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As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.
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Zhang ’12 [Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower” 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm ]
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As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would i be helpful in the fight against global poverty In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other This philosophy is, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger he rise of China's political soft power has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues
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b. Chinese soft power is an existential impact – it controls every scenario for extinction
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China's forays into Latin America are part of its grand strategy to acquire "comprehensive national power" to become a "global great power that is second to none." Aiming to secure access to the continent's vast natural resources and markets, China is forging deep economic, political and military ties with most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. There is more to China's Latin American activism than just fuel for an economic juggernaut. China now provides a major source of leverage against the United States for some Latin American and Caribbean countries. As in many other parts of the developing world, China is redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help propel China's rise as a global superpower. Beijing's courtship of Latin American countries to support its plan to subdue Taiwan and enlist them to join a countervailing coalition against U.S. global power under the rubric of strengthening economic interdependence and globalization has begun to attract attention in Washington. Nonetheless, Beijing's relations with the region are neither too cozy nor frictionless. For Latin America and the Caribbean countries, China is an enviable competitor and rival, potential investor, customer, economic partner, a great power friend and counterweight to the United States, and, above all, a global power, much like the United States, that needs to be handled with care. As in Asia and Africa, China is rapidly expanding its economic and diplomatic presence in Latin America -- a region the United States has long considered inside its sphere of influence. China's interest in Latin America is driven by its desire to secure reliable sources of energy and raw materials for its continued economic expansion, compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, pursue defense and intelligence opportunities to define limits to U.S. power in its own backyard, and to showcase China's emergence as a truly global great power at par with the United States. In Latin America, China is viewed differently in different countries. Some Latin American countries see China's staggering economic development as a panacea or bonanza (Argentina, Peru, and Chile view China as an insatiable buyer of commodities and an engine of their economic growth); others see it as a threat (Mexico, Brazil, and the Central American republics fear losing jobs and investment); and a third group of countries consider China their ideological ally (Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela). While China's growing presence and interests have changed the regional dynamics, it still cannot replace the United States as a primary benefactor of Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8 billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S. companies, and U.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than China-Latin America trade. Nonetheless, China is the new kid on the block that everyone wants to be friendly with, and Beijing cannot resist the temptation to exploit resentment of Washington's domineering presence in the region to its own advantage. For Washington, China's forays into the region have significant political, security and economic implications because Beijing's grand strategy has made Latin America and Africa a frontline in its pursuit of global influence. China's Grand Strategy: Placing Latin America in the Proper Context China's activities in Latin America are part and parcel of its long-term grand strategy. The key elements of Beijing's grand strategy can be identified as follows: Focus on "comprehensive national power" essential to achieving the status of a "global great power that is second to none" by 2049; Seek energy security and gain access to natural resources, raw materials and overseas markets to sustain China's economic expansion; Pursue the "three Ms": military build-up (including military presence along the vital sea lanes of communication and maritime chokepoints), multilateralism, and multipolarity so as to counter the containment of China's regional and global aspirations by the United States and its friends and allies; Build a network of Beijing's friends and allies through China's "soft power" and diplomatic charm offensive, trade and economic dependencies via closer economic integration (free trade agreements), and mutual security pacts, intelligence cooperation and arms sales.
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Malik ‘6 (Mohan, PhD in International Relations, "China's Growing Involvement in Latin America," June 12, uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/info@uyghuramerican.org)
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China's forays into Latin America are part of its grand strategy to acquire "comprehensive national power China is forging deep economic ties with most of the Latin American There is more to China's Latin American activism than just fuel for an economic juggernaut. China now provides a major source of leverage against the United States for some Latin American countries China is redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help propel China's rise as a global superpower China is rapidly expanding its economic and diplomatic presence in Latin America - China's interest in Latin America is driven by its desire to secure reliable sources of energy and raw materials for its continued economic expansion, compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, pursue defense and intelligence opportunities to define limits to U.S. power in its own backyard, and to showcase China's emergence as a truly global great power at par with the United States. Beijing cannot resist the temptation to exploit resentment of Washington's domineering presence in the region to its own advantage China's forays into the region have significant political, security and economic implications because Beijing's grand strategy has made Latin America a frontline in its pursuit of global influence ild a network of Beijing's friends and allies through China's "soft power" and diplomatic charm offensive, trade and economic dependencies via closer economic integration
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Successful engagement in Latin America key to Chinese global soft power.
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China Disadvantage - Berkeley 2013.html5
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Berkeley (CNDI)
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1,802 |
As part of the commentary which focuses upon the general relationship between the developed and developing world, more often than not a clear delineation is drawn between the way of life pursued by the people in the Eastern hemisphere and that of the developed Western world, while Africa is generally left out altogether. Although it is necessary to acknowledge differences during any analysis of East and West, the reality is that the most powerful country in the 'new' Eastern/Asian bloc, i.e. China, has inherited many of the characteristics that made America into the power it is today. The number of similarities between the two societies is astounding. China is not only on the verge of becoming an equal partner within the world balance of power over the next 50 years; it is also set to take America's place as a beacon for prosperity and opportunity. The United States of America, as we know it today, came to being as a result of the culmination of the 1929 Wall Street Crash and the Second World War. These two events allowed America to emerge as the world’s strongest power and accelerated the decline of former colonial powers Britain, France and Germany. At this time, Asia was not even part of the equation. Today, however, it is possible to see a very similar situation. This time it is China that remains well afloat within a sea of global recession and Middle Eastern skirmishes. The fact that China holds huge dollar-denominated assets as part of their foreign exchange reserves reaffirms America’s remaining importance within the global financial system, but it is generally accepted by all that China will eventually balance America in terms of both hard and soft power. The soft power that China cultivates often exists within the developing world and is often seen as a rallying bloc contrasted against the self-seeking interests of developed nations. Building soft power was a priority for America post 1949 as it is for China going into the 21st Century. China is going through the same stages of formation, albeit at an accelerated pace, that the United States went through from the 1920s onwards. Disregarding the question of history (i.e. that China boasts a 5000 year history which nobody below the age of 50 is willing to study in-depth, and America only possesses around 200 years of modern history, most of which they would rather forget to a large extent), the similarities are quite clear to see. Not unlike America, China has become home to many people from outside of its borders. Many people have set up a home here in hope of pursuing what is fast becoming the Chinese dream: making their fortune. In Guangzhou, a 10-square-kilometer area centered around Hongqiao, affectionately referred to by locals as Chocolate City, serves as home to a mix of Chinese and foreign dwellers, the majority of which are of African descent. According to Guangzhou Daily, the total number of Africans in this city alone is thought to be almost 100,000, and is only set to rise further. This influx is, at this moment in time, a novel feature of certain cities for many Chinese people, but so too was the influx of immigrants to America in the 1920s. What is more, it is not only immigrants expecting to find fortune in China. As Lester R. Brown, President of Earth Policy Institute in Washington has stated, "for China's 1.3 billion people, the American dream is fast becoming the Chinese dream…Millions of Chinese are living like Americans: eating more meat, driving cars, traveling abroad, and otherwise spending their fast-rising incomes much as Americans do." In this sense, China bears a greater resemblance to the America of the 1920s and 30s than modern America does today. Aside from demographic or financial similarities between China and the United States, one must also acknowledge the general similarity between the psyche of the American and Chinese peoples. Both peoples are generally insular, largely unconcerned with foreign affairs, and their grasp of geography outside of their respective continents is rather poor. Forays into foreign countries are usually the result of humanitarian efforts or as part of their search for natural resources, glaring examples being China’s involvement in Africa and America’s obvious involvement in Iraq. There is no working class sentiment in China or America, and both countries are fiercely patriotic. Patriotism seems to have filled the void of any class sentimentality and it is for this reason that the hope of one People's Daily writer of restructuring Chinese growth in the context of globalization, as stated in the recent article "Why can't China climb up the value chain?," will always be constrained so long as unions are non-existent and labor remains cheap. Though the creation of a "Chinese Dream" may seem like an achievement for the country, there is also the idea that the American Dream could become a Chinese nightmare (USA Today, June 2005), with the possibility that consumption could outstrip global output. And even though the above paragraphs detail the likenesses that exist between the two countries, vast differences remain, mostly in political terms. It is no secret that the two countries have endured a tumultuous relationship, which has most recently been seen when the United States came to China with its tail between its legs regarding a global economic bailout. China, meanwhile, is the arbiter of East Asian stability and is often a thorn in America's side in their pursuit of Western-led initiatives. Hilary Clinton said that global issues could not be solved by the United States or China alone, but without participation of the two countries, no problems would likely be solved. As it turns out, when they do work together nothing gets done, hence the stalemate with the South Korean Yellow Sea missile, a result of a strategic alliance between China and North Korea.
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Wiggin ’10 [Stu. Staffer for China Radio Intl. “American Dream now a Chinese Reality” 8/10/10 Xinhua]
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the reality is that the most powerful country in the 'new' Eastern bloc China, has inherited many of the characteristics that made America into the power it is today China is set to take America's place as a beacon for prosperity and opportunity China remains well afloat within a sea of global recession and Middle Eastern skirmishes. it is generally accepted by all that China will eventually balance America in terms of both hard and soft power The soft power that China cultivates often exists within the developing world and is often seen as a rallying bloc contrasted against the self-seeking interests of developed nations China , is the arbiter of East Asian stability and is often a thorn in America's side in their pursuit of Western-led initiatives Clinton said that global issues could not be solved by the United States or China alone, but without participation of the two countries, no problems would likely be solved when they do work together nothing gets done, hence the stalemate with the South Korean Yellow Sea missile, a result of a strategic alliance between China and North Korea
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Chinese soft power is key to Asian stability
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China Disadvantage - Berkeley 2013.html5
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Berkeley (CNDI)
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Initially, China’s activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in infrastructure constructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since then, with China's economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has gradually become a problem that plagues China -- and its exchanges with Latin America thus are endowed with real substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector. In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isn’t much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that China doesn’t care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United States.
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Xiaoxia, 5/6 (Wang, ECONOMIC OBSERVER/Worldcrunch, “In America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America,” May 5, 2013, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/) -mikee
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with China's economic boom, the supply of energy has gradually become a problem that plagues China -- and its exchanges with Latin America thus are endowed with real substantive purpos the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy secto All China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United States
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The plan changes the oil dynamic and guts Chinese influence – causes energy insecurity for China.
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China Disadvantage - Berkeley 2013.html5
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Berkeley (CNDI)
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The competitive relationship between China and India has become a defining feature of the strategic environment across emerging Asia. While both nations are currently not in direct conflict, there are several areas of strategic interest which could potentially be clashing points in the future. Energy security is one such point; and while escalation between China and India is unlikely, it is important to note that the energy policies of each nation are largely based on geopolitical considerations. First, it is important to recognize that energy cooperation between China and India over the past decade has been increasing. In January 2006, for example, both nations signed a memorandum of cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas which encouraged collaboration between their enterprises, including joint exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources. Escalations in global energy prices and political uncertainties in the Middle East, however, have resulted in both countries looking for long-term arrangements. As China and India are increasingly forced to rely on the global oil market to meet their energy demands, they are more susceptible to supply disruptions and price fluctuations. In response, both countries have partly followed geopolitical energy policies, based on notions of traditional security. Ultimately, what we see is the arrival of military and political planning in trying to solve the issue of natural resource shortages. Energy security is of utmost strategic importance to China and India if they hope to continue to expand their economies. Rapid growth rates in both countries have grown in tandem with increased demand for energy. By 2020, it is estimated that China and India combined will account for roughly one-third of the world’s GDP and, as such, will require vast amounts of energy to fuel their economies. As such, the competition for energy resources such as oil and natural gas will only become fiercer. An important aspect of energy security is maritime control in the Asia-Pacific oceans. The sea lines of communication that run through Asia effectively act as the vital arteries for both countries. Maritime security is thus of major national interest for both China and India, and is directly linked to their energy security. Recent military modernization within China has been focused towards upgrading its naval capabilities, and ultimately moving towards creating a strong and powerful blue-water navy. India’s drive for maritime dominance has resulted in its naval budget increasing from US$1.3 billion in 2001 to US$3.5 billion in 2006, with plans to further increase naval spending 40 percent by 2014. China’s thirst for oil has doubled over the last decade, and is only predicted to rise. Similarly, India relies on the energy shipped through maritime regions to fund its own industrialization. India continues to state its maritime goals in pure geopolitical terms, even explicitly acknowledging in their 2004 Maritime Doctrine that “control of the choke points would be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military power remains a stark reality.” Thus it is clear that energy security has been directly translated into a national security issue, which has both political and military implications. The geopolitical rivalry in Myanmar between China and India provides great insight into their adversarial energy relationship. In Myanmar, both Chinese and Indian geopolitical and geoeconomic interests collide, and as such, may become a point of contention between China and India. Myanmar holds vast strategic importance for both China and India due to its location and abundance of natural resources. It has vast reserves of natural gas, so for both China and India it is presented as a source of energy free from the geopolitical risks of the Middle East. There has thus been major competition between China and India for access to the market. India has signed a US$40 billion deal with Myanmar for the transfer of natural gas, and has also had frequent discussions about building a pipeline from Myanmar to India. However, China has increasingly gained the most from Myanmar’s available resources. In 2005, for example, Myanmar reneged on a deal with India, and instead signed a 30-year contract with China for the sale of 6.5 trillion cubic liters of natural gas. For China, Myanmar is also important as it provides a land route to the Indian Ocean that vital resources could be shipped through in place of the Strait of Malacca. The potential for the Malacca Strait to be blockaded by a rival is of great concern to China, since as much as 85 percent of China’s oil is shipped through the region. For India, Myanmar is also of a strategic importance due to its location. China is already on friendly terms with Pakistan and has been expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean, thus giving India a feeling of Chinese encirclement. India’s interest in Myanmar directly relates to the growing presence and influence of China in the region. China’s “string of pearls” strategy refers to attempts to negotiate basing rights along the sea route linking the Middle East with China, including creating strong diplomatic ties with important states in the region. Not only does this contain India’s naval projection of power, it also directly threatens India’s energy access and the regional balance of power. While military confrontation between China and India remains unlikely, it is important to recognize that China and India’s energy policies revolve around traditional ideas of security, which highlight military and political balancing. Their energy policies are largely based on geopolitical and security considerations, and not just with regards to the global oil market. As such, it is critical for there to be ongoing diplomatic engagement between China and India to avoid unnecessary or accidental escalation.
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Clement ’12 [Nicholas, China and India Vie for Energy Security, May 25, http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2012/05/25/china-and-india-vie-for-energy-security-11177.html]
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The competitive relationship between China and India has become a defining feature of the strategic environment across there are areas of strategic interest which could potentially be clashing points in the future Energy security is one such point As China and India are increasingly forced to rely on the global oil market to meet their energy demands, they are more susceptible to supply disruptions and price fluctuations both countries have partly followed geopolitical energy policies, based on notions of traditional security . Energy security is of utmost strategic importance to China and India if they hope to continue to expand their economies the competition for energy resources such as oil and natural gas will only become fiercer. An important aspect of energy security is maritime control in the Asia-Pacific oceans. Maritime security is thus of major national interest for both China and India, and is directly linked to their energy security. Recent military modernization within China has been focused towards upgrading its naval capabilities, and ultimately moving towards creating a strong and powerful blue-water navy. India’s drive for maritime dominance has resulted in its naval budget increasing India continues to state its maritime goals in pure geopolitical terms Thus it is clear that energy security has been directly translated into a national security issue, which has both political and military implications. The potential for the Malacca Strait to be blockaded by a rival is of great concern to China, For India, Myanmar is also of a strategic importance due to its location. China is already on friendly terms with Pakistan and has been expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean, thus giving India a feeling of Chinese encirclement it is critical for there to be ongoing diplomatic engagement between China and India to avoid unnecessary or accidental escalation.
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Energy insecurity sparks Asian war
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Øystein Noreng has argued that for governments, energy is a politicized commodity, critical to economic and military strength and therefore vital to national security. The significance of energy as a component of foreign trade far outweighs its proportion of the total value of turnover. Simply put, political leaders view oil in a different category than footwear, electronics, or automobiles.[2] Energy, and in particular oil, is too important to be left to market forces alone.[3] Considerable attention has been paid in the international relations literature to the link between economic interdependence and conflict. Liberalists in the field, going back to Kant, argue that greater economic interdependence moderates the prospects for conflict, while realists contend that economic ties exacerbate conflict by increasing a state’s vulnerability in an anarchic environment.[4] Surprisingly few academic studies have focused on oil in foreign policy despite the strategic nature of this commodity. Logically, support for either realist or liberal theories from a study of energy interdependence should be particularly persuasive, given the vital importance of oil for national security. For example, oil dependence heightens uncertainty, and there is evidence that major powers in the past have gone to great lengths, including war, to ensure oil supplies. If the world’s major rising power is employing cooperative strategies rather than using military means to ensure energy supplies, that choice may have significant theoretical and policy implications. The vulnerability of oil consuming states depends on whether they have alternative forms of energy available either domestically or in the international environment. Consumer states can reduce dependence on oil through various strategies, with resort to war as only the most extreme measure. Domestically, states can provide incentives for exploration and enhanced production, assuming that sufficient reserves exist or are suspected to exist, to make such efforts worthwhile. Governments can also adopt conservation policies to reduce consumption. A third strategy to reduce strategic dependence is to shift from imported oil to alternate fuels—coal, natural gas, nuclear power, wind or solar energy—wherever possible. Finally, states may establish strategic reserves to dampen the shock of unexpected supply interruptions or to even out severe price fluctuation. Internationally, consumer states may improve their energy security by diversifying imports, obtaining oil from as many suppliers are possible. Second, they may form or join multilateral organizations in order to bargain more effectively with supply cartels or with major producers. Third, states may encourage oil majors within the country to acquire oil properties abroad, to control upstream production. States that do not have nationalized oil companies may enter into corporatist arrangements with private companies, since the interests of the government and those of private energy companies overlap significantly. Finally, states that are sufficiently powerful may use military force to ensure the flow of oil. For modern industrial and industrializing states oil is a vital component in economic growth. Oil prices are closely tied to inflation and economic growth rates. For example, the Energy Information Administration estimates that doubling the price of oil 1999-2000, from $11 to $22 per barrel, resulted in a .50% increase in inflation in the United States in 1999, and a .75% increase in 2000 The same price increase resulted in a .50% decline in GDP for growth 1999, and a full 1.0% decline in GDP in 2000. The surge in world oil prices to over $65 per barrel in 2005 has further constrained growth and fueled inflation. Given the strong emphasis China’s leaders place on social stability and continued rates of high economic growth, steep price increases and shortages threaten domestic order.
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Ziegler ‘6 (Charles E. Ziegler is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Louisville, and Director of the Institute for Democracy and Development. “THE ENERGY FACTOR IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2006. http://louisville.edu/democracydevelopment/research/current-publications/the-energy-factor-in-china2019s-foreign-policy.html)-mikee
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energy is a politicized commodity The significance of energy as a component of foreign trade far outweighs its proportion of the total value of turnover political leaders view oil different The vulnerability of oil consuming states depends on whether they have alternative forms of energy available Consumer states can reduce dependence on oil through various strategies, with resort to war as only the most extreme measure Internationally, consumer states may improve their energy security by diversifying imports, obtaining oil from as many suppliers are possible For modern industrial and industrializing states oil is a vital component in economic growth. Oil prices are closely tied to inflation and economic growth rates. Given the strong emphasis China’s leaders place on social stability and continued rates of high economic growth, steep price increases and shortages threaten domestic order.
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Oil shortages collapse Chinese growth and triggers regime instability.
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Berkeley (CNDI)
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1,806 |
Tokyo, which used to be the dominant Asian player in energy markets, has been shocked by China’s growing oil needs. Japan’s view of Chinese energy policies is shaped by its perception that a stronger China is asserting itself regionally and globally to Tokyo’s detriment. In particular, Japan views the dispute over territorial demarcation and oil and gas resources in the East China Sea as part of a more aggressive Chinese posture. Japan has responded assertively as well, chasing away a Chinese nuclear submarine that intruded into Japanese waters in 2004. In 2005 relations deteriorated when China and Japan accused one another of beginning to extract resources in contested regions of the East China Sea.51 China sent a small fleet led by Sovremennyy- class destroyers in a show of force around the gas field, and a Chinese ship reportedly trained its guns on a Japanese P-3C patrol craft.52 Japan declared for the first time in its 2004 defense white paper that Chinese naval power should be a cause of concern for all of Asia. The prospect of two Asian powers using military force to emphasize or settle competing claims for oil and gas is unsettling. The United States has significant treaty obligations to Japan, meaning that risk of conflict with Japan is a risk of conflict with the United States. Japan is alarmed by the rate of China’s energy consumption growth and a perceived mercantilist tilt in China’s energy policy.53 This Japanese perception has prompted Japanese national security policymakers to take a tougher line with China and upgrade the alliance with the United States. Japanese energy policy is likewise responding: following a two-decade period of liber- alization, Japan’s latest energy strategy has a more nationalist cast, with calls for government intervention to compete on an equal footing with China for international resources.54 To be sure, Japan is also taking measures to reduce demand and proposing multilateral cooperation, but a view insisting that energy is a strategic resource, and that Japan will need to compete for it with China, has grown prominent of late in Tokyo. Tokyo’s and Beijing’s recent competition for Russian energy supplies from East Siberia and Sakhalin is a case in point. An energy policy that fuels great power competition threatens the security of Asia. Given Japanese and Indian angst over Beijing’s energy strategy, it is incumbent upon the United States to maintain its predominance in Asia through robust economic and military presence. The appearance of Ameri- can withdrawal or inattention would create a vacuum to be filled by intensi- fied security competition among the three major powers, two of whom have nuclear weapons.
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Blumenthal, ‘8 (Dan is a resident fellow at AEI. “Concerns with Respect to China's Energy Policy,” July 01, 2008, http://www.aei.org/files/2003/08/26/20080723_ChinaEnergyStrat.pdf)
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Tokyo, which used to be the dominant Asian player in energy markets, has been shocked by China’s growing oil needs. Japan’s view of Chinese energy policies is shaped by its perception that a stronger China is asserting itself regionally and globally to Tokyo’s detriment The prospect of two Asian powers using military force to emphasize or settle competing claims for oil and gas is unsettling risk of conflict with Japan is a risk of conflict with the United States Japan is alarmed by the rate of China’s energy consumption growth and a perceived mercantilist tilt in China’s energy policy view insisting that energy is a strategic resource, and that Japan will need to compete for it with China, has grown prominent An energy policy that fuels great power competition threatens the security of Asia.
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Energy insecurity in Asia causes great power wars.
| 2,700 | 51 | 803 | 435 | 8 | 134 | 0.018391 | 0.308046 |
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So what does China want exactly in entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China’s involvement in the Latin American continent doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached “loans-for-oil” swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries’ livelihood — and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S.
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Xiaoxia, ’13 (Wang, ECONOMIC OBSERVER/Worldcrunch, “In America’s Backyard: China’s Rising Influence In Latin America,” May 6, 2013, http://stratrisks.com/geostrat/12352)
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China’s involvement oesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached “loans-for-oil” swap agreements with Venezuela that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries’ livelihood — and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S
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China oil influence improves US energy security.
| 886 | 49 | 549 | 141 | 7 | 88 | 0.049645 | 0.624113 |
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A steady drizzle of disappointing data in the last few weeks on everything from exports to electricity generation has experts busily downgrading their forecasts for China’s economy. Most expect between 7% and 8% growth this year, after a decade of world-beating double-digit rates. Looking further out, some analysts expect things to get worse. “China has basically said goodbye to 8% GDP growth in spirit if not in statistics and will have to embrace slower growth, with the average annual growth rate in the next seven years to 2020 perhaps falling to the vicinity of 6%,” wrote Goldman Sachs GS -1.75% China strategist Jiming Ha in a June 10 research report. There used to be a widely held view that China had to maintain growth of 8% to keep a lid on social unrest; now, the official target is 7.5% and analysts think 7% may still be within the government’s comfort zone. But anything less than that would cross a psychological threshold, taking growth to its lowest levels in more than 20 years.
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Silk, 6/13 (Richard, “Goldman Strategist’s 6% Call for China Growth,” 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/06/13/goldman-strategists-6-call-for-china-growth/
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Most expect between 7% and 8% growth this year “China has basically said goodbye to 8% GDP growth in spirit if not in statistics and will have to embrace slower growth There used to be a widely held view that China had to maintain growth of 8% to keep a lid on social unrest; now, the official target is 7.5% and analysts think 7% may still be within the government’s comfort zone. But anything less than that would cross a psychological threshold
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Even if growth has slowed, it just provides us a brink.
| 1,000 | 56 | 447 | 172 | 11 | 82 | 0.063953 | 0.476744 |
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As China's engagement in the region expands, the United States hopes this will produce positive benefits and not detract from the U.S. hemispheric agenda. "We support China's engagement in the region in ways that create prosperity and promote transparency, good governance, and respect for human rights," Shapiro said. "We need to work with China and with our friends and allies to ensure that every effort is taken to promote polices that converge with our interests." He said the United States will continue to monitor China's presence in the Latin America to ensure that it does not detract from the U.S. goals of prosperity, democracy and respect for human right in the region. Shapiro concluded that China's increased engagement in Latin America should lead to increased cooperation between the United States, China and Latin American and Caribbean governments, while not diminishing U.S. capabilities and influence in the region. "Our allies throughout Latin America believe good U.S.-China relations are important to global peace, prosperity and stability," he said. "Our efforts to work with China should enhance, not impair, our regional alliances."
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Shapiro, ‘5 (Charles S., U.S. Department of State, “Chinese Engagement in Latin America Should Enhance U.S.,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western Hemisphere, September 21, 2005, http://archives.uruguay.usembassy.gov/usaweb/paginas/527-00EN.shtml)
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China's engagement in the region will produce positive benefits and not detract from the U.S. hemispheric agenda. China's increased engagement in Latin America should lead to increased cooperation between the United States "Our allies throughout Latin America believe good U.S.-China relations are important to global peace, prosperity and stability," Our efforts to work with China should enhance our regional alliances."
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China influence allows for cooperation instead of US dominance.
| 1,158 | 63 | 422 | 179 | 9 | 60 | 0.050279 | 0.335196 |
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Nelson Cunningham of McLarty Associates argued that from a strategic perspective, China’s interests appear to be purely commercial. This is distinct from Russia’s ideologically-based military and diplomatic alliance with the government of Venezuela, described by Cunningham as aimed at balancing US influence in the region. Latin American countries may have initially pursued the Chinese market to serve as a “strategic counterweight” to the region’s historical commercial and political dependence on the United States. Yet the relationship has not necessarily fulfilled these expectations. For example, popular accusations have been leveled against Brazilian President “Lula” da Silva that China took advantage of him through both the commercial arrangements between the two countries and in negotiations over China’s accession to the WTO. Building a strategic relationship with China is challenging not only because of low levels of Chinese investment in the region, but also because the investment that does occur generally employs Chinese laborers and materials brought over for specific infrastructure projects. While China’s lack of human rights and environmental restrictions makes it an easier commercial partner as compared to the United States and Europe, the relationship lacks the deep cultural kinship that exists between Latin America and these other two areas of the world. Within this context, Cunningham posited that the relationship between China and Latin America will remain strictly commercial, but recommended that the United States be vigilant regarding the way that increasing commercial ties can transform into political alliances. In order for the United States to maintain its privileged relationship with the region, it must compete with China at the commercial level. This consists of lowering trade barriers to Latin American exports and expanding pre- existing commercial and corporate ties.
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Cunningham ’11 (Nelson, McLarty Associates, “China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle,” January 2011, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Institute of the Americas)
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China’s interests appear to be purely commercial. Latin American countries may have initially pursued the Chinese market to serve as a “strategic counterweight Yet the relationship has not necessarily fulfilled these expectations Building a strategic relationship with China is challenging not only because of low levels of Chinese investment in the region the relationship lacks the deep cultural kinship that exists between Latin America and these other two areas of the world the relationship between China and Latin America will remain strictly commercial
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China engagement only effects economic growth – it doesn’t link to your security or political influence impacts.
| 1,922 | 113 | 559 | 280 | 17 | 83 | 0.060714 | 0.296429 |
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But this is far from a new problem. In the 1980s and 1990s most of Latin American countries switched to liberal economic policies, which meant the dismantling of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) and the opening up to foreign trade. These measures unfortunately brought back a scheme of international insertion based on Ricardian comparative advantages. With a handful of exceptions such as countries like Mexico, Latin America and the Caribbean underwent swift processes of de-industrialisation and simultaneously “re-primarised” their exports. By 2010, 76% of Latin American exports were still composed of primary commodities. Even Brazil, widely heralded as a BRIC member and emerging power, has experienced a similar trend, with two-thirds of its exports constituted by raw materials. Despite decades of industrialising efforts, in the early 21st century the structure of Latin American foreign trade is not too different from what it was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
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León-Manríquez ’12 (José Luis León-Manríquez is Professor of International and East Asian Studies at the Metropolitan Autonomous University in Mexico City. “Should we worry about China’s engagement in Latin America?” 08/06/2012, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/PartnerPosts/tabid/671/PostID/3100/language/en-US/Default.aspx)
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But this is far from a new problem. In the 1980s and 1990s most of Latin American countries switched to liberal economic policies These measures unfortunately brought back a scheme of international insertion based on Ricardian comparative advantages Latin America underwent swift processes of de-industrialisation and simultaneously “re-primarised” their exports Despite decades of industrialising efforts, in the early 21st century the structure of Latin American foreign trade is not too different from what it was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
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Commodity dependence is non-unique.
| 995 | 36 | 558 | 150 | 4 | 83 | 0.026667 | 0.553333 |
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However, when assessing the US-Mexico-China TR along the dimension of trade, it is necessary to consider the role of other actors external to the triangle. This is the core of the argument advanced by Ralph Watkins in his chapter.4 He argues that the loss of market share by Mexico and the United States in the NAFTA market is not solely explained by the expansion of China’s exports to the NAFTA-region, but also by the decrease of NAFTA’s imports from other Asian countries, such as Japan. In the US case, Watkins notes that the most relevant shift of production was from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan to China, and not from the United States to China. Using the same logic, he anticipates that the current slow-down in China’s manufacturing may accentuate the shift in labor- intensive production to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Watkins’s analysis also indicates that it is necessary to “drill down” into specific sectors to explore the nature of the “competition” between Mexico and China in the US market. As he shows, geography matters, as Mexico’s comparative advantage in transportation costs makes it more competitive than China with regards to exports “characterized by a high weight and volume to value ratio.” Though more optimistic about the role of NAFTA in facilitating US and Mexican competitive edge than Gallagher and Dussel Peters, Watkins comes to a similar con- clusion: the integration of the North American side of the triangle is fundamental for the competitiveness of the region’s manufacturing industry.5 Thus any policies oriented to deepen NAFTA’s integration—from investment in infrastructure to enforcement of intellectual property rights—are vital for the future of these economies.
