role as a late modernizer. As a prominent military history notes, “[a]fter 1871 the Prussian institutions—conscription, strategic railways, mobilization techniques, above all the General Staff—were copied by every state in continental Europe. Thirty years later, after disastrous experiences in South Africa and Cuba, Britain and the United States adapted the model to their own needs.”35 Schmitt’s book is remarkably silent about this decisive feature of recent military development. The reason for this oversight is obvious enough: it allows him to underplay the existence of a potential link between modern dictatorship and total war. After all, it was dictatorships, at least as commonly as liberal democracies, which perfected the horrible techniques of total war in the twentieth-century: recall the Japanese invasion of China, or Nazi Germany’s aerial bombings against the Spanish Republic and, subsequently, slaughter of innocent civilians in World War II. It is telling that in Schmitt’s own account (at least in its Nazi-era rendition), the Axis powers represented paradigmatic cases of political entities that had broken decisively with the “decadent” legacy of liberal universalism.
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Scheuerman 4 [William Scheuerman, Political Science at Indiana, “International Law as Historical Myth,” Constellations, 11 (4) p. 544-546]
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Schmitt’s historical periodization of the rise and fall of the jus publicum europaeum constitutes a key building block for his book’s deeply rooted anti-Americanism The anti-American thrust of the overall argument probably only works if Schmitt can plausibly link the emergence of the United States as a global power to the decline of the jus publicum europaeum this periodization is the most idiosyncratic feature of Schmitt’s account. Most historians of international relations suggest that key features of the traditional European state system were in shambles long before the appearance of the United States as a major player They also interpret the resurgence of total warfare, where civilians are subjected to horrible state violence, as occurring before World War I. much of this historical literature works to underline the highly selective and crudely partisan character of Schmitt’s analysis of the resurgence of total war. it is tendentious to see the roots of total warfare in liberal international law let alone a specifically messianic American version of liberalism total war builds at least as clearly on the militarization of Prussian society that accompanied Germany’s role as a late modernizer the Prussian institutions—conscription, strategic railways, mobilization techniques, above all the General Staff—were copied by every state in continental Europe it was dictatorships, at least as commonly as liberal democracies, which perfected the horrible techniques of total war in the twentieth-century: recall the Japanese invasion of China, or Nazi Germany’s aerial bombings against the Spanish Republic and, subsequently, slaughter of innocent civilians in World War II. in Schmitt’s own account (at least in its Nazi-era rendition), the Axis powers represented paradigmatic cases of political entities that had broken decisively with the “decadent” legacy of liberal universalism
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Non-universalist and illiberal states fight total wars. Their alternative can’t solve.
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However, despite important insights, this position remains highly disputable. The reason behind this qualification is not hard to understand. With great trepidation my contention is that one of the main distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between 'institutional' and 'brute' threats. In its attempts to follow a more radical approach to security problems wherein threats are institutional, that is, mere products of communicative relations between agents, the CS has neglected the importance of 'external or brute threats', that is, threats that do not depend on language mediation to be what they are - hazards for human life. In methodological terms, however, any framework over-emphasizing either institutional or brute threat risks losing sight of important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, securitization, as suggested earlier, is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development. In this scheme, there is no security problem except through the language game. Therefore, how problems are 'out there' is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them. This is not always true. For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would determine its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that some security problems are the attribute of the development itself. In short, threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language. Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization. Thus, far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it.
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Balzacq 5—Thierry, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Namur University [“The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context” European Journal of International Relations, London: Jun 2005, Volume 11, Issue 2]
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one of the main distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between 'institutional' and 'brute' threats. In its attempts to follow a radical approach to security problems where threats are mere products of communicative relations CS has neglected the importance of 'external threats that do not depend on language mediation to be what they are hazards for human life. In methodological terms any framework over-emphasizing institutional threat risks losing sight of important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon how problems are 'out there' is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them. is not always true language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it it is not theoretically useful nor empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would determine its essence what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence some security problems are the attribute of the development itself threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization. external developments are central to it.
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Reps don't shape reality
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I have no easy answer to this question of how practical or “do-able” reform proposals made by philosophers should be. As suggested above, it is a question that has obvious important implications for the application of philosophical principles to environmental policy. My intuition though is that the pragmatist ought to have a long-term end in view while at the same time she must have at the ready viable alternatives which assume current political or economic systems and structures whenever possible. This is not to say that the pragmatic philosopher gives up on the tasks of defending alternatives to current structures, and the pursuit of those alternatives in democratic debates on the reallocation of resources. It only means that our position may require, for consistency sake to our pragmatic intentions at least, that we not rely exclusively on such changes in articulating our preferred ends for better public policies. In this context, there are at least two senses in which one could understand the meaning of “pragmatic” philosophy as discussed so far. (1) Philosophy that has practical intent, anchored to practical problems, and (2) Philosophy which aids in the development of policy solutions that can actually achieve support and consensus. While Young’s approach certainly encompasses (1) the question is whether she also does (2). My own pragmatist approach assumes that there is a connection between (1) and (2) (indeed, that (1) implies (2)). Assuming a successful argument that (1) and (2) are related in this way (for some this may take some argument, for others it will be obvious) then a question remains concerning how to go about achieving (2). Let me make just one suggestion for how the pragmatist could go about reconciling her desire to change systems with the need to make achievable policy recommendations. As is suggested by my approach, my view is that if a pragmatic philosophy in the end is in the service of an argument to create better polices, then in our democratic society it must be prepared to argue its case before the public, and perhaps sometimes only before policy makers. As Said puts it, the public intellectual not only wants to express her beliefs but also wants to persuade others—meaning the public at large—of her views (1994, p. 12). This raises the critical issue of how such appeals to the public are to be made. It raises the issue of how important persuasion is to the creation of pragmatic arguments. All philosophy is in some sense about persuasion, though to differentiate ourselves from rhetoricians (if we are interested in making such distinctions, which I still am) we must restrict ourselves to persuasion through some form of argument given more or less agreed upon (and revisable) standards for what counts as a good argument. But the pragmatic philosopher is not simply concerned with per- suading other philosophers. She is also interested in persuading the public either directly (in hopes that they will in turn influence policy makers) or indirectly, by appealling to policy makers who in turn help to shape public opinion. The work of a public philosophy is not solely for intramural philosophical discussion; it is aimed at larger forums. But as I suggested before, such a task requires some attention to the question of what motivates either the public, policy makers, or both to act. Our bar is set higher than traditional philosophical standards of validity and abstractly conceived soundness. For if we are to direct our philosophy at policies in a context other than a hypothetical philosophical framework, we must also make arguments which will motivate our audiences to act. Since we are dealing in ethi- cal and political matters, the question for pragmatic philosophers like Young and myself is how much we must attend to the issue of moral motivation in forming our pragmatic arguments. If we agree that the issue of moral motivation is always crucial for a pragmatic philosophy then at least two issues arise. First, as I suggested before, we must be prepared to embrace a theoretical or conceptual pluralism which allows us to pick and choose from a range of conceptual frameworks in making our arguments without committing to the theoretical monism which may be assumed in some versions of these frameworks. The reason is that we need to be able to make arguments that will appeal to the conceptual frameworks of our audiences while recognizing that these frameworks can change from audience to audience. So, if we think a utilitarian argument will be useful for talking to economists in decision making positions, then we should be allowed to engage such a framework without completely committing ourselves to utilitarianism.
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Light 5—Andrew Light, Environmental Philosophy @ NYU [“What is Pragmatic Philosophy,” http://faculty.washington.edu/alight/papers/Light.What%20Pragmatic.pdf. P. 349-351]
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the pragmatist ought to have a long-term end in view while at the same time she must have at the ready viable alternatives which assume current political or economic systems and structures whenever possible not to say that the pragmatic philosopher gives up on the tasks of defending alternatives to current structures, our position may require we not rely exclusively on such changes in articulating our preferred ends for better public policies. a pragmatic philosophy in the end is in the service of an argument to create better polices it must be prepared to argue its case before the public, and policy makers the public intellectual not only wants to express her beliefs but also wants to persuade others the pragmatic philosopher is interested in appealling to policy makers such a task requires some attention to the question of what motivates either the public, policy makers, we must embrace a theoretical pluralism which allows us to pick and choose from a range of conceptual frameworks in making our arguments without committing to the theoretical monism which may be assumed in some versions of these frameworks frameworks can change from audience to audience. So, if we think a utilitarian argument will be useful for talking to economists in decision making positions, then we should be allowed to engage such a framework without completely committing ourselves to utilitarianism.
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Representations and framework aren’t a prior issue—arguments for better policy should draw from different frameworks when appropriate.
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Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer toaddressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come – is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement. Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment. Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and established the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increasingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action.Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international community, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to confronting and solving them. One approach, which might avoid the massive tidal impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward strategic planning, strategic investment, and strategic attention. Clearly, the time is now to reorder our entire approach to how we address – or fail to address – security.
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Liotta 5—Prof of Humanities at Salve Regina University, Professor of Humanities at Salve Regina University, Newport, RI, and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy [P. H. “Through the Looking Glass” Sage Publications]
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‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are social constructions fail in practice. global community faces wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises urgency to act is the only appropriate first response. The cost of not investing in the right way and early is decades of military engagement Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right seems necessary. If this occurs, a tectonic shift might take place in international relations and human affairs we should be focusing on the best approaches to confronting and solving them to reorder our entire approach to how we fail to address – security
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Threat con isn’t a link—the alternative results in war.
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When philosophers become more or less direct participants in the policy-making process and so are no longer academics just hoping that an occasional policymaker might read their scholarly journal articles, this scholarly virtue of the unconstrained search for the truth—all assumptions open to question and follow the arguments wherever they lead—comes under a variety of related pressures. What arises is an intellectual variant of the political problem of "dirty hands" that those who hold political power often face. I emphasize that I do not conceive of the problem as one of pure, untainted philosophers being corrupted by the dirty business of politics. My point is rather that the different goals of academic scholarship and public policy call in turn for different virtues and behavior in their practitioners. Philosophers who steadfastly maintain their academic ways in the public policy setting are not to be admired as islands of integrity in a sea of messy political compromise and corruption. Instead, I believe that if philosophers maintain the academic virtues there they will not only find themselves often ineffective but will as well often fail in their responsibilities and act wrongly. Why is this so? The central point of conflict is that the first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect. This is not to say that they should not be concerned with the moral evaluation of those consequences—they should; nor that they must be moral consequentialists in the evaluation of the policy, and in turn human, consequences of their actions—whether some form of consequentialism is an adequate moral theory is another matter. But it is to say that persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be irresponsible if they did not focus their concern on how their actions will affect policy and how that policy will in turn affect people. The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but also the fact that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on people's lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social consequences of that scholarship. When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their primary commitment from knowledge and truth to the policy consequences of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do this, why did they enter the public domain? What are they doing there?
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Dan W. Brock, Professor of Philosophy and Biomedical Ethics at Brown University, 1987 (“Truth or Consequences: The Role of Philosophers in Policy-Making," Ethics, Volume 97, July, Available Online via JSTOR, p. 787)
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When philosophers become direct participants in the policy-making process and are no longer academics the unconstrained search for the truth comes under a variety of pressures the different goals of academic scholarship and public policy call in turn for different virtues and behavior in their practitioners. Philosophers who steadfastly maintain their academic ways in the public policy setting are not to be admired as islands of integrity in a sea of messy political compromise and corruption. Instead if philosophers maintain the academic virtues there they will not only find themselves often ineffective but will as well often fail in their responsibilities and act wrongly The central point of conflict is that the first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be irresponsible if they did not focus their concern on how their actions will affect policy and how that policy will in turn affect people The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but also the fact that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on people's lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social consequences of that scholarship. When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their primary commitment from knowledge and truth to the policy consequences of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do this, why did they enter the public domain? What are they doing there
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Looking at consequences is the only way to evaluate policy
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For the realist, then, if rationalist theories prove so conservative as to make their adoption problematic, critical theories prove so progressive as to make their adoption unattractive. If the former can justifiably be criticised for seeking to make a far from ideal order work more efficiently, thus perpetuating its existence and legitimating its errors, reflectivist theory can equally be criticised for searching for a tomorrow which may never exist, thereby endangering the possibility of establishing any form of stable order in the here and now. Realism's distinctive contribution thus lies in its attempt to drive a path between the two, a path which, in the process, suggests the basis on which some form of synthesis between rationalism and reflectivism might be achieved. Oriented in its genesis towards addressing the shortcomings in an idealist transformatory project, it is centrally motivated by a concern to reconcile vision with practicality, to relate utopia and reality. Unifying a technical and a practical stance, it combines aspects of the positivist methodology employed by problem-solving theory with the interpretative stance adopted by critical theory, avoiding the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two. Ultimately, it can simultaneously acknowledge the possibility of change in the structure of the international system and the need to probe the limits of the possible, and yet also question the proximity of any international transformation, emphasise the persistence of problems after such a transformation, and serve as a reminder of the need to grasp whatever semblance of order can be obtained in the mean time. Indeed, it is possible to say that realism is uniquely suited to serve as such an orientation. Simultaneously to critique contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority as unsatisfactory and yet to support them as an attainable measure of order in an unstable world involves one in a contradiction which is difficult to accept. Yet, because it grasps the essential ambiguity of the political, and adopts imperfectionism as its dominant motif, realism can relate these two tasks in a way which allows neither to predominate, achieving, if not a reconciliation, then at least a viable synthesis. 66
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Murray 97—Alastair J. H. Murray, Professor of Politics at the University of Wales Swansea, 1997 [“Part II: Rearticulating and Re-Evaluating Realism,” Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, Keele University Press, ISBN 1853311960, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Net-Library, p. 195]
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critical theories prove so progressive as to make their adoption unattractive reflectivist theory can equally be criticised for searching for a tomorrow which may never exist, thereby endangering the possibility of establishing any form of stable order in the here and now. Realism's distinctive contribution thus lies in its attempt to drive a path between the two, a path which, in the process, suggests the basis on which some form of synthesis between rationalism and reflectivism might be achieved it is centrally motivated by a concern to reconcile vision with practicality, to relate utopia and reality. Unifying a technical and a practical stance, it combines aspects of the positivist methodology employed by problem-solving theory with the interpretative stance adopted by critical theory, avoiding the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two. Ultimately, it can simultaneously acknowledge the possibility of change in the structure of the international system and the need to probe the limits of the possible, and yet also question the proximity of any international transformation, emphasise the persistence of problems after such a transformation, and serve as a reminder of the need to grasp whatever semblance of order can be obtained in the mean time realism is uniquely suited to serve as such an orientation because it grasps the essential ambiguity of the political, and adopts imperfectionism as its dominant motif, realism can relate these two tasks in a way which allows neither to predominate, achieving, if not a reconciliation, then at least a viable synthesis
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Perm – do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative
