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1,900	For several years stories in the media have reported a farm labor shortage. This study examines this question and finds little evidence to support this conclusion. First, fruit and vegetable production is actually rising. Second, wages for farm workers have not risen dramatically. Third, household expenditure on fresh fruits and vegetables has remain relatively constant, averaging about $1 a day for the past decade. Among the findings: Production of fruits and vegetables has been increasing. In particular, plantings of very-labor intensive crops such as cherries and strawberries have grown by more than 20 percent in just five years. The average farm worker makes $9.06 an hour, compared to $16.75 for non-farm production workers. Real wages for farm workers increased one-half of one percent (.5 percent) a year on average between 2000 and 2006. If there were a shortage, wages would be rising much more rapidly. Farm worker earnings have risen more slowly in California and Florida (the states with the most fruit and vegetable production) than in the United States as a whole. The average household spends only about $1 a day on fresh fruits and vegetables. Labor costs comprise only 6 percent of the price consumers pay for fresh produce. Thus, if farm wages were allowed to rise 40 percent, and if all the costs were passed on to consumers, the cost to the average household would be only about $8 a year. Mechanization could offset higher labor costs. After the “Bracero” Mexican guestworker program ended in the mid-1960s, farm worker wages rose 40 percent, but consumer prices rose relatively little because the mechanization of some crops dramatically increased productivity. Labor-saving mechanization can be difficult for one farmer, since packers and processors are usually set up to deal either with hand-picked or machine-picked crops, but not both. Government has a key role to play in facilitating mechanization. Introduction News reports and editorials suggest widespread farm labor shortages. The Los Angeles Times described “a nationwide farm worker shortage threatening to leave fruits and vegetables rotting in fields.”1 The Wall Street Journal in a July 20, 2007, editorial claimed that “farmers nationwide are facing their most serious labor shortage in years.” The editorial asserted that “20 percent of American agricultural products were stranded at the farm gate” in 2006, including a third of North Carolina cucumbers, and predicted that crop losses in California would hit 30 percent in 2007. The Wall Street Journal editorial continued that, since “growers can only afford to pay so much and stay competitive,” some U.S. growers are moving fruit and vegetable production abroad. The New York Times profiled a southern California vegetable grower who rented land in Mexico to produce lettuce and broccoli because, the grower asserted: “I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that if I did that [raise U.S. wages] I would raise my costs and I would not have a legal work force.”2 These reports of farm labor shortages are not accompanied by data that would buttress the anecdotes, like lower production of fruits and vegetables or a rise in farm wages as growers scrambled for the fewer workers available. There is a simple reason. Fruit and vegetable production is rising, the average earnings of farm workers are not going up extraordinarily fast, and consumers are not feeling a pinch – the cost of fresh fruits and vegetables has averaged about $1 a day for most households over the past decade. This Backgrounder reviews definitions of farm labor shortages, trends in the production of fresh fruits and vegetables, farm worker earnings and consumer prices, and the ways in which growers would adjust to higher farm wages. The new Farm Bill would spend $286 billion over the next five years on farm subsidies and food assistance, including assistance for specialty crops. Instead of using tax funds to increase production of U.S. fruits and vegetables in ways that require migrant workers, it may be better to subsidize the labor-saving mechanization needed to keep U.S. fruit and vegetable agriculture competitive in an increasingly global marketplace. Farm Labor Shortages There is no economic or government definition of persisting shortage. In a market economy, demand curves rank consumers by their willingness to pay a particular price for a commodity, and supply curves rank suppliers by their willingness to sell at particular prices. In the familiar X-diagram, if demand exceeds supply, prices rise, reducing demand and increasing supply; if supply exceeds demand, prices fall. Producers of fresh fruits and vegetables are very familiar with the price changes associated with these workings of the market, especially with shifts in supply. Demand and supply adjustments to price changes can occur with considerable lags. For example, growers of perennial crops such as apples or oranges must decide if high prices are likely to persist before making the investments necessary for additional production, since it may be three or more years between the time a tree is planted and the grower harvests a first crop. Government intervention can slow the market adjustments that normally bring supply and demand into balance. If there is a ceiling on the price of a commodity, there can be shortages, as with price-controlled apartments in New York City. If suppliers are guaranteed high prices, there can be surpluses, as with some farm commodities. The labor market adjusts in the same way, using wage changes to send signals about changes in supply and demand. Labor demand curves rank employers by the wages they are willing to pay to fill particular jobs, and labor supply curves rank workers by their reservation wages, which are the wages needed to induce them to fill particular jobs. As with farmers who must decide whether to plant more perennial crops in response to higher prices, there can be lags between changes in the demand for labor and a supply response. For example, an IT-boom can sharply increase the wages of computer programmers but not produce an immediate surge in programmers because it takes time to acquire the needed education and skills. Government intervention also affects labor market adjustments. Farm and trade policies affect the demand for labor by encouraging new plantings if tariff and other barriers to exports are reduced, as with apples and oranges sent to Japan and Korea. Government policies in areas from education and training to welfare and minimum wages can affect the supply of workers by providing other options for those who would otherwise fill seasonal farm jobs. However, the major government intervention that affects the farm labor market is immigration. According to the most recent U.S. Department of Labor survey, over three-fourths of the hired workers employed on U.S. crop farms were born outside the United States, usually in Mexico. The same survey found that 53 percent of crop workers were unauthorized.3 Media reports of farm labor shortages usually quote farm employers saying they have fewer workers than they want. For example, a farm employer may claim a labor shortage if there is a crew of 30 working but a crew of 40 is preferred, or if the farmer asked for two crews of workers today but contractors do not bring them until tomorrow.	Martin, ’07. Philip Martin is a professor of agricultural and resource economics at the University of California, Davis. November 2007. Center for Immigration Studies. “Farm Labor Shortages: How Real? What Response.” http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/back907.html – clawan	For several years stories in the media have reported a farm labor shortage little evidence to support this conclusion. fruit and vegetable production is actually rising. Second, wages for farm workers have not risen dramatically. Third, household expenditure on fresh fruits and vegetables has remain relatively constant plantings of very-labor intensive crops such as cherries and strawberries have grown by more than 20 percent in just five years. Real wages for farm workers increased (.5 percent) a year If there were a shortage, wages would be rising much more rapidly reports of farm labor shortages are not accompanied by data that would buttress the anecdotes, like lower production of fruits and vegetables or a rise in farm wages There is no economic or government definition of persisting shortage Demand and supply adjustments to price changes can occur with considerable lags Media reports of farm labor shortages usually quote farm employers saying they have fewer workers than they want	No farm labor shortage – all the aff’s reports are subjective – prefer concrete data	7,347	84	1,001	1,186	15	158	0.012648	0.133221	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,901	The United States alone cannot meet the global need to reduce hunger and promote food security. And foreign assistance alone will not end hunger or eliminate under-nutrition. We must draw on significant investments from other donors, the private sector, partner countries, and citizens themselves. Foreign assistance must play a key role in strengthening public institutions that catalyze private investment rather than hold it back. It must also invest in the experience of the small-scale farmers and business that can succeed by providing them with loans to jumpstart operations. The most effective food security strategies come from those closest to the problems—not governments or institutions thousands of miles away. In the past, our efforts have been undermined by a lack of coordination, limited transparency, uneven monitoring and evaluation, and relationships with recipient countries based more on patronage than partnership. Going forward, we will emphasize consultation and careful analysis of impact and make corrections as we go. While we will increase our own efforts, success will ultimately rest on the shoulders of the farmers and entrepreneurs who wake up each day committed to grow their future. It also will rest on the national and local leaders in their countries who must foster environments where investments in agricultural development can thrive, with zero tolerance for the petty corruption and polices that restrict agriculture-led growth.	OGFS, 9. Office of Global Food Security, US Department of State, September 28, 2009. “Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative: Consultation Document.” http://www.state.gov/s/globalfoodsecurity/129952.htm – clawan	The United States alone cannot meet the global need to reduce hunger and promote food security. And foreign assistance alone will not end hunger We must draw on significant investments from other donors, the private sector, partner countries, and citizens themselves Foreign assistance must play a key role in strengthening public institutions It must also invest in the experience of the small-scale farmers and business The most effective food security strategies come from those closest to the problems—not governments or institutions thousands of miles away. our efforts have been undermined by a lack of coordination, limited transparency, uneven monitoring and relationships with recipient countries based more on patronage than partnership success will ultimately rest on the shoulders of the farmers and entrepreneurs It also will rest on the national and local leaders in their countries	US ag can’t resolve global food security – regional investments are key	1,470	71	896	221	12	135	0.054299	0.61086	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,902	UK food production needs to respond to growing global demand for food 4.21. We need to feed a growing world population in a way that does not degrade the natural resources on which farming and food production ultimately depend. 4.22. UK production is of course crucial to our food supply, but it is not on its own sufficient for UK food security. We should encourage a sufficient volume of domestic production for the food supply chain as a whole, and that means continuing to ENSURING THE UK’S FOOD SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 20 encourage a market-driven, efficient and environmentally sustainable farming sector producing what consumers want. 4.23. Domestic farming will need the capacity to respond to changes, including to climate and market changes. These changes will mean using different crops and varieties, and building capacity to deal with evolving risks and threats including volatile prices, adverse weather, and pests and disease, while at the same time providing assurance over production methods and a proper, risk-based use of agro-chemicals. The Government is committed to supporting UK food and farming 4.24. Defra has as one of its departmental strategic objectives “a thriving farming and food sector with an improving net environmental impact", and promoting a strong domestic farming sector alongside stakeholder partners is central to Defra’s work. 4.25. Farming's economic and environmental performance are inextricably linked, and we need to make progress across both fronts in order to meet the global challenges ahead - including feeding a growing world population in a way that does not degrade the natural resources on which farming and food production ultimately depends. This is one of the central principles of the Government's Sustainable Farming and Food Strategy. 4.26. Defra’s spends half its research budget on supporting the farming and food sectors. £27.5 million is aimed at resource management in the farming and food industries, including energy and water use and additional activity on climate change mitigation and adaptation. 4.27. The Rural Development Programme for England will invest £3.9 billion in England's farming industry and rural areas over 2007-2013; this funding will help secure environmental goods that the market does not currently reward including: ƒ £3.3 billion to support farmers delivering environmental land management, forestry schemes, uplands and energy crops; ƒ £300 million to help improve farming's competitiveness and sustainability; and ƒ £300 million to support the wider rural economy and communities. ENSURING THE UK’S FOOD SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 21 The Government is also supporting research on the best ways to respond to growing competition for land 4.28. Defra, working together with the Department for Communities and Local Government, are joint sponsors of an independent Foresight Land Use Futures project which was launched in April 2008. The project will explore how society’s use of land could evolve over the next 50 years and how Government needs to respond. The Government is supporting the farming industry in its fight against diseases and pests 4.29. The Government is working with food producers and processors to help prevent animal and plant diseases disrupting food supplies. Defra is spending £405 million on preventing and controlling animal diseases. Steps taken by the Government and industry together in recent years to prevent outbreaks and spread of disease have helped to ensure that plant and animal diseases in the UK do not have a major or prolonged impact on food production and supply. The arrival of diseases like bluetongue show some of the challenges we face. 4.30. Defra is working with the farming industry to develop new arrangements for cost and responsibility sharing. This will provide an opportunity for Government and the farming industry to reach better decisions on the prevention, control and eradication of plant and animal diseases that command the widest possible support. The Government is working with the farming industry to ensure there are enough workers with the right skills	Defra, ‘8. Department for Environment, the UK government department responsible for policy and regulations on environmental, food and rural issues. Our priorities are to grow the rural economy, improve the environment and safeguard animal and plant health.Food and Rural Affairs. July 2008. “Ensuring the UK’s Food Security in a Changing World.” http://www.ifr.ac.uk/waste/Reports/DEFRA-Ensuring-UK-Food-Security-in-a-changing-world-170708.pdf – clawan	UK food production needs to respond to growing global demand for food 4.21. We need to feed a growing world population in a way that does not degrade the natural resources on which farming and food production ultimately depend. UK production is crucial to our food supply The Government is committed to supporting UK food and farming Defra has as one of its departmental strategic objectives “a thriving farming and food sector with an improving net environmental impact", and promoting a strong domestic farming sector The Government is also supporting research on the best ways to respond to growing competition for land The project will explore how society’s use of land could evolve over the next 50 years and how Government needs to respond. The Government is supporting the farming industry in its fight against diseases and pests The Government is working with food producers and processors to help prevent animal and plant diseases disrupting food supplies Steps taken by the Government and industry together in recent years to prevent outbreaks and spread of disease have helped to ensure that plant and animal diseases do not have a major or prolonged impact on food production and supply. This will provide an opportunity for Government and the farming industry to reach better decisions on the prevention, control and eradication of plant and animal diseases	US ag not key – UK food production solves	4,118	41	1,370	642	9	223	0.014019	0.347352	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,903	Several potential conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, the causal relationship between food security and political stability in humanitarian emergencies is complex and difficult to generalize that is to say that food insecurity can be caused by conflict/political instability, and political instability can be caused by food insecurity. Militarized conflict an extreme form of political instability has clearly been a major driver of humanitarian emergencies, particularly since the end of the cold war, with high levels of food insecurity a common consequence of these emergencies. However, at the same time, many of the local drivers of conflict have been related to control over land and other natural resources, which are ultimately linked to people s livelihoods and therefore to their food security (Alinovi, Hemrich, & Russo, 2008). In most of these emergencies, it isn t really possible to specify the independent and dependent variables in the relationship. The relationship can be understood in any given context, but it is circular and iterative, not linear. And, it should also be noted, that there isn t always any particularly demonstrable relationship between the two. Substantial levels of food insecurity can exist without there being any driver related to political instability, and without necessarily causing major political instability. Hence, a certain amount of caution is justified regarding any general theory of the link between the two. Second, there are some common drivers of both political instability and food insecurity. Climate change is at least partly implicated for both in the Darfur conflict, for example: as rainfall patterns changed, nomadic camel herders had to migrate farther and farther southwards to find dry season grazing and water, which brought them increasingly into conflict with other ethnic and livelihoods groups and made the lack of a designated homeland or Dar for the nomadic groups more evident (Young et al., 2005). Needless to say, the Darfur conflict was quickly politicized by other actors predominantly the ruling party in Khartoum for their own purposes, so it would be wrong to blame the Darfur crisis predominantly on climate change. Nevertheless, it likely played a crucial underlying role. Increasing frequency of drought and climate variability is equally implicated in food security crises elsewhere. It seems unlikely that there will be any change in the foreseeable future in a number of drivers of food insecurity: the volatility of short-term weather impacts and medium-term climate change impacts, the volatility of global and local food prices, or the number of localized conflicts (ripe for manipulation the way Darfur or Somalia were). In other words, the number of localized food security crises is unlikely to decrease. This has major implications for both humanitarian preparedness and response and for policy makers worried more broadly about the implications for political stability, notwithstanding the caution raised above about generalizing the relationship between food insecurity and political stability. The social protection responses rolled out on a national scale in Ethiopia, and piloted in a number of other countries have certainly made progress in providing a safety net but the jury is still out on whether such programs actually offer a broadly accessible ladder out of poverty and chronic food insecurity. It is likely that substantially more resources will be required to achieve the latter objective at scale, and the infrastructure and capacity needed for implementation are likely inadequate in the most affected countries.	Maxwell, ’12. Daniel Maxwell, Research Director for Food Security and Complex Emergencies; Professor; MAHA Director. 13-14 SEPTEMBER 2012. “Food Security and Its Implications for Political Stability: A Humanitarian Perspective.” http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs_high_level_forum/documents/FS-Implications-Political_Stability-Maxwell.pdf – clawan	the causal relationship between food security and political stability is complex food insecurity can be caused by conflict/political instability , it isn t really possible to specify the independent and dependent variables in the relationship there isn t any particularly demonstrable relationship between the two. Substantial levels of food insecurity can exist without there being any driver related to political instability, and without necessarily causing major political instability there are some common drivers of both political instability and food insecurity. Climate change drought and climate variability short-term weather localized conflicts the number of localized food security crises is unlikely to decrease. substantially more resources will be required to achieve the latter objective at scale the infrastructure and capacity needed for implementation are likely inadequate in the most affected countries	Food insecurity doesn’t cause conflict – no correlation and alt causes	3,637	70	922	555	11	129	0.01982	0.232432	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,904	And yet most experts agree the situation is nothing like as dire as it was four years ago, nor in fact two years ago when droughts again hit food production hard, sending prices to record highs. Prices are measured against expectations, and harvests have not been as bad as many had feared. More importantly, stocks are in better shape. Perhaps most importantly, key producers, in particular Russia, have not imposed the kinds of export bans that helped trigger previous price hikes. These were particularly damaging as the world has become more dependent for its grain on the Commonwealth of Independent States, which includes some of the world's biggest producers of wheat, including Russia, Kazakhstan and unofficial member Ukraine. "Big producers have been battered by drought but they are honouring their export contracts," says James Walton, chief economist at food experts IGD. "If Russia or central Asian countries were going to do something, they would probably have done it by now." The Agricultural Market Information System, which was established last year and allows the world's major food producers to work off common data as well as providing a forum for discussion, has played an important part. "Governments are shying away from restrictive measures; supplies are not as bad and inventories are not as bad," says Abdolreza Abbassian, senior economist at the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. "Recent experiences have made people a little over sensitive, but [the situation] does not look as bad [as 2008]". In fact, according to Mr Abbassian, there is no shortage of rice, despite patchy harvests, while inventories of wheat are good, and much higher than in 2007. Sugar production in Brazil has also been much better than expected, while China has generally had a good growing season, Mr Walton adds.There is also less pressure on prices from biofuels, a "big factor" in the 2008 price spikes, Mr Abbassian says, when a record high for the price of oil drove demand for alternative fuels. Corn and sugar, for example, are used extensively in biofuels - in the US, 40% of all corn production goes into making ethanol. Not only is the oil price well below those highs, but the UN says fewer crops are being diverted towards biofuels.Overall, then, fears of an impending food price crisis would appear to be exaggerated. "There has been a lot of talk about food prices at the UN, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and the general feeling is we are not in the same situation we were in in 2008," says Marc Sadler, senior agriculture economist at the World Bank.	BBC 12 (October 15th, Food price crisis: What crisis?, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19715504)	nd yet most experts agree the situation is nothing like as dire as it was four years ago, More importantly, stocks are in better shape. , key producers, have not imposed the kinds of export bans that helped trigger previous price hike Recent experiences have made people a little over sensitive, but [the situation] does not look as bad [as 2008] In fact, according to Mr Abbassian, there is no shortage of rice, despite patchy harvests, while inventories of wheat are good, and much higher than in 2007. Sugar production in Brazil has also been much better than expected, while China has generally had a good growing season, Mr Walton adds.There is also less pressure on prices from biofuels, a "big factor" in the 2008 price spikes, Mr Abbassian says, when a record high for the price of oil drove demand for alternative fuels. Corn and sugar, for example, are used extensively in biofuels - in the US, 40% of all corn production goes into making ethanol. Not only is the oil price well below those highs, but the UN says fewer crops are being diverted towards biofuels Overall, then, fears of an impending food price crisis would appear to be exaggerated. "There has been a lot of talk about food prices at the UN, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the general feeling is we are not in the same situation we were in in 2008,	Food price impacts exaggerated – experts agree	2,597	46	1,345	432	7	239	0.016204	0.553241	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,905	People normally think high food prices are bad, or at least bad to net consumers, although good to net producers. As many small holders and the poor are the net consumers, they are vulnerable to high food prices. The memory of 2008 food crisis is still fresh to many people: the high food prices exaggerated poverty and pushed more than 100 million people into hunger in 2008 (WFP, 2008). In the recent south-south cooperation workshop in Beijing however, it was argued that high food prices were not always bad. When the prices go up, it hurts farmers, but farmers will quickly have coping strategy and produce more. They become producers and benefit from the high prices. This opinion is likely to be consistent with Chinese government’s food prices policy. The objective of food price policy is to keep the food prices growing moderately. The rationale is to provide enough incentives for farming, and gradually increase farmers’ income, but not too radical to cause food crisis. I think it seems a good blueprint but the question is how well for government to create an environment to allow the prices grow moderately? And if there is a pressure of volatility of food prices , how well could the government, the community, the producers and the consumers prevent and prepare for it?	Wang 12 (Weijing; Are High Food Prices Good or Bad? http://asia.ifad.org/web/china/blogs/-/blogs/are-high-food-prices-good-or bad?p_p_auth=mnKY6vAo&p_r_p_564233524_catego ryId=0&_33_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fasia.ifad.org%2Fweb%2Fchina%2Fblogs%3Fp _p_auth%3DmnKY6vAo%26p_p_id%3D33%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-2%26p_p_col_count%3D4%26p_r_ p_564233524_categoryId%3D0&) HS	People normally think high food prices are bad, or at least bad to net consumers, although good to net producers. As many small holders and the poor are the net consumers, they are vulnerable to high food prices. T the high food prices exaggerated poverty and pushed more than 100 million people into hunger in 200 high food prices were not always bad. When the prices go up, it hurts farmers, but farmers will quickly have coping strategy and produce more. They become producers and benefit from the high prices. The rationale is to provide enough incentives for farming, and gradually increase farmers’ income, but not too radical to cause food crisis.	Farmers and governments check high food prices	1,286	46	654	219	7	112	0.031963	0.511416	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,906	Recent droughts in the midwestern United States threaten to cause global catastrophe driven by a speculator ampliﬁed food price bubble. Here we show the eﬀect of speculators on food prices using a validated quantitative model that accurately describes historical food prices. During the last six years, high and ﬂuctuating food prices have lead to widespread hunger and social unrest. While the spring of 2012 had a relative dip in the food prices, a massive drought in the American midwest in June and July threatens to trigger another crisis. In a previous paper, we constructed a model that quantitatively agreed with food prices and demonstrated that, while the behavior could not be explained by supply and demand economics, it could be parsimoniously and accurately described by a model which included both the conversion of corn into ethanol and speculator trend following. An update to the original paper in February 2012 demonstrated that the model previously published was predictive of the ongoing price dynamics, and anticipated a new food crisis by the end of 2012 if adequate policy actions were not implemented. Here we provide a second update, evaluating the eﬀects of the current drought on global food prices. We ﬁnd that the drought may trigger the expected third food price bubble to occur sooner, before new limits to speculation are scheduled to take eﬀect. Reducing the amount of corn that is being converted to ethanol may address the immediate crisis. Longer term, market stabilization requires limiting ﬁnancial speculation. 1A global crisis in food prices is widely recognized [1], and the vulnerability of the limited food supply to environmental and other disruptions is a matter of ongoing concern. Recent food price peaks in 2007-8 and 2010-1 have resulted in food riots and are implicated in triggering widespread revolutions known as the Arab Spring [2]. The underlying vulnerability of the global food supply system is being tested again this summer by a severe drought in the Midwestern United States which is responsible for a large portion of the global food supply [3, 4, 5, 6]. In a paper published in September 2011 [7], we built a quantitative model that, for the ﬁrst time, was able to precisely match the monthly FAO food price index over the last 8 years. The model showed that, of all the factors proposed to be responsible for the recent dramatic spikes and ﬂuctuations in global food prices, rapid increases in the amount of cornto-ethanol conversion and speculation on futures markets were the only factors which could justiﬁably be held responsible. Each of these causes is due to particular acts of government intervention or deregulation. Thus, while the food supply and prices may be vulnerable to global population increases and environmental change, the existing price increases are due to speciﬁc governmental policies. In order to prevent further crises in the food market, we recommended the halting of government support for ethanol conversion and the reversal of commodities market deregulation, which enables unlimited ﬁnancial speculation. Since the publication of our analysis, a few changes in these directions have been made. At the end of 2011, ethanol subsidies were allowed to expire [8, 9]. However, a governmentguaranteed demand for 37% of the US corn crop is still in place [10]. It is unclear what eﬀect this partial change in policy will have on the percentage of corn converted to ethanol, currently about 40%. New position limits on speculative activity by the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission are scheduled to come into eﬀect by the end of 2012, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act [11, 12]. It remains to be seen how eﬀective these new regulations will be, as there are those who consider them too watered-down [13], and market participants are seeking to dilute them further [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. In a subsequent update published in February 2012 [18], we showed that the model continued to ﬁt current data, up to January 2012, which had not been available at the time of the construction of the model. We further observed that extrapolating model prices into the future yielded the prediction of another speculative bubble starting by the end of 2012 and causing food prices to rise even higher than recent peaks. 2This season, the American Midwestern agricultural region has experienced debilitating droughts and high temperatures, the most severe in at least 50 years, leading to rapidly rising corn and wheat prices in anticipation of a poor yield [4, 5]. Here we include this as a shock in our established model. We ﬁnd that through the mechanism of speculative activity, the drought may trigger the third massive price spike to occur earlier than otherwise expected, beginning immediately, and sooner than could be prevented by the anticipated new regulations. This spike may raise prices well beyond an increase justiﬁed by the reduced supply caused by the droughts. In Fig. 1 we plot our model predictions for diﬀerent scenarios. The central comparison is between the drought triggered speculative bubble (red line) compared to the same shock with the speculator and ethanol model [7], without the eﬀects of the current drought (yellow line) with the eﬀects of the current drought (red line), and with the eﬀects of the drought, but with speculation reduced (green line). In all cases, corn-to-ethanol conversion is considered to be constant after Jan 2012 and stock prices and bond prices are considered to be constant after July 2012. For the red and green line, drought is modeled as a shock in equilibrium prices (+3%) in July 2012. In all cases, the new optimized parameters for the ﬁt up to July 2012: ksd = 0.089, ksp = 1.25, µequityγ 0 = −0.074, µbondsγ 0 = −15.4. The speculation parameter after July 2012 is reduced to ksp = 0.3 for the green line. 3reduced speculation (green line). While the drought only causes a limited price shock, the impact on prices is ampliﬁed by the speculative activity. This shows the role of speculators using the current level of market speculation as validated by prior analysis of food prices. The speculative bubble is modeled starting from a price shock driven by the drought, which is expected to occur based upon existing grain price increases [5] though it has not yet been speciﬁed by the FAO. The price increase then causes the upcoming price spike to come sooner than would have otherwise occurred. The level of earlier riot-inducing bubbles is reached before the end of 2012 and prices continue to rise much higher. Without the drought (yellow line), the rise in prices would be just as dramatic, but is predicted to occur several months later, possibly in time for the new regulations to prevent it. On the other hand, if speculation were to be curbed immediately, starting from July 2012, the model shows (green curve) that the price increase due to the drought would be far smaller, and would not lead to another dramatic price spike. An alternative intervention, eliminating the government mandated ethanol quota for this year [20], would would result in a new market shock and could cause a sudden drop in prices. This may alleviate the immediate concerns though its eﬀect is subject to speculator driven band wagon eﬀects.	Lagi and Bar-Yam ‘12 Marco Lagi, Yavni Bar-Yam and Yaneer Bar-Yam, researchers at MIT’s New England Complex Systems Institute; “UPDATE July 2012 — The Food Crises: The US Drought;” July 23, 2012; publ. by New England Complex Systems Institute http://necsi.edu/research/social/foodprices/updatejuly2012/food_prices_july_2012.pdf RMJ	Recent droughts in the midwestern U S threaten to cause global catastrophe driven by a speculator ampliﬁed food price bubble During the last six years, high and ﬂuctuating food prices have lead to widespread hunger and social unrest a massive drought in the American midwest in June and July threatens to trigger another crisis. In a previous paper, we constructed a model that quantitatively agreed with food prices and demonstrated that, while the behavior could not be explained by supply and demand economics, it could be parsimoniously and accurately described by a model which included both the conversion of corn into ethanol and speculator trend following the drought may trigger the expected third food price bubble to occur sooner, before new limits to speculation are scheduled to take eﬀect. Reducing the amount of corn that is being converted to ethanol may address the immediate crisis we built a quantitative model that, for the ﬁrst time, was able to precisely match the monthly FAO food price index over the last 8 years showed that, of all the factors proposed to be responsible for the recent dramatic spikes and ﬂuctuations in global food prices, rapid increases in the amount of cornto-ethanol conversion and speculation on futures markets were the only factors which could justiﬁably be held responsible. Each of these causes is due to particular acts of government intervention or deregulation In order to prevent further crises in the food market, we recommended the halting of government support for ethanol conversion and the reversal of commodities market deregulation, which enables unlimited ﬁnancial speculation extrapolating model prices into the future yielded the prediction of another speculative bubble starting and causing food prices to rise even higher than recent peaks. the American Midwestern agricultural region has experienced debilitating droughts and high temperatures, the most severe in at least 50 years, leading to rapidly rising corn and wheat prices in anticipation of a poor yield through the mechanism of speculative activity, the drought may trigger the third massive price spike to occur earlier than otherwise expected, beginning immediately, and sooner than could be prevented by the anticipated new regulations. This spike may raise prices well beyond an increase justiﬁed by the reduced supply caused by the droughts. While the drought only causes a limited price shock, the impact on prices is ampliﬁed by the speculative activity. This shows the role of speculators using the current level of market speculation as validated by prior analysis of food prices. Without the drought (yellow line), the rise in prices would be just as dramatic if speculation were to be curbed immediately the price increase would be far smaller, and would not lead to another dramatic price spike	Food price spikes inevitable – speculation and droughts outweigh production	7,272	75	2,836	1,197	10	449	0.008354	0.375104	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,907	Underfunding of agricultural R&D in developing countries is clearly problematic, and the stage is set for the problem to worsen. In addition to the distinctive features of developing countries described above, the inadequacy of agricultural knowledge stocks may be exacerbated by changes occurring in developed countries. Although the most immediate and tangible effect of the new technologies and ideas stemming from research done in one country is to foster productivity growth in that country, the new technologies and ideas often spill over and spur sizable productivity gains elsewhere in the world. In the past, developing countries benefited considerably from technological spillovers from developed countries, in part because the bulk of the world’s agricultural science and innovation occurred in rich countries.13 Increasingly, spillovers from developed countries may not be available to developing countries in the same ways or to the same extent. Decreasing spillover potential is caused by several related market and policy trends in developed countries. First, the types of technologies being developed may no longer be as readily applicable to developing countries as they were in the past. As previously noted, developed country R&D agendas have been reoriented away from productivity gains in food staples toward other aspects of agricultural production, such as environmental effects, food quality, and the medical, energy, and industrial uses of agricultural commodities. This growing divergence between developed-country research agendas and the priorities of developing countries implies fewer applicable technologies that would be candidates for adaptation to developing countries. Second, technologies that are applicable may not be as readily accessible because of increasing intellectual property protection of privately owned technologies and, perhaps, more important, the expanding scope and enforcement of biosafety regulations. Different approaches may have to be devised to make it possible for countries to achieve equivalent access to technological potential generated by other countries. Third, those technologies that are applicable and available are likely to require more substantial local development and adaptation, calling for more sophisticated and more extensive forms of scientific R&D than in the past. The requirement for local adaptive research is also likely to be exacerbated as changes in global and local climate regimes add further to the need for adaptive responses to those changed agricultural production environments. In some instances developing countries may also have to extend their own agricultural R&D efforts farther upstream, to more fundamental areas of the science. These new pressures for self-reliance in agricultural research are coming at a time when many developing countries, along with developed countries, are finding it difficult to sustain the current rates of investment in agricultural research.	Pardey and Alston, ’10. Philip G. Pardey is professor of science and technology policy in the Department of Applied Economics at the University of Minnesota. Julian M. Alston is a professor in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics of the University of California, Davis, where he teaches graduate and undergraduate classes in microeconomic theory and the analysis of agricultural markets and policies. January 2010. “U.S. Agricultural Research in a Global Food Security Setting.” A Report of the CSIS Task Force on Food Security. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmakers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. http://csis.org/files/publication/100111_Pardey_USAgriRes_Web.pdf - clawan	Underfunding of agricultural R&D in developing countries is clearly problematic, and the stage is set for the problem to worsen the inadequacy of agricultural knowledge stocks may be exacerbated Increasingly, spillovers from developed countries may not be available to developing countries in the same ways or to the same extent First, the types of technologies being developed may no longer be as readily applicable to developing countries developed country R&D agendas have been reoriented away from productivity gains toward other aspects of agricultural production This growing divergence between developed-country research agendas and the priorities of developing countries implies fewer applicable technologies technologies that are applicable may not be as readily accessible because of increasing intellectual property protection and expanding scope and enforcement of biosafety regulations Third, those technologies that are applicable and available are likely to require more substantial local development and adaptation, calling for more sophisticated and more extensive forms requirement for local adaptive research is also likely to be exacerbated as changes in global and local climate regimes add further to the need for adaptive responses	No spillover of U.S. tech – tech barrier, intellectual property, and regulations	2,971	80	1,254	427	12	178	0.028103	0.416862	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,908	U.S. assistance cannot reach every country that needs assistance; multilateral institutions provide an opportunity to partner with the global community to make a global impact. Multilateral institutions can efficiently deliver global resources for food security, complement bilateral activities, and strengthen in-country donor coordination processes. Multilateral development banks and funds, such as the World Bank, the regional development banks, and the International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD) also have important comparative advantages that complement bilateral programs. For example, they can undertake large-scale transportation projects or support intra-regional transportation corridors that boost trade flows and reduce the costs and time to ship inputs and crops. In addition, multilateral institutions such as the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP) have significant technical experience that can be leveraged to help implement a multi-stakeholder strategy. Multilateral institutions, such as the UN High Level Task Force, will also play an important global coordination role.	OGFS, 9. Office of Global Food Security, US Department of State, September 28, 2009. “Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative: Consultation Document.” http://www.state.gov/s/globalfoodsecurity/129952.htm – clawan	U.S. assistance cannot reach every country that needs assistance; multilateral institutions provide an opportunity to partner with the global community to make a global impact. Multilateral institutions can efficiently deliver global resources for food security Multilateral development banks and funds, such as the World Bank, the regional development banks, and the IFAD) also have important comparative advantages Multilateral institutions will also play an important global coordination role.	US alone can’t resolve – multilateral institutions solve best	1,147	61	496	155	9	67	0.058065	0.432258	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,909	The destruction of southern food systems occurred through a series of northern economic development projects: The Green Revolution (1960-90) was a campaign led by the international agricultural research centers that aimed to modernize farming in the developing world. Impressive gains in national productivity were accompanied by the steady monopolization of seed and input markets by northern corporations. The highly celebrated Asian and Mexican "miracles" masked the loss of 90% of agro-biodiversity, the massive reduction of water tables, salinization and erosion of soils, and the displacement of millions of peasants to fragile hillsides, shrinking forests, and urban slums. Excluding China, the Green Revolution increased food per capita by 11%. However, the number of hungry people also increased by 11%. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 1980s-90s imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund followed, dismantling marketing boards, eliminating price guarantees, closing entire research and extension systems, breaking down tariffs, and deregulating agricultural markets. Southern countries were flooded with subsidized grain from the U.S. and Europe that was sold at prices far under the costs of production. This destroyed national agricultural markets and tied southern food security to global markets dominated by rich northern countries. Regional free trade agreements and the World Trade Organization "The idea that developing countries should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better ensure their food security by relying on U.S. agricultural products, which are available, in most cases at lower cost." U.S. Agriculture Secretary John Block, 1986 The rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) cemented the policies of the Structural Adjustment Programs in international treaties that overrode national laws. WTO rules, like the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, further consolidated northern control over southern agricultural economies. The global South was forced to strip away genuine protections for smallholders and local producers to open its markets to northern goods while northern markets remained largely protected through a combination of both tariff and non-tariff barriers. Regional free trade agreements such as NAFTA and CAFTA, pushed through by the North, continued trade liberalization, forcing southern farmers out of business and making countries of the South dependent on northern food imports.	Gimenez, 8. Eric Holt-Giménez, Ph.D., is Executive Director of Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy and analyst for the Americas Program of the Center for International Policy. October 23, 2008. “The world food crisis: what is behind it and what we can do.” http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/09/editorials/holt-gimenez.htm – clawan	The destruction of southern food systems occurred through a series of northern economic development projects The Green Revolution aimed to modernize farming in the developing world Impressive gains in national productivity were accompanied by the steady monopolization of seed and input markets by northern corporations. Mexican "miracles" masked the loss of 90% of agro-biodiversity the Green Revolution increased food per capita by 11%. However, the number of hungry people also increased by 11%. SAPs eliminating price guarantees, closing entire research and extension systems, breaking down tariffs, and deregulating agricultural markets. Southern countries were flooded with subsidized grain from the U.S. and Europe that was sold at prices far under the costs of production This destroyed national agricultural markets and tied southern food security to global markets dominated by rich northern countries. WTO rules further consolidated northern control over southern agricultural economies The global South was forced to strip away protections for smallholders while northern markets remained largely protected through a combination of both tariff and non-tariff barriers Regional free trade agreements such as NAFTA continued trade liberalization, forcing southern farmers out of business and making countries of the South dependent on northern food imports.	US measures don’t solve – they only result in the exploitation of the South by the North	2,572	88	1,367	370	17	194	0.045946	0.524324	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,910	World food aid in 2007 reached its lowest level since 1961 (5.9 million tons), precisely when more people than ever are going hungry. Why? Because when prices are high—and food is unavailable to the poor—food aid decreases. When prices are low—and food is abundant—food aid increases. Sound backward? That is because food aid responds to grain prices on the international market—not to the food needs of poor countries. When the price of cereals is low, northern countries and transnational grain companies seek to sell their commodities through food aid programs. When the price is high, they prefer to sell their grains on the international market. When more people suffer from hunger, less food aid arrives. Global food aid is dominated by U.S. food aid, whose objective since 1954 has been to "lay the basis for a permanent expansion of our exports of agricultural products with lasting benefits to ourselves and peoples of other lands." Apart from other geopolitical goals, food aid functions as a sponge to absorb commodities surpluses in the North and dispose of it at prices below the cost of production in the South. Food aid is monopolized by four companies that control 84% of the transport and delivery. Further, 50-90% of global food aid is conditioned on bilateral trade agreements. USAID, for example, forces recipient countries to accept genetically modified grains. In 2007, 99.3% of U.S. food aid was "in-kind," that is, food procured in the United States and shipped to recipient countries (rather than provisions of cash or coupons for purchasing food closer to recipients). The crippling of food systems in the global South opened up entire continents to the expansion of industrial agri-foods from the North. This expansion devastated local agro-biodiversity and emptied the countryside of valuable natural and human resources. But as long as cheap, subsidized grain from the industrial North kept flowing, the industrial agri-foods complex grew, consolidating control of the world's food systems in the hands of fewer and fewer grain, seed, chemical, and petroleum companies. Today three companies, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Cargill, and Bunge control 90% of the world's grain trade. Chemical giant Monsanto controls one-fifth of seed production, while Bayer Crop Science, Syngenta, and BASF control half of the total agro-chemical market.	Gimenez, 8. Eric Holt-Giménez, Ph.D., is Executive Director of Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy and analyst for the Americas Program of the Center for International Policy. October 23, 2008. “The world food crisis: what is behind it and what we can do.” http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/09/editorials/holt-gimenez.htm – clawan	World food aid in 2007 reached its lowest level since 1961 precisely when more people than ever are going hungry when prices are high—and food is unavailable to the poor—food aid decreases food aid responds to grain prices on the international market—not to the food needs of poor countries. When the price of cereals is low, northern countries sell their commodities through food aid programs. When the price is high, they prefer to sell their grains on the international market. . Global food aid is dominated by U.S. food aid, whose objective since 1954 has been to "lay the basis for a permanent expansion of our exports of agricultural products with lasting benefits to ourselves and peoples of other lands." food aid absorb commodities surpluses in the North and dispose of it at prices below the cost of production in the South. The crippling of food systems in the global South opened up entire continents to the expansion of industrial agri-foods from the North expansion devastated local agro-biodiversity and emptied the countryside of valuable resources	American aid fails to resolve food shortages – the entire process is dominated by self-interest	2,366	95	1,065	373	15	175	0.040214	0.469169	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,911	Drought, rocketing bread prices, food and water shortages have all blighted parts of the Middle East. Analysts at the Centre for American Progress in Washington say a combination of food shortages and other environmental factors exacerbated the already tense politics of the region. As the Observer reports today, an as-yet unpublished US government study indicates that the world needs to prepare for much more of the same, as food prices spiral and longstanding agricultural practices are disrupted by climate change. "We should expect much more political destabilisation of countries as it bites," says Richard Choularton, a policy officer in the UN's World Food Programme climate change office. "What is different now from 20 years ago is that far more people are living in places with a higher climatic risk; 650 million people now live in arid or semi-arid areas where floods and droughts and price shocks are expected to have the most impact. "The recent crises in the Horn of Africa and Sahel may be becoming the new normal. Droughts are expected to become more frequent. Studies suggest anything up to 200 million more food-insecure people by 2050 or an additional 24 million malnourished children. In parts of Africa we already have a protracted and growing humanitarian disaster. Climate change is a creeping disaster," he said. The Mary Robinson climate justice foundation is hosting a major conference in Dublin this week. Research to be presented there will say that rising incomes and growth in the global population, expected to create 2 billion more mouths to feed by 2050, will drive food prices higher by 40-50%. Climate change may add a further 50% to maize prices and slightly less to wheat, rice and oil seeds. "We know population will grow and incomes increase, but also that temperatures will rise and rainfall patterns will change. We must prepare today for higher temperatures in all sectors," said Gerald Nelson, a senior economist with the International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington. All of the studies suggest the worst impacts will be felt by the poorest people. Robinson, the former Irish president, said: "Climate change is already having a domino effect on food and nutritional security for the world's poorest and most vulnerable people. Child malnutrition is predicted to increase by 20% by 2050. Climate change impacts will disproportionately fall on people living in tropical regions, and particularly on the most vulnerable and marginalised population groups. This is the injustice of climate change – the worst of the impacts are felt by those who contributed least to causing the problem." But from Europe to the US to Asia, no population will remain insulated from the huge changes in food production that the rest of the century will bring. Frank Rijsberman, head of the world's leading Cgiar crop research stations, said: "There's a lot of complacency in rich countries about climate change. We must understand that instability is inevitable. We already see a lot of refugees. Perhaps if a lot of people come over on boats to Europe or the US that would wake them up."	Vidal ’13 John Vidal, environment editor for The Guardian; “Climate change: how a warming world is a threat to our food supplies;” Apr 13 2013; The Guardian: The Observer http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/apr/13/climate-change-threat-food-supplies RMJ	an as-yet unpublished US government study indicates that the world needs to prepare for much more of the same, as food prices spiral and longstanding agricultural practices are disrupted by climate change We should expect much more political destabilisation of countries says a policy officer in the UN's World Food Programme climate change office now far more people are living in places with a higher climatic risk; 650 million in arid or semi-arid areas The recent crises in Africa may be becoming the new normal. Droughts are expected to become more frequent. Studies suggest anything up to 200 million more food-insecure people by 2050 or an additional 24 million malnourished children. In parts of Africa we already have a protracted and growing humanitarian disaster. Climate change is a creeping disaster," he said. rising incomes and growth in the global population will drive food prices higher by 40-50%. Climate change may add a further 50% population will grow and incomes increase temperatures will rise and rainfall patterns will change. We must prepare today for higher temperatures in all sectors," said a senior economist with the International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington. Rijsberman, head of the world's leading Cgiar crop research stations, said: "There's a lot of complacency in rich countries about climate change instability is inevitable. We already see a lot of refugees	Warming makes food insecurity inevitable	3,127	40	1,413	511	5	223	0.009785	0.436399	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,912	4.47. Defra is already taking action to help ensure UK farmers and food producers are aware of how they are likely to be affected by climate change and what they need to do to manage the risks, both economic and environmental. A cross-Government Adapting to Climate Change Programme has been set up, to bring together work already underway, and to co-ordinate and drive forward the development of 26 www.berr.gov.uk. The differences and similarities between energy security and food security are set out in Defra, Food Security and the UK: an evidence and analysis paper, pp. 73-4 27 www.defra.gov.uk ENSURING THE UK’S FOOD SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 26 Government's work on adaptation in the future. We will shortly launch an Adapting to Climate Change website, which will provide further information about this Programme and which will also help users find out more about how the climate is changing, and what they can do to adapt. 4.48. Defra has also launched a new project, as part of its Farming for the Future programme, to specifically address climate change adaptation by agriculture. The overarching aim of the project is to make the agriculture sector environmentally and economically sustainable in a changing climate; and to make agricultural ecosystems resilient to climate change by protecting, restoring and enhancing ecosystem services (e.g. biodiversity, water purification, flood management). This will help both to maintain the current multiple benefits we obtain from agricultural land and to manage the broader impacts of climate change on the UK as a whole. The project is supported by a continuing programme of research on agriculture and climate change.	Defra, ‘8. Department for Environment, the UK government department responsible for policy and regulations on environmental, food and rural issues. Our priorities are to grow the rural economy, improve the environment and safeguard animal and plant health.Food and Rural Affairs. July 2008. “Ensuring the UK’s Food Security in a Changing World.” http://www.ifr.ac.uk/waste/Reports/DEFRA-Ensuring-UK-Food-Security-in-a-changing-world-170708.pdf – clawan	Defra is already taking action to help ensure farmers and food producers are aware of how they are likely to be affected by climate change and what they need to do to manage the risks, both economic and environmental Defra has also launched a new project to specifically address climate change adaptation by agriculture. The overarching aim of the project is to make the agriculture sector environmentally and economically sustainable in a changing climate restoring and enhancing ecosystem services This will help both to maintain benefits we obtain from agricultural land and to manage the broader impacts of climate change on the UK as a whole. The project is supported by a continuing programme of research on agriculture and climate change.	UK ag industry solves best for environment – proactive initiatives to respond to climate change	1,680	95	745	267	15	121	0.05618	0.453184	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,913	5. Conclusion 5.1. The UK currently enjoys a high level of national food security, which reflects the diverse and abundant supply of foodstuffs available in our supermarkets. We produce much of our food ourselves, and because the UK is a developed economy, we are able to access the food we need on the global market. 5.2. The recent increases in global food prices have, however, focused the attention of Governments around the world on short-term supply and long-term challenges to our food system. Rising global demand, climate change, high oil prices and new pressures on land such as biofuels have undermined global food security. These pressures are compounded by trade distorting subsidies and protectionist policies imposed in the US, EU and other countries 5.3. To address the global food price increases, the UK has committed to a substantial aid package to help the most vulnerable countries and called on the G8 to take coordinated action. The G8 has agreed to invest over $10 billion to meet not just immediate humanitarian needs – including increases in food aid – but to improve food security and increase agricultural productivity over the longer term. This needs to be done in an environmentally sustainable way to maintain the natural resource base for the future. It makes sense to encourage food production in Africa, as a lack of production globally will force up prices which will affect consumers in the UK too. 5.4. The UK believes that effectively functioning markets are fundamental to ensuring global food security. The Government is committed to continuing to liberalise markets through the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations and reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. 5.5. We believe that global food security means everyone having enough to eat, and we have committed to substantial investment in research and development to enable developing countries to improve their food production. Climate change presents one of the greatest threats to increasing agricultural productivity and the Government is leading the EU and the world in tackling climate change. In addition, we are investing in research and development and capacity building to increase resilience in countries that will be most affected by climate change. ENSURING THE UK’S FOOD SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 28 5.6. One of the most important contributions the UK can make to global, and our own, food security is having a thriving and productive agriculture sector in the UK, operating in a global market and responding to what consumers want. The Government is committed to supporting the agricultural sector including through investment in research and development, support on skills and ensuring the UK benefits from EU support under Rural Development Programmes.	Defra, ‘8. Department for Environment, the UK government department responsible for policy and regulations on environmental, food and rural issues. Our priorities are to grow the rural economy, improve the environment and safeguard animal and plant health.Food and Rural Affairs. July 2008. “Ensuring the UK’s Food Security in a Changing World.” http://www.ifr.ac.uk/waste/Reports/DEFRA-Ensuring-UK-Food-Security-in-a-changing-world-170708.pdf – clawan	The UK currently enjoys a high level of national food security, the UK is able to access the food we need on the global market. To address the global food price increases, the UK has committed to a substantial aid package to help the most vulnerable countries and called on the G8 to take coordinated action. The G8 has agreed to invest to improve food security and increase agricultural productivity over the longer term. UK functioning markets are fundamental to ensuring global food security One of the most important contributions the UK can make to global, and our own, food security is having a thriving and productive agriculture sector in the UK, operating in a global market and responding to what consumers want. The Government is committed to supporting the agricultural sector including through investment in research and development,	UK ag industry key to global food security – international aid and food markets	2,778	79	846	442	14	139	0.031674	0.31448	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,914	But you would hardly know it from reading what NGOs and international organizations have produced on the topic. (For my past instances of blowing off steam on the subject, see this and this.) As Johan F.M. Swinnen notes in a new essay these basic principles are well known, [yet] we do not find them reflected in most arguments put forward in the food policy debate. For example, there has been hardly any mentioning of the benefits of low food prices for urban consumers and net consuming rural households during the pre-2006 low price era, and there has been very little emphasis in more recent statements on the benefits for producers in poor countries from high food prices. In 2005, Oxfam International wrote: US and Europe[‘s s]urplus production is sold on world markets at artificially low prices, making it impossible for farmers in developing countries to compete. As a consequence, over 900 millions of farmers are losing their livelihoods. Three years later, following a substantial rise in food prices, Oxfam International’s view was that: Higher food prices have pushed millions of people in developing countries further into hunger and poverty. There are now 967 million malnourished people in the world…. It is unfair to single out Oxfam since organizations like the World Bank, OECD, and the FAO have not been much better. So here is the World Bank in 1990: The combination of depressed world prices and developing country policies which tax agriculture relative to industry have discouraged farm output and hence lowered rural incomes. Because the majority of the world’s poorest households depend on agriculture and related activities for their livelihood, this … is especially alarming. And the World Bank in 2008: The increase in food prices represents a major crisis for the world’s poor. (All these cites come from Swinnen’s article.) In other words, the news on the food prices front is always bad for the world’s poor, regardless of whether prices are rising or falling. Why do these institutions always accentuate the negative? Swinnen argues the reason has to do with international organizations’ incentives to capture media attention, capitalize on “sudden shocks,” and emphasize the negative in the “news” (to which people seem to pay more attention). Whatever the reason, it makes for bad public policy.	Rodrik 10 (Dani; Harvard Professor of EconomicsAre high food prices good or bad for poverty? http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2010/11/are-high-food-prices-good-or-bad-for-poverty.html) HS	In 2005, Oxfam International wrote: US and Europe[‘s s]urplus production is sold on world markets at artificially low prices, making it impossible for farmers in developing countries to compete. As a consequence, over 900 millions of farmers are losing their livelihoods. Three years later, following a substantial rise in food prices, Oxfam International’s view was that: Higher food prices have pushed millions of people in developing countries further into hunger and poverty. There are now 967 million malnourished people in the world In other words, the news on the food prices front is always bad for the world’s poor, regardless of whether prices are rising or falling. Why do these institutions always accentuate the negative? international organizations’ incentives to capture media attention, capitalize on “sudden shocks,” and emphasize the negative in the “news”	Any change in food prices causes millions to die; food price death is inevitable	2,332	80	874	378	14	133	0.037037	0.351852	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,915	The current commodity (agricultural and non-agricultural) price boom brings opportunities for increased government revenue and private sector income in exporting countries. At the same time, it presents a challenge as to how governments can best allocate windfall gains between consumption and investment. Thus, decisions made during the price boom are decisive for economic growth during periods of low prices. Several research efforts have identified a “resource curse”, meaning natural resourceabundant countries tend to grow more slowly than resource-scarce countries. However recent research points out that the impact on long-term growth varies with the type of export commodity (Collier and Goderis, 2007; Collier, 2007). Specifically for the African context, the resource curse relates primarily to oil and non-agricultural commodity price booms, while booming prices on agricultural commodities may, in fact, lead to higher economic growth both in the short and long run. Where the public sector derives a large share of its revenue through taxation of pricevolatile non-agricultural commodities, research has shown that such revenues are allocated in an unbalanced way that favours short-term consumption or relatively unproductive investment rather than savings and sound investments that will protect the economy during periods of lower prices. As a result, short-term growth is reversed when prices decline in the long run. On the other hand, agricultural export commodities compete for land and other input factors with other crops, thus limiting opportunities for rent seeking. Additionally, farmers make expenditure and investment decisions for additional income generated by an agricultural commodity boom that consider long-term consumption paths, investment opportunities, etc. This tends to lead to both short-term economic growth and longer-term economic growth. The policy implication is that the present agricultural commodity price boom provides an important opportunity for stimulating both short- and long-term growth if it is not, imprudently, taxed away and if the public sector provides the necessary resources in the form of public goods which will increase agricultural productivity.	FAOUN 08 (HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY: THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIOENERGY; http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload /foodclimate/HLCdocs/HLC08-inf-1-E.pdf) HS	The current commodity (agricultural and non-agricultural) price boom brings opportunities for increased government revenue and private sector income in exporting countries decisions made during the price boom are decisive for economic growth during periods of low prices. Several research efforts have identified a “resource curse”, meaning natural resourceabundant countries tend to grow more slowly than resource-scarce countries. However recent research points out that the impact on long-term growth varies with the type of export commodity Specifically for the African context, the resource curse relates primarily to oil and non-agricultural commodity price booms, while booming prices on agricultural commodities may, in fact, lead to higher economic growth both in the short and long run. , short-term growth is reversed when prices decline in the long run. On the other hand, agricultural export commodities compete for land and other input factors with other crops, thus limiting opportunities for rent seeking.	High food prices help long term economic sustainability	2,214	55	1,021	317	8	148	0.025237	0.466877	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,916	What explains the recent increase in agricultural prices? A combination of record low global inventory levels, weather induced supply side shocks, surging outside investor influence, record oil prices and structural changes in demand for grains and oilseeds due to biofuels have created the high prices. The question is whether it is a coincidence that the past and current high price levels coincide with high oil prices or whether other reasons for the current price peak are more important. 12 Effects on the supply side • Poor harvests in Australia, Ukraine and Europe for wheat and barley. According to FAO statistics, these three regions contributed on average 51% of total world barley production and 27% of total world wheat production for the period 200592006. Figure 8 Deviation from trend in yields (wheat and coarse grains) in tons/ha Source: OECD and FAO Secretariats. • Lower harvests in wheat and barley are more than compensated by a bumper harvest for corn worldwide. o Therefore, world cereal production increased in total even in 2007. o The bumper harvest in corn kept corn prices low and the wheat9corn spread increased significantly (see Figure 3). o Only recently have corn prices also strongly increased. 13 • Higher energy prices lead to higher food prices as costs (e.g. fertilizer, processing, and transport) increase. Higher transport costs induce higher price effects as distances increase. • CAP policies such as mandatory set9aside regulation or production quota restrained supply. Furthermore, there was a change from price to income support and compensatory payments became decoupled, set aside was introduced and export subsidies were diminished. Some of these measures limited supply within the EU. However, the general aim of the last CAP reforms was an enforcement of farmers’ ability to react to market signals instead of following policy signals given by market price support. Measures aimed to restrict supply, e.g. production quota or set9aside requirements, are instruments designed for a world with declining prices, but which may act to reinforce prices in case of food shortages. • Low prices in the last decades did not provide an incentive to invest in productivity enhancing technologies.	Banse et al 08 (Dutch Ministry of Agriculture; Why Are Current World Food Prices So High? http://www.agripressworld.com/_STUDIOEMMA_UPLOADS/downloads/opr24Y32.pdf) HS	What explains the recent increase in agricultural prices? A combination of record low global inventory levels, weather induced supply side shocks, surging outside investor influence, record oil prices and structural changes in demand for grains and oilseeds due to biofuels have created the high prices. 12 Effects on the supply side • Poor harvests in Australia, Ukraine and Europe for wheat and barley. According to FAO statistics, these three regions contributed on average 51% of total world barley production and 27% of total world wheat production • Lower harvests in wheat and barley are more than compensated by a bumper harvest for corn worldwide. o Therefore, world cereal production increased in total even in 2007 Higher energy prices lead to higher food prices as costs (e.g. fertilizer, processing, and transport) increase. Higher transport costs induce higher price effects as distances increase Measures aimed to restrict supply, e.g. production quota or set9aside requirements, are instruments designed for a world with declining prices, but which may act to reinforce prices in case of food shortages. • Low prices in the last decades did not provide an incentive to invest in productivity enhancing technologies.	Alt cause to Ag price spike – Laundry list	2,236	42	1,231	352	9	191	0.025568	0.542614	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,917	Long run drivers of demand (based on Scenar 2020, Nowicki et al., 2006) 1 Population and macro9economic growth are important drivers of demand for agricultural products. In past years, rapid population growth has accounted for the bulk of the increase in food demand for agricultural products, with a smaller effect from income changes and other factors (Nowicki et al., 2006)2 . The world’s population growth will fall to about 1% in the coming ten years. Continued economic growth is expected over the coming period in almost all regions of the world (see Figure 4). Expected population developments in period 200592020 • The world’s population growth will fall from 1.4% in the 199092003 period to about 1% in the coming ten years. This is mainly due to birth or fertility rates, which are declining and are expected to continue to do so. • Almost all annual population growth will occur in low and middle income countries, whose population growth rates are much higher than those in high income countries. • Europe’s share in world population has declined sharply and is projected to continue declining during the 21st century. • Population growth in Europe is very low (0.3% yearly for EU915) or slightly negative (90.2% for EU910). • The uncertainty with regard to birth and death rates at world or regional level is not too large. However, migration flows between countries and regions are much more uncertain.	Banse et al 08 (Dutch Ministry of Agriculture; Why Are Current World Food Prices So High? http://www.agripressworld.com/_STUDIOEMMA_UPLOADS/downloads/opr24Y32.pdf) HS	Long run drivers of demand 1 Population and macro9economic growth are important drivers of demand for agricultural products. In past years, rapid population growth has accounted for the bulk of the increase in food demand for agricultural products, with a smaller effect from other factors Almost all annual population growth will occur in low and middle income countries, whose population growth rates are much higher than those in high income countries	Population increases create a larger demand	1,417	43	454	235	6	71	0.025532	0.302128	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,918	That sneaking suspicion you get every time you arrive at the grocery checkout counter is right: food generally costs more than it did just 12 months ago. According to a recent statement presented to the U.S. House Committee on Agriculture, the Consumer Price Index, a measure of average prices for household and consumer goods, is projected to rise from 3.5 percent to 4.5 percent by year’s end. Prices are expected to remain high as global food production struggles to keep pace with the rising demand for commodities such as wheat and corn. While governments and consumers decry the steady increase in food prices, groups like the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are taking a harder look at some of the factors contributing to this rise—including the role of climate change. Changing climatic conditions, in particular the decline in water availability, are forcing farmers to continually adapt their agricultural production. According to the FAO, climate change has both environmental and socioeconomic outcomes for agriculture: changes in the availability and quality of land, soil, and water resources, for example, are later reflected in crop performance, which causes prices to rise. Climate change has been attributed to greater inconsistencies in agricultural conditions, ranging from more-erratic flood and drought cycles to longer growing seasons in typically colder climates. While the increase in Earth’s temperature is making some places wetter, it is also drying out already arid farming regions close to theEquator. This year’s Intergovermental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment report states that “increases in the frequency of droughts and floods are projected to affect local production negatively, especially in subsistence sectors at low latitudes.” The decline in production in the face of growing demand can drive up prices in markets that may lack the technology to fight environmental hazards to overall production. Such has been the case in Australia, where the once-fruitful food-production regions of New South Wales have been subject to a severe drought for the last five years. There is evidence of shifting rainfall patterns in the region, and a growing number of Australians now view this as a repercussion of climate change. The crop failures, economic hardship in rural communities, and subsequent jump in food prices are forcing the country to reassess its approach to climate change and to consider increasing food imports, a move that would drive prices up further. Speaking on the issue last year, Mike Rann, the premier of South Australia, remarked, “what we’re seeing with this drought is a frightening glimpse of the future with global warming.”	WWI 07 (World Watch Institute; Climate Change The Unseen Force Behind Rising Food Prices; http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5434) HS	Prices are expected to remain high as global food production struggles to keep pace with the rising demand for commodities such as wheat and corn Changing climatic conditions, in particular the decline in water availability, are forcing farmers to continually adapt their agricultural production. According to the FAO, climate change has both environmental and socioeconomic outcomes for agriculture: changes in the availability and quality of land, soil, and water resources, for example, are later reflected in crop performance, which causes prices to rise. Climate change has been attributed to greater inconsistencies in agricultural conditions, ranging from more-erratic flood and drought cycles to longer growing seasons in typically colder climates drying out already arid farming regions close to theEquator “increases in the frequency of droughts and floods are projected to affect local production negatively, especially in subsistence sectors at low latitudes.” The decline in production in the face of growing demand can drive up prices in markets that may lack the technology to fight environmental hazards to overall production. Such has been the case in Australia, have been subject to a severe drought for the last five years. There is evidence of shifting rainfall patterns in the region The crop failures, economic hardship in rural communities, and subsequent jump in food prices are forcing the country to reassess its approach to climate change and to consider increasing food imports,	Climate Change creates high food prices	2,717	39	1,506	423	6	228	0.014184	0.539007	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,919	There is a debate churning regarding what factors play a role in driving up the cost of food, with some blaming the Renewable Fuel Standard for spikes in prices. But because our margins rely so narrowly on these inputs, we know better than anyone that the culprit for increasing food prices isn’t corn prices or ethanol production, as some would have us believe. In fact, the prices of most of our business inputs are dependent on our nation’s addiction to fossil fuels, and specifically to oil. The cost of food is almost entirely made up of things like transportation and packaging, and the prices of these inputs increase as oil prices rise. The average distance food travels from source to plate is 1,500 miles – and with unstable gas prices, the cost of transportation adds up quickly. Because it is actually these production costs that dictate food prices, we see that oil prices drive up food prices in a near-perfect correlation. Some may claim that newly discovered U.S. reserves of oil and natural gas will help insulate the United States against volatile oil prices. But the reality is that because oil is an internationally traded commodity, oil price fluctuations are a global phenomenon. Increases in non-OPEC production (including here in the U.S.) simply allow OPEC producers to withhold portions of their supply, thereby keeping the total world supply artificially scarce and prices high. Increased transportation costs not only negatively affect supply chain costs for food shipment, they also affect personal transportation decisions. In an industry with notoriously high rates of turnover, rising gasoline prices mean higher barriers for our workers to even get to work, and increasing financial stresses when they can’t. Breaking this dependence on an unpredictable world market for limited oil supplies can only be achieved by creating oil alternatives such as ethanol and advanced biofuels. Conveniently, these same renewable fuels also offer us a solution to combating the deleterious effects of climate change – their combustion produces up to 60 percent fewer emissions than gasoline. The RFS has already been highly instrumental in combating rising gas prices, saving consumers $1.09 on every gallon of gasoline in 2011. For small businesses like ours, every penny in reduced costs allows us to invest in our operations and our employees. Our nation’s dependence on oil is raising those input costs, and while ethanol may not be a silver bullet, it is one of the only alternatives to oil that exists, and is a step in the right direction.	