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Armony ‘13. Ariel C. Armony. Director of the University of Miami’s Center for Latin American Studies, designated as a Title VI National Re- source Center by the U.S. Department of Education, is also the Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies and Professor of International Studies. “China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas. China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations.” Center for Latin American Studies. 5/17/13
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the loss of market share by Mexico and the United States in the NAFTA market is not solely explained by the expansion of China’s exports to the NAFTA-region, but also by the decrease of NAFTA’s imports from other Asian countries, such as Japan. that the most relevant shift of production was from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan to China, and not from the United States to China. Mexico’s comparative advantage in transportation costs makes it more competitive than China with regards to exports “characterized by a high weight and volume to value ratio.”
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No China threat to Mexico – alt causes
| 1,717 | 38 | 552 | 273 | 8 | 93 | 0.029304 | 0.340659 |
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Additionally, China’s economic growth has had positive impacts on Mexico in other aspects as well: (1) The huge demand for raw materials driven by Chinese industrialization and urbanization has increased their price on the global market, benefitting Mexico and other resource-rich Latin American countries. (2) The incremental appreciation of the Chinese yuan may have a “spillover effect”, which to a certain extent would contribute to the reduction of external debts and help Mexico and other Latin American countries achieve macroeconomic stability, given that China’s yuan has become so strong that Chinese goods may not be the bargain they once were. Such currency dynamics are not the case between the U.S. and Mexico, however. As the dollar weakened, the Mexican peso’s value dropped as well. Therefore, while the yuan was becoming stronger and the dollar becoming weaker, the peso’s value dropped accordingly, making Mexico a viable alternative to China in terms of trade.
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Wang ‘13. Ping Wang. Is the Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at Nankai University, Tianjin, China. She is also the vice president of the China Association of Latin American Historical Studies, and senior research fellow of the Institute of Global Studies of Hong Kong and the Chinese Foreign Economic and Trade University. “China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas. China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations.” Center for Latin American Studies. 5/17/13
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China’s economic growth has had positive impacts on Mexico in other aspects as well: (1) The huge demand for raw materials driven by Chinese industrialization has increased their price on the global market, benefitting Mexico and other resource-rich Latin American countries. incremental appreciation of the Chinese yuan would contribute to the reduction of external debts and help Mexico and other Latin American countries achieve macroeconomic stability Such currency dynamics are not the case between the U.S. and Mexico, however. As the dollar weakened, the Mexican peso’s value dropped as well.
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Chinese investment in Mexico is beneficial – increased export value and debt reduction
| 980 | 86 | 599 | 152 | 13 | 90 | 0.085526 | 0.592105 |
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Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America’s broadening international relations as marking the end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century. A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programs, structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth. As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis. The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40% of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the US’s fastest-growing export destination. Mexico is America’s second-largest foreign market (valued at $215 billion in 2012). US exports to Central America have risen by 94% over the past six years; imports from the region have risen by 87%. And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent. American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbors. This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy – one that recognizes the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran’s nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama’s recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Piñera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after. Language and culture matter, too. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos’ influence in the US, it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China or Russia, let alone Iran. Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.
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Ben-Ami, 6/5 (Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace. “Is the US Losing Latin America?” Jun. 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami#dvmjOomDWM2ExTYG.99)-mikee
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it would be a mistake to regard Latin America’s broadening international relations as marking the end of US preeminence American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century Responsible economic management and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth. he US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40% of US exports now go to Mexico and South America, the US’s fastest-growing export destination exports to Central America have risen And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent. Language and culture matter, too. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos’ influence in the US, it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.
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US influence is still unchallenged – culture, proximity, and economic relations.
| 2,961 | 81 | 1,081 | 466 | 11 | 172 | 0.023605 | 0.369099 |
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U.S. Outreach Biden’s tour, which began May 26 in Colombia, included a “frank” and at times “brutal” discussion about trade, economic growth and security with 15 Caribbean leaders in Trinidad yesterday, Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said, without giving more details. The leaders signed an accord to boost investment and economic cooperation. “Our country is deeply invested and wants to be more deeply invested in the region,” Biden said in Port of Spain. Yesterday’s accord “will give us all a vehicle to overcome special, specific, practical barriers to trade and investment. Our goal is not simply growth, but growth that reaches everyone.” In Colombia, Biden said a one-year-old free-trade agreement between the two countries is “just the beginning,” citing a doubling of the period for which entry visas are valid and efforts to expand trade ties further. State Visit The outreach follows President Barack Obama’s visits in May to Mexico and Costa Rica and precedes talks at the White House in June with the leaders of Chile and Peru. In October, Obama will host Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff to a state dinner at the White House. U.S. business with the region is brisk even in the absence of a region-wide free-trade agreement that the U.S. pursued for more than a decade and that anti-U.S. allies of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez helped bury in 2005. Buoyed by bilateral agreements signed since then with Peru, Panama and Colombia, U.S. exports to Latin America have more than doubled since 2000 to a record $400 billion last year. The region last year bought 26 percent of U.S. exports, an increase from 22 percent in 2000. Brazil Surplus In Rio, Biden will tour a research facility operated by state-run oil company Petroleo Brasileiro SA. U.S. exports of capital goods are helping Brazil develop the biggest oil discoveries in the Americas since 1976 and are one reason why the U.S. in 2009 began posting a trade surplus with Brazil, the region’s biggest economy, for the first time in a decade.
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Goodman, 5/29 (Joshua, “Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties,” 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/biden-circles-xi-as-u-s-duels-china-for-latin-america-influence.html)-mikee
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U.S. Outreach Biden’s tour included a “frank” and at times “brutal” discussion about trade with 15 Caribbean leaders The leaders signed an accord to boost investment and economic cooperation. Our country is deeply invested and wants to be more deeply invested in the region,” Colombia trade agreement is “just the beginning, The outreach follows President Barack Obama’s visits to Mexico U.S. business with the region is brisk .S. exports to Latin America have more than doubled since 2000
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US stepping up engagement now.
| 2,031 | 31 | 489 | 335 | 5 | 78 | 0.014925 | 0.232836 |
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[RIO DE JANEIRO] The competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display this week as US Vice-President Joe Biden arrived in Rio de Janeiro near the end of a three-nation tour of the region with Chinese President Xi Jinping close behind. The duelling visits - Mr Biden departs Brazil tomorrow, the same day Mr Xi arrives in Trinidad & Tobago to begin his first tour of the region since China's political transition ended in March - underscore how Latin America's natural resources and rising middle class are making it an increasingly attractive trade partner for the world's top two economies. Competing with China's cheque book isn't easy for the United States. Seeking South American soya, copper and iron ore, China boosted imports from Latin America twenty-fold, to US$86 billion in 2011 from US$3.9 billion in 2000, according to calculations by the Inter-American Development Bank. By contrast, the US policy of pursuing free trade accords has been controversial, said Kevin Gallagher, a Boston University economist. The Latin America visits come as the International Monetary Fund forecasts the region's economies will expand 3.4 per cent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world.
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Business Times, 5/30 (“US and China compete for influence in Latin America,” 2013, http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/premium/top-stories/us-and-china-compete-influence-latin-america-20130530)-mikee
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The competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on The duelling visits - Mr Biden Mr Xi underscore how Latin America's natural resources and rising middle class are making it an increasingly attractive trade partner for the world's top two economies. Competing with China's cheque book isn't easy for the United States.
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US & China competing for influence now.
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The battle is on. The world's two largest economic superpowers, China and the United States, are making moves on Latin America, hoping to gain more geopolitical influence in a booming region. U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden arrived in Rio de Janeiro on Wednesday, while Chinese President Xi Jinping just landed in the Caribbean island nation of Trinidad and Tobago and is following closely in Biden’s steps. Biden’s visit to Brazil marks the end of a six-day swing through the region, which included stops in Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago. Xi’s trip to Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico is the first since the formal transition of power ended in China in March. These parallel journeys from the world’s top powers to Latin America emphasize how the region’s vast natural resources and steady economic growth are making it an increasingly attractive trading partner.
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Mallén, 5/30 (Patricia Ray, “Latin Lovers: China And U.S. Both Vying To Increase Influence And Trade In Latin America, Caribbean,” 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-lovers-china-us-both-vying-increase-influence-trade-latin-america-caribbean-1284839)-mikee
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The battle is on. The world's two largest economic superpowers, China and the United States, are making moves on Latin America, hoping to gain more geopolitical influence in a booming region. U.S. Vice President Biden arrived in Rio de Janeiro while Chinese President Xi Jinping just landed in Trinidad and Tobago These parallel journeys from the world’s top powers to Latin America emphasize how the region’s vast natural resources and steady economic growth are making it an increasingly attractive trading partner.
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Battle for influence now.
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Concern is rising about the sputtering Chinese economy and tightening liquidity. The European Union, China’s biggest trading partner, remains mired in a stubborn economic downturn, while in the United States, China’s next-largest export market, the Federal Reserve has recently been sending signals it may start curtailing its stimulative monetary policies. China’s figures showed it had a trade surplus of $20.4 billion in May, up from $19.3 billion, as imports declined 0.3 percent, the Customs Administration said. The drop in imports — however slight — was a possible sign of weakness in the domestic economy. Chinese stocks declined last week, their first weekly decline in six weeks, amid signs of tightening liquidity within China. A clearer picture of the Chinese economy is expected Sunday, when the government releases data on retail sales, industrial output and inflation. Economists had expected the May figures to show a slowdown, as the government has begun a campaign to prevent companies from overstating their exports. Many businesses are believed to have done so in March and April as a way to bypass currency controls and bring more money into the country to speculate on further appreciation of China’s renminbi. The main evidence for such strategies lay in official statistics showing soaring exports to Hong Kong and bonded export zones on the mainland even as exports to the rest of the world from these places remained weak.
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Mullany, 6/8 (Gerry, “China’s Export Growth Slows Amid Concern of Slowdown,” NY Times, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/business/global/chinas-export-growth-slows-amid-concern-of-slowdown.html?_r=0)
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Concern is rising about the sputtering Chinese economy and tightening liquidity Chinese stocks declined last week amid signs of tightening liquidity within China Economists had expected the slowdown
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China’s economy is down.
| 1,448 | 25 | 198 | 230 | 4 | 28 | 0.017391 | 0.121739 |
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CHINESE banks are adding assets at the rate of an entire US banking system in five years. To Charlene Chu of Fitch Ratings, that signals a crisis is brewing. Total lending from banks and other financial institutions in China was 198 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) last year, compared with 125 per cent four years earlier, according to calculations by Chu, the company's Beijing-based head of China financial institutions. Fitch cut the nation's long-term local currency debt rating last month, in the first downgrade by one of the top three rating companies in 14 years. "There is just no way to grow out of a debt problem when credit is already twice as large as GDP and growing nearly twice as fast," Chu said in an interview. Chu's view puts her in a minority among those charting the future of the world's biggest nation. She questions how long China can maintain the model of growth driven by bank lending that has allowed its economy to sidestep the global financial crisis. Fitch's sovereign-debt downgrade to "A+", the fifth-highest level, has sparked a debate in which Chu's calculations have been called "biased" by an Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd economist and a "misinterpretation" by Everbright Securities Co. Her views have struck a nerve.
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Business Times, 5/30 (“Fitch: China credit bubble shows crisis is brewing” 2013, http://www.btimes.com.my/Current_News/BTIMES/articles/chibanks/Article/)
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Fitch cut the nation's long-term local currency debt rating last month, in the first downgrade in 14 years There is just no way to grow out of a debt problem when credit is already twice as large as GDP and growing nearly twice as fast She questions how long China can maintain the model of growth driven by bank lending that has allowed its economy to sidestep the global financial crisis
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China’s finances are dooming growth now.
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2013
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1,820 |
On Tuesday, Fitch Ratings downgraded China’s long-term local currency debt one notch, from AA- to A+. The primary reason for the move was the country’s too-rapid expansion of credit, one of the “underlying structural weaknesses” the agency cited in its announcement. Many analysts in fact think the debt resulting from then Premier Wen Jiabao’s borrowing binge, which began to accumulate in earnest in late 2008, is now China’s number one economic risk. There are, of course, other risk factors now undermining the country’s economic growth. Among them are an eroding environment, unfavorable demographic trends, and persistent internal discontent. Yet the events since early last month in North Asia—the tearing up of the Korean War armistice, Pyongyang’s promises of pre-emptive nuclear strikes on the U.S., and the deployment of North Korea’s mobile missiles, to name just a few of them—suggest the biggest threat to the Chinese economy may be the least discussed one: turmoil in the region. As Fitch carefully noted in its explanation of Tuesday’s downgrade, “The ratings assume there is no significant deterioration of geopolitical risk, for example a conflict between China and Japan or an outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula.”
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Chang, 4/14 (Gordon G., Contributor at Forbes, “The Biggest Threat To China's Economy” 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2013/04/14/the-biggest-threat-to-chinas-economy/)
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Fitch Ratings downgraded China’s long-term local currency debt The primary reason was the country’s too-rapid expansion of credit, one of the “underlying structural weaknesses debt is now China’s number one economic risk. There are, other risk factors now undermining the country’s economic growth. Among them are an eroding environment, unfavorable demographic trends, and persistent internal discontent. suggest the biggest threat to the Chinese economy may be the least discussed one: turmoil in the region
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China’s economy is structurally ruined – too many alt causes to growth.
| 1,237 | 72 | 509 | 194 | 12 | 74 | 0.061856 | 0.381443 |
China Disadvantage - Berkeley 2013.html5
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Berkeley (CNDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
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1,821 |
Some people also claim that the development of China–Latin America relations, especially economic and trade relations, threatens the interests of other powers in Latin America. I believe the contrary. Our economic and trade relations do not pose any potential threat to the interests of the United States and European countries in Latin America; they will instead help to alleviate the pressure on the U.S. and European countries to provide aid to Latin America. Of course, China and Latin America are not the first priority in either side’s foreign policy strategies. The U.S., the European Union and the countries on the periphery of China in Asia are China’s diplomatic priorities. At the same time, Latin America’s diplomatic priorities are the U.S., the European Union and its hemispheric neighbors. That’s only natural. And it is for that reason that the development of China–Latin America relations should not affect U.S. and EU positions in respect to their relationship or diplomacy with Latin America.
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Mingde ‘12 (Zhang is a professor of diplomatic policy at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies in China. “A senior Shanghai scholar says China poses no threat to the region,” Americas Quarterly, January 11, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Mingde)
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Our economic and trade relations do not pose any potential threat to the interests of the United States ; they will instead help to alleviate the pressure on the U.S. to provide aid to Latin America. China and Latin America are not the first priority in either side’s foreign policy strategies. The U.S., the European Union and Asia are China’s diplomatic priorities. At the same time, Latin America’s diplomatic priorities are the U.S., the European Union and its hemispheric neighbors. That’s only natural the development of China–Latin America relations should not affect U.S. positions in respect to their relationship or diplomacy with Latin America
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No impact – China influence doesn’t trade-off and isn’t a high priority.
| 1,011 | 73 | 654 | 160 | 12 | 104 | 0.075 | 0.65 |
China Disadvantage - Berkeley 2013.html5
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Berkeley (CNDI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,822 |
Even if critics accept that the Chinese government is adaptable and meritocratic, they still question its legitimacy. Westerners assume that multiparty elections are the only source of political legitimacy. Because China does not hold such elections, they argue, the CCP'S rule rests on inherently shaky ground. Following this logic, critics have predicted the party's collapse for decades, but no collapse has come. The most recent version of the argument is that the CCP has maintained its hold on power only because it has delivered economic growth -- so-called performance legitimacy. No doubt, performance is a major source of the party's popularity. In a poll of Chinese attitudes published by the Pew Research Center in 2011, 87 percent of respondents noted satisfaction with the general direction of the country, 66 percent reported significant progress in their lives in the past five years, and a whopping 74 percent said they expected the future to be even better. Performance legitimacy, however, is only one source of the party's popular support. Much more significant is the role of Chinese nationalism and moral legitimacy. When the CCP built the Monument to the People's Heroes at the center of Tiananmen Square in 1949, it included a frieze depicting the struggles of the Chinese to establish the People's Republic. One would expect the CCP, a Marxist-Leninist party, to have its most symbolic political narrative begin with communism -- the writing of The Communist Manifesto, for example, or perhaps the birth of the CCP in 1921. Instead, the first carving of the frieze depicts an event from 1839: the public burning of imported opium by the Qing dynasty's imperial minister, Lin Zexu, which triggered the first Opium War. China's subsequent loss to the British inaugurated the so-called century of humiliation. In the following hundred years, China suffered countless invasions, wars, and famines -- all, in the popular telling, to reach 1949. And today, the Monument to the People's Heroes remains a sacred public site and the most significant symbol of the CCP'S national moral authority. The CCP'S role in saving and modernizing China is a far more durable source of its legitimacy than the country's economic performance. It explains why, even at the worst times of the party's rule in the past 63 years, including the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the CCP was able to keep the support of mainstream Chinese long enough for it to correct its mistakes. China's recent achievements, from economic growth to space exploration, are only strengthening nationalist sentiments in the country, especially among the youth. The party can count on their support for decades to come. A final type of staying power comes from repression, which China watchers in the West claim is the real force behind the CCP. They point to censorship and the regime's harsh treatment of dissidents, which undoubtedly exist. Still, the party knows very well that general repression is not sustainable. Instead, it seeks to employ smart containment. The strategy is to give the vast majority of people the widest range possible of personal liberties. And today, Chinese people are freer than at any other period in recent memory; most of them can live where they want and work as they choose, go into business without hindrance, travel within and out of the country, and openly criticize the government online without retaliation. Meanwhile, state power focuses on containing a small number of individuals who have political agendas and want to topple the one-party system. As any casual observer would know, over the last ten years, the quantity of criticism against the government online and in print has increased exponentially -- without any reprisals. Every year, there are tens of thousands of local protests against specific policies. Most of the disputes are resolved peacefully. But the government deals forcefully with the very few who aim to subvert China's political system, such as Liu Xiaobo, an activist who calls for the end of single-party rule and who is currently in jail. That is not to say that there aren't problems. Corruption, for one, could seriously harm the CCP'S reputation. But it will not derail party rule anytime soon. Far from being a problem inherent to the Chinese political system, corruption is largely a byproduct of the country's rapid transformation. When the United States was going through its industrialization 150 years ago, violence, the wealth gap, and corruption in the country were just as bad as, if not worse than, in China today. According to Transparency International, China ranks 75th in global corruption and is gradually getting better. It is less corrupt than Greece (80th), India (95th), Indonesia and Argentina (tied at 100th), and the Philippines (129th) -- all of which are electoral democracies.
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Li ’13 (Eric X. is a board of directors – China Europe International Business School, fellow – Aspen Institute, “The Life of the Party,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Jan/Feb)
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critics still question its legitimacy. critics have predicted the party's collapse for decades, but no collapse has come. The most recent version of the argument is that the CCP has maintained its power only because it has delivered growth In a poll of Chinese attitudes 87 percent noted satisfaction with the general direction of the country Performance legitimacy, however, is only one source of the party's popular support. Much more significant is the role of Chinese nationalism and moral legitimacy. The CCP'S role in saving and modernizing China is a far more durable source of its legitimacy than the country's economic performance. even at the worst times of the party's rule the CCP was able to keep the support of mainstream Chinese long enough for it to correct its mistakes. recent achievements are only strengthening nationalist sentiments especially among the youth. The party can count on their support for decades staying power comes from repression the party knows very well that general repression is not sustainable. Instead, it seeks smart containment. today, Chinese people are freer than at any other period in recent memory state power focuses on containing a small number of individuals who have political agendas and want to topple the one-party system. the quantity of criticism has increased exponentially -- without any reprisals. the government deals forcefully with very few That is not to say that there aren't problems. Corruption could harm the CCP'S reputation. But it will not derail party rule
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CCP is resilient and instability impacts are empirically denied.
| 4,877 | 65 | 1,530 | 785 | 9 | 245 | 0.011465 | 0.312102 |
China Disadvantage - Berkeley 2013.html5
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Berkeley (CNDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,823 |
China also may not be able to build its soft power indefinitely. As we have seen, greater familiarity with China will expose many countries to the People's Republic's flaws. China's promises of aid and investment could take years to materialize, yet Beijing has created heightened expectations about its potential as a donor and investor in many countries. China's exportation of labor, environmental, and governance problems alienates average people in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. China's support for autocratic rulers in countries like Zimbabwe and Sudan angers civil society leaders and opposition politicians. If Beijing seems to be dropping its preference for noninterference and "win-win" relations, it will spark fears in countries like Vietnam already suspicious of China. It also could reinforce the idea that despite Beijing's rhetoric of cooperation, when it comes to core interests, China, like any great power, will think of itself first. The Mekong River offers an obvious example. Though China promises to cooperate peacefully with other countries, in the development of the river, China has proven both uncooperative and meddling. It has meddled by refusing to join the multilateral group monitoring the river and by injecting itself into other nations' domestic politics to get politicians to support China's damming of the river.8 China could further alienate other nations if it seems to be using multilateral institutions as a cover, without jettisoning Beijing's own more aggressive, even military aims. Despite signing a deal with the Philippines and Vietnam for joint exploration of the disputed South China Sea, Beijing has not retracted its claim to large swaths of the water. Any Chinese decision that appears arrogant or targeted toward Chinese domination of the region will cause a backlash. Even as officials in Vietnam signed the join exploration deal, they privately warned that they still could not trust their Chinese counterparts enough to share the most important data to Beijing. China’s trade relations, too, ultimately could limit its soft power. If China builds the kind of trade surpluses with the developing world that it enjoys with the United States, it could stoke local resentment. Eventually, Beijing could wind up looking little different to people in Asia or Africa or Latin America than the old colonial powers, who mined and dug up their colonies, doing little to improve the capacity of locals on the ground. Whole regions could become trapped in a cycle of mercantilism, in which they sell natural resources to China and buy higher-value manufactured Chinese goods.
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Kurlantzick ‘7, visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s China Program (Joshua, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World. p. 232-233)
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China also may not be able to build its soft power indefinitely. greater familiarity with China will expose many countries to the People's Republic's flaws. China's promises of aid and investment could take years to materialize, yet Beijing has created heightened expectations China's exportation of labor, environmental, and governance problems alienates average people China's support for autocratic rulers angers civil society leaders and opposition politicians. If Beijing seems to be dropping its preference for noninterference it will spark fears in countries already suspicious of China. It also could reinforce the idea that despite Beijing's rhetoric when it comes to core interests, China will think of itself first China could further alienate other nations if it seems to be using multilateral institutions as a cover, without jettisoning Beijing's own aims. Despite signing a deal with the Philippines for joint exploration of the disputed South China Sea, Beijing has not retracted its claim to large swaths of the water. Any Chinese decision that appears arrogant or targeted toward Chinese domination of the region will cause a backlash China’s trade relations could limit its soft power. If China builds the kind of trade surpluses with the developing world that it enjoys with the U S it could stoke local resentment Beijing could wind up looking little different than the old colonial powers
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Chinese soft power decline inevitable – internal flaws and resentment.
| 2,628 | 70 | 1,416 | 409 | 10 | 219 | 0.02445 | 0.535452 |
China Disadvantage - Berkeley 2013.html5
|
Berkeley (CNDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,824 |
The analysis presented herein shows that China’s rapidly developing trade relationship with both Mexico and the U.S. has had significant effects on each country’s respective trade dynamics. For instance, today China is the second largest trading partner for both Mexico and the United States, falling behind only the total intra-NAFTA trade volume. As we have seen from our examination of the top twenty products imported by Mexico from the U.S. and China, the structure of trade in the region is shifting significantly: for Mexico, its export share in the U.S. market has fallen sharply, contrary to the trade growth of Asia, and particularly of China. As discussed previously, from 2000-2011 both the U.S. and Mexico endured substantial losses in their respective export markets in the NAFTA region, particularly in regards to the manufacturing sector and in products such as telecommunications equipment, electric power machinery, passenger motor vehicles, and clothing accessories and garments, among many others. NAFTA, since its origins, has passed through two distinct phases. During the first phase (1994-2000), the re- gion was deeply integrated as a result of trade, investment, and rules of origin in specific industrial sectors such as autoparts-automobiles (AA) and yarn-textile-garments (YTG). In this first phase, NAFTA evolved in accordance with some of the predictions and estimations that we discuss in the literature survey. The region as a whole grew in terms of GDP, trade, investment, employment, and wages, among other variables, while intra-industry trade increased substantially. While some of the “gaps” between the U.S. and Mexico were slowly closing, however, this was only true for a small portion of Mexico’s highly polarized socioeconomic and territorial structure. In other words, even in Mexican sectors highly integrated with NAFTA, the integration process did not allow for the promotion of backward and forward linkages in Mexico. In the second phase (2000-...), NAFTA has shown a de- terioration of this process of integration in terms of investment and intra-industrial trade, among other variables. During this time period, both Mexico and the United States have been on the losing end of competitions with third-party countries, a topic only discussed somewhat in debates on NAFTA (see the survey in part two of this paper). The first section of this paper argues that since China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 and up to 2011, we find that China is outcompeting Mexico in the U.S. market, and is further beginning to compete with the United States in the Mexican market. In fact, we have identified 52 sectors in Mexico in which the U.S. is losing market share and China is gaining, thus appearing to allow Mexico to make efficiency gains and become more competitive in U.S. markets. However, Mexico is losing market share in the United States in those same 52 sectors, which represent 49 percent of all of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. The second section of this document examines in detail the features of both phases. The trade analysis clearly shows how Mexico’s share over total U.S. imports increased from 2001-2004 – second only to Canada – and was subsequently displaced by China. In Mexico’s case, while the U.S. has historically been its primary trading partner, U.S. share over total Mexican imports fell from levels above 75% in the first five years after NAFTA to a share below 50% since 2009. As shown by multiple calculations, in both cases China is the determining factor behind this process of disintegration. China’s share in Mexico’s top twenty exports to the U.S., as well as its share in U.S. exports to Mexico, increased substantially since 2000. Regarding the top twenty U.S. exports to Mexico, U.S. share over Mexican total exports fell from 72 percent to 41.54 percent during the period 2000-2009, while China’s share jumped from 1.09 percent to 17.83 percent. Furthermore, China’s “threat” to Mexican and U.S. markets – as calculated using Lall and Weiss’s methodology – is substantial, affecting 96 percent of U.S. manufacturing exports to Mexico and 81 percent of Mexico’s manufacturing exports to the U.S. Finally, we examine the “triple threat”, in terms of sectors in which the U.S. is losing market share to China in the Mexican market and Mexico is losing market share to China in the U.S. market. As a result of this trade analysis and the recent “triangular relationship”, we find that China is rapidly outcom- peting Mexico in the U.S. market, as well as the United States in the Mexican market. Trade falling under the cat- egory of “direct threat” suggests that these trends will continue in the future.
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Gallagher and Peters, 13. Kevin P. Gallagher. Is an associate professor of international relations at Boston University, where he directs the Global Economic Governance Initiative and the Global Development Policy Master’s Program. Enrique Dussel Peters. Is a Professor at the Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), 1993 to present. Consultant for several Mexican and international institutions. “China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas. China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations.” Center for Latin American Studies. 5/17/13
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China’s rapidly developing trade relationship with both Mexico and the U.S. has had significant effects on each country’s respective trade dynamics. China is the second largest trading partner for both Mexico and the United States the structure of trade in the region is shifting significantly: for Mexico, its export share in the U.S. market has fallen sharply, contrary to the trade growth of Asia, and particularly of China. China is outcompeting Mexico in the U.S. market, and is further beginning to compete with the United States in the Mexican market. 52 sectors in Mexico in which the U.S. is losing market share and China is gaining, thus appearing to allow Mexico to make efficiency gains and become more competitive in U.S. markets. However, Mexico is losing market share in the United States in those same 52 sectors, which represent 49 percent of all of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. Mexico’s share over total U.S. imports was subsequently displaced by China China’s “threat” to Mexican and U.S. markets is substantial China is rapidly outcom- peting Mexico in the U.S. market, as well as the United States in the Mexican market these trends will continue in the future.
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China is outcompeting U.S.-Mexican trade in the status quo – future disruption is only going to increase
| 4,679 | 105 | 1,182 | 756 | 17 | 196 | 0.022487 | 0.259259 |
China Disadvantage - Berkeley 2013.html5
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Berkeley (CNDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,825 |
By failing to secure the borders and control immigration, we have opened ourselves up to a frightening scenario. The United States could face a flood of refugees from Mexico if it were to collapse, overwhelming state and local governments along the U.S.-Mexico border. During a time of economic duress, the costs would be overwhelming and would simply add to the already burgeoning costs at the federal level. Immigration and border control never was nor should it ever be about racism. Immigration and border control are national security and homeland security issues. Sleeper cells from numerous terrorist groups could, and probably already have, infiltrated the United States, just laying in wait to attack at an appropriately vulnerable time.
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Brown ‘9 (Michael Brown, Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Department of Homeland Security, “Border Control: Collapse of Mexico Is A Homeland Security & National Security Issue,” 1/14/2009, http://michaelbrowntoday.com/journal/2009/1/15/border-control-collapse-of-mexico-is-a-homeland-security-nat.html)
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By failing to secure the borders and control immigration, we have opened ourselves up to a frightening scenario. The United States could face a flood of refugees from Mexico if it were to collapse, overwhelming state and local governments along the U.S.-Mexico border During a time of economic duress, the costs would be overwhelming and would simply add to the already burgeoning costs at the federal level Sleeper cells from numerous terrorist groups could, and probably already have, infiltrated the United States, just laying in wait to attack at an appropriately vulnerable time
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Mexican economic decline causes a flood of refugees, resulting in terrorism.
| 746 | 76 | 583 | 117 | 11 | 93 | 0.094017 | 0.794872 |
China Disadvantage - Berkeley 2013.html5
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Berkeley (CNDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,826 |
State-owned Petroleos Mexicanos admits that "serious" corruption exists in some areas of the company and that contracting processes in particular have been plagued by "interference from organized crime," a leading Mexican daily said Friday.¶ In a front-page story, El Universal said Pemex representatives and members of the Mexican Construction Industry Chamber drew that conclusion at a meeting in late April.¶ Pemex executives acknowledged that corruption is fueled "by the elevated potential economic benefit of illegal acts, impunity and the spaces opened up due to unnecessary flexibility," the newspaper reported.