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This article concentrates on Morgenthau’s views on the ethics of scholarship and argues that all his works must be read in the light of his central goal: speaking truth to power. Morgenthau wrote at length, and held very specific views about, the role and function of scholars in society. It is therefore legitimate to claim that, as a scholar himself, Morgenthau attempted to live up to his very demanding definition of scholarly activity, and his assertion that scholars have the moral responsibility to speak truth to power informed all his major works. While Morgenthau’s conception of the ethics of scholarship is generally ignored or neglected, it is, however, indispensable to take it into account when approaching his writings. Indeed, it demonstrates that for Morgenthau, a realist theory of international politics always includes two dimensions, which are intrinsically linked: it is supposed to explain international relations, but it is also, fundamentally, a normative and critical project which questions the existing status quo. While the explanatory dimension of realism is usually discussed at great length, its critical side is consistently – and conveniently – forgotten or underestimated by the more recent, self-named ‘critical’ approaches. However diverse these recent approaches may be in their arguments, what unites them all is what they are supposedly critical of: the realist tradition. The interpretation they provide of realism is well known, and rarely questioned. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to review it at length, it is worth stressing some of the main features which are constantly emphasised. First then, realism is a state-centric approach, by which is meant that it stresses the importance of anarchy and the struggle for power among states. From this, most critical approaches jump to the conclusion that realism is therefore strikingly ill-equipped to deal with the contemporary era where the state is increasingly regarded as outdated and/or dangerous, because it stands in the path of different, more emancipatory modes of political organisation. Realism, it is also argued, pretends to be objective and to depict ‘things as they are’: but this cannot obscure the fact that theories are never value-neutral and constitute the very ‘reality’ they pretend to ‘describe’. This leads to the idea that realism is in fact nothing but conservatism: it is portrayed as the voice of (great) powers, with the effect of reifying (and therefore legitimising) the existing international order. This explains why Rothstein can confidently argue that realism ‘is . . . implicitly a conservative doctrine attractive to men concerned with protecting the status quo’, and that it is a ‘deceptive and dangerous’ theory, not least because it ‘has provided the necessary psychological and intellectual support to resist criticism, to persevere in the face of doubt, and to use any means to outwit or to dupe domestic dissenters’.2 Such views represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the realist project, but are nonetheless widely accepted as commonsense in the discipline. A typical example of this is the success of Cox’s famous distinction between ‘problem solving’ and ‘critical’ theory. Unsurprisingly, realism is the archetypal example of a problem-solving theory for Cox. His account of the realist tradition sweepingly equates Morgenthau and Waltz, who are described as ‘American scholars who transformed realism into a form of problem-solving theory’.3 Thereafter in his famous article ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, Cox refers to the works of both scholars by using the term ‘neo-realism’. Problem solving theory (and therefore realism) ‘takes the world as it finds it . . . as the given framework for action’, while by contrast, the distinctive trait of ‘critical theory’ is to ‘stand apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about’.4 Problem-solving theory, says Cox, ‘serves particular national sectional or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order’, which therefore means that its purpose is ‘conservative’.5 Problem-solving theory also pretends to be ‘value free’, while Cox is keen to remind his reader that it contains some ‘latent normative elements’, and that its ‘non normative quality is however, only superficial’.6 By contrast to what Cox presents as a problem-solving theory, being ‘critical’ in IR means being openly normative, challenging the status quo, and seeking to advance human emancipation( s), however this concept is to be defined.7 The picture Cox proposes is therefore simple: critical theory is named as such because of its commitment to ‘bringing about an alternative order’ and because of its openly normative stance, while realism, by contrast, is presented as a theory which in effect reproduces and ‘sustain[s] the existing order’.8 To be fair, not all critical theorists promote such a simplistic vision of what realism stands for – Cox himself, in some of his later works, recognised that classical realism possesses an undeniable critical dimension. In 1992, providing a more nuanced analysis of the school, he thus accepted that ‘classical realism is to be seen as a means of empowerment of the less powerful, a means of demystification of the manipulative instruments of power’.9 He did not, however, investigate the critical dimension of realism in much depth, and failed to identify its emancipatory dimension. Other critical theorists demonstrate an awareness of the richness and subtlety of Morgenthau’s ideas. The best example remains Ashley’s famous piece on the poverty of neorealism, where he justly argues that the triumph of the latter has obscured the insights provided by classical realism. Ashley’s analysis remains, however, problematic as his interpretation of Morgenthau does not identify all the critical dimensions of his writings, and ultimately continues to present classical realism as the ‘ideological apparatus’ of one particular ruling group, that of statesmen, which remains essentially incapable of realising its own limitations. As he writes: It is a tradition whose silences and omissions, and failures of self critical nerve join it in secret complicity with an order of domination that reproduces the expectation of inequality as a motivating force, and insecurity as an integrating principle. As the ‘organic intellectuality of the world wide public sphere of bourgeois society, classical realism honors the silences of the tradition it interprets and participates in exempting the ‘private sphere’ from public responsibility.10 (emphasis added) The ‘picture’ of classical realism which is provided by Ashley therefore does not adequately capture its inherent critical dimension, as it ultimately presents it as reproducing the existing order and silencing dissent. Cox’s distinction clearly echoes the now classic one between ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ approaches (a label broad enough to include the self-named Critical Theory, Feminism, Normative theory, Constructivism and Post-Structuralism). The diversity of critical approaches should not obscure the fact that crucially, what allows them to think of themselves as critical is not simply a set of epistemological (usually ‘post-positivist’) or ontological assumptions they may share. It is also, fundamentally, the image they think lies in the mirror when they turn it to realism. In most cases then, it seems to be enough to oppose a simplistic picture of realism like that provided by Cox to deserve the much coveted label ‘critical’. This leads to the idea that it is impossible to be at the same time a realist scholar and critical, as the two adjectives are implicitly presented as antithetical. This clearly amounts to an insidious high-jacking of the very adjective ‘critical’, which more often than not merely signals that one does not adopt a realist approach. The meaning of the adjective is therefore presented as self-evident, and realism is denied any critical dimension. This is highly problematic as this reinforces a typical ‘self-righteousness’ from these ‘critical’ approaches, which tend to rely on a truncated and misleading picture of what realism stands for and conveniently never properly engage with realists’ arguments. The fact that Waltz is always the primary target of these approaches is no coincidence: this article demonstrates that realism as expressed by Morgenthau is at its very core a critical project. In order to challenge the use of the adjective ‘critical’ by some who tend to think of themselves as such simply by virtue of opposing what they mistakenly present as a conservative theoretical project, the article highlights the central normative and critical dimensions underlying Morgenthau’s works. It does so by assessing his views about the ethics of scholarship. The article is divided into two parts. First, it investigates Morgenthau’s ideal of the scholarly activity, which rests upon a specific understanding of the relationship between truth and power. Second, it focuses on some features which, for Morgenthau, constitute a ‘betrayal’ of this ideal (a term he borrowed from Julien Benda). The article demonstrates that contrary to the common interpretation of realism as a theoretical outlook that holds an implicit and hidden normative commitment to the preservation of the existing order, Morgenthau’s formulation of realism is rooted in his claim that political science is a subversive force, which should ‘stir up the conscience of society’, and in doing so, challenge the status quo. For Morgenthau, IR scholars have the responsibility to seek truth, against power if needed, and then to speak this truth to power even though power may try to silence or distort the scholar’s voice.11 Giving up this responsibility leads to ideology and blind support for power, which is something that Morgenthau always saw as dangerous, and consistently opposed. His commitment to truth in turn explains why, according to him, political science is always, by definition, a revolutionary force whose main purpose is to bring about ‘change through action’. In complete contrast to what ‘critical approaches’ consistently claim, the realist project is therefore best understood as a critique of the powers-that-be
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Cozette 8 [Murielle Cozette* BA (Hons) (Sciences Po Paris), MA (King's College London), MA (Sciences Po Paris), PhD (LSE) is a John Vincent Postdoctoral fellow in the Department of International Relations. Review of International Studies (2008), 34, 5–27]
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speaking truth to power. role and function of scholars in society a realist theory of international politics always includes two dimensions intrinsically linked it is supposed to explain i r , but it is also, fundamentally, a normative and critical project which questions the existing status quo. While the explanatory dimension is usually discussed its critical side is consistently – and conveniently – forgotten by self-named ‘critical’ approaches what unites them is what they are supposedly critical of: the realist tradition. The interpretation they provide of realism is rarely questioned realism is state-centric jump to the conclusion that realism is therefore ill-equipped to deal with the contemporary era where Realism pretends to be objective leads to the idea that realism is in fact nothing but conservatism Such views represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the realist project, A typical example is the distinction between ‘problem solving’ and ‘critical’ theory realism is presented as a theory which in effect reproduces and ‘sustain[s] the existing order’. The ‘picture’ of classical realism does not adequately capture its inherent critical dimension, diversity of critical approaches should not obscure the fact that crucially, what allows them to think of themselves as critical is not simply a set of epistemological or ontological assumptions t . It is fundamentally, the image they think lies in the mirror when they turn it to realism , it seems to be enough to oppose a simplistic picture of realism This leads to the idea that it is impossible to be at the same time a realist scholar and critical This clearly amounts to an insidious high-jacking of the very adjective ‘critical’ realism is denied any critical dimension This is highly problematic as this reinforces a typical ‘self-righteousness’ from critical’ approaches, which tend to rely on a truncated and misleading picture of what realism stands for and conveniently never properly engage with realists’ arguments to the common interpretation of realism as a theoretical outlook that holds an implicit and hidden normative commitment to the preservation of the existing order, Morgenthau’s formulation of realism is rooted in his claim that political science is a subversive force, which should ‘stir up the conscience of society’, and in doing so, challenge the status quo In complete contrast to what ‘critical approaches’ consistently claim, the realist project is therefore best understood as a critique of the powers-that-be
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Realism has critical potential—only the perm solves
| 10,295 | 51 | 2,523 | 1,586 | 7 | 391 | 0.004414 | 0.246532 |
Security Kritik - Emory 2013.html5
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Emory (ENDI)
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Kritiks
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1,668 |
The Will to Violence presents a powerful and one-sided critique of the forces which enable violence between individuals to occur. Violence between individuals is taken in this context to mean all forms of violence, from personal experiences of assault to war. Kappeler's thesis is that violence in all these cases is caused in the final instance by one overriding factor -- the individual choice to commit a violent act. Of course, in one sense that is true. Acknowledging alternative models of human behaviour and analyses of the social causes of violence, Kappeler dismisses these as outside her subject matter and exhorts her readers not to ignore the “agent's decision to act as he [sic] did”, but to explore “the personal decision in favour of violence”. Having established this framework, she goes on to explore various aspects of personal decisions to commit violence. Ensuing chapters cover topics such as love of the “other”, psychotherapy, ego-philosophy and the legitimation of dominance. However, it is the introduction which is most interesting. Already on the third page, Kappeler is dismissive of social or structural analyses of the multiple causes of alienation, violence and war. She dismisses such analyses for their inability to deal with the personal decision to commit violence. For example, “some left groups have tried to explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of Black men as a result of racist oppression”. She continues, “The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it” [my emphasis]. Kappeler goes on to argue that, “although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life context, these `explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence”, i.e. the perpetrator has decided to violate. Kappeler's aim of course was to establish a framework for her particular project: a focus on the individual and the psychological to “find” a cause for violence. However, her rejection of alternative analyses not only as of little use, but as actively contributing to the problem, frames her own thesis extremely narrowly. Her argument suffers from both her inability, or unwillingness, to discuss the bigger picture and a wilful distortion of what she sees as her opponents' views. The result is less than satisfactory. Kappeler's book reads more as a passionate plea than a coherent argument. Her overwhelming focus on the individual, rather than providing a means with which to combat violence, in the end leaves the reader feeling disempowered. After all, there must be huge numbers of screwed up and vengeful people in the world to have chosen to litter history with war, environmental destruction and rape. Where do we go from here? Those lucky enough to have read Kappeler's book are supposed to “decide not to use violence ourselves”. A worthy endeavour, but hardly sufficient to change the world.
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Gelber 95 [Kath Gelber, Lecturer in Australian Politics and Human Rights at the University of New South Wales, 1995, “The Will To Oversimplify,” Green Left Weekly, Issue 198, August 16, Available Online at http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/1995/198/198p26b.htm]
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Kappeler's thesis is that violence in all these cases is caused in the final instance by one overriding factor -- the individual choice to commit a violent act. Of course, in one sense that is true However Kappeler is dismissive of social or structural analyses of the multiple causes of alienation, violence and war. She dismisses such analyses for their inability to deal with the personal decision to commit violence her rejection of alternative analyses not only as of little use, but as actively contributing to the problem, frames her own thesis extremely narrowly. Her argument suffers from both her inability, or unwillingness, to discuss the bigger picture and a wilful distortion of what she sees as her opponents' views The result is less than satisfactory. Kappeler's book reads more as a passionate plea than a coherent argument. Her overwhelming focus on the individual, rather than providing a means with which to combat violence, in the end leaves the reader feeling disempowered. After all, there must be huge numbers of screwed up and vengeful people in the world to have chosen to litter history with war, environmental destruction and rape Where do we go from here? Those lucky enough to have read Kappeler's book are supposed to “decide not to use violence ourselves”. A worthy endeavour, but hardly sufficient to change the world
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Turn—Kappeler’s critique crushes individual agency
| 3,119 | 50 | 1,351 | 501 | 5 | 223 | 0.00998 | 0.44511 |
Security Kritik - Emory 2013.html5
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Emory (ENDI)
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Kritiks
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2013
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1,669 |
This wrong-headed policy represents a dangerous threat to the environment and a huge missed opportunity to the U.S. oil industry. The U.S. embargo will do nothing to prevent oil drilling from taking place in Cuban waters. But it will prevent that work from being done by the most experienced companies with the highest-quality equipment. Norway’s Statoil is a proven operator with a long history in the North Sea and the Gulf. The rest of those companies are just getting started offshore.
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Helman 12/12/11 (Christopher-Forbes Staff, “U.S. Should Drop Cuba Embargo For Oil Exploration”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/12/12/u-s-should-drop-cuba-embargo-for-oil-exploration/)
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This wrong-headed policy represents a dangerous threat to the environment and a huge missed opportunity to the U.S. oil industry The U.S. embargo will do nothing to prevent oil drilling from taking place in Cuban waters. it will prevent that work from being done by the most experienced companies with the highest-quality equipment
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Embargo prevents safe drilling with the best tech from U.S. companies.
| 489 | 71 | 331 | 81 | 11 | 53 | 0.135802 | 0.654321 |
Cuba Oil Addon - Emory 2013.html5
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Emory (ENDI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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1,670 |
The potential for Cuba’s oil reserves, like nearly everything involving Cuba, has been a matter of dispute. Cuban officials had predicted that oil companies would find 20 billion barrels of oil reserves off its northern coast. The United States Geological Survey has estimated Cuban oil reserves at 5 billion barrels, one quarter of the Cuban estimate.
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Krauss 11/10/12 (Clifford- Authour for the New York Times, “Cuba’s Prospects for an Oil-Fueled Economic Jolt Falter With Departure of Rig”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/americas/rigs-departure-to-hamper-cubas-oil-prospects.html?_r=0)
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The potential for Cuba’s oil reserves, like nearly everything involving Cuba, has been a matter of dispute. Cuban officials oil companies would find 20 billion barrels of oil reserves off its northern coast.
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Embargo deters international investment in Cuban oil
| 352 | 52 | 207 | 56 | 7 | 33 | 0.125 | 0.589286 |
Cuba Oil Addon - Emory 2013.html5
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Emory (ENDI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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1,671 |
Despite the sanctions, Washington has engaged both with these foreign companies and the Cuban government after the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling recommended such co-operation to protect “fisheries, coastal tourism and other valuable US natural resources”.
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Frank 1/17/12 (Marc, author at Financial Times, “US frets at Cuba oil exploration”, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ed255d6a-4129-11e1-8c33-00144feab49a.html#axzz2XLf7HYli)
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Despite the sanctions, Washington has engaged both with these foreign companies and the Cuban government Drilling recommended such co-operation to protect “fisheries, coastal tourism and other valuable US natural resources
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US companies looking to invest in Cuba.
| 305 | 39 | 222 | 43 | 7 | 30 | 0.162791 | 0.697674 |
Cuba Oil Addon - Emory 2013.html5
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Emory (ENDI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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1,672 |
It was announced this week that China's National Petroleum Corporation had signed a US$6 billion agreement for an oil refinery important to Cuba's drilling explorations.
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Bosquet 12/7/10 ( Earl, author at China.org.cn, gets news from China, “China's refinery deal helps Cuba's oil exploration”, http://www.china.org.cn/business/2010-12/07/content_21495604.htm)
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China's National Petroleum Corporation had signed a US$6 billion agreement for an oil refinery important to Cuba's drilling explorations
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China investing in Cuban Oil.
| 169 | 29 | 136 | 25 | 5 | 19 | 0.2 | 0.76 |
Cuba Oil Addon - Emory 2013.html5
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Emory (ENDI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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1,673 |
Raj 12 (Dr. P.J. Sanjeeva Raj, consultant ecologist and the Professor and Head of the Zoology Department of the Madras Christian College (MCC), “Beware the loss of biodiversity”, September 23, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/open-page/beware-the-loss-of-biodiversity/article3927062.ece) Professor Edward O. Wilson, Harvard visionary of biodiversity, observes that the current rate of biodiversity loss is perhaps the highest since the loss of dinosaurs about 65 million years ago during the Mesozoic era, when humans had not appeared. He regrets that if such indiscriminate annihilation of all biodiversity from the face of the earth happens for anthropogenic reasons, as has been seen now, it is sure to force humanity into an emotional shock and trauma of loneliness and helplessness on this planet. He believes that the current wave of biodiversity loss is sure to lead us into an age that may be appropriately called the “Eremozoic Era, the Age of Loneliness.” Loss of biodiversity is a much greater threat to human survival than even climate change. Both could act, synergistically too, to escalate human extinction faster.