Barth 6/20 (Woody; Columnist for the Hill; The real cause of rising food prices;http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/306313-the-real-cause-of-rising-food-prices) HS	that the culprit for increasing food prices isn’t corn prices or ethanol production, the prices of most of our business inputs are dependent on our nation’s addiction to fossil fuels, and specifically to oil. The cost of food is almost entirely made up of things like transportation and packaging, and the prices of these inputs increase as oil prices rise. unstable gas prices, the cost of transportation adds up quickly. Because it is actually these production costs that dictate food prices, we see that oil prices drive up food prices in a near-perfect correlation. oil is an internationally traded commodity, oil price fluctuations are a global phenomenon. Increases in non-OPEC production (including here in the U.S.) simply allow OPEC producers to withhold portions of their supply, thereby keeping the total world supply artificially scarce and prices high. Increased transportation costs not only negatively affect supply chain costs for food shipment, they also affect personal transportation decisions. In an industry with notoriously high rates of turnover, rising gasoline prices mean higher barriers for our workers to even get to work, and increasing financial stresses when they can’t.	Oil prices is the main correlation for food price spikes	2,565	56	1,201	418	10	186	0.023923	0.444976	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,920	A parsimonious explanation that accounts for food price change dynamics over the past seven years can be based upon only two factors: speculation and corn to ethanol conversion. We can attribute the sharp peaks in 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 to speculation, and the underlying upward trend to biofuels. The impact of changes in all other factors is small enough to be neglected in comparison to these effects. Our analysis reinforces the conclu- sions of some economic studies that suggest that these factors have the largest influence [2, 152]. Our model provides a direct way to represent speculators, test if they can indeed be responsible for price e ects, and determine the magnitude of those e ects. Our back- ground check of the pricing mechanisms of the spot food price market confirms that futures prices are the primary price-setting mechanism, and that the duration of commodity bubbles is consistent with the delay in supply and demand restoring forces. Despite the artificial nature of speculation-driven price increases, the commodities futures market is coupled to actual food prices, and therefore to the ability of vulnerable populations – especially in poor countries – to buy food	Lagi et al. ‘11 Marco Lagi, Yavni Bar-Yam, Karla Z. Bertrand, and Yaneer Bar-Yam, researchers at MIT’s New England Complex Systems Institute; “The Food Crises: A quantitative model of food prices including speculators and ethanol conversion;” Sep 21, 2011; publ. NECSI http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_prices.pdf RMJ	A explanation for food price dynamics can be based upon only two factors: speculation and corn to ethanol conversion The impact of changes in all other factors is small enough to be neglected in comparison to these effects. Our analysis reinforces the conclu- sions of some economic studies that suggest that these factors have the largest influence Our back- ground check of the pricing mechanisms of the spot food price market confirms that futures prices are the primary price-setting mechanism, and that the duration of commodity bubbles is consistent Despite the artificial nature of speculation-driven price increases, the commodities futures market is coupled to actual food prices, and therefore to the ability of vulnerable populations – especially in poor countries – to buy food	Alt cause – ONLY speculation and ethanol can explain food price spikes – best economic models	1,195	93	789	191	16	124	0.08377	0.649215	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,921	The role of speculation in commodity prices has been considered for many years by highly regarded economists [78, 79]. There is a long history of speculative activity on commodity markets and regulations were developed to limit its e ects [123{125]. Recently, however, claims have been made that there is no possibility of speculator in uence on commodity prices because investors in the futures market do not receive commodities [75, 76]. We have investigated this claim by asking individuals who set prices at granaries (the spot market) and who monitor the prices at the US Department of Agriculture how they determine the prices at which to buy or sell [83, 84]. They state that spot market prices are set according to the Chicago Board of Trade futures exchange, assuming that it re ects otherwise hidden global information, with standard or special increments to incorporate transportation costs, pro ts, and when circumstances warrant, slight changes for over- or under-supply at a particular time in a granary. Thus the futures market serves as the starting point for spot market prices. The conceptual temporal paradox of assigning current prices based upon futures is not considered a problem, and this makes sense because grains can be stored for extended periods. If commodities futures investors determine their trading based upon supply and demand news, the use of the futures market to determine spot market prices, discounting storage costs, would be a self-consistent way of setting equilibrium prices [126{128]. But if investors are ine ective in considering news or are not motivated by supply and demand considera- tions, deviations from equilibrium and speculative bubbles are possible. When prices depart from equilibrium, accumulation or depletion of inventories may result in an equilibrium restoring force. This impact is, however, delayed by market mechanisms. Since producers and consumers generally hedge their sales and purchases through the futures market, trans- actions at a particular date may immediately impact food prices and decisions to sell and buy, but impact delivery of grains at a later time when contracts mature. The primary nancial consequences of a deviation of prices from equilibrium do not lead to equilibrium- 12restoring forces. Producers, consumers and speculators each have gains and losses relative to the equilibrium price, depending on the timing of their transactions, but the equilibrium price is not ibdenti ed by the market. Pro ts (losses) are made by speculators who own futures contracts as long as futures prices are increasing (decreasing), and by producers as long as the prices are above (below) equilibrium. When prices are above equilibrium con- sumers incur higher costs which may reduce demand. Producers may increase production due to higher expected sales prices. The result of this reduction and increase is an expected increase in inventories after a time delay: an agricultural or nancial planning cycle, which may be estimated to be six months to a year [85, 86]. Finally, the feedback between in- creased inventories and price corrections requires investors to change their purchases. First the information about increased inventories must become available. Even with information about increasing inventories, the existence of high futures prices can be interpreted as a sig- nal of increased future demand, further delaying market equilibration. Speculatively driven bubbles can thus be expected to have a natural duration of a year or longer (see Fig. 4). (We note that it is possible to relate trend following speculators to the \supply of storage" concept in which current inventories increase due to higher expected future prices [129, 130]. However, in doing so we encounter paradoxes of recursive logic, see Appendix D.) We review the empirical evidence for the role of speculation in food prices, which includes the timing of the food price spikes relative to the global financial crisis, the synchrony of food price spikes with other commodities that do not share supply and demand factors, the existence of large upwards and downwards movement of prices consistent with the expecta- tions of a bubble and bust cycle, statistical causality analysis of food prices increasing with commodity speculator activity, and an inability to account for the dynamics of prices with supply and demand equations despite many economic analyses. We add to these an explicit model of speculator dynamics which quantitatively ts the price dynamics. The mechanisms of speculator-driven food price increases can be understood from an analysis of the global consequences of the nancial crisis. This analysis connects the bursting of the US real estate market bubble and the nancial crisis of 2007-2008 to the global food price increases [131, 132]. Figure 4 shows the behavior of the mortgage market (housing prices), stock market (S&P 500), and several commodities: wheat, corn, silver, oil, and the FAO food price index. The increase in food prices coincided with the financial crisis and followed the decline of the housing and stock markets. An economic crisis would be 13expected to result in a decrease in commodity prices due to a drop in demand from lower overall economic activity. The observed counterintuitive increase in commodity prices can be understood from the behavior expected of investors in the aftermath of the collapse of the mortgage and stock markets: shifting assets to alternative investments, particularly the commodity futures market [133{135]. This creates a context for intermittent bubbles, where the prices increase due to the arti cial demand of investment, and then crash due to their inconsistency with actual supply and demand, only to be followed by another increase at the next upward uctuation. The absence of learning behavior can be explained either by the \greater fool theory," whereby professionals assume they can move their assets before the crash and leave losses to less skilled investors, or by the hypothesis that traders are active for just one price cycle, and that the next cycle will see new traders in the market. Even without a quantitative analysis, it is common to attribute rapid drops in prices to bubble and crash dynamics because the rapid upwards and downward movements are di cult to reconcile with normal fundamental supply and demand factors [2, 136, 137]. In addition to the timing of the peak in food prices after the stock market crash, the coin- cidence of peaks in unrelated commodities including food, precious and base metals, and oil indicates that speculation played a major role in the overall increase [138]. An explanation of the food price peaks in 2008 and 2011 based upon supply and demand must not only include an explanation of the rise in prices of multiple grains, including wheat, corn and rice, but must separately account for the rise in silver, oil and other prices. In contrast, speculator-driven commodity bubbles would coincide after the nancial crisis because of the synchronous movement of capital from the housing and stock markets to the commodity markets. Moreover, the current dominant form of speculator investment in commodity mar- kets is in index funds [77], which do not di erentiate the behavior of di erent commodities, as they are aggregate bets on the overall commodity market price behavior. Such investor activity acts in the same direction across all commodities, without regard to their distinct supply and demand conditions. The relative extent to which each type of commodity is a ected depends on the weighting factors of their representation in index fund investing activity compared to the inherent supply and demand related market activity. Recently, the growth of commodity investment activity has been studied in relation to commodity prices [2, 15, 78, 80]. Since index fund investments are almost exclusively bets on price increases (i.e. \long" rather than \short" investments), the investment activity is 14an indication of pressure for price increases. Increases in measures of investment have been found to precede the increases in prices in a time series (Granger) causality analysis [15, 80]. (An OECD study claiming that speculation played no role [139, 140], has been discounted due to invalid statistical methods [141].) Granger causality tests also show the influence of futures prices on spot market prices [81]. The causality analysis results provide statistical evidence of a role of speculative activity in commodity prices. However, they do not provide quantitative estimates of the magnitude of the in uence.	Lagi et al. ‘11 Marco Lagi, Yavni Bar-Yam, Karla Z. Bertrand, and Yaneer Bar-Yam, researchers at MIT’s New England Complex Systems Institute; “The Food Crises: A quantitative model of food prices including speculators and ethanol conversion;” Sep 21, 2011; publ. NECSI http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_prices.pdf RMJ	the US Department of Agriculture state that spot market prices are set according to the Chicago Board of Trade futures exchange Thus the futures market serves as the starting point for spot market prices. The conceptual temporal paradox of assigning current prices based upon futures is not considered a problem, and this makes sense because grains can be stored for extended periods We review the empirical evidence for the role of speculation in food prices, which includes the timing of the food price spikes relative to the global financial crisis, the synchrony of food price spikes with other commodities that do not share supply and demand factors, the existence of large upwards and downwards movement of prices consistent with the expecta- tions of a bubble and bust cycle, statistical causality analysis of food prices increasing with commodity speculator activity, and an inability to account for the dynamics of prices with supply and demand equations despite many economic analyses The increase in food prices coincided with the financial crisis and followed the decline of the housing and stock markets. An economic crisis would be 13expected to result in a decrease in commodity prices due to a drop in demand from lower overall economic activity In addition to the timing of the peak in food prices after the stock market crash, the coin- cidence of peaks in unrelated commodities including food, precious and base metals, and oil indicates that speculation played a major role in the overall increase [138]. An explanation of the food price peaks in 2008 and 2011 based upon supply and demand must not only include an explanation of the rise in prices of multiple grains, including wheat, corn and rice, but must separately account for the rise in silver, oil and other prices. In contrast, speculator-driven commodity bubbles would coincide after the nancial crisis because of the synchronous movement of capital from the housing and stock markets to the commodity markets investor activity acts in the same direction across all commodities, without regard to their distinct supply and demand conditions An OECD study claiming that speculation played no role [139, 140], has been discounted due to invalid statistical methods [141].) Granger causality tests also show the influence of futures prices on spot market prices [81]. The causality analysis results provide statistical evidence of a role of speculative activity in commodity prices	Speculation explains food prices – they’re not tied to supply	8,613	61	2,459	1,355	10	393	0.00738	0.290037	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,922	High prices are their own worst enemy. Increased profit margins entice entrepreneurial investment, which results in increased production. Lower market prices inevitably follow. The ‘invisible hand’ of Adam Smith ensures that winners’ gains and losers’ losses will be temporary, as entrepreneurs correct market imbalances. In the USA, in the 2008 spring planting farmers are shifting from maize to wheat and soybeans, setting the prices of the latter on a downward trajectory and stabilising the price of the former. - Higher prices induce more production as planted areas increase and available arable land will be used more intensively. Therefore, the current situation is not structural and as a result prices will go down again. However, first stocks have to be built up again. Both effects take some time. In Brazil and Russia there are ample opportunities as additional land can be taken into production, whereas in many other countries production can only be higher due to intensification. According to USDA analyses, Russia, Ukraine and Argentina can become one of the world’s top grain exporters. - R&D investments in agriculture (e.g. yields, etc) become more profitable with higher food prices. - Strategic stocks are essential to limit price volatility in world agricultural markets, but they are costly.	Banse et al 08 (Dutch Ministry of Agriculture; Why Are Current World Food Prices So High? http://www.agripressworld.com/_STUDIOEMMA_UPLOADS/downloads/opr24Y32.pdf) HS	. Increased profit margins entice entrepreneurial investment, which results in increased production. Lower market prices inevitably follow , as entrepreneurs correct market imbalances. In the USA, in the 2008 spring planting farmers are shifting from maize to wheat and soybeans, setting the prices of the latter on a downward trajectory and stabilising the price of the former. - Higher prices induce more production as planted areas increase and available arable land will be used more intensively R&D investments in agriculture (e.g. yields, etc) become more profitable with higher food prices. - Strategic stocks are essential to limit price volatility in world agricultural markets, but they are costly.	Increased international production and crop shift checks high prices – empirics prove	1,315	85	708	205	12	107	0.058537	0.521951	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,923	Rising food prices hit the world’s poor extremely hard. The World Bank estimates that the spike in food prices since June has placed 44 million people into extreme poverty. The good news is the United States and Brazil are well-positioned to help reverse these trends. They are the largest economies in the Western Hemisphere and they are recognized global agricultural superpowers. The United States is the largest agricultural exporter in the world and Brazil is ranked third. The two nations are also ranked number one (United States) and two (Brazil) in the production and export of soybeans, beef, and poultry, and they are major producers of corn, cotton, and pork. They both share impressive records in agricultural research and innovation. Confronting the rise in current food prices and achieving lasting global food security will require long-term investment in developing countries’ agricultural development. The United States and Brazil will also need to impart lessons learned—some good, some not-so-good—from their respective experiences increasing food production. Brazil has made remarkable progress in agriculture development in the last 40 years. Strengthening U.S.-Brazil links on food security creates an opportunity to assess and draw on Brazil’s efforts in agricultural production. Several of the methods and conditions the United States and Brazil have used are simply not practical elsewhere. Clearly, exclusive reliance on the large-scale, energy-intensive industrial agriculture model that the United States and Brazil are frequently associated with will neither be sustainable nor appropriate for boosting agricultural production in the vast majority of the world. Nonetheless, the Brazilian experience—explained in brief in the next section—can help guide ongoing efforts to boost agricultural development in the developing world as an essential component of meeting the world’s food security needs. That experience should be combined with an emphasis on meeting local agriculture needs with local knowledge, sustainable techniques, and less resource-intensive farming in developing countries.	Caldwell, ’11. Jake Caldwell is the Director of Policy for Agriculture, Trade & Energy at American Progress. March 18, 2011. “A U.S.-Brazil Alliance to Strengthen Global Food Security.” Center for American Progress. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2011/03/18/9256/a-u-s-brazil-alliance-to-strengthen-global-food-security/ - clawan	Rising food prices hit the world’s poor extremely hard the United States and Brazil are well-positioned to help reverse these trends. They are the largest economies in the Western Hemisphere and they are recognized global agricultural superpowers. The United States is the largest agricultural exporter in the world and Brazil is ranked third. They both share impressive records in agricultural research and innovation. Strengthening U.S.-Brazil links on food security creates an opportunity to assess and draw on Brazil’s efforts in agricultural production Several of the methods and conditions the United States and Brazil have used are simply not practical elsewhere the Brazilian experience can help guide ongoing efforts to boost agricultural development in the developing world as an essential component of meeting the world’s food security needs. should be combined with an emphasis on meeting local agriculture needs	U.S.-Brazilian ag cooperation resolves global food security – leadership and tech	2,121	81	924	308	11	138	0.035714	0.448052	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,924	Brazil is in economic overdrive. The economy grew in 2010 at a rate of 7.5 percent, and Brazil is now the seventh-largest economy in the world. Brazil’s growth in the agricultural sector is even more impressive. It made the successful transition from a net food importer in the 1970s to a net food exporter powerhouse. The value of Brazil’s crops grew 300 percent in the last 16 years. Brazil is nearly the physical size of the United States and it is blessed with substantial land and water resources. But the majority of its agricultural production gains in recent years have been a result of boosting yields and less a result of increased land use. The country is undoubtedly using more land for agriculture. Land under cultivation has increased by one-third and numerous challenges remain to ensure biodiversity conservation is not overrun by agriculture and deforestation in the cerrado and Amazon regions. In general, however, agricultural production is 10 times the level of land use. Grain production in the cerrado increased 129.7 percent from 1991 to 2007 but the corresponding area cultivated increased by only 25.9 percent. Brazil’s success increasing yields is less about importing and attempting to replicate other nations’ identical agricultural successes of the past. That approach rarely works. Brazil’s achievements are instead more noteworthy for blending agricultural research and innovation with actual conditions on the ground. As Brazil developed its agricultural sector, both the private and public sector dedicated resources to agricultural research and the United States provided considerable support. Brazil focused on enhancing soil quality, low-technology cross-breeding of plant varieties, and a willingness to explore innovative techniques such as no-till agriculture that results in more nutrient and carbon-rich soil. Brazil has also made impressive commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 36 percent to 39 percent by 2020 by reducing deforestation by 80 percent in the Amazon and 40 percent in the cerrado savannah. Brazil can put this knowledge and experience to use in helping the rest of the developing world enhance its agricultural development.	Caldwell, ’11. Jake Caldwell is the Director of Policy for Agriculture, Trade & Energy at American Progress. March 18, 2011. “A U.S.-Brazil Alliance to Strengthen Global Food Security.” Center for American Progress. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2011/03/18/9256/a-u-s-brazil-alliance-to-strengthen-global-food-security/ - clawan	Brazil is in economic overdrive. Brazil’s growth in the agricultural sector is even more impressive. It made the successful transition from a net food importer in the 1970s to a net food exporter powerhouse. Brazil is blessed with substantial land and water resources the majority of its agricultural production gains in recent years have been a result of boosting yields and less a result of increased land use agricultural production is 10 times the level of land use Brazil’s success increasing yields is less about importing and attempting to replicate other nations’ identical agricultural successes of the past. Brazil’s blending agricultural research and innovation with actual conditions on the ground both the private and public sector dedicated resources to agricultural research and the United States provided considerable support. Brazil has also made impressive commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions Brazil can put this knowledge and experience to use in helping the rest of the developing world enhance its agricultural development.	Brazilian model for development can benefit global ag – efficiency and sustainability	2,190	85	1,055	337	12	160	0.035608	0.474777	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,925	Today’s rising global food prices are a harbinger of things to come. FAO experts estimate global agricultural productivity must double in 40 years to keep pace with increased demand and a projected global population of 9.1 billion in 2050. Climate change’s impact on agriculture and development in developing countries is projected to be particularly acute. More than 1 billion of the world’s poor depend on agriculture for their livelihood and it is predicted that severe crop losses leading to food shortages in Africa and South Asia will happen in a much shorter timeframe than previously anticipated. Agriculture productivity is a fundamental building block of economic development and poverty reduction in many developing countries. The United States and developed countries have neglected investment in agricultural development and small farmers in developing countries for too long. Investment in agriculture programs has shrunk to 3.5 percent of all U.S. overseas development assistance from 18 percent in 1979. Agricultural productivity growth in developing countries has dropped below 1 percent. Greater collaboration on food security between the United States and Brazil can reverse this dangerous course. For starters, they will need to rethink the sustainability of exporting industrial-level, energy-intensive agriculture productivity to developing countries. This approach is unlikely to meet global food security needs over the long term in a resource-constrained world. A more diverse strategy is needed. Instead, the United States and Brazil should provide technical assistance, training, and financial incentives to developing countries to enhance food security and adapt to the destructive impacts of climate change. The two nations should focus on agricultural production that preserves the soil and water supply, promotes crop diversification, encourages local agricultural knowledge and the role of women farmers, and reduces dependence on fossil fuels and other high-cost inputs. It will be vital for the private and public sector in the United States and Brazil to fund agricultural research to increase food production yields, conserve biodiversity, and combat pests and disease in a safe and transparent manner. The United States and Brazil are also the global leaders in the production and export of biofuels. They have a mutual interest in ensuring that future biofuels production moves forward in a sustainable manner in a world experiencing growing competition for grain and natural resources. The next generation of biofuels does have a role to play in diversifying the energy needs of the United States and Brazil and other countries. But ongoing progress will require action to ensure biofuels are done smarter and better. The United States and Brazil should strive to produce advanced biofuels that deliver measurable lifecycle greenhouse gas reductions, use feedstocks grown sustainably or nonfood-based feedstocks, and are produced in closed containers or on semiarable land that minimizes competition with food or feed. The two countries should collaborate immediately to leverage funding, increase private investment, coordinate trade policy, and expedite the deployment of technology to spur advanced biofuels development in developing countries. Coming together The United States and Brazil have an opportunity and a responsibility to lead the fight against one of the greatest challenges of the 21st century: food security. Making the world more food secure is an urgent but achievable goal, and the 50th anniversary of the Alliance for Progress is a fitting moment to strengthen this joint effort. In the medium term we can expect global food prices to remain high due to increased demand, low stocks, high oil prices, and increasing vulnerability of harvests to the impacts of climate change. The world food system must transform to meet these challenges. An emboldened strategic partnership on food security between the United States and Brazil will require an honest assessment of conventional resource-intensive past practices. Only the best ideas that meet local needs and contribute to increasing yields and sustainable production should be deployed in developing countries. Together, the United States and Brazil can strengthen agricultural investment and development in developing countries to meet the needs of a growing world population. Words must be turned into action.	Caldwell, ’11. Jake Caldwell is the Director of Policy for Agriculture, Trade & Energy at American Progress. March 18, 2011. “A U.S.-Brazil Alliance to Strengthen Global Food Security.” Center for American Progress. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2011/03/18/9256/a-u-s-brazil-alliance-to-strengthen-global-food-security/ - clawan	Today’s rising global food prices are a harbinger of things to come Climate change’s impact on agriculture and development in developing countries is projected to be particularly acute re than 1 billion of the world’s poor depend on agriculture for their livelihood severe crop losses leading to food shortages Agriculture productivity is a fundamental building block of economic development and poverty reduction Greater collaboration on food security between the United States and Brazil can reverse this dangerous course. they will need to rethink the sustainability of exporting industrial-level agriculture to developing countries. This approach is unlikely to meet global food security needs over the long term Instead, the United States and Brazil should provide technical assistance and incentives to developing countries to enhance food security The two nations should focus on agricultural production that preserves supply, promotes crop diversification, and reduces dependence on fossil fuels The United States and Brazil have an opportunity and a responsibility to lead the fight against food security. Together, the United States and Brazil can strengthen agricultural investment and development in developing countries to meet the needs of a growing world population	Agriculture collaboration solves best – global tech assistance and adaptation to climate change	4,424	95	1,280	661	13	187	0.019667	0.282905	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,926	An Iowa State University grain markets expert said this week that a combination of long-term trends and recent weather patterns are responsible for putting Brazil in a position this year to overtake U.S. soybean production for the first time. A report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture released Friday predicted that Brazil's soybean production would eclipse the United States. Chad Hart, an ISU Extension and Outreach grain markets specialist and associate professor of economics, said USDA predicted a similar scenario earlier in the year and updated its forecast on Friday. Hart said the general trend in recent years has pointed toward Brazil eventually surpassing the United States, but he said the 2012 drought that withered much of the prime U.S. farmland hastened Brazil's ascent among the world's top soybean producers. "This has been building over a long period of time, but this year will be a milestone," Hart said. "The United States has been the dominant producer of corn and soybeans for quite some time. For Brazil to ramp up dramatically and catch us, it shows the changing global conditions behind the crop markets."	ISU, 3/12/13, Iowa State Univ., [Card quotes Chad Hart, an ISU Extension and Outreach grain markets specialist and associate professor of economics] Brazil to overtake US as top soybean produce, http://phys.org/news/2013-03-brazil-soybean.html	An Iowa State University grain markets expert said this week that a combination of long-term trends and recent weather patterns are responsible for putting Brazil in a position this year to overtake U.S. soybean production for the first time. . Hart said the general trend in recent years has pointed toward Brazil eventually surpassing the United States, but he said the 2012 drought that withered much of the prime U.S. farmland hastened Brazil's ascent among the world's top soybean producers. "	Alt Cause: US Soybean decline a result of weather patterns	1,140	58	498	184	10	81	0.054348	0.440217	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,927	The destruction of Amazon rainforest has reached its lowest level since monitoring began 24 years ago, the Brazilian government says. Environment minister Izabella Teixeira said it was thanks to government action against offenders. Figures show the rate of deforestation fell 27% in the year to July compared lowest deforestation rate since Brazil began its monitoring," Ms Teixeira told a press conference. "I believe that it is the only good piece of environmental news." Deforestation rates in the Amazon have been declining since 2004 but critics say recent changes to Brazil's forest protection code could reverse that trend. “Start Quote Environment minister Izabella Teixeira Regrettably we have noticed that in states that didn't used to have an aggressive level of deforestation there has been a rise” Environment minister Izabella Teixeira The latest data from the National Institute of Space Research relates to a period before a change in the code which environmentalists say eases the protection designed to prevent deforestation - a claim the government disputes.	BBC, 12, [Card quotes Brazilian Environment Minister Izabella Teixeira], http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20512722	The destruction of Amazon rainforest has reached its lowest level since monitoring began 24 years ago, the Brazilian government says. Environment minister Izabella Teixeira said it was thanks to government action against offenders. Figures show the rate of deforestation fell 27% in the year to July compared lowest deforestation rate since Brazil began its monitoring," Ms Teixeira told a press conference. "I believe that it is the only good piece of environmental news."	Status Quo Solves Deforestation- Brazilian Government Regulations	1,077	65	473	165	7	73	0.042424	0.442424	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,928	Brazil enjoys the "privilege" of having the world's biggest rainforest and can be proud of its conservation efforts, President Dilma Rousseff has said. Ms Rousseff was speaking just days before the UN sustainable development conference begins in Rio de Janeiro. Speaking on her regular Monday radio broadcast, Ms Rousseff highlighted data showing deforestation at a record low. She recently vetoed parts of a forest law but critics say the bill still relaxes environmental rules too much. Ms Rousseff said she was proud that Brazil had managed to curb deforestation of the Amazon region. She said it was "the result of the government's strong action" in policing environmental crimes and promoting less aggressive development policies. "It's important too that we have offered alternatives... to people who live in the rainforest, so they can be productive and earn their living without destroying the environment." Brazil had begun to design and implement a new model of sustainable development, she said, one that would be presented during the Rio+20 summit. The preparatory phase of the meeting, held 20 years after the first Earth Summit in Rio, begins on Wednesday. The main government delegations will be in the city between 20-22 June.	BBC, 12, [Card quotes Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff, on Environmental Policy] Brazil President Rousseff 'proud' of forest protection, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18396917	Brazil enjoys the "privilege" of having the world's biggest rainforest and can be proud of its conservation efforts, President Dilma Rousseff has said. Ms Rousseff was speaking just days before the UN sustainable development conference begins in Rio de Janeiro. Speaking on her regular Monday radio broadcast, Ms Rousseff highlighted data showing deforestation at a record low. Ms Rousseff said she was proud that Brazil had managed to curb deforestation of the Amazon region. She said it was "the result of the government's strong action" in policing environmental crimes and promoting less aggressive development policies. "It's important too that we have offered alternatives... to people who live in the rainforest, so they can be productive and earn their living without destroying the environment." Brazil had begun to design and implement a new model of sustainable development, she said, one that would be presented during the Rio+20 summit.	Status Quo Solves Deforestation- Brazil implementing new model of sustainable development	1,242	89	949	197	11	147	0.055838	0.746193	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,929	Cattle ranching is the leading cause of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. This has been the case since at least the 1970s: government figures attributed 38 percent of deforestation from 1966-1975 to large-scale cattle ranching. Today the figure is closer to 60 percent, according to research by Brazil's National Institute for Space Research (INPE) and its Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa). Most of the beef is destined for urban markets, whereas leather and other cattle products are primarily for export markets. Brazil is today the world's largest exporter and producer of beef. Much of its expansion has taken place in the Amazon, which currently has more than 80 million head of cattle, up from 26.6 million in 1990 and equivalent to more than 85 percent of the total U.S. herd. The Brazilian Amazon has more than 214,000 square miles of pasture, an open space larger than France.	Butler 12, Rhett A Butler, [President and Editor-in-chief of mongabay.com, WildMadagascar.org, co-founder of Tropical Conservation Science, an open-access academic journal, Tropical Forest Network, Rhett Butler has advised a wide range of organizations, including governments, multilateral development agencies, media outlets, academic institutions, foundations, and private sector entities. He has been an information source for the BBC, CNN, CBS, NBC, Fox News, National Geographic, the Wall Street Journal, Fortune Magazine, Business Week, Bloomberg, the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Reuters, Voice of America, the Associated Press, the San Francisco Chronicle, the L.A. Times, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Forbes, among others.] http://www.mongabay.com/brazil.html	Cattle ranching is the leading cause of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Most of the beef is destined for urban markets, whereas leather and other cattle products are primarily for export markets. Brazil is today the world's largest exporter and producer of beef. Much of its expansion has taken place in the Amazon, which currently has more than 80 million head of cattle, up from 26.6 million in 1990 and equivalent to more than 85 percent of the total U.S. herd. The Brazilian Amazon has more than 214,000 square miles of pasture, an open space larger than France	Alt Cause to Deforestation- Cattle Ranching	901	43	572	146	6	98	0.041096	0.671233	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,930	Road construction in the Amazon leads to deforestation. Roads provide access to logging and mining sites while opening forest frontier land to exploitation by poor landless farmers. Brazil's Trans-Amazonian Highway was one of the most ambitious economic development programs ever devised, and one of the most spectacular failures. In the 1970s, Brazil planned a 2,000-mile highway that would bisect the massive Amazon forest, opening rainforest lands to (1) settlement by poor farmers from the crowded, drought-plagued north and (2) development of timber and mineral resources. Colonists would be granted a 250-acre lot, six-months' salary, and easy access to agricultural loans in exchange for settling along the highway and converting the surrounding rainforest into agricultural land. The plan would grow to cost Brazil US$65,000 (1980 dollars) to settle each family, a staggering amount for Brazil, a developing country at the time. The project was plagued from the start. The sediments of the Amazon Basin rendered the highway unstable and subject to inundation during heavy rains, blocking traffic and leaving crops to rot. Harvest yields for peasants were dismal since the forest soils were quickly exhausted, and new forest had to be cleared annually. Logging was difficult due to the widespread distribution of commercially valuable trees. Rampant erosion, up to 40 tons of soil per acre (100 tons/ha) occurred after clearing. Many colonists, unfamiliar with banking and lured by easy credit, went deep into debt. Adding to the economic and social failures of the project, are the long-term environmental costs. After the construction of the Trans-Amazonian Highway, Brazilian deforestation accelerated to levels never before seen and vast swaths of forest were cleared for subsistence farmers and cattle-ranching schemes. The Trans-Amazonian Highway is a prime example of the environmental havoc that is caused by road construction in the rainforest.	Butler 12, Rhett A Butler, [President and Editor-in-chief of mongabay.com, WildMadagascar.org, co-founder of Tropical Conservation Science, an open-access academic journal, Tropical Forest Network, Rhett Butler has advised a wide range of organizations, including governments, multilateral development agencies, media outlets, academic institutions, foundations, and private sector entities. He has been an information source for the BBC, CNN, CBS, NBC, Fox News, National Geographic, the Wall Street Journal, Fortune Magazine, Business Week, Bloomberg, the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Reuters, Voice of America, the Associated Press, the San Francisco Chronicle, the L.A. Times, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Forbes, among others.] http://www.mongabay.com/brazil.html	Road construction in the Amazon leads to deforestation. Roads provide access to logging and mining sites while opening forest frontier land to exploitation by poor landless farmers. Brazil's Trans-Amazonian Highway was one of the most ambitious economic development programs ever devised, and one of the most spectacular failures. I The sediments of the Amazon Basin rendered the highway unstable and subject to inundation during heavy rains, blocking traffic and leaving crops to rot. Adding to the economic and social failures of the project, are the long-term environmental costs. After the construction of the Trans-Amazonian Highway, Brazilian deforestation accelerated to levels never before seen and vast swaths of forest were cleared for subsistence farmers and cattle-ranching schemes. The Trans-Amazonian Highway is a prime example of the environmental havoc that is caused by road construction in the rainforest.	Alt Cause to Deforestation- Infrastructure development.	