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GP May-17-13 (Global Post, “Mexican daily: Pemex admits "serious" corruption,” http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/agencia-efe/130517/mexican-daily-pemex-admits-serious-corruption)
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Pe Mex admits "serious" corruption exists contracting processes plagued by "interference from organized crime," Pemex executives acknowledged that corruption is fueled "by the elevated potential economic benefit of illegal acts, impunity and the spaces opened up due to unnecessary flexibility,"
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Serious corruption fueled by lack of police reform undermines Pemex
| 619 | 67 | 295 | 89 | 10 | 40 | 0.11236 | 0.449438 |
Tournament Updates - Gradual CP Answers%2C Dip Cap DA%2C Politics - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Unknown
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Unknown
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Unknown
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1,827 |
The 70-year-old Pemex, the biggest company in Latin America, which employs 154,761 people, 125,523 of whom belong to the powerful oil workers union, is facing severe financial difficulties and is in dire need of upgrading its technology infrastructure. Moreover, Mexico’s proven oil reserves are expected to run out in nine years.¶ Billions of dollars are lost to corruption which, according to observers, is deeply rooted in an opaque administration choked with red tape, and in political and economic vested interests.
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Cevallos May-7-08 (Diego, Inter Press Service News Agency, Diego Fernández de Cevallos Ramos is a Mexican politician affiliated to the conservative National Action Party. He was a presidential candidate in the 1994 election and President of the Mexican Senate. “MEXICO: Pemex Oozes Corruption,” http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/05/mexico-pemex-oozes-corruption/)
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Pemex facing severe financial difficulties Billions of dollars are lost to corruption which is deeply rooted in an opaque administration choked with red tape, and in political and economic vested interests.
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Pemex loses billions of dollars because of corruption
| 520 | 53 | 206 | 80 | 8 | 31 | 0.1 | 0.3875 |
Tournament Updates - Gradual CP Answers%2C Dip Cap DA%2C Politics - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Unknown
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Unknown
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Unknown
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1,828 |
Political analysts Denise Dresser and Sergio Aguayo commented on the energy and fiscal reforms which are next on the agenda and claimed that one of the key aspects to the energy reform is combating the corruption at Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex).¶ During an MVS News round table, moderated by Carmen Aristegui, Dresser said that at a meeting she attended with private investors, it was suggested that the only way to move the markets was to pass an energy reform, which was to become the key reform of Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidency.¶ “There’s a great myth that Pemex belongs to the Mexican people...in fact the oil belongs to the government, the governors and the authorities who use those resources to pay for elections,” she said. ¶ The ITAM (Autonomous Technical Institute of Mexico) professor noted that she is not in favor of privatizing Pemex and that the PAN proposal does not give detailed explanations, which could lead to a murky debate.¶ “Norway, Colombia, Cuba and Brazil have done interesting things, and Mexico has the opportunity to correctly manage the resources that Pemex produces,” she said.¶ Denise Dresser referred to the fiscal reform in relation to the increased VAT [value added tax] on food and medicines, saying that if the reform does not put an end to privileges, especially for big corporations, it won't work.¶ Sergio Aguayo noted that the reforms have provoked a passionate debate, but that the energy reform must tackle the corruption that exists within Pemex, because to the degree it doesn't do so, there won't be a successful solution to this issue.
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Aristegui Noticias Aug-1-13 (Prestigious news organization in Mexico, “Mexico Energy Reform Has to Tackle Pemex Corruption,” http://mexicovoices.blogspot.com/2013/07/mexico-energy-reform-has-to-tackle.html)
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energy and fiscal reforms on the agenda key aspects to the energy reform is combating the corruption at Pemex Mexico has the opportunity to correctly manage the resources that Pemex produces the energy reform must tackle the corruption that exists within Pemex, because to the degree it doesn't do so, there won't be a successful solution to this issue.
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Solving corruption key to reform Pemex
| 1,584 | 38 | 353 | 263 | 6 | 59 | 0.022814 | 0.224335 |
Tournament Updates - Gradual CP Answers%2C Dip Cap DA%2C Politics - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Unknown
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Unknown
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Unknown
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1,829 |
Yet even during the bonanza years, now ending, there were concerns. Cheap Chinese imports undermined Latin American manufacturers even in countries such as Brazil with a sophisticated industrial base. The currencies of commodity exporters appreciated – a classic case of “Dutch disease” – making their manufactured goods still less competitive. Some, such as Mr Toro Hardy, worried that over-reliance on commodities might imply “going back in time” to a primary export economy. For a high-technology producer such as Brazil, he said, this smacked of neo-colonialism. Such concerns, though they have particular resonance in Latin America, apply to other countries that have ridden China’s commodity train, from Australia to Mongolia. Many countries have bet the farm – or rather the mine – on everlasting demand from a China whose economy is now slowing. As China decelerates from double-digit growth to a projected 7.5 per cent this year, the economies of some commodity exporters have stumbled. Brazil is a case in point. Partly as a result of slowing exports to China and falling commodity prices – copper, iron ore and coal are 30-50 per cent off their 2011 peaks – it registered average growth of just 1.8 per cent in 2011 and 2012, down from a roaring 7.5 per cent in 2010. That process could have further to go. China’s economy may slow more sharply than expected or it may rebalance more quickly from investment-led to consumption-driven growth. The Economist, perhaps prematurely, has already declared a structural “Great Deceleration” in emerging markets. In a report entitled If China sneezes, Nomura estimates the impact on several economies if 2014 growth in China’s $8tn-plus economy slips 1 percentage point below Nomura’s baseline forecast of 6.9 per cent. It finds that a 1 point fall would shave a further half-point off Latin American growth. Some countries such as Australia, down 0.7 per cent, and trade-dependent Singapore, down 1.3 per cent, would fare worse.
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Pilling 7/31(David Pilling Asia editor FT http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8777b83c-f938-11e2-86e1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2bF4Dj1WI 7/31/2013 “The benefits and perils of riding China’s coat-tails”)
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Cheap Chinese imports undermined Latin American manufacturers a classic case of “Dutch disease” making their goods still less competitive this smacked of neo-colonialism Many countries have bet the farm – on everlasting demand from a China whose economy is now slowing As China decelerates from double-digit growth , the economies of some commodity exporters have stumbled That process could have further to go. China’s economy may slow more sharply than expected I a 1 point fall would shave a further half-point off Latin American growth
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China Economy Slowing Now—Means it’s the key time for America to Step in
| 1,983 | 73 | 541 | 318 | 13 | 85 | 0.040881 | 0.267296 |
Tournament Updates - Gradual CP Answers%2C Dip Cap DA%2C Politics - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Unknown
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Unknown
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Unknown
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1,830 |
In the years since the world’s most famous PowerPoint presentation hit theatres, public opinion and political leadership on climate change have seemingly vacillated with the seasons. Yet even as public sentiment shifted, the science on climate change became starker. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned the world of the consequences of overloading the atmosphere with carbon dioxide in 2007. In the United States, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) projected that the U.S. Northeast would have a climate more like the South’s by the end of the century if no action was taken to reduce emissions. Subsequent studies and reports have confirmed and built on those findings. A few years ago, serious national and international laws to address climate change seemed all but inevitable. But poor diplomacy and a sluggish global economy doomed international treaty negotiations. Domestically, fossil fuel interests and an increasingly polarized Congress scuttled climate legislation. Some politicians started to treat climate change as a punch line. Notably, Senator James Inhofe (R-Okla.) erected an igloo in the shadow of the Capitol dedicated to Al Gore during a Washington snowstorm. But as “climate” became a four-letter word in Washington, extreme weather made 2011 a turbulent year for Earth’s climate system. Amid heatwaves and flooding, more people began to understand that this was just what scientists said would happen under a warming climate. It’s clearer now that in addition to cutting emissions, we also have to prepare for the climate change already underway. Few events illustrated that new reality as starkly as Sandy, which rode in on a high tide made ever-higher by rising sea levels. Suddenly, political leaders were talking about climate change again, including President Obama. Outside of Washington, of course, the climate conversation never really stopped. Dr. Jennifer Jurado, the Natural Resources Management and Planning Director of Broward County, Florida, has for years been working with other officials to reduce emissions and prepare for rising seas. Thankfully, she’s not alone. From Boston to Chicago, to Tucson and Los Angeles, local leaders are using science to figure out how to respond. Interestingly, they’re finding that even when people disagree about whether or not climate change is causing sea levels to rise or wildfires to proliferate, that disagreement doesn’t stop them from taking steps to make their communities safer. Yale professor Dan Kahan explains this seemingly odd phenomenon: “Coastal states like Florida, Louisiana, Virginia, and the Carolinas, as well as arid western ones like Arizona, Nevada, California, and New Mexico have all had ‘climate problems’ for as long as human beings have been living in them. Dealing with such problems in resourceful, resilient, and stunningly successful ways is what the residents of those states do all the time.” The reality of climate change we’re seeing on the ground is pushing inexorably on Washington. As more and more communities move to protect themselves from a changing climate, more and more politicians are supporting policies that can reduce emissions and protect us all.
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Angela Anderson 6/7, 2013, director of Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/06/07/angela-anderson-climate-change
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public opinion and political leadership on climate change have seemingly vacillated with the seasons serious national and international laws to address climate change seemed all but inevitable. But poor diplomacy and a sluggish global economy doomed international treaty negotiations fossil fuel interests and an increasingly polarized Congress scuttled climate legislatio Amid heatwaves and flooding, more people began to understand that this was just what scientists said Few events illustrated that new reality as starkly as Sandy . Suddenly, political leaders were talking about climate change again, including President Obam From Boston to Chicago, to Tucson and Los Angeles, local leaders are using science to figure out how to respond that disagreement doesn’t stop them from taking steps to make their communities safer The reality of climate change we’re seeing on the ground is pushing inexorably on Washington. As more and more communities move to protect themselves from a changing climate, more and more politicians are supporting policies that can reduce emissions and protect us al
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Policymakers in the US are becoming more open to climate change now – poor diplomacy has meant that international climate change policies have failed to be enacted
| 3,202 | 163 | 1,096 | 494 | 27 | 165 | 0.054656 | 0.334008 |
Tournament Updates - Gradual CP Answers%2C Dip Cap DA%2C Politics - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Unknown
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“We ought to reserve that term for nations that actually use the apparatus of statehood to support the targeting of U.S. interests and civilians,” said Juliette Kayyem, a former assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security and now writing and lecturing on national security in the Boston area. “Yes, Cuba does a lot of bad things that we don’t like, but it doesn’t rise to anything on the level of a terrorist threat.”¶ On Wednesday, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration “has no current plans to remove Cuba” from the list to be released later this month. The island nation that has been under a U.S. trade and travel embargo since shortly after revolutionary leader Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 is in the company of only Iran, Syria and Sudan in being branded with the “state sponsor” label.¶ Kayyem laments the “diluting” of the terrorist designation based on political or ideological disputes.¶ “We work with a lot of countries we don’t like, but the imprimatur of ‘terrorism’ has a ring to it in a way that can be harmful to us,” she said.¶ Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the mutual threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade and financial restrictions that comes along with the “state sponsor” censure, Kayyem said.¶ “There are some real operational impediments when we have a system that begins with ‘no’ rather than ‘why not?’ ” she said of the legally encumbered contacts between Havana and Washington.¶ Politicians who have pushed for a continued hard line against Cuba cheered their victory in getting the Obama administration to keep Cuba on the list. U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a South Florida Republican whose efforts to isolate and punish the Castro regime have been a central plank of her election strategy throughout her 24 years in Congress, hailed the State Department decision as “reaffirming the threat that the Castro regime represents.”¶ Arash Aramesh, a national security analyst at Stanford Law School, blamed the continued branding of Cuba as a terrorism sponsor on politicians “pandering for a certain political base.” He also said President Obama and Secretary of State John F. Kerry have failed to make a priority of removing the impediment to better relations with Cuba. “As much as I’d like to see the Castro regime gone and an open and free Cuba, it takes away from the State Department’s credibility when they include countries on the list that aren’t even close” to threatening Americans, Aramesh said.¶ Political considerations also factor into excluding countries from the “state sponsor” list, he said, pointing to Pakistan as a prime example. Although Islamabad “very clearly supports terrorist and insurgent organizations,” he said, the U.S. government has long refused to provoke its ally in the region with the official censure.¶ The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious relationship between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of power to his younger brother, Raul, modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before they could leave their country for foreign travel. There was talk early in Obama’s first term of easing the 51-year-old embargo, and Kerry, though still in the Senate then, wrote a commentary for the Tampa Bay Tribune in 2009 in which he deemed the security threat from Cuba “a faint shadow.” He called then for freer travel between the two countries and an end to the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba “that has manifestly failed for nearly 50 years.”¶ The political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more recently Havana’s refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at bay.
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Williams 13(Carol J. Williams, journalist for Los angeles times and cites Arash aramesh who is a national security analyst at Stanford Law School, “Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors”, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/03/world/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502/2)
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State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration “has no current plans to remove Cuba” from the list to be released later this month. Kayyem laments the “diluting” of the terrorist designation based on political or ideological disputes. but the imprimatur of ‘terrorism’ has a ring to it in a way that can be harmful to us,” There are some real operational impediments Politicians who have pushed for a continued hard line against Cuba cheered their victory in getting the Obama administration to keep Cuba on the list. U.S. Rep. a South Florida Republican whose efforts to isolate and punish the Castro regime have been a central plank of her election strategy throughout her 24 years in Congress, hailed the State Department decision as “reaffirming the threat that the Castro regime represents.” As much as I’d like to see the Castro regime gone and an open and free Cuba, it takes away from the State Department’s credibility when they include countries on the list that aren’t even close” to threatening Americans Political considerations also factor into excluding countries from the “state sponsor” list, Pakistan as a prime example The political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more recently Havana’s refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at bay.
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Removing Cuba from Terror List links to politics, is unpopular, costs pc, and causes backlash
| 3,962 | 93 | 1,342 | 649 | 15 | 218 | 0.023112 | 0.335901 |
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Unknown
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1,832 |
The gradual lifting of the embargo now will condemn the Cuban people to a longer dictatorship and the perpetuation of a failed Marxist-Leninist society. The gradual lifting of the embargo entails a real danger that the U.S. may implement irreversible policies toward Cuba while Castro provides no concessions to the U.S. or concessions that he can reverse. A piecemeal lifting of the embargo will guarantee the continuance of the present totalitarian political structures and prevent a rapid transformation of Cuba into a free and democratic society. The lifting of the travel ban without meaningful and irreversible concessions from the Castro regime could provide the Castro brothers with much needed foreign exchange. It would represent one of the first steps in ending the U.S. embargo and prolong the suffering of the Cuban people.
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Suchlicki, 2000 (Jaime Suchlicki, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, “The U.S. Embargo of Cuba”, 06/2000, University of Miami, http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf)
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The gradual lifting of the embargo will condemn the Cuban people to a longer dictatorship and the perpetuation of a failed Marxist-Leninist society. A piecemeal lifting of the embargo will guarantee the continuance of the present totalitarian political structures and prevent a rapid transformation of Cuba into a free and democratic society. It would prolong the suffering of the Cuban people
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Gradually lifting the embargo prevents rapid Cuban democratic shift
| 837 | 67 | 394 | 132 | 9 | 61 | 0.068182 | 0.462121 |
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Unknown
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Unknown
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1,833 |
It was astounding that the embargo was maintained when a full 187 Member States had voted last year in favour of the General Assembly resolution that called for its immediate lifting, he said. “Why should the Cuban people continue to suffer when the international community is almost unanimous in its conviction that the cause of their anguish is unjustified and illegal?” he asked, adding that there were no credible answers to that question. The Movement once again urged the United States to immediately and fully comply with all General Assembly resolutions calling for the end of the embargo, and “once and for all” listen to the will of the overwhelming majority of the international community.
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UN 11 (United Nations General Assembly, “Speakers Denounce Cuban Embargo as ‘Sad Echo’ of Failed Cold War Politics; General Assembly, for Twentieth Year, Demands Lifting of Economic Blockade,” GA/11162, October 25, 2011, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ga11162.doc.htm)
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a full 187 Member States voted last year in favour of the General Assembly resolution that called for its immediate lifting Why should the Cuban people continue to suffer when the international community is almost unanimous in its conviction that the cause of their anguish is unjustified and illegal there were no credible answers to that question. The Movement once again urged the United States to immediately and fully comply with all General Assembly resolutions calling for the end of the embargo, and “once and for all” listen to the will of the overwhelming majority of the international community.
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The international community is unanimous in calling for an immediate repeal of the embargo.
| 700 | 91 | 606 | 115 | 14 | 99 | 0.121739 | 0.86087 |
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Unknown
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Unknown
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1,834 |
MEUTYA VIADA HAFID ( Indonesia) said that the Assembly was convening once again to consider the 51 year-old unilateral policy banning economic, commercial and financial activity with Cuba. Imposed during the Cold War, that embargo had cost the people of Cuba dearly and impacted the economic and commercial relations of third countries. Further, the sanctions exceeded the jurisdiction of national legislation and encroached on the sovereignty of other States that dealt with Cuba. Times had changed since 1961, she said; globalization had created conditions for true global solidarity and partnership among the community of nations.
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UNNS 12 – United Nations News Service, November 13, 2012, “ ‘ARCHAIC, PUNITIVE’ EMBARGO MUST BE CONSIGNED TO HISTORY BOOKS, SAY SPEAKERS,,” http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11311.doc.htm
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the Assembly was convening to consider the policy banning economic, commercial and financial activity with Cuba that embargo cost the people of dearly and impacted the economic and commercial relations of third countries
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Only an immediate end to the entire embargo solves credibility
| 633 | 63 | 220 | 95 | 10 | 33 | 0.105263 | 0.347368 |
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Unknown
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Unknown
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Unknown
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1,835 |
Since the second half of 2009 and so far in 2010, opposition to U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba has increased at the international level:
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LAC 10 – Latin American Council, 10/29/10, “Follow-up report on the application of the Helms Burton Law. 2009 – 2010,” http://www.sela.org/attach/258/EDOCS/SRed/2010/11/T023600004503-0-Follow-up_report_on_the_application_of_the_Helms_Burton_Law._2009_-_2010.pdf
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opposition to U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba has increased at the international level
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Gradual engagement doesn’t solve Latin American relations---regional states are only satisfied by an immediate, total, unconditional repeal
| 142 | 140 | 91 | 24 | 17 | 13 | 0.708333 | 0.541667 |
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Unknown
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Unknown
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Congress is unlikely to approve broad changes in Cuba policy because of staunch opposition from Cuban-Americans — including Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla. – and influential Democrats, such as Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada and U.S. Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz of Weston.
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William E. Gibson 13, Washington Bureau, “Travel to Cuba: Will Obama ease restrictions?” 1-27-13, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-01-27/news/fl-cuba-travel-embargo-nominees-20130122_1_cuba-policy-silvia-wilhelm-alan-gross
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Congress is unlikely to approve broad changes in Cuba policy because of staunch opposition from Cuban-Americans — including Rubio and influential Democrats such as Reid and Wasserman Schultz
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Party leaders would backlash
| 279 | 28 | 190 | 43 | 4 | 28 | 0.093023 | 0.651163 |
Politics Links Core - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,837 |
Ultimately none of the Cuba provisions related to financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba were included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2012, H.R. 2055 (P.L. 112-74), a “megabus” bill that included the FY2012 Financial Services and General Government bill. As discussed above, dropping the provisions appear to have been a tradeoff to compensate for not including a provision that would have rolled back the Obama Administration’s lifting of some restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba. In the second session of the 112th Congress, no Cuba provisions related to U.S. exports to Cuba are expected in either the House or Senate versions of the FY2013 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bills, H.R. 6020 and S. 3301 respectively; both measures were reported out of committee without any Cuba policy provisions. Senator Jerry Moran indicated during an Appropriations Subcommittee markup of the Senate bill in June 2012 that he was “taking a hiatus” from advocating an easing of restrictions on financing for payments for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba “until Cuba deals with the detention of Alan Gross,” the USAID subcontractor imprisoned in Cuba since late 2009. Senator Moran expressed hope that his action would “put pressure on Cuba to release” Gross.136 (Also see “December 2009 Imprisonment of Alan Gross” below.)
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Sullivan 12 (Mark, Specialist in Latin American Affairs at Congressional Research Service, Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress, 11/6/12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41617.pdf)
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none of the Cuba provisions related to financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba were included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act no Cuba provisions related to U.S. exports to Cuba are expected in either the House or Senate versions of the FY2013 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bills Moran “taking a hiatus” from advocating an easing of restrictions on financing for payments for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba “until Cuba deals with the detention of Alan Gross
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Plan is unpopular – has been passed over in Congress multiple times, and they want the Alan Gross issue resolved first
| 1,367 | 118 | 500 | 211 | 21 | 78 | 0.099526 | 0.369668 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,838 |
Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba maintain that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the large amount of sales since 2001. Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed billions of dollars in private humanitarian donations. Opponents further argue that easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural producers that export to Cuba support continuation of the prohibition on financing for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures that they will be paid.
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Sullivan 12 (Mark, Specialist in Latin American Affairs at Congressional Research Service, Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress, 11/6/12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41617.pdf)
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Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba maintain that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba further argue that easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the Castro regime repressive policies agricultural producers that export to Cuba support continuation of the prohibition on financing for agricultural exports
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Large opposition to further easing of restrictions
| 877 | 50 | 565 | 138 | 7 | 87 | 0.050725 | 0.630435 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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In a House floor speech on Feb. 9, 2011, Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, took aim at American aid to foreign countries. Poe has introduced a bill to require separate votes on aiding specific countries, thus ending the practice of bundling foreign aid into a single bill. "Maybe it’s time to reconsider our foreign aid that we send to countries throughout the world," Poe said in the floor speech, which has attracted attention in conservative circles on the Internet. "There are about 192 foreign countries in the world, … and we give foreign aid to over 150 of them." Poe proceeded to name some examples of countries where many Americans might be uncomfortable sending taxpayer money, including Egypt, Pakistan, Russia and China. But two of the nation’s in Poe’s speech caught our eye -- Venezuela and Cuba. Critics of Venezuela’s leader, Hugo Chavez, call him a dictator. Meanwhile, Cuba has been a communist country for decades, led by Fidel Castro and now his brother Raul. In its widely followed rankings, the group Freedom House rates Venezuela toward the bottom of the nations it classifies as "partly free," while Cuba sits at the lower end of its "not free" scale. And both nations have strained relations with the United States. So Poe suggested these as two examples of what’s wrong with U.S. foreign aid. "We give money to Venezuela. Why do we give money to Chavez and Venezuela? He hates the United States. He defies our president, makes fun of our nation. We don’t need to give him any foreign aid. We give $20 million to Cuba. Why do we give money to Cuba? Americans can’t even go to Cuba. It’s off-limits. It’s a communist country. But we’re dumping money over there." We looked at budget documents for foreign aid and talked to experts in the field, and here’s what we found. Poe is correct that U.S. foreign aid flows into both countries. In fiscal year 2010, the Venezuela account showed $6 million, while the Cuba account showed $20 million. For fiscal year 2012, the administration has requested a little less for Venezuela -- $5 million -- and the same $20 million amount for Cuba. To give a sense of context, the 2010 funds allocated for Venezuela amounted to less than 1/100th of 1 percent of the total U.S. foreign-aid budget, and the figure for Cuba was about 4/100 of 1 percent of the U.S. foreign aid budget. The percentage of the entire federal budget is even more minuscule. Still, even if the amount is small, taxpayer money is taxpayer money, so Poe has a point. However, Poe also said in plain language that "we give money to Chavez." And while he didn’t say it in as explicit a fashion, Poe implied that the U.S. sends aid to the Cuban regime. This is where it gets more complicated. The funding for both nations comes from the Economic Support Fund, which, according to the State Department, "supports U.S. foreign policy objectives by providing economic assistance to allies and countries in transition to democracy. Programs funded through this account promote stability and U.S. security interests in strategic regions of the world." Let’s take Cuba first. A spokesman for the U.S. Agency for International Development confirmed that no U.S. aid goes to the Cuban government. In an explanation of its proposed budget, the administration writes that "Cuba is the only non-democratically elected government in the Western Hemisphere and one of the most politically repressed countries in the world. In view of these challenges, U.S. assistance for Cuba aims to empower Cuban civil society to advocate for greater democratic freedoms and respect for human dignity." The $20 million designated for Cuba "focuses on strengthening independent Cuban civil society organizations, including associations and labor groups. … To advance the cause of human rights in Cuba, U.S. assistance provides humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families … The United States supports nascent pro-democracy groups, the use of technology, and new information-sharing opportunities." A 2006 review by the Government Accountability Office noted that the aid is such a threat to the regime that it has to be kept under tight wraps on the island. "Given the Cuban government’s repressive policies and opposition to U.S. democracy assistance, grantees employed a range of discreet delivery methods," GAO reported. In other words, the money being sent to Cuba is designed to foster democracy in what is currently an undemocratic country -- not to support the government. Poe’s failure to note that distinction as he attacks aid to "Cuba" strikes us as misleading.
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PolitiFact 11 (“The U.S. gives foreign aid to Cuba and Venezuela, even though those countries are our enemies”, February 9th, 2011, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/mar/23/ted-poe/ted-poe-decries-us-aid-venezuela-cuba/)
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Rep Poe took aim at American aid to foreign countries. it’s time to reconsider our foreign aid Poe proceeded to name some examples of countries where many Americans might be uncomfortable sending taxpayer money, including Cuba Cuba has been a communist country for decades In its widely followed rankings, the group Freedom House rates Cuba not free So Poe suggested these examples of what’s wrong with U.S. foreign aid. Why do we give money to Cuba? Americans can’t even go to Cuba. It’s off-limits. It’s a communist country. But we’re dumping money over there." no U.S. aid goes to the Cuban government. , U.S. assistance for Cuba aims to empower Cuban civil society to advocate for greater democratic freedoms and respect for human dignity." The $20 million designated for Cuba "focuses on strengthening independent Cuban civil society organizations, including associations and labor groups . assistance provides humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families the money being sent to Cuba is designed to foster democracy
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All foreign aid to Cuba is for democracy assistance which causes political fights, none goes to the government
| 4,581 | 110 | 1,042 | 761 | 18 | 165 | 0.023653 | 0.21682 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,840 |
Since the early 90s the United States has funded several programs that are designed ostensibly to promote democracy in Cuba. All are managed by USAID. Gross's arrest has shone a spotlight on these programs, which have been questioned over the past few years for issues of corruption and transparency. Many USAID programs in Cuba are run through the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). A congressional report noted in 2009 that, "Unlike many foreign assistance programs, Transition Initiative programs are often initiated on short notice and are not always accurately detailed in budget justification documents. The annual appropriations provisions for OTI require that the office give only five days' notice to Congress of new TI programs, and even ongoing programs are not reported at the same level of detail as other foreign assistance programs." A 2006 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) offered stinging criticism of USAID for the lack of oversight in its Cuba aid program. According to the report, "Nearly all of the $74 million spent on contracts to promote democracy in Cuba over the past decade has been distributed without competitive bidding or oversight in a program that opened the door to waste and fraud." Some of the profligacy cited includes the purchase of a gas chainsaw, computer gaming equipment and software (including Nintendo Gameboys and Sony Playstations), a mountain bike, leather coats, cashmere sweaters, crabmeat, and Godiva chocolates. A Miami Herald article from the same year pointed out that "most of the USAID money has remained in Miami or Washington—creating an anti-Castro economy that finances a broad array of activities." The corruption that exists in the Cuba democracy promotion programs came to a head in 2008, when Howard Berman, the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, placed a hold on the $45 million due to be allocated to Cuban programs that year. Berman wrote a memo to the assistant secretary for Legislative Affairs, questioning the "four-fold increase" in funding for Cuban democracy promotion programs given the fraudulent abuse and lack of adequate oversight reported by the GAO in 2006 and the media. He requested the freeze be maintained until USAID responded to a list of questions regarding the reported irregularities. Berman wanted answers on where the $74 million awarded for Cuba democracy promotion programs mentioned in the GAO report had gone. He also requested follow-up information and measures regarding the case of Felipe Sixto from the Washington-based Center for a Free Cuba (CFC). Sixto was discovered to have embezzled between $500,000 and $700,000 from the grantee's total award of $7.3 million. Sixto, who was a special assistant for intergovernmental affairs during the George W. Bush administration, was given thirty months in jail. Berman later unfroze the withheld funds saying that he had been given assurances by USAID and the State Department that it was "working to improve the program."