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Ostfeld and Keesing 13 (Richard S Ostfeld, Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies, Millbrook, NY, USA, Felicia Keesing, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY, USA, Elsevier Encyclopedia of Biodiversity, “Biodiversity and Human Health” http://ac.els-cdn.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/B9780123847195003324/3-s2.0-B9780123847195003324-main.pdf?_tid=e3f0ac3e-f33b-11e2-8ded-00000aab0f02&acdnat=1374545112_3c915724869f82f0aad33f3288a1e075)The organization of economic activity into more-or-less private markets is, by and large, a phenomenon that began several hundred years ago in the West and has expanded worldwide in more recent decades (while the world's major economies have increasingly been organized along market lines, virtually all remain “mixed” economies, in which economic activity is apportioned in varying degrees between private and public sectors). (For an interesting perspective on changes in social views concerning private self-interest over the centuries, see Heilbroner, 1999.) BC The scale of economic activity neither tracks exactly the degradation of the environment in general nor the decline in biodiversity. Technological improvements may result in the production of both more valuable and less environmentally damaging goods. The empirical fact is, however, that biodiversity has declined with the appearance and expansion of modern market economies. It is easy to link the causes of biodiversity loss with the hallmarks of economic growth. Overharvesting results when growing demands for fish, timber, and other biological resources interact with emerging technologies for their extraction and exploitation. Modern market economies are not conducive to the types of social norms and local institutions that have, in many cases, led to sustainable resource extraction from common-pool resources in small-scale preindustrial communities (e.g., Ostrom, 1990). International trade and travel are leading causes of the introduction of exotic diseases, pests, and predators that have eliminated native populations, particularly in isolated habitats. (It is worth noting, however, that prehistoric human migrations also had devastating effects on native biota. Paleontological evidence suggests that the extinction of American megafauna were at least suspiciously contemporary with the migration of humans across the Bering land bridge, even if experts disagree as to the culpability of humans. The extinction of Pacific island fauna, such as the giant Moa of New Zealand, has been more definitively linked to the arrival of Polynesian voyagers and, in some instances more importantly, the rats and pigs they brought with them.) In the early nineteenth century, William Blake wrote that the industrial revolution had brought “dark satanic mills,” to “England's green and pleasant land,” and by the end of the twentieth century the industrial air and water pollution that had transformed landscapes in the worlds' wealthier nations was also to be found, often in greater quantities and concentrations, in less-developed countries. Perhaps most importantly, the sheer scale of human activity has resulted in the destruction of natural habitats to provide more area for industry, residences, and agriculture
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Professor Edward O. Wilson, Harvard visionary of biodiversity, observes that the current rate of biodiversity loss is perhaps the highest since the loss of dinosaurs about 65 million years He regrets that if such indiscriminate annihilation of all biodiversity from the face of the earth happens for anthropogenic reasons, as has been seen now, it is sure to force humanity into an emotional shock and trauma of loneliness and helplessness on this planet. Loss of biodiversity is a much greater threat to human survival than even climate change. Both could act, synergistically too, to escalate human extinction faster.
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1. <Insert Respective Country Uniqueness: “Biodiversity High Now”>
| 1,134 | 66 | 619 | 169 | 8 | 98 | 0.047337 | 0.579882 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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1,674 |
Biodiversity is so indispensable for human survival that the United Nations General Assembly has designated the decade 2011- 2020 as the ‘Biodiversity Decade’ with the chief objective of enabling humans to live peaceably or harmoniously with nature and its biodiversity. We should be happy that during October 1-19, 2012, XI Conference of Parties (CoP-11), a global mega event on biodiversity, is taking place in Hyderabad, when delegates from 193 party countries are expected to meet. They will review the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which was originally introduced at the Earth Summit or the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) is the nodal agency for CoP-11. Today, India is one of the 17 mega-diverse (richest biodiversity) countries. Biodiversity provides all basic needs for our healthy survival — oxygen, food, medicines, fibre, fuel, energy, fertilizers, fodder and waste-disposal, etc. Fast vanishing honeybees, dragonflies, bats, frogs, house sparrows, filter (suspension)-feeder oysters and all keystone species are causing great economic loss as well as posing an imminent threat to human peace and survival. The three-fold biodiversity mission before us is to inventorise the existing biodiversity, conserve it, and, above all, equitably share the sustainable benefits out of it.
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Raj 12 (Dr. P.J. Sanjeeva Raj, consultant ecologist and the Professor and Head of the Zoology Department of the Madras Christian College (MCC), “Beware the loss of biodiversity”, September 23, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/open-page/beware-the-loss-of-biodiversity/article3927062.ece) Professor Edward O. Wilson, Harvard visionary of biodiversity, observes that the current rate of biodiversity loss is perhaps the highest since the loss of dinosaurs about 65 million years ago during the Mesozoic era, when humans had not appeared. He regrets that if such indiscriminate annihilation of all biodiversity from the face of the earth happens for anthropogenic reasons, as has been seen now, it is sure to force humanity into an emotional shock and trauma of loneliness and helplessness on this planet. He believes that the current wave of biodiversity loss is sure to lead us into an age that may be appropriately called the “Eremozoic Era, the Age of Loneliness.” Loss of biodiversity is a much greater threat to human survival than even climate change. Both could act, synergistically too, to escalate human extinction faster.
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Biodiversity is so indispensable for human survival that the United Nations General Assembly has designated the decade 2011- 2020 as the ‘Biodiversity Decade’ with the chief objective of enabling humans to live peaceably or harmoniously with nature and its biodiversity. Biodiversity provides all basic needs for our healthy survival — oxygen, food, medicines, fibre, fuel, energy, fertilizers, fodder and waste-disposal, etc. Fast vanishing honeybees, dragonflies, bats, frogs, house sparrows, filter (suspension)-feeder oysters and all keystone species are causing great economic loss as well as posing an imminent threat to human peace and survival.
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3. <Insert Country Specific Internal Link>
| 1,409 | 42 | 652 | 210 | 6 | 93 | 0.028571 | 0.442857 |
Environment Disadvantage - Northwestern 2013 4WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,675 |
Lovgren 6 (Stefan winner of the American Association for the Advancement of Science Journalism Award, “Castro the Conservationist? By Default or Design, Cuba Largely Pristine,” National Geographic, August 4, Online: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060804-castro-legacy.html) Isolated in part because of the U.S. trade embargo against the island, Cuba has been excluded from much of the economic globalization that has taken its toll on the environment in many other parts of the world. "The healthy status of much of the wetlands and forests of Cuba is due not to political influence as much as the lack of foreign exchange with which to make the investments to convert lands and introduce petrochemical pesticides and fertilizers," Pearl said. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Cuban factories and agricultural fields have sat dormant. The island has had to become self-sufficient, turning to low-energy organic farming. It has had to scrap most of its fishing fleet because it can't afford to maintain the ships. Population pressure has also been a nonissue, with many Cubans fleeing the country for economic and political reasons.
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Conell 9 (Christina Conell Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Associate, "The U.S. and Cuba: an Environmental Duo?", Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Scoop, June 15, 2009, PAS) www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0906/S00198.htm)The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be an Environmental Duo?Cuba’s abundant natural resources need to be protected with heightened vigilance Lifting the trade embargo would open up the possibility for a constructive partnership between Cuba and the U.S. by developing compatible and sustainable environmental policies¶ •With the support of the U.S., Cuba could become a model for sustainable preservation and environmental protection on a global scale¶ Through accidents of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource. The United States should capitalize on its proximity to this resource-rich island nation by moving to normalize relations and establishing a framework for environmental cooperation and joint initiatives throughout the Americas. Cuba is the most biologically diverse of all the Caribbean Islands. Since it lies just 90 miles south of the Florida Keys, where the Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico intersect, the U.S. could play a key role in environmental conservation as well as the region in general. However, when it comes to environmental preservation, the Obama administration is obstructing progress and hindering any meaningful cooperation with its current U.S.- Cuba policy.¶ Climate change and environmental degradation are two of the most pressing contemporary issues. If President Obama is sincerely committed to environmental sustainability, he must forge international partnerships to implement this objective. Where better to begin than in the U.S.’s own backyard, where Cuba has a huge presence. Only then can Cuba and the United States move forward to find joint solutions to environmental challenges.¶ Environmental Riches and Implications¶ Cuba’s glittering white sand beaches, extensive coral reefs, endemic fauna and diverse populations of fish compose the Caribbean’s most biologically diverse island. Based on a per hectare sampling when compared to the U.S. plus Canada, Cuba has 12 times more mammal species, 29 times as many amphibian and reptile species, 39 times more bird species, and 27 times as many vascular plant species. Equally important, adjacent ocean currents and the island nation’s close proximity, carry fish larvae into U.S. waters, making protection of Cuba’s coastal ecosystems vital to replenishing the U.S.’s ailing fisheries. Therefore, preserving the marine resources of Cuba is critical to the economic health of North America’s Atlantic coastal communities.¶ The U.S. and Cuba also share an ancient deepwater coral system that stretches up to North Carolina. The island’s 4,200 islets and keys support important commercial reef fish species such as snapper and grouper as well as other marine life including sea turtles, dolphins and manatees in both countries. Fifty percent of its flora and 41 percent of its fauna are endemic, signifying the importance of protecting the island’s resources in order to safeguard the paradisiacal vision that Christopher Columbus observed when landing on the island in 1492.¶ Oro Negro and Dinero¶ The recent discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the Florida straits in Cuban waters has attracted foreign oil exploration from China and India, both eager to begin extraction. Offshore oil and gas development could threaten Cuba’s and Florida’s environmental riches. Together, Cuba and the U.S. can develop policies to combat the negative results coming from the exploitation of these resources. The increased extraction and refining of oil in Cuba could have detrimental effects on the environment. Offshore drilling is likely to increase with the discovery of
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Isolated because of the U.S. trade embargo against the island, Cuba has been excluded from much of the economic globalization that has taken its toll on the environment in many other parts of the world. "The healthy status of much of the wetlands and forests of Cuba is due to the lack of foreign exchange with which to make the investments to convert lands and introduce petrochemical pesticides and fertilizers many Cuban factories and agricultural fields have sat dormant. The island has had to become self-sufficient, turning to low-energy organic farming It has had to scrap most of its fishing fleet because it can't afford to maintain the ships. Population pressure has also been a nonissue, with many Cubans fleeing the country for economic and political reasons
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Cuba is key to global ecosystems AND relations are critical to solving global environmental collapse
| 1,160 | 101 | 770 | 175 | 15 | 127 | 0.085714 | 0.725714 |
Environment Disadvantage - Northwestern 2013 4WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,676 |
Lovgren 6 (Stefan , winner of the American Association for the Advancement of Science Journalism Award“Castro the Conservationist? By Default or Design, Cuba Largely Pristine,” National Geographic, August 4, Online: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060804-castro-legacy.html) Though Cuba is economically destitute, it has the richest biodiversity in the Caribbean. Resorts blanket many of its neighbors, but Cuba remains largely undeveloped, with large tracts of untouched rain forest and unspoiled reefs. The country has signed numerous international conservation treaties and set aside vast areas of land for government protection. But others say Cuba's economic underdevelopment has played just as large a role. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union—its main financial benefactor—Cuba has had to rely mostly on its own limited resources. It has embraced organic farming and low-energy agriculture because it can't afford to do anything else. And once Castro is gone, the experts say, a boom in tourism and foreign investment could destroy Cuba's pristine landscapes.
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Lovgren 6 (Stefan winner of the American Association for the Advancement of Science Journalism Award, “Castro the Conservationist? By Default or Design, Cuba Largely Pristine,” National Geographic, August 4, Online: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060804-castro-legacy.html) Isolated in part because of the U.S. trade embargo against the island, Cuba has been excluded from much of the economic globalization that has taken its toll on the environment in many other parts of the world. "The healthy status of much of the wetlands and forests of Cuba is due not to political influence as much as the lack of foreign exchange with which to make the investments to convert lands and introduce petrochemical pesticides and fertilizers," Pearl said. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Cuban factories and agricultural fields have sat dormant. The island has had to become self-sufficient, turning to low-energy organic farming. It has had to scrap most of its fishing fleet because it can't afford to maintain the ships. Population pressure has also been a nonissue, with many Cubans fleeing the country for economic and political reasons.
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Though Cuba is economically destitute, it has the richest biodiversity in the Caribbean. Cuba remains largely undeveloped, with large tracts of untouched rain forest and unspoiled reefs The country has signed numerous international conservation treaties and set aside vast areas of land for government protection Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Cuba has had to rely mostly on its own limited resources. It has embraced organic farming and low-energy agriculture because it can't afford to do anything else. a boom in tourism and foreign investment could destroy Cuba's pristine landscapes.
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Cuba’s environment is very healthy – it’s been protected from pollution by the embargo.
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PBS 10 (Public Broadcasting Service, “Cuba: The Accidental Eden A Brief Environmental History”, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/episodes/cuba-the-accidental-eden/a-brief-environmental-history/5830/, MS) Cuba has been called the “Accidental Eden” for its exceptional biodiversity and unique historical development. The island nation and its archipelagos supports thousands of plant and animal species, many of which are endemic, making Cuba the most naturally diverse Caribbean nation and a destination for biological scientists and ecotourists.¶ Cuba’s natural blessings are the result of a manifold historical trajectory. The American trade and tourism embargo and the collapse of the Soviet Union have both made “accidental” contributions to the survival of Cuban wildlife. Cuba’s low population density (about 102 people per square kilometer) and relative land isolation as an island have afforded it moderately low levels of environmental destruction and high levels of endemism. And Cuba remains biologically diverse, but it has seen its share of loss.
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Lovgren 6 (Stefan , winner of the American Association for the Advancement of Science Journalism Award“Castro the Conservationist? By Default or Design, Cuba Largely Pristine,” National Geographic, August 4, Online: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060804-castro-legacy.html) Though Cuba is economically destitute, it has the richest biodiversity in the Caribbean. Resorts blanket many of its neighbors, but Cuba remains largely undeveloped, with large tracts of untouched rain forest and unspoiled reefs. The country has signed numerous international conservation treaties and set aside vast areas of land for government protection. But others say Cuba's economic underdevelopment has played just as large a role. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union—its main financial benefactor—Cuba has had to rely mostly on its own limited resources. It has embraced organic farming and low-energy agriculture because it can't afford to do anything else. And once Castro is gone, the experts say, a boom in tourism and foreign investment could destroy Cuba's pristine landscapes.
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Cuba has been called the “Accidental Eden” for its biodiversity The island nation supports thousands of plant and animal species making Cuba the most naturally diverse Caribbean nation The American trade and tourism embargo and the collapse of the Soviet Union have both made “accidental” contributions to the survival of Cuban wildlife. Cuba’s low population density afforded it moderately low levels of environmental destruction Cuba remains biologically diverse
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Cuba is home to one of the most protected environments in the world
| 1,056 | 67 | 464 | 143 | 13 | 68 | 0.090909 | 0.475524 |
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The energy debate in the United States introduces one more powerful argument in support of current U.S. policy toward Cuba: environmental protection. For years the Castro brothers have been courting foreign oil companies, and in recent years none have been courted more assiduously than China's Sinopec. Why Sinopec?¶ The answer is simple: If the Chinese were to start drilling in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Cuba - so very close to the coast of Florida - it would send a "red scare" through the halls of the U.S. Congress, creating a new and otherwise improbable coalition for unilaterally lifting the current embargo. Longtime advocates of lifting trade sanctions against Cuba would join with conservative Republicans, who, though they now support the trade embargo, are strong advocates for allowing U.S. companies to drill offshore, and with liberal environmentalists who would rather have strictly regulated U.S. companies drilling than unregulated Chinese companies. In Cuba that looks like a winning trifecta for changing U.S. policy.¶ As early as 2006, the Reuters news bureau in Cuba was reporting: "Havana is eager to see American oil companies join forces with the anti-embargo lobby led by U.S. farmers who have been selling food to Cuba for four years."¶ In recent weeks this strategy has taken center stage in Washington with political and public opinion leaders openly discussing the irony of "the Chinese drilling 60 miles from Florida's coast," while U.S. law prevents American companies from doing the same along the outer continental shelf.¶ The premise of the argument, however, is just not true. Chinese companies are not drilling in Cuba's offshore waters. Nor do the Chinese have any lease agreements with Cuba's state-owned oil company, Cupet, to do so. As a matter of fact, the last drilling for oil off Cuba's coast took place in 2004 and was led by the Spanish-Argentine consortium Repsol YPF. It found oil but not in any commercially viable quantity. Inactivity since suggests that Repsol YPF is not eager to follow up with the required investment in Castro's Cupet.¶ For almost a decade now, the Castro regime has been lauding offshore lease agreements. It has tried Norway's StatoilHydro, India's state-run Oil & Natural Gas Corporation, Malaysia's Petronas and Canada's Sherritt International. Yet, there is no current drilling activity off Cuba's coasts. The Cuban government has announced plans to drill, then followed with postponements in 2006, 2007 and this year.¶ Clearly, foreign oil companies anticipate political changes in Cuba and are trying to position themselves accordingly. It is equally clear they are encountering legal and logistical obstacles preventing oil and gas exploration and development. Among the impediments are well-founded reservations as to how any new discovery can be turned into product. Cuba has very limited refining capacity, and the U.S. embargo prevents sending Cuban crude oil to American refineries. Neither is it financially or logistically viable for partners of the current Cuban regime to undertake deep-water exploration without access to U.S. technology, which the embargo prohibits transferring to Cuba. The prohibitions exist for good reason. Fidel Castro expropriated U.S. oil company assets after taking control of Cuba and has never provided compensation.¶ Equally important, foreign companies trying to do business with Cuba still face a lot of expenses and political risks. If, or when, the Cuban regime decides again to expropriate the assets of these companies, there is no legal recourse in Cuba.¶ Frankly, it is bewildering why some seem to believe that U.S. companies partnering with one more anti-American dictatorship to explore and develop oil fields will somehow reduce fuel costs for American consumers and contribute to U.S. energy independence. One needs only to look at the reaction of the international oil markets when Hugo Chávez of Venezuela nationalized assets of U.S.-based ConocoPhillips and Chevron.¶ What message would the United States be sending to oil-rich, tyrannical regimes around the world about the consequences of expropriation if we were now to lift the embargo that was imposed after Fidel Castro expropriated the assets of Esso, Shell and Texaco?¶ For many years the U.S. embargo has served to protect America's national security interests; today it is also serving to prevent Cuba's regime from drilling near U.S. shores. And that's good for the environment.