1,960	56	923	296	6	136	0.02027	0.459459	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,931	In the past, scientists scorned the “secondary forests,” as the new growth is called. There is no doubt that they are not nearly as spectacular as the species-rich primary forests, with their giant trees, which are often centuries old; and they are not home to nearly as many animal and plant species. But now a growing number of biologists are interested in this previously ignored vegetation. According to a United Nations study, the ecological importance of these new forests, which are “growing dramatically” all over the world, is “undervalued.” Is the rain forest truly recovering from overexploitation? And could it be that the consequences of deforestation are not as devastating as environmentalists have been preaching for years? “There are more secondary than primary rain forests in most tropical countries today,” explains American biologist Joe Wright. “On the whole, the amount of land covered by vegetation is stable.” In tropical countries, in particular, rural flight and urbanization have led to more and more farmers abandoning their fields, allowing new vegetation to grow rampant on the fallow ground. “The numbers speak for themselves,” Wright says.	Salon, 9, Salon.com, No author given, Quotes Biologist Joe Wright, http://www.salon.com/2009/08/17/rainforest_recovery/	In the past, scientists scorned the “secondary forests,” as the new growth is called. .” Is the rain forest truly recovering from overexploitation? And could it be that the consequences of deforestation are not as devastating as environmentalists have been preaching for years? “There are more secondary than primary rain forests in most tropical countries today,” explains American biologist Joe Wright “On the whole, the amount of land covered by vegetation is stable.” In tropical countries, in particular, rural flight and urbanization have led to more and more farmers abandoning their fields, allowing new vegetation to grow rampant on the fallow ground. “The numbers speak for themselves,” Wright says.	Impact Overstated- Secondary Forests	1,172	36	709	183	4	109	0.021858	0.595628	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,932	4. Farm Subsidies Damage U.S. Trade Relations. Global stability and U.S. security are enhanced when less developed countries achieve stronger economic growth. America can further that end by encouraging the reduction of trade barriers. However, U.S. and European farm subsidies and agricultural import barriers are a serious hurdle to making progress in global trade agreements. U.S. sugar protections, for example, benefit only a very small group of U.S. growers but are blocking broader free trade within the Americas. The World Trade Organization estimates that even a one-third drop in all tariffs around the world would boost global output by $686 billion, including $164 billion for the United States.30 Trade liberalization would boost the exports of U.S. goods that are competitive on world markets, including many agricultural products, but U.S. farm subsidies and protections stand in the way of that goal.	Edwards, 9 (Chris, Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of www.DownsizingGovernment.org, June 2009, “Agricultural Subsidies,” CATO Institute, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/agriculture/subsidies)	Global stability and U.S. security are enhanced when less developed countries achieve stronger economic growth. , U.S. and European farm subsidies and agricultural import barriers are a serious hurdle to making progress in global trade agreements . The W T O estimates that even a one-third drop in all tariffs around the world would boost global output by $686 billion Trade liberalization would boost the exports of U.S. goods that are competitive on world markets, including many agricultural products but U.S. farm subsidies and protections stand in the way of that goal.	Strong US agricultural system hurts US relations with other countries	916	69	575	140	10	92	0.071429	0.657143	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,933	Clearing the Amazon rainforest for soy farms will help address the global food crisis, said Blairo Maggi, the governor of Brazil's chief soy-producing state, according to the Folha de Sao Paulo newspaper. In comments published Friday, the Mato Grosso governor defended the recent surge in Amazon deforestation. "With the worsening of the global food crisis, the time is coming when it will be inevitable to discuss whether we preserve the environment or produce more food. There is no way to produce more food without occupying more land and taking down more trees," Maggi told Folha de Sao Paulo. "In this moment of crisis, the world needs to understand that the country has space to raise its production."	Mongobay 08, 'Soy King' says Amazon deforestation could help solve global food crisis mongabay.com April 28, 2008 [Card quotes Blairo Maggi, Governor of Matto Graso] http://news.mongabay.com/2008/0428-brazil.html	Clearing the Amazon rainforest for soy farms will help address the global food crisis "With the worsening of the global food crisis, the time is coming when it will be inevitable to discuss whether we preserve the environment or produce more food. There is no way to produce more food without occupying more land and taking down more trees," Maggi told Folha de Sao Paulo. "In this moment of crisis, the world needs to understand that the country has space to raise its production."	Amazon Deforestation Good- Solves food Shortages	709	48	484	117	6	84	0.051282	0.717949	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,934	In a new book, The Coming Famine: The Global Food Crisis and What We Can Do to Avoid It, Professor Julian Cribb argues a catastrophic global food shortage will hit by mid-century. His predictions paint a glum picture of the perfect storm that could threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people: Populations will grow to 9.2 billion by 2050 and in turn double today’s global food requirement and outstrip growth in food output. Combined with unpredictable extreme weather patterns, droughts will haunt those most vulnerable and lead to crop failures, food riots and war. Food prices will inevitably spike with a rising demand for protein foods such as meat, milk, fish and eggs. Growing shortages of water and less productive land to yield crops will further hinder the world’s future food production. “The world has ignored the ominous constellation of factors that now make feeding humanity sustainably our most pressing task – even in times of economic and climatic crisis,” writes Professor Cribb. But Professor Cribb isn’t the only scientist clamoring for politicians to take climate change seriously. In a recent study by the ARC Center of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, it warned of a potential mass extinction as the number of ocean dead zones – waters starved of oxygen – increase at an accelerating pace. The Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research also put out a study that shows the increasing likelihood of frightening changes to rainfall, water supplies, weather systems, sea levels and crop harvests by the end of the century.	Kelly 10, Tara Kelly, New York Times, [Card quotes Professor Julian Cribb, Writer, The Coming Famine, specialises in the communication of science, agriculture, mining, energy and the environment, newspaper editor, scientific editor at The Australian newspaper, national awareness director for CSIRO, and president of national professional bodies for agricultural journalism and science communication.] http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/12/07/impending-crisis-earth-to-run-out-of-food-by-2050/	In a new book, The Coming Famine: The Global Food Crisis and What We Can Do to Avoid It, Professor Julian Cribb argues a catastrophic global food shortage will hit by mid-century. His predictions paint a glum picture of the perfect storm that could threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people: Populations will grow to 9.2 billion by 2050 and in turn double today’s global food requirement and outstrip growth in food output. Combined with unpredictable extreme weather patterns, droughts will haunt those most vulnerable and lead to crop failures, food riots and war. Food prices will inevitably spike with a rising demand for protein foods such as meat, milk, fish and eggs. Growing shortages of water and less productive land to yield crops will further hinder the world’s future food production. “The world has ignored the ominous constellation of factors that now make feeding humanity sustainably our most pressing task – even in times of economic and climatic crisis,” writes Professor Cribb. In a recent study by the ARC Center of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, it warned of a potential mass extinction as the number of ocean dead zones – waters starved of oxygen – increase at an accelerating pace. The Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research also put out a study that shows the increasing likelihood of frightening changes to rainfall, water supplies, weather systems, sea levels and crop harvests by the end of the century.	Food Shortages lead to extinction within the century	1,559	52	1,453	256	8	241	0.03125	0.941406	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,935	The influx of Mexicans, which has dominated U.S. immigration patterns for four decades, began to tumble in 2006 and 2007 as the housing bust and recession created a dearth of jobs. At the same time, the number of Mexicans returning to their native country along with their U.S.-born children soared.¶ Stricter border enforcement, more deportations and tough state immigration laws such as the Arizona statute being challenged before the Supreme Court on Wednesday probably also contributed to the shift, says Jeffrey Passel, lead author of the report. The study analyzed data from censuses and a variety of other sources in both countries.¶ STORY: Supreme Court weighs fate of immigration law¶ "There was a suspicion that people were going back" but results of the Mexican census confirmed it, he says. "They point to a fairly large number of people going back to Mexico."¶ From 2005 to 2010, 1.4 million Mexicans came to the USA— down by more than half from the 3 million who came from 1995 to 2000. From 2005 to 2010 , the number of Mexicans who moved from the USA to Mexico rose to 1.4 million, roughly double the number who had done so 10 years before.¶ Passel says the data suggest that the return flow to Mexico probably surpassed the incoming flow in the last two years	Nasser 12 [Haya el Nasser; USA Today; More Mexicans returning home, fewer immigrating to U.S.; http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-04-23/mexican-immigration-united-states/54487564/1; Demographic reporter for USA Today]	The influx of Mexicans, which has dominated U.S. immigration patterns for four decades, began to tumble in 2006 and 2007 At the same time, the number of Mexicans returning to their native country along with their U.S.-born children soared. tough immigration laws such as the Arizona statute being challenged before the Supreme Court on Wednesday probably contributed to the shift The study analyzed data from censuses and a variety of other sources in both countries results point to a fairly large number of people going back to Mexico. the number of Mexicans who moved from the USA to Mexico rose to 1.4 million, roughly double the number who had done so 10 years before.¶ Passel says the data suggest that the return flow to Mexico probably surpassed the incoming flow in the last two years	Illegal immigration is down	1,276	27	793	220	4	135	0.018182	0.613636	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,936	The ambiguity and expansiveness of the new border security mission is paralleled by the Border Patrol’s apparent inability to evaluate the threats and risks to border security and to assess the degree to which the border is secure. The Border Patrol has squandered much of the goodwill, trust and credibility that resounded to its border control mission after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The billions of dollars wasted in flawed high-tech projects, and the agency’s unwillingness to subject its many new border-security initiatives to cost-benefit evaluations and risk-based assessments, have given rise to new skepticism about border policy. The Border Patrol rightly links its security mission to an assessment of risks and threats and to a new risk-management commitment. Yet, as has been the practice of the Border Patrol both before and after 9/11, there is no evidence that the agency has instituted rigorous risk-based strategies for its operations and resource distributions. The Border Patrol implicitly equates numbers and threats. In the post-9/11 lexicon, all illegal entries are defined as threats. Rather than undertaking traditional threat assessments, the Border Patrol has dumbed down its definitions of threats and risks. Its risk-based, intelligence-driven strategy, therefore, identifies the areas of highest risk as the areas of the border with the highest number of illegal entries. Securing the Border Against Foreign Terrorists * *The Border Patrol asserts that its main mission is to protect the homeland against terrorists and terrorist weapons. The joint mission of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Border Patrol states: We are the guardians of our Nation’s borders. We are America’s frontline. We safeguard the American homeland at and beyond our borders. We protect the American public against terrorists and the instruments of terror. Inexplicably, the agency has never included terrorism protection as a performance indicator. Nor has the Border Patrol offered any evidence that its “intelligence-driven” border security programs actually focus on terrorists and terrorist networks.	Barry 13 (Tom, January 9, 2013, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy in Wash. DC. “With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What Does It Really Mean?” http://www.alternet.org/immigration/resurrection-immigration-reform-well-hear-lot-about-securing-our-borders-what-does-it)	The expansiveness of the new border security mission is paralleled by the Border Patrol’s apparent inability to evaluate the threats and risks to border security and to assess the degree to which the border is secure. The billions of dollars wasted in flawed high-tech projects and the agency’s unwillingness to subject its many new border-security initiatives to cost-benefit evaluations and risk-based assessments, have given rise to skepticism The Border Patrol rightly links its security mission to an assessment of risks and threats and to a new risk-management commitment. In the post-9/11 , all illegal entries are defined as threats Rather than undertaking traditional threat assessments, the Border Patrol has dumbed down its definitions of threats Its strategy, therefore, identifies the areas of highest risk as the highest number of illegal entries the agency has never included terrorism protection as a performance indicator. Nor has the Border Patrol offered any evidence that its “intelligence-driven” border security programs actually focus on terrorists and terrorist networks.	Aff can’t solve border security – the border patrol sucks	2,143	57	1,095	321	10	163	0.031153	0.507788	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,937	Technology is not a substitute for trained, professional security personnel. It was not technology that caught Ahmed Ressam in 1999. It was good, old-fashioned security experience that resulted in Ressam’s capture and the disruption of the attack. x False documents are the currency of the terrorist trade. Ressam was able to falsify a passport that got him on a plane to Canada. Once in Canada, he was able to create another passport that allowed him to travel to Afghanistan, where he was trained in one of Osama bin Laden’s terrorist camps. Perhaps most important, he was able to create a new identity that allowed him to avoid being arrested while the authorities sought “Ahmed Ressam.” x The border threat is not just a southern phenomenon; there is threat from the north. As early as 1998, Canada’s Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence labeled Canada “a ‘venue of opportunity’ for terrorist groups: a place where they may raise funds, purchase arms, and conduct other activities to support their organizations and their terrorist activities elsewhere. Most of the major international terrorist organizations have a presence in Canada. Our geographic location also makes Canada a favorite conduit for terrorists wishing to enter the United States, which remains the principal target for terrorist attacks worldwide.”4 More recently, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service acknowledged in its 2004–2005 annual report that “[a] relatively large number of terrorist groups [is] known to be operating in Canada, engaged in fundraising, procuring materials, spreading propaganda, recruiting followers and conducting other activities.”5 x Our allies face many of the same border security problems as the United States faces. In 1994, the year that Ressam entered Canada, there were some differences in how the United States and Canada handled asylum claims. However, Canadian and U.S. officials confronted many similar issues at that time, including a shortage of personnel to patrol the vast physical borders, an inability to ensure that immigrants and asylumseeking individuals complied with the terms of their entry, and no reliable system for ensuring that international travelers were traveling with valid passports. U.S. border security is thus, to some extent, a hemispheric, if not international, issue.	Riley ’06 K. Jack Riley, VP of Natl Scty Rsch Divsn @ RAND, PhD in public policy; “Border Security and the Terrorist Threat;” Aug 2006, RAND corp.; http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT266.pdf RMJ	Technology is not a substitute for trained, professional security personnel The border threat is not just a southern phenomenon; there is threat from the north. As early as 1998 Canada “a ‘venue of opportunity’ for terrorist groups: a place where they may raise funds, purchase arms, and conduct other activities to support their organizations and their terrorist activities elsewhere. Most of the major international terrorist organizations have a presence in Canada. Our geographic location also makes Canada a favorite conduit for terrorists wishing to enter the United States, which remains the principal target for terrorist attacks worldwide Canadian Security Intelligence Service acknowledged that “[a] relatively large number of terrorist groups [is] known to be operating in Canada, engaged in fundraising, procuring materials, spreading propaganda, recruiting followers and conducting other activities U.S. officials confronted a shortage of personnel to patrol the vast physical borders U.S. border security is thus a hemispheric, if not international, issue.	Canadian border security key to prevent terrorism	2,331	49	1,070	358	7	154	0.019553	0.430168	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,938	One of the nation’s biggest domestic counterterrorism programs has failed to provide virtually any useful intelligence, according to Congressional investigators. Their scathing report, to be released Wednesday, looked at problems in regional intelligence-gathering offices known as “fusion centers” that are financed by the Department of Homeland Security and created jointly with state and local law enforcement agencies. The report found that the centers “forwarded intelligence of uneven quality — oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism.” The investigators reviewed 610 reports produced by the centers over 13 months in 2009 and 2010. Of these, the report said, 188 were never published for use within the Homeland Security Department or other intelligence agencies. Hundreds of draft reports sat for months, awaiting review by homeland security officials, making much of their information obsolete. And some of the reports appeared to be based on previously published information or facts that had long since been reported through the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Congressional investigators also found that the reports were often derided by homeland security analysts who reviewed the work. “I see nothing to be gained by releasing this report,” one analyst wrote repeatedly on several draft reports. “This report does not provide the who, what, when, where, how,” another official complained about a document. The investigators also discovered that federal officials cannot account for as much as $1.4 billion in taxpayer money earmarked for fusion centers and that some of the centers listed on paper by the Homeland Security Department do not even exist. The report also lays out problems in protecting citizens’ privacy as the centers gathered and disseminated intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security provided only one week of training to officials assigned to sift through tips and uncorroborated information about American citizens that came into their offices. In a 2009 e-mail discovered by the Senate investigators, one department official warned that the fusion centers were collecting information on Americans “without proper vetting,” and were “improperly reporting this information through homeland information reporting channels.” More broadly, the flaws uncovered by the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations raise questions about the role of the Department of Homeland Security in the nation’s fight against terrorism, and whether the department can ever live up to its original purpose of “connecting the dots” to prevent another surprise like the Sept. 11 attacks. The report on the dysfunctional nature of the fusion centers makes clear that in the decade since the department was created, Homeland Security has not carved out a clear counterterror mission that does not overlap with those of other agencies. Top officials of the Homeland Security Department have known about the problems for years, but hid an internal department report on the program’s flaws from Congress while continuing to tell lawmakers and the public that the fusion centers were highly valuable and that they formed the centerpiece of Homeland Security’s counter-terrorism efforts. A 2010 internal assessment by the department discovered, for instance, that four of its claimed 72 fusion centers did not exist, even as department officials kept using the 72 figure publicly with Congress. Homeland Security officials disputed the findings of the Senate investigators. Matthew Chandler, a department spokesman, said the Senate report “is out of date, inaccurate and misleading.” He said the investigators “refused to review relevant data, including important intelligence information pertinent to their findings.” When it was created, the Department of Homeland Security was supposed to function as a central clearinghouse for terrorism-related intelligence, to solve what was supposed to be one of the big problems identified in the government’s failure to prevent 9/11 — a lack of intelligence sharing between the F.B.I., the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies. But almost immediately, the George W. Bush administration created other organizations to do much the same thing. Today, the central clearinghouse is the National Counterterrorism Center, part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Department officials soon began angling to find something else to do. They hit on the idea of taking charge of intelligence sharing between the federal government and state and local law enforcement agencies, and by 2006, fusion centers were being set up across the country. However, state and local law enforcement agencies already were working with the F.B.I. in regional counterterror units called Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which were responsible for handling terrorism-related criminal cases. The fusion centers quickly became a black hole for taxpayer money, the Senate investigators found. The fusion centers were run by state and local officials, but were funded through grants to states from the Federal Emergency Management Agency with little oversight. That made it easy for state and local officials to divert the federal money earmarked for the centers to other things, including sport utility vehicles and dozens of flat-screen televisions for use by state and local agencies.	Risen, ’12. James Risen is a Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist for The New York Times who previously worked for the Los Angeles Times, citing Congressional report, October 2, 2012. “Inquiry Cites Flaws in Counterterrorism Offices.” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/us/inquiry-cites-flaws-in-regional-counterterrorism-offices.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 – clawan	One of the nation’s biggest domestic counterterrorism programs has failed to provide virtually any useful intelligence problems in regional intelligence-gathering offices financed by the Department of Homeland Security the centers “forwarded intelligence of uneven quality — oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism.” Hundreds of draft reports sat for months, awaiting review by homeland security officials, making much of their information obsolete federal officials cannot account for as much as $1.4 billion in taxpayer money earmarked for fusion centers Department of Homeland Security provided only one week of training to officials assigned to sift through tips and uncorroborated information the flaws uncovered raise questions about the role of the Department of Homeland Security in the nation’s fight against terrorism in the decade since the department was created, Homeland Security has not carved out a clear counterterror mission other organizations do much the same thing. the central clearinghouse is the National Counterterrorism Center, state and local law enforcement agencies already were working with the F.B.I. in regional counterterror units fusion centers quickly became a black hole for taxpayer money, state and local officials to divert the federal money earmarked for the centers to other things,	Aff can’t solve counterterrorism – internal DHS inefficiencies and redundancy tank solvency	5,523	91	1,443	822	12	208	0.014599	0.253041	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,939	Analyses of these newly collected data revealed trends in these border crossings by individuals indicted on federal terrorism charges. The border crossers were most often U.S. citizens entering back into the United States, most often via an airport (rather than a seaport or a land port of entry). Almost all were male, and a large majority was married. According to U.S. court documents, only a minority had previous arrests. There was notable variation in the points of origin for these border crossers, with trips originating all around the world. Researchers found that 87% of the known border crossings attempted by these indictees were successful, allowing the individuals to enter or exit the United States. Analyses of these data indicate that bordercrossings were more likely to be prevented in winter months (December-January-February), but that this seasonal trend was not statistically significant. Similarly, the type of POE used by a traveler was not significantly related to the likely success of the crossing, nor were entrants more or less likely to succeed than those exiting the country	Smarick and LaFree ’12 Kathleen Smarick and Gary D. LaFree, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, U Maryland; “Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Lessons for Protecting against Dangerous Entrants;” Nov 2012 http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_BorderCrossingsTerroristAttacks.pdf RMJ	border crossers were most often U.S. citizens entering back into the United States, most often via an airport (rather than a seaport or a land port of entry only a minority had previous arrests. There was notable variation in the points of origin 87% of the known border crossings attempted by these indictees were successful, allowing the individuals to enter or exit the United States the type of POE used by a traveler was not significantly related to the likely success of the crossing	Border security is insufficient – 87% of terrorists get in and most come through airports	1,105	89	489	174	15	84	0.086207	0.482759	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,940	Overview: The Mexican government remained vigilant against domestic and international terrorist threats. It increased law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and other neighbors and took steps to enhance control of its northern and southern borders. No known international terrorist organization had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist group targeted U.S. citizens in or from Mexican territory. There was no evidence of ties between Mexican criminal organizations and terrorist groups, nor that the criminal organizations had political or territorial control, aside from seeking to protect and expand the impunity with which they conduct their criminal activity. Legislation and Law Enforcement: The Mexican government continued to improve the abilities of its security forces to counter terrorism. The United States supported these efforts by providing training and equipment to Mexican law enforcement and security agencies, sharing information, and promoting interagency law enforcement cooperation. The United States also supported Mexican efforts to address border security challenges along its southern and northern borders and its ports. The U.S. and Mexican governments implemented programs to share information and jointly analyze transnational threats; promote information and intelligence sharing; deploy enhanced cargo screening technologies; and strengthen passenger information sharing. U.S. and Mexican officials also continued coordinated efforts to prevent the transit of third country nationals who may raise terrorism concerns. On the U.S.-Mexico border, officials increased coordination of patrols and inspections and improved communications across the border. On the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border, Mexico deployed additional security forces and implemented biometric controls. Mexico remained a critical partner nation in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program, which began to shift its focus from protection of national leadership training to border security, preventing safe havens, and protecting critical targets. The Mexican government aided U.S. efforts to disrupt an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States. U.S. officials arrested Iranian-American Manssor Arbabsiar in New York on September 29 after the Mexican government denied him entry to Mexico and he was returned to the starting point of his journey. Arbabsiar had planned to contact a Mexican criminal organization on behalf of elements of the Iranian government. Countering Terrorist Finance: Mexico is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Financial Action Task Force of South America Against Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. As a result of the announcement of a National Strategy for the Prevention and Elimination of Money Laundering and Financing for Terrorism in 2010, Mexico issued a number of Anti-Money Laundering/Counterterrorist Finance (AML/CTF) regulations that strengthen reporting requirements and expand the range of financial entities covered under AML/CTF provisions. In April, the government proposed to amend the Federal Criminal Code to expressly establish that corporate entities are liable for crimes, including cases of terrorist financing, committed by their legal representatives. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm. Regional and International Cooperation: Through the Organization of American States' Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism and the Central American Integration System, Mexico has led regional efforts to strengthen capacities to increase security and prevent terrorism by promoting consultation, increasing law enforcement cooperation, and strengthening border controls.	State Dept ‘12 OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM; Country Reports on Terrorism 2011: Chapter 2. Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview; 7/31/12; State Dept; http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/ RMJ	The Mexican government remained vigilant against domestic and international terrorist threats. It increased law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and other neighbors and took steps to enhance control of its northern and southern borders. No known international terrorist organization had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist group targeted U.S. citizens in or from Mexican territory. There was no evidence of ties between Mexican criminal organizations and terrorist groups, nor that the criminal organizations had political or territorial control The Mexican government continued to improve the abilities of its security forces to counter terrorism The U S supported these efforts by providing training and equipment to Mexican law enforcement and security agencies, sharing information, and promoting interagency law enforcement cooperation also supported Mexican efforts to address border security challenges programs to share information and jointly analyze transnational threats; promote information and intelligence sharing; deploy enhanced cargo screening technologies; and strengthen passenger information sharing officials also continued coordinated efforts to prevent the transit of third country nationals who may raise terrorism concerns officials increased coordination of patrols and inspections and improved communications across the border. On the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border, Mexico deployed additional security forces and implemented biometric controls. Mexico remained a critical partner nation in the Antiterrorism Assistance program Mexican government aided U.S. efforts to disrupt an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States Mexico is a member of the Financial Action Task Force issued a number of Anti-Money Laundering/Counterterrorist Finance regulations the government proposed to amend the Federal Criminal Code to expressly establish that corporate entities are liable for terrorist financing Mexico has led regional efforts to strengthen capacities to increase security and prevent terrorism by promoting consultation, increasing law enforcement cooperation, and strengthening border controls.	Squo solves US-Mexico border terrorism	3,946	38	2,201	536	5	294	0.009328	0.548507	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,941	As foreign competition and mechanization shrink manufacturing and farmworker jobs, low-skilled immigrants are likely to wind up farther on the margins of our economy, where many already operate. For example, although only about 12 percent of construction workers are foreign-born, 100,000 to 300,000 illegal immigrants have carved a place for themselves as temporary workers on the fringes of the industry. In urban areas like New York and Los Angeles, these mostly male illegal immigrants gather on street corners, in empty lots, or in Home Depot parking lots to sell their labor by the hour or the day, for $7 to $11 an hour. That’s far below what full-time construction workers earn, and for good reason. Unlike the previous generations of immigrants who built America’s railroads or great infrastructure projects like New York’s bridges and tunnels, these day laborers mostly do home-improvement projects. A New York study, for instance, found that four in ten employers who hire day laborers are private homeowners or renters wanting help with cleanup chores, moving, or landscaping. Another 56 percent were contractors, mostly small, nonunion shops, some owned by immigrants themselves, doing short-term, mostly residential work. The day laborer’s market, in other words, has turned out to be a boon for homeowners and small contractors offering their residential clients a rock-bottom price, but a big chunk of the savings comes because low-wage immigration has produced such a labor surplus that many of these workers are willing to take jobs without benefits and with salaries far below industry norms. Because so much of our legal and illegal immigrant labor is concentrated in such fringe, low-wage employment, its overall impact on our economy is extremely small. A 1997 National Academy of Sciences study estimated that immigration’s net benefit to the American economy raises the average income of the native-born by only some $10 billion a year—about $120 per household. And that meager contribution is not the result of immigrants helping to build our essential industries or making us more competitive globally but instead merely delivering our pizzas and cutting our grass. Estimates by pro-immigration forces that foreign workers contribute much more to the economy, boosting annual gross domestic product by hundreds of billions of dollars, generally just tally what immigrants earn here, while ignoring the offsetting effect they have on the wages of native-born workers.	Steve Malanga is a Contributing Editor to City Journal and a Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute., Summer 2006, How Unskilled Immigrants Hurt Our Economy, http://www.city-journal.org/html/16_3_immigrants_economy.html	As foreign competition and mechanization shrink manufacturing and farmworker jobs, low-skilled immigrants are likely to wind up farther on the margins of our economy Because so much of our legal and illegal immigrant labor is concentrated in such fringe, low-wage employment, its overall impact on our economy is extremely small. A 1997 National Academy of Sciences study estimated that immigration’s net benefit to the American economy raises the average income of the native-born by only some $10 billion a year—about $120 per household. And that meager contribution is not the result of immigrants helping to build our essential industries or making us more competitive globally but instead merely delivering our pizzas and cutting our grass.	Doesn’t solve econ– immigration impact negligible	2,492	49	745	387	6	115	0.015504	0.297158	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,942	Throughout the history of human civilization, wherever there were established cultures and populations, there were borders – the Great Wall of China to protect against invaders; stone walls to protect European cities from the time of the Roman Empire to the Middle Ages; stockades that protected early American settlers from Indian attacks; and barbed wire fences stretching across the plains of Texas to protect roaming herds of cattle from rustlers. Strong borders make good neighbors; also, safe homelands. Yet, preservation of the homeland does not appear to be the true focus of supporters of the so-called “immigration reform” bill recently passed by the U.S. Senate. Rather than craft a bill that actually modernized our immigration process to reflect today’s economic, fiscal and social conditions, the Senate pieced together a massive slab of legislation, loaded with pork, and aimed more at appeasing special interest groups than fixing serious deficiencies in our immigration system. Worse still, at the core of the legislation’s attempt at reform is a pathway to amnesty for millions of illegal aliens. There is no denying the number of illegal aliens in the United States must be addressed, but “reform” does not begin by exacerbating problems supposedly being remedied. Granting amnesty to millions of illegals only adds to the long list of incentives for others to sneak into the U.S. While the Senate bill does allocate more resources to the Border Patrol to better secure the border, physical security measures can only go so far to stem the waves of illegal immigrants constantly penetrating our southern border. Meaningful immigration reform must include more comprehensive steps to address why so many people immigrate to our country illegally. Only by tackling illegal immigration at the foundation can America’s border security be made effective. Once the balance of immigration is shifted back towards legal pathways, Congress can address the question of what to do with the millions of undocumented peoples within our border. Otherwise, it is simply bailing out a sinking ship. This approach will force Congress to look at two key problems in our current immigration process. The first is the financial incentives to “cut in line” through the legal immigration process by sneaking into the country. The second is to address the “line” itself.	Barr, 7/3 – Bob Barr is a former federal prosecutor and a former member of the United States House of Representatives. He represented Georgia's 7th congressional district as a Republican from 1995 to 2003 (“’A’ Is For ‘Amnesty’ -- And ‘Amnesia’”, 7/3/13, http://townhall.com/columnists/bobbarr/2013/07/03/a-is-for-amnesty---and-amnesia-n1633158/page/full)	Strong borders make good neighbors also, safe homelands preservation of the homeland does not appear to be the focus of immigration reform” bill Rather than craft a bill that actually modernized our immigration process to reflect today’s economic, fiscal and social conditions at the core of the legislation’s attempt at reform is a pathway to amnesty for millions of illegal aliens. There is no denying the number of illegal aliens in the United States must be addressed reform” does not begin by exacerbating problems supposedly being remedied. Granting amnesty to millions of illegals only adds to the long list of incentives for others to sneak into the U.S. immigration reform must include more comprehensive steps to address why so many people immigrate to our country illegally. Only by tackling illegal immigration at the foundation can America’s border security be made effective Otherwise, it is simply bailing out a sinking ship	Border reform key – ensures security and a starting point for legislation	2,366	73	939	374	12	150	0.032086	0.40107	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,943	WASHINGTON (AP) — Supporters of far-reaching immigration legislation rejected a challenge Wednesday from Senate conservatives demanding evidence that the nation's borders are secure before millions living in the United States unlawfully can gain legal status. The vote came as lawmakers on both sides of the issue digested a startling Congressional Budget Office forecast that the bill would fail to prevent a steady increase in illegal residents in the future, even though it would grant legal status to millions already in the country without the necessary papers. "Illegality will not be stopped, but it will only be reduced by 25 percent," said Sen. Jeff Sessions, R-Ala., referring to the prediction by the non-partisan CBO. Only a day earlier, the CBO had cheered supporters of the bill with an estimate that it would help the economy and reduce deficits in each of the next two decades.	Espo & Werner, 6/19 - Journalists for AP (“Bill could reduce illegal immigration 25 percent”, 6/19/13, AP, http://news.yahoo.com/bill-could-reduce-illegal-immigration-25-percent-191257192.html)	Supporters of far-reaching immigration legislation Illegality will not be stopped, but it will only be reduced by 25 percent referring to the prediction by the non-partisan CBO the CBO had cheered it would reduce deficits in each of the next two decades	Weak immigration impact and takes decades to effect economy	893	59	253	144	9	42	0.0625	0.291667	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,944	The pending 2013 immigration reform bill aims to establish a pathway to citizenship for more than 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States. The bill also calls for the completion of 700 miles of border fencing between the United States and Mexico and doubles the number of Border Patrol agents. Critics of the bill say that heightened border control measures, along with the bill’s proposal to reduce the number of available work visas for agriculture, will only lead to an increase in undocumented migration to the United States from Mexico. Through an exhaustive study of a time when the border was more porous, Stanford historian Ana Raquel Minian illustrates how “unilateral policies that have attempted to limit population flows across the U.S.