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Collins 10 (Michael Collins is the program associate for the Americas Program of the Center for International Policy, “Cuba: Democracy Promotion Programs under Fire as Fallout from Spy Arrest Continues”, May 12th, 2010, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/cuba-archives-43/2488-cuba-democracy-promotion-programs-under-fire-as-fallout-from-spy-arrest-continues)
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the U S has funded several programs to promote democracy in Cuba. All are managed by USAID these programs have been questioned over the past few years for issues of corruption and transparency A report by the GAO) offered stinging criticism r the lack of oversight in its Cuba aid program Nearly all of the $74 million spent to promote democracy in Cuba has been distributed without oversight that opened the door to waste and fraud corruption exists in the Cuba democracy promotion programs Berman placed a hold on the $45 million due to be allocated to Cuban programs He requested the freeze be maintained until USAID responded to a list of questions regarding the reported irregularities
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Cuban democracy assistance programs are corrupt and opaque – Congress has been very critical of them
| 3,009 | 100 | 690 | 475 | 16 | 117 | 0.033684 | 0.246316 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,841 |
In spite of the efforts of Rep. Berman, USAID's Cuba democracy promotion programs have continued to be riddled with problems. A recent article from the Miami Herald stated that, "The lack of clear rules allowed some of USAID's grantees to spend 95% of the millions of dollars they received to cover salaries, office overhead, and attend international conferences, while Cuba's dissidents were left with crumbs. Many of those USAID grantees had funding automatically renewed without the benefit of competition or an assessment of the impact their programs were having on the ground in Cuba." The issue of transparency looms large in these programs. USAID's Cuba program is one of the only programs that does not fully disclose the names of the organizations it funds or the amounts it provides. With other country projects such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, full up-to-date disclosure is given regarding all aspects of the programs funded. In the case of Cuba, its list was last updated in July 2006. A GAO report in November 2008 stated that "continued efforts were needed to strengthen USAID's oversight of U.S. democracy assistance in Cuba," yet it censored the names of active grantees, with the exception of two organizations whose names had already appeared in the media due to corruption scandals. The legality of such programs is also under scrutiny. Julia Sweig, of the Council on Foreign Relations, described the types of programs in which Mr. Gross was involved as a continuance of "Cold War tactics," stating that prior to 1989 these operations were carried out covertly, but with no Russian influence in Cuba, the United States can carry them out overtly. John McAuliff, executive director of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development, points out that not only are Alan Gross's actions illegal under Cuban law; they are illegal under U.S. law as well. "The Foreign Agents Registration Act criminalizes any unregistered agent of a foreign power (which this 'contractor' certainly was) who 'within the United States solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal.' In the United States such a foreign agent would be liable to a sentence of 5 years in jail and a fine of $10,000." Reviews and Recriminations When the Obama administration took office, it promised to review controversial USAID programs. The arrest of Gross seems to have spurred this task on. In July 2009, the State Department began its Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development review (QDDR) to assess diplomacy and development programs at the State Department and USAID. In August 2009, President Obama signed a Presidential Study Directive (PSD) on Global Development Policy, authorizing a comprehensive review of U.S. development efforts. Both reviews were due to be completed by now but have yet to surface. The reviews have been backed by proposed legislation that would increase oversight and transparency at USAID, introduced by Howard Berman in the House of Representatives and John Kerry and Richard Lugar in the Senate. Since the arrest of Mr. Gross, Cuban democracy promotion groups have accused the Obama administration of failing to hand over $40 million in funds allocated for democracy promotion efforts in Cuba. The director of a Miami-based group that received over $12.5 million from USAID said his "small organization only has enough money to continue operating for a few more months." Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen recently stated, "I continue to be concerned by reports that USAID programs in Cuba have come to a standstill since the arrest and imprisonment of U.S. citizen Alan Gross." Nine Republican congressional representatives have accused the Obama administration of trying to appease the Cuban government by freezing the funds. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley denied the suggestion that the programs had been frozen but admitted that a full review was underway. Despite repeated criticism, proven corruption, and pending reviews of democracy promotion programs in Cuba, the Obama administration proceeded to set aside $20 million for its 2011 budget to "promote self-determined democracy in Cuba." Funds are to be used "to provide humanitarian assistance to political prisoners, their families, and other victims of repression; advance human rights; strengthen independent civil society organizations; and support information sharing into and out of Cuba." Furthermore, the State Department recently notified organizations that they can start making trips to Cuba again, the Miami Herald reported. The trips were halted after the Gross arrest. On March 26, Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, placed a new hold on U.S. democracy promotion programs in Cuba until State Department officials "undertake a review of these programs, and while the committee investigates whether they're effectively accomplishing our shared goal." Kerry's spokesman Frederick Jones commented that, "We all want democratic change in Cuba. The question is whether American taxpayers are getting progress toward that goal." As the debate over the USAID programs rages on, the Cuban government continues to denounce the programs as subversive and hostile. With Alan Gross's case unresolved and other contractors continuing similar activities, analysts say the Obama administration must tread carefully if it wants to avoid a repeat of the current debacle.
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Collins 10 (Michael Collins is the program associate for the Americas Program of the Center for International Policy, “Cuba: Democracy Promotion Programs under Fire as Fallout from Spy Arrest Continues”, May 12th, 2010, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/cuba-archives-43/2488-cuba-democracy-promotion-programs-under-fire-as-fallout-from-spy-arrest-continues)
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Cuba democracy promotion programs have continued to be riddled with problems The lack of clear rules allowed some of USAID's grantees to spend 95% of the millions of dollars they received to cover salaries, office overhead, and attend international conferences, while Cuba's dissidents were left with crumbs The issue of transparency looms large in these programs. USAID's Cuba program is one of the only programs that does not fully disclose the names of the organizations it funds or the amounts it provides The legality of such programs is also under scrutiny not only are Alan Gross's actions illegal under Cuban law; they are illegal under U.S. law as well When the Obama administration took office, it promised to review controversial USAID programs Despite repeated criticism, proven corruption, and pending reviews of democracy promotion programs in Cuba Funds are to be used "to provide humanitarian assistance to political prisoners John Kerry aced a new hold on U.S. democracy promotion programs in Cuba until State Department officials "undertake a review of these programs, We all want democratic change in Cuba. The question is whether American taxpayers are getting progress toward that goal." the debate over the USAID programs rages on
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Cuban democracy promotion efforts are questionably legal and Kerry has put funding on hold till there is accountability
| 5,488 | 119 | 1,252 | 852 | 18 | 198 | 0.021127 | 0.232394 |
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On the opposite side of the policy debate, a number of policy groups and Members of Congress oppose engagement with Cuba, including U.S. investment in Cuba’s offshore energy development. A legislative initiative introduced in the 111th Congress, H.R. 5620, would have gone further by imposing visa restrictions and economic sanctions on foreign companies and their executives who help facilitate the development of Cuba’s petroleum resources. The bill asserted that offshore drilling by or under the authorization of the Cuban government poses a “serious economic and environmental threat to the United States” because of the damage that an oil spill could cause. Opponents of U.S. support for Cuba’s offshore oil development also argue that such involvement would provide an economic lifeline to the Cuban government and thus prolong the continuation of the communist regime. They maintain that if Cuba reaped substantial economic benefits from offshore oil development, it could reduce societal pressure on Cuba to enact market-oriented economic reforms. Some who oppose U.S. involvement in Cuba’s energy development contend that while Cuba might have substantial amounts of oil offshore, it will take years to develop. They maintain that the Cuban government is using the enticement of potential oil profits to break down the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba.78
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Nerurkar and Sullivan 11 (Neelesh Nerurkar - Specialist in Energy Policy and Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations”, November 28th, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf)
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a number of policy groups and Members of Congress oppose engagement with Cuba, including U.S. investment in Cuba’s offshore energy development. A legislative initiative would have gone further by imposing visa restrictions and economic sanctions on foreign companies who help facilitate the development Opponents of U.S. support for Cuba’s offshore oil development also argue that such involvement would provide an economic lifeline to the Cuban government and thus prolong the continuation of the communist regime. They maintain that if Cuba reaped substantial economic benefits from offshore oil development, it could reduce societal pressure on Cuba to enact market-oriented economic reforms. Some who oppose U.S. involvement in Cuba’s energy developmen maintain that the Cuban government is using the enticement of potential oil profits to break down the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba
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Engaging Cuba on their energy development sparks huge backlash
| 1,361 | 62 | 888 | 207 | 9 | 131 | 0.043478 | 0.63285 |
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On the opposite side of the policy debate, a number of policy groups and members of Congress oppose engagement with Cuba, including U.S. investment in Cuba’s offshore energy development. A legislative initiative introduced in the 111th Congress, H.R. 5620, would go further and impose visa restrictions and economic sanctions on foreign companies and its executives who help facilitate the development of Cuba’s petroleum resources. The bill asserts that offshore drilling by or under the authorization of the Cuban government poses a “serious economic and environmental threat to the United States” because of the damage that an oil spill could cause. Opponents of U.S. support for Cuba’s offshore oil development also argue that such involvement would provide an economic lifeline to the Cuban government and thus prolong the continuation of the communist regime. They maintain that if Cuba reaped substantial economic benefits from offshore oil development, it could reduce societal pressure on Cuba to enact market-oriented economic reforms. Some who oppose U.S. involvement in Cuba’s energy development contend that while Cuba might have substantial amounts of oil offshore, it will take years to develop. They maintain that the Cuban government is using the enticement of potential oil profits to break down the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba.59
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Nerurkar & Sullivan 10 – Neelesh Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy at the Congressional Research Service, and Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, November 29, 2010, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations,” online: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41522_20101129.pdf
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a number of members of Congress oppose engagement with Cuba including U.S. investment in Cuba’s offshore energy development A legislative initiative introduced would go further and impose visa restrictions and economic sanctions on foreign companies who help facilitate the development of Cuba’s petroleum resources Opponents of U.S. support for Cuba’s oil development argue such involvement would provide an economic lifeline to the Cuban government while Cuba might have substantial amounts of oil offshore, it will take years to develop
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The plan gets drawn into the most divisive embargo debates---it’s perceived as throwing the Cuban government a lifeline
| 1,350 | 120 | 539 | 206 | 18 | 79 | 0.087379 | 0.383495 |
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Interest in Cuba’s offshore oil development has continued in the 112th Congress as foreign oil companies have moved forward with plans to begin exploratory drilling. To date, five legislative initiatives have been introduced taking different approaches, and two congressional hearings have been held examining the issue. H.R. 372 (Buchanan), introduced January 26, 2011, would amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to deny oil and gas leases and permits “to persons who engage in activities with the government of any foreign country that is subject to any sanction or an embargo” by the U.S. government. The intent of the legislation is to provide a disincentive to companies involved, or contemplating becoming involved, in Cuba’s oil development, although the scope of the legislation is much broader and could affect other oil companies, including U.S. companies, not involved in Cuba. Because the bill does not define “sanction,” the term could be used to refer to such U.S. restrictions as export controls or limits on foreign assistance. With this use of the term, many countries worldwide could be construed as being subject to a U.S. sanction, and as a result, any energy company that engages in activities with one of these countries could be denied an oil and gas lease in the United States under the proposed legislation. S. 405 (Bill Nelson), the Gulf Stream Protection Act of 2011, introduced February 17, 2011, would require a company that is conducting oil or gas operations off the coasts of Cuba to submit an oil response plan for their Cuba operations and demonstrate sufficient resources to respond to a worst case scenario if the company wanted to lease drilling rights in the United States. The bill would also require the Secretary of the Interior to carry out an oil spill risk analysis and planning process for the development and implementation of oil spill response plans for nondomestic oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico. The Secretary of the Interior would be required, among other things, to include recommendations for Congress on a joint contingency plan with the countries of Mexico, Cuba, and the Bahamas to ensure an adequate response to oil spills located in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. H.R. 2047 (Ros-Lehtinen), the Caribbean Coral Reef Protection Act of 2011 (identical to a bill introduced in the 111th Congress and noted above), was introduced May 26, 2011, and would impose visa restrictions on foreign nationals and economic sanctions on companies that help facilitate the development of Cuba’s offshore petroleum resources. The bill would exclude from the United States aliens who invest $1 million or more that contributes to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its offshore oil resources. It would also require the imposition of sanctions (two or more from a menu of listed sanctions) if the President determined that a person had made an investment of $1 million on or after January 10, 2005, that contributed to Cuba’s offshore oil development.
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Nerurkar and Sullivan 11 (Neelesh Nerurkar - Specialist in Energy Policy and Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations”, November 28th, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf,)
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five legislative initiatives have been introduced taking different approaches Buchanan), would amend the O C S Lands Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to deny oil and gas leases and permits “to persons who engage in activities with the government of any foreign country that is subject to any sanction or an embargo” by the U.S. government The intent of the legislation is to provide a disincentive to companies involved, or contemplating becoming involved, in Cuba’s oil development, Ros-Lehtinen would impose visa restrictions on foreign nationals and economic sanctions on companies that help facilitate the development of Cuba’s offshore petroleum resources It would also require the imposition of sanctions if the President determined that a person had made an investment of $1 million that contributed to Cuba’s offshore oil development.
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Congress HATES any cooperation with Cuba over oil drilling – several bills have been brought to sanction companies that even try
| 3,053 | 128 | 856 | 497 | 21 | 132 | 0.042254 | 0.265594 |
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The prospect of foreign companies exploring for petroleum in the waters of Cuba and close to Florida is driving debate about possible involvement of U.S. companies, many of whom are eager to join their European and Asian counterparts. American firms have privately suggested that if foreign companies are exploring so close to American shores, American companies should also be allowed to explore in Cuban waters. This raises concerns, however, among Florida’s Congressional delegation, resolutely opposed to drilling off the coast of Florida and in the Gulf. Florida Democratic Senator Bill Nelson wrote to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking her “to use diplomatic channels to temporarily keep Repsol (Spain) and others from supporting drilling for oil off Cuba”. This is an uphill battle, however, given the variety of countries involved, their commercial interests, and the difficulty in negotiating with Spain’s Socialist government.
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Jaime Suchlicki 11, the Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, June 2011, “Drilling for Oil in Cuban Waters,” http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue143.htm
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The prospect of foreign companies exploring for petroleum in the waters of Cuba and close to Florida is driving debate about possible involvement of U.S. companies This raises concerns among Florida’s Congressional delegation resolutely opposed to drilling off the coast of Florida and in the Gulf Florida Democratic Nelson wrote to Clinton asking her “to use diplomatic channels to keep Repsol and others from supporting drilling for oil off Cuba
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The plan combines anti-Cuba backlash with anti-drilling environmental anger---causes a firestorm
| 949 | 97 | 447 | 143 | 11 | 70 | 0.076923 | 0.48951 |
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Cuba’s efforts to “update” its socialist system through a series of economic reforms just got more complicated. The death of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, its principal benefactor, could seriously disrupt what is already a precarious process of maintaining top-down political control while liberalizing elements of the economy. Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will step down in five years and the emergence of younger leaders born after the 1959 revolution add further uncertainty to the island’s future. These new circumstances offer President Obama a rare opportunity to turn the page of history from an outdated Cold War approach to Cuba to a new era of constructive engagement. In his second term in office, he should place a big bet by investing political capital in defrosting relations, an approach that will advance U.S. interests in a stable, prosperous and democratic Cuba.
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Piccone 13 (Ted, deputy director of the Brookings Institute, Brookings Deputy Director Ted Piccone: Time to bet on Cuba, http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/guest-commentary/288425-brookings-deputy-director-ted-piccone-time-to-bet-on-cuba#ixzz2YsOj1RPo, 3/18/13)
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Cuba’s efforts to “update” its system through a series of economic reforms just got more complicated. The death of Chávez could disrupt political control These new circumstances offer President Obama a rare opportunity to turn the page of history he should place a big bet by investing political capital in defrosting relations, an approach that will advance U.S. interests
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Cuban foreign aid costs capital
| 881 | 31 | 373 | 138 | 5 | 59 | 0.036232 | 0.427536 |
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In a House floor speech on Feb. 9, 2011, Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, took aim at American aid to foreign countries. Poe has introduced a bill to require separate votes on aiding specific countries, thus ending the practice of bundling foreign aid into a single bill. "Maybe it’s time to reconsider our foreign aid that we send to countries throughout the world," Poe said in the floor speech, which has attracted attention in conservative circles on the Internet. "There are about 192 foreign countries in the world, … and we give foreign aid to over 150 of them." Poe proceeded to name some examples of countries where many Americans might be uncomfortable sending taxpayer money, including Egypt, Pakistan, Russia and China. But two of the nation’s in Poe’s speech caught our eye -- Venezuela and Cuba. Critics of Venezuela’s leader, Hugo Chavez, call him a dictator. Meanwhile, Cuba has been a communist country for decades, led by Fidel Castro and now his brother Raul. In its widely followed rankings, the group Freedom House rates Venezuela toward the bottom of the nations it classifies as "partly free," while Cuba sits at the lower end of its "not free" scale. And both nations have strained relations with the United States. So Poe suggested these as two examples of what’s wrong with U.S. foreign aid. "We give money to Venezuela. Why do we give money to Chavez and Venezuela? He hates the United States. He defies our president, makes fun of our nation. We don’t need to give him any foreign aid. We give $20 million to Cuba. Why do we give money to Cuba? Americans can’t even go to Cuba. It’s off-limits. It’s a communist country. But we’re dumping money over there."
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Politifact 11 (Pulitzer Price website which analyzes political statements and situations, The U.S. gives foreign aid to Cuba and Venezuela, even though those countries are our enemies., 2/9/11, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/mar/23/ted-poe/ted-poe-decries-us-aid-venezuela-cuba/)
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Ted Poe took aim at American aid to foreign countries. Poe has introduced a bill to require separate votes on aiding specific countries, thus ending the practice of bundling foreign aid into a single bill. Poe proceeded to name some examples of countries where many Americans might be uncomfortable sending taxpayer money, including Venezuela and Cuba. Cuba has been a communist country for decades, led by Castro We give $20 million to Cuba. Why do we give money to Cuba? Americans can’t even go to Cuba. It’s off-limits. It’s a communist country. But we’re dumping money over there."
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Ted Poe hates foreign aid to Cuba and Venezuela
| 1,675 | 47 | 585 | 290 | 9 | 98 | 0.031034 | 0.337931 |
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A leading conservative Republican in Congress who held hard-line views on immigration, including ardent opposition to legalizing undocumented immigrants, now supports measures that would include a path to legal status. U.S. Rep. Ted Poe, who is vice chairman of the House immigration subcommittee, said that like many of his conservative colleagues, he used to be loath to even discuss other aspects of immigration reform until the border was absolutely secure. But that, said Poe in an interview with Fox News Latino, is both unrealistic and counterproductive. “I’ve changed,” said Poe, who was first elected to Congress in 2004. “I used to think we had to do border security before we ever talk about other immigration issues. But we have to do them in tandem, because [otherwise] we’ll never get to those other issues. The border is really not secure because of the drug cartels.” Now, Poe not only will discuss other immigration issues, but is going head-on against many of his fellow conservatives in his decision to support a path to legal status for the more than 11 million undocumented immigrants in the country. Poe’s softened stance is becoming more common among Republicans, notably among those who once were hawkish on immigration. Many of them point to the role that immigration – specifically the sometimes hard-line tone that underpinned discussions of the issue by Republicans – played in the bruising defeat of Republicans presidential candidate Mitt Romney in the 2012 election. Latinos turned out to vote at a record rate, 10 percent, with 71 percent of them choosing President Obama and 27 percent voting for Romney. Latino population growth also upended many congressional districts – including Poe’s. His district was about 10 percent Latino, but redistricting after the 2010 Census swelled his Latino constituency to 41 percent. Poe, 64, maintains that his change of heart regarding some emotionally charged immigration issues comes from a realization that his former views are not in sync with reality or truly fixing the broken system. And, he said, he’s not advocating rewarding illegal behavior. “They’re not leaving,” Poe said of the millions of undocumented immigrants. “They’re not going to go back to their countries, and what purpose would it serve for them to leave?” “It’s not automatic pathway to citizenship,” Poe said. “I don’t think that’s right, I agree that we shouldn’t reward people for being here illegally. But if you’re in the country without permission, you should register, we have to know who’s in the country. Then you would have legal status for a period of time, and you can stay here and work here during that time.” He envisions a system of “tiered sanctions,” depending on the circumstances of a person’s illegal presence, and if they meet a strict set of criteria, such as staying out of trouble with the law and paying taxes, among other things. He also supports giving undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as minors an opportunity to apply for legal status. “The kids that are here and getting older, who are here through no fault of their own, we have to make sure they have the opportunity to get legal status,” Poe said. He added, however, that he did not agree with Obama’s decision last year to suspend deportation for such immigrants for two years, and allow them to obtain work permits. “The president basically waved the big wand and violated the constitution,” he said. “It is the responsibility of Congress to deal with immigration.” Poe said that he knows many of his fellow conservatives, as well as some more moderate Republicans, see a pathway to legal status as “amnesty.” That, he said, is a misperception. Noting that he served for 22 years as a criminal court judge in Houston before serving in Congress, Poe said: “I know what amnesty means.” “Amnesty is when there is no punishment or sanction for certain conduct,” he said. “There are sanctions if you’re here and want legal status, whether it’s temporary or permanent and you want to get citizenship.” Those who support a hard line on immigration are watching the conversions on immigration in the Republican Party with concern. Many have criticized U.S. Sen. Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican, for instance, for supporting a pathway to legalization, though the junior senator stresses that he is not compromising on border security. “They say they’re having a change of heart,” said Bob Dane, spokesman for the Federation for American Immigration Reform, or FAIR, one of the nation’s leading groups advocating for strict immigration policies. “But Washington is turning a deaf ear to the millions of Americans who are scratching their heads saying ‘What’s in [immigration reform] for me?’” “The amnesty bill is splitting the Republican party right down the middle.” Poe believes that Congress will pass an immigration reform bill this year. He has misgivings about the Senate approach to dealing with a massive immigration bill, and thinks a better way is to have several smaller measures addressing different aspects. He expects the House to deal with the matter in smaller, separate bills. “When you have one big massive bill, it’s a lot easier to vote against it,” he said. The road to a bill will be hard, Poe said. “The debates in the party are pretty strong,” he said. “We have major differences in the conservative group.” But Poe, known for not mincing words, vowed to keep trying to persuade his conservative colleagues.
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Llorente 4/11 (Elizabeth, Senior GOP Congressman Ted Poe, Once An Immigration Hardliner, Softens Stance, 4/11/13, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/04/11/senior-gop-congressman-ted-poe-once-immigration-hardliner-softens-stance/)
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leading conservative Republican in Congress who held hard-line views on immigration now supports measures that would include a path to legal status. Ted Poe is vice chairman of the House immigration subcommittee Poe is going head-on against many of his fellow conservatives in his decision to support a path to legal status Poe’s softened stance is becoming more common among Republicans, notably among those who once were hawkish on immigration Poe believes that Congress will pass an immigration reform bill this year. He expects the House to deal with the matter in smaller, separate bills. Poe vowed to keep trying to persuade his conservative colleagues.
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Poe is key to getting other Republicans to sign onto immigration reform
| 5,476 | 71 | 659 | 903 | 12 | 105 | 0.013289 | 0.116279 |
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WASHINGTON, D.C. — This week, Congressman Ted Poe (TX-02), the new Chairman of the Immigration Reform Caucus (IRC), held the IRC Executive Committee’s first meeting of the 113th Congress with Reps. Diane Black (TN-6), Bill Flores (TX-17), Phil Gingrey (GA-11), and Lamar Smith (TX-21). In the meeting, the Executive Committee agreed that the IRC’s role this Congress will be to serve as an active forum to facilitate Member discussion, education and debate on immigration reform and border protection legislation. “Our immigration system has been broken for decades,” said Poe. “Now is the time for Congress to take the lead and work together to craft a permanent solution. Politics must not continue to trump people. The IRC will serve as a vehicle to bring people together to discuss what immigration reform should look like and how it can be accomplished.”
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House.gov 13 (POE NAMED CHAIRMAN OF IMMIGRATION REFORM CAUCUS; HOLDS KICKOFF MEETING, http://poe.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8963)
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Congressman Ted Poe the new Chairman of the Immigration Reform Caucus held the IRC Executive Committee’s first meeting of the 113th Congress the IRC’s role this Congress will be to serve as an active forum to facilitate Member discussion, education and debate on immigration reform and border protection legislation. Now is the time for Congress to take the lead and work together to craft a permanent solution. The IRC will serve as a vehicle to bring people together to discuss what immigration reform should look like and how it can be accomplished.”
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Poe is key to unity
| 859 | 19 | 553 | 139 | 5 | 92 | 0.035971 | 0.661871 |
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President Obama called today for a renewed effort to close the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. But back in 2009, the White House dropped the ball on closing the controversial military prison by failing to come up with a plan in time, refusing to help House Democrats who were fighting for its closure, and then abandoning the plan altogether and blaming Republicans. In a speech at the National Defense University in Washington, Obama said his Jan. 21, 2009, executive order to close the prison was never implemented because House Republicans placed funding and legislative restrictions on moving suspected terrorists from the facility and blocked efforts to shut it down. But he didn’t mention his own administration’s missteps in not shutting down the prison in one year’s time, as he had promised. “As president, I have tried to close Gitmo,” Obama said. “I transferred 67 detainees to other countries before Congress imposed restrictions to effectively prevent us from either transferring detainees to other countries, or imprisoning them in the United States. These restrictions make no sense.” According to lawmakers, officials, and experts who were closely involved in that 2009 fight, the White House, led on the issue by then-chief of staff Rahm Emanuel, was late in coming up with a plan to close the prison and then made a political decision not to help House Democrats who were fighting tooth and nail with Republicans over the policy. The fight over restrictions to fund the closure of the prison was led on the Democratic side by then-House Appropriations Committee Chairman David Obey (D-WI), and Reps. Jack Murtha (D-PA) and Jim Moran (D-VA). In an interview Thursday with The Daily Beast, Moran said that when fight was on, the White House was nowhere to be found. “They left all of us twisting in the wind,” he said. “Rightly or wrongly, they gave us a very clear impression, ‘You’re on your own on this issue.’” White House and Justice Department officials refused congressional requests for briefings, talking points, and other statistics that would have helped Democrats dispute Republican claims that transferring prisoners from the island prison facility increased the threat to national security. Moran argued with Justice officials at the time, but the policy was being made at the White House and was handed down by Emanuel specifically, he said. “The administration could have weighed in more consistently and more aggressively. They pretty much gave up on getting the Congress to act responsibly on the issue,” Moran said. “It was politically expedient not to use up chips on this issue… Eventually it wasn’t worth fighting anymore because we didn’t have the White House beside us.” But the White House official technically in charge of the issue at the time wasn’t Emanuel; it was White House Counsel Greg Craig, who was removed as the lead on closing Guantánamo as it became apparent the effort was failing in fall of 2009. But Craig was repeatedly overruled by Emanuel when it came to implementing the president’s policy. Emanuel saw Guantánamo as a lower priority than other pressing matters such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the economic crisis, and the health-care bill. “Rahm Emmanuel’s basic view was that he thought this was a crazy waste of political capital. That was a signal to the rest of the bureaucracy, ‘Don’t expose yourself on this,’” one person involved in the discussions said. “There was more that could be done. But once it became clear that the White House was no longer investing, everyone got the message.” The White House forbade Justice and State Department officials from even going to Capitol Hill to meet with Democrats for much of 2009, over the objections of senior officials in those departments. “They flaked out on the policy in 2009 and the administration starved their friends in Congress,” the person said. Tommy Vietor, who was National Security Council spokesman at the time, told The Daily Beast Thursday that the White House did make a decision to back off the drive to close Guantánamo, but only after several things changed that were outside of the administration’s control. “There were several factors,” as to why the drive to close the prison was no longer a priority he said. “Obviously we didn’t play the politics right. There were also a number of events that made the political situation shift beneath our feet.” For example, as Obama mentioned Thursday, key Republicans who had supported the effort to close the prison in 2008 reversed themselves after the election, including Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham. Also, public and congressional reaction to Attorney General Eric Holder’s November 2009 announcement to try terror suspects in civilian courts and the Dec. 25, 2009, attempted terrorist attack by underwear bomber Umar Abdulmutallab changed the politics of the Guantánamo issue, Vietor said. By the time Congress put restrictions on shuttering the prison in the 2010 defense bill in late 2009, the door was closed. “All those things took an issue that had a national-security consensus and changed the politics around it,” he said. “The dynamic changed so much. Once that was the case, sure we moved on to other priorities. I don’t think there was a scenario where if we just kept pushing, it would have gotten better.” One former administration official who was in the loop told The Daily Beast that while it’s true the White House prevented officials from briefing Congress, that was because the administration’s plan had not been completed as soon as everyone had expected. The executive order Obama signed in his second day in office created two task forces staffed by Defense and Justice Department officials, one to iron out the new policy and one to examine the statuses of the individuals who were being held at the prison. “There was definitely a decision to not go up and brief the Hill in 2009, but that was because the plan was not finalized yet. The task forces’ timing was not in sync,” the official said. “It’s overly simplistic to say that Rahm just decided that closing Gitmo was just too politically costly.” A big part of the hangup was not having congressional buy-in on a domestic location to house those prisoners who could never be transferred or released, the official explained. There were proposals to use prisons in Michigan or Illinois, but Congress quickly passed legislation barring the transfer of prisoners to U.S. soil without strict certifications by the Secretary of Defense. Obama took that issue head-on Thursday when he called on Congress to remove restrictions on transferring prisoners to the U.S., announced the Defense Department will establish a domestic site for holding military commissions, defended the idea of trying alleged terrorists on U.S. soil, and lifted the ban on transferring Guantánamo prisoners to Yemen, which could greatly reduce the prisoner population in Guantánamo. By announcing these steps, Obama is calling on the public to support his contention that the prison can be closed safely, in order to put pressure on Congress to change its tune, experts said. “It looks like he’s learned some lessons from the last go-round,” said Ken Gude, chief of staff at the Center for American Progress, the think tank founded by former Clinton chief of staff John Podesta. “Starting by designating a site on a military base to hold commissions is a great first step. What is Congress going to say to the Defense Department? That it doesn’t think it can secure a U.S. military base inside the United States from potential attack by terrorists?” The president’s new plan is only as viable as his willingness to fight for it, according to all those who witnessed its failure the first time around. It remains to be seen if Obama will use his political capital to make sure the job gets done, or if he will leave it to underlings who might not carry it out once more. Congress is not going to move unless the White House is engaged and the president uses his own personal power to force lawmakers to implement a policy they may not like, said Moran. “I believe the president genuinely wants to do this, but he needs to prove it and he needs to be prepared to use his leverage to make it happen,” he said. “If he doesn’t achieve it, it’s going to be one of those things that will bother him for the rest of his days.”
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Rogin 5/23(Josh, senior correspondent for national security and politics for Newsweek and The Daily Beast, How Obama Bungled the Guantánamo Closing, 5/23/13, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/23/how-obama-bungled-the-guantanamo-closing.html)
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Obama called today for a renewed effort to close the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba when fight was on, the White House was nowhere to be found. “They left all of us twisting in the wind,” he said. “Rightly or wrongly, they gave us a very clear impression, ‘You’re on your own on this issue.’” The administration pretty much gave up on getting the Congress to act responsibly on the issue “It was politically expedient not to use up chips on this issue… Eventually it wasn’t worth fighting anymore because we didn’t have the White House beside us.” once it became clear that the White House was no longer investing, everyone got the message.” Obama took that issue head-on en he called on Congress to remove restrictions on transferring prisoners to the U.S., announced the Defense Department will establish a domestic site for holding military commissions Obama is calling on the public to support his contention that the prison can be closed safely, in order to put pressure on Congress to change its tune The president’s new plan is only as viable as his willingness to fight for it, It remains to be seen if Obama will use his political capital to make sure the job gets done, or if he will leave it to underlings who might not carry it out once more. Congress is not going to move unless the White House is engaged and the president uses his own personal power to force lawmakers to implement a policy they may not like, said Moran. “I believe the president genuinely wants to do this, but he needs to prove it and he needs to be prepared to use his leverage to make it happen,” he said. “If he doesn’t achieve it, it’s going to be one of those things that will bother him for the rest of his days.”