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Claver-Carone 8 (Mauricio Claver-Carone, Writer for the New York Times, “How the Cuban Embargo Protects the Enviroment”, , July, 25, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/opinion/25iht-edcarone.1.14793496.html?_r=0)
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The energy debate in the United States introduces one more powerful argument in support of current U.S. policy toward Cuba: environmental protection For years the Castro brothers have been courting foreign oil companies, : If the Chinese were to start drilling in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Cuba - so very close to the coast of Florida - it would send a "red scare" through the halls of the U.S. Congress, creating a new and otherwise improbable coalition for unilaterally lifting the current embargo. Longtime advocates of lifting trade sanctions against Cuba would join with conservative Republicans, who, though they now support the trade embargo, are strong advocates for allowing U.S. companies to drill offshore, and with liberal environmentalists who would rather have strictly regulated U.S. companies drilling than unregulated Chinese companies Cuba has very limited refining capacity, and the U.S. embargo prevents sending Cuban crude oil to American refineries. Neither is it financially or logistically viable for partners of the current Cuban regime to undertake deep-water exploration without access to U.S. technology, which the embargo prohibits transferring to Cuba. The prohibitions exist for good reason Equally important, foreign companies trying to do business with Cuba still face a lot of expenses and political risks What message would the United States be sending to oil-rich, tyrannical regimes around the world about the consequences of expropriation if we were now to lift the embargo that was imposed after Fidel Castro expropriated the assets of Esso, Shell and Texaco?¶ For many years the U.S. embargo has served to protect America's national security interests; today it is also serving to prevent Cuba's regime from drilling near U.S. shores. And that's good for the environment.
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Another Reason to keep the embargo: Environmental Protection
| 4,487 | 60 | 1,822 | 703 | 8 | 284 | 0.01138 | 0.403983 |
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Rhoda-Burton 10 (Richard Rhoda and Tony Burton, “Geo-Mexico; the geography and dynamics of modern Mexico,” 2010, http://geo-mexico.com/?p=2765, Dr. Richard Rhoda has a PhD in Geography from the University of Iowa and Tony Burton has an MA in Geography from Cambridge University and a teaching qualification from the University of London) People from elsewhere generally think of Mexico as an arid country with lots of cacti. The general impression is that Mexico has relatively little biodiversity in comparison with equator-hugging tropical countries such as Brazil and Indonesia. These impressions could not be farther from the truth. While northern Mexico is indeed arid, many areas in southern Mexico receive over 2,000 mm (80 inches) of annual precipitation, almost entirely in the form of rainfall. The rainiest place in Mexico— Tenango, Oaxaca—receives 5,000 mm (16.4 feet) of rain annually. Straddling the Tropic of Cancer, Mexico is a world leader in terms of climate and ecosystem diversity. It is one of the only countries on earth with arid deserts, dry scrublands, temperate forests, high altitude alpine areas, subtropical forests, tropical rainforests and extensive coral reefs. The multitude of ecosystems in Mexico supports a very wide range of biodiversity. Mexico’s Environmental Ministry (SEMARNAT) indicates that there are over 200,000 different species in Mexico. This is about 10% – 12% of all the species on the planet. About half of all Mexico’s species are endemic; they exist only in Mexico. An unknown number of endemic species were forced to extinction by the intended and unintended importation of Old World species by the Spaniards. The U.N. Environment Programme has identified 17 “megadiverse” countries. The list includes Mexico, the USA, Australia, five South American countries, three African countries, and six Asian counties. Actually, Mexico is among the upper third of this group along with Brazil, Colombia, China, Indonesia and DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo). The other countries on the list are: the USA, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, South Africa, Malagasy Republic, India, Malaysia, The Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Australia.
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Whittle 6 (Daniel Whittle, “Protecting Cuba’s Environment: Efforts to Design and Implement Effective Environmental Laws and Policies in Cuba,” J.D., University of Colorado. BA, economics and German, Vanderbilt University. Adjunct Law Professor of Environmental Law, Wake Forest University Law School (2002); Senior Policy Advisor, North Carolina Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources (1995-1997); Associate Attorney, Van Ness, Feldman & Curtis, P.C. (1991-1993). http://www.upress.pitt.edu/htmlSourceFiles/pdfs/9780822942917exr.pdf) The future of Cuba’s environment, and its prospects for developing its economy in a manner compatible with environmental quality and natural resources conservation, is at the center of a growing international debate among academics, scientists, government officials, conservation organizations, and others. Few dispute the richness of Cuba’s natural environment or the challenges associated with reversing a long history of environmental neglect. 6 The present debate instead focuses on whether Cuba will be able to achieve meaningful levels of environmental protection while it is still hurting economically and isolated politically. The Cuban government has developed a modern and sophisticated plan for environmental protection and sustainable development and has started using it. The question now is whether government leaders can and will do what it takes to put the plan on the ground. Or, in spite of the country’s new, far-reaching environmental laws, will Cuba instead subordinate environmental protection goals to economic development priorities like so many other developing countries have done?
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The impression that Mexico has relatively little biodiversity in comparison with equator-hugging tropical countries such as Brazil and Indonesia could not be farther from the truth many areas in southern Mexico receive over 2,000 mm (80 inches) of annual precipitation, almost entirely in the form of rainfall. The rainiest place in Mexico— Tenango, Oaxaca—receives 5,000 mm (16.4 feet) of rain annually. Mexico is a world leader in terms of climate and ecosystem diversity. It is one of the only countries on earth with arid deserts, dry scrublands, temperate forests, high altitude alpine areas, subtropical forests, tropical rainforests and extensive coral reefs. The multitude of ecosystems in Mexico supports a very wide range of biodiversity. Mexico’s Environmental Ministry indicates that there are over 200,000 different species in Mexico. This is about 10% – 12% of all the species on the planet. The U.N. Environment Programme has identified 17 “megadiverse” countries Mexico is among the upper third of this group
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Cuba is working towards economic and environmental compatibility and US economic engagement causes subordination of environmental concern
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Wall 8 (Allan Wall resided in Mexico for a decade and a half, where he worked as an English teacher in various schools and at various levels. Allan was able to meet and associate with Mexicans of various sectors and socioeconomic levels and to travel to different parts of the country. MexiData.info columnist, Mexican Biodiversity and Six Species in Peril, March 24, 2008, http://mexidata.info/id1765.html¶ Mexico has a great variety of plant and animal life, the country’s collection of flora and fauna being among the most diverse in the world. ¶ UNEP (the United Nations Environment Program) has designated Mexico and 16 other nations as “megadiverse,” these countries being home to the majority of living species on the planet. ¶ Besides Mexico, the other megadiverse nations are Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Kinshasa-Congo (formerly Zaire), Kenya, South Africa, Madagascar, China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Australia .¶ It’s estimated that Mexico is home to over 200,000 species which would account for 10-12% of the entire planet’s biodiversity, making Mexico the world’s 11th most biologically diverse country.¶ Mexico has the world’s most diverse collection of reptiles, with 717 known reptile species. Of those 717 species, 574 of them are only found in Mexico.¶ Mexico is the #2 country in the world in diversity of mammals, with 502 species, and #4 in amphibians, with 290 known species. ¶ Mexico is home to 290 bird species, with 1,150 avian varieties.¶ As far as plants go, Mexico is #4 worldwide in flora, with 26,000 known species.¶ This is all very impressive, but, as everywhere, there are conservation problems in Mexico that put various species in peril of extinction.¶ Legally speaking, there are 2,500 species specifically protected by Mexican law. “Protected Natural Areas” cover 170,000 square kilometers. These territories include 34 biosphere reserves, 64 national parks, 4 natural monuments, 26 areas of protected flora and fauna, 4 natural resource protection areas, and 17 species-rich diversity sanctuaries.¶ But just establishing protected areas is not enough; they must be enforced, which requires game rangers to protect the protected areas.¶ In order to publicize the danger to some of Mexico’s diverse species, the Mexican conservation organization Pronatura has chosen six at-risk species to publicize. Not that these six are the only species in peril of extinction, but they’ve been selected to highlight, in a concrete fashion, the plight of endangered species in Mexico.¶ Let’s take a brief look at each species.¶ The golden eagle is one of the world’s biggest birds of prey, with a wingspan sometimes extending past two meters. This majestic bird is Mexico’s national symbol, but although it’s more common in other parts of the world, nowadays it is rarely seen in Mexico.¶
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Rhoda-Burton 10 (Richard Rhoda and Tony Burton, “Geo-Mexico; the geography and dynamics of modern Mexico,” 2010, http://geo-mexico.com/?p=2765, Dr. Richard Rhoda has a PhD in Geography from the University of Iowa and Tony Burton has an MA in Geography from Cambridge University and a teaching qualification from the University of London) People from elsewhere generally think of Mexico as an arid country with lots of cacti. The general impression is that Mexico has relatively little biodiversity in comparison with equator-hugging tropical countries such as Brazil and Indonesia. These impressions could not be farther from the truth. While northern Mexico is indeed arid, many areas in southern Mexico receive over 2,000 mm (80 inches) of annual precipitation, almost entirely in the form of rainfall. The rainiest place in Mexico— Tenango, Oaxaca—receives 5,000 mm (16.4 feet) of rain annually. Straddling the Tropic of Cancer, Mexico is a world leader in terms of climate and ecosystem diversity. It is one of the only countries on earth with arid deserts, dry scrublands, temperate forests, high altitude alpine areas, subtropical forests, tropical rainforests and extensive coral reefs. The multitude of ecosystems in Mexico supports a very wide range of biodiversity. Mexico’s Environmental Ministry (SEMARNAT) indicates that there are over 200,000 different species in Mexico. This is about 10% – 12% of all the species on the planet. About half of all Mexico’s species are endemic; they exist only in Mexico. An unknown number of endemic species were forced to extinction by the intended and unintended importation of Old World species by the Spaniards. The U.N. Environment Programme has identified 17 “megadiverse” countries. The list includes Mexico, the USA, Australia, five South American countries, three African countries, and six Asian counties. Actually, Mexico is among the upper third of this group along with Brazil, Colombia, China, Indonesia and DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo). The other countries on the list are: the USA, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, South Africa, Malagasy Republic, India, Malaysia, The Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Australia.
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UNEP designated Mexico “megadiverse,” home to the majority of living species on the planet It’s home to over 200,000 species which would account for 10-12% of the entire planet’s biodiversity, making Mexico the world’s 11th most biologically diverse country. Mexico has the world’s most diverse collection of reptiles, with 717 known reptile species. Of those 717 species, 574 of them are only found in Mexico. Mexico is the #2 country in the world in diversity of mammals, with 502 species, and #4 in amphibians, with 290 known species. Mexico is home to 290 bird species, with 1,150 avian varieties. As far as plants go, Mexico is #4 worldwide in flora, with 26,000 known species.
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Mexico’s biodiversity is high
| 2,868 | 29 | 682 | 451 | 4 | 114 | 0.008869 | 0.252772 |
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Biodiversidad Mexicana 9 (National Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity, The Mexican Biodiversity portal information is the product of many years of collaboration of a large number of research institutions of civil society organizations and government agencies. It is also the result of the work of all employees of the National Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity, “Mexican Biodiversity”, http://www.biodiversidad.gob.mx/v_ingles/country/pdf/naturalWealth.pdf The location, complex topography, climate and¶ evolutionary history of our country have resulted in a¶ great richness of environment, fauna and flora, and this¶ has put us among the top five places in the world. This¶ great natural diversity has been presented to us and offers¶ many development opportunities while giving us a great¶ responsibility as custodians of nature.¶ Hotspots. Mexico contains¶ portions of three of the 34¶ “hotspots” on the planet.¶ These hotspots are regions¶ with at least 1500 endemic¶ species of vascular¶ flowering plants (more¶ than 0.5 percent of the¶ total species in the world)¶ which have lost at least¶ 70% of the original extent¶ of their habitat. “Hotspots” have some features of isolation¶ that differentiates them from their neighbouring regions.¶ n Mexico the “hotspots” are: the Pine-Oak Forests of¶ the Sierra Madre (including the Sierra Madre del Sur and¶ the Neovolcanic axis); Mesoamerica (including Southeast¶ Mexico, the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and the Balsas¶ river basin); and the southern portion of the California¶ Floristic Province.¶ Wilderness areas. Mexico has three of the 37 “Wilderness¶ Areas” of the planet. These areas retain 70% or more of¶ their original habitat in good condition, and cover at least¶ 10,000 km2 with a density of less than 5 inhabitants per¶ square kilometre.¶ The wilderness areas of Mexico are: The Chihuahuan¶ Desert, which covers part of the states of Chihuahua,¶ Coahuila and Nuevo Leon; the Sonora Desert, which¶ occupies Sonora State and the Baja Californian Desert,¶ located in both states of the peninsula.¶ Centres of Plant Diversity. Along with Brazil, Mexico is¶ the American country with the largest number of Centres¶ of Plant Diversity . These centres were selected due to their¶ great diversity of plant species, high number of endemic¶ species, high diversity of habitats, high proportion of species¶ adapted to special conditions of soil, and also because of¶ the degree of threat of deterioration.
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Wall 8 (Allan Wall resided in Mexico for a decade and a half, where he worked as an English teacher in various schools and at various levels. Allan was able to meet and associate with Mexicans of various sectors and socioeconomic levels and to travel to different parts of the country. MexiData.info columnist, Mexican Biodiversity and Six Species in Peril, March 24, 2008, http://mexidata.info/id1765.html¶ Mexico has a great variety of plant and animal life, the country’s collection of flora and fauna being among the most diverse in the world. ¶ UNEP (the United Nations Environment Program) has designated Mexico and 16 other nations as “megadiverse,” these countries being home to the majority of living species on the planet. ¶ Besides Mexico, the other megadiverse nations are Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Kinshasa-Congo (formerly Zaire), Kenya, South Africa, Madagascar, China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Australia .¶ It’s estimated that Mexico is home to over 200,000 species which would account for 10-12% of the entire planet’s biodiversity, making Mexico the world’s 11th most biologically diverse country.¶ Mexico has the world’s most diverse collection of reptiles, with 717 known reptile species. Of those 717 species, 574 of them are only found in Mexico.¶ Mexico is the #2 country in the world in diversity of mammals, with 502 species, and #4 in amphibians, with 290 known species. ¶ Mexico is home to 290 bird species, with 1,150 avian varieties.¶ As far as plants go, Mexico is #4 worldwide in flora, with 26,000 known species.¶ This is all very impressive, but, as everywhere, there are conservation problems in Mexico that put various species in peril of extinction.¶ Legally speaking, there are 2,500 species specifically protected by Mexican law. “Protected Natural Areas” cover 170,000 square kilometers. These territories include 34 biosphere reserves, 64 national parks, 4 natural monuments, 26 areas of protected flora and fauna, 4 natural resource protection areas, and 17 species-rich diversity sanctuaries.¶ But just establishing protected areas is not enough; they must be enforced, which requires game rangers to protect the protected areas.¶ In order to publicize the danger to some of Mexico’s diverse species, the Mexican conservation organization Pronatura has chosen six at-risk species to publicize. Not that these six are the only species in peril of extinction, but they’ve been selected to highlight, in a concrete fashion, the plight of endangered species in Mexico.¶ Let’s take a brief look at each species.¶ The golden eagle is one of the world’s biggest birds of prey, with a wingspan sometimes extending past two meters. This majestic bird is Mexico’s national symbol, but although it’s more common in other parts of the world, nowadays it is rarely seen in Mexico.¶
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The location, complex topography, climate and¶ evolutionary history of our country have resulted in a¶ great richness of environment, fauna and flora this¶ has put us among the top five places in the world. This¶ great natural diversity has been presented to us and offers¶ many development opportunities while giving us a great¶ responsibility as custodians of nature Mexico contains¶ portions of three of the 34¶ “hotspots” on the planet.¶ hotspots are regions¶ with at least 1500 endemic¶ species of vascular¶ flowering plants Mexico has three of the 37 “Wilderness¶ Areas” of the planet. These areas retain 70% or more of¶ their original habitat in good condition, and cover at least¶ 10,000 km2 with a density of less than 5 inhabitants per¶ square kilometre. Mexico is¶ the American country with the largest number of Centres¶ of Plant Diversity . These centres were selected due to their¶ great diversity of plant species, high number of endemic¶ species, high diversity of habitats, high proportion of species¶ adapted to special conditions of soil, and also because of¶ the degree of threat of deterioration.