-Mexico border through militarization have failed in the past” and are “bound to fail in the future.” Minian’s research is the first in-depth history of transnational Mexican migration from 1965 to 1986, an era of transition that saw booming circular migration between the United States and Mexico as well as expanding bi-national efforts to regulate the border. The increasingly stringent immigration policies enacted during this period left many Mexicans without the right to fully belong in either nation. An assistant professor of history at Stanford, Minian hopes her research will bring to light the “historical development of migratory policies and their impact on people’s lives.” Her research, she said, also shows why current immigration policies “must take into account the transnational forces behind people’s migratory patterns.” “At the outset, Mexican officials discouraged emigration, but by the 1970s, those same officials were encouraging such departures as a solution to high unemployment and population growth,” Minian said. Simultaneously, she noted, “the U.S. government attempted to address these same problems by starting to militarize the border. Thousands of Mexican nationals found themselves without the substantive right to belong to either nation-state.” According to Minian, border militarization “did not reduce migration but instead made it more dangerous.” It also forced undocumented migrants in the United States to make their stay permanent.	LDN, 7/1 – Latino Daily News (“STUDY: Border Militarization Leads to an Increase in Illegal Immigration”, 7/1/13, http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/latino-daily-news/details/study-border-militarization-leads-to-an-increase-in-illegal-immigration/25550)	Critics of the bill say that heightened border control measures, along with the bill’s proposal to reduce the number of available work visas for agriculture, will only lead to an increase in undocumented migration to the United States from Mexico. Through an exhaustive study unilateral policies that have attempted to limit population flows across the U.S.-Mexico border through militarization have failed in the past” and are “bound to fail in the future.” The increasingly stringent immigration policies enacted during this period left many Mexicans without the right to fully belong in either nation Minian hopes research will bring to light the “historical development of migratory policies and their impact the U.S. government attempted to address these same problems by starting to militarize the border. Thousands of Mexican nationals found themselves without the substantive right to belong to either nation-state.” militarization “did not reduce migration but instead made it more dangerous	Unilateral actions towards the border historically fail	2,249	55	1,000	340	7	150	0.020588	0.441176	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,945	Did you know that the U.S. has been operating surveillance drones in Mexico, providing air support for the Mexican military, tracking the movements of Mexican citizens, sharing state-of-the-art spy technology with Mexican officials, and sending CIA agents to help Mexico train drug informants? Did you know the DEA has more employees stationed in Mexico than any of its other foreign posts? That Mexican nationals trained and bankrolled by the CIA raid Mexican drug cartels? Or that the CIA runs high-tech "fusion centers" in Mexico City, Monterrey and elsewhere? "For the past seven years, Mexico and the United States have put aside their tension-filled history on security matters to forge an unparalleled alliance against Mexico's drug cartels, one based on sharing sensitive intelligence, U.S. training and joint operational planning," Dana Priest reports in the Washington Post. "But now, much of that hard-earned cooperation may be in jeopardy." Enrique Pena Nieto, Mexico's new leader, reportedly dislikes the status quo, and was shocked, on taking office this December, at the degree of United States involvement in his country. The article is worth reading in full. What I can't help but remark upon is the way that it handles the spectacular failure of the War on Drugs. It notes "mounting criticism" that any success fighting cartel leaders has also helped to incite "more violence than anyone had predicted, more than 60,000 deaths and 25,000 disappearances in the past seven years alone." Put another way, the period of maximum American involvement has coincided with a horrific spike in drug-related violence. "Meanwhile," Priest continues, "the drug flow into the United States continued unabated. Mexico remains the U.S. market's largest supplier of heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine and the transshipment point for 95 percent of its cocaine." So the strategy was high cost, low reward. It increased violence and did nothing to reduce the drug supply. Yet the fact that it completely failed plays basically no role in the rest of the article, in large part because everyone in the United States government apparently wants to preserve the failed status quo. American officials are very upset that Mexico's new leader has decided to go his own way. Look at the very next sentences: No one had come up with a quick, realistic alternative to Calderon's novel use of the Mexican military with U.S. support. But stopping the cartel violence had become Peña Nieto's top priority during the campaign. The U.S. administration didn't know what that meant. Some feared a scaling back of the bilateral efforts and a willingness to trade the relentless drive against cartel leaders for calmer streets. Does anyone else think that "a willingness to trade the relentless drive against cartel leaders for calmer streets" just might be "a quick, realistic alternative to Calderon's novel use of the Mexican military with U.S. support"? At the very least, it surely it doesn't make sense to presume, as the article seems to, that the obviously failed status quo is the most "realistic" way forward. Sticking with it is arguably delusional. But that angle is seemingly never pursued. As ever, the utter failure of American drug policy is taken by the establishment as evidence that persisting is of even more importance. The policies the United States pursued in Mexico as part of our increased role there coincided with a huge uptick in violence and no reduction in the supply of Mexican drugs? By God, let's hope that the Mexicans don't decide to try something completely different!	Friedersdorf 4/30 Conor Friedersdorf, staff writer for The Atlantic; “Mexico Is Ready to End Failed Drug-War Policies—Why Isn't the U.S.?” APR 30 2013; The Atlantic; http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/mexico-is-ready-to-end-failed-drug-war-policies-why-isnt-the-us/275410/ RMJ	the U.S. has been operating surveillance drones in Mexico, providing air support for the Mexican military, tracking the movements of Mexican citizens, sharing state-of-the-art spy technology with Mexican officials, and sending CIA agents to help Mexico train drug informants the DEA has more employees stationed in Mexico than any of its other foreign posts Mexican nationals trained and bankrolled by the CIA raid Mexican drug cartels the CIA runs high-tech "fusion centers" in Mexico For the past seven years, Mexico and the United States have put aside their tension-filled history on security matters to forge an unparalleled alliance against Mexico's drug cartels success fighting cartel leaders has also helped to incite "more violence than anyone had predicted Put another way, the period of maximum American involvement has coincided with a horrific spike in drug-related violence Meanwhile the drug flow into the United States continued unabated. Mexico remains the U.S. market's largest supplier the strategy was high cost, low reward. It increased violence and did nothing to reduce the drug supply everyone in the United States government apparently wants to preserve the failed status quo. American officials are very upset that Mexico's new leader has decided to go his own way. stopping the cartel violence had become Peña Nieto's top priority during the campaign. The U.S. administration feared a scaling back of the bilateral efforts a willingness to trade the relentless drive against cartel leaders for calmer streets" just might be "a quick, realistic alternative to Calderon's novel use of the Mexican military with U.S. support it surely it doesn't make sense to presume that the obviously failed status quo is the most "realistic" way forward Sticking with it is arguably delusional the utter failure of American drug policy is taken by the establishment as evidence that persisting is of even more importance. The policies the United States pursued in Mexico as part of our increased role there coincided with a huge uptick in violence and no reduction in the supply of Mexican drugs	Bilateralism can’t solve cartel violence and derails effective drug policy	3,587	74	2,107	577	10	333	0.017331	0.577123	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,946	A turning political tide has renewed fears that raged after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks - that terrorists will sneak into the country across the U.S.-Mexico border. Nobody disputes that's possible, but analysts and government officials say terrorists plotting to kill Americans are more likely to use other routes into the country, if they're not here already. It's much more common for people convicted in the U.S. of crimes connected to international terrorism to have been U.S. citizens or legal residents, or come into the country on visas. "There is no serious evidence that the U.S.-Mexico border is a significant threat from terrorism," said Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think tank based in New York. Claims of terrorist threats on the Southwest border distract legislators and policymakers from addressing long-term solutions to drug smuggling and illegal immigration, said Tom Barry, senior analyst at the Center for International Policy in Washington. "It's politically motivated," Barry said, "playing on that sense of fear that certain people are susceptible to." But proponents of tougher border enforcement say protecting Americans against terrorism motivates them, not politics. "There's an enormous risk," said Michael Braun, who retired as chief of operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008. Members of Hezbollah, for example, "are absolute masters at identifying existing smuggling infrastructures on many borders around the world where they operate." The State Department's 2009 "Country Reports on Terrorism" found that "no known international terrorist organizations had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist incidents targeting U.S. interests and personnel occurred on or originated from Mexican territory." The State Department said that there was no evidence of ties between Mexican organized crime and international terrorist groups. But it warns: "The violence attributed to organized-crime groups on the border, however, continued to strain Mexico's law-enforcement capacities, creating potential vulnerabilities that terrorists seeking access to the United States could exploit." Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu emphasized the risk of terrorists crossing the Mexican border into the U.S. in a May 26 open letter to President Obama. "If the majority of regular illegal immigrants can sneak into America, what does this say about the ability of terrorist sleeper cells?" Babeu wrote. "The porous U.S.-Mexican border is the gravest national-security threat facing America." Hiding in a car trunk In his letter to the president, Babeu said thousands of illegal immigrants hailing from "special-interest countries" make the U.S.-Mexico border a national-security threat. "In some cases, we have confirmed their troubling ties to terrorism," Babeu wrote. "Yet for those we apprehend, how many today live amongst us?" The Border Patrol apprehended an average of 339 people from "special-interest countries" - those that warrant special handling based on terrorism risk factors - at the U.S.-Mexico border each year over the past six years, Homeland Security data show. That's less than 1 percent each year of the total apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border, Homeland Security figures show. None of the 2,039 people arrested at the U.S.-Mexico border in that span presented a credible terrorist threat, Homeland Security officials say. Homeland Security monitors, analyzes and gathers intelligence about potential threats but at this time "does not have any credible information on terrorist groups operating along the Southwest border," said department spokesman Matt Chandler. Among the 36 people convicted by the U.S. Justice Department of charges relating to international terrorism last year, none came into the United States from Mexico. Half were U.S. citizens, most of them naturalized from countries such as Sudan or Somalia. Seven were extradited from other countries, while three were captured abroad by American forces. The others came to the United States on visas, or, in one case, were arrested while trying to come into the United States legally at a port of entry on the Canadian border.	McCombs and Steller, 11 – Columnists for AP (“Border seen as unlikely terrorist crossing point”, June 7th, 2011, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/border-seen-as-unlikely-terrorist-crossing-point/article_ed932aa2-9d2a-54f1-b930-85f5d4cce9a8.html)	A turning political tide has renewed fears that terrorists will sneak into the country across the U.S.-Mexico border. analysts and government officials say terrorists plotting to kill Americans are more likely to use other routes into the country It's much more common for peopl to come into the country on visas. There is no serious evidence that the U.S.-Mexico border is a significant threat from terrorism Claims of terrorist threats on the Southwest border distract legislators and policymakers from addressing long-term solutions to drug smuggling and illegal immigration, "It's politically motivated playing on that sense of fear The State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism" found that "no known international terrorist organizations had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist incidents targeting U.S. interests and personnel occurred on or originated from Mexican territory None of the people arrested present a credible terrorist threat Among the 36 people convicted by the U.S. Justice Department of charges relating to international terrorism ne came into the United States from Mexico The others came to the United States on visas	Terrorists won’t target the border – your authors are hype	4,226	58	1,162	636	10	176	0.015723	0.27673	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,947	Over the last two decades, almost all of the known international terrorists arrested in the United States have come on legal visas or were allowed to come in without a visa, said Alden, of the Council on Foreign Relations. "These are people that come on airplanes," said Alden, author of "The Closing of the American Border," which explains how the U.S. revised visa and border policies in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The 19 people involved in the Sept. 11 attacks entered the country on legal visas. And over the last four to five years, the terrorist plots have increasingly involved people already in the United States - citizens and legal residents, he said. "The notion of the (Southwest) border as the line that protects us from terrorism has really gone out of the window in the last several years," Alden said. Not only is the U.S. side of the border heavily guarded, but the Mexican government makes an extraordinary effort to prevent terrorists from coming through its country. For instance, Mexico shares real-time information with the U.S. about airline passengers arriving in Mexico to make sure they don't include potential terrorists, Alden said. The Mexican drug-smuggling organizations have no interest in allowing smuggling routes to be used by terrorist organizations either, he said. "If it is discovered that a terrorist that carried out an attack in the United States came across the Mexican border, then the response would be further fortification of that border that shuts down smuggling routes and cuts into the profits," he said. Being associated with terrorist groups would be very bad for business for drug-smuggling organizations, said Sylvia Longmire, a drug-war analyst and author. Proof of a terrorist coming through Mexico would have dire consequences for the Mexican government, too, she said. But that point of view ignores the fact that terrorist groups and Latin American drug smugglers sometimes do business with each other and therefore have connections, said Braun, the former DEA operations chief, who now runs a security-consulting firm, Spectre Group International. "Hezbollah is now heavily involved in the global cocaine trade," Braun said. "Most of the cocaine they're involved in distributing is heading toward Europe, but they're affiliating with the same cartels sending drugs to the United States." That isn't to say the groups share an ideology, but simply that they have the connections needed to exploit smuggling routes into the United States. Also, people from the Middle East tend to have dark hair, dark eyes and olive skin, like most Latin Americans, so they can easily blend in, he said. "On a moonless night at two in the morning, there's not a lot of due diligence going on when the coyotes and gatekeepers are moving human traffic across that border," Braun said. Canada is a more likely crossing point because that country allows in more people as refugees and asylum seekers, said Henry Willis, a senior policy researcher on homeland security at the Rand Corp. "To regard the Southwestern border as the 'frontline against terrorism,' as the Border Patrol does, is folly," wrote Barry, of the Center for International Policy, in a recent report. People have talked about terrorists crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, but Anthony Coulson, who retired as head of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Tucson office last year, has seen hardly any evidence. "Through the years I can probably count on my fingers on one hand the number of times that there was some type of terrorist activity associated with the border," Coulson said. "It just doesn't happen."	McCombs and Steller, 11 – Columnists for AP (“Border seen as unlikely terrorist crossing point”, June 7th, 2011, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/border-seen-as-unlikely-terrorist-crossing-point/article_ed932aa2-9d2a-54f1-b930-85f5d4cce9a8.html)	Over the last two decades, almost all of the known international terrorists arrested in the United States have come on legal visas the U.S. revised visa and border policies in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The 19 people involved in the Sept. 11 attacks entered the country on legal visas. The notion of the border as the line that protects us from terrorism has really gone out of the window in the last several years The Mexican drug-smuggling organizations have no interest in allowing smuggling routes to be used by terrorist organizations either If it is discovered that a terrorist that carried out an attack in the United States came across the Mexican border, then the response would be further fortification of that border that shuts down smuggling routes and cuts into the profits Being associated with terrorist groups would be very bad for business for drug-smuggling organizations That isn't to say the groups share an ideology Canada is a more likely crossing point because that country allows in more people as refugees and asylum seekers To regard the Southwestern border as the 'frontline against terrorism is folly It just doesn't happen	Double bind – either terrorists won’t travel the border – or the AFF causes terrorism – terrorists ride visas	3,634	109	1,170	591	19	195	0.032149	0.329949	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,948	One likely reason the Border Patrol does not address its counterterrorism in any detail is that the agency’s border security buildup on the southwestern border has not resulted in the apprehension of members of foreign terrorist organizations, as identified by the State Department. Experts in counterterrorism agree there is little risk that foreign terrorist organizations would rely on illegal border crossings – particularly across the U.S.-Mexico border – for entry into the United States. While the fear that foreign terrorists would illegally cross U.S. land borders drove much of the early build-up in border security programs under the newly created homeland security department, counterterrorism seems to have dropped off the actual and rhetorical focus of today’s border security operations.	Barry 13 (Tom, January 9, 2013, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy in Wash. DC. “With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What Does It Really Mean?” http://www.alternet.org/immigration/resurrection-immigration-reform-well-hear-lot-about-securing-our-borders-what-does-it)	One likely reason the Border Patrol does not address counterterrorism is that the agency’s border security buildup on the southwestern border has not resulted in the apprehension of members of foreign terrorist organizations Experts in counterterrorism agree there is little risk that foreign terrorist organizations would rely on illegal border crossings – particularly across the U.S.-Mexico border – for entry into the U S e fear that foreign terrorists would illegally cross U.S. land borders drove much of the early build-up counterterrorism seems to have dropped off the actual and rhetorical focus of today’s border security operations.	Low risk of their impact-terrorists would not use the border for entry	802	70	643	119	12	97	0.10084	0.815126	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,949	WASHINGTON, Feb. 16 (Xinhua) -- A nuclear or biological attack by terrorists on the United States is the country's greatest threat, but that is unlikely to happen, experts said. In a recent CNN interview, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a militant group like al-Qaida were the biggest threat to the UnitedStates. "The biggest nightmare that many of us have is that one of these terrorist member organizations within this syndicate of terror will get their hands on a weapon of mass destruction," she said. Clinton said al-Qaida remained "unfortunately a very committed,clever, diabolical group of terrorists who are always looking for weaknesses and openings." But while the threat is a horrific one, it is also one of the least likely to occur, experts said. For one thing, it is difficult for a non-state entity like al-Qaida -- and most countries, for that matter -- to build a deployable nuclear device, said Scott Stewart, vice president of tactical intelligence at global intelligence company Stratfor. Some states have access to universities, teams of scientists, huge facilities and large state budgets all aimed at creating a nuclear weapon, and even still those countries have difficulty in producing a usable weapon, he said. Purchasing a weapon of mass destruction would also be extremely difficult for militant groups, as the United States spends hefty sums -- around 1 billion dollars per year -- to track and buy fissile material in a bid to keep it off the market, he said. And if nuclear weapons-grade material were on the market, a number of nations would scramble to get their hands on it, creating heated competition, he said. As for U.S. attempts to protect the country from such a threat, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency have placed a high priority on the issue. "It's hard to determine if they are doing enough," he said. "There's only so much realistically you can do and always more could be done, but they have placed a great deal of resources into it."	Rusling ’10 Matthew Rusling; Feb. 17 2010; “Nuclear or biological attack on U.S. unlikely: experts;” Xinhua English News http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-02/17/c_13177523.htm RMJ	A nuclear attack on the United States is unlikely to happen, experts said. it is difficult for a non-state entity like al-Qaida -- and most countries, for that matter -- to build a deployable nuclear device, said Scott Stewart, vice president of tactical intelligence at global intelligence company Some states have access to universities, teams of scientists, huge facilities and large state budgets all aimed at creating a nuclear weapon, and even still those countries have difficulty in producing a usable weapon, he said. Purchasing a weapon of mass destruction would also be extremely difficult for militant groups, as the United States spends hefty sums -- around 1 billion dollars per year -- to track and buy fissile material in a bid to keep it off the market There's only so much realistically you can do and always more could be done	No nuke terror – can’t build or purchase – experts	2,081	50	845	348	10	142	0.028736	0.408046	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,950	To consider what might follow the terrorist use of a nuclear weapon upon an industrialized country, and especially on a country that is itself armed with nuclear weapons, is to engage a whole cosmos of uncertainties and assumptions. Moreover, in order to acquire a nuclear weapon in the ﬁrst place, the terrorist group in question would need to surmount considerable hurdles. Having done so, the successful delivery and detonation of the nuclear device is no automatic process. And even once past this second set of obstacles, there remains a battery of questions, likelihoods, and interactions regarding what might happen once the world’s ﬁrst dramatic act of nuclear terrorism has occurred.	Ayson 10 (Robert – Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington – “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, obtained via InformaWorld)	To consider what might follow the terrorist use of a nuclear weapon is to engage a whole cosmos of uncertainties and assumptions. in order to acquire a nuclear weapon in the ﬁrst place, the terrorist group in question would need to surmount considerable hurdles the successful delivery and detonation of the nuclear device is no automatic process even once past this second set of obstacles, there remains a battery of questions, likelihoods, and interactions regarding what might happen	Multiple hurdles to nuclear terrorism and no impact- their author	692	65	487	110	10	78	0.090909	0.709091	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,951	The most sophisticated terrorist attack here or elsewhere was 9/11. But their preparation for that was easy: a few months in flight schools and the ability to read airline schedules and acquire box cutters. A nuclear attack envisioned by the warnings we have had this month would require immensely more preparation, more difficult targeting, and expensive, complicated, and large weapons. Terrorist attacks to date, other than 9/11, have been primitive. More sophisticated car bombs are being developed for use in Iraq, but they remain car bombs. Even the use of chemical weapons has been limited to small amounts of chlorine gas with only a dozen or so victims. The explosives used in the Madrid train depot bombing were more sophisticated than those used in the London subway bombings, but neither were devastating. In 2005, the FBI reported that it could find no sign of terrorist cells in the US, and even if there were a strong one it is hard to believe that it could get and deliver a nuclear bomb. It might fashion a "dirty bomb" but judging from the terrorist cell recently discovered that targeted an army base, it would have a hard time fashioning one. This cell had yet to acquire any firearms, was poorly organized, easily penetrated, and quite unsophisticated. Of course, a nuclear attack might be organized from abroad, but there is no evidence of sophisticated cells abroad The plot to blow up airliners in the Atlantic last year involved a few who had looked at flight schedules, but did not have passports to fly, or any bomb-making equipment nor the skills to fashion credible liquid explosives while in flight. There was no evidence the flight was "ready to go in a day or so" as the British initially said. A March report by RAND concluded a terror strike from abroad was unlikely. It found al Queda to be more preoccupied with foreign targets, especially Iraq, and lacked a specific strategic plan for attacking targets within the U.S. A rogue state such as North Korea, or Pakistan after Islamic fundamentalists take over, might be able to launch a nuclear missile from a freighter off our shore and we might not even be able to establish the source immediately. But it would be hard for them to avoid eventual detection, and it is hard to see their motivation for such an attack, especially since eventual detection means they would be destroyed in return.	Perrow ’07 Charles Perrow, prof. Sociology @ Yale; “The Likelihood of Nuclear Terror;” May 17 2007; Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-perrow/the-likelihood-of-nuclear_b_48700.html RMJ	The most sophisticated terrorist attack was 9/11 preparation for that was easy A nuclear attack would require immensely more preparation, more difficult targeting, and expensive, complicated, and large weapons Terrorist attacks to date have been primitive. More sophisticated car bombs are being developed for use in Iraq, but they remain car bombs chemical weapons has been limited to small amounts of chlorine gas with only a dozen or so victims the FBI could find no sign of terrorist cells in the US, and even if there were a strong one it is hard to believe that it could get and deliver a nuclear bomb. It might fashion a "dirty bomb" but judging from the terrorist cell recently discovered would have a hard time This cell had yet to acquire any firearms, was poorly organized, easily penetrated, and quite unsophisticated a nuclear attack might be organized from abroad, but there is no evidence of sophisticated cells abroad RAND concluded a terror strike from abroad was unlikely found al Queda to lack a specific strategic plan for attacking targets within the U.S. it would be hard for them to avoid eventual detection, and it is hard to see their motivation for such an attack	No nuke terror – too unsophisticated	2,379	36	1,189	407	6	202	0.014742	0.496314	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,952	MEXICO CITY — The recent changes ordered by new President Enrique Peña Nieto to Mexico’s anti-narcotics partnership with the United States have produced markedly different reactions here and in Washington, underscoring what appear to be diverging perceptions of the drug war’s goals and the costs of fighting it. Peña Nieto’s decision to limit the ability of American agents to operate in Mexico has been met with dismay by U.S. law enforcement agencies, which left a heavy footprint under the previous administration of Felipe Calderon. They warn that intelligence sharing will suffer if they can no longer choose which Mexican force — the army, navy or federal police — to give sensitive information to; they’ve been instructed to now funnel everything through Mexico’s Interior Ministry instead. The agents also caution that the personal relationships developed under Calderon will fray if they are no longer welcome to work side by side with trusted partners at sites such as the joint command centers where Americans helped spy on Mexican narcotics traffickers and direct operations against them. Yet here on the southern side of the fight, where gangland violence has taken 60,000 to 90,000 lives in the past six years, there is little surprise that Peña Nieto would move to reformat the relationship. It is a change that has been coming for a long time. Standing opposite President Obama at a news conference here May 2 during the U.S. president’s recent visit, Peña Nieto insisted that drug war cooperation would remain robust but that Mexico wants a more “efficient” strategy. “Let me say it very clearly,” he said. “Under this new strategy, we’re going to order things up. We’re going to make it institutional. The channels will be very clear. We’re going to use one single channel in order to be more efficient, to attain better results.” It is the meaning of “better results” that the two countries increasingly differ on. Seeking change Seizing dope and smashing cartels were the shared goals for Mexico and the United States under Calderon. He allowed U.S. agencies unprecedented latitude to gather intelligence on drug cartel suspects and decide which Mexican security forces were trustworthy and effective enough to share it with. To safeguard against the gangsters’ corrupting powers, the Americans developed “vetted” units of elite drug-war fighters, relying heavily on Mexico’s marines to be a lethal strike force against high-level targets. But the flow of drugs north and the death toll in Mexico remained virtually undiminished as fallen mafia capos were quickly replaced by new leaders and the troubles of the border region spread south. Frustrated Mexicans were looking for a change, and on the campaign stump last year and since taking office in December, Peña Nieto pledged that “reducing violence” would become his overarching security goal. In private, his aides characterized the Calderon years as a free-for-all that put tens of thousands of troops on the streets but didn’t make Mexico safer.	Miroff 5/14 Nick Miroff, writes extensively on US-Latin American policy with a focus on Mexico; “In Mexico, restrictions on U.S. agents signal drug war shift;” May 14, 2013; Washington Post; http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-14/world/39250614_1_calderon-years-mexican-security-forces-better-results RMJ	recent changes ordered by Nieto to Mexico’s anti-narcotics partnership with the United States have produced markedly different reactions underscoring what appear to be diverging perceptions of the drug war’s goals and costs there is little surprise that Peña Nieto would move to reformat the relationship Nieto insisted that drug war cooperation would remain robust but that Mexico wants a more “efficient” strategy he said. “Under this new strategy, we’re going to order things up. We’re going to make it institutional. The channels will be very clear to be more efficient, to attain better results.” Seizing dope and smashing cartels were the shared goals for Mexico and the United States under Calderon. He allowed U.S. agencies unprecedented latitude the Americans developed “vetted” units of elite drug-war fighters, relying heavily on Mexico’s marines to be a lethal strike force against high-level targets. But the flow of drugs north and the death toll in Mexico remained virtually undiminished Nieto pledged that “reducing violence” would become his overarching security goal his aides characterized the Calderon years as a free-for-all that put tens of thousands of troops on the streets but didn’t make Mexico safer.	Despite policy changes, drug cooperation strong and improving	3,023	61	1,227	486	8	190	0.016461	0.390947	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,953	Under Obama,"institutionalizing the rule of law," "reforming the police," and "building strong and resilient communities" became the center of U.S. policy in Mexico. In late 2009, the United States increased its efforts to train jurists and police officers, and undertook institution- and community-level projects that included opening a police academy in San Luis Potosí and funding more than a dozen $100,000 community-building grants in crime-ridden Ciudad Juárez. At the same time, the United States aided and trained Mexican intelligence, as a 2009 embassy cable published by WikiLeaks revealed. "Cooperation, while not flawless, has never been better," the cable reads. "Close collaboration and assistance ... in key counterdrug operations undoubtedly is critical and will pay dividends over time." But in the wake of the CIA agents' August 24 shooting, it's worth asking again: Just what are these "dividends" supposed to look like? As a 2011 Congressional Research Service study explained, Mexico and the United States have different definitions of "success" in the drug war. For Washington, the seizure of drug shipments and the removal of kingpins -- such as the 2009 killing of cartel boss Arturo Beltran Leyva, who was cornered by the Mexican Navy with the help of U.S. intelligence -- are markers of success. But for Mexico, the drug trade is a "national security threat" rather than an "organized crime threat," and the country's short-term goals might be more focused on "reducing drug trafficking-related crime and violence" than on dismantling the country's criminal organizations, according to the CRS study. This will be especially true after Enrique Peña Nieto -- the president-elect of Mexico who promised a break from Calderón's militarized drug policy -- is inaugurated on December 1. Nieto has emphasized public safety and violence reduction over a Calderón-like assault on drug cartels and their leadership.	Rosin ‘12 ARMIN ROSEN; “The 'Dividends' of U.S.-Mexican 'Cooperation' on the Drug War;” OCT 3 2012; The Atlantic; http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/10/the-dividends-of-us-mexican-cooperation-on-the-drug-war/263072/ RMJ	Under Obama,"institutionalizing the rule of law," "reforming the police," and "building strong and resilient communities" became the center of U.S. policy in Mexico. In late 2009, the United States increased its efforts to train jurists and police officers, and undertook institution- and community-level projects that included opening a police academy At the same time, the United States aided and trained Mexican intelligence a 2009 embassy cable revealed. "Cooperation, while not flawless, has never been better Mexico and the United States have different definitions of "success" in the drug war. For Washington, the seizure of drug shipments and the removal of kingpin are markers of success. But for Mexico, the drug trade is a "national security threat" rather than an "organized crime threat," and the country's short-term goals might be more focused on "reducing drug trafficking-related crime and violence" than on dismantling the country's criminal organizations This will be especially true after Nieto	US and Mexico are incompatible in the context of drug policy – different goals	1,932	78	1,014	297	14	152	0.047138	0.511785	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,954	That doesn’t mean I favor abandoning the fight against los narcos. I’m just saying that if the past seven years have shown us anything, it’s that it doesn’t matter whether Peña Nieto ratchets up that fight (as his predecessor did) or dials it down, or whether Washington pumps more or less aid into it — not as long as police and judicial institutions remain dysfunctional in Mexico and demand for illegal drugs remains insatiable in the U.S. Which is why, if Obama and Peña Nieto are the smart politicos they’ve proved to be, they’ll realize that the two most important developments in the drug war over the past six months took place not during any interdiction operation but on Election Day last November in the U.S. and on Tuesday, April 30, in Mexico. The Mexican news first, because I think it’s potentially more consequential. Tuesday night, the Mexican Senate convincingly passed a telecommunications-reform bill, pushed by Peña Nieto and already approved in the lower Chamber of Deputies. It’s aimed at dismantling the monopolies that smother competition in Mexican industries like telecom, where the América Móvil company headed by tycoon Carlos Slim, the world’s richest man, controls more than 80% of the nation’s land-line market and more than 70% of its cell-phone market. The legislation packs sharper enforcement teeth and “prevents monopolies from being able to resort to the constant, endless appeals litigation they use to avoid paying fines and sanctions,” as Peña Nieto described the bill to me in a TIME interview shortly before his inauguration in December. (MORE: 10 Questions for Enrique Peña Nieto) So why does this impact the drug war? Call it a leap of faith, but if this reform really does turn out to be a monopoly-buster — and, this being Mexico and the ruling party being the PRI, it’s better to take a wait-and-see approach — it will be striking evidence that rule of law has a chance to take root in Mexico. Slim and the other Mexican monopolists targeted in the bill aren’t drug lords. But for decade after decade, they’ve been getting away with an unjust practice that modern democracies usually penalize if not thwart. Stripping them of their notorious impunity could go a long way toward fostering the kind of culture of legality that in turn nurtures more professional and less corrupt courts, judges, prosecutors and especially investigative cops — the judicial backbone of any credible fight against organized crime. Washington ought to know this already after its happier experience more than a decade ago in Colombia — where the billions the U.S. poured into antidrug aid bore fruit largely because Colombia finally made the effort to strengthen rule of law. Shannon O’Neil, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, aptly pointed out in her 2011 article “How Mexico Can Win the Drug War, Colombia’s Way” that Colombia emphasized “professionalizing the police and reforming [the] judicial system.” It did this via nothing less than a “transformation within” the country that saw its elites finally take responsibility for public security, something Mexico’s hypernegligent ruling class is still reluctant to do. (In fact, as evidenced by one recent scandal, Mexico’s rich and powerful still seem more interested in shutting down restaurants that don’t give them good tables.) “More than foreign security aid,” O’Neil wrote, “this is what Mexico needs today: an investment by [its] elites in the safety and well-being of all its citizens.” (MORE: Mexico’s Drug Lords Ramp Up Their Arsenals With RPGs) If I were Obama, and if I were truly interested in the Mexican drug war’s long-term success, I’d be focused less on Peña Nieto’s interdiction scorecard at the moment and more on the Mexican Senate’s roll call Tuesday night. And I’d hope like hell that it really is the first installment of the Mexican elite’s own, long-overdue investment in rule of law. As for what happened on Election Day last fall in the U.S., if I were Peña Nieto I’d urge Obama to do on the federal level what the states of Colorado and Washington did: legalize marijuana. (Mexico should do the same, by the way.) That would do two things: First, deprive Mexico’s drug cartels of more than a third of the $30 billion or so they make each year. Second, save the U.S. the estimated $10 billion it wastes every year chasing down a drug that’s no more harmful than alcohol when used in moderation. It can then steer that money to drug-demand-reduction efforts like rehab services, which studies show do more to ease the drug plague than conventional supply-side interdiction does.	