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Closing Guantanamo Bay requires a massive input of political capital
| 8,352 | 68 | 1,703 | 1,398 | 10 | 311 | 0.007153 | 0.222461 |
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WASHINGTON -- A worsening hunger strike and a fresh plea by President Barack Obama to close the Guantanamo Bay prison fell on deaf ears in Congress Friday, as the House of Representatives voted to keep the increasingly infamous jail open. The House voted to make it harder for Obama to begin shifting inmates, adding a restriction to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2014 that bars any of the roughly 56 prisoners who have been cleared by military and intelligence officials to be sent to Yemen from being transferred there for one year. Some 30 other Gitmo inmates of the 166 kept there have also been cleared for release. "The Defense Department should not transfer detainees to Yemen because they represent some of the most dangerous terrorists known in the world," said Rep. Jackie Walorski (R-Ind.), who sponsored the fresh ban on shipping anyone out of Gitmo. Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), who offered a competing amendment to create a plan to close Gitmo, found the new restriction especially ironic, noting that federal authorities believe the Yemeni detainees are safe enough to be set free. "Not everybody that we rounded up and took to Guantanamo, unfortunately, turned out to be the very dangerous terrorists that we thought they were," Smith said, adding that continuing to hold them -- at a facility costing $1.6 million a year for each inmate -- was not sensible. "Determining that if there is any minimimal threat whatsoever we're simply going to hold them forever is, well, quite frankly, un-American. That is contrary to our values to say we're going to hold somebody indefinitely -- I gather forever -- because we think there might possibly be some risk," Smith said. "That's not the way the Constitution is supposed to work." Walorski's amendment passed, 236 to 188. Smith's, also backed by Reps. Jim Moran (D-Va.) and Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.), failed 174 to 249 after Republicans argued that it was simply too dangerous to send terrorsim suspects to the United States. "These terrorist detainees pose a very real danger to our security in America. They mean us real harm," said Rep. Brad Wenstrup (R-Ohio), a veteran of the Iraq war who called closing Gitmo "appeasement." "Who are these detainees? They are not innocent goat herders swept up by marauding United States military, of which I was a part, and of which I detained numerous potential terrorists," said Rep. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), referring to his service in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.) argued that moving the prisoners to the United States would paint targets for terrorists "on every elementary school, every shopping mall, every small business" in the area where they end up being housed. "It's important that we come together, unified, and send a message to the president," Forbes said. "We may not be able to stop every terrorist from coming to U.S. soil, but we can stop these terrorists."
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McAuliff 6/14 (Michael, Washington Correspondent for the Huffington Post, Guantanamo Bay To Stay Open As House Blocks Bill To Close Infamous Prison, 6/14/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/14/guantanamo-bay-close_n_3438347.html)
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a fresh plea by Obama to close Guantanamo Bay fell on deaf ears in Congress as the House of Representatives voted to keep the infamous jail open. The House voted to make it harder for Obama to begin shifting inmates, adding a restriction to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2014 that bars any of the roughly 56 prisoners who have been cleared by military and intelligence officials to be sent to Yemen from being transferred there for one year. detainees they represent some of the most dangerous terrorists in the world," said Walorski Walorski's amendment Republicans argued that it was too dangerous to send terrorsim suspects to the United States pose a very real danger to our security moving the prisoners to the United States would paint targets for terrorists "on every elementary school, every shopping mall, every small business "We may not be able to stop every terrorist from coming to U.S. soil, but we can stop these terrorists."
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Plan is unpopular – the House just voted to keep Guantanamo Bay open
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Sometimes, when you watch the strange, repetitive political dance that swirls around the U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba -- the president announcing yet again that he plans to "close" it and the Republicans in Congress swearing that they won't let him -- it's hard not to wonder what alternative universe we live in. The initial round of this began on the day Barack Obama entered the Oval Office and circulated an executive order meant to close that prison within a year. The latest presidential "closing" announcement came just over two weeks ago. In a major speech at National Defense University, Obama also claimed that he would soon lift restrictions he had imposed in 2009 on sending Guantanamo prisoners long cleared of any criminal activities back to Yemen. Just last week, Congressional Republicans offered the usual reply. They proposed to keep the prison open, whatever the president wanted, "by barring the administration from transferring its terror suspects to the United States or a foreign country such as Yemen." By now everyone knows that Guantanamo can't be closed, not by this administration or any other one imaginable. At present, it is the scene of an extraordinary protest movement, now almost three months old, by 103 prisoners using potential death by starvation to bring attention to the nightmare that has been their lives behind bars in Cuba.
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Engelhardt 6/10 (Tom, editor of tomdispatch.com and Huffington Post contributor, Why Guantanamo Won't Be Shut Down – Ever, 6/10/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-engelhardt/guantanamo-bay-closing_b_3415305.html)
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repetitive political dance that swirls around the U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba -- the president announcing yet again that he plans to "close" it and the Republicans in Congress swearing that they won't let him Congressional Republicans proposed to keep the prison open, whatever the president wanted, "by barring the administration from transferring its terror suspects By now everyone knows that Guantanamo can't be closed
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Guantanamo Bay has too much support to be shut down
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And Cuba has a long history of tossing ice on warming relations. The latest example is the jailing of Alan Gross, a State Department contractor who has spent nearly three years behind bars for distributing satellite telephone equipment to Jewish groups in Havana. In Washington, Mr. Gross is seen as the main impediment to an easing of the embargo, but there are also limits to what the president could do without Congressional action. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act conditioned the waiving of sanctions on the introduction of democratic changes inside Cuba. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act also requires that the embargo remain until Cuba has a transitional or democratically elected government. Obama administration officials say they have not given up, and could move if the president decides to act on his own. Officials say that under the Treasury Department’s licensing and regulation-writing authority, there is room for significant modification. Following the legal logic of Mr. Obama’s changes in 2009, further expansions in travel are possible along with new allowances for investment or imports and exports, especially if narrowly applied to Cuban businesses. Even these adjustments — which could also include travel for all Americans and looser rules for ships engaged in trade with Cuba, according to a legal analysis commissioned by the Cuba Study Group — would probably mean a fierce political fight. The handful of Cuban-Americans in Congress for whom the embargo is sacred oppose looser rules. When asked about Cuban entrepreneurs who are seeking more American support, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the Florida Republican who is chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, proposed an even tighter embargo. “The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered,” she wrote in an e-mail. “Responsible nations must not buy into the facade the dictatorship is trying to create by announcing ‘reforms’ while, in reality, it’s tightening its grip on its people.”
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NY Times 12 (“Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, November 19th, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)
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further expansions in travel are possible along with new allowances for investment or imports and exports Even these adjustments — which could also include travel for all Americans and looser rules for ships engaged in trade with Cuba would probably mean a fierce political fight. When asked about Cuban entrepreneurs who are seeking more American support Ros-Lehtinen, the chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, proposed an even tighter embargo. The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered Responsible nations must not buy into the facade the dictatorship is trying to create by announcing ‘reforms’ while, in reality, it’s tightening its grip on its people.”
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Reforming US-Cuba trade laws cause fierce political fights
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The November 2 midterm elections resulted in a new balance of power in Congress, most notably in the House of Representatives—now a Republican majority house. Domestic implications aside, the shift in power will have a significant effect on foreign policy initiatives, not least of which (for our purposes) is Cuba policy.¶ First of all, the next head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee—changing because the majority party has the privilege of holding this seat—will be Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), the unrelenting anti-Castro, pro-embargo ranking Republican. She will replace Representative Howard Berman (D-CA), an advocate for modest rapprochement with Havana and co-sponsor of stalled bipartisan legislation to end the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba.¶ To be fair, we were not counting on much happening regarding the embargo in the short term, even with a Democratic House. But with Ileana at the helm of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, any loosening of restrictions will be out of the question. Significant changes in Cuba policy, without some sort of unforeseen breakthrough, will almost certainly be tabled until 2012.¶ Of course, although President Obama cannot lift the heavy embargo legislation on his own, he can use his executive authority to dismantle parts of it.¶ But it is highly unlikely that the President will spend any of his diminished political capital on the issue of Cuba when there is so little potential gain for him in doing so. The likely cost—say, a storm of ill will from Republicans in Congress and from an easily angered public that is vigilant these days for signs of executive overreach—simply outweighs any benefit that might emerge… a positive reaction from the global community, perhaps? The promise of applause from partners abroad has not been the impetus for any change on U.S. policy toward Cuba in prior years and will not be now, not even when the entire body of the United Nations General Assembly (save Israel) condemns the embargo. Every year the vote is taken and every year the tiny U.S. team has become more outnumbered: in 2008 the vote was 185 to 3; in 2009, 187 to 3; and now in 2010 (last week), 187 to 2—the two being the United States and Israel, a country whose citizens freely travel to, spend and invest in Cuba.¶
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Global Post 10 – “Midterms and a changing face of Congress,” November 10, 2010, online: http://www.globalpost.com/webblog/cuba/midterms-and-changing-face-congress
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The midterm will have a significant effect on foreign policy initiatives not least Cuba policy the next head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee will be Ros-Lehtinen the unrelenting anti-Castro, pro-embargo ranking Republican with Ileana at the helm of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, any loosening of restrictions will be out of the question it is highly unlikely that the President will spend his diminished political capital on Cuba when there is so little potential gain in doing so The likely cost a storm of ill will from Republicans and an easily angered public that is vigilant for signs of executive overreach outweighs any benefit that might emerge
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Cuba policy changes require tons of political capital and trade off with the rest of Obama’s agenda
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In Singapore, a semisubmersible oil rig is being prepared for oil exploration off the coast of Cuba. Repsol, a Spanish energy company working with Cuba, is expected to drill as close as 50 miles off the coast of Florida and at depths deeper than Deepwater Horizon, which exploded in U.S. waters last year, producing the largest oil spill ever in the Gulf of Mexico.¶ These developments rightly have the attention of Florida's federal leaders.¶ Attempts to use brute force in ceasing Cuban oil operations to protect Florida's beaches, marine life and tourism revenue may be sincere, but they are not the best way to prevent a repeat of the Deepwater spill.¶ The bipartisan efforts include placing pressure on Repsol and legislation such as U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson's (D-Fla) plan to pull U.S. visas for company executives associated with Cuban oil. or U.S. Rep. Vern Buchanan's (R-Sarasota) proposed legislation that would have the U.S. Interior Department deny oil and gas leases to companies dealing in Cuban oil.
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The Oracle 11 – “US leaders must cooperate with Cuba to prevent oil spills,” February 16, 2011, online: http://www.usforacle.com/us-leaders-must-cooperate-with-cuba-to-prevent-oil-spills-1.2471166
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Repsol, a Spanish energy company working with Cuba, is expected to drill as close as 50 miles off the coast of Florida These developments have the attention of Florida's federal leaders. bipartisan efforts include placing pressure on Repsol and legislation to pull U.S. visas for company executives associated with Cuban oil or legislation that would have the U.S. Interior Department deny oil and gas leases to companies dealing in Cuban oil
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Joint oil production’s massively unpopular with anti-Cuba hardliners
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A key factor driving opposition to Cuban drilling in the U.S., especially from politicians representing Gulf Coast states, is concern about what happens if something goes wrong with Cuban drilling. The Gulf oil spill in 2010 increased apprehension about liability close to the Florida Coast and the Bahamas. Given Cuba’s economic conditions, liability for an oil spill will rest with the European and Asian companies involved in drilling. The U.S. embargo would prevent U.S. companies, in most cases, from helping with cleanup efforts in the event of a major accident. Yet in the event of a spill, the U.S. would be under pressure to grant an exception to the embargo allowing U.S. companies to help so that the spill would not negatively impact US territory. During the Gulf spill, the U.S. shared information with Cuba about the spill. The Administration publicly declared its willingness to provide limited licenses for U.S. firms to respond to a catastrophe that threatened Cuba. Meanwhile, Cuba permitted a vessel from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to look for damage in Cuban waters. But, ongoing concerns about the US underwriting the costs of spill cleanup has increased political pressure to halt Cuban drilling before it even begins.
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Jaime Suchlicki 11, the Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, June 2011, “Drilling for Oil in Cuban Waters,” http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue143.htm
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A key factor driving opposition to Cuban drilling in the U.S., especially from politicians representing Gulf Coast states, is concern about what happens if something goes wrong with Cuban drilling. Given Cuba’s economic conditions, liability for an oil spill will rest with the European and Asian companies involved in drilling ongoing concerns about the US underwriting the costs of spill cleanup has increased political pressure to halt Cuban drilling before it even begins
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Environmental concerns are a neg link warrant---Congress is scared of U.S. companies being exposed to liability, and they think the best way to prevent a spill is to stop drilling in the first place
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From his hotel in Havana, marine scientist and conservation policy specialist David Guggenheim, aka the “Ocean Doctor,” can see the lights of Scarabeo 9. The recently arrived oil-drilling platform off the Cuban coast began drilling exploratory deepwater wells on the Cuban side of the Florida Straits, about 70 miles from Key West, last month.¶ The 53,000-ton rig is, literally, under more pressure than Deepwater Horizon. Operated by Spanish company Repsol, it’s what’s known as an “ultra-deepwater” platform, drilling at depths up to 6,000 feet. (Deepwater Horizon’s depth was 5,000 feet.) A Scarabeo 9 spill would damage critical marine ecosystems in the Gulf. US environmentalists and policymakers are concerned that Cuba doesn’t have the resources, technology, or expertise needed to prevent or respond to such a disaster.¶ But even the threat of irreparable environmental damage hasn’t been enough to clear away old Cold War resentments and political inertia between the two countries and get them working together to formulate an emergency response plan. Which is why an unlikely coalition of environmentalists, oil executives, and scientists — like Guggenheim — are joining forces to try to, in his words, “fight half a century of an illogical policy with logic.”
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Karen Hoffman 12, Earth Island Journal, “Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico Oil Exploration Makes Strange Bedfellows,” 3/15/12, http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/cubas_gulf_of_mexico_oil_exploration_makes_strange_bedfellows/
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Scarabeo 9 began drilling exploratory deepwater wells on the Cuban side of the Florida Straits A spill would damage critical marine ecosystems in the Gulf. US environmentalists and policymakers are concerned But even the threat of irreparable environmental damage hasn’t been enough to clear away old Cold War resentments and political inertia between the two countries
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Environmental concerns don’t come close to outweighing the backlash against the plan
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Taking the first steps towards the industrialization of the Florida Straits, Cuba has allowed international energy companies to lease portions of the Straits for oil exploration. n1 In the United States, political fallout from high energy prices led Congress to lift an offshore drilling ban in 2008, though as this Note goes to print in May 2010, a massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico following the April 20, 2010, explosion and subsequent sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig has put offshore drilling in limbo, with the Obama administration freezing plans to open more offshore waters for drilling. n2 The environmental and political consequences of the Gulf of Mexico spill could destroy momentum in both countries to drill for oil in the Florida Straits, though long before the Deepwater Horizon spill, some U.S. politicians cited Cuba's moves to drill for oil as a compelling reason to open U.S.-controlled portions of the Florida Straits for oil and gas leasing. n3¶ The industrialization of the Florida Straits remains theoretical; there is no drilling taking place in U.S. or Cuban waters, though drilling off Cuba might occur in the near future through joint ventures between Cuba and Brazilian, Spanish, Indian, and Norwegian companies. n4 In recent [*559] years, the only oil exploration to occur in these waters took place when the Spanish oil company Repsol undertook prospective drilling ninety-five miles offshore of Key West, Florida, in 2004. n5 Repsol discovered oil, though in insignificant quantities. n6 Further indicative of the uncertain nature of any Florida Straits oil rush is the fact that drilling for oil off Florida has been controversial for decades. n7 This debate has been so contentious that the pro-drilling administration of President George W. Bush looked to repurchase drilling leases in the Gulf of Mexico off the Florida panhandle in 2002. n8¶ Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the Florida Straits will undergo some form of industrialization, in which case environmental laws in both Cuba and in the United States will play a critical role in protecting this shared tropical ecosystem. As Juan Leon, an employee at the Florida Keys Wild Bird Center, in Key Largo, Florida, told the Atlanta Journal-Constitution in 2006, drilling in Cuban waters necessarily affects Florida's coast. Leon commented on the prospect of drilling off Cuba: "That's absolutely scary. The [Florida] Keys don't have sandy beaches and you couldn't just scoop up oil if there was a spill." n9 Moreover, the risk of oil development in the Straits threatens the entire ecosystem. Oil spills and industrial contamination do not adhere to political boundaries. n10 Nor does aquatic life respect territorial boundaries; for example, dolphins stranded in 2005 in the Florida Keys immediately returned to Cuban waters once re-released into the wild. n11¶ [*560] In examining possible Florida Straits oil drilling, this Note surveys the environmental laws in the United States and Cuba that may impact offshore drilling, as well as the ecological, economic, and infrastructural challenges associated with drilling in these troubled waters. Rather than critiquing each nation's environmental laws, this Note recognizes that the Florida Straits drilling matter brings into focus the turbulent relationship between Cuba and the United States. Thus, the Note's central recommendations center around easing barriers to dialogue between scientists and policy leaders on both sides of the waters. n12 Whether each nation has effective environmental laws is less relevant if dialogue over the shared Florida Straits ecosystem does not exist.¶ As a practical matter, this Note begins with a discussion of the environmental laws in both Cuba and the United States that will come to bear on offshore mineral development. Second, the Note examines the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea treaty and ways that this global treaty might impact protection of these waters. Third, this Note explores non-legal economic and environmental issues involved in the drilling debate, notably the risks posed by industrial pollution in the Florida Straits and whether Cuba has the economic wherewithal to spearhead industrialization. The Note concludes with an argument that the Florida Straits drilling issue has the potential to be a starting point for a more productive U.S.-Cuban relationship if both countries come to recognize the value of collaboration over protecting these tropical waters. Cuban and U.S. scientists and attorneys already speak to each other regarding protecting the marine resources of the Florida Straits, and laws should encourage, rather than hamper, their continued collaboration.¶ II. Laws Currently Governing Oil and Gas Development in the Florida Straits¶ A. United States Environmental Law¶ In order for oil drilling to occur in U.S.-controlled waters off the Florida Keys, federal and state interests must align, and the Department of the Interior must perform environmental impact assessments. The [*561] following overview of the U.S. laws governing offshore development notes the federal-state cooperative relationship, which is critical to the issue of offshore development in the Florida Straits because of Florida's historic intransigence over any offshore development that might threaten its economically important marine resources.¶ As a general matter, the United States federal government oversees offshore oil drilling pursuant to an Executive Order issued by President Harry Truman in 1945 that declared "that the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas ... appertain to the United States." n13 The individual states generally control tidal areas up to three miles offshore, though along Florida's Gulf coast, state-controlled waters extend nearly nine miles offshore. n14 Accordingly, responsibility for the development of oil in U.S.-controlled waters of the Florida Straits vests in the federal government. n15¶ Despite federal control of offshore resources, the State of Florida has influence over the management of the Florida Straits under the terms of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act ("the CZMA"). The CZMA envisions a cooperative relationship between the states and the federal government over coastal resources. n16 Under the CZMA, projects initiated by federal agencies in offshore areas that impact state-controlled coastal waters must be "consistent to the maximum extent practicable" with individual state coastal management plans. n17 In exchange for the federal government's obligation to ensure consistency with individual state plans, the CZMA requires coastal states to implement their own state-specific coastal zone management plans. n18 Therefore, the federal government must consider Florida's designs over management of its coastal waters in light of the CZMA's model of "cooperative federalism." n19 In the end, however, the Secretary of Commerce must [*562] approve each state's coastal zone management plan, and the Secretary of Commerce is the final decisionmaker if a state challenges a federal offshore drilling plan on the grounds that the plan is inconsistent with the state's coastal zone management plan. n20 As a result, a federal imprimatur constrains state plans.¶ Turning to Florida law, the state's coastal zone management plan operates as the Florida Coastal Management Program ("the FCMP"), promulgated under the Florida Coastal Management Act. n21 The FCMP comprises twenty-four statutes designed to "protect and enhance" Florida's "natural, cultural, and economic coastal resources." n22 A portion of the FCMP details how consistency analyses should be conducted. n23 One pertinent FCMP section for offshore energy exploration is Florida's Ocean and Coastal Resources Act. n24 The Ocean and Coastal Resources Act mandates environmentally sustainable development of the Sunshine State's coastal areas, and that mandate, however ambiguous, must be reconciled with federal plans for oil drilling off Florida's coast. n25 The Ocean and Coastal Resources Act thus memorializes the importance of Florida's marine environments. n26 The law states that "Florida's oceans and coastal resources comprise habitats that support endangered and threatened species and extraordinary marine biodiversity," and that "the coral reefs of southeast Florida and the barrier reef of the Florida Keys, the only barrier reef in the United States, are a national treasure and must continue to be protected." n27 These words set a high bar for environmentally sensitive offshore development, though at the moment, Florida does not have laws addressing offshore drilling because of the various drilling moratoria protecting the state's coastal waters. n28 Lastly, [*563] under the FCMP, the Florida State Clearinghouse serves as the primary state agency for consistency reviews, and that agency consults with eight other state agencies to evaluate and comment upon any proposed federal program. n29 Considered together, these laws suggest that protection of Florida Straits marine resources in U.S. waters will occur through a collaborative evaluation period among both state and federal agencies.¶ Federal-state consistency is not the only prerequisite for drilling to proceed in U.S. waters. Returning to federal law, in order for drilling to commence in U.S.-controlled portions of the Straits, the Secretary of the Interior ("the Secretary") must undertake an environmental review process. n30 First, before the actual environmental review takes place, the Secretary must develop a five-year leasing program that authorizes drilling, a requirement imposed by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("the OCLSA"). n31 The OCLSA states that the Secretary's lease program shall include a schedule for prospective lease sales that details the lease size, timing, and location. n32 The lease program is comprehensive; it covers all potential development in all U.S. offshore waters in the specified five-year period. n33 The Secretary has authority under the OCLSA to grant a lease to the highest bidder once the Department of the Interior opens leasing pursuant to its planned schedule. n34 As a result, Florida Straits offshore waters would have to be included in a five-year offshore drilling lease plan in order to be opened to oil and gas exploration.¶ As mentioned, an environmental impact review must occur before any drilling takes place, and this step happens after the Secretary releases the five-year lease plan. n35 The Minerals Management Service ("MMS"), a bureau of the Department of the Interior, conducts the environmental impact reviews. n36 MMS oversees all oil and natural gas deposits located [*564] in the outer continental shelf. n37 If drilling in the Florida Straits proceeds, MMS will first prepare a comprehensive "Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement" supporting the Secretary's five-year leasing plan and covering all areas proposed for leasing, be it Florida Straits, Gulf of Mexico, or Pacific Ocean waters. n38 MMS will then complete either a secondary environmental impact statement, or a shorter environmental assessment, once a specific block of offshore land has been leased, and this second environmental impact statement is specific to the block to be leased. n39 The OCLSA describes the procedure for the MMS to follow in conducting these environmental impact reviews. n40 The process contemplates a public notice and comment period, and a notice and comment period from individual state governments impacted by the proposed leasing. n41 Importantly, the OCLSA obligates the Secretary to consider "the potential impact of oil and gas exploration on ... the marine, coastal, and human environment." n42 Because U.S. laws mandate this environmental impact review process by MMS, proposed offshore industrial activities must conform to minimum environmental standards, underscored by the directive to consider potential impacts. This review process, along with the consistency requirements, creates a layering effect to environmental safeguards covering development in U.S. offshore waters. Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, controversy has engulfed MMS, and the Obama administration has proposed splitting the agency, separating its compliance section from other divisions to reform its allegedly industry-friendly practices. n43¶ [*565] So far, this discussion of U.S. laws has detailed the environmental laws that would be triggered should offshore oil development proceed in waters off the Florida Keys. Yet before these laws come into play, politically inspired offshore drilling moratoria must first expire. n44 These moratoria are as relevant to the drilling issue as the legal regime governing development in U.S. offshore waters. In the event that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill becomes a far-reaching environmental calamity, these moratoria may see enhanced public support.¶ Moratoria on offshore drilling reflect skepticism among the American public over offshore energy development. Restrictions on offshore development have enjoyed public support in recent decades, with a massive 1969 oil spill off Santa Barbara, California, frequently identified as the catalyst for politically driven offshore development limitations. n45 The Santa Barbara spill scarred thirty-plus miles of Pacific coastline with inches-deep oil. n46 Emblematic of the subsequent erosion of public confidence in offshore development, offshore oil and gas leasing has been largely restricted since 1982. n47 Lately, opposition to offshore drilling has declined with increased gasoline and energy costs. n48 In July 2008, President George W. Bush lifted an executive ban on offshore drilling. n49 Responding to a change in attitude over offshore drilling, the U.S. House of Representatives let the long-standing ban expire in September 2008. n50 The move lifted the moratorium on offshore drilling off both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. n51 The Senate followed the House's lead, incorporating the lifting of the moratorium into a government spending bill that President Bush signed in to law on September 30, 2008. n52 President Barack Obama's March 31, 2010, move to open large areas of the southeast Atlantic coastline, including areas off Florida's Atlantic coast, to oil exploration demonstrates the evolution in public attitudes towards offshore drilling, though the Obama administration has since backed down on its offshore drilling plans in light of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. n53¶ [*566] Despite Washington's recent approval of new offshore oil and gas development, drilling off Florida's coast is a more uncertain matter, given the moratoriums unique to that state's offshore waters. A 2006 moratorium on drilling off Florida's Gulf coast bars industrial leasing and development until the year 2022. n54 The moratorium, part of federal legislation entitled the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, barred "leasing, preleasing, or any related activity" in areas of the Gulf within 100 or 125 miles of Florida's coast in exchange for opening 8.3 million acres for oil and gas leasing in other parts of the Gulf. n55 The discrepancy in the 100 or 125 mile limitation arises from the division of the Gulf of Mexico into several lease planning zones by the MMS. n56 The 2006 moratorium remains in effect despite the abandonment of offshore drilling bans by the federal government in the fall of 2008. n57 The prohibitions in the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act demonstrate that for drilling to proceed in the Florida Straits, Congress must repeal bans on drilling in offshore waters around Florida's Gulf coast.
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Jonathan P. White 10, J.D., University of Colorado School of Law, Summer 2010, “NOTE & COMMENT: Drilling in Ecologically and Environmentally Troubled Waters: Law and Policy Concerns Surrounding Development of Oil Resources in the Florida Straits,” Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy, 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 557, p. lexis
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some U.S. politicians cited Cuba's moves to drill for oil as a compelling reason to open U.S.-controlled portions of the Florida Straits for oil and gas leasing there is no drilling taking place in U.S. or Cuban waters Despite Washington's recent approval of new offshore oil and gas development, drilling off Florida's coast is a more uncertain matter given the moratoriums unique to that state's offshore waters A 2006 moratorium on drilling off Florida's Gulf coast bars leasing and development until the year 2022 The moratorium part of federal legislation entitled the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, barred "leasing, preleasing, or any related activity" in areas of the Gulf within 100 or 125 miles of Florida's coast The 2006 moratorium remains in effect despite the abandonment of offshore drilling bans by the federal government in the fall of 2008 Congress must repeal bans on drilling in offshore waters around Florida's Gulf coast
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The plan requires Congress---it’s unlike drilling in other areas---proximity to Florida
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The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious relationship between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of power to his younger brother, Raul, modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before they could leave their country for foreign travel. There was talk early in Obama’s first term of easing the 51-year-old embargo, and Kerry, though still in the Senate then, wrote a commentary for the Tampa Bay Tribune in 2009 in which he deemed the security threat from Cuba “a faint shadow.” He called then for freer travel between the two countries and an end to the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba “that has manifestly failed for nearly 50 years.” The political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more recently Havana’s refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at bay. It’s a matter of political priorities and trade-offs, Aramesh said. He noted that former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton last year exercised her discretion to get the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK, removed from the government’s list of designated terrorist organizations. That move was motivated by the hopes of some in Congress that the group could be aided and encouraged to eventually challenge the Tehran regime. “It’s a question of how much political cost you want to incur or how much political capital you want to spend,” Aramesh said. “President Obama has decided not to reach out to Cuba, that he has more important foreign policy battles elsewhere.”
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Williams 13 (Carol, currently at the LA Times, A foreign correspondent for 25 years, Carol J. Williams traveled to and reported from more than 80 countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors. http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502,0,2494970.story#ixzz2YmmqmyTI, 5/3/13)
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The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious relationship between Havana and Washington Raul has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before they could leave their country for foreign travel The political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more recently Havana’s refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at bay. It’s a matter of political priorities and trade-offs, It’s a question of how much political cost you want to incur or how much political capital you want to spend, Obama has decided not to reach out to Cuba
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Plan costs capital and is a flip-flop
| 1,690 | 37 | 649 | 278 | 7 | 108 | 0.02518 | 0.388489 |
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In the face of mounting calls to remove Cuba from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FLA) defended Foggy Bottom's recent decision to keep Cuba on the list, in a statement to The Cable. "The Castro regime sponsors terrorism abroad and against their own people, and removing a country from the list of nations that sponsor terrorism requires evidence of reform," Rubio said. "We have not seen such evidence in Cuba." In its annual Country Reports on Terrorism released last week, the State Department acknowledged that some conditions on the island were improving, but maintained three reasons for keeping Cuba on the list: Providing a safe haven for some two dozen members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a Spanish rebel group charged with terrorist activity; providing aid to Colombia's rebel group the FARC "in past years" -- Cuba no longer supports the group today; and providing harbor to "fugitives wanted in the United States." "It remains clear that Cuba is the same totalitarian state today that it has been for decades," Rubio told The Cable. "This totalitarian state continues to have close ties to terrorist organizations." Critics allege that State's rationale for keeping Cuba on the list is increasingly thin and say the island nation shares little in common with the list's other members: Iran, Syria, and Sudan or those that didn't make the list, and arguably should, such as North Korea and Pakistan. They also latched on to a line in the report that says: "There was no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary training to terrorist groups." "The report makes it clear that the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism," said Geoff Thale, program director at the left-leaning advocacy group Washington Office on Latin America. "Cuba is clearly on the terrorist list for political reasons." Cuba has been under a U.S. economic embargo since 1962, which is supported by a small but vocal community of former Cuban citizens in Florida, and a number of members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, such as Senate Foreign Relations Chairman and Cuban-American Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who declined to comment to The Cable. Earlier this year, the Boston Globe reported that Secretary of State John Kerry, who has criticized travel restrictions to Cuba in the past, was considering removing Cuba from the list, but ultimately opted not to change the policy. Rubio made it clear that he supports a hard-line on Cuba, and opposes administration efforts to move too quickly on the issue. "The Obama administration should abandon considering unilateral concessions to the Cuban regime," he told The Cable. "An American development worker Alan Gross remains hostage and only cosmetic reforms have taken place, while nothing has been done to give the Cuban people greater freedoms."