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Enormous Mexican biodiversity- ranked as the 11th most biologically diverse country in the world
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Agence France Presse 9 (Agence France-Presse (AFP) is a French news agency, the oldest one in the world,[1][2] and one of the three largest with Associated Press and Reuters. It is also the largest French news agency, “Mexico plants trees, loses forests: Greenpeace” June 3, 2009, http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/) Mexico is failing to stop deforestation, despite planting millions of trees, Greenpeace said here Wednesday, two days before the country hosts the UN World Environment Day .Mexico is fifth in the world for species diversity, but also fifth in the world for deforestation, the lobby group said."We call on the government of (President) Felipe Calderon to be coherent. It's not possible to extol Mexico as an example in defending the environment ... whilst systematically destroying ecosystems with environment policies which do not stop deforestation," a statement said.Mexico loses around 600,000 hectares (almost 1.5 million acres) of trees and jungle each year, which is equivalent to four times the size of the country's sprawling capital of some 20 million people, the group said. Environmental policy under Calderon -- who will host World Environment Day on Mexico's Caribbean coast -- has not changed, Greenpeace said." Mexico even has one of the highest rates of environmental degradation in the world," it added. Greenpeace said that bad practice in tourism -- one of Mexico's main sources of foreign income -- had accelerated the destruction of the environment. Mexico has so far planted 537 million trees and is a "leading partner" in a plan to plant seven billion trees worldwide by the end of 2009, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).The UN-sponsored World Environment Day began 37 years ago and takes place annually on June 5.This year's event will focus on combating climate change, one of the top priorities of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.
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Biodiversidad Mexicana 9 (National Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity, The Mexican Biodiversity portal information is the product of many years of collaboration of a large number of research institutions of civil society organizations and government agencies. It is also the result of the work of all employees of the National Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity, “Mexican Biodiversity”, http://www.biodiversidad.gob.mx/v_ingles/country/pdf/naturalWealth.pdf The location, complex topography, climate and¶ evolutionary history of our country have resulted in a¶ great richness of environment, fauna and flora, and this¶ has put us among the top five places in the world. This¶ great natural diversity has been presented to us and offers¶ many development opportunities while giving us a great¶ responsibility as custodians of nature.¶ Hotspots. Mexico contains¶ portions of three of the 34¶ “hotspots” on the planet.¶ These hotspots are regions¶ with at least 1500 endemic¶ species of vascular¶ flowering plants (more¶ than 0.5 percent of the¶ total species in the world)¶ which have lost at least¶ 70% of the original extent¶ of their habitat. “Hotspots” have some features of isolation¶ that differentiates them from their neighbouring regions.¶ n Mexico the “hotspots” are: the Pine-Oak Forests of¶ the Sierra Madre (including the Sierra Madre del Sur and¶ the Neovolcanic axis); Mesoamerica (including Southeast¶ Mexico, the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and the Balsas¶ river basin); and the southern portion of the California¶ Floristic Province.¶ Wilderness areas. Mexico has three of the 37 “Wilderness¶ Areas” of the planet. These areas retain 70% or more of¶ their original habitat in good condition, and cover at least¶ 10,000 km2 with a density of less than 5 inhabitants per¶ square kilometre.¶ The wilderness areas of Mexico are: The Chihuahuan¶ Desert, which covers part of the states of Chihuahua,¶ Coahuila and Nuevo Leon; the Sonora Desert, which¶ occupies Sonora State and the Baja Californian Desert,¶ located in both states of the peninsula.¶ Centres of Plant Diversity. Along with Brazil, Mexico is¶ the American country with the largest number of Centres¶ of Plant Diversity . These centres were selected due to their¶ great diversity of plant species, high number of endemic¶ species, high diversity of habitats, high proportion of species¶ adapted to special conditions of soil, and also because of¶ the degree of threat of deterioration.
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Mexico is failing to stop deforestation, despite planting millions of trees Mexico is fifth in the world for species diversity, but also fifth in the world for deforestation, Environmental policy -- has not changed Mexico has one of the highest rates of environmental degradation in the world
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Mexican BioD high now
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Natura, No Date (Viva Natura, an online source of information on Biodiversity of Mexico founded in 2001. Recently a small publishing house dealing with the topics relevant to natural heritage of Mexico and its conservation, “Mexican Biodiversity”, http://www.vivanatura.org/Biodiversity.html, MS) There are more than 170 countries in the World. Out of these 12 alone harbor in between 60 and 70% of the total biodiversity of the planet and thus earn the privilege to be called megadiverse. Mexico is one of them.¶ You can find Mexico, together with Brazil, Colombia and Indonesia, on the very top of the list taking up the first place in reptile diversity, second in mammals, fourth in amphibians and vascular plants and tenth in birds. In general terms, it is estimated that more than 10% of all world's species live in this country. Up to date around 65.000 species have been described, although more than 200.000 are believed to exist here.
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Agence France Presse 9 (Agence France-Presse (AFP) is a French news agency, the oldest one in the world,[1][2] and one of the three largest with Associated Press and Reuters. It is also the largest French news agency, “Mexico plants trees, loses forests: Greenpeace” June 3, 2009, http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/) Mexico is failing to stop deforestation, despite planting millions of trees, Greenpeace said here Wednesday, two days before the country hosts the UN World Environment Day .Mexico is fifth in the world for species diversity, but also fifth in the world for deforestation, the lobby group said."We call on the government of (President) Felipe Calderon to be coherent. It's not possible to extol Mexico as an example in defending the environment ... whilst systematically destroying ecosystems with environment policies which do not stop deforestation," a statement said.Mexico loses around 600,000 hectares (almost 1.5 million acres) of trees and jungle each year, which is equivalent to four times the size of the country's sprawling capital of some 20 million people, the group said. Environmental policy under Calderon -- who will host World Environment Day on Mexico's Caribbean coast -- has not changed, Greenpeace said." Mexico even has one of the highest rates of environmental degradation in the world," it added. Greenpeace said that bad practice in tourism -- one of Mexico's main sources of foreign income -- had accelerated the destruction of the environment. Mexico has so far planted 537 million trees and is a "leading partner" in a plan to plant seven billion trees worldwide by the end of 2009, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).The UN-sponsored World Environment Day began 37 years ago and takes place annually on June 5.This year's event will focus on combating climate change, one of the top priorities of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.
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You can find Mexico, on the very top of the list taking up the first place in reptile diversity, second in mammals, fourth in amphibians and vascular plants and tenth in birds. In general terms, it is estimated that more than 10% of all world's species live in this country. Up to date around 65.000 species have been described, although more than 200.000 are believed to exist here.
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Mexican Environment on a downhill slope
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Evans 13 (Dan Evans, 13, Peace Corps Mexico Director, Peace Corps México, “About Mexico”, http://mexico.peacecorps.gov/about/mexico.php) Mexico is one of the 18 megadiverse countries of the world. With over 200,000 different species, Mexico is home of 10–12% of the world's biodiversity. Mexico ranks first in biodiversity in reptiles with 707 known species, second in mammals with 438 species, fourth in amphibians with 290 species, and fourth in flora, with 26,000 different species. Mexico is also considered the second most diverse country in the world in ecosystems and fourth in overall species. Approximately 2,500 species are protected by Mexican legislation. In Mexico, 170,000 square kilometres are considered "Protected Natural Areas." These include 34 reserve biospheres, 64 national parks, 4 natural monuments, 26 areas of protected flora and fauna, 4 areas for natural resource protection and 17 sanctuaries.¶ The discovery of the Americas brought to the rest of the world many widely used food crops and edible plants. Some of Mexico's native culinary ingredients include: chocolate, tomato, maize, vanilla, avocado, guava, chayote, epazote, camote, jícama, nopal, tejocote, huitlacoche, sapote, mamey sapote, many varieties of beans, and an even greater variety of chiles, such as the Habanero. Most of these names are in indigenous languages like Nahuatl.
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Natura, No Date (Viva Natura, an online source of information on Biodiversity of Mexico founded in 2001. Recently a small publishing house dealing with the topics relevant to natural heritage of Mexico and its conservation, “Mexican Biodiversity”, http://www.vivanatura.org/Biodiversity.html, MS) There are more than 170 countries in the World. Out of these 12 alone harbor in between 60 and 70% of the total biodiversity of the planet and thus earn the privilege to be called megadiverse. Mexico is one of them.¶ You can find Mexico, together with Brazil, Colombia and Indonesia, on the very top of the list taking up the first place in reptile diversity, second in mammals, fourth in amphibians and vascular plants and tenth in birds. In general terms, it is estimated that more than 10% of all world's species live in this country. Up to date around 65.000 species have been described, although more than 200.000 are believed to exist here.
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Mexico is one of the 18 megadiverse countries of the world Mexico is home of 10–12% of the world's biodiversity. Mexico ranks first in biodiversity in reptiles with 707 known species, second in mammals with 438 species Mexico is also considered the second most diverse country in the world in ecosystems and fourth in overall species.
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Mexican Biodiversity is among the highest in the world
| 1,372 | 54 | 334 | 203 | 9 | 56 | 0.044335 | 0.275862 |
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Miloslavich et. al. 3 (Patricia Miloslavich, Eduardo Klein, Edgard Yerena and Alberto Martin, Jounrnalists at the Department of Environmental Studies, Universidad Simon Bolivar, Caracas, Venezuela and The Institute of Marine Science and Technology (INTECMAR), “MARINE BIODIVERSITY IN VENEZUELA: STATUS AND PERSPECTIVES”,http://www.scielo.cl/pdf/gayana/v67n2/Miloslavich%202.pdf, MS ) Venezuela is among the ten countries with the highest biodiversity in the world, both in the terrestrial and the¶ marine environment. Due to its bio geographical position, Venezuelan marine flora and fauna are composed of¶ species from very different marine bioregions such as the Caribbean and the Orinoco Delta. The ecosystems in¶ the Caribbean have received considerable attention but now, due to the tremendous impact of human activities¶ such as tourism, over-exploitation of marine resources, physical alteration, the oil industry, and pollution,¶ these environments are under great risk and their biodiversity highly threatened. The most representative ecosystems¶ of this region include sandy beaches, rocky shores, seagrass beds, coral reefs, soft bottom communities,¶ and mangrove forests. The Orinoco Delta is a complex group of freshwater, estuarine, and marine ecosystems;¶ the habitats are very diverse but poorly known. This paper summarizes the known, which is all of the¶ information available in Venezuela about research into biodiversity, the different ecosystems and the knowledge¶ that has become available in different types of publications, biological collections, the importance and¶ extents of the Protected Areas as biodiversity reserves, and the legal institutional framework aimed at their¶ protection and sustainable use. As the unknown, research priorities are
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Evans 13 (Dan Evans, 13, Peace Corps Mexico Director, Peace Corps México, “About Mexico”, http://mexico.peacecorps.gov/about/mexico.php) Mexico is one of the 18 megadiverse countries of the world. With over 200,000 different species, Mexico is home of 10–12% of the world's biodiversity. Mexico ranks first in biodiversity in reptiles with 707 known species, second in mammals with 438 species, fourth in amphibians with 290 species, and fourth in flora, with 26,000 different species. Mexico is also considered the second most diverse country in the world in ecosystems and fourth in overall species. Approximately 2,500 species are protected by Mexican legislation. In Mexico, 170,000 square kilometres are considered "Protected Natural Areas." These include 34 reserve biospheres, 64 national parks, 4 natural monuments, 26 areas of protected flora and fauna, 4 areas for natural resource protection and 17 sanctuaries.¶ The discovery of the Americas brought to the rest of the world many widely used food crops and edible plants. Some of Mexico's native culinary ingredients include: chocolate, tomato, maize, vanilla, avocado, guava, chayote, epazote, camote, jícama, nopal, tejocote, huitlacoche, sapote, mamey sapote, many varieties of beans, and an even greater variety of chiles, such as the Habanero. Most of these names are in indigenous languages like Nahuatl.
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Venezuela is among the ten countries with the highest biodiversity in the world Venezuelan marine flora and fauna are composed of species from very different marine bioregions The ecosystems in the Caribbean have received considerable attention but now, due to the tremendous impact of human activities such as tourism, over-exploitation of marine resources, physical alteration, the oil industry, and pollution, these environments are under great risk and their biodiversity highly threatened. The Orinoco Delta is a complex group of freshwater, estuarine, and marine ecosystems; the habitats are very diverse but poorly known.
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Mexico has incredible biodiversity
| 1,776 | 34 | 631 | 243 | 4 | 92 | 0.016461 | 0.378601 |
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proposed: a complete survey of the area,¶ the completion of a species list, and an assessment of the health status of the main ecosystems on a broad¶ national scale. This new information must be integrated and summarized in nationwide Geographic Information¶ Systems (GIS) databases, accessible to the scientific community as well as to the management agencies. In¶ the long term, a genetic inventory must be included in order to provide more detailed knowledge of the biological¶ resources. Future projects at the local (Venezuela), regional (Southern Caribbean: Colombia, Venezuela, and the Netherlands Antilles), and global (South America) scales are recommended.
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Miloslavich et. al. 3 (Patricia Miloslavich, Eduardo Klein, Edgard Yerena and Alberto Martin, Jounrnalists at the Department of Environmental Studies, Universidad Simon Bolivar, Caracas, Venezuela and The Institute of Marine Science and Technology (INTECMAR), “MARINE BIODIVERSITY IN VENEZUELA: STATUS AND PERSPECTIVES”,http://www.scielo.cl/pdf/gayana/v67n2/Miloslavich%202.pdf, MS ) Venezuela is among the ten countries with the highest biodiversity in the world, both in the terrestrial and the¶ marine environment. Due to its bio geographical position, Venezuelan marine flora and fauna are composed of¶ species from very different marine bioregions such as the Caribbean and the Orinoco Delta. The ecosystems in¶ the Caribbean have received considerable attention but now, due to the tremendous impact of human activities¶ such as tourism, over-exploitation of marine resources, physical alteration, the oil industry, and pollution,¶ these environments are under great risk and their biodiversity highly threatened. The most representative ecosystems¶ of this region include sandy beaches, rocky shores, seagrass beds, coral reefs, soft bottom communities,¶ and mangrove forests. The Orinoco Delta is a complex group of freshwater, estuarine, and marine ecosystems;¶ the habitats are very diverse but poorly known. This paper summarizes the known, which is all of the¶ information available in Venezuela about research into biodiversity, the different ecosystems and the knowledge¶ that has become available in different types of publications, biological collections, the importance and¶ extents of the Protected Areas as biodiversity reserves, and the legal institutional framework aimed at their¶ protection and sustainable use. As the unknown, research priorities are
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Future projects at the local (Venezuela), regional (Southern Caribbean: Colombia, Venezuela, and the Netherlands Antilles), and global (South America) scales are recommended.
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Venezuela Biodiversity highest in the world
| 666 | 43 | 174 | 99 | 6 | 22 | 0.060606 | 0.222222 |
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The Amazon Basin’s biological diversity is staggering. It holds the largest area of contiguous and relatively intact tropical forest in the world. While these biological assets could provide a sound foundation for regional development, they are instead threatened by unsustainable resource uses that are associated with agriculture, ranching, logging, mining, petroleum exploration, and fishing. These threats, in turn, are provoked by forces such as population growth, infrastructure development, expanding commodity markets, insecure land and natural resources tenure, and distorted policy incentives.
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USAID 5 (United States Agency for International Development, “CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY IN THE AMAZON BASIN CONTEXT AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR USAID” May 2005, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF441.pdf, MS)
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The Amazon ’s biological diversity is staggering. It holds the largest area of contiguous and relatively intact tropical forest in the world. they are instead threatened by unsustainable resource uses that are associated with agriculture, ranching, logging, mining, petroleum exploration, and fishing These threats, provoked by forces such as population growth, infrastructure development, expanding commodity markets, insecure land and natural resources tenure, and distorted policy incentives.