Padgett 5/3 Tim Padgett; “Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War;” May 3 2013; TIME; http://world.time.com/2013/05/03/how-obama-and-pena-nieto-can-win-the-drug-war/ RMJ	if the past seven years have shown us anything, it’s that it doesn’t matter whether Peña Nieto ratchets up that fight (as his predecessor did) or dials it down, or whether Washington pumps more or less aid into it — not as long as police and judicial institutions remain dysfunctional in Mexico and demand for illegal drugs remains insatiable in the U.S. the Mexican Senate convincingly passed a telecommunications-reform bill aimed at dismantling the monopolies that smother competition in Mexican industries like telecom it will be striking evidence that rule of law has a chance to take root in Mexico Mexican monopolists for decade after decade, they’ve been getting away with an unjust practice that modern democracies usually penalize if not thwart. Stripping them of their notorious impunity could go a long way toward fostering the kind of culture of legality that in turn nurtures more professional and less corrupt courts, judges, prosecutors and especially investigative cops — the judicial backbone of any credible fight against organized crime Colombia emphasized “professionalizing the police and reforming [the] judicial system.” It did this via a “transformation within” the country that saw its elites finally take responsibility for public security, something Mexico’s hypernegligent ruling class is still reluctant to do Mexico needs an investment by [its] elites in the safety and well-being of all its citizens.” if I were Peña Nieto I’d urge Obama to do on the federal level what the states of Colorado and Washington did: legalize marijuana That would do two things: First, deprive Mexico’s drug cartels of more than a third of the $30 billion or so they make each year. Second, save the U.S. the estimated $10 billion it wastes every year chasing down a drug that’s no more harmful than alcohol when used in moderation. It can then steer that money to drug-demand-reduction efforts like rehab services, which studies show do more to ease the drug plague than conventional supply-side interdiction does	Drug wars will always fail – squo internal Mexican reforms solve	4,603	64	2,025	766	11	325	0.01436	0.424282	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,955	So whatever Obama’s position ends up being this time around, which one is right? Are guest worker programs a workable alternative to a pathway to citizenship for some low-skill workers? Most experts argue no. “I find it slightly amazing that the phrase ‘guest worker program’ still gets used with a straight face in Washington,” remarks Boston College political scientist Peter Skerry, who specializes in immigration policy and the politics around it. The two most-studied guest worker programs are the Bracero Program — a program for Mexican workers coming to the U.S. that was in place from 1942 to 1964 — and the West German “Gastarbeiter” program in the 1960s and ’70s, which allowed in workers from Italy, Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Portugal. The latter program was mimicked, usually at a smaller scale, in the Netherlands and Belgium as well as in East Germany (whose workers generally came from Vietnam). Living under Bracero Workers in the Braceros Program. (Source: University of California — Santa Cruz) The most common analysis holds that the programs were far less temporary than initially intended. “Most students of the Bracero Program would argue that they were, in great part, the beginning of our illegal immigrant problem,” Skerry explains. Before then, many Mexicans didn’t have the information or means to get to the U.S. Bracero both made emigration desirable and provided a ready means. “They were started in 1942, at a time when Mexico wasn’t that developed, and it wasn’t so easy to get here, in terms of roads and railroads and means of transportation,” Skerry continues. “It’s something that has to get opened up, so [Bracero] had the effect of kind of exposing this opportunity to lots of Mexican workers and peasants, and that really helped build these kinds of networks and patterns where people came and moved north to come here and work.” Some of those people bolted into the U.S. and never returned. While the public reputation of the Bracero Program holds that it led to employer abuse, Michael Snodgrass, a Latin American historian at Indiana University who has studied the program, has a slightly more optimistic take. “The more the program has been studied, we’re finding it was not as exploitative as has often been portrayed,” he explains. In the early going, in fact, employer abuses were fairly rare due to rigorous enforcement on the part of Mexican consular officials in the United States, who advocated on behalf of the program’s participants. It didn’t hurt, Snodgrass adds, that many Bracero participants got their spots as a result of patronage from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ran the Mexican government from 1929 to 2000 (and regained power in last year’s elections). PRI had an incentive to make sure its people were treated well. And it used what powers it had. “They had the right to blacklist entire U.S. counties if it was found that growers there were violating the provisions of the initial agreement,” Snodgrass tells me. “There are cases of counties from the Delta region of Mississippi, and Arkansas and Oregon being kicked out of the program.” But that only worked when relatively few people were coming across the border. After World War II, their ranks swelled and enforcement of labor standards waned. There just weren’t enough Mexican officials to protect that many people.”The biggest complaint I’ve heard is that once they got into the United States, the one right they did not have is to leave their employers,” Snodgrass continues. “You were assigned to a growers’ association, you didn’t know if you’d harvest cotton in Texas or tomatoes in California. If it was a bad harvest you could make no money, so some decided I’m not going to use the program because of these limitations or I’ll use it to get in and then skip out.” How many stuck around? Gastarbeiter program participants in Frankfurt, 1959. (Bildarchiv Prussian Cultural Heritage / Abisag Tüllmann Archives) Snodgrass notes that many Mexicans used the program exactly as intended, returning home after their stint ended. Some would go to the U.S. for a few months and then return, living off their much higher American wages for the rest of the year. But he concedes, as Skerry says, that some used the program as a way to get in permanently. That also happened in Germany. Jagdish Bhagwati, an economist at Columbia and the Council on Foreign Relations who has studied the German program, quotes the Swiss-German writer Max Frisch: “We asked for workers. We got people instead.” As with Bracero, it proved hard to ensure that all participants used the program in the intended temporary fashion. “Even though the contracts said these people could be sent back, when it came to the crunch, it was impossible to do that,” Bhagwati continues. “Even if it was called temporary, it would turn into de facto permanent.” Skerry agrees. “People came in on temporary work visas in Germany, and they didn’t go back, like they were supposed to,” he tells me. The current system isn’t immune to this kind of gaming. People overstay their visas all the time. And some of those cases end in people going legit, even without a “path to citizenship” along the lines being discussed in Congress. Bhagwati cites a study by Guillermina Jasso, Douglas Massey, Mark Rosenzweig and James Smith that found that about 32 percent of immigrants who were granted legal status in 1996 were previously illegal residents. What’s more, 19 percent had entered illegally too, while just 12 percent were overstaying a visa (another 2.22 percent or so were otherwise illegally here; the numbers don’t add up perfectly due to rounding). But a guest worker program will, in all likelihood, push that number even higher.	Matthews 1/30 [Dylan Matthews; January 30, 2013; We’ve tried guest worker programs before. They don’t work.; Dylan Matthews is a reporter for the Washington Post specializing in data and number analysis; http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/30/weve-tried-guest-worker-programs-before-they-dont-work/]	Are guest worker programs a workable alternative to a pathway to citizenship for some low-skill workers? Most experts argue no. “I find it slightly amazing that the phrase ‘guest worker program’ still gets used with a straight face in Washington,” remarks Boston College political scientist Peter Skerry The two most-studied guest worker programs are the Bracero Program and the Gastarbeiter” program Most students of the Bracero Program would argue that they were, in great part, the beginning of our illegal immigrant problem Before then, many Mexicans didn’t have the information or means to get to the U.S. Bracero both made emigration desirable and provided a ready means. “They were started in 1942, at a time when Mexico wasn’t that developed, and it wasn’t so easy to get here, in terms of roads and railroads and means of transportation It’s something that has to get opened up, so [Bracero] had the effect of kind of exposing this opportunity to lots of Mexican workers and peasants, and that really helped build these kinds of networks and patterns where people came and moved north to come here and work.” Some of those people bolted into the U.S. and never returned some used the program as a way to get in permanently. That also happened in Germany We asked for workers. We got people instead.” As with Bracero, it proved hard to ensure that all participants used the program in the intended temporary fashion People came in on temporary work visas in Germany, and they didn’t go back, like they were supposed to The system isn’t immune to this kind of gaming. People overstay their visas all the time. What’s more, 19 percent had entered illegally too, while just 12 percent were overstaying a visa (another 2.22 percent or so were otherwise illegally here But a guest worker program will, in all likelihood, push that number even higher.	Turn – Guest worker program boosts illegal immigration – empirics prove	5,756	71	1,853	955	11	314	0.011518	0.328796	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,956	Guest worker programmes have been advocated as a substitute for the employment of illegal migrants in sectors experiencing labour shortages. It has been suggested that by imposing control, these programmes promote general respect for the law and discourage wholesale law breaking. However, critics of guest worker programmes maintain that many temporary workers tend to stay in the country, thus inflating, rather than reducing, the ranks of undocumented migrants (Papademetriou, Martin and Miller, 1983: 41-44; Miller and Martin, 1982: 1; Bustamante, 1984; Castles and Kosack, 1985: 396-400; Miller, 1986; Castles, 1986). This article argues that whether or not guest workers stay in the country after their visas expire depends on the way the programme is administered. Administration of the programme in turn reflects various interests that shape the State’s regulation of the foreign labour importation process. The article compares the US Bracero Program (under PL-45 and PL-78) and the Canadian Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program. While analysis of the Bracero Program is based on secondary sources, discussion of the Canadian programme is grounded in original research conducted by the author in both Canada and Mexico which included interviews with Mexican seasonal workers, Canadian and Mexican officials responsible for the administration of the programme, and greenhouse growers in Leamington, Ontario between 1996 and 1999.1 While the Bracero Program entailed a significant increase in illegal migration (much but not all of which can be attributed to non-return), in Canada most programme participants return home. The US Bracero Program catered mainly to the growers’ interests, and the Government’s objective was to provide abundant labour to growers as quickly and cheaply as possible. Thus, large numbers of Mexican workers were recruited through haphazard procedures, using agricultural background, strength, and health as major criteria. In the absence of structured procedures to guarantee return to braceros, many chose to stay in the US indefinitely instead of returning home at the end of the season. Furthermore, the US Government exercised very little control over working and living conditions experienced by braceros. It was not unusual for these workers to be paid less than a minimum wage and to live in dismal conditions. As a result, desertion was a widespread phenomenon. By contrast, the Canadian programme is shaped not only by growers’ interests but also by the Canadian Government’s objective to prevent “unwanted” immigrants from staying inHe came, he saw, he ... stayed. Guest worker programmes 217 Canada and by the need to protect domestic labour. It allows for bureaucratic selection of a relatively small number of programme participants whose return to Canada is very likely as long as they remain healthy and employers are pleased with their performance. Growers’ compliance with requirements for minimum working and living standards assures workers’ loyalty. Desertion is therefore rare. Two other factors account for the difference in outcomes in the two countries. First, whereas in the US the treatment of braceros employed by growers’ farm labour associations was rather impersonal, in Canada Mexicans assigned to individual growers often develop a paternalistic relationship with their employers. As a result, most of the workers feel loyal to their patrones (employers) and do not wish to abandon them. Second, desertion in the US was facilitated largely by the existence of social networks among other Mexicans, or Latin Americans in general, and of an economic infrastructure which easily absorbed undocumented migrants. In Canada, Mexicans are sent to work in rural areas where there are hardly any other Spanish-speaking persons. Even if some programme participants decide to stay in Canada illegally, they find it extremely difficult to adjust without such a support network. Critics of guest worker programmes argue that rather than replacing illegal labour, guest worker programmes end up exacerbating the problems of illegality and non-return. Morales estimates that during the twenty-two-year tenure of the Bracero Program (1942-1964) five million illegal Mexican workers were apprehended and deported from the US, including some who were unsuccessful Bracero Program candidates and decided to cross the border illegally, as well as former braceros who did not return home (cited in Hansen, 1988: 99).	Basok 2k (Tanya Basok is a professor at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology @ the University of Windsor // ‘He came, He Saw, He…Stayed: Guest Worker Programs and the Issue of Non-Return’ Page 216-233) L S	critics of guest worker programmes maintain that many temporary workers tend to stay in the country, thus inflating, rather than reducing, the ranks of undocumented migrants The US Bracero Program catered mainly to the growers’ interests, and the Government’s objective was to provide abundant labour to growers as quickly and cheaply as possible. Thus, large numbers of Mexican workers were recruited through haphazard procedures, using agricultural background, strength, and health as major criteria. In the absence of structured procedures to guarantee return to braceros, many chose to stay in the US indefinitely instead of returning home at the end of the season. the US Government exercised very little control over working and living conditions It was not unusual for these workers to be paid less than a minimum wage and to live in dismal conditions. As a result, desertion was a widespread phenomenon. in the US the treatment of braceros employed by growers’ farm labour associations was rather impersonal desertion in the US was facilitated largely by the existence of social networks among other Mexicans, or Latin Americans in general, and of an economic infrastructure which easily absorbed undocumented migrants. rather than replacing illegal labour, guest worker programmes end up exacerbating the problems of illegality and non-return. Morales estimates that during the twenty-two-year tenure of the Bracero Program (1942-1964) five million illegal Mexican workers were apprehended and deported from the US, including some who were unsuccessful Bracero Program candidates and decided to cross the border illegally, as well as former braceros who did not return home	Guest worker programs empirically increase illegal immigration	4,472	62	1,682	674	7	256	0.010386	0.379822	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,957	Researchers have suggested that the Bracero Program has contributed to undocumented migration in three ways. First, by providing Mexican migrants with valuable experience in the US and familiarizing them with US cultural and social institutions, it provided the braceros with the knowledge necessary for permanent migration. Second, it provided Mexican workers the opportunity to establish contacts with employers and to build ties with Mexican-American communities in the US. The social networks they formed made it easier for the braceros to return when active recruitment by the US Government ceased. As Gamboa (1990: 66) shows, some workers found good employers with whom they remained for years without returning to Mexico. Some employees found that farmers would take extraordinary steps to keep them in the country permanently as well as provide assistance in bringing their wives from Mexico. Third, the Bracero Program allowed its participants to improve their living18 Basok standards, thus raising overall expectations. When the programme was discontinued in 1964, in order to maintain the standards of living to which these workers and their families had become accustomed, former braceros either stayed in the US illegally or managed to acquire permanent resident status, using ties with the US employers or kinship support (Hansen, 1988: 99; Reichert and Massey, 1982: 5-6; Pfeffer, 1980: 39). The first two explanations refer to opportunities which facilitate non-return but do not provide reasons why braceros chose to drop out of the Bracero Program and stay in the US illegally. The third explanation links non-return (and illegal entry into the US) to termination of the Bracero Program. While the cessation of the guest worker programme certainly provoked illegal migration, it should be pointed out that even before the programme ended, many braceros had not returned to Mexico. Therefore, other factors which propel guest workers to stay must be considered. These include the nature of administration of the guest worker programme, including its recruitment policies, enforcement of working and living standards, and the size of the programme. In each of these areas Canadian experience has differed from the US which is why hardly any participants of the Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program, which has been in existence since 1974, have stayed behind.	Basok 2k (Tanya Basok is a professor at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology @ the University of Windsor // ‘He came, He Saw, He…Stayed: Guest Worker Programs and the Issue of Non-Return’ Page 216-233) L S	Researchers have suggested that the Bracero Program contributed to undocumented migration in three ways First, by providing Mexican migrants with valuable experience in the US and familiarizing them with US cultural and social institutions, it provided the braceros with knowledge necessary for permanent migration. Second, it provided Mexican workers the opportunity to establish contacts with employers and to build ties with Mexican-American communities in the US The social networks they formed made it easier for the braceros to return when active recruitment by the US Government ceased farmers would take extraordinary steps to keep them in the country permanently as well as provide assistance in bringing their wives from Mexico. Third, the Bracero Program allowed its participants to improve their living When the programme was discontinued in 1964 these workers either stayed in the US illegally or managed to acquire permanent resident status, using ties with the US employers or kinship support	Guest worker programs sustain undocumented immigration—Bracero proves	2,384	69	1,007	365	7	152	0.019178	0.416438	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,958	Mexico and the United States have forged one of the strongest and most productive relationships in the world. No two countries anywhere engage so intensely on a daily basis, cooperate across such a wide and varied spectrum of issues, and affect the economy and society of the other so profoundly. No two sovereign nations are more demographically and economically integrated. With annual cross-border commerce of some $500 billion, Mexico is now the United States’ second largest trading partner. Some analysts project that it will overtake Canada for the No. 1 position within the decade. Sales to Mexico make up twothirds of all US exports to Latin America. Mexico, in turn, sends 80 percent of its exports to the United States and purchases nearly 60 percent of its imports from its northern neighbor. Substantial investment, too, flows in both directions. US investments in Mexico have averaged $12 billion annually for the past dozen years, amounting to more than half of all foreign investment in the country, according to the US State Department. In addition, families in the United States send more than $20 billion in remittances to Mexico each year. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which joined the economies of Mexico, the United States, and Canada in 1994, is today the world’s largest economic bloc, exceeding, albeit by a small margin, the total output of the 27-member European Union. Demography also matters. Some 33 million US residents are of Mexican origin. They make up more than 10 percent of the US population, nearly two-thirds of all Latinos, and around 7 percent of American voters. While US political debates tend to spotlight unauthorized immigration, 80 percent of Mexicans in the United States are legal residents. Still, illegal immigration may be the single most troubling issue in US-Mexico relations, although changing migration patterns and the growing influence of Latino voters may offer solutions going forward. Security has become an area of intense cooperation as Mexico grapples with an ongoing wave of brutal crime and violence. The United States and Mexico may not always agree on policy or strategy, but the extensive collaboration among their police and security agencies is unprecedented. Indeed, the bilateral agenda has seen cooperation flourish on almost every issue, with more opportunities emerging as mutual interests deepen. Mexico and the United States are consistently finding new ways to complement and reinforce one another in the global marketplace and on matters of regional and international importance. Both governments have made clear a commitment to consolidate and enhance this cooperation to fully leverage their inevitable and accelerating economic and demographic integration. In many ways, the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico is complicated and conditioned by the long and the bloody war on drugs. It's difficult to say exactly how many people have been killed in that war, but Mexican media have estimated that around 70,000 people have died since 2006; many thousands more have been disappeared. The United States has been closely involved, providing money, technology and intelligence to the Mexican government.	Shifter 13 (Michael, Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue, “A More Ambitious Agenda” February 2013 http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9042_USMexicoReportEnglishFinal.pdf\\CLans)	Mexico and the U S have forged one of the strongest relationships in the world No two countries anywhere engage so intensely on a daily basis and affect the economy and society of the other so profoundly. No two sovereign nations are more demographically and economically integrated. Sales to Mexico make up twothirds of all US exports to Latin America. Mexico, in turn, sends 80 percent of its exports to the United States US investments in Mexico have averaged $12 billion annually for the past dozen years, NAFTA is today the world’s largest economic bloc While US political debates tend to spotlight unauthorized immigration, 80 percent of Mexicans in the United States are legal residents. Security has become an area of intense cooperation The United States and Mexico may not always agree on policy or strategy, but the extensive collaboration among their police and security agencies is unprecedented. the bilateral agenda has seen cooperation flourish on almost every issue, Mexico and the United States are consistently finding new ways to complement and reinforce one another in the global marketplace and on matters of regional and international importance Both governments have made clear a commitment to consolidate and enhance this cooperation to fully leverage their inevitable and accelerating economic and demographic integration. the U.S. and Mexico is conditioned by the long and the bloody war on drugs The United States has been closely involved, providing money, technology and intelligence to the Mexican government.	Mexico and US relations high – economically integrated	3,207	55	1,540	503	8	242	0.015905	0.481113	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,959	Following a lengthy closed meeting, the presidents stood before the cameras to reaffirm their mutual commitment to a war that has cost 35,000 Mexican lives since 2007, with the death toll rising by often 50 homicides a day. Obama affirmed the U.S. strategy of increased engagement in the Mexican drug war, stating “We are very mindful that the battle President Calderon is fighting inside of Mexico is not just his battle, it’s also ours.” He promised to deliver $900 million this year of funds appropriated under the Merida Initiative, a security agreement launched in 2007 by the George W. Bush administration and extended indefinitely under Obama. The binational relationship suffered some serious blows in the weeks preceding Calderon’s Washington visit. The release of thousands of Wikileaks cables between the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and the State Department revealed U.S. officials’ deep concerns regarding the Mexican government’s capacity to carry out its high-risk war on drug cartels and wavering public opinion. Cable 10MEXICO83, for example, states that “the GOM’s (Government of Mexico’s) inability to halt the escalating numbers of narco-related homicides in places like Ciudad Juarez and elsewhere… has become one of Calderon’s principal political liabilities as the general public has grown more concerned about citizen security.” The cable cites “official corruption,” inter-agency rivalries, “dismal” prosecution rates and a “slow and risk averse” Mexican army. In an interview with El Universal, Calderon responded angrily, calling the statements exaggerated, the ambassador “ignorant” and citing a lack of inter-agency coordination within the United States. Continued releases of the cables by the Mexican daily La Jornada promise more embarrassments for both governments in attempting to portray a confident and united front in the drug war. Tensions also followed the assassination of Jaime Zapata, a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent in San Luis Potosí on Feb. 15. Although the Mexican government has arrested the alleged attackers–members of the Zetas drug cartel–the incident highlighted the risks of the drug war cooperation and the power of the cartels. The Mexican government’s contradictory statements on what happened and the army’s absurd hypothesis that the assassins did not know they were attacking U.S. agents (the agents’ car bore US diplomatic plates) only deepened perceptions of a lack of transparency. Within Mexico, the incident heightened fears that the U.S. government would demand more direct involvement, in particular a lifting of the ban on foreign agents bearing arms within Mexican territory.	Carlson 11 (Laura Carlson, Director of the Americas Program of the Center for International Policy in Mexico City, US-Mexico Relations Back on track in the wrong direction; http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/4068#sthash.F2HKoPpB.dpuf)	The binational relationship suffered some serious blows in the weeks preceding Calderon’s Washington visit. The release of thousands of Wikileaks cables between the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and the State Department revealed U.S. officials’ deep concerns regarding the Mexican government’s capacity to carry out its high-risk war on drug cartels and wavering public opinion. The cable cites “official corruption,” inter-agency rivalries, “dismal” prosecution rates and a “slow and risk averse” Mexican army. Continued releases of the cables by the Mexican daily La Jornada promise more embarrassments for both governments in attempting to portray a confident and united front in the drug war. Tensions also followed the assassination of Jaime Zapata, a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent in San Luis Potosí on Feb. 15. Although the Mexican government has arrested the alleged attackers–members of the Zetas drug cartel–the incident highlighted the risks of the drug war cooperation and the power of the cartels. The Mexican government’s contradictory statements on what happened and the army’s absurd hypothesis that the assassins did not know they were attacking U.S. agents (the agents’ car bore US diplomatic plates) only deepened perceptions of a lack of transparency.	Alt causes tank relations – Wikileaks, drug cartels, dismal production rates, inter-agency rivalries, and a slow army	2,659	117	1,286	402	17	193	0.042289	0.4801	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,960	Mexico and the United States are two neighboring countries whose connections are complex, broad, multilayered, and intricate in a variety of areas and on a number of delicate issues. The relationship is created by flows of people, culture, technology, goods services, and labor between the two countries. The immigration issue is one of the most direct consequences of such geographical proximity between both countries. Indeed, Mexico is one of the main migratory countries in the world, and the vast majority of its migrants travel north to work or settle in the United States. In fact, according to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (PEW), Mexico is the main source of laborers to the United States. For example, as of 2010, there were 11.2 million illegal workers in this nation, and of that number, 58 percent come from Mexico. That is an estimated 6.5 million immigrants from south of the border who have established residence in the United States.7 This geographical proximity between both countries has created a deep and complex framework of interdependence. The full variety and nature of the issues that shape the character of this relationship probably do not exist in the contemporary history of other neighboring countries in the Western Hemisphere. For example, after Canada and China, Mexico is America’s third-ranked trading partner, purchasing two-thirds of its imports from the United States while sending about two-thirds of its exports to the north. From 1993 to 2006, trade between the signatory nations has doubled, totaling 883 billion dollars within that period.	Gaytan 12 (José Alberto Gaytan; PhD @ the School of International Studies @ UMiami; Bachelor of Law @ University of Nuevo León; Director of Legal Services of IMSS. Mexican Migrant Farmworkers’ Impact on South Florida: A Case Study in the Context of US–Mexican Relations’)//L Shen	Mexico and the United States are two neighboring countries whose connections are complex , multilayered, and intricate The relationship is created by flows of people, culture, technology, goods services, and labor between the two countries. The immigration issue is one of the most direct consequences of such proximity , Mexico is one of the main migratory countries in the world, and the vast majority of its migrants travel north to work or settle in the United States Mexico is the main source of laborers to the United States. This geographical proximity between both countries has created a deep and complex framework of interdependence. The full variety of the issues probably do not exist in the contemporary history of other neighboring countries in the Western Hemisphere	US-Mexican relations are resilient – Interdependent networks	1,627	60	781	261	7	125	0.02682	0.478927	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,961	But Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has begun to back away from the U.S. And this week, his administration said they would limit its contacts with American agencies. David Shirk is an associate professor at the University of San Diego. He studies the U.S.-Mexico relationship, and joins us in our studios. Thanks so much for being with us. DAVID SHIRK: Thank you for having me. SIMON: How closely has the United States been involved? SHIRK: In the last 12 years, and especially the last six years, have really been a high-water mark in U.S.-Mexico collaboration, particularly on security issues. Levels of trust are so high that we have had the opportunity to fly drones in Mexico, we have agents operating in direct collaboration with their Mexican counterparts, we've seen record levels of extradition. So, the collaboration is at a much higher level of intensity than we've ever seen before - or has been, at least over the last six years or so.	Simon 13 (Scott Simon in an interview with David Shirk, Shirk is an associate professor of political science at the University of San Diego and recently finished his tenure as director of the Trans-Border Institute at USD, “U.S.-Mexico Relations Complicated, Conditioned By Drug War” May 4, 2013 http://www.npr.org/2013/05/04/181053775/u-s-mexico-relations-complicated-conditioned-by-drug-war)CL	Nieto has begun to back away from the U.S. And this week, his administration said they would limit its contacts with American agencies How closely has the United States been involved? In especially the last six years, have really been a high-water mark in U.S.-Mexico collaboration, particularly on security issues Levels of trust are so high that we have had the opportunity to fly drones in Mexico the collaboration is at a much higher level of intensity than we've ever seen before - or has been, at least over the last six years or so.	Security cooperation makes relations the highest they’ve been in 6 years	953	72	539	162	11	95	0.067901	0.58642	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,962	With a new president in Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, and the re-election of President Barack Obama last fall, the timing was right to re-examine the relationship, said Peter H. Smith, professor of political science and Latin American Studies at the University of California San Diego. Smith co-edited the book with Andrew Selee, vice president of the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. “There is closer collaboration than ever between the United and Mexico in areas such as commerce and culture,” said Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, director of University of California San Diego’s Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies and co-author of one of the chapters. “And yet the United States as a country lives in denial of the reality of the state of its relationship with Mexico.”	Dibble 13 (Sarah, bachelor's degree in Arabic from the University of Utah and a master's degree in journalism from Columbia University, “Academics call for changes in U.S.-Mexico relations” April 5, 2013 http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/Apr/05/academic-call-for-changes-in-us-mexico-relations/\\CLans)	With a new president in Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto and Obama the timing was right to re-examine the relationship There is closer collaboration than ever between the United and Mexico in areas such as commerce and culture,” said Díaz-Cayeros the U S as a country lives in denial of the reality of the state of its relationship with Mexico.”	US-Mexico relations high-commerce and culture ensure collaboration	758	66	339	122	7	59	0.057377	0.483607	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,963	What are the prospects for cooperation at this time? On one hand, the underlying factors that favored cooperation during the 1990s generally remain in place. Despite the intractability of migration policy, the overall US-Mexican relationship has never been closer. With 75 million trucks and passengers entering the United States from Mexico in 2009, $250 billion in legal trade between the countries, and about 30 million Hispanics of Mexican origin living in the United States, the two countries are simply too intertwined to leave any issue of mutual concern off the bilateral agenda. Realistically, neither country can hope to accomplish its core goals at the border — controlling crime and violence, countering terrorist threats, preventing illegal entries, facilitating legal travel and cross-border trade — without close coordination and cooperation with the other. Broader questions about US immigration policy including how to manage employment-based migration and what to do about the 11 million unauthorized immigrants already in the United States, are also easier to answer if policymakers draw from a cooperative toolkit. The United States and Mexico have a great deal to gain long-term by working together to manage migration policy as a tool for enhancing the region’s human capital, an engine for regional economic growth and increased global competitiveness.	Rosenblum 11 (Marc R., Marc Rosenblum is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of New Orleans, B.A. in political science at Columbia University and Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, San Diego, “Obstacles and Opportunities For Regional Cooperation: The US-Mexico Case, April 2011, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/usmexico-cooperation.pdf\\CLans)	Despite the intractability of migration policy, the overall US-Mexican relationship has never been closer With 75 million trucks and passengers entering the U S $250 billion in legal trade between the countries, and about 30 million Hispanics of Mexican origin living in the United States, the two countries are simply too intertwined to leave any issue of mutual concern off the bilateral agenda. . The United States and Mexico have a great deal to gain by working together to manage migration policy for enhancing the region’s human capital, an engine for regional economic growth and increased global competitiveness.	Despite immigration issues, relations high now	1,375	47	620	208	6	98	0.028846	0.471154	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,964	Relations between the United States and Mexico are complex due to the wide range of issues they share that bring them together and set them apart. Thus, "multi-thematic" is a fine choice of words to describe the relationship between the administrations of presidents Barack Obama and Enrique Peña Nieto. The U.S. leader's visit to Mexico served to jumpstart bilateral relations, adapting them to the change in the neighboring country. Particularly, regarding the change in the Mexican government's strategy for how to collaborate with its neighbor to the north to fight drug trafficking in Mexico. Former President Felipe Calderón's more liberal policy of contacts at multiple levels between Mexican and U.S. authorities has been left behind and replaced with a single channel. This move toward centralization has been replicated in various sectors of the new government, reflecting the PRI's traditional modus operandi. At the same time, comments by both leaders showed a healthy caution to avoid making the mistakes of previous presidents. One example was the tact employed by Peña Nieto in his remarks on immigration reform. That respect to avoid encroaching on the work of Congress in Washington also gives Peña Nieto the chance to expand the bilateral agenda to really stress investment, trade, and educational exchanges and go beyond his PAN predecessor's priorities of security and immigration. It is now up to the White House to respect and understand the change that has occurred at Los Pinos. Security is undoubtedly a central issue in their relationship. The United States provides the drug users and the guns, while Mexico supplies the drugs and the victims of violence. Nonetheless, while security dominates the headlines, it need not dominate the bilateral agenda, especially from the U.S viewpoint.	La Opinion 13 (Los Angeles based Spanish site, “A broader agenda” May 5, 2013 http://www.laopinion.com/article/20130505/IMPORT01/305059843\\CLans)	Relations between the U S and Mexico are complex due to the wide range of issues they share that bring them together and set them apart The U.S. leader's visit to Mexico served to jumpstart bilateral relations, Particularly the change in the Mexican government's strategy for how to collaborate with its neighbor to the north to fight drug trafficking Calderón's liberal policy of contacts at multiple levels between Mexican and U.S. authorities has been left behind comments by both leaders showed a healthy caution to avoid making the mistakes of previous presidents That respect to avoid encroaching on the work of Congress gives Peña Nieto the chance to expand the bilateral agenda to really stress investment, trade, and educational exchanges It is now up to the White House to respect and understand the change that has occurred at Los Pinos. Security is undoubtedly a central issue in their relationship.	Relations between US and Mexico high now – security issues take precedent	1,813	74	911	285	12	149	0.042105	0.522807	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,965	A recent spate of comments from high-ranking U.S. officials served to fan the flame of distrust of the U.S. government. Sec. of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano’s speculated out loud of possible links between Mexican drug cartels and Al Qaeda, and Undersecretary of the Army Joseph Westphal characterized organized crime in Mexico as an “insurgency,” while openly raising the specter of US troops being sent in. Mexican columnists and anti-militarization activists have intensified criticism of U.S. growing involvement in the country’s national security. These tensions arise from the commitment of both governments to deepen and reinforce a military alliance based on a drug war that is rapidly losing the support of their populations and proving itself counterproductive. The central concern of the presidential summit wasn’t the relatively superficial frictions between the countries, but the desire to bolster the beleaguered drug war. Despite talk of a deteriorating relationship, in fact the Calderon and Obama administrations are overseeing the birth of historically unprecedented cooperation between the two nations. The problem is that nearly all of that cooperation centers on the severely flawed approach to confront transnational drug-trafficking. The Mexico City US Embassy has expanded into a massive web of Washington-led programs and infrastructure. The controversial Merida Initiative, up for another round of funding in Congress, has allocated more than $1.5 billion to help fight Mexico’s drug war with devastatingly negative effects. In addition to the rise in violence, the binational relationship, which should be multi-faceted and focused on peaceful co-existence, has been hijacked by proponents of a war model to reduce illicit drug flows to the U.S. market and confront organized crime where it is most powerful—in brutal battle. The Pentagon is thrilled with its open access to the Mexican security apparatus and the Calderon government—entering election mode—needs the political and economic support for its flagship war policy.	