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Hudson 6/3 (John, Foreign Policy staff writer, Rubio: Cuba belongs on the ‘state sponsors of terrorism' list, 6/3/13, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/03/rubio_cuba_belongs_on_the_state_sponsor_of_terror_list)
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In the face of mounting calls to remove Cuba from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism Rubio defended recent decision to keep Cuba on the list "The Castro regime sponsors terrorism abroad and against their own people, and removing a country from the list of nations that sponsor terrorism requires evidence of reform," Rubio said. "We have not seen such evidence in Cuba." It remains clear that Cuba is the same totalitarian state today that it has been for decades, This totalitarian state continues to have close ties to terrorist organizations Rubio made it clear that he supports a hard-line on Cuba, "The Obama administration should abandon considering unilateral concessions to the Cuban regime
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Rubio wants Cuba on the state sponsor list
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The second tier of senators, who are less likely to back the bill but could be swayed, includes John Barrasso of Wyoming, John Thune of South Dakota, Mike Crapo and Jim Risch of Idaho and Johnny Isakson of Georgia. This is a group that could vote yes if Rubio is still on board and other conservatives are falling into line. “The key is Rubio,” said Aguilar, executive director of the Latino Partnership for Conservative Principles. “Without Rubio, this bill would not get anywhere with Republicans. He gives them the cover.”
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Politico 5-6 (“Gang of Eight plots path to Senate supermajority”, May 6th, 2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/gang-of-eight-immigration-supermajority-90949_Page2.html)
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The second tier of senators are less likely to back the bill but could be swayed This is a group that could vote yes if Rubio is still on board The key is Rubio Without Rubio, this bill would not get anywhere with Republicans. He gives them the cover.”
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Rubio determines immigration passage
| 525 | 36 | 252 | 90 | 4 | 49 | 0.044444 | 0.544444 |
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In 1963, following heightened tensions in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy imposed the first travel restrictions on American citizens desiring to travel to Cuba. After years of gridlock regarding the subject courtesy of Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) and her ideological kinsman from the ultra-conservative Cuban American National Foundation, a growing number of U.S. members of Congress have consistently introduced legislation in an attempt to remove long-held constraints on U.S. citizens’ freedom to travel. Although former Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), among others, nearly managed to muster sufficient forces in Congress to remove the restrictions, these reforms have failed to attract a sufficient number of votes to lift the ban. In a November 2009 hearing, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Howard Berman (D-CA), raised important issues regarding the logic behind the travel ban in his opening statement. During the hearing, entitled “Is it Time to Lift the Ban on Travel to Cuba?,” Berman explained, “Americans have the right to travel to Iran, the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism…We can go to North Korea, which threatens to destabilize East Asia with its nuclear weapons program. And even during the darkest days of the Cold War, our citizens could visit the Soviet Union.” Berman argued that the U.S.’s current approach toward Cuba has had the effect of undermining ordinary Cubans’ prospects for attaining political and social freedoms. He emphasized that Washington’s policy, which is centered on inhibiting the Castro regime, should be guided by a more constructive compass that helps rather than consciously hurts the Cuban population. Although support for the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations has steadily mounted on Capitol Hill, a number of setbacks have limited the goals of Representative Berman and other progressive legislators. Such incidents include the December 2009 detainment and subsequent imprisonment of Alan Gross, an American contractor working in Cuba, and the death by hunger strike of political prisoner Orlando Zapata Tamayo in February. These episodes have sparked new rifts in the relationship between Washington and Havana. Deep political divisions and a scandal involving Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), who has sponsored bills that encourage improved bilateral relations, further complicate already frustrated attempts to reinstate American travel rights to Cuba. In addition to these foothills, the Obama administration was not prepared to use its political capital to scale the peaks of a regional foreign policy issue which has a limited domestic constituency and is fiercely opposed by a relatively small core of zealots, whose detestation of the Castro brothers cannot be exaggerated.
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Patchen and Rodriguez 10 (Carl Patchen and Katya Rodriguez, members of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Travel to Cuba Legislation Mired by Scandal, Fierce Opposition, http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/89731:travel-to-cuba-legislation-mired-by-scandal-fierce-opposition, 5/22/10)
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Kennedy imposed the first travel restrictions on American citizens desiring to travel to Cuba. After years of gridlock members of Congress have introduced legislation reforms have failed to attract a sufficient number of votes to lift the ban , a number of setbacks have limited the goal Such incidents include the December 2009 detainment and subsequent imprisonment of Alan Gross, an American contractor working in Cuba, and the death by hunger strike of political prisoner Orlando Zapata Tamayo These episodes have sparked new rifts in the relationship between Washington and Havana. Deep political divisions and a scandal involving Rangel further complicate already frustrated attempts to reinstate American travel rights to Cuba. In addition to these foothills, the Obama administration was not prepared to use its political capital to scale the peaks of a regional foreign policy issue which has a limited domestic constituency and is fiercely opposed by a relatively small core of zealots, whose detestation of the Castro brothers cannot be exaggerated.
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Plan is massively unpopular- costs capital
| 2,813 | 42 | 1,060 | 421 | 6 | 163 | 0.014252 | 0.387173 |
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WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is planning to expand opportunities for Americans to travel to Cuba, the latest step aimed at encouraging more contact between people in both countries, while leaving intact the decades-old embargo against the island’s Communist government, according to Congressional and administration officials. The officials, who asked not to be identified because they had not been authorized to discuss the policy before it was announced, said it was meant to loosen restrictions on academic, religious and cultural groups that were adopted under President George W. Bush, and return to the “people to people” policies followed under President Bill Clinton. Those policies, officials said, fostered robust exchanges between the United States and Cuba, allowing groups — including universities, sports teams, museums and chambers of commerce — to share expertise as well as life experiences. Policy analysts said the intended changes would mark a significant shift in Cuba policy. In early 2009, President Obama lifted restrictions on travel and remittances only for Americans with relatives on the island. Congressional aides cautioned that some administration officials still saw the proposals as too politically volatile to announce until after the coming midterm elections, and they said revisions could still be made. But others said the policy, which does not need legislative approval, would be announced before Congress returned from its break in mid-September, partly to avoid a political backlash from outspoken groups within the Cuban American lobby — backed by Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey — that oppose any softening in Washington’s position toward Havana. Those favoring the change said that with a growing number of polls showing that Cuban-Americans’ attitudes toward Cuba had softened as well, the administration did not expect much of a backlash. “They have made the calculation that if you put a smarter Cuba policy on the table, it will not harm us in the election cycle,” said one Democratic Congressional aide who has been working with the administration on the policy. “That, I think, is what animates this.” Mr. Menendez, in a statement, objected to the anticipated changes. “This is not the time to ease pressure on the Castro regime,” he said, referring to President Raúl Castro of Cuba, who took office in 2006 after his brother, Fidel, fell ill. Mr. Menendez added that promoting travel would give Havana a “much needed infusion of dollars that will only allow the Castro brothers to extend their reign of oppression.”
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NY Times 10 (“U.S. Said to Plan Easing Rules for Travel to Cuba”, August 16th, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/world/americas/17cuba.html?_r=3&hp&)
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Obama is planning to expand opportunities for Americans to travel to Cuba policies fostered robust exchanges between the United States and Cuba, allowing groups to share expertise as well as life experiences. the intended changes would mark a significant shift in Cuba policy some saw the proposals as too politically volatile political backlash from outspoken groups within the Cuban American lobby that oppose any softening in Washington’s position toward Havana. “This is not the time to ease pressure on the Castro regime,” promoting travel would give Havana a “much needed infusion of dollars that will only allow the Castro brothers to extend their reign of oppression.
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Backlash from Cuban lobbies
| 2,591 | 27 | 675 | 404 | 4 | 106 | 0.009901 | 0.262376 |
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At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.
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Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_ideas_us_mexico_relations.pdf)
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the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.
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Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters
| 802 | 74 | 432 | 130 | 9 | 70 | 0.069231 | 0.538462 |
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The Senate Judiciary Committee held the new Senate's first substantive hearing on the issue of immigration reform Wednesday. While there is general agreement that the nation's immigration system is in need of reform, most of the print coverage this morning indicates that the hearing revealed strong partisan disagreement over how best to approach that overhaul. The Washington Post (2/13, Helderman, 489K) reports that partisan divisions over how to approach an overhaul the nation's immigration laws "were on display" during the hearing. Republicans on the committee "complained that the nation's borders are not secure and that the latest efforts to change laws could lead to a new attempt at amnesty for illegal immigrants similar to those they have helped derail in the past." Meanwhile, Democrats "stressed that a legal rewrite must recognize the rights of same-sex immigrant couples, an issue some Republicans involved in the effort have said could cost GOP support." Still, lawmakers "involved with bipartisan efforts to push immigration changes said Wednesday that they were encouraged by the urgency expressed by Obama during his State of the Union address and that they will move ahead quickly while the nation's attention is focused on the issue." USA Today (2/14, Gomez, 1.71M) calls the hearing "contentious" and notes that senators "berated" DHS Secretary Napolitano "and speakers were interrupted repeatedly." USA Today also reports that Republicans were insistent "that the Obama administration must secure the border before serious talk can begin on the future of illegal immigrants in the country."
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The Frontrunner 2/14 (“Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Immigration Hearing,” 2/24/13, Bulletin News Network, Inc., Lexis)
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immigration reform hearing revealed strong partisan disagreement Republicans on the committee "complained that the nation's borders are not secure Republicans involved in the effort have said could cost GOP support Republicans were insistent "that the Obama administration must secure the border before serious talk can begin on the future of illegal immigrants in the country."
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Won’t remove border restrictions – Republicans want border security
| 1,617 | 67 | 378 | 248 | 9 | 55 | 0.03629 | 0.221774 |
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Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) on Monday said enhancements in border security must be “in place” before the process of granting legal status to 11 million illegal immigrants begins, laying down a new marker in the debate over immigration reform. “The House is going to do its own job on developing an immigration bill,” Boehner said Monday after an event on the Capitol steps on student loans. “But it’s real clear, from everything that I’ve seen and read over the last couple of weeks, that the American people expect that we’ll have strong border security in place before we begin the process of legalizing and fixing our legal immigration system.”
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Berman 7/8 (Russel, Congressional Reporter for The Hill, Boehner: Boost border security before legalizing immigrants, 7/8/13, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/309653-boehner-boost-border-security-before-legalizing-immigrants-)
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Boehner said enhancements in border security must be “in place” “The House is going to do its own job on developing an immigration bill,” “But it’s real clear, that the American people expect that we’ll have strong border security in place before we begin the process of fixing our legal immigration system.”
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Border security is the House’s primary concern
| 649 | 46 | 308 | 109 | 7 | 52 | 0.06422 | 0.477064 |
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No two countries implement MfDR in exactly the same way. While changes in planning and budgeting processes are the most common and logical entry points for improving the approach, some countries have begun with changes in monitoring and evaluation of programmes, changes in civil service procedures, or changes in project planning and selection. Each of these actions, properly conceived and executed, can yield tangible results and support a cycle of performance improvement. Launching a serious MfDR process usually requires committed leaders with extensive credibility and a willingness to spend political capital to reform entrenched systems and improve government performance. The 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, which examines progress on aid effectiveness, found that the proportion of countries with “largely developed results-oriented frameworks” was a modest 5%. However, 56% of countries reported having taken some action since 2005. Experience suggests that fully institutionalising the approach takes a minimum of seven years. In most countries, this means that the process spans at least one political transition, and much of that time is taken up with important but relatively unglamorous efforts to change core systems and assemble a valid empirical basis for decisions. For this reason, it is essential to develop constituencies inside and outside of government and to ensure that the process is not seen as partisan or donor driven. N
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OECD 9 (ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Managing for Development Results, http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/42447575.pdf, March 2009) **MfDR is Managing for Development Results**
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No two countries implement MfDR in exactly the same way. some countries have begun with changes in monitoring and evaluation of programmes, changes in civil service procedures, or changes in project planning and selection Launching a serious MfDR process usually requires committed leaders with extensive credibility and a willingness to spend political capital to reform entrenched systems and improve government performance. The 2008 Survey , found that the proportion of countries with “largely developed results-oriented frameworks” was a modest 5 fully institutionalising the approach takes a minimum of seven years. In most countries, this means that the process spans at least one political transition, and much of that time is taken up with important but relatively unglamorous efforts to change core systems and assemble a valid empirical basis for decisions
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Development assistance costs capital
| 1,469 | 36 | 867 | 221 | 4 | 130 | 0.0181 | 0.588235 |
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There have been ongoing concerns about the human rights records of Mexico’s federal, state, and municipal police. For the past several years, State Department’s human rights reports covering Mexico have cited credible reports of police involvement in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings for ransom, and torture.83 While abuses are most common at the municipal and state level, where corruption and police collaboration with criminal groups often occurs, federal forces—including the Federal Police—have also committed serious abuses. Individuals are most vulnerable to police abuses after they have been arbitrarily detained and before they are transferred to the custody of prosecutors, or while they are being held in preventive detention. Some 43% of Mexican inmates are reportedly in pre-trial detention.84 The Calderón government sought to combat police corruption and human rights abuses through increased vetting of federal forces; the creation of a national police registry to prevent corrupt police from being re-hired; the use of internal affairs units; and the provision of human rights training. In 2012, the government also announced new protocols on the use of force and how detentions are to be handled that were designed to prevent abuses. A January 2009 public security law codified vetting requirements and professional standards for state police to be met by 2013, but progress toward meeting those standards has been uneven. With a few exceptions, efforts to reform municipal police forces have lagged behind. There has also been increasing concern that the Mexican military, which is less accountable to civilian authorities than the police, is committing more human rights abuses since it is has been tasked with carrying out public security functions. A November 2011 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report maintains that cases of torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings have increased significantly in states where federal authorities have been deployed to fight organized crime.85 According to Mexico’s Human Rights Commission (CNDH), the number of complaints of human rights abuses by Mexico’s National Defense Secretariat (SEDENA) increased from 182 in 2006 to a peak of 1800 in 2009 before falling slightly to 1,695 in 2011. The Trans-Border Institute has found that the number of abuses by SEDENA forces that have been investigated and documented by CNDH has also declined since 2008-2009, particularly in areas where large-scale deployments have been scaled back.86 In contrast, complaints of abuses against the Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR) reported to CNDH increased by 150% from 2010 to 2011 as its forces became more heavily involved in anti-DTO efforts.87 While troubling, only a small percentage of those allegations have resulted in the CNDH issuing recommendations for corrective action to SEDENA or SEMAR, which those agencies say they have largely accepted and acted upon.88 A June 2011 constitutional amendment gave CNDH the authority to force entities that refuse to respond to its recommendations to appear before the Mexican Congress. In addition to expressing concerns about current human rights abuses, Mexican and international human rights groups have criticized the Mexican government for failing to hold military and police officials accountable for past abuses.89 In addition to taking steps to reform the police and judiciary, the Calderón government took some steps to comply with rulings by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) that cases of military abuses against civilians should be tried in civilian courts. While a few dozen cases90 were transferred to civilian jurisdiction and former President Calderón asked SEDENA and SEMAR to work with the Attorney General to accelerate transfers, most cases were still processed in the military justice system.91 Military prosecutors have opened thousands of investigations into allegations of human rights abuses as a result of complaints filed with the CNDH, with few having resulted in convictions.92 A reform of Article 57 of the military justice code was submitted by then-President Calderón in October 2010 mandating that at least certain human rights violations be investigated and prosecuted in civilian courts. A more comprehensive proposal that required that all cases of alleged military human rights violations be transferred to the civilian justice system was approved by the Mexican Senate’s Justice Commission in April 2012; however, the bill was subsequently blocked from coming to a vote. In September 2012, another proposal to reform Article 57 was presented in the Mexican Senate, but not enacted. Enacting a reform of Article 57 of the military justice code may become more urgent now for the Peña Nieto Administration now that Mexico’s Supreme Court is in the process of establishing binding legal precedent for determining jurisdiction in cases involving alleged military human rights violations against civilians. Human rights defenders and journalists have been particularly vulnerable to abuses by organized crime, sometimes acting in collusion with corrupt government authorities. Recently, several prominent human rights defenders have been harassed, attacked, and even killed, including members of the high-profile Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity led by Javier Sicilia. Increasing violent crimes targeting journalists, combined with high levels of impunity for the perpetrators of those crimes, have made Mexico the most dangerous country in the Western Hemisphere for journalists. Crimes against journalists range from harassment, to extortion, to kidnapping and murder. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has documented 58 murders of journalists and at least 10 cases of journalists disappearing in Mexico since 2000. Threats from organized crime groups have made journalists and editors fearful of covering crime-related stories, and in some areas coverage of the DTOs’ activities have been shut down.93 The Calderón government and the Mexican Congress took some steps to better protect human rights defenders and journalists, but many human rights organizations have called upon the Peña Nieto Administration to do more. The Calderón government established a special prosecutor within the Attorney General’s Office to attend to crimes against freedom of expression and created mechanisms to provide increased protection for journalists and human rights defenders. Those mechanisms have yet to be effectively implemented. The Mexican Congress enacted a law to make crimes against journalists a federal offense and a law to require the federal government to provide protection to journalists and human rights defenders who are “at risk” of being victimized and to their families. Another law approved by the Congress in 2012, but not promulgated by the Calderón government, would require the state to track victims of organized crime and provide assistance to victims and their families. Human rights organizations expressed satisfaction after President Peña Nieto signed that law, commonly referred to as the “victims’ law,” in January 2013, but said that the real test of his government’s commitment to human rights will be in how that and other laws are implemented. Human Rights Conditions on U.S. Assistance to Mexico In 2008, Congress debated whether human rights conditions should be placed on Mérida assistance beyond the requirements in §620J of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. That section was re-designated as §620M and amended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-74). It states that an individual or unit of a foreign country’s security forces is prohibited from receiving assistance if the Secretary of State receives “credible evidence” that an individual or unit has committed “a gross violation of human rights.” The FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), which provided the first tranche of Mérida funding, had less stringent human rights conditions than had been proposed earlier, largely due to Mexico’s concerns that some of the conditions would violate its national sovereignty. The conditions required that 15% of INCLE and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is taking action in four human rights areas: 1. improving transparency and accountability of federal police forces; 2. establishing a mechanism for regular consultations among relevant Mexican government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant Mexican civil society organizations, to make consultations concerning implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and international law; 3. ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of the federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to have committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces are fully cooperating with the investigations; and 4. enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on the use of testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment. Similar human rights conditions were included in FY2009-FY2011 appropriations measures that funded the Mérida Initiative.95 However, the first two conditions are not included in the 15% withholding requirement in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74). As previously mentioned, Congress has yet to pass a final FY2013 appropriations measure. It remains to be seen whether an omnibus bill would include the conditions on aid to Mexico that are in the Senate Appropriations Committee’s version of the FY2013 foreign operations ppropriations measure S. 3241 (S.Rept. 112-172). Those conditions would retain the condition related to torture, as well as require the State Department to report that Mexico has reformed its military justice code and is requiring police and military officials to immediately transfer detainees to civilian judicial authorities. Thus far, the State Department has submitted three 15% progress reports on Mexico to congressional appropriators (in August 2009, September 2010, and August 2012) that have met the statutory requirements for FY2008-FY2012 Mérida funds that had been on hold to be released. Nevertheless, the State Department has twice elected to hold back some funding pending further progress in key areas of concern. In the September 2010 report, for example, the State Department elected to hold back $26 million in FY2010 supplemental funds as a matter of policy until further progress was made in the areas of transparency and combating impunity.96 Those funds were not obligated until the fall of 2011. In the August 2012 report, the State Department again decided to hold back all of the FY2012 funding that would have been subject to the conditions (roughly $18 million) as a matter of policy until it can work with Mexican authorities to determine steps to address key human rights challenges. Those include: improving the ability of Mexico’s civilian institutions to investigate and prosecute cases of human rights abuses; enhancing enforcement of prohibitions against torture and other mistreatment; and strengthening protection for human rights defenders.97
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Seelke 13 (Clare Ribando Seelke - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Mexico and the 112th Congress”, January 29th, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32724.pdf)
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There have been ongoing concerns about the human rights records of Mexico’s federal, state, and municipal police State Department’s human rights have cited credible reports of police involvement in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings for ransom, and torture Federal Police have also committed serious abuses efforts to reform municipal police forces have lagged behind. groups have criticized the Mexican government for failing to hold military and police officials accountable for past abuses Increasing violent crimes targeting journalists, combined with high levels of impunity for the perpetrators of those crimes, have made Mexico the most dangerous country in the Western Hemisphere Congress has yet to pass a final FY2013 appropriations measure. It remains to be seen whether an omnibus bill would include the conditions on aid to Mexico the Senate Appropriations Committee’s version of the FY2013 foreign operations ppropriations has twice elected to hold back some funding pending further progress in key areas of concern. to hold back $26 million as a matter of policy until further progress was made in the areas of transparency and combating impunity the State Department again decided to hold back all of the FY2012 funding until it can work with Mexican authorities to determine steps to address key human rights challenges
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Aid to Mexico is put on hold due to human rights violations – won’t get approved in committees
| 11,364 | 94 | 1,337 | 1,697 | 18 | 204 | 0.010607 | 0.120212 |
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1,869 |
The concept of political capital has become increasingly conceptualised in development studies as an extra dimension within the ‘Livelihoods Framework’ (e.g. Carney 1999), and defined as being ‘based on access to decision-making’ in the political process (Rakodi 1999: 318). Despite limited applications, it is accorded a high degree of explanatory power, such that political capital ‘is one of the key capital assets on which people draw to build their livelihoods’ (Baumann 2000: 6), and acts ‘as a gatekeeper asset, permitting or preventing the accumulation of other assets upon which successful poverty-reducing growth depends’ (Booth et al 1998: 79, quoted in Rakodi 1999: 318). In a bid to overcome the ‘localism’ that has limited other approaches to popular agency in development studies (Mohan and Stokke 2000), political capital is linked directly to policy influence, such that it ‘consists of the resources which an actor…can dispose of and use to influence policy formation processes and realise outcomes which are in an actor’s perceived interest’ (Birner and Wittner 2000: 6), with resources including political literacy, ideological resources, and civil and political rights.5
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Hickey 5 (Sam, Reader in Politics and Development at the Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester. Between 2003-2010 he was research fellow within the Chronic Poverty Research Centre, conducting research into the politics of poverty reduction and alternative forms of poverty analysis. He is currently Co-Research Director of the Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre, Capturing the political? The role of political analysis in the multi-disciplining of development studies, http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-006.pdf, January 2005)
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The concept of political capital has become increasingly conceptualised in development studies defined as being ‘based on access to decision-making’ in the political process it is accorded a high degree of explanatory power, such that political capital ‘is one of the key capital assets on which people draw to build their livelihoods’ and acts ‘as a gatekeeper asset, permitting or preventing the accumulation of other assets upon which successful poverty-reducing growth depends’
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Development assistance costs capital
| 1,191 | 36 | 481 | 179 | 4 | 72 | 0.022346 | 0.402235 |
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Policymakers already know that the political space is not currently available for landmark treaty agreements like those signed at Rio ‘92, and is unlikely to open up before Rio 2012. As discussed earlier, publics around the world remain primarily focused on material standards of living; leaders are reluctant to expend political capital on long term global risk issues like sustainable development; multilateral bandwidth remains low; and in many cases it is not yet clear what solutions would look like even if the first three obstacles ceased to apply. But the fact remains that making progress on some aspects of sustainable development will be impossible without hard bargaining – especially those aspects centered on the equity and fairness issues discussed in Section Two of the paper.
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Evans and Steven 11 (Alex Evans, senior fellow at NYU Center on International Cooperation, where he works on issues including climate change, resource scarcity, international development, and global public goods, David Steven, Senior Fellow and Associate Director at NYU Center on International Cooperation where he works on development policy and the post-2015 agenda, Making Rio 2012 work Setting the stage for global economic, social and ecological renewal, http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/evans_steven_rio.pdf, June 2011)
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Policymakers know that the political space is not currently available for landmark treaty agreements like those signed at Rio ‘92, and is unlikely to open up before Rio 2012. leaders are reluctant to expend political capital on long term global risk issues like sustainable development; multilateral bandwidth remains low making progress on some aspects of sustainable development will be impossible without hard bargaining
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Specifically in Latin America it costs capital
| 792 | 46 | 423 | 125 | 7 | 63 | 0.056 | 0.504 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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Three key factors help explain why continuity has prevailed over change in U.S. drug-control policies, and each presents a possible impediment to a change in course during Obama’s second term. First, for the most part drug “warriors” on Capitol Hill continue to have the upper hand on drug-policy issues debated in the U.S. Congress. As the elections reaffirmed the status quo in Washington, there is no reason to expect that to change. Second, the drug-war bureaucracy remains bloated, firmly entrenched, and extremely resistant to change. Apart from a few notable exceptions at ONDCP, the same officials continue to be the driving force behind U.S. drug policy, in some cases for decades. And over the years, the drug-policy bureaucracy has obtained a great deal of autonomy from the broader official policy-making community. Finally, because of these dynamics, high-level and committed leadership from the President is needed to begin to change the status quo. Yet the Obama administration is engaged in major debates on a range of salient issues that continue into its second term. Based on his comments following his reelection, the president’s political capital will more likely be spent on issues such as climate change and immigration reform.
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Youngers 3/5 (Coletta, leading expert on international drug control policy and drug policy related developments in Latin America for Washington Office on Latin America, U.S. Elections and the War on Drugs, 3/5/13, https://nacla.org/news/2013/3/5/us-elections-and-war-drugs)
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continuity has prevailed over change in U.S. drug-control policies, drug “warriors” on Capitol Hill continue to have the upper hand on drug-policy issues debated in the U.S. Congress , the drug-war bureaucracy remains extremely resistant to change the drug-policy bureaucracy has obtained a great deal of autonomy from the broader official policy-making community committed leadership from the President is needed to begin to change the status quo. the president’s political capital will more likely be spent on issues such as immigration reform.
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Political capital for drug trafficking and immigration reform trade-off
| 1,250 | 71 | 546 | 198 | 9 | 82 | 0.045455 | 0.414141 |
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6. Reschedule cannabis, or encourage the courts to “force” him to. There’s an optimist’s case that Obama’s ultimate goal is to significantly reform federal cannabis laws. The case is based more in personal narrative than in first-term policy: as a racial minority who enjoyed cannabis in his youth and could have very easily watched his career ruined by getting caught, Barack Obama is presumably sympathetic on a personal level to advocates who point out glaring racial disparities in the enforcement of cannabis laws, as well as to those who decry harsh penalties for a relatively harmless drug on principle. Perhaps, goes the theory, the “tough on crime” posturing of his first term was only a political ploy to ease his reelection, and now that he has won a second term, Obama will show his true stripes.
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Downs 12 (David, SFGate staff writer, What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis, 11/13/12, http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/)
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There’s an optimist’s case that Obama’s ultimate goal is to significantly reform federal cannabis laws.
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Re-negotiating cannabis laws requires political capital
| 808 | 55 | 103 | 136 | 6 | 15 | 0.044118 | 0.110294 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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This was to be the year of comprehensive immigration reform legislation. President Bush spent a good deal of his once-hefty "political capital” to advocate for a “guest worker” program. But so polarized are the views of state officials, legislators and advocacy groups representing all points on the political spectrum that Congress-watchers are expressing serious doubt that 2006 will see any meaningful progress toward such reform. Tom Barry, Policy Director for the International Relations Center (IRC), predicted flatly, “There will be no comprehensive reform proposal approved by the U.S. Congress during this session or any session in the near future because the immigration restrictionists have seized control of the debate.” What is likely, experts agree, is a battle royal between two critical GOP constituencies: the “law-and-order conservatives” and business interests that rely on immigrant labor. One camp wants to tighten borders and deport people who are here illegally; the other seeks to bring illegal workers out of the shadows and acknowledge their growing economic importance. The issue is complicated by the competing -- and sometimes counter-intuitive � demands of a wide range of groups and coalitions. Usually conservative business interests, particularly in the fields of agriculture, construction, and hospitality, want to open American borders to avail themselves of cheaper labor. Groups representing states on the U.S.-Mexican border propose adopting draconian measures � including construction of a �security fence� -- to stem the tide of illegal immigrants. Others are advocating legislation that would tighten U.S. border security but give some legal status to newcomers. Still others are focusing on providing �a path to citizenship� for the more than 10 million undocumented immigrants already in the U.S.
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Fisher 6 (William, journalist who writes about foreign affairs, human and civil rights, the Middle East and US politics, Give Us Your Huddled Masses - Or Not, http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0321-34.htm, 3/21/6)
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Bush spent a good deal of political capital” to advocate for a “guest worker” program. But so polarized are the views of state officials, legislators and advocacy groups representing all points on the political spectrum that Congress-watchers are expressing serious doubt that 2006 will see any meaningful progress toward such reform There will be no comprehensive reform during any session in the near future because the immigration restrictionists have seized control of the debate.” What is likely is a battle royal between two critical GOP constituencies: the “law-and-order conservatives” and business interests that rely on immigrant labor. One camp wants to tighten borders and deport people who are here illegally; the other seeks to bring illegal workers out of the shadows and acknowledge their growing economic importance. The issue is complicated by the competing demands of a wide range of groups and coalitions.