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Biodiversity high – Especially in the Amazon
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WWF 13 (World Wildlife Fund, First overall fundraising organization for wildlife safety, “AMAZON”, 2013, http://worldwildlife.org/places/amazon, MS) The Amazon contains millions of species, most of them still undescribed, and some of the world's most unusual wildlife. It is one of Earth's last refuges for jaguars, harpy eagles and pink dolphins, and home to thousands of birds and butterflies. Tree-dwelling species include southern two-toed sloths, pygmy marmosets, saddleback and emperor tamarins, and Goeldi's monkeys. The diversity of the region is staggering:¶ •40,000 plant species 3,000 freshwater fish species¶ •more than 370 types of reptiles
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WWF 13 (World Wildlife Fund, First overall fundraising organization for wildlife safety, “AMAZON”, 2013, http://worldwildlife.org/places/amazon, MS) The Amazon is a vast region that spans across eight rapidly developing countries: Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana, an overseas territory of France.¶ The landscape contains:¶ One in ten known species on Earth¶ •1.4 billion acres of dense forests, half of the planet's remaining tropical forests¶ •4,100 miles of winding rivers¶ •2.6 million square miles in the Amazon basin, about 40 percent of South America¶ There is a clear link between the health of the Amazon and the health of the planet. The rain forests, which contain 90-140 billion metric tons of carbon, help stabilize local and global climate. Deforestation may release significant amounts of this carbon, which could have catastrophic consequences around the world.¶
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The Amazon contains millions of species It is Earth's last refuges for jaguars, harpy eagles and pink dolphins, The diversity of the region is 40,000 plant species 3,000 freshwater fish species more than 370 types of reptiles
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The Amazon is key to global environment
| 653 | 39 | 225 | 92 | 7 | 37 | 0.076087 | 0.402174 |
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AVN 9 (Henrik Bratfeldt, Agencia Venezolana de Noticias. “Venezuela-Capitalism puts the world on the brink of ecocide” December 27 2009, http://www.turismo-venezuela.com/travel-news/45-top-headlines/1055-venezuela-capitalism-puts-the-world-on-the-brink-of-ecocide, Agencia Venezolana de Noticias (AVN) is the national news agency of Venezuela. It is part of the Ministry of Communication and Information (MCI), but run as an autonomous service. It reports on national and regional issues, as well as on Latin America in general.)"Those who are putting us on the brink of ecocide are unthinkable. The causes of climate change must be forced to assume their responsibilities," stressed the President of the Republic, Hugo Chávez. In his usual lines Chavez, published Sunday and titled “Happy New Year, Happy 2010!” the Venezuelan president said that before the United Nations Organization (UNO) and the countries of the world was clearly the position of countries developed that cause climate change, as to further ensure their own interests over global welfare. "(...) Has become clear the position of the industrialized countries, since relative and jeopardize the functioning of the UN as a global organization function effectively in defending the principle of equality among nations. At the Summit on Climate Change, held between 7 and 18 December in Copenhagen, Denmark, President Chavez urged people everywhere to stay in the struggle against capitalism, the main culprit of climate crisis that affects the planet today, mainly to underdeveloped countries and weaker. The Head of State also called for reducing the inequalities gap between rich and poor countries and the signing of a document which commits industrialized nations to take their huge share of responsibility in the effects produced at the rate of climate change and as to reduce the emission of polluting gases. In this same line of ideas are the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), and the president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, who proposed holding another summit as an alternative to lackluster climate meeting in Copenhagen on 19 April in the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia. Among the main topics discussed at the event included the right of mother earth and how to ensure a world referendum on the damage to the environment.
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WWF 13 (World Wildlife Fund, First overall fundraising organization for wildlife safety, “AMAZON”, 2013, http://worldwildlife.org/places/amazon, MS) The Amazon contains millions of species, most of them still undescribed, and some of the world's most unusual wildlife. It is one of Earth's last refuges for jaguars, harpy eagles and pink dolphins, and home to thousands of birds and butterflies. Tree-dwelling species include southern two-toed sloths, pygmy marmosets, saddleback and emperor tamarins, and Goeldi's monkeys. The diversity of the region is staggering:¶ •40,000 plant species 3,000 freshwater fish species¶ •more than 370 types of reptiles
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"Those who are putting us on the brink of ecocide are unthinkable. The causes of climate change must be forced to assume their responsibilities," stressed the President of the Republic, Hugo Chávez. At the Summit on Climate Change, held between 7 and 18 December in Copenhagen, Denmark, President Chavez urged people everywhere to stay in the struggle against capitalism, the main culprit of climate crisis that affects the planet today, mainly to underdeveloped countries and weaker. The Head of State also called for reducing climate change and as to reduce the emission of polluting gases. Among the main topics discussed at the event included the right of mother earth and how to ensure a world referendum on the damage to the environment.
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The Amazon has high Biodiveristy now
| 2,333 | 36 | 743 | 354 | 6 | 122 | 0.016949 | 0.344633 |
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IPS 10 (IPS - Inter Press Service, “ATIN AMERICA: BIODIVERSITY SUPERPOWER FACES DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA”, December 3, 2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/)>BC If Latin America is to sustain continued economic growth, it faces the dilemma of either threatening its rich biodiversity or transforming into a global leader in providing environmental services based on its unique ecosystems. This is the message emerging from the report "Latin America and the Caribbean: A Biodiversity Superpower" released on the eve of the 20th Ibero- American Summit, taking place Dec. 3-4, in the Argentine city of Mar del Plata, 400 kilometres south of Buenos Aires. The vast study, coming in at more than 400 pages, involved a team of 500 people working two years, under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other regional and international entities. Their goal was to inform governments and the private sector in the region about the economic opportunities and risks involved in areas like agriculture, mining, fishing and forestry that have an effect on biodiversity and the environmental services that unique flora, fauna and ecosystems can provide. The UN declared 2010 the International Year for Biodiversity to raise awareness about the serious problem of species loss and to promote initiatives to slow the pace of extinction, which ultimately helps preserve human life. The UNDP study's conclusions are optimistic because although the research explains the negative environmental impacts it also highlights incentives that benefit the region's ecosystems and its economies alike. The region is home to six of the countries with greatest biodiversity in the world: Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela," Emma Torres, the UNDP's environment and energy advisor in Latin America, told IPS. These countries cover 10 percent of the world's land surface but hold 70 percent of mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, plant and insect species, according to the study. Within this territory is the area of greatest diversity on the planet: the Amazon jungle. And 40 percent of the world's biodiversity as well as 25 percent of its forests are concentrated in South America alone. Central America, despite covering just 0.5 percent of the Earth's landmass, possesses 10 percent of its biodiversity. In the Caribbean, meanwhile, 50 percent of the plant life is endemic; in other words, it is not found anywhere else. The natural wealth of Latin America and the Caribbean already contributes to the national economies. Nevertheless, to the extent that development is environmentally unsustainable, this natural capital is at risk. From this premise, the report gives economic value to the environment and recommends options. For example, it notes that Mexico's protected areas contribute 3.5 billion dollars annually to the national economy. That is, each Mexican peso invested in national parks, for example, generates 52 pesos. The study also indicates that 66 to 75 percent of foreign tourists travelling to the region visited at least one protected area, and nearly 94 percent of tourism operators in the Caribbean state that they rely on the natural surroundings as a basis for their businesses. In Venezuela, 73 percent of the electricity generated in 2007 came from hydroelectric plants, with the watersheds of various national parks providing the water. In Peru, 376,000 hectares of cultivated land is irrigated with water originating in protected areas. The report points out that the last decade saw exceptional achievement in economic growth and poverty reduction in the region, which also has a promising economic future despite the global financial crisis, In this context, biodiversity plays a role whose true scope is not yet sufficiently appreciated, according to the study. Torres said there are statistics experts working to quantify this natural capital.
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AVN 9 (Henrik Bratfeldt, Agencia Venezolana de Noticias. “Venezuela-Capitalism puts the world on the brink of ecocide” December 27 2009, http://www.turismo-venezuela.com/travel-news/45-top-headlines/1055-venezuela-capitalism-puts-the-world-on-the-brink-of-ecocide, Agencia Venezolana de Noticias (AVN) is the national news agency of Venezuela. It is part of the Ministry of Communication and Information (MCI), but run as an autonomous service. It reports on national and regional issues, as well as on Latin America in general.)"Those who are putting us on the brink of ecocide are unthinkable. The causes of climate change must be forced to assume their responsibilities," stressed the President of the Republic, Hugo Chávez. In his usual lines Chavez, published Sunday and titled “Happy New Year, Happy 2010!” the Venezuelan president said that before the United Nations Organization (UNO) and the countries of the world was clearly the position of countries developed that cause climate change, as to further ensure their own interests over global welfare. "(...) Has become clear the position of the industrialized countries, since relative and jeopardize the functioning of the UN as a global organization function effectively in defending the principle of equality among nations. At the Summit on Climate Change, held between 7 and 18 December in Copenhagen, Denmark, President Chavez urged people everywhere to stay in the struggle against capitalism, the main culprit of climate crisis that affects the planet today, mainly to underdeveloped countries and weaker. The Head of State also called for reducing the inequalities gap between rich and poor countries and the signing of a document which commits industrialized nations to take their huge share of responsibility in the effects produced at the rate of climate change and as to reduce the emission of polluting gases. In this same line of ideas are the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), and the president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, who proposed holding another summit as an alternative to lackluster climate meeting in Copenhagen on 19 April in the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia. Among the main topics discussed at the event included the right of mother earth and how to ensure a world referendum on the damage to the environment.
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If Latin America is to sustain continued economic growth, it faces the dilemma of threatening its rich biodiversity The region is home to six of the countries with greatest biodiversity in the world These countries cover 10 percent of the world's land surface but hold 70 percent of mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, plant and insect species, biodiversity plays a role whose true scope is not yet sufficiently appreciated
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Venezuela is working towards environmental sustainability now, but capitalism pushes it over the brink
| 3,938 | 102 | 421 | 599 | 14 | 68 | 0.023372 | 0.113523 |
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It is not just a matter of preserving resources that go towards economic production but also of valuing the environment's potential as a laboratory for medical answers, an area in which the region could become a leader, states the text. While just 12 percent of the world is under some sort of environmentally protected status, the region's average is higher, with cases like Colombia, where 43 percent of its territory is protected area. Torres underscored that one of the region's main achievements has been to slow the pace of deforestation in the Amazon, and applauded Brazil for establishing minimum pricing for products obtained from its rich biodiversity. The UNDP expert also noted the commitment by the Brazilian Association of Meat Exporters to ban the purchase of livestock and cattle products coming from recently deforested areas -- similar to a pledge from the soybean industry. Mexico, meanwhile, has enacted a broad payment mechanism for hydrological services, which gives value to protecting the country's water resources. In Peru, a program for reducing overfishing of anchovies was covered by government incentives for retraining the sector's workers, promoting microenterprise and providing early retirement options. The study points to diverse and innovative proposals for compensating conservation efforts, citing the example of Ecuador, which requested the international community pay 3.6 billion dollars for this Andean nation to leave oil reserves untouched in a protected area, the 9,820-square-km Yasuní National Park. However, the study warns about "near-sighted decisions" that could lead to low-quality development and potentially to collapse. Beyond its intrinsic value, the region's natural capital represents its main competitive advantage, according to the report. Its conclusion: The conservation of natural wealth presents an opportunity -- not a cost or a limitation -- for creating a new development paradigm, one that is based on environmental integrity, human health and social equality.
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IPS 10 (IPS - Inter Press Service, “ATIN AMERICA: BIODIVERSITY SUPERPOWER FACES DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA”, December 3, 2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/)>BC If Latin America is to sustain continued economic growth, it faces the dilemma of either threatening its rich biodiversity or transforming into a global leader in providing environmental services based on its unique ecosystems. This is the message emerging from the report "Latin America and the Caribbean: A Biodiversity Superpower" released on the eve of the 20th Ibero- American Summit, taking place Dec. 3-4, in the Argentine city of Mar del Plata, 400 kilometres south of Buenos Aires. The vast study, coming in at more than 400 pages, involved a team of 500 people working two years, under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other regional and international entities. Their goal was to inform governments and the private sector in the region about the economic opportunities and risks involved in areas like agriculture, mining, fishing and forestry that have an effect on biodiversity and the environmental services that unique flora, fauna and ecosystems can provide. The UN declared 2010 the International Year for Biodiversity to raise awareness about the serious problem of species loss and to promote initiatives to slow the pace of extinction, which ultimately helps preserve human life. The UNDP study's conclusions are optimistic because although the research explains the negative environmental impacts it also highlights incentives that benefit the region's ecosystems and its economies alike. The region is home to six of the countries with greatest biodiversity in the world: Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela," Emma Torres, the UNDP's environment and energy advisor in Latin America, told IPS. These countries cover 10 percent of the world's land surface but hold 70 percent of mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, plant and insect species, according to the study. Within this territory is the area of greatest diversity on the planet: the Amazon jungle. And 40 percent of the world's biodiversity as well as 25 percent of its forests are concentrated in South America alone. Central America, despite covering just 0.5 percent of the Earth's landmass, possesses 10 percent of its biodiversity. In the Caribbean, meanwhile, 50 percent of the plant life is endemic; in other words, it is not found anywhere else. The natural wealth of Latin America and the Caribbean already contributes to the national economies. Nevertheless, to the extent that development is environmentally unsustainable, this natural capital is at risk. From this premise, the report gives economic value to the environment and recommends options. For example, it notes that Mexico's protected areas contribute 3.5 billion dollars annually to the national economy. That is, each Mexican peso invested in national parks, for example, generates 52 pesos. The study also indicates that 66 to 75 percent of foreign tourists travelling to the region visited at least one protected area, and nearly 94 percent of tourism operators in the Caribbean state that they rely on the natural surroundings as a basis for their businesses. In Venezuela, 73 percent of the electricity generated in 2007 came from hydroelectric plants, with the watersheds of various national parks providing the water. In Peru, 376,000 hectares of cultivated land is irrigated with water originating in protected areas. The report points out that the last decade saw exceptional achievement in economic growth and poverty reduction in the region, which also has a promising economic future despite the global financial crisis, In this context, biodiversity plays a role whose true scope is not yet sufficiently appreciated, according to the study. Torres said there are statistics experts working to quantify this natural capital.