Carlson 11 (Laura Carlson, Director of the Americas Program of the Center for International Policy in Mexico City, US-Mexico Relations Back on track in the wrong direction; http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/4068#sthash.F2HKoPpB.dpuf)	A recent spate of comments from high-ranking U.S. officials served to fan the flame of distrust of the U.S. government. Sec. of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano’s speculated out loud of possible links between Mexican drug cartels and Al Qaeda, and Undersecretary of the Army Joseph Westphal characterized organized crime in Mexico as an “insurgency,” while openly raising the specter of US troops being sent in. Mexican columnists and anti-militarization activists have intensified criticism of U.S. growing involvement in the country’s national security. These tensions arise from the commitment of both governments to deepen and reinforce a military alliance based on a drug war that is rapidly losing the support of their populations and proving itself counterproductive. The central concern of the presidential summit wasn’t the relatively superficial frictions between the countries, but the desire to bolster the beleaguered drug war. . In addition to the rise in violence, the binational relationship, which should be multi-faceted and focused on peaceful co-existence, has been hijacked by proponents of a war model to reduce illicit drug flows to the U.S. market and confront organized crime where it is most powerful—in brutal battle.	The US is fanning the flame of distrust – US commitment to the drug war increases tensions	2,059	90	1,246	305	17	189	0.055738	0.619672	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,966	But the new relationship forged in war rooms is bad news for the Mexican people. Polls now show that the majority of the population does not believe its government is winning the war on drugs and feels the social costs are too high. A new movement called No More Blood has taken hold throughout the country and regions like Ciudad Juarez, where militarization has been heaviest and not coincidentally violence has taken the highest toll, have seen the rise of grassroots movements to defend human rights, call for an end to militarization and put forward alternative strategies. Among their demands is to rechannel scarce resources away from the attack on cartels to address social needs, restore the armed forces to their constitutional mandate of national defense, and end impunity for crime by fixing the judicial and public security systems and attacking government corruption. It’s also bad news for the U.S. public. Opening up a war front in Mexico has not only destabilized our closest neighbor, but also drains resources needed in U.S. communities. The government-funded contracts granted to Blackwater and Blackhawk to fight Mexico’s war could be used for schools in crisis. With an on-going economic crisis and two wars across the ocean, the prospect of long-term involvement south of the border hurts all but the flourishing war economy. Presidents Obama and Calderon could have used this meeting to rethink the strategy. Both have at times indicated a need to defuse the drug war by turning more to health-oriented approaches to drug consumption and backing off the cops and robbers persecutions by adopting more sophisticated methods of dismantling financial structures and carrying out more focused intelligence operations. A wide range of alternative policies exist to supplant the endless drug war. Human rights concerns, along with longterm effectiveness, should dominate in considering which of these to adopt. Mexico’s drug war has generated death, an erosion of rule of law, increased gender-based violence and has significantly altered daily life in many parts of the county. This crisis should have elicited a modicum of self-criticism and willingness to consider reforms from the leaders who developed the strategy. Instead, the presidential summit made a show of putting the binational relationship back on track—in precisely the wrong direction	Carlson 11 (Laura Carlson, Director of the Americas Program of the Center for International Policy in Mexico City, US-Mexico Relations Back on track in the wrong direction; http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/4068#sthash.F2HKoPpB.dpuf)	But the new relationship forged in war rooms is bad news for the Mexican people. Polls now show that the majority of the population does not believe its government is winning the war on drugs and feels the social costs are too high. A new movement called No More Blood has taken hold throughout the country where militarization has been heaviest and not coincidentally violence has taken the highest toll, have seen the rise of grassroots movements to defend human rights, call for an end to militarization and put forward alternative strategies It’s also bad news for the U.S. public. Opening up a war front in Mexico has not only destabilized our closest neighbor, but also drains resources needed in U.S. communities. The government-funded contracts granted to Blackwater and Blackhawk to fight Mexico’s war could be used for schools in crisis. With an on-going economic crisis and two wars across the ocean, the prospect of long-term involvement south of the border hurts all but the flourishing war economy. This crisis should have elicited a modicum of self-criticism and willingness to consider reforms from the leaders who developed the strategy. Instead, the presidential summit made a show of putting the binational relationship back on track—in precisely the wrong direction	Continued drug war is unpopular with the public and takes funds away from education (possible impact turn to drug war, or a plan unpopular with public for ptx)	2,369	159	1,285	373	28	208	0.075067	0.557641	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,967	If Obama and Peña Nieto were to talk about common concerns while on the border instead of in sitting rooms of the White House and Los Pinos, they would see a common future in the river that divides the two nations. Climate change-aggravated drought has reduced the Río Bravo to a viscous, milky green trickle. Groundwater reserves in the greater borderlands are being quickly depleted, and farmers, ranchers, and city planners on both sides of the border are battling over rapidly diminishing supplies in the first skirmishes of the water wars that will surely soon overshadow the drug wars as the main threat to regional stability. A common commitment by Obama and Peña Nieto for each government to do its part to mitigate and mutually adjust to climate change—which doesn’t respect border lines or border security fortifications—would be a sign that binational relations can move beyond being merely economic partners and fighting on the same side of the drug war. The sad plight of the once glorious Río Bravo should not further divide the two nations, but bring the communities to the north and those to the south together as neighbors and part of the larger North American community with shared interests and responsibilities.	Barry 13 (Tom Barry, senior policy analyst at the Center for International Policy, where he directs the TransBorder project, “Changing Perspectives on US-Mexico Relations” May 7, 2013 http://truth-out.org/news/item/16221-changing-perspectives-on-us-mexico-relations\\CLans)	If Obama and Peña Nieto were to talk about common concerns while on the border hey would see a common future in the river that divides the two nations. Climate change-aggravated drought has reduced the Río Bravo to a viscous, milky green trickle Groundwater reserves are being quickly depleted planners on both sides of the border are battling over rapidly diminishing supplies in the first skirmishes of the water wars that will overshadow drug wars as the main threat to regional stability. A common commitment by Obama and Peña Nieto for each government to do its part to mitigate and mutually adjust to climate change would be a sign that binational relations can move beyond economic partners The sad plight of the once glorious Río Bravo should not further divide the two nations, but bring the communities to the north and those to the south together	Climate change is an alt cause to relations	1,231	44	857	204	8	146	0.039216	0.715686	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,968	The near-fortification of the border during the Bush and Obama administrations has greatly stymied regional trade and the once-vibrant crossborder culture. In highly urbanized areas such as the El Paso-Juárez metroplex, some level of border fencing makes for good neighborly relations, but the 3,169-kilometer border the “secure border fence” is not only a multibillion waste of scarce U.S. revenues, it’s also a shameful monument to U.S. xenophobia and political opportunism. President Obama should shed the “border security” framing of U.S.-Mexico border policy adopted by the Bush administration and tell President Peña Nieto and the U.S. public that Mexico and Mexicans present no security risk to the borderlands or the U.S. homeland. Terrorism is a palpable threat to U.S. public safety and national security, but this threat is best met by better U.S. intelligence about potential foreign and domestic terrorists and by a common regional security perimeter—not by continuing or increasing military-like measures of border control including drones and militarized border patrols. It is not common knowledge that Mexico is the United States’ third largest trading partner, behind Canada and China. Every day, at least a billion dollars of goods flows across the border. Yet, Mexico is frequently negatively caricaturized, primarily with images of migrants illegally crossing the border into the U.S. and stealing U.S. jobs. Instead of viewing Mexico as a valuable partner that can benefit the U.S. in many facets, it is perceived as a liability, a region that cultivates corruption and violence and is the root of the current U.S. immigration ‘problem’ that has spurred controversial rogue measures like Arizona’s SB 1070.	Barry 13 (Tom Barry, senior policy analyst at the Center for International Policy, where he directs the TransBorder project, “Changing Perspectives on US-Mexico Relations” May 7, 2013 http://truth-out.org/news/item/16221-changing-perspectives-on-us-mexico-relations\\CLans)	The near-fortification of the border during the Bush and Obama administrations has greatly stymied regional trade and the once-vibrant crossborder culture the 3,169-kilometer border the “secure border fence” is not only a multibillion waste of scarce U.S. revenues, it’s also a shameful monument to U.S. xenophobia and political opportunism President Obama should shed the “border security” framing of U.S.-Mexico border policy and tell Nieto that Mexico and Mexicans present no security risk to the borderlands or the U.S. homeland Terrorism is a palpable threat to U.S but this threat is best met by better U.S. intelligence about potential foreign and domestic terrorists not by continuing or increasing military-like measures of border control It is not common knowledge that Mexico is the United States’ third largest trading partner Yet, Mexico is frequently negatively caricaturized Instead of viewing Mexico as a valuable partner it is perceived as a liability, a region that cultivates corruption and violence and is the root of the current U.S. immigration ‘problem’	Alt cause- securitized framing of Mexico subsumes relations	1,727	59	1,076	264	8	164	0.030303	0.621212	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,969	Conflict over water can arise when there are competing interests for limited resources. This is seen throughout the world with rivers that traverse borders in places like Central Asia and North Africa. For the Colorado River, the U.S.-Mexico border is likely less relevant to the competition for the river’s resources than the artificial border drawn at Lees Ferry. Aside from growing populations, increased energy production from unconventional hydrocarbon sources in the Upper Basin has the potential to increase consumption. While this amount will likely be small compared to overall allocations, it emphasizes the value of water to the Upper Basin. Real or perceived threats to the Upper Basin’s surplus of water could be seen as threats to economic growth in the region. At the same time, further water shortages could limit the potential for economic growth in the Lower Basin — a situation that would only be exacerbated by growing populations. While necessary, conservation efforts and the search for alternative sources likely will not be able to make up for the predicted shortage. Amendments to the original treaty typically have been issued to address symptomatic problems. However, the core problem remains: More water is promised to river users than is available on average. While this problem has not come to a head yet, there may come a time when regional growth overtakes conservation efforts. It is then that renegotiation of the treaty with a more realistic view of the river’s volume will become necessary. Any renegotiation will be filled with conflict, but most of that likely will be contained in the United States.	Stratfor 13 (Stratfor is a geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the world, “U.S., Mexico: The Decline of the Colorado River” May 13, 2013 http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/us-mexico-decline-colorado-river#ixzz2TH6K2oMA\\CLans)	Conflict over water can arise when there are competing interests for limited resources For the Colorado River, the U.S.-Mexico border increased energy production from unconventional hydrocarbon sources in the Upper Basin has the potential to increase consumption Upper Basin’s surplus of water could be seen as threats to economic growth in the region. further water shortages could limit the potential for economic growth in the Lower Basin — a situation that would only be exacerbated by growing populations. conservation efforts and the search for alternative sources likely will not be able to make up for the predicted shortage While this problem has not come to a head yet, there may come a time when regional growth overtakes conservation efforts Any renegotiation will be filled with conflict	Water conflict alt cause to relations	1,638	37	800	263	6	126	0.022814	0.479087	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,970	(CNN) -- Ahead of their meetings in Mexico City this week, President Obama and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto hinted that they wanted to put economic ties atop their agenda. But reports that Mexico is restructuring the way it cooperates with American officials on security matters -- in essence restricting communication -- threaten to impose a shadow over the positive economic story the leaders want to tell. The apparent friction highlights the critical security relationship and illustrates the complexities of U.S.-Mexico relations. "We spend so much time on security issues between the United States and Mexico that sometimes I think we forget this is a massive trading partner, responsible for huge amounts of commerce and huge numbers of jobs on both sides of the border," Obama said this week. But writing a new narrative on U.S.-Mexico relations that doesn't lead with Mexico as a major transit point for narcotics, or the United States as a market hungry for the drugs, isn't easy. That was made clear by the spate of news reports this week on both sides of the border about changes to how Mexico cooperates with the Americans. Under the new rules, all U.S. requests for collaboration with Mexican agencies will flow through a single office, Interior Minister Miguel Angel Osorio Chong confirmed to Mexico's state-run Notimex news agency. It is a drastic change from recent years, when U.S. agents enjoyed widespread access to their Mexican counterparts. So in the days leading up to Obama's arrival in the Mexican capital, the buzz was not about the economy, but whether Mexico was being uncooperative with the United States. Osorio Chong downplayed the idea that the change signified a retreat in security cooperation. The United States "should have the confidence that things are on a good path," he told Notimex. In a conference call with reporters, Obama administration official Ben Rhodes said it was natural that Peña Nieto, who has been in office for only five months, would want to revisit its security structure. "We're currently working with the Mexicans to evaluate the means by which we cooperate, the means by which we provide assistance, and we're certainly open to discussing with Mexico ways to improve and enhance cooperation, streamline the provision of assistance," said Rhodes, who is the deputy national security adviser for strategic communications. "Our goal is not to have a certain amount of presence in terms of security efforts in Mexico; it's to cooperate with the Mexicans so that we can meet the interests of both our countries." But analysts say impact of the changes should not be underestimated. U.S. officials who had built rapport and personal relationships with Mexican counterparts now have an obstacle to their communication, said George Grayson, an expert on Mexican security issues and professor of government at the College of William & Mary. "The door is not wide-open like it used to be," he said. There is a lot to boast of on the economic front, but security will likely remain a key part of how U.S.-Mexico relations will be judged. Among U.S. officials, there is an unspoken concern about whether Peña Nieto will merely give lip service to the the idea of security cooperation or whether he will provide real substance, said David Shirk, former director of the Trans-Border Institute in San Diego.	Catillo 13 (Mariano, News Editor for CNN, Columbia SIPA alumnus, “Security dominates talk of U.S.-Mexico relations” May 2, 2013 http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/world/americas/mexico-us-relations\\CLans)	Obama and Peña Nieto hinted that they wanted to put economic ties atop their agenda But reports that Mexico is restructuring the way it cooperates with American officials on security matters - threaten to impose a shadow over the positive economic story leaders want to tell. The apparent friction highlights the critical relationship of U.S.-Mexico relations writing a new narrative on U.S.-Mexico relations that doesn't lead with Mexico as a major transit point for narcotics isn't easy. the buzz was not about the economy, but whether Mexico was being uncooperative with the United States. Our goal is not to have a certain amount of presence in terms of security efforts in Mexico; it's to cooperate with the Mexicans analysts say impact of the changes should not be underestimated. U.S. officials who had built rapport and personal relationships with Mexican counterparts now have an obstacle to their communication said George Grayson The door is not wide-open like it used to be," he said. security will likely remain a key part of how U.S.-Mexico relations will be judged. there is an unspoken concern about whether Peña Nieto will merely give lip service to the the idea of security cooperation or whether he will provide real substance	Relations low now- security communications issues are an alt cause	3,362	66	1,245	551	10	204	0.018149	0.370236	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,971	Despite ongoing violence south of the border, cooperation between Mexico and the United States has reached unprecedented levels. At a luncheon Monday at a Washington think tank, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Mexican Interior Secretary Alejandro Poire touted how they’ve teamed up to fight drug and weapons trafficking, money laundering and human smuggling. Simultaneously, they warned that progress could be stalled if not continued by the next administrations in both countries. “The challenges are so massive, and the threats so clear, that as much as we have advanced it is imperative that the level of effort not only stays at the same level, but hopefully increases on both sides of the border,” Poire said.	Ordonez 12 (Franco Ordonez, September 17, 2012; Franco is a researcher and writer for McClatchy Newspaper and a Washington correspondent for The Charlotte Observer; Mexican, U.S. relations improve in fighting against drugs, trafficking; http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/09/17/168769/mexican-us-relations-improve-in.html#.UdQygvnFVsk#storylink=cpy)	Despite ongoing violence south of the border, cooperation between Mexico and the United States has reached unprecedented levels. Homeland Security Secretary and Mexican Interior Secretary touted how they’ve teamed up to fight drug and weapons trafficking, money laundering and human smuggling. progress could be stalled if not continued by the next administrations in both countries. “The challenges are so massive, and the threats so clear, that as much as we have advanced it is imperative that the level of effort not only stays at the same level, but hopefully increases on both sides of the border,	Relations have reached unprecedented levels – no risk of decline – Co-op is too important to solve threats	731	106	603	115	18	96	0.156522	0.834783	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,972	“Cooperation between our two countries has never been stronger, but we also know that the threats we face are dynamic,” Napolitano said. “We must continue to work together. This is not a static situation and we should never be comfortable leaning back in our chairs and saying we’re done.” Poire credited U.S. intelligence with helping Mexico capture the alleged kingpin of the Gulf Cartel, Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sanchez, known as “El Coss.” The State Department had a $5 million reward out for his arrest. “I think the reality is there is more day-to-day cooperation on an operational level on very sensitive issues than we’ve ever seen before,” said Andrew Selee, director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, which hosted the event. “At the same time, there is a great deal of distrust between and among agencies. And there are crises of trust and political taboos that are still hard to break.”	Ordonez 12 (Franco Ordonez, September 17, 2012; Franco is a researcher and writer for McClatchy Newspaper and a Washington correspondent for The Charlotte Observer; Mexican, U.S. relations improve in fighting against drugs, trafficking; http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/09/17/168769/mexican-us-relations-improve-in.html#.UdQygvnFVsk#storylink=cpy)	“Cooperation between our two countries has never been stronger, but we also know that the threats we face are dynamic,” We must continue to work together. This is not a static situation and we should never be comfortable leaning back in our chairs and saying we’re done.” “I think the reality is there is more day-to-day cooperation on an operational level on very sensitive issues than we’ve ever seen before,”	Cooperation has never been stronger – dynamic issues force cooperation	943	70	411	157	10	70	0.063694	0.44586	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,973	Why were the Mexican and United States governments unable to establish formal cooperation for the management of migration ﬂows even after agreeing on the need for a ‘‘shared responsibility’’ approach and establishing an agenda for negotiations on a bilateral agreement in the spring of 2001? Conventional wisdom is that the terrorist attacks of September 11th were the main reason for the shift from a bilateral to a unilateral approach to the management of US-Mexico migration ﬂows. Although this event changed the US government’s foreign policy priorities, in order to understand the reasons why the proposal for a migration agreement failed, it is necessary to look beyond the security context that permeated the US agenda after September 11th and analyse the underlying structural, domestic and ideological factors that inﬂuenced the governments’ positions during and after the negotiations. By examining the context of power asymmetry in the US-Mexico relationship, the domestic politics that surround the issue and public perceptions of immigration in the United States, this paper identiﬁes the challenges implied in efforts to expand bilateral cooperation over migration issues in the NAFTA framework. The fact that both countries’ migration policies are mostly pursued unilaterally despite the acceptance of a ‘‘shared responsibility’’ raises key questions regarding the limits of regional integration and bilateral or multilateral cooperation for the management of migration.	Delano 9 (Alexandra Delano, PhD in International Relations @ Oxford; Assistant Professor and Coordinator of Global Studies @ The New School; Fellow at Yale University; Senior Researcher @ The Council of the Americas // ‘‘Shared Responsibility’’ to a Migration Agreement? The Limits for Cooperation in the Mexico-United States Case (2000–2008) // International Migration Journal, 2009) // LShen	Why were the Mexican and U S governments unable to establish formal cooperation for migration ﬂows even after agreeing on the need for a ‘‘shared responsibility’’ approach Conventional wisdom is that the terrorist attacks of September 11th were the main reason for the shift from a bilateral to a unilateral approach to the management of US-Mexico migration ﬂows. this event changed the government’s foreign policy priorities	US-Mexican relations unattainable through immigration—9/11	1,485	59	425	219	5	66	0.022831	0.30137	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,974	The terrorist attacks of September 11th altered the course of these bilateral negotiations as the US government’s foreign and domestic policy priorities changed. Although migration issues were not dropped completely from the agenda, they were viewed through a security lens and addressed in a very different manner by the Bush administration. This ‘‘re-conceptualization of how to protect U.S. borders and prevent the entry of any foreign nationals who would pose a new threat’’ (Mohar, 2004) did not incorporate the possibility of negotiating a migration agreement with Mexico to manage existing migration ﬂows and protect migrants’ rights. Mexico and the United States continued to collaborate closely on the security front and signed the 22-point ‘‘Mexico-U.S. Border Partnership Action Plan’’, also known as the ‘‘Smart Borders Initiative’’, in March 2002. This included agreements in areas of infrastructure and secure ﬂow of people and goods. They also signed the ‘‘Partnership for Prosperity’’ initiative in Monterrey in March 2002, – expanded into the ‘‘Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America’’ in 2005 – to promote foreign and domestic investment in Mexico’s marginal areas, among other goals that do not include regulating the ﬂow of migrant workers in the region. Migration-related initiatives were thus left out of the bilateral agenda and in November 2002, Colin Powell declared that the political conditions did not exist in the United States to advance the migration discussions and Mexican ofﬁcials should be patient (Mohar, 2004). The idea of a bilateral agreement was never put back on the table despite Mexico’s efforts to reframe and resume the negotiations	Delano 9 (Alexandra Delano, PhD in International Relations @ Oxford; Assistant Professor and Coordinator of Global Studies @ The New School; Fellow at Yale University; Senior Researcher @ The Council of the Americas // ‘‘Shared Responsibility’’ to a Migration Agreement? The Limits for Cooperation in the Mexico-United States Case (2000–2008) // International Migration Journal, 2009) // LShen	The terrorist attacks of September 11th altered the course of these bilateral negotiations as the US government’s foreign and domestic policy priorities changed migration issues were viewed through a security lens and addressed in a very different manner by the Bush administration. This ‘‘re-conceptualization of how to protect U.S. borders and prevent the entry of any foreign nationals who would pose a new threat did not incorporate the possibility of negotiating a migration agreement with Mexico to manage existing migration ﬂows and protect migrants’ rights. Mexico and the United States continued to collaborate closely on the security front promote foreign and domestic investment in Mexico’s marginal area Migration-related initiatives were thus left out of the bilateral agenda in November 2002, Colin Powell declared that the political conditions did not exist in the United States The idea of a bilateral agreement was never put back on the table despite Mexico’s efforts to reframe and resume the negotiations	Relations turn—cooperation can only be achieved through heightening security—migration makes it unattainable due to 9/11 paranoia	1,691	129	1,023	258	16	156	0.062016	0.604651	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,975	Chávez put great effort into his friendship with Iran and into a broader alliance with other states in Latin America, with both efforts motivated in part by opposition to the United States' international role. Chávez's death is certainly changing the political calculus in Venezuela, but will it also result in a broader shift that could realign much of Latin America and affect attitudes toward, and relationships with, the United States? The answer is likely "yes." First, the grouping of nations previously opposing the United States under Chávez's leftist alliance -- namely the "Alba" alliance, comprised of Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia -- could well wither away, due to Venezuela's ongoing recession and fears that alliance members will no longer have Venezuela's financial backing. When combined with reports of Chávez's expressed desire to strengthen ties with the Obama administration, regional hostility towards the United States may decline. By 2005, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, Honduras and Ecuador joined Chávez's coalition, which led to the formation of the Bolivian Alliance of the Americas, also known as Alba. Alba served as an alternative to the Free Trade Act of the Americas, with an explicit focus on poverty reduction, but it also facilitated the unification of these nations in their anti-American sentiments . With Chávez gone, however, there may be no one left who has the clout to keep financing this alliance. Venezuela is Alba's largest financier, contributing millions in aid to its members as well as oil at low prices. But Venezuelans may believe that with ongoing poverty and inequality, their country's needs are more important than those of Chávez's small club of nations. This situation worries Alba members. According to Cynthia Arnson of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, while Bolivia and Ecuador are independently wealthy and not financially dependent on Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua are. U.S. diplomatic officials view Maduro as a pragmatist and the fact that he was supportive of initiating closer ties with the United States last year suggests that this could continue, especially in light of Venezuela's economic troubles and the need to increase revenues through trade. Chávez's passing should motivate the United States to seek a new partnership with Venezuela. First, Secretary of State John Kerry should reopen the U.S. embassy in Caracas, which has been closed since 2010, while assigning diplomats who are committed to engaging in peaceful dialogue and political and economic cooperation. Second, Kerry should take this opportunity to strengthen cooperation over issues that can provide mutual benefits in the areas of national security and the economy, such as counternarcotics, counterterrorism, as well as sustaining oil trade: the United States currently imports just under 1 million barrels a day from Venezuela. But the United States should also see this situation as an opportunity to strengthen its ties with other nations, such as Cuba. With the likely decline in economic assistance to Cuba from Venezuela, Cuban President Raul Castro may consider stepping up negotiations with the Obama administration over the U.S. embargo, human rights and the release of American prisoners, such as Alan Gross.	Eduardo Gomez, 3/13/13, Eduardo Gomez has a Ph.D. in Public Policy and is the assistant professor for the Department of Public Policy & Administration at Rutgers University, “Ahmadinejad's hug and the future of Chavez's alliance”, http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/13/opinion/gmez-chavez-ahmadinejad-america	Chávez's death is certainly changing the political calculus in Venezuela, but will it also result in a broader shift that could realign much of Latin America and affect attitudes toward, and relationships with, the United States? The answer is likely "yes." First, the grouping of nations previously opposing the United States under Chávez's leftist alliance -- namely the "Alba" alliance, comprised of Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia -- could well wither away, due to Venezuela's ongoing recession and fears that alliance members will no longer have Venezuela's financial backing. When combined with reports of Chávez's expressed desire to strengthen ties with the Obama administration, regional hostility towards the United States may decline. Second, Kerry should take this opportunity to strengthen cooperation over issues that can provide mutual benefits in the areas of national security and the economy, such as counternarcotics, counterterrorism, as well as sustaining oil trade: the United States currently imports just under 1 million barrels a day from Venezuela. But the United States should also see this situation as an opportunity to strengthen its ties with other nations, such as Cuba. With the likely decline in economic assistance to Cuba from Venezuela, Cuban President Raul Castro may consider stepping up negotiations with the Obama administration over the U.S. embargo, human rights and the release of American prisoners, such as Alan Gross.	US-Mexico Relations Not key; Venezuela and ALBA	3,295	47	1,481	509	7	224	0.013752	0.440079	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,976	In contrast to his three post-Cold War predecessors, President Obama did not put forth a vision or strategy for US policy in the hemisphere, or propose any major new initiatives. Instead, the Obama White House set out modestly to reduce discord and friction in hemispheric affairs, and encourage greater regional cooperation. A change in style and emphasis was promised, including a turn to multilateralism and partnership—and a closer alignment of US and Latin American policy goals. None of this has worked out very well, however. Although Obama remains well-liked and admired across Latin America, his administration has not managed to improve the quality of US relations in the region or do much to solve the outstanding problems. The new president's overcrowded agenda left little room for Latin America—which had no chance of competing successfully for Washington's limited foreign policy attention with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and China's expanding global muscle. And the attentiveness of Latin American governments, especially those in South America, to their relations with the US waned as well, as the region became more self-sufficient and acquired other international partners. Washington’s intense and bitter partisanship compounded the problem of developing constructive policies toward Latin American. It took three years of Obama’s term for Congress to ratify the long-stalled free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama. Ratification only became possible after the 2010 election which gave Republicans a majority in the House of Representatives. Now, however, it is mainly the Republican party that is blocking efforts to address three troublesome issues that have long stood in the way of improved US-Latin American ties—immigration, drug policy, and Cuba. Washington’s failure to repair its broken immigration system, accentuated by the often anti-immigrant, anti-Hispanic tone of US debate about immigration, is resented across the region, particularly among US neighbors, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. The bitter political battles over immigration notwithstanding, there is considerable consensus in Washington about what a sensible policy reform should include. The package developed by George W. Bush combined effective border enforcement, a visa program consistent with US labor market needs, and a path toward residence and citizenship for the estimated 12 million unauthorized migrants in the country. The deeply divisive politics of the US, made worse by the weak US economy, have so far blocked this comprehensive approach and led some states to adopt punitive anti-immigrant laws. It was Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa that raised the issue of Cuba’s participation at the Cartagena Summit –and made a clash between the US and Latin America almost inevitable. There is strong consensus among every other nation of the hemisphere that Washington should lift its 50-year-old embargo against the island. They see the embargo as vindictive and counterproductive, prolonging Cuba’s repressive rule rather than ending it. As long as US politics prevent a change in Washington’s position on Cuba, Latin American governments will remain reluctant, even minimally, to say or do anything about Cuba’s dismal record on human rights and democracy, because it might suggest they find some virtue in US policy. They want Cuba to be a full participant in hemisphere affairs now, even with an unelected, undemocratic government. The Summit discussion on drugs was more encouraging. Latin Americans have never been very happy with US drug policy in the region. They have, by and large, deferred to US leadership and pressure on this issue, mostly because it was such a high priority for Washington and because they had no alternatives to offer. The surge across Latin America in drug-related crime and violence over the past dozen years, however, has turned the tables. In country after country, drugs and organized crime have become central issues of concern, and Latin Americans have increasingly come to view US anti-drug policies, not merely as ineffectual, but contributing directly to their problems.	Hakim, ’12. Peter Hakim, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western Hemisphere affairs, July 5, 2012. “The Incredibly Shrinking Vision: US Policy in Latin America.” Política Exterior. http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3011 – clawan	Obama set out modestly to reduce discord and friction in hemispheric affairs, and encourage greater regional cooperation None of this has worked out very well Obama administration has not managed to improve the quality of US relations in the region or do much to solve the outstanding problems. The new president's overcrowded agenda left little room for Latin America the attentiveness of Latin American governments, to their relations with the US waned as well Washington’s intense and bitter partisanship compounded the problem of developing constructive policies toward Latin American it is mainly the Republican party that is blocking efforts to address three troublesome issues that have long stood in the way of improved US-Latin American ties—immigration, drug policy, and Cuba. Washington’s failure to repair its broken immigration system, accentuated by the often anti-immigrant, anti-Hispanic tone of US debate about immigration, is resented across the region The deeply divisive politics of the US, made worse by the weak US economy, have so far blocked this comprehensive approach and led some states to adopt punitive anti-immigrant laws. Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa raised the issue of Cuba’s participation at the Cartagena Summit –and made a clash between the US and Latin America almost inevitable. There is strong consensus among every other nation of the hemisphere that Washington should lift its 50-year-old embargo against the island They see the embargo as prolonging Cuba’s repressive rule rather than ending it. The Summit discussion on drugs was more encouraging. Latin Americans have never been very happy with US drug policy in the region The surge across Latin America in drug-related crime has turned Latin Americans have increasingly come to view US anti-drug policies, as contributing directly to their problems.	Alt causes to relations – immigration, drugs, and embargo	4,173	57	1,850	635	9	283	0.014173	0.445669	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,977	The overarching goal of our bilateral relationship should be to thoroughly integrate the economies of North America. Democracy and security are strengthened when commerce flows and grows. This creates wealth, opens new jobs, and establishes better personal relationships in both countries. To achieve this, we can work together to reduce the regulatory barriers to efficient trade by harmonizing cross-border regulations and modernizing border infrastructure. The U.S. must pass comprehensive immigration reform that recognizes reality in our labor needs and legal protections for immigrants who are here helping build our economy. The U. S. must implement a debt reduction program combining serious spending cuts and revenue increases to give certainty and new impetus to growing our economy. Mexico must implement judicial and law enforcement reforms that will give confidence to businesses and citizens that a rule of law prevails there. Energy reforms are needed to attract private capital to fully realize Mexico's abundant opportunities. Mexico needs tax reform that increases revenue, reduces the informal economy, and provides the framework to close the deep wealth divide among its citizens. To accomplish this and to further reduce the 40 million living in poverty, Mexico needs to make massive investments in infrastructure and quality education. Mexico's growing middle class is impressive but to expand that even more will create market and economic power that will be the envy of the hemisphere. North America sits near the pinnacle of its greatest economic strength in history. Together we can take it to the top.	Jones 12 (James Jones, 12/3/12; Chairman and CEO of ManattJones Global Strategies and the former U.S. ambassador to Mexico; North America sits near the pinnacle of its greatest economic strength in history)	The overarching goal of our bilateral relationship should be to thoroughly integrate the economies of North America. Democracy and security are strengthened when commerce flows and grows. This creates wealth, opens new jobs, and establishes better personal relationships in both countries. To achieve this, we can work together to reduce the regulatory barriers to efficient trade by harmonizing cross-border regulations and modernizing border infrastructure. The U.S. must pass comprehensive immigration reform that recognizes reality in our labor needs and legal protections for immigrants who are here helping build our economy. Mexico must implement judicial and law enforcement reforms that will give confidence to businesses and citizens that a rule of law prevails there. To accomplish this and to further reduce the 40 million living in poverty, Mexico needs to make massive investments in infrastructure and quality education. Mexico's growing middle class is impressive but to expand that even more will create market and economic power that will be the envy of the hemisphere. North America sits near the pinnacle of its greatest economic strength in history. Together we can take it to the top.	