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Plan sparks a firestorm- destroys capital
| 1,839 | 41 | 925 | 274 | 6 | 143 | 0.021898 | 0.521898 |
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By no means was the Bracero Program unanimously accepted in the United States, even at its inception.42 The principal opponents of the program were the representatives of organized labor, the AFL-CIO, and later a number of "social reform-human rights organizations. "43 They argued that there was no shortage of domestic workers: "[T]here were ... many unemployed individuals who would gladly accept agricultural work if only decent wages and working conditions were offered."44 They worried that imported labor would undermine the wages, working conditions, and employment opportunities of domestic farm laborers. 45 With a ready and willing alternate labor force, employers could force American workers either to accept whatever they were offered or be replaced by Mexican workers. 46
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Bickerton 1 (Maria, Mara is a founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC and formerly practiced at Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. Maria has over 10 years of experience practicing employee benefits, ERISA, executive compensation, and tax law. Maris is recognized in The Best Lawyers in America® for employee benefit, Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, Lexis, March 2001)
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By no means was the Bracero Program unanimously accepted in the United States, even at its inception.42 The principal opponents of the program were the representatives of organized labor, the AFL-CIO, and later a number of "social reform-human rights organizations "[T]here were ... many unemployed individuals who would gladly accept agricultural work if only decent wages and working conditions were offered."44 They worried that imported labor would undermine the wages, working conditions, and employment opportunities of domestic farm laborers employers could force American workers either to accept whatever they were offered or be replaced by Mexican workers. 46
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Human rights and unions lobbies hate the plan
| 786 | 45 | 669 | 118 | 8 | 98 | 0.067797 | 0.830508 |
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Forge a continental plan for transportation and infrastructure. Led by each country's minister of transportation, the countries should build new trade corridors, improve railroads and ports, and construct a new highway that stretches from Canada to southern Mexico. Funding for the infrastructure could come from the common tariff, which should yield about $45 billion annually. These funds would be managed by a North American Investment Fund, which could be administered by the World Bank with decision-making in the hands of the three governments. Create a single North American working group on regulatory issues with a comprehensive strategy. Currently there are two separate bilateral working groups—U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico—that negotiate individual regulations, but they have failed to agree on a single one. A merged working group should aim for across-the-board regulatory convergence. This means that pharmaceuticals should be subject to uniform high standards and would not need to be retested in each country, that food imports should be tested just once by North American inspectors, and that regulations on the size, weight, and fuel efficiency of trucks should be the same in all three countries. Adapt immigration policies to a wider labor market. The United States and Canada should permit their citizens to work freely in either country. This step is not possible with Mexico until the income gap narrows, but other steps should be taken. NAFTA visas for professionals should be easier to obtain and extend longer for Mexicans. An expanded guest-worker program for Mexicans should be included in comprehensive immigration reform, and to prevent abuse, biometric identification should be required for hiring all employees. For the United States and Canada, negotiate a new energy framework. The framework should balance the region's need for energy security with the necessity of curbing carbon emissions. The two countries should also develop ways to reduce the multiple-approval process for hydroelectricity transfers and negotiate a plan for future oil and natural gas pipelines. Mexico should be invited to participate but will probably wait until it completes domestic energy reforms. Make antitrust policies continental. In a continental market, national efforts to break up corporate monopolies will be needlessly duplicative and, as in the case of the telecom monopoly in Mexico, ineffective. A concerted trinational effort would strengthen the capacity of each government to keep North America competitive. The Need for Leadership There is no better path to stimulate the U.S. economy, increase U.S. competitiveness, and bolster U.S. influence in emerging markets in Asia and Europe than by deepening integration with Canada and Mexico. The three countries already trade more than $1 trillion in goods and services each year. A small but vocal group in the United States opposes any further integration, but by and large the public supports freer trade in North America. Leadership is needed from President Barack Obama, the U.S. business community, and border states and communities. Mexico's new president has already expressed support for bolder initiatives to integrate the continent. Canada is more reluctant, but would not want to be left out if there was clear leadership from its neighbors. The place to start is the next North American Leaders Summit, which Mexico will host this year. The three leaders should articulate a clear vision and pledge to create a single continental market of mostly harmonized regulations in which nearly all products, produce, and services would transit borders without impediment.
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Pastor 3/28 (Robert, professor and founding director of the Center for North American Studies at American University, Shortcut to U.S. Economic Competitiveness: A Seamless North American Market, 3/28/13, http://www.cfr.org/competitiveness/shortcut-us-economic-competitiveness-seamless-north-american-market/p30132)
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the countries should build new trade corridors, improve railroads and ports, and construct a new highway that stretches from Canada to southern Mexico These funds would be managed by a North American Investment Fund The three countries already trade more than $1 trillion in goods and services each year. A small but vocal group in the United States opposes any further integration Leadership is needed from President Barack Obama
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The plan requires political capital
| 3,651 | 35 | 430 | 557 | 5 | 69 | 0.008977 | 0.123878 |
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It is unclear who in the Senate objected to the agreement’s passage, but sources say it was likely out of concern for the process by which it was being passed rather than the substance of the agreement. ¶ That may stem in part from lingering uncertainty over whether the agreement is a treaty, which would require a two-thirds majority for Senate ratification, or an executive agreement, which would require implementing legislation to be passed by a majority in both chambers. ¶ Regardless, its failure was a surprise to staff on the ENR Committee who had crafted a news release in preparation for its passage but had to delete it after the agreement was blocked. ¶ According to the report by Foreign Relations Republicans, the Obama administration has yet to say whether the agreement is a treaty or an executive agreement but appears to prefer the latter. Mexico’s Senate ratified the agreement, suggesting it was interpreted as a treaty. ¶ If it is a treaty, a formal communication would need to be sent from the president to the Foreign Relations Committee, which would trigger hearings on the matter and allow Congress to interpret any ambiguous language in the agreement. ¶ That is important, because several provisions in the treaty “invite scrutiny and clarification,” according to the committee report. ¶ “The treaty doesn’t have every detail worked out,” said Neil Brown, a former adviser to Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) who was ranking member of the committee until his retirement earlier this month. ¶ For example, one section of the agreement calls for “common standards,” but it is unclear whether that requires companies to adopt U.S. safety and environmental standards or Mexico’s, which are considered less developed. Another area of the agreement creates a dispute resolution process without saying whether the arbitration is binding, the report said. ¶ The agreement would allow joint inspections by Interior’s BSEE and the Mexican government to ensure compliance with applicable laws. ¶ Some on the Foreign Relations Committee said they were miffed that the administration did not consult with them before pushing the agreement through in the lame duck.
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Phil Taylor 13, E&E Reporter, 1/9/13, “E&E: U.S.-Mexico transboundary agreement mired in Congress,” http://www.bromwichgroup.com/2013/01/ee-offshore-drilling-u-s-mexico-transboundary-agreement-mired-in-congress/
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It is unclear who in the Senate objected to the agreement’s passage, but it was out of concern for the process by which it was being passed rather than the substance That may stem from lingering uncertainty over whether the agreement is a treaty or an executive agreement Obama has yet to say whether the agreement is a treaty or an executive agreement If it is a treaty a formal communication would need to be sent from the president which would trigger hearings That is important, because several provisions invite scrutiny and clarification,” according to the committee report The treaty doesn’t have every detail worked out the Foreign Relations Committee were miffed that the administration did not consult with them before pushing the agreement through in the lame duck
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The plan sparks backlash over the process of ratification, and requires Presidential involvement
| 2,173 | 97 | 775 | 352 | 13 | 129 | 0.036932 | 0.366477 |
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A nearly year-old agreement to allow the joint development of oil reservoirs straddling the U.S.-Mexico maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico stalled last month in the Senate, stranding a widely supported measure many argue would increase domestic energy security and improve the safety of offshore drilling. ¶ The agreement announced by government officials last February in Los Cabos, Mexico, creates a framework for U.S. offshore drilling companies and Mexico’s Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to jointly develop oil production in an area nearly the size of New Jersey that is outside both countries’ economic waters (Greenwire, Feb. 20, 2012). ¶ Resources in the area have been off limits to both countries under a treaty that runs through 2014. ¶ The Mexican Senate ratified the agreement last April, loosening a decades-long policy that forbids foreign oil companies from developing Mexican oil. ¶ But while the agreement is backed strongly by the U.S. Interior and State departments, major oil companies, and senators on both sides of the aisle, it failed to pass the chamber during the lame-duck session. ¶ Senators on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee on Dec. 18 sent out a “hotline” request to attach the agreement as an amendment to H.R. 670, a Northern Mariana Islands lands bill, in hopes of passing it by unanimous consent, but a Republican senator objected, according to Senate sources (E&ENews PM, Dec. 19, 2012). ¶ The impasse derailed, for now, an agreement that many think could improve bilateral relations and spur much-needed reforms in Mexico’s energy sector.
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Phil Taylor 13, E&E Reporter, 1/9/13, “E&E: U.S.-Mexico transboundary agreement mired in Congress,” http://www.bromwichgroup.com/2013/01/ee-offshore-drilling-u-s-mexico-transboundary-agreement-mired-in-congress/
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A agreement to allow joint development of oil reservoirs stalled in the Senate stranding a widely supported measure while the agreement is backed by the U.S. Interior and State departments oil companies, and senators on both sides of the aisle it failed to pass the chamber during the lame-duck session Senators on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee sent out a “hotline” request to attach the agreement as an amendment to a Northern Mariana Islands lands bill but a Republican senator objected The impasse derailed an agreement
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No turns---even a little opposition from Republicans is enough to gum up the works---outweighs broad support for the substance of the treaty
| 1,589 | 141 | 535 | 254 | 22 | 87 | 0.086614 | 0.34252 |
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Wicker said the administration has worked with members of his committee on implementing legislation that would require majority approval in both chambers. That process suggests it would be passed as an executive agreement, not a treaty.¶ But the Obama administration has yet to officially submit implementing legislation to the appropriate committee for passage through regular order, the Foreign Relations report said.
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Phil Taylor 13, E&E Reporter, 1/9/13, “E&E: U.S.-Mexico transboundary agreement mired in Congress,” http://www.bromwichgroup.com/2013/01/ee-offshore-drilling-u-s-mexico-transboundary-agreement-mired-in-congress/
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the administration has worked with members on implementing legislation That suggests it would be passed as an executive agreement, not a treaty But the Obama administration has yet to officially submit implementing legislation to the appropriate committee for passage through regular order
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The plan requires Obama’s involvement in pushing implementing legislation
| 419 | 74 | 289 | 61 | 9 | 42 | 0.147541 | 0.688525 |
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2013
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New Hampshire, U.S.A. -- Political heavyweights know this about their rough-and-tumble game – you project victory long before the results are in. And when you think you've won, you never give your opponent an opening. In Washington, it’s hard enough to craft legislation even in relatively amicable times. In the tense atmosphere on the Hill today, meaningful legislation takes a ringside seat, and the game becomes theater. That’s where we are now. In one corner is the House budget, essentially the Republican Party’s line in the sand that’s been drawn over the size of the federal government. A key component of this is the federal government’s more limited role in supporting a clean energy future. In the other corner is the White House and the Democrat-controlled Senate, which has vowed to stonewall any legislation that it says caters to the super-wealthy and the entrenched fossil fuels industry. Like two tired boxers in the ring, they’re content to leave it in the hands of the judges — in this case the voters, who will in many ways determine the force with which our federal government pursues a national policy built on clean energy. But the real prospects for any meaningful legislation is likely to come after the election, when the rhetoric cools and when political capital comes due. Until then, most industry observers don’t expect much chance of any real federal renewable energy legislation passing through a divided Congress. That means no Clean Energy Standard, no revival of the 1603 Treasury grant program, no extension of the Production Tax Credit until the end of the year at the earliest. There are just too few vehicles that can be used to pass any of the measures, and too little trust between key negotiators to find find common ground. One of the last best hopes — the transportation bill — included an amendment that addressed some of these concerns. Ultimately, the amendment went nowhere, and the renewable industry was left looking months down the road to when something could get resolved. The question now is will it be too late. For 1603 to be brought back to life, it would require a major shift in thinking, especially in the House. The PTC has a better shot, but international players in the wind industry are already indicating that they’ll get out of the market if the credit tied to energy produced expires. Will they wait around until the end of the year to see if it can be revived? It’s increasingly looking like the answer may be no.
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Leone 12 (Steve, Associate Editor of Renewable Energy World, "Part 2: Political Reality and the Way Forward for Renewable Energy," 4/3/12, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/04/part-2-political-reality-and-the-way-forward-for-renewable-energy)
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Political heavyweights know this about their rough-and-tumble game – you project victory long before the results are in. In the tense atmosphere on the Hill today, meaningful legislation takes a ringside seat, and the game becomes theater. In one corner is the House budget, essentially the Republican Party’s line in the sand that’s been drawn over the size of the federal government. A key component of this is the federal government’s more limited role in supporting a clean energy future. In the other corner is the White House and the Democrat-controlled Senate, which has vowed to stonewall any legislation that caters to the super-wealthy and the entrenched fossil fuels industry. the real prospects for any meaningful legislation is likely to come after the election, when the rhetoric cools and when political capital comes due. There are too few vehicles that can be used to pass any of the measures, and too little trust between key negotiators to find find common ground. transportation amendment went nowhere, and the renewable industry was left looking months down the road to when something could get resolved. The question now is will it be too late. it would require a major shift in thinking, especially in the House. Will they wait around until the end of the year to see if it can be revived? It’s increasingly looking like the answer may be no.
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Renewable energy investment causes backlash
| 2,482 | 43 | 1,365 | 424 | 5 | 229 | 0.011792 | 0.540094 |
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2013
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Whether or not you voted for President Obama, the clean energy-loving part of you must be feeling hopeful that POTUS will deliver in his second term what we would have liked to have seen more of during the first — strong leadership driving forward the clean energy economy. Though I still have a bit of a hope hangover from November, 2008, I have reason to believe Obama 2.0 will put solar on the White House and leverage the power of the EPA and the Department of Energy to arrest coal-fired power production and ramp up renewables. Obama, like any politician, will do what the public demands. With public support for renewables at unprecedented levels and the memory of Hurricane Sandy and drought-stricken corn fields fresh in people’s minds, clean energy could jump to the top of Obama’s and Congress’ agenda. But only if we mobilize. And when I say “we”, I mean all of us–environmental activists with their arm bands and twitter feeds, Occupiers with sleeping bags and cell phones, homeowners with caulk guns and solar panels, commuters with EVs and bikes, students with campuses crying out for solar power, social entrepreneurs with double lattes and ramen noodles, and Mosaic investors with bank accounts. We all have a role to play in demonstrating our personal commitment to reducing our carbon footprint and demanding government policies that help others do the same. As Obama said last night, “The role of citizen does not end with your vote.” Take that as invitation to hold his feet to the fire. The climate clock hits midnight not long after Obama leaves office. It’s now or never, and I’m throwing cautious optimism to the wind and jumping on the reckless hope roller coaster. Because not hoping means not trying, and try we must if we expect Obama to spend his political capital on clean energy.
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Etelson 12 (Erica, Relationship Marketing Specialist at Solar Mosaic, OBAMA 2.0: DELIVERING CLEAN ENERGY PROMISES?, 11/8/12, http://www.solarfeeds.com/obama-2-0-delivering-clean-energy-promises/)
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the clean energy-loving part of you must be feeling hopeful that POTUS will deliver strong leadership driving forward the clean energy economy. With public support for renewables at unprecedented levels clean energy could jump to the top of Obama’s and Congress’ agenda As Obama said last night, “The role of citizen does not end with your vote.” Take that as invitation to hold his feet to the fire. The climate clock hits midnight not long after Obama leaves office try we must if we expect Obama to spend his political capital on clean energy.
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Clean energy investment costs capital
| 1,811 | 37 | 546 | 310 | 5 | 94 | 0.016129 | 0.303226 |
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2013
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1,881 |
While the United States is currently negotiating the trade agreement that covers relationships with eight other countries—Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam—the Obama Administration has repeatedly expressed its goal of building "an agreement that expands out progressively to include countries across the Asia-Pacific region." UAW has serious concerns regarding the premature expansion of the TPP negotiations to include Japan, Mexico, Canada, or any other nation, before our negotiators first demonstrate an ability to formulate and successfully negotiate a "transformative agreement for the 21st Century," that will produce genuine benefits for American workers and increase domestic production. The primary goal must be to maximize employment opportunity for workers, not simply to maximize profits for multinational corporations looking to further globalize their supply chains.
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UAW 12 (United Automobiles, Aerospace & Agricultural Workers of America, “Japan's Expression of Interest in the Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Trade Agreement”, January 13th, 2012)
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the United States is currently negotiating the trade agreement that covers relationships with eight countries UAW has serious concerns regarding the expansion of the TPP negotiations to include Mexico before our negotiators demonstrate an ability to formulate and successfully negotiate a "transformative agreement for the 21st Century," that will produce genuine benefits for American workers and increase domestic production The primary goal must be to maximize employment opportunity for workers, not simply to maximize profits for multinational corporations looking to further globalize their supply chains.
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Unions oppose expanding trade with Mexico
| 936 | 41 | 611 | 127 | 6 | 85 | 0.047244 | 0.669291 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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The president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, offered humanitarian asylum to Edward Snowden, former contractor at the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) who leaked classified information about mass surveillance programs in the United States and the Great Britain. Snowden, charged with espionage and property theft by the United States government, is currently on Russian territory, where he is attempting to avoid extradition to American soil. Maduro's offer comes at a complicated diplomatic moment: UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) demanded an apology from Europe due to the incident suffered by Evo Morales, during which various countries closed their airspace to the Bolivian leader based on suspicions that he was transporting Snowden. In events leading up to the military parade that celebrated 202 years since the signing of the Venezuelan declaration of independence on Friday, July 5, President Maduro stated [es] that, “As leader of the State and Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, I have decided to offer humanitarian asylum to the American young man, Snowden.” Maduro explained that Venezuela is offering the measure to Snowden to “protect him from the persecution that has been unleashed from the most powerful empire in the world against a young man who has told the truth”. A day later, the Venezuelan president confirmed his intention via Twitter (@NicolasMaduro) [es]: @NicolasMaduro: Ratifico el espíritu humanitario de conceder el asilo al joven estadounidense Snowden para protegerlo de la persecución mundial del imperio. @NicolasMaduro: I confirm the humanitarian spirit of granting asylum to Snowden, the young American, to protect him from the empire's global persecution. President Maduro had mentioned the possibility of welcoming Snowden on various occasions, but this is the first time he has done it openly and directly. Despite the controversy, the United States government declined to make comments regarding the Venezuelan president's offer. According to Reuters [es], the White house has not released an opinion on the issue and referred questions to the country's Department of Justice. Nevertheless, on Sunday, July 7, a group of U.S. Congress members established their position on Snowden's possible political asylum, stating that: “Whatever country offers asylum to Edward Snowden, who leaked data from the National Security Agency's (NSA) surveillance program, will set itself against the United States.” The announcement [es] appears to be a direct response to statements made by Venezuela and Bolivia to grant the humanitarian measure to the former U.S. contractor.
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Aglaia Berlutti, 7-09-2013, witch by birth (no srsly doe), writer for the website Spanish Global Voices, “Venezuela's President Offers Asylum to Edward Snowden,” http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/07/09/venezuelas-president-offers-asylum-to-edward-snowden-and-controversy-erupts/
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Maduro offered asylum to Snowden who leaked classified information about mass surveillance programs in the U S Maduro's offer comes at a complicated diplomatic moment Maduro is offering the measure to “protect him from the persecution that has been unleashed from the most powerful empire in the world against a young man who has told the truth”. a group of U.S. Congress members established their position on Snowden's possible political asylum, stating that: “Whatever country offers asylum to Snowden will set itself against the U S The announcement appears a direct response to statements made by Venezuela to grant the humanitarian measure to the former U.S. contractor.
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Congress hates Venezuela – Snowden scandal.
| 2,630 | 43 | 675 | 396 | 6 | 107 | 0.015152 | 0.270202 |
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Some observers have criticized the Obama Administration for making overtures to engage with Maduro, contending that U.S. policy should focus on attempting to ensure that the upcoming election is free and fair. A Washington Post editorial from early March 2013 contended that “further wooing of Mr. Maduro should wait until he survives the scrum in his own party, wins a free vote and demonstrates that he is more than a Castro puppet.”19 While it is likely that any improvement in relations will remain on hold during the election process, some analysts maintain that it is important for U.S. policymakers to remember that taking sides in Venezuela’s internal politics can be counter-productive. According to Cynthia Arnson of the Woodrow Wilson Center: “Supporting broad principles such as internal dialogue to overcome polarization for the rule of law is not the same as promoting a particular political outcome, an approach that is destined to only backfire.”20 Other analysts maintain that it is important for U.S. policymakers to recognize the level of popular support in Venezuela for President Chávez. While there was considerable controversy over past elections in which Chávez’s campaign unfairly utilized state resources and broadcast media, the margins of his electoral victories in four elections over the years left no doubt that he had won those elections. His death, at least in the short to medium term, could deepen popular support for the PSUV. In the aftermath of the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be restoring ambassadors in order to augment engagement on critical bilateral issues, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and democracy concerns, but on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters. With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential election, the 113th Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight on the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran.
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Sullivan 4-9 (Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations”, April 9th, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf)
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observers have criticized the Obama Administration for making overtures to engage with Maduro, further wooing of Mr. Maduro should wait until he survives the scrum in his own party, wins a free vote and demonstrates that he is more than a Castro puppet any improvement in relations will remain on hold during the election process there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan relations to get back on track With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential election, the 113th Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight on the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as drug trafficking and terrorism concerns,
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Maduro is seen as a Castro puppet- sparks backlash
| 2,119 | 50 | 640 | 331 | 9 | 104 | 0.02719 | 0.314199 |
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While the United States sent a representative, Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY), the Obama administration itself offered no condolences. “At this challenging time of President Hugo Chavez’s passing, the United States reaffirms its support for the Venezuelan people and its interest in developing a constructive relationship with the Venezuelan government,” said a statement released by the White House. “As Venezuela begins a new chapter in its history, the United States remains committed to policies that promote democratic principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.” Criticized by many Chavez supporters for its unsympathetic and, some claim, contemptible tone, the White House statement and the reactions it has elicited are representative of the divide between the United States and Venezuela which emerged during Chavez’s presidency. The influence and standing of the United States in Latin America has decreased in recent years as domestic inequality and political polarization in America rise. There seem but few signs that Chavez’s death will spark a shift in U.S.-Venezuelan relations. As Venezuela enters into the post-Chavez era with a struggling economy, high inflation, and some of the worst crime rates in the world, why do both countries continue to demonize one another?
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Schultz 13 – The International (Kylie, 03/17, “The Rocky U.S.-Venezuela Relationship: What Both Countries Could Learn,” http://www.theinternational.org/articles/370-the-rocky-us-venezuela-relationship-wh)
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the Obama administration itself offered no condolences. the White House statement and the reactions it has elicited are representative of the divide between the United States and Venezuela which emerged during Chavez’s presidency. The influence and standing of the United States in Latin America has decreased in recent years as domestic inequality and political polarization in America rise. There seem but few signs that Chavez’s death will spark a shift in U.S.-Venezuelan relations.
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Political polarization over Venezuela is increasing despite Chavez’s death
| 1,296 | 74 | 486 | 197 | 9 | 73 | 0.045685 | 0.370558 |
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Finally, there is a fourth point that should appeal to Chávez's harshest critics. A bilateral meeting would be the most significant thing a US President could do to temper his power. Chávez, like his friend Fidel Castro before him, benefits from the specter of a hostile US. Rhetoric about US imperialism and interventionism appeals to Venezuelans' pride in their sovereignty, and unifies Chávez's base against a perceived enemy; it also distracts them from real problems in their country and political process. The Bush Administration's disgraceful complicity with the plot to overthrow Chávez's democratic government in 2002, and its subsequent funneling of money and political support to an isolated, fragmented opposition in Venezuela played right into Chávez's hands. If Obama demonstrated that the US government is not Venezuela's enemy, he would accomplish far more than the millions of dollars the Bush Administration has invested in destabilizing Venezuela's government. Venezuela, like all democracies, benefits from free and open public debate but the political process is derailed, civil society distracted by the threat—real or exaggerated—of US intervention. Obama has the political capital and the credibility to singlehandedly restore the world's faith in the goodwill of the US; Venezuela is a perfect place to start. To be sure, an Obama offer to meet with Chávez, a twice-elected president widely portrayed in the US as undemocratic and anti-American, carries certain risks and the right-wing is bound to attack Obama for his efforts. But one of Obama's gifts as a politician is taking the high road, even in the face of counterparts who refuse to do the same; here, too, whether with Chávez's fiery rhetoric or the right-wing media's assault, he would surely come out on top. Moreover Chávez has already indicated a desire to work with Obama, issuing a congratulatory press release after the election, extraditing two Colombian drug traffickers to the US days later, and now continuing a generous charity program even as Venezuela suffers from the global economic slowdown. All are signs reminiscent of the Chávez of Mets games and stock market gavels: he wants to play ball. Conservatives may see Obama offering to meet with Chávez as a sign of weakness but it should be perceived as a sign of confidence and strength just as when President Nixon visited China in 1972, or when President Reagan met with Gorbachev in 1985 in the midst of the Cold War. In fact, numerous American politicians from both parties have met with Chávez over the years, often with tangible results; the Citgo charity program that last week Chávez announced he would continue, for example, emerged from meetings with Representative Delahunt (D-MA) and other congressmen.
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Boudin 9 (Chesa, Rhodes Scholar with degrees from Yale and Oxford Universities. Currently attending Yale Law School, he is coauthor of The Venezuelan Revolution: 100 Questions—100 Answers and coeditor of Letters from Young Activists, Why Obama Should Meet With Hugo Chavez, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuela-archives-35/1671-why-obama-should-meet-with-hugo-chavez, 1/18/9)
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a fourth point that should appeal to Chávez's harshest critics. A bilateral meeting would be the most significant thing a US President could do to temper his power. Chávez benefits from the specter of a hostile US. Rhetoric If Obama demonstrated that the US government is not Venezuela's enemy Obama has the political capital and the credibility to singlehandedly restore the world's faith in the goodwill of the US an Obama offer to meet with Chávez, a twice-elected president widely portrayed in the US as undemocratic and anti-American, carries certain risks and the right-wing is bound to attack Obama for his efforts whether with Chávez's fiery rhetoric or the right-wing media's assault Conservatives may see Obama offering to meet with Chávez as a sign of weakness
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Venezuelan diplomatic engagement costs capital
| 2,766 | 46 | 771 | 439 | 5 | 126 | 0.01139 | 0.287016 |
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Nonetheless, the White House has remained consistent when it comes to Venezuela, stating publicly that it does not consider Chávez’s regime a threat to vital U.S. national security interests and identifying bilateral cooperation on issues of mutual interest as the goal of current policy. The Republican establishment has identified the lack of engagement with Latin America as a weak spot in Obama’s foreign policy record, in particular criticizing the president for allowing Chávez, an outspoken opponent of American interests, to strengthen his foothold in the region at the expense of the United States. Conservative think tanks repeatedly point to Chávez’s anti-American worldview, Venezuela’s alliances with Iran, Syria and Cuba, and the provision of safe havens for documented terrorist organizations, such as Colombia’s FARC guerrillas, as examples of the grave security risks associated with the status quo. There is some merit to both sides’ views. The Obama administration’s stated policy of working with Venezuela on pragmatic issues, such as counternarcotics and trade, has been viable in the short term. But GOP leaders are right to note that deeper involvement is needed to address the legitimate security risks and democratic challenges posed by the current government’s policies. In fact, it will take an approach based on elements of both these arguments to bolster U.S. influence in South America’s largest oil-producing country.
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Dane Bryant, 9-28-2012, management consultant and freelance writer with an interest in geopolitical strategy, writer for World Politics Review, “Chávez or Not, It's Time to Rethink the U.S.-Venezuela Relationship,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12380/chavez-or-not-its-time-to-rethink-the-u-s-venezuela-relationship
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the White House has remained consistent when it comes to Venezuela, stating that it does not consider a threat to U.S. national security and identifying bilateral cooperation as the goal The Republican establishment has identified a weak spot criticizing the president Conservative think tanks repeatedly point to anti-American worldview, Venezuela’s alliances with Iran, Syria and Cuba, and provision of safe havens for documented terrorist organizations, such as FARC as examples of the grave security risks Obama ’s policy of working with Venezuela on pragmatic issues has been viable in the short term. But GOP leaders note that involvement is needed to address security risks and democratic challenges posed by the current government’s policies.
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Republicans don’t like the plan – they see Venezuela as a security threat.
| 1,448 | 74 | 750 | 219 | 13 | 113 | 0.059361 | 0.515982 |
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But if certain members of Congress think they can drive a wedge among the countries of the region, they are mistaken. Latin American countries have been expanding their ties with one another — including a recent rapprochement between Venezuela and Colombia — and there is a deepening consensus that their differences should be worked out in an atmosphere of mutual respect. (The inaugural co-chairs of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, a regional organization set to be founded in 2011, are Chile and Venezuela, two countries that don’t see eye to eye on everything, but are willing to cooperate.) For instance, even though the United States opposed Cuba’s entry to the Organization of American States, the group last year approved its readmittance. If Washington, instead of accepting this new reality, relies on antagonistic foreign-policy dogma to placate local constituencies, it will only lose in regional and global influence. Now is an especially inopportune time for the United States to alienate its southern neighbors. Latin American countries are gaining in confidence and increasing their political and economic connections with the rest of the world, both regionally through organizations like UNASUR and bilaterally with countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. It’s not just Latin America that needs the United States anymore; increasingly, the United States needs Latin America. Unfortunately, Ros-Lehtinen and Mack are hard-line ideologues. Given that she once called for Fidel Castro’s assassination, it’s no surprise that Ros-Lehtinen is an anti-Cuba hawk. But she has in recent years also become more aggressive toward Venezuela. This year, for example, she made unsubstantiated accusations against Venezuela for serving as a conduit between the rebel group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and al Qaeda. In a March 11 interview with the Council of the Americas, Gen. Douglas Fraser, chief of U.S. Southern Command, debunked those claims in no uncertain terms: “I don’t see any evidence of terrorist activity within Latin America or the Caribbean from outside of the region.” Even more disturbing was Ros-Lehtinen’s meeting with Venezuelan terrorist Raúl Díaz in Miami several months ago. Díaz had just arrived in the United States after escaping prison in Venezuela, where he was serving a sentence for participating in the 2003 bombings of the Spanish and Colombian consulates in Caracas. It is troubling that Ros-Lehtinen would think it appropriate to use the powers of her office to extend legitimacy to a violent criminal simply because he opposes Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. (Venezuela has yet to receive any answers on how Díaz could have been granted a visa to enter the United States in the first place.) Ros-Lehtinen has also remained conspicuously quiet on Luis Posada Carriles, a Venezuelan-Cuban dual national wanted in Venezuela for the 1973 bombing of a Cuban civilian airliner that left 73 innocent people dead. Posada snuck into the United States in 2005 after years of clandestine operations in Central America and Cuba, many for the CIA. He now lives in South Florida awaiting the start of a postponed trial on immigration-related charges. Venezuela’s repeated requests for extradition have remained unanswered. But in terms of anti-Venezuelan enmity, Ros-Lehtinen is outdone by Mack, who, though newer to the House, has quickly established himself as the Republicans’ go-to hard liner on Chávez. He has called Chávez a “sworn enemy of the United States” and more recently called on Obama to deal with the “inherent threat that Chávez poses to our nation and the region.” More shockingly, though, Mack has twice introduced resolutions to have Venezuela added to the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, a move supported by Ros-Lehtinen. Just recently, I received letters from a number of the 37 right-wing congressmen supporting Mack’s most recent attempt. Seeing as most have never shown any interest in Venezuela, it is clear that extremists within the Republican caucus have made my country a political priority. If Venezuela does indeed end up on the terrorism list, it would amount to the imposition of a Cuba-like embargo on the country. Commerce and oil would be disrupted, and even cursory financial and economic transactions would be made prohibitively expensive. It would also put the large U.S.-Venezuelan commercial relationship — the countries’ trade with one another from January through September of this year totaled nearly $31 billion — in jeopardy. And it would serve as more evidence that some policymakers in Washington use the “terrorist” label as a cudgel against their political foes. It should come as no surprise that a 2008 report prepared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adamantly warned against manipulating the terrorism list in that way, stating that “policymakers must be wary of the implications of poorly thought-out sanctions which might isolate the United States.” Ros-Lehtinen and Mack are not alone in advocating for a Cold War-era stance toward Latin America. In fact, they’re being educated and enabled by a chorus of similarly hard-line former Bush administration officials. Chief among them are Otto Reich and Roger Noriega, both of whom served as assistant secretaries of state for Western Hemisphere affairs under Bush. Reich has a long track record of using the battle over Cuba to determine U.S. policy toward the entire region, while Noriega honed his skills as a foreign-policy aide to late Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and currently works at the right-wing American Enterprise Institute. Most recently — on this very website — Noriega has been claiming that Venezuela is working with Iran on a nuclear-weapons program, a claim so outlandish that the only prominent public figures who repeated it were John Bolton (another hard-line Bush administration official) in an op-ed in the Los Angeles Times and Jackson Diehl, the deputy editor of the Washington Post‘s editorial pages and a crusader against anything that has to do with Chávez. (Recently released cables from U.S. embassies in Latin America admit that these charges are “likely baseless,” as a Post article put it.) In a recent op-ed, Noriega also called Chávez the “deadly kingpin of a criminal regime.” It might be easy to call Noriega and Reich out-of-touch extremists, but their views now hold greater sway on Capitol Hill and at many Washington think tanks. For example, a Nov. 17 conference in Washington, organized by the Interamerican Institute for Democracy and called “Danger in the Andes,” was a forum for outlandish views to be exchanged by ostensibly serious policy analysts. The guests of honor at the conference? Ros-Lehtinen and Mack, of course. Now that the Republicans are no longer marginalized in Congress, dogma threatens to totally trump the greater U.S. national interest. That would be terrible for Americans, and their neighbors to the south. The remaining pragmatists in Washington should do everything in their power to prevent it.