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It is not just a matter of preserving resources that go towards economic production but also of valuing the environment's potential as a laboratory for medical answers the study warns about "near-sighted decisions" that could lead to low-quality development and potentially to collapse
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It’s a Tradeoff- No EE AND Biodiversity
| 2,027 | 39 | 285 | 304 | 7 | 43 | 0.023026 | 0.141447 |
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http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&sid=19ae2143-9ca4-4635-a10a-6578020ac499%40sessionmgr114&hid=108&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=89157177)BC Anthropogenic drivers of environmental change often have multiple effects, including changes in biodiversity, species composition, and ecosystem functioning. It remains unknown whether such shifts in biodiversity and species composition may, themselves. be major contributors to the total, long-term impacts of anthropogenic drivers on ecosystem functioning. Moreover, although numerous experiments have shown that random losses of species impact the functioning of ecosystems, human-caused losses of biodiversity are rarely random. Here we use results from long-term grassland field experiments to test for direct effects of chronic nutrient enrichment on ecosystem productivity, and for indirect effects of enrichment on productivity mediated by resultant species losses. We found that ecosystem productivity decreased through time most in plots that lost the most species. Chronic nitrogen addition also led to the nonrandom loss of initially dominant native perennial C4 grasses. This loss of dominant plant species was associated with twice as great a loss of productivity per lost species than occurred with random species loss in a nearby biodiversity experiment. Thus, although chronic nitrogen enrichment initially increased productivity, it also led to loss of plant species, including initially dominant species, which then caused substantial diminishing returns from nitrogen fertilization. In contrast, elevated CO2 did not decrease grassland plant diversity, and it consistently promoted productivity overtime. Our results support the hypothesis that the long-term impacts of anthropogenic drivers of environmental change on ecosystem functioning can strongly depend on how such drivers gradually decrease biodiversity and restructure communities
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Isbell et. al. 7/16/13 (Isbell, F., Reich, P. B., Tilman, D., Hobbie, S. E., Polasky, S., & Binder, S. (2013). Nutrient enrichment, biodiversity loss, and consequent declines in ecosystem productivity. Proceedings Of The National Academy Of Sciences Of The United States Of America, 110(29), 11911-11916. doi:10.1073/pnas.1310380110
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drivers of environmental change often have multiple effects, including changes in biodiversity species composition, and ecosystem functioning human-caused losses of biodiversity are rarely random ecosystem productivity decreased through time most in plots that lost the most species This loss of dominant plant species was associated with twice as great a loss of productivity per lost species than occurred with random species loss in a nearby biodiversity experiment. results support the hypothesis that the long-term impacts of anthropogenic drivers of environmental change on ecosystem functioning can strongly depend on how such drivers gradually decrease biodiversity and restructure communities
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Human Intervention kills biodiversity
| 1,958 | 37 | 701 | 241 | 4 | 97 | 0.016598 | 0.40249 |
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NPG 12(M. Lenzen, D. Moran, K. Kanemoto, B. Foran, L. Lobefaro & A. Geschke, Nature Publishing Group (NPG) is a publisher of high impact scientific and medical information in print and online. NPG publishes journals, online databases, and services across the life, physical, chemical and applied sciences and clinical medicine, “International trade drives biodiversity threats in developing nations”, http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v486/n7401/pdf/nature11145.pdf)> BC Human activities are causing Earth’s sixth major extinction event1—an accelerating decline of the world’s stocks of biological diversity at rates 100 to 1,000 times pre-human levels2. Historically, low-impact intrusion into species habitats arose from local demands for food, fuel and living space3. However, in today’s increasingly globalized economy, international trade chains accelerate habitat degradation far removed from the place of consumption. Although adverse effects of economic prosperity and economic inequality have been confirmed4, 5, the importance of international trade as a driver of threats to species is poorly understood. Here we show that a significant number of species are threatened as a result of international trade along complex routes, and that, in particular, consumers in developed countries cause threats to species through their demand of commodities that are ultimately produced in developing countries. We linked 25,000 Animalia species threat records from the International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List to more than 15,000 commodities produced in 187 countries and evaluated more than 5 billion supply chains in terms of their biodiversity impacts. Excluding invasive species, we found that 30% of global species threats are due to international trade. In many developed countries, the consumption of imported coffee, tea, sugar, textiles, fish and other manufactured items causes a biodiversity footprint that is larger abroad than at home. Our results emphasize the importance of examining biodiversity loss as a global systemic phenomenon, instead of looking at the degrading or polluting producers in isolation. We anticipate that our findings will facilitate better regulation, sustainable supply-chain certification and consumer product labelling. Many studies have linked export-intensive industries with biodiversity threats, for example, coffee growing in Mexico6 and Latin America7, soya8 and beef9 production in Brazil, forestry10 and fishing11 in Papua New Guinea, palm oil plantations in Indonesia and Malaysia12, and ornamental fish catching in Vietnam13, to name but a few. However, such studies are neither systematic nor comprehensive in their coverage of international trade. They also do not link exports to consuming countries, and miss threats more difficult to connect to specific exports, such as agricultural and industrial pollution. Our approach provides a comprehensive view of the commercial causes of biodiversity threats. Using information from the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List on threat causes, we associated threatened species with implicated commodities; for example, Ateles geoffroyi (spider monkey) is endangered and threatened by habitat loss linked to coffee and cocoa plantations in Mexico and Central America. Using a high-resolution global trade input–output table, we traced the implicated commodities from the country of their production, often through several intermediate trade and transformation steps, to the country of final consumption (Methods). This is the first time, to our knowledge, that the important role of international trade and foreign consumption as a driver of threats to species has been comprehensively quantified. We calculated the net trade balances of 187 countries (Supplementary Information section 1) in terms of implicated commodities (Supplementary Information section 2). Countries that export more implicated commodities than they import are net biodiversity exporters, and importers vice versa. A striking division exists between the world’s top ten net exporters and net importers of biodiversity (Fig. 1 and Supplementary Information section 3). Developed countries tend to be relatively minor net exporters, but major net importers of implicated commodities. This is probably due to environmental policies that effectively protect remaining domestic species and that force impacting industries to locate elsewhere. Among the net importers a total of 44% of their biodiversity footprint is linked to imports produced outside their boundaries. In stark contrast, developing countries find themselves degrading habitat and threatening biodiversity for the sake of producing exports. Top net importers and exporters of biodiversity threats. In importer countries marked with an asterisk, the biodiversity footprint rests more abroad then domestically; that is, more species are threatened by implicated imports than are threatened by domestic production. Next Examining exporters and importers in unison shows that primarily the USA, the European Union and Japan are the main final destinations of biodiversity-implicated commodities. Coffee, a top-ranking commodity, is threatening species in Mexico, Colombia and Indonesia. Agriculture also affects habitat in Papua New Guinea (where coffee, cocoa, palm oil and coconut growing are linked to nine critically endangered species including the northern glider, Petaurus abidi, the black-spotted cuscus, Spilocuscus rufoniger, and the eastern long-beaked echidna, Zaglossus bartoni), Malaysia (the main export products are palm oil, rubber and cocoa; 135 species are affected by agriculture) and Indonesia (the main crops are rubber, coffee, cocoa and palm oil, affecting 294 species including Panthera tigris, the Sumatran serow, Capricornis sumatraensis, and Sir David’s long-beaked echidna, Zaglossus attenboroughi). Fishing and forestry industries cause biodiversity loss directly through excessive and illegal resource use and indirectly through bycatch and habitat loss. Such impacts occur not only in developing countries such as the Philippines (affecting 420 species, 28 of which are critically endangered) and Thailand (affecting 352 species, 28 critically) but also in the United States (affecting 450 species, 63 critically). Biological resource use is not the only threat. In China, pollution is responsible for one-fifth (304 out of 1,526) of all threats. Consumers in the United States and Japan are the largest beneficiaries of these trade flows. Finally, most species on the Red List suffer several different threats. For example, the vulnerable round whipray, Himantura pastinacoides, is under threat in Indonesia owing to chemical pollution and loss of its native mangrove habitat to shrimp aquaculture, logging and coastal development. Flow map of threats to species caused by exports from Malaysia (reds) and imports into Germany (blues). Note that the lines directly link the producing countries, where threats are recorded, and final consumer countries. Supply-chain links in intermediate countries are accounted for but not explicitly visualized. An interactive version is available at http://www.worldmrio.com/biodivmap/. Our findings clearly show that local threats to species are driven by economic activity and consumer demand across the world. Consequently, policy aimed at reducing local threats to species should be designed from a global perspective, taking into account not just the local producers who directly degrade and destroy habitat but also the consumers who benefit from the degradation and destruction. Allocating responsibility between producers and consumers is not straightforward, even as an academic exercise. Producers exert the impacts and control production methods, but consumer choice and demand drives production, so that responsibility may lie with both camps, and may hence have to be shared between them14. Notwithstanding its theoretical challenges, the consumer responsibility principle is now receiving ample attention in the climate change debate. Its political relevance is demonstrated by China’s official stance that final consumer countries should be held accountable for the greenhouse gases emitted during the production of China’s export goods14. To inform this debate, countries’ carbon footprints are now being calculated using global multi-region input–output models15.
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Ostfeld and Keesing 13 (Richard S Ostfeld, Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies, Millbrook, NY, USA, Felicia Keesing, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY, USA, Elsevier Encyclopedia of Biodiversity, “Biodiversity and Human Health” http://ac.els-cdn.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/B9780123847195003324/3-s2.0-B9780123847195003324-main.pdf?_tid=e3f0ac3e-f33b-11e2-8ded-00000aab0f02&acdnat=1374545112_3c915724869f82f0aad33f3288a1e075)The organization of economic activity into more-or-less private markets is, by and large, a phenomenon that began several hundred years ago in the West and has expanded worldwide in more recent decades (while the world's major economies have increasingly been organized along market lines, virtually all remain “mixed” economies, in which economic activity is apportioned in varying degrees between private and public sectors). (For an interesting perspective on changes in social views concerning private self-interest over the centuries, see Heilbroner, 1999.) BC The scale of economic activity neither tracks exactly the degradation of the environment in general nor the decline in biodiversity. Technological improvements may result in the production of both more valuable and less environmentally damaging goods. The empirical fact is, however, that biodiversity has declined with the appearance and expansion of modern market economies. It is easy to link the causes of biodiversity loss with the hallmarks of economic growth. Overharvesting results when growing demands for fish, timber, and other biological resources interact with emerging technologies for their extraction and exploitation. Modern market economies are not conducive to the types of social norms and local institutions that have, in many cases, led to sustainable resource extraction from common-pool resources in small-scale preindustrial communities (e.g., Ostrom, 1990). International trade and travel are leading causes of the introduction of exotic diseases, pests, and predators that have eliminated native populations, particularly in isolated habitats. (It is worth noting, however, that prehistoric human migrations also had devastating effects on native biota. Paleontological evidence suggests that the extinction of American megafauna were at least suspiciously contemporary with the migration of humans across the Bering land bridge, even if experts disagree as to the culpability of humans. The extinction of Pacific island fauna, such as the giant Moa of New Zealand, has been more definitively linked to the arrival of Polynesian voyagers and, in some instances more importantly, the rats and pigs they brought with them.) In the early nineteenth century, William Blake wrote that the industrial revolution had brought “dark satanic mills,” to “England's green and pleasant land,” and by the end of the twentieth century the industrial air and water pollution that had transformed landscapes in the worlds' wealthier nations was also to be found, often in greater quantities and concentrations, in less-developed countries. Perhaps most importantly, the sheer scale of human activity has resulted in the destruction of natural habitats to provide more area for industry, residences, and agriculture
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http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v486/n7401/pdf/nature11145.pdf)> BC Human activities are causing Earth’s sixth major extinction event an accelerating decline of the world’s stocks of biological diversity at rates 100 to 1,000 times pre-human levels , the importance of international trade as a driver of threats to species is poorly understood that a significant number of species are threatened as a result of international trade along complex routes consumers in developed countries cause threats to species through their demand of commodities that are ultimately produced in developing countries . In developed countries consumption causes a biodiversity footprint that is larger abroad than at home the important role of international trade and foreign consumption as a driver of threats to species has been comprehensively quantified. Fishing and forestry industries cause biodiversity loss directly through excessive and illegal resource use and indirectly through bycatch and habitat loss threats to species are driven by economic activity and consumer demand across the world. , policy aimed at reducing local threats to species should be designed from a global perspective, taking into account not just the local producers who directly degrade and destroy habitat but also the consumers who benefit from the degradation and destruction.
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Market expansion destroys biodiversity- empirics prove
| 8,421 | 54 | 1,350 | 1,190 | 6 | 194 | 0.005042 | 0.163025 |
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A Brief Environmental History”, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/episodes/cuba-the-accidental-eden/a-brief-environmental-history/5830/, MS) The expansion of Cuban commercialism and industry, particularly with the influence of European and American capital, continued to threaten Cuban wildlife populations. Tobacco and more significantly sugar transformed the country from a Spanish shipping port to a major agricultural exporter. As sugar demand rose, habitat was destroyed for farming. Today, farmers still compete with wildlife for use of the land. At the same time, heavy industrial development polluted Cuban air, land, and water.¶ Cuba’s 1959 revolution set the country on a path apart from other post-colonial nations.¶ Although revolutionary Cuba instituted policies around agriculture, industry, forests, and water, like most states in the 1960s, its moderate environmental efforts had mixed results. Focusing more heavily on agriculture rather than heavy industry probably did more to save Cuban wildlife in the ‘60s and ‘70s than did any environmentally conscious policies.¶ While global capitalism continued on a general course of thoughtless environmental destruction, the U.S. embargo against Cuba, including a travel ban, freed the country from its most salient environmental threat while putting the nation under great economic strain. Cuba traded and underwent forms of “development,” but in many ways avoided the developments of late century American capitalism. While both “capitalism” and “communism” ultimately undervalued natural resources, American executive and legislative dispositions helped nurture the blossoming of Cuban wildlife.¶
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PBS 10 (Public Broadcasting Service, “Cuba: The Accidental Eden
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The expansion of Cuban commercialism and industry, particularly with the influence of European and American capital, continued to threaten Cuban wildlife populations. still compete with wildlife for use of the land heavy industrial development polluted Cuban air, land, and water While global capitalism continued on a general course of thoughtless environmental destruction, the U.S. embargo against Cuba, including a travel ban, freed the country from its most salient environmental threat While both “capitalism” and “communism” ultimately undervalued natural resources, American executive and legislative dispositions helped nurture the blossoming of Cuban wildlife.
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Capitalist expansion creates environmental destruction
| 1,658 | 54 | 670 | 222 | 5 | 91 | 0.022523 | 0.40991 |
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Dasgupta 2 (Sir Partha Dasgupta is the Frank Ramsey Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom; Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge; and Professorial Research Fellow at the University of Manchester “Economic Development, Environmental Degradation, and the Persistence of Deprivation in Poor Countries”, November 2002).>> IL That Nature is a part of our productive base may appear a commonplace, but scratch an economist and you are likely to find someone who regards the natural environment as a mere luxury. For it is even today commonly thought that, to quote an editorial in the UK’s The Independent (4 December 1999), "... (economic) growth is good for the environment because countries need to put poverty behind them in order to care"; or, to quote The Economist (4 December, 1999: 17), "... trade improves the environment, because it raises incomes, and the richer people are, the more willing they are to devote resources to cleaning up their living space." These passages reflect a detached view, observed from Olympian heights. The viewpoint encourages even economic egalitarians to justify the use of GNP as a measure of human wellbeing in poor countries: since the environment is a luxury, why should one care if it depreciates 5 For a study of indices that reflect human well-being over time, and for conditions under which genuine investment is an ideal index of improvements in well-being over time, see Partha Dasgupta and Karl-Göran Mäler, "Net National Product, Wealth, and Social Well-Being", Environment and Development Economics , 2000, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 69-93; Partha Dasgupta, Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Kenneth J. Arrow, Partha Dasgupta, and Karl-Göran Mäler (1), "Evaluating Projects and Assessing Sustainable Development in Imperfect Economies", forthcoming, Environmental and Resource Economics , 2003, and (2) "The Genuine Savings Criterion and the Value of Population", forthcoming, Economic Theory , 2003. 3 during the early stages of economic development? 6 Closer to home, however, matters look different. For Nature offers us a multitude of ecosystem services, which include maintaining a genetic library, preserving and regenerating soil, fixing nitrogen and carbon, recycling nutrients, controlling floods, filtering pollutants, assimilating waste, pollinating crops, operating the hydrological cycle, and maintaining the gaseous composition of the atmosphere. A number of these services filter into a global context (e.g., the atmosphere as a sink for pollutants), many are spatially localized. 7 Spatially localized natural assets are of the utmost importance to the world’s poor. When wetlands, inland and coastal fisheries, woodlands, ponds and lakes, and grazing fields are damaged (say, owing to agricultural encroachment or urban extensions or the construction of large dams), traditional dwellers suffer. For them - and they are among the poorest in society there are frequently no alternative source of livelihood. In contrast, for rich eco-tourists or importers of primary products there is something else, often somewhere else, which means that there are alternatives. The range between a need and a luxury is enormous and context-ridden. Macroeconomic reasoning glosses over the heterogeneity of Earth’s resources and the diverse uses to which they are put - by people residing at the site and by those elsewhere. National income accounts reflect this reasoning by failing to record a wide array of our transactions with Nature. The reason why changes in the size and composition of natural capital are in large measure missing from national accounts is that Nature’s services most often do not come with a price tag. The reason for that is that property rights to natural capital are often very difficult 6 The view’s origin can be traced to the World Bank’s World Development Report 1992 . For an assessment of the empirical findings that led to the view, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Bert Bolin, Robert Costanza, Partha Dasgupta, Carl Folke, Crawford S. Holling, Bengt-Owe Jansson, Simon A. Levin, Karl-Göran Mäler, Charles Perrings, and David Pimentel, "Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity, and the Environment", Science , 1995, vol. 268, pp.520-1; and the commentaries on the note in invited symposia in Ecological Economics , 1995, vol. 15, no. 1; Ecological Applications , 1996, vol. 6, no. 1; and Environment and Development Economics , 1996, vol. 1, no. 1. See also the special issue of Environment and Development Economics , 1997, vol. 2, no. 4. In the text that follows I focus on a different set of weaknesses in the view than are identified in the Arrow et al . note. 7 For the economics of ecosystem services, see my book, The Control of Resources (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). A modern classic on the science of ecosystem services is Gretchen Daily, ed., Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1997). 4 to establish, let alone enforce. And the reason for that is that natural capital is frequently mobile. At the broadest level soil, water, and the atmosphere (which are capital assets themselves) are media that enable capital assets to connect among themselves and flourish, meaning that a disturbance to any one asset can be expected to reverberate on many others at distances away, sometimes at far distances. Under current practice though the consequences of the connectedness of natural capital can easily go unnoted in economic transactions. 8 It can then be that those who destroy mangroves in order to create shrimp farms, or cut down forests in the uplands of watersheds to export timber, are not required to compensate fishermen dependent on the mangroves, or farmers and fishermen in the lowlands whose fields and fisheries are protected by the upland forests. Economic development in the guise of growth in per capita GNP can come in tandem with a decline in the wealth of some of the poorest members of society.
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McCarty 4 (Professor James McCarthy earned a B.A. in English and Environmental Studies from Dartmouth College and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Geography from the University of California, Berkeley. Prior to joining the Graduate School of Geography in 2011, he was an Assistant and Associate Professor of Geography at Penn State University, “Privatizing conditions of production: trade agreements as neoliberal environmental governance”, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718503001064) .>> IL The environmental sting in these FTAs is found in the protection from ‘expropriation’ afforded to transnational corporations. Under the FTA, any environmental regulations or resource use consent requirements which affect such a corporation must be ‘reasonable’ – but not as determined by the people of New Zealand or their elected representatives. The reasonableness (or otherwise) is decided by a panel of three arbitrators, one of whom is appointed by the corporation concerned. Any regulations or requirements deemed ‘unreasonable’ would be an ‘expropriation’ under the FTA rules (in other words, what is seen from a neoliberal standpoint as an illegal imposition on private property rights known as ‘regulatory taking’). Compensation is payable for any such ‘expropriation’. This is not just a fear of what might happen. James McCarthy has described how Metalclad Corporation was refused municipal permits for the expansion of a waste disposal facility it had purchased in Guadalcazar, Mexico. The company sought arbitration under the investment protection rules of the North American FTA (NAFTA) and was awarded US$16.7 million on the basis of the arbitration tribunal’s own interpretations of domestic Mexican law. It’s interesting to note that the investment protection provisions of the China-New Zealand FTA (Chapter 11 – Investment) look very much like those in the notorious and ill-fated MAI (IV – Investment Protection). While the MAI attracted huge opposition from anti-globalisation activists, unions, indigenous peoples and greens around the world in the late 1990s, now the bilateral FTAs accumulate around the world with hardly a street protest, and the piecemeal MAI arrives by stealth. The roll-out of neoliberalism The ‘roll-back’ of the state that I’ve described so far is accompanied by the ‘roll-out’ of neoliberalism – the familiar “near worship of … the ‘self regulating market’ … as the mechanism for allocating all goods and services.” This dogma leads to “privatization via putatively market-based schemes” along with a “deeply contradictory endorsement of excludable, private property rights and commodification created and defended by the state” (p.276). Neoliberal ideas about environmental policy are found, for example, in ‘ecosystem markets’ and also in the carbon market, which I focus on here. In current debates on the ways to address global warming, it seems to be assumed that a market system is the only possible mechanism available to regulate CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. To appreciate the fallacy in this thinking, it is worth noting how the idea of tradeable permits came to be the conventional wisdom of emissions reduction. In Carbon trading: A critical conversation (at p. 51), Larry Lohmann describes how, during the Kyoto meetings in 1997, the Brasilian delegation proposed a system whereby fines were imposed on countries exceeding their emission cap to fund ‘clean energy’ developments in the South. This proposal was accepted in principle by the ‘G-77 plus China’ group of developing nations. However, after a few days of intensive negotiations, ‘fines’ had become ‘prices’ and a ‘judicial system’ had become a ‘market’, in line with what the US wanted. The dominance of US power, the desire of other nations to keep the US on board, and the pressure applied by corporations drove the agenda in this direction throughout. As most readers will realise, all this is deeply ironic because the US has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, having formally withdrawn from it in 2001. Nevertheless, the attachment to the idea of an emission permit/trading system remains, promoted (by governments, political parties, policy wonks, international agencies and even many NGOs too) as the best way to tackle climate change – regardless of the accumulating evidence to the contrary.
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scratch an economist and you are likely to find someone who regards the natural environment as a mere luxury. For Closer to home, however, matters look different. For Nature offers us a multitude of ecosystem services, which include maintaining a genetic library, preserving and regenerating soil, fixing nitrogen and carbon, recycling nutrients, controlling floods, filtering pollutants, assimilating waste, pollinating crops, operating the hydrological cycle, and maintaining the gaseous composition of the atmosphere. A number of these services filter into a global context And the reason for that is that natural capital is frequently mobile. At the broadest level soil, water, and the atmosphere (which are capital assets themselves) are media that enable capital assets to connect among themselves and flourish, meaning that a disturbance to any one asset can be expected to reverberate on many others at distances away, sometimes at far distances. Under current practice though the consequences of the connectedness of natural capital can easily go unnoted in economic transactions. 8 It can then be that those who destroy mangroves in order to create shrimp farms, or cut down forests in the uplands of watersheds to export timber, are not required to compensate fishermen dependent on the mangroves, or farmers and fishermen in the lowlands whose fields and fisheries are protected by the upland forests.
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Environmental Regulation under Economic Expansion is impossible- empirics prove
| 6,055 | 79 | 1,413 | 953 | 9 | 217 | 0.009444 | 0.227702 |
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At low levels of development both the quantity and intensity of environmental degradation is limited to the impacts of subsistence economic activity on the resource base and to limited quantities of biodegradable wastes. As economic development accelerates with the intensification of agriculture and other resource extraction and the take off of industrialization, the rate of resource depletion begins to exceed the rates of resource regeneration, and waste generation increases in quantity and toxicity. At higher levels of development, structural change towards information-intensive industries and services, coupled with increased environmental awareness, enforcement of environmental regulations, better technology and higher environmental expenditures, result in leveling off and gradual decline of environmental degradation. (Panayotou, 93).
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Stern et. al. 96 (David I. Stern, “Economic Growth and Environmental Degradation: The Environmental Kuznets Curve and Sustainable Development” Boston University, Massachusetts, Vol. 24, No. 7, pp. 1151-l 160, 1996 Copyright 0 1996) IL
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As economic development accelerates with the intensification of agriculture and other resource extraction and the take off of industrialization, the rate of resource depletion begins to exceed the rates of resource regeneration, and waste generation increases in quantity and toxicity.
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Economic development causes resource depletion
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We have used data on some 114,000 industrial facilities and other businesses in Mexico to evaluate the Clean Industry Program, Mexico’s flagship voluntary regulatory program. The first stage of our analysis focused on identifying the drivers of participation in the program, and the second stage focused on determining whether it improves participants’ environmental performance. To analyze participation, we used a duration model, because it explicitly accounts for the timing of the dependent variable (participation) and the main independent variable of interest (regulatory fines), and because it controls for right censoring. Our results suggest that regulatory fines do motivate participation in the program: a fine roughly triples the probability of participation for three years after it is assessed. Hence, the Clean Industry Program does not simply consist of already-clean plants. Rather, it has attracted dirty plants under pressure from regulators. The analysis also shows that certain types of plants – those that sell their goods in overseas markets and to government suppliers, use imported inputs, are large, and are in certain sectors and states – are more likely to participate. To analyze program impacts, we used the postamnesty incidence of fines as a proxy for plants’ environmental performance and used propensity score matching to control for bias created by self-selection into the program of plants with characteristics likely to affect environmental performance. To control for the lengthy inspection amnesty granted to participating plants, we focused on plants that joined the program in its first nine years. Our analysis indicates that after their inspection amnesty expired, Clean Industry participants were not fined at a substantially lower rate than matched nonparticipants. This suggests that the Clean Industry Program did not have a large, lasting impact on average environmental performance. It is important to reiterate that we used a proxy for environmental performance instead of a direct measure, and we relied on a restricted sample of participants from the program’s first nine years. Nevertheless, we believe our results are credible and shed important light on the environmental benefits of an increasingly popular yet little-studied regulatory policy in developing countries. Our findings raise two questions. The first concerns the relationship between the results from our participation and impact analyses: if Clean Industry Program participants included dirty firms under pressure from regulators, and if program participants obtained certificates attesting that they had remedied all deficiencies identified by a comprehensive independent environmental audit, then why were program graduates not cleaner on average than similar nonparticipants? The most likely explanation is simply that the effect of the Clean Industry Program on graduates’ environmental performance was temporary, not permanent. After receiving their Clean Industry Certificates, at least some plants reverted to pre-participation levels of environmental performance. This explanation is consistent with an evidence that the effect on participants’ environmental performance of U.S. voluntary (climate and energy efficiency) programs was temporary, lasting just two to three years after participation A second question concerns our participation analysis: how could regulatory pressure have driven participation in the Clean Industry Program, if such pressure is reputed to have been relatively weak during our participation study period (1992–2004) [32], [20] and [9]? We believe the explanation has partly to do with PROFEPA’s enforcement strategy. For most of our study period, PROFEPA targeted facilities “at risk” of industrial accidents—i.e., large facilities in particularly dirty sectors [16], [17] and [37]. Our duration analysis shows that these same plants were particularly likely to participate in the Clean Industry Program. Therefore, although PROFEPA monitoring and enforcement may have been weak for the average facility, for targeted sectors, it was less so. The design features of the Clean Industry Program may also explain how even weak regulatory pressure may have spurred participation. The program provides carrots – namely certification and an inspection amnesty – that helped leverage PROFEPA’s enforcement sticks. Finally, we note that the main findings from our participation and impact analyses are broadly consistent with research on voluntary programs in industrialized countries. Like many studies of government led-voluntary programs, we find that dirty firms under pressure from regulators are more likely to participate, and like most such studies, we find that participation does not significantly improve an average environmental performance [26] and [29]. Our findings raise questions about the ability of voluntary programs to help shore up weak mandatory regimes in developing countries.
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Blackman 10 (Allen Blackman, Bidisha Lahiri, William Pizer, Marisol Rivera Planter, Carlos Mun˜oz Pin˜a,Resources for the Future, 1616 P Street, N.W. Washington DC 20036, USA Department of Economics, Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK, USA Independent Instituto Nacional de Ecología, Secretaría del Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, Mexico City, Mexico “Voluntary environmental regulation in developing countries: Mexico’s Clean Industry Program”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 60 (2010) 182–192,http://www.sciencedirect.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/science/article/pii/S0095069610000781) BC
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We have used data on some 114,000 industrial facilities and other businesses in Mexico to evaluate the Clean Industry Program, Mexico’s flagship voluntary regulatory program. regulatory fines do motivate participation in the program a fine roughly triples the probability of participation for three years after it is assessed the Clean Industry Program does not consist of already-clean plants it has attracted dirty plants under pressure from regulators types of plants that sell in overseas markets and to government suppliers are more likely to participate. after their inspection amnesty expired the Clean Industry Program did not have a large, lasting impact on average environmental performance. the effect of the Clean Industry Program on graduates’ environmental performance was temporary, not permanent. After receiving their Clean Industry Certificates least some plants reverted to pre-participation levels of environmental performance dirty firms under pressure from regulators are more likely to participate, and like most such studies, we find that participation does not significantly improve an average environmental performance
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There is no incentive for environmental protection in Mexico industry
| 4,951 | 69 | 1,144 | 716 | 10 | 163 | 0.013966 | 0.227654 |
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Human activity is causing the extinction of animal, plant and microbial species at rates that are a thousand times greater than those which would have occurred naturally (Wilson l992), approximating the largest extinctions in geological history. When homo sapiens evolved, some l00 thousand years ago, the number of species that existed was the largest ever to inhabit the Earth (Wilson l989). Current rates of species loss are reducing these levels to the lowest since the end of the Age of Dinosaurs, 65 million years ago, with estimates that one-fourth of all species will become extinct in the next 50 years (Ehrlich and Wilson l99l).
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Chivian 11 (Dr. Eric S. Chivian is the founder and Director of the Center for Health and the Global Environment (CHGE) at Harvard Medical School,[1] where he is also an assistant clinical professor of psychiatry, “Species Extinction, Biodiversity Loss and Human Health”, September, 2011, http://www.ilo.org/oshenc/part-vii/environmental-health-hazards/item/505-species-extinction-biodiversity-loss-and-human-health)> BC
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Human activity is causing extinction of animal, plant and microbial species at rates a thousand times greater than those which would have occurred naturally
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Loss of Biodiversity bad, hurts future progress, collapses ecosystems
| 638 | 69 | 156 | 104 | 9 | 24 | 0.086538 | 0.230769 |
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“How much is a species worth? What is the price tag on the services provided by a river or a forest?” These are the questions biologist María Elena Perdomo is asking to encourage Cubans to take account of environmental costs, which may apparently be incorporated in the present economic reforms.¶ “Climate change effects reduce biodiversity, cause a decline in quality of life, change landscapes and have enormous social consequences. But what does all this mean in economic terms?” asks Perdomo, a researcher at the Centre for Environmental Studies and Services in Villa Clara, 268 kilometres from Havana.¶ In an interview with IPS, she said that this kind of analysis should be given more attention when decisions are being made about how to protect the environment, and when planning ecological projects, defining environmental education messages and programmes and planning construction or other works that could harm vulnerable areas.¶ “One way of determining the value of a service, resource or ecosystem is to consider the cost of replacing it if it were not available,” she said. “What losses are caused by a tropical cyclone or a prolonged drought? How much would it cost to take clean water to arable lands left without water sources?”¶ In Cuba, as in other Caribbean countries, the effects of global warming will have the greatest impact on coastal areas, although the whole island will be increasingly affected by extreme weather events, such as heat waves, prolonged periods of drought and heavy rains. Potable water and fertile land will be scarcer and biodiversity will be diminished. Some 80 coastal settlements are likely to be affected and 15 could disappear by 2050 if the Cuban government does not implement adaptation measures in response to the prediction that, by then, 2.32 percent of the national territory will be permanently under water, according to the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment. Because of this situation, conservation and remediation of natural areas that can contribute to mitigating temperature rise is another challenge for Cuba’s 11.2 million people and its economy, which is struggling to emerge from a severe crisis that has lasted over 20 years.¶ The strategic programme of economic and social reforms begun in 2008 by the government of President Raúl Castro includes addressing environmental problems. This year, that approach became more visible as using renewable sources of energy, which are much less polluting than fossil fuels, became a higher priority.¶ The authorities are directing investments so that by 2030 about 10 percent of the energy consumed in the country will come from wind, sun, water and other renewable sources, it was announced this month.¶ The ministry has also created an environmental research and management macro-project to consider climate change vulnerability and risk assessment in coastal zones from 2050 to 2100, which includes recommendations for adaptation measures.¶ “Often there is no reliable quantitative evaluation of natural resources,” said Perdomo. Other problems that have been identified, she added, are the lack of “financing for remediation, lack of decision-making power in local communities, and lack of financial support for environmental education.”¶ A study published in 2012 by the Revista Cubana de Geografía, an online geographical journal, estimated the total cost of restoring the vegetation along the banks of the river Guanabo, in the Cuban capital, at 825,500 dollars, according to figures from Unidad Silvícola, a state forestry unit in Havana.¶ To remedy damage to the vegetation of the Guanabo river basin caused by human activity, the research study found that forests, “cuabal” (dry-adapted thorny scrub growing on thin soil or bare rock) and mangroves would all have to be restored, to allow natural regeneration to occur.¶ Replanting efforts would take until 2022, says the study titled “Valoración económica de las afectaciones ambientales al recurso bosque en la franja hidrorreguladora de la corriente principal del río Guanabo, La Habana, Cuba” (Cost of environmental damage to forest resources in the hydro-regulating zones along the main course of the Guanabo river, Havana, Cuba).¶ This area has been subjected to indiscriminate exploitation for years, with the result that forests and thickets have been fragmented and destroyed, river channels eroded and bodies of water polluted with sediments, among other effects, the study says. If nothing is done, the costs of remediation will increase, the authors warn.¶ The National Statistics Office reported that Cuba spent 37 million dollars more on environmental protection in 2012 than in the previous year. However, expenditure on river basins of national interest fell by 81,000 dollars in the same period.¶ The report “Social Panorama of Latin America 2012″ by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) says that the environment was one of the most neglected areas in the region over the last two decades. On average, the region’s countries devoted 0.2 percent of public expenditure to environmental actions, sanitation, housing and drinking water during that period.¶ “Communities should be mitigating factors, not agents that accelerate climate change,” Sandra Ribalta, the coordinator of Ando Reforestando, a community reforestation and awareness-raising project in Havana, told IPS. “Our population sees climate change as something that will happen far in the future, or simply isn’t aware of it as a problem.”¶ Alba Camejo, an environmental communicator, told IPS that “things are being done, but information about them needs to be circulated more widely.”¶ That is why she started Árbol de Vida (Tree of Life), a way of spreading the word about environmental actions using a web site and a subscriber list of more than 10,000 email addresses.¶ Torrential rains from tropical storm Andrea buffeted the western province of Pinar del Río in the first few days of June, pouring down almost twice the province’s average rainfall for the month. Local authorities are now taking stock of the environmental damage and agricultural and housing losses left in its wake.¶ According to preliminary reports, the state Provincial Environmental Unit of Pinar del Río identified damage to the dunes of the Boca de Galafre beach. The local press was told that the downpours may also have caused deforestation in certain locations, among other destructive effects.
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González 13 (Ivet Gonzalez, Inter Press Serivce News Agency, , “Cuba Wakes Up to Costs of Climate Change Effects”, June 17, 2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/cuba-wakes-up-to-costs-of-climate-change-effects/)
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“How much is a species worth? What is the price tag on the services provided by a river or a forest?” “Climate change effects reduce biodiversity, cause a decline in quality of life, change landscapes and have enormous social consequences. In Cuba, as in other Caribbean countries, the effects of global warming will have the greatest impact on coastal areas, although the whole island will be increasingly affected by extreme weather events, such as heat waves, prolonged periods of drought and heavy rains. Potable water and fertile land will be scarcer and biodiversity will be diminished. Some 80 coastal settlements are likely to be affected and 15 could disappear by 2050 if the Cuban government does not implement adaptation measures in response to the prediction that, by then, 2.32 percent of the national territory will be permanently under water
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Reduction in biodiversity reduces quality of life
| 6,470 | 49 | 856 | 1,009 | 7 | 139 | 0.006938 | 0.13776 |
Environment Disadvantage - Northwestern 2013 4WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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