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Bernardo Álvarez Herrera, 12-07-2010, Venezuelan ambassador to the United States, degree in political science from the Universidad Central de Venezuela, master’s degree in development studies from the University of Sussex in England, “The Tea Party’s Vendetta,” http://venezuela-us.org/2010/12/08/the-tea-partys-vendetta/
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certain members of Congress think they can drive a wedge among the countries of the region Ros-Lehtinen and Mack are hard-line ideologues. Ros-Lehtinen has become more aggressive toward Venezuela. Mack has quickly established himself as the Republicans’ go-to hard liner Mack has twice introduced resolutions to have Venezuela added to the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism Ros-Lehtinen and Mack are not alone in advocating for a Cold War-era stance toward Latin America. they’re being educated and enabled by hard-line former Bush administration officials. Chief among them are Otto Reich and Roger Noriega Noriega has been claiming that Venezuela is working with Iran on a nuclear-weapons program Noriega and Reich hold great sway on Capitol Hill Republicans are no longer marginalized in Congress, dogma threatens to totally trump the greater U.S. national interest. That would be terrible for Americans, and their neighbors to the south.
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Engagement stops isolation- kills support
| 7,089 | 41 | 967 | 1,119 | 5 | 148 | 0.004468 | 0.132261 |
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Texas wildcatters and Iran hawks in the U.S. Congress are helping Venezuela get out of the U.S. oil market, one of the most cherished dreams of its late President Hugo Chavez. While there is a certain irony to the fact that these two groups of people, most of whom it is safe to say are not friendly to Chavez's left-wing ideals, it underscores the true nature of the shifts in the U.S. oil market due to the shale revolution. Ignoring the impact of an anti-government strike that shut down the Venezuelan oil industry in early 2003, U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude fell to a more than 20-year low in February as American refineries only bought the heaviest, most difficult to process Venezuelan oil, forgoing lighter grades. A superabundance of light and very light crude oil has forced the complex refineries of the U.S. Gulf Coast to scour the globe for heavy crude to keep their cokers running. Thus imports of heavy Kuwaiti oil have risen sharply even as armchair policy theorists predict "energy independence" will end U.S. purchases of Middle Eastern crude.
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Robert Campbell, 3-07-2013, a Reuters Oil Market Analyst and Columnist, education @ McMaster University and McGill University, “COLUMN-Shale, Iran sanctions push Venezuelan oil to Asia: Campbell,” http://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/column-shale-iran-sanctions-push-venezuelan-oil-asia-152812475.html
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Texas wildcatters and Iran hawks in Congress are helping Venezuela get out of the U.S. oil market these two groups of people are not friendly to Chavez's left-wing ideals underscores the true nature of shifts in the U.S. oil market due to the shale revolution. U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude fell to a more than 20-year low policy theorists predict "energy independence" will end U.S. purchases of Middle Eastern crude.
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House Republicans support current efforts to push Venezuela out of oil markets – the plan reverses this trend.
| 1,065 | 110 | 421 | 182 | 18 | 70 | 0.098901 | 0.384615 |
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Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chávez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric. But Mr. Maduro's pragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels privately, say experts and observers. "It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chávez, who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector. Another stumbling block to improved relations could be U.S. allegations of high-level involvement by the Chávez government in drug trafficking. The U.S. has put seven top current and former Venezuelan officials on a Treasury blacklist for their alleged drug and arms dealing links to Colombian guerrillas based in Venezuela. Those links were exposed in 2008 after the Colombian military captured computers used by a guerrilla leader killed on a cross border raid in Ecuador.
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Jose de Córdoba1 and Sara Muñoz2, 1-11-2013, Latin American Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts, School of Journalism @ Columbia University, NY, reporter at the Wall Street Journal1, reporter at the Wall Street Journal, no I refuse to make a Linkedin account to find this person’s quals, sorry2, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html
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Both sides remain deeply suspicious Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with Venezuela drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." U.S. investment over the oil sector. A stumbling block to improved relations could be U.S. allegations of high-level involvement in drug trafficking. links were exposed in 2008 after the Colombian military captured computers used by a guerrilla leader killed on a cross border raid in Ecuador.
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Investment in Venezuelan oil is unpopular in Congress – GOP mistrust.
| 1,775 | 69 | 562 | 283 | 11 | 87 | 0.038869 | 0.30742 |
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The US government has been increasing aggressive actions against the Chavez administration in an attempt to isolate the major petroleum producing nation and aid in ousting the Venezuelan President. During a hearing last Friday, June 24, in the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives regarding “Sanctionable Activities in Venezuela”, democrats and republicans requested the Obama administration take more aggressive actions against the government of Hugo Chavez. The head of the Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs for the Western Hemisphere, Connie Mack, a Florida Republican, branded the Venezuelan government “terrorist”, saying “it’s time to act to contain the dangerous influence of Hugo Chavez and his relations with Iran”. Mack is known for his rabid anti-Chavez stance. But however “obsessed” he may seem with the Venezuelan President, the republican congressman does have influence in the legislature due to his high ranking in the Foreign Relations Committee. His efforts, along with those of the head of the Foreign Relations Committee, Florida republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, convinced the White House to impose sanctions against Venezuela’s state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) last May 24. Mack has said that his only objective this year is “get Hugo Chavez”.
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Eva Golinger, 7-04-2011, writer for Geopolitical Weekly, “ANALYSIS: US to Act Against Venezuela?” http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/analysis-us-to-act-against-venezuela-4405/
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The government has been increasing aggressive actions an attempt to isolate the major petroleum producing nation ”, democrats and republicans requested Obama take more aggressive actions Mack branded the Venezuelan government “terrorist”, saying “it’s time to act to contain the dangerous influence and relations with Iran”. Mack does have influence in the legislature due to his high ranking in the Foreign Relations Committee. Florida republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, convinced the White House to impose sanctions against Venezuela’s state oil company P d V SA
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The plan attracts backlash from both Democrats and Republicans – Congress empirically pushes for isolation of Venezuelan oil, not engagement.
| 1,306 | 142 | 561 | 195 | 20 | 83 | 0.102564 | 0.425641 |
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In a House floor speech on Feb. 9, 2011, Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, took aim at American aid to foreign countries. Poe has introduced a bill to require separate votes on aiding specific countries, thus ending the practice of bundling foreign aid into a single bill. "Maybe it’s time to reconsider our foreign aid that we send to countries throughout the world," Poe said in the floor speech, which has attracted attention in conservative circles on the Internet. "There are about 192 foreign countries in the world, … and we give foreign aid to over 150 of them." Poe proceeded to name some examples of countries where many Americans might be uncomfortable sending taxpayer money, including Egypt, Pakistan, Russia and China. But two of the nation’s in Poe’s speech caught our eye -- Venezuela and Cuba. Critics of Venezuela’s leader, Hugo Chavez, call him a dictator. Meanwhile, Cuba has been a communist country for decades, led by Fidel Castro and now his brother Raul. In its widely followed rankings, the group Freedom House rates Venezuela toward the bottom of the nations it classifies as "partly free," while Cuba sits at the lower end of its "not free" scale. And both nations have strained relations with the United States. So Poe suggested these as two examples of what’s wrong with U.S. foreign aid. "We give money to Venezuela. Why do we give money to Chavez and Venezuela? He hates the United States. He defies our president, makes fun of our nation. We don’t need to give him any foreign aid. We give $20 million to Cuba. Why do we give money to Cuba? Americans can’t even go to Cuba. It’s off-limits. It’s a communist country. But we’re dumping money over there." We looked at budget documents for foreign aid and talked to experts in the field, and here’s what we found. Poe is correct that U.S. foreign aid flows into both countries. In fiscal year 2010, the Venezuela account showed $6 million, while the Cuba account showed $20 million. For fiscal year 2012, the administration has requested a little less for Venezuela -- $5 million -- and the same $20 million amount for Cuba. To give a sense of context, the 2010 funds allocated for Venezuela amounted to less than 1/100th of 1 percent of the total U.S. foreign-aid budget, and the figure for Cuba was about 4/100 of 1 percent of the U.S. foreign aid budget. The percentage of the entire federal budget is even more minuscule. Still, even if the amount is small, taxpayer money is taxpayer money, so Poe has a point. However, Poe also said in plain language that "we give money to Chavez." And while he didn’t say it in as explicit a fashion, Poe implied that the U.S. sends aid to the Cuban regime. This is where it gets more complicated. The funding for both nations comes from the Economic Support Fund, which, according to the State Department, "supports U.S. foreign policy objectives by providing economic assistance to allies and countries in transition to democracy. Programs funded through this account promote stability and U.S. security interests in strategic regions of the world." Let’s take Cuba first. A spokesman for the U.S. Agency for International Development confirmed that no U.S. aid goes to the Cuban government. In an explanation of its proposed budget, the administration writes that "Cuba is the only non-democratically elected government in the Western Hemisphere and one of the most politically repressed countries in the world. In view of these challenges, U.S. assistance for Cuba aims to empower Cuban civil society to advocate for greater democratic freedoms and respect for human dignity." The $20 million designated for Cuba "focuses on strengthening independent Cuban civil society organizations, including associations and labor groups. … To advance the cause of human rights in Cuba, U.S. assistance provides humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families … The United States supports nascent pro-democracy groups, the use of technology, and new information-sharing opportunities." A 2006 review by the Government Accountability Office noted that the aid is such a threat to the regime that it has to be kept under tight wraps on the island. "Given the Cuban government’s repressive policies and opposition to U.S. democracy assistance, grantees employed a range of discreet delivery methods," GAO reported. In other words, the money being sent to Cuba is designed to foster democracy in what is currently an undemocratic country -- not to support the government. Poe’s failure to note that distinction as he attacks aid to "Cuba" strikes us as misleading. Now let’s look at Venezuela. In its $5 million budget request for 2012, the administration said it wants to "strengthen and support a Venezuelan civil society that will protect Democratic space and seek to serve the interests and needs of the Venezuelan people. Funding will enhance citizens’ access to objective information, facilitate peaceful debate on key issues, provide support to democratic institutions and processes, promote citizen participation and encourage democratic leadership." Another administration document says aid helps "strengthen the capacity of non-governmental organizations to monitor and report on government performance" -- in other words, to be a watchdog of the government, not a supporter. The U.S. AID spokesman confirmed that no money goes to the Venezuelan government. So far, this sounds a lot like the situation with aid to Cuba. But there’s a difference. The same administration document goes on to say that this civil-society funding "will involve both government and opposition supporters and will be open to all regardless of political perspectives," providing some support for Poe’s statement. Still, most observers see the State Department’s openness to funding representatives of Chavez’s government as more of a diplomatic nicety, since foreign efforts to bolster democracy in a country with democratic shortcomings are typically framed with great rhetorical care. Indeed, there are strong signals that Chavez himself has no use for U.S. funding. A 2010 study by FRIDE and the World Movement for Democracy, a pair of non-governmental organizations, noted that members of a local group called Súmate who had received U.S. aid for a project on electoral observance "were accused of conspiracy and betrayal. The trial against them, which was initiated in 2003, is still pending." In a 2006 article based on Freedom of Information Act requests, the Associated Press reported that Chavez accused his opponents of taking "gringo money" to undermine his regime. So, while it’s possible that some U.S. aid has flowed to allies of Chavez, the bulk of U.S. aid goes to independent groups whose existence is more likely to undermine his authority than strengthen it. Where does this leave us? The one claim for which Poe may have a point is that some U.S. aid could make its way to supporters of Chavez (though not the government per se), given how the U.S. wrote the ground rules. However, Chavez has made his opposition to U.S. aid clear, and has even gone so far as to prosecute some opponents who have taken it. Meanwhile, the aid sent to Cuba is certainly not going into the government’s coffers, and it, like the Venezuela aid, is considered far likelier to undercut the government than support it.
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PolitiFact 11 (“The U.S. gives foreign aid to Cuba and Venezuela, even though those countries are our enemies”, February 9th, 2011, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/mar/23/ted-poe/ted-poe-decries-us-aid-venezuela-cuba/)
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Poe took aim at American aid to foreign countries. Americans might be uncomfortable sending taxpayer money in Venezuela In its widely followed rankings, the group Freedom House rates Venezuela toward the bottom of the nations it classifies as "partly free Poe suggested these as examples of what’s wrong with U.S. foreign aid. Why do we give money to Venezuela? We don’t need to give him any foreign aid In its $5 million budget request administration said it wants to "strengthen and support a Venezuelan civil society U.S. aid could make its way to supporters of Chavez
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Congress opposes aid to Venezuela – seen as supporting Chavez’s governemnt
| 7,319 | 74 | 571 | 1,198 | 11 | 96 | 0.009182 | 0.080134 |
Politics Links Core - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,892 |
The current political relationship decreases bilateral trade because Chávez seeks to build counter-balancing relations with US rivals and only has oil to attract them. The relationship with China in particular is important because the Chinese are also willing to provide tens of billions of dollars in credit to the Chávez government to spend as it sees fit, with Venezuelan oil in payment. In addition, Chávez diverts a small quantity of oil to subsidized sales to the Caribbean and Central America to gain allies. These diversions for political reasons result in a lower quantity available for market driven purchases, as are those of the US. The US Congress does have a small group of anti-Chavista legislators who demand that the US embargo Venezuelan oil, and emphasize the undemocratic nature of the Chávez government and its Chinese, Russian and Iranian ties as threats to US national security. A few think tanks (e.g., the Inter-American Security Watch) and interest groups are promoting these views. But so far they do not have a large following in the Legislative and the Executive branches, where a lower profile in opposing Chávez is perceived to be more effective, or at least less damaging to overall US interests.
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Mares 12 (David R. Mares - Institute of the Americas Chair for InterAmerican Affairs, University of California, San Diego, “The United States-Venezuela Relationship”, January 19-20, 2012)
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The current political relationship decreases bilateral trade The US Congress does have a group of anti-Chavista legislators who demand that the US embargo Venezuelan oil, and emphasize the undemocratic nature of the government and its Chinese, Russian and Iranian ties as threats to US national securit
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Strong opposition to Venezuelan trade – Congress demands embargo
| 1,228 | 64 | 302 | 200 | 9 | 46 | 0.045 | 0.23 |
Politics Links Core - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,893 |
When considering foreign assistance levels for Latin American and Caribbean nations, Congress might examine the issues of political will and program sustainability. According to the State Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the United States should “assess and monitor host nations’ political will to make the reforms necessary to make effective use of U.S. assistance to ensure our assistance is being targeted where it can have the most impact.”76 Unless partner nations are willing to implement complementary reforms and take ownership and sustain programs as aid is reduced and withdrawn, the results of U.S. assistance will likely be limited and short-lived. The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have a mixed record in terms of demonstrating political will and ensuring program sustainability. The Colombian government, which has benefitted from high levels of U.S. assistance for more than a decade, has undertaken numerous reforms and raised revenue. As a result, the United States is able to carry out a managed transition of its assistance programs in the country in which aid is slowly reduced as Colombia takes over financial and technical responsibility.77 Similarly, USAID is closing its mission in Panama, and closing out its voluntary family planning programs in a number of other Latin American countries because partner nations have developed the capacity to manage and fund the programs on their own.78 Despite these successes, numerous GAO reports over the past decade indicate that political will has often been lacking in the region, especially with regard to raising sufficient government revenue to sustain efforts initiated with U.S. support. A 2003 study of U.S. democracy programs in six Latin American nations found “cases in which U.S.-funded training programs, computer systems, and police equipment had languished for lack of resources after U.S. support ended.”79 Likewise, a 2010 study of counter-narcotics programs found that several countries in the region were unable to use U.S.-provided boats for patrol or interdiction operations due to a lack of funding for fuel and maintenance.80 Even MCC-funded projects, in which assistance is contingent on partner nation actions, have run into problems with program sustainability. A July 2011 study of the MCC compact in Honduras found that the lifespan of roads built to improve small farmers’ access to markets may be relatively limited as the municipalities where they were constructed lack the equipment, expertise, and funding for road maintenance.81
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Meyer and Sullivan 12 (Peter J. Meyer - Analyst in Latin American Affairs and Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations”, June 26th, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf)
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When considering foreign assistance levels for Latin American Congress might examine issues of political will The nations of Latin America have a mixed record in terms of demonstrating program sustainability political will has often been lacking especially with regard to raising sufficient government revenue to sustain efforts
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Plan sparks fights- no political will
| 2,580 | 37 | 328 | 392 | 6 | 47 | 0.015306 | 0.119898 |
Politics Links Core - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,894 |
At this juncture it is uncertain if Congress will approve a stand-alone FY2013 foreign aid appropriations measure, or whether such legislation will be rolled into an omnibus appropriations measure that combines several appropriations bills. With increasing frequency, Congress has included the language of appropriations bills that have not first received House or Senate floor action in omnibus appropriations measures. In these cases, the lack of floor action on the individual bills has reduced the opportunities for Members to consider and amend regular appropriations measures. For example, for FY2012 foreign aid appropriations, neither chamber approved individual State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bills before such appropriations were include in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74). If similar action is taken for FY2013, it would continue the pattern of reduced opportunities for Members that are not on the Appropriations Committees to consider and debate foreign aid legislation, including assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. To date in the FY2013 foreign aid appropriations process, the Administration has requested a 9% reduction in foreign aid to Latin America and the Caribbean while House and Senate Appropriations Committees have approved bills that would likely further reduce U.S. assistance going to the region, although by how much is unclear. The House bill, H.R. 5857, would reduce the Administration’s worldwide foreign aid request by almost 12% while the Senate bill, S. 3241, would reduce overall foreign aid by almost 5%. Potential automatic spending cuts stemming from the implementation of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) could result in further cuts in worldwide foreign assistance, including aid to Latin America and the Caribbean. Further reductions in assistance to the region beyond the Administration’s FY2013 request would force the Administration to make even more difficult choices about where to prioritize assistance and scale back some of its foreign aid programs in a critical neighboring region where the United States has extensive ties and diverse economic, political, and security interests.
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Meyer and Sullivan 12 (Peter J. Meyer - Analyst in Latin American Affairs and Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations”, June 26th, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf)
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it is uncertain if Congress will approve a FY2013 foreign aid appropriations measure the lack of floor action has reduced the opportunities Latin America To date in the FY2013 foreign aid appropriations process, the Administration has requested a 9% reduction in foreign aid to Latin America while House and Senate Appropriations have approved bills that would likely further reduce U.S. assistance going to the region by almost 12%
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Congress is reducing foreign aid to Latin America now – any increase will be a political fight
| 2,221 | 94 | 432 | 326 | 17 | 68 | 0.052147 | 0.208589 |
Politics Links Core - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,895 |
For some authors the stakeholders approach could reproduce the inequalities that many social organizations oppose. Companies usually select their stakeholders depending on their power of influence, their legitimacy and recognition in society, or the urgency of the situation (Mitchel 1997 quoted by Capron and Quairel‐Lanoizelée, 2004). Many of the stakeholders are already organized civil society groups. Therefore, it can be important to ask whether some workers or local communities can participate directly or depend on being represented by NGOs(Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 507). Along with the question of inclusion and representation is the question of civil society empowerment, their capacity to influence decision making processes and to develop their projects. This capacity can be associated in first place to the existence of what Nancy Thède (2006) calls process rights, the possibility of using the law to look for restitution or compensation in case of violations of fundamental rights. We are talking about the right to information, to participation, to association, to free expression, etc. Moreover, the applicability of such rights should be considered, so some informal power resources(social and political capital) would need to be accessible (Fox, 2000,). It is what Nuria Cunill (2007) calls resources of influence. Consequently, if business actors keep all power resources within social accountability initiatives, if civil society representatives are chosen on an inequality base excluding important stakeholders, if these social actors are not provided with effective influence capacities, the potential of such mechanisms to transform society are limited. They can even engender negative consequence for the local democracy development.
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Espinosa 9 (ANA CAROLINA GONZALEZ, 2005-2011. Externado University. Bogotá, Colombia. • Associated Researcher on Transparency and Extractive Sector. Center for International Studies and Especial Projects. CIPE (From 2007) • International Affairs Master Coordinator (2006-2007) • Lecturer on Political Sciences and Latin America ( From 2005), Anti-corruption Policies (From 2006) and Public Policies on Mining and Oil (2011). • Junior Researcher on Local democracy, Governance and Public Policies (2006 –2007) 2002-2011. Other experiences • Professional experience at international organizations (United Nations Program for Development, 2002-2004) and NGOs (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, Revenue Watch Institute, Colombian chapter of Transparency International, FINANSOL France, OCASA). Consultant for the public sector (From February 2010). • Ocasa –youth against corruption. Member of the NGO (From 2006), President of the Board of Directors (from may 2009), and consultant for different projects (From 2006), Business and Civil Society in Latin America: Building partnerships for a democratic governance of Natural Resource Revenues, http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_2903.pdf, July 2009)
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Companies usually select their stakeholders depending on their power of influence, their legitimacy and recognition in society Many of the stakeholders are already organized civil society groups. Therefore, it can be important to ask whether some workers or local communities can participate directly or depend on being represented by NGOs their capacity to influence decision making processes and to develop their projects. the applicability of such rights should be considered, so political capital) would need to be accessible It is resources of influence. resources if these social actors are not provided with effective influence capacities, the potential of such mechanisms to transform society are limited.
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Plan costs capital and the link turns the case
| 1,763 | 46 | 713 | 255 | 9 | 105 | 0.035294 | 0.411765 |
Politics Links Core - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Disadvantages
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2013
|
1,896 |
The plan calls for significant private sector funding, but Obama has invested little time, or political capital, in it. Fund-raising has been left in charge of the State Department, whose boss — Secretary of State John Kerry — has shown scant interest in Latin America. Kerry did not travel with Obama to Mexico and Costa Rica last week, and his April 18 remark at a congressional hearing about Latin America being “our backyard” had the rare effect of antagonizing friends and foes alike in the region. My opinion: As regular readers of this column know well, I much prefer Obama over his Republican critics on most issues. But I find it unfortunate that, as Obama’s recent trade initiatives with Asia and Europe show, he looks East and West, but very little toward the South. Neither he, nor Kerry, nor any Cabinet-level official is focused on the region.
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Oppenheimer 13 (Andres, reporter with the Miami Herald, Andres Oppenheimer: What Obama didn’t say about Latin America, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/08/3387818/andres-oppenheimer-obama-should.html#storylink=cpy, 5/8/13)
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he plan calls for significant private sector funding, but Obama has invested little time, or political capital, in it. Fund-raising has been left in charge of the State Department has shown scant interest in Latin America Latin America being “our backyard” had the rare effect of antagonizing friends and foes alike in the region Obama looks East and West, but very little toward the South.
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The plan costs capital and is a flip flop
| 857 | 41 | 390 | 147 | 9 | 65 | 0.061224 | 0.442177 |
Politics Links Core - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
|
1,897 |
Of course, leaders face many political obstacles that are not captured in the formal process of treaty ratification, and it is important to consider such constraints in addition to the specific hurdles governing treaty ratification. As one U.S. BIT negotiator explained, it is not just the ratification institutions that Washington takes into account in a partner, “it’s how freely the government functions.”34 Like legislation and other policy initiatives, treaty ratification is subject to issue-linkage at the domestic level and often requires the expenditure of finite political capital, thus the executive must take into account these broader political dynamics when advocating for a treaty. For example, President Obama’s efforts to secure Senate ratification of the new START treaty with Russia were held up by Republicans in Congress as part of a broad political strategy, not for reasons related to proliferation or national security. Partly for these reasons, and because executives may depend on legislatures and local governments to implement a treaty’s provisions, the preferences of other domestic actors matter even when they do not play a formal role in ratification. In Canada, for example, the prime minister often seeks to “build a broad base of support for international treaties”35—even though no such legal requirement exists.
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Haftel and Thompson 11 (Yoram Z. Haftel, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Chicago, Alexander Thompson, associate professor of political science at Ohio State University, Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/athompson/pdf/Delayed_Ratification_Dec2011.pdf, December 2011)
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leaders face many political obstacles that are not captured in the formal process of treaty ratification, it is not just the ratification institutions that Washington takes into account in a partner, “it’s how freely the government functions.”34 Like legislation and other policy initiatives, treaty ratification is subject to issue-linkage and often requires the expenditure of finite political capital, Obama’s efforts to secure Senate ratification of the new START treaty with Russia were held up by Republicans in Congress as part of a broad political strategy, not for reasons related to proliferation or national security. Partly for these reasons, and because executives may depend on legislatures and local governments to implement a treaty’s provisions, the preferences of other domestic actors matter even when they do not play a formal role in ratification
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Issue linkage costs capital- the plan is a target for backlash
| 1,348 | 62 | 867 | 204 | 11 | 131 | 0.053922 | 0.642157 |
Politics Links Core - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,898 |
NAFTA Ratification: A Slim Victory for the Clinton Administration: In the high-pressure days leading up to vote in November 1993, Clinton’s pro-NAFTA forces expected to squeak through the House of Representatives with little more than the 218 votes needed to win. Clinton spent most of the day of the vote on the phone trying to sway supporters, and he even hosted a last minute meeting with key legislators at the White House. In the end, the House of Representatives voted in favor of NAFTA implementing legislation by a vote of 234-200. Three days later, the treaty easily passed in the Senate by a vote of 61-38. Clinton had effectively expanded his win- set size for NAFTA ratification through synergistic issue linkage and targeted side payments, but at a significant expenditure of political capital.
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Lantis 5 (Jeffrey, member of the Department of Political Science at The College of Wooster, Double-Edged Diplomacy and the Politics of International Treaty Ratification in Comparative Perspective, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/9/8/8/pages69887/p69887-1.php, March 1-5, 2005)
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In the high-pressure days leading up to vote pro-NAFTA forces expected to squeak through the House of Representatives with little more than the 218 votes needed to win. Clinton spent most of the day of the vote on the phone trying to sway supporters Clinton had effectively expanded his win- set size for NAFTA ratification through synergistic issue linkage and targeted side payments, but at a significant expenditure of political capital.
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Issue linkage costs capital- NAFTA proves
| 807 | 41 | 440 | 133 | 6 | 71 | 0.045113 | 0.533835 |
Politics Links Core - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
|
1,899 |
The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that farm income in 2013 will be more than double what it was in 2009. The nation’s farmers are enjoying the benefits of high crop prices, massive crop insurance subsidies, and technological advances that have made crops more resistant to drought. As a result, farming’s record level of income far surpasses that of comparable non-farm sectors.Yet much of the debate over new farm legislation seems oblivious to these facts. The latest farm bill would give farmers even greater subsidies. In 2012, the Senate and the House failed to reach a consensus on a farm bill and instead passed a compromise extension of expiring law. The hope was that the agricultural committees would then develop a traditional omnibus farm bill package of legislation. The extension is set to expire on September 30; House and Senate leaders have pledged to complete a bill this year and the House will hold a markup this month. Today, as has increasingly been the case since the early 1980s, U.S. farmers are protected from significant yield and price losses by a massive and heavily subsidized crop insurance program. The program offers most producers the option to guarantee up to 85 percent of their projected yield or revenue. The most popular form of crop insurance guarantees revenue and promises to replace yield losses at the greater of the expected price at planting time or the actual price at harvest. As crop prices and farm incomes have increased to record levels, so too have the revenues guaranteed to farmers under these insurance contracts and the subsidies paid by taxpayers.
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Goodwin 2013, May 1, Barry Goodwin is reporter for the American Enterprise Institute, “More subsidies for Prosperous farmers”, http://www.american.com/archive/2013/may/more-subsidies-for-prosperous-farmers
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The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that farm income in 2013 will be more than double what it was in 2009 The nation’s farmers are enjoying the benefits of high crop prices, massive crop insurance subsidies, and technological advances that have made crops more resistant to drought. As a result, farming’s record level of income far surpasses that of comparable non-farm sectors.Yet much of the debate over new farm legislation seems oblivious to these facts. The latest farm bill would give farmers even greater subsidies U.S. farmers are protected from significant yield and price losses by a massive and heavily subsidized crop insurance program. The most popular form of crop insurance guarantees revenue and promises to replace yield losses at the greater of the expected price at planting time or the actual price at harvest. As crop prices and farm incomes have increased to record levels, so too have the revenues guaranteed to farmers under these insurance contracts and the subsidies paid by taxpayers.
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No US ag collapse – they’re doing well now
| 1,618 | 42 | 1,023 | 267 | 9 | 164 | 0.033708 | 0.614232 |
Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5
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Hoya-Spartan Scholars
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Case Negatives
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2013
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