Aff is insufficient to spur democracy - requires comprehensive reform and a plethora of domestic Mexican reforms	1,628	112	1,206	248	17	184	0.068548	0.741935	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,978	That the CIA is on the ground bolstering nations south of the border (with pro-US economic policies) goes without question. They have a long history of working with drug kingpins and cartels in Latin America when it meets their needs, as was noted in a previous Truthout installment. The CIA also has a belief that the US national interest trumps democracy. An interesting passage in the Truthout on the Mexican Border installment cited above speaks volumes about US policy toward Mexico and Latin America: In a 2007 documentary, "The War on Democracy," by British, leftist, political commentator John Pilger, he explores the exploitative and deadly anti-democracy efforts to ensure that Latin America stays in the hands of the ruling classes and open to American business and the extraction of natural resources south of our border. Toward the end of a recounting of the US backing of juntas and keeping tin horn dictators on a short leash, Pilger interviewed Duane Claridge, CIA chief for Latin America from 1981 to 1984 - during a high point of the Central American and Southern Cone nations' reign of terror and death. In a remarkably pugnacious and blunt series of responses, Claridge vociferously asserted that he didn't give a hoot about whether a country was a democracy. All that mattered was whether or not the Latin American nation was an obstacle to the "national security interest" of the US, although he didn't define that term. Here are some excerpts: Pilger: Is it then okay to overthrow a democratically-elected government? Claridge: It depends upon what your national security interests are. Pilger: What right does the CIA and the US government have to do what you do in other countries? Claridge: National security. We are going in to protect ourselves. We will intervene whenever we decide it is in our national interest to intervene and if you don't like it, lump it. Get used to it world! It is important to understand that our national interest is perhaps often perceived by the US government as preserving our economic status through the guarantee of open markets, cheap labor and natural resources. In analyzing the war on drugs in Mexico, it is important to remember that drug traffickers without a political agenda are not nearly the perceived threat to the US that advocates for an uprising of the poor in Latin America are. In fact, as noted in an earlier installment in this series, drug cartel kingpins are generally illicit business men with which, when mutually beneficial, America's intelligence agencies and companies (along with surrogates) can strike a deal. There are exceptions to this theory, however, including the stalled Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), which uses cocaine trafficking to fund its control of a large swath of Colombia's territory. In addition, a drug lord such as Pablo Escobar or a drug trafficking capo such as former CIA favorite Manuel Noriega are targeted when they become too independent and threaten the US "national interest." The Zetas cartel, one of the warring factions in Mexico, was started by former members of an elite Mexican special forces military unit (which was created on the model of the infamous Guatemalen US backed and trained counter-insurgency troops, the Kaibiles). Paley argued that, in many ways, they are a paramilitary force that traffics in drugs. She also contended that they have likely proved useful to some large corporations in a number of ways when they function as a paramilitary force, based on the model that developed in Colombia. Is the War on Drugs the New "Shock Doctrine" to Undermine Democracy and Promote Unfettered Capitalism in Latin America? On March 24, 1980, the Archbishop of El Salvador, Óscar Romero, was assassinated while celebrating Mass. He was killed on the orders of right-wing paramilitary leader, killer and torturer Roberto D'Aubuisson. D'Aubuisson, who was responsible for death squads that killed thousands of people, most of them guilty of nothing more than being poor or indigenous, was lionized by members of the Reagan administration. Romero began his short tenure as archbishop (appointed in 1977) as a conservative priest. After the murder of a fellow priest and friend by the death squads, he became a transformed advocate for the poor indigenous populations of El Salvador. Like other nuns and priests who were gunned down, he was guilty of nothing more than speaking out on behalf of those without power, land, education and sufficient food. But to the right wing in the United States, the State Department and many in Congress, the man who ordered him killed was a hero. This is an important incident to recall when evaluating the war on drugs. The vast majority of victims in this endless bloody show war are not those who traffic in drugs; they are the poor and the indigenous peoples. They are also any other individuals who might get in the way - knowingly or unknowingly - of corporations that benefit from free trade or persons who benefit from the trade in drugs. And in the case of Mexico -- particulary over the last six years -- the victims are also, to a great degree, those who obtruct, offend or inconvenience segments of the government, police, military and oligarchy who are corrupt and unscrupulous. (Mexico is undergoing, in many ways, a tumultuous transition from a predatory internal monopolistic capitalism to an economy more reliant on the outside financial predators of globalization.)	Karlin, ’12. Mark Karlin is the editor of BuzzFlash, the first progressive website to aggressively expose political hypocrisy and manipulation of power among the right wing. Yale University B.A., English, Writing. “How the Militarized War on Drugs in Latin America Benefits Transnational Corporations and Undermines Democracy.” http://truth-out.org/news/item/10676-how-the-war-on-drugs-in-latin-america-benefits-transnational-corporations-and-undermines-democracy – clawan	the CIA is on the ground bolstering nations south of the border They have a long history of working with drug kingpins and cartels in Latin America when it meets their needs The CIA also has a belief that the US national interest trumps democracy. the exploitative and deadly anti-democracy efforts to ensure that Latin America stays in the hands of the ruling classes and open to American business and the extraction of natural resources south of our border. the US backing of juntas and keeping tin horn dictators on a short leash Claridge, CIA chief for Latin America vociferously asserted that he didn't give a hoot about whether a country was a democracy. All that mattered was whether or not the Latin American nation was an obstacle to the "national security interest" of the US, he War on Drugs the New "Shock Doctrine" to Undermine Democracy and Promote Unfettered Capitalism in Latin America the war on drugs. The vast majority of victims are the poor and the indigenous peoples. They are also any other individuals who might get in the way of corporations that benefit from free trade the victims are also those who obtruct the government, police, military and oligarchy who are corrupt and unscrupulous	No Latin American democracy – war on drugs props up dictators	5,464	61	1,214	900	11	207	0.012222	0.23	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,979	Latin America is a paradoxical world leader. In the twentieth century, Latin America led the struggle for democracy—and now, Latin America leads in unjust societies that cannot fulfill the promise of universal human rights despite elections and theoretical rule of law. The “citizenship gap” between developed formal entitlements and distorted life conditions, including massive personal insecurity, is greater than in any other region.1 While Latin America receives the highest scores on electoral democracy and political participation in the developing world, the region has the worst record on effective rule of law, crime, and corruption except for grossly impoverished Africa and South Asia.2 Latin America’s experience demonstrates how the rule of law can be systematically undermined by private and transnational displacement of power, as well as incomplete democratization of state institutions. The persistence of injustice demonstrates the interdependence of democratic processes in the public sphere and democratization of social relations.3 The transition to electoral democracy does make a difference in the level, incidence, and amelioration of political repression. In a pale echo of the past generation’s right-wing military authoritarian regimes, it is now egalitarian but undemocratic Cuba that has more than 300 political prisoners, the death penalty, and the world’s second highest number of journalists in jail.4 Nevertheless, democracy is not enough—the region’s most violent countries are democratic but insecure: Colombia and desperately impoverished Haiti, which some consider a failed state despite a series of internationally supervised elections and reconstruction efforts. Below the level of these signal political pathologies, for most Latin American countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, injustice is a chronic condition metastasized through an ostensibly democratic political body, most visible at the extremities of social marginality. This essay will argue that injustice in Latin America is a problem of democratic deficits in function—despite the democratic structure of elections and institutions— Alison Brysk is a professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of California, Irvine. 55BRYSK The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations and that better and broader human rights are the bridge between equal laws and unequal societies. The citizenship gap is not an inherent insufficiency of democracy for addressing social problems, as some populists claim, but rather an insufficient application of democracy to functional arenas of power outside the formal legal system that distort the juridical equality of citizenship.5 While the Washington Consensus neo-liberal program adopts a truncated version of human rights, narrowed to a thin set of individual liberties functional for the operation of free markets, a full spectrum of universal, indivisible human rights provides a basis for social equity and sustainable justice. The democratic deficit in Latin America can be understood as a failure in the indivisibility, universality, and accountability of human rights. Indivisibility indicates the relationship between civil and social rights, while universality demands the extension of these interconnected rights to all citizens regardless of class or status. Accountability is the duty of the state to provide rights, which corresponds to citizens' entitlement to claim rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights lays the foundation for the interdependence of “first generation” civil and political rights with “secondgeneration” social and economic rights, by including civil and political freedoms alongside fundamental requisites of human dignity such as a food security. The Preamble incorporates this interdependence in its definition that all human beings are “free and equal in rights and dignity” [emphasis added]. The lack of social rights may be the predominant acute threat to human dignity in some of Latin America’s most impoverished countries and sectors. In Nicaragua, 46 percent of citizens are poor, 6 and across the region, almost one-quarter live on less than $2 a day.7 Both absolute and relative poverty are intertwined with lack of access to social rights such as health care and education. Education, in turn, empowers political participation and is highly correlated with access to justice.8 It is important to mention that in the long-run, the achievement of civil and political rights depends on prior and contextual social rights.9 One illustration of this linkage is the prevalence of land disputes as a systematic source of civil rights violations in Latin America. In democratic Brazil, between 1985 and 2000 almost 1,200 landless people and their advocates were killed.10	Brysk, ’08. ALISON BRYSK is the Mellichamp Professor of Global Governance in the Global and International Studies Program at the University of California, Santa Barbara. “Democratic Reform and Injustice in Latin America: The Citizenship Gap Between Law and Society.” http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/07%20Brysk.pdf – clawan	In the twentieth century, Latin America led the struggle for democracy—and now, Latin America leads in unjust societies that cannot fulfill the promise of universal human rights despite elections and theoretical rule of law. Latin America has the worst record on effective rule of law, crime, and corruption the rule of law can be systematically undermined by private and transnational displacement of power, as well as incomplete democratization of state institutions democracy is not enough—the region’s most violent countries are democratic but insecure: Colombia and desperately impoverished Haiti for most Latin American countries injustice is a chronic condition The democratic deficit in Latin America can be understood as a failure in the indivisibility, universality, and accountability of human rights Both absolute and relative poverty are intertwined with lack of access to social rights such as health care and education. Education, in turn, empowers political participation and is highly correlated with access to justice achievement of civil and political rights depends on prior and contextual social rights	Latin American democracy fails – rampant human rights abuses means domestic reforms are a pre-requisite to stability	4,801	116	1,123	701	17	166	0.024251	0.236805	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,980	In a later article, Kling sought to refine his previous formulation by offering a precision indicator for the likelihood of political instability. In this effort he postulated that the durability of political reform depended upon the scope and depth of socioeconomic change and that the extent of exploitive taxation of exports and imports provided an indicator of political stability-instability within an given country. Kling contended that with few exception, governments which depended upon taxation of the “external” Sector for more than 30 per cent of their revenues conformed to prevailing images of caudillismo and instability.	Johnson 64-(Kenneth, political analyst for Western Political Science, The Western Political Quarterly, Causal Factor isn Latin American Political Instability,http://www.jstor.org/stable/445794?seq=3)	Kling sought to refine his previous formulation by offering a precision indicator for the likelihood of political instability he postulated that the durability of political reform depended upon the scope and depth of socioeconomic change the extent of exploitive taxation of exports and imports provided an indicator of political stability-instability within an given countr , governments which depended upon taxation of the “external” Sector for more than 30 per cent of their revenues conformed to images of instability.	Alt causes to Latin American instability – Socioeconomic factors and taxation of the external sector cause LA political instability	635	131	522	95	19	78	0.2	0.821053	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,981	Latin Americans can't seem to make democracy work. Ecuador now has its seventh president in nine years. Bolivian Indians recently overthrew their second president in less than two years. In 2001 the majority Indian population in Peru elected one of its own as president, after his predecessor had fled the country, but as The Economist of London reported last month, he has long been the region's most unpopular president. Related stories What are Mitt Romney's foreign policy goals in Latin America? Latin America Monitor What are Mitt Romney's foreign policy goals in Latin America? Latin America Monitor Four messages Obama is sending Latin America from his trip through Asia Latin America Monitor Honduras fire reflects dire state of prisons in Latin America Ads by Google Biofuels & Food Prices Noticed Food Prices Rising? Read about the Biofuels Effect. SmarterFuelFuture.org Subscribe Today to the Monitor Click Here for your FREE 30 DAYS of The Christian Science Monitor Weekly Digital Edition And that's just the beginning. The decades-long guerrilla/drug war in Colombia rages on and the United Nations reports that drug production is rising in the Andes. President Hugo Chávez increasingly polarizes Venezuela and the region, and uses oil hand-outs to prop up Fidel Castro's decrepit authoritarian regime in Cuba. Costa Rica's long-admired democratic system is torn by presidential scandals, Nicaragua may soon elect a failed Sandinista from the past, and Haiti is a perpetual failure in every way. Even Argentina, the market reform "model" in the 1990s, is on its sixth president in four years, five of them in a fortnight around New Year's Day, 2002. The economic collapse then devastated living standards for the majority and precipitated the largest debt default in world history, which was greeted with cheers in the national congress. Polls show that democracy as a system is popular in the region, but also that most Latin Americans don't believe it works for them. Indeed, international agencies report that the region has long had the world's widest rich-poor gap and that living conditions and opportunities for bettering one's lot are few and in most places not increasing. And Latin America is falling ever farther behind the developing countries of Asia. The problem of ineffective or downright failing democracies is far more basic to the region's thinking and governance than politicians in the Americas - including Washington - are aware of or willing to admit. Perhaps the main reason is because most Latin leaders and their cronies don't want to change a system that serves their private interests. And most policymakers in Washington concentrate so narrowly on a few yardsticks like periodic votes and trade agreements that they don't see (or acknowledge) what is really happening to people and why. Instability, which seems so destructive of progress, is nothing new. Thirty years ago it was guerrilla wars, astronomical inflation, military governments, and human rights violations. Five hundred years ago it was conquest, virtual slavery, and mass exploitation under the guise of Catholic paternalism. But that's not the point: Perpetual surface instability is not what causes Latin America's cycles of failure. The real problem is the opposite: excessive stability - the enduring legacy of Iberian colonialism ever modified to serve a new generation of leadership cliques. For more than five centuries ruling cliques that took office - whether by colonial appointment, swords, bullets, or ballots - justified and maintained power with a culture and institutions that treated people as groups and denied most individuals the skills and opportunities to improve their lives. One of the very few things an overwhelming majority of people in all countries agreed on in a 2004 regional poll was that despite elections, power is held by cliques pursuing mainly their own interests. The centuries of failure in Latin America stand in bleak contrast to the development successes in many Asian countries since World War II - and, more recently, even in Spain itself. In Asia, the basic changes in some cases were begun by authoritarian governments that in time became more democratic, as also happened in Chile from 1973 to 1990, when the current foundations of Latin America's most viable state were laid. But very few democrats or others have ever made major permanent changes to benefit the people, and the failures of much-touted reforms in the 1990s laid the groundwork for increasing frustration and demagoguery today. The next few years are not likely to bring a rash of military coups, but mainly more democratic formalities that don't really serve the interests of the people.	Ratliff, 05. William Ratliff is a research fellow and curator of Americas Collection at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. July 27, 2005. “Latin America's flickering democracy.” Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0727/p09s02-coop.html – clawan	Latin Americans can't seem to make democracy work. Ecuador now has its seventh president in nine years. Bolivian Indians recently overthrew their second president in less than two years Peru president has long been the region's most unpopular The decades-long guerrilla/drug war in Colombia rages on Chávez increasingly polarizes Venezuela and the region Costa Rica's long-admired democratic system is torn by presidential scandals, Nicaragua may soon elect a failed Sandinista from the past, and Haiti is a perpetual failure in every way. Even Argentina, the market reform "model" in the 1990s, is on its sixth president in four years democracy as a system is popular in the region, but also that most Latin Americans don't believe it works for them Latin America is falling ever farther behind the developing countries of Asia. despite elections, power is held by cliques pursuing mainly their own interests. But very few democrats or others have ever made major permanent changes to benefit the people, and the failures of much-touted reforms in the 1990s laid the groundwork for increasing frustration and demagoguery today	Latin American democracy is a bad model – instability and corruption	4,709	68	1,127	751	11	178	0.014647	0.237017	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,982	Jo and Gartzke [8] find economic capacity to be a statistically significant determinant of nuclear proliferation, but Singh and Way‟s [6] results indicated that this effect is nonlinear; “at low levels of GDP, further economic growth steadily increases the likelihood that a country will explore the nuclear option; yet at high levels Aubone and Tavira 85 of development, the effect levels off and, in fact, reverses because very high levels of income are associated with a falling hazard rate” [7]. Yet, both major and regional powers are more inclined to continue nuclear weapons proliferation than non-major powers [8]. Scholars also argue that nuclear proliferation depends on the regime type of a state, although whether autocracies or democracies are more inclined to develop nuclear weapons is unclear [7,8]. Neither democracy nor democratization are found to be statistically significant determinants of nuclear proliferation in Singh and Way‟s [6] study, but Jo and Gartzke [8] find that democracies are more likely to deepen on nuclear weapons development. Most major powers have democratic political systems and possess both the means to produce and develop nuclear weapons and the desire to maintain leverage within the international community, explaining an inclination to expand nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, democratic politicians both influence and act upon public opinion regarding nuclear proliferation. In their explanation for the inclination of democratic governments to develop nuclear weapons, Jo and Gartzke [8] argue, citing the case of public support for nuclear tests in Pakistan: “Populist politicians scrambling to mobilize public opinion may be tempted to pander to nationalist hysteria” (170), and their empirical findings support that democracies are more inclined to deepen nuclear weapons development [8]. Yet, while political liberalism might induce further nuclear proliferation, Solingen [20] contends that domestic coalitions advocating economic liberalism tend to grant greater support to military regimes than their nationalist counterparts, and Singh and Way‟s [6] findings also indicate an indirect relationship between economic liberalism and nuclear proliferation. The international system, bilateral relations, and domestic considerations described above provide insight into why states engage in nuclear proliferation or restraint. Using Levite‟s [16] notion of nuclear hedging, researchers explain why state leaders might engage in nuclear hedging not solely for the purpose of enhancing security and status in the international system, but also for more tangible benefits.	Aubone and Tavira 13 (Amber Aubone is Director, Undergraduate International Relations, Assistant Professor, Political Science, St. Mary’s University, Roger Tavira is a McNair Scholar, St. Mary’s University, “Paying to proliferate? Examining the effects of Brazil’s Latent Nuclear Capabilities on U.S. Aid Distribution” March 6, 2013 http://71.18.145.248/JSS/pdf/2013/apr/Aubone%20and%20Tavira.pdf\\CLans)	both major and regional powers are more inclined to continue nuclear weapons proliferation than non-major powers democracies are more likely to deepen on nuclear weapons development Most major powers have democratic political systems and possess both the means to produce and develop nuclear weapons and the desire to maintain leverage within the international community democratic politicians both influence and act upon public opinion regarding nuclear proliferation In their explanation for the inclination of democratic governments to develop nuclear weap Populist politicians scrambling to mobilize public opinion may be tempted to pander to nationalist hysteria cracies are more inclined to deepen nuclear weapons development domestic coalitions advocating economic liberalism tend to grant greater support to military regimes than their nationalist counterparts The international system, bilateral relations, and domestic considerations described above provide insight into why states engage in nuclear proliferation	Democratic expansion causes prolif	2,625	35	1,023	378	4	139	0.010582	0.367725	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,983	On the other hand, low growth increases government instability. A vast empirical literature has shown that in industrial democracies incumbent governments’ chances of reelection depend on the rate of growth immediately before the elections. In nondemocracies, low growth increases popular dissatisfaction, creates incentives for antigovernment activities, and may make coups d’etat more likely. The interaction between growth and political instability can lead to a vicious circle: suppose the probability of a government collapse increases. This might result, for example, from an increase in political conflict unrelated to the economy or from international political developments. Investment and growth fall as a result of the shock, further increasing the likelihood of a government collapse, leading to even more political uncertainty. On the other hand, suppose that the rate of growth falls for some exogenous reason-for instance, an adverse movement in a nation’s terms of trade. The public will hold the government responsible, at least in part, for the poor economic outcome. This increases the probability of an executive collapse, reducing growth even more.	Alesina 96-(Alberto, Ph.D. in economics, Journal of economic growth, Political Instability and Economic Growth, http://www.jstor.org.resources.skokielibrary.info/stable/40215915?seq=3&Search=yes&searchText=Political&searchText=instability&searchText=economic&searchText=growth&list=hide&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3DPolitical%2Binstability%2Band%2Beconomic%2Bgrowth%26acc%3Don%26wc%3Don%26fc%3Doff&prevSearch=&item=2&ttl=46222&returnArticleService=showFullText&resultsServiceName=null)	low growth increases government instability. In nondemocracies, low growth increases popular dissatisfaction, creates incentives for antigovernment activities, and may make coups d’etat more likely. The interaction between growth and political instability can lead to a vicious circle: suppose the probability of a government collapse increases. This might result from an increase in political conflict unrelated to the economy or from international political developments Investment and growth fall as a result of the shock, further increasing the likelihood of a government collapse, leading to even more political uncertainty suppose that the rate of growth falls for instance, an adverse movement in a nation’s terms of trade. The public will hold the government responsible, at least in part, for the poor economic outcome. This increases the probability of an executive collapse, reducing growth even more.	Lack of Growth causes LA instability	1,169	36	912	171	6	133	0.035088	0.777778	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,984	There are several reasons that economic and political stability are harmful to economic development. Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) argue that “governments in politically unstable and polarized countries are more likely to adopt inefficient or suboptimal policies, including the maintenance of inefficient tax systems, higher current government consumption, or the accumulation of larger external debts, which, in turn, adversely affect long-run economic growth” (p.621). Political instability dampens new investment. Since investments are often irreversible, investors will attempt to delay investment in new technology and capital goods during periods of increased uncertainty. It is also possible that politicians in unstable political environments try to delay necessary but unpopular reforms, which would discourage new investment and growth.	Grier 7-(Robin, Professor of Economics and International & Area Studies, Losing Ground: Latin American Growth from 1955 to 1999, http://www.jstor.org.resources.skokielibrary.info/stable/20111959?seq=12&Search=yes&searchText=latin&searchText=american&searchText=instability&list=show&searchUri=%2Fbetasearch%2F%3Facc%3Don%26Query%3Dlatin%2Bamerican%2Binstability%26fc%3Doff%26wc%3Don%26fq%3Dpy%253A%255B2000%2BTO%2B2013%255D&prevSearch=&item=2&ttl=4223&returnArticleService=showFullText&resultsServiceName=null)	governments in politically unstable and polarized countries are more likely to adopt inefficient or suboptimal policies, including the maintenance of inefficient tax systems, higher current government consumption, or the accumulation of larger external debts, which, in turn, adversely affect long-run economic growth instability dampens new investment Since investments are often irreversible, investors will attempt to delay investment in new technology politicians in unstable political environments try to delay necessary but unpopular reforms, which would discourage new investment and growth.	Economic Instability contributes to LA political instability	848	60	598	114	7	79	0.061404	0.692982	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,985	The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) obligates Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, nor to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Besides the agreement among the Latin American countries themselves, there are two Additional Protocols dealing with matters that concern non-Latin American countries. Protocol I involves an undertaking by non-Latin American countries that have territories in the nuclear-free zone. Protocol II involves an undertaking by those powers which possess nuclear weapons. The United States is a party to both protocols. The United States has favored the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where, inter alia, they would limit the spread of nuclear weapons; they would not disturb existing security arrangements; provisions exist for adequate verification; the initiative for such zones originates in the geographical area concerned; and all states important to the denuclearization of the area participate. Considering that Soviet proposals for the denuclearization of Central Europe and other areas have not met these criteria, the United States has opposed them. From the start, however, the United States supported and encouraged Latin American countries in this undertaking. In mid-1962, the Brazilian representative to the UN General Assembly proposed making Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone. At the seventeenth regular session of the General Assembly, during the October Cuban missile crisis, a draft resolution calling for such a zone was submitted by Brazil and supported by Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador. While asserting support for the principle, Cuba stipulated certain conditions, including the requirement that Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone be included in the zone, and that foreign military bases, especially Guantanamo Naval Base, be eliminated. The draft resolution was not put to a vote at the General Assembly that year. On April 29, 1963, at the initiative of the President of Mexico, the Presidents of five Latin American countries -- Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico -- announced that they were prepared to sign a multilateral agreement that would make Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone. On November 27, 1963, this declaration received the support of the UN General Assembly, with the United States voting in the affirmative. The Latin American nations followed this initiative by extensive and detailed negotiations among themselves. At the Mexico City Conference (November 23-27, 1964) a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America was created, with instructions to prepare a draft Treaty. Important differences among the Latin American countries emerged over questions of defining the boundaries of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, transit guarantees, and safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. On February 14, 1967, the Treaty was signed at a regional meeting of Latin American countries at Tlatelolco, a section of Mexico City. On December 5, 1967, the UN General Assembly endorsed it by a vote of 82-0 with 28 abstentions, the United States voting in support of the Treaty. As of January 1, 1989, the Treaty had entered into force for 23 Latin American states. Belize and Guyana were not invited to accede to the Treaty because a special regime is foreseen for those political entities whose territories are wholly or partially the subject of disputes or claims by an extracontinental state and one or more Latin American states. When all eligible states ratify the Treaty, it will enter into force for all of them, as specified in Article 28. Alternatively, under that article, any Latin American state may bring the Treaty into force for itself at any time by waiving that provision. The basic obligations of the Treaty are contained in Article I: 1. The contracting parties undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories; (a) The testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and (b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment, and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. 2.The contracting parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession, or control of any nuclear weapon. Important provisions in the Treaty deal with verification. Treaty parties undertake to negotiate agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for application of its safeguards to their nuclear activities. The Treaty also establishes an organization to help ensure compliance with Treaty provisions -- the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) -- with a General Conference, a Council, and a Secretariat as its permanent organs. The five-member elected Council is empowered to perform "special inspections." Of the accompanying protocols, Protocol I calls on nations outside the Treaty zone to apply the denuclearization provisions of the Treaty to the territories in the zone "for which de jure or de facto they are internationally responsible." All four powers having such territories have signed -- the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and the United States. All except France have ratified. The U.S. Protocol I territories include Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Since the entry into force of the Panama Canal Treaties on October 1, 1979, U.S. obligations to the former Canal Zone have been governed by those treaties and by Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.	ACA, ‘1. Arms Control Association, founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Feb 1, 2001. “Latin America Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco).” http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/tlatelolco – clawan	The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America obligates Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, nor to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. there are two Additional Protocols dealing with matters that concern non-Latin American countries. The United States has favored the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they would limit the spread of nuclear weapons the United States supported and encouraged Latin American countries in this undertaking. On April 29, 1963 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico announced that they were prepared to sign a multilateral agreement that would make Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone. this declaration received the support of the UN General Assembly The basic obligations of the Treaty are The contracting parties use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories; Important provisions in the Treaty deal with verification. Treaty parties undertake to negotiate agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for application of its safeguards to their nuclear activities The Treaty also establishes an organization to help ensure compliance with Treaty provisions Protocol I calls on nations outside the Treaty zone to apply the denuclearization provisions of the Treaty to the territories in the zone	No Latin American prolif – treaties solve	6,044	42	1,441	926	7	212	0.007559	0.228942	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,986	Three key states are relevant in considering future nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. For historical and geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to reactivate nuclear weapons programs. Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chávez, has repeatedly demonstrated interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela lacks any serious nuclear expertise. Even if it had the managerial and technological capacity, the lead-time to develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from international sources would be difficult because members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards, and potential non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suppliers are highly surveilled, risking the exposure of such a program before Venezuela could put a deterrent into place. While South American states have historically opposed nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation. Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security community. On the other hand, Venezuela under President Chávez is perceived as a revisionist power seeking a transformation of the international system. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and Colombia, and it would prompt nuclear weapons development by Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for reasons of preserving regional leadership and prestige than for fear of a Venezuelan threat.	Trinkunas, ’11. Harold Trinkunas is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. “Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions.” Florida International University 9-1-2011 http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=whemsac – clawan	Three key states are relevant in considering future nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. For historical and geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to reactivate nuclear weapons programs Venezuela has repeatedly demonstrated interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela lacks any serious nuclear expertise. the lead-time to develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from international sources would be difficult because members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards (NSG) suppliers are highly surveilled While South American states have historically opposed nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation. Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security community. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and Colombia	No Latin American prolif – regional safeguards and lack of tech	1,681	63	1,135	238	11	157	0.046218	0.659664	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,987	Overall, the probability of further nuclear proliferation in Latin America is low because the combination of both capability and intention to develop nuclear forces is not found in any of the possible proliferators. The two countries that have the capability to pursue such a program, Argentina and Brazil, gave up the pursuit of nuclear weapons two decades ago, and they are not likely to resume this path given their historical experience and the geopolitical threat environment. Venezuela, whose intentions in the nuclear arena are suspected by some, lacks all indigenous capability to pursue nuclear weapons development at this time. Even with the assistance of outside powers, the likelihood that it could put such a system in place undetected within the next ten to twenty years is almost nil. While Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela have been on friendly terms during the past decade, there is no indication that they have any interest in helping Venezuela obtain nuclear weapons. Moreover, the possibility that non-State actors (such as the private sector or organized crime) within Argentina and Brazil might form part of such a network without State knowledge, as has been detected in the former Soviet Union states and demonstrated by the A. Q. Khan network, is lower than in many other regions of the world because of two decades of nuclear mutual confidence-building and mutual inspection through permanent bi-national agency, Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Côntrole de Materiais Nucleares (ABACC). This agency monitors all nuclear stockpiles and facilities in these two countries, and it would be likely to detect theft of nuclear technology or materials. For the foreseeable future, Argentina and Brazil are unlikely to resume efforts to acquire nuclear weapons without some revolutionary change in the international system that would lead them to perceive an existential threat to the state. The initial rationale for abandoning the pursuit of nuclear weapons in Argentina and Brazil was to safeguard democracy. Nuclear development had been heavily influenced by the military in both countries, and civilian leaders of the newly democratic states stripped the armed forces of control of nuclear programs in the 1980s. These programs, some of which had the potential to lead to nuclear weapons, had been shrouded in secrecy and were unaccountable both under civilian governments and military dictatorships.3 The developing security community in the Southern Cone, taking the form of UNASUR in its latest evolution, means that any territorial defense or deterrence rationales for nuclear weapons acquisition have faded. The resolution of all territorial disputes between the major regional powers (Argentina, Brazil, Chile), and ongoing mutual confidencebuilding measures, limit the possibility that new conflict dynamics will lead States in the region to seek nuclear weapons. Of the two powers with indigenous nuclear technology industries, Brazil‟s constitution bans the development of nuclear weapons, and both Argentina and Brazil are committed to sophisticated nuclear safeguards through the ABACC. 4	Trinkunas, ’11. Harold Trinkunas is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. “Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions.” Florida International University 9-1-2011 http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=whemsac – clawan	the probability of further nuclear proliferation in Latin America is low because the combination of both capability and intention to develop nuclear forces is not found in any of the possible proliferators Argentina and Brazil, gave up the pursuit of nuclear weapons two decades ago, and they are not likely to resume this path given their historical experience and the geopolitical threat Venezuela lacks all indigenous capability to pursue nuclear weapons development at this time the likelihood that it could put such a system in place undetected within the next ten to twenty years is almost nil While Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela have been on friendly terms during the past decade, there is no indication that they have any interest in helping Venezuela obtain nuclear weapons the possibility that non-State actors might form part of such a network without State knowledge is lower than in many other regions of the world because of two decades of nuclear mutual confidence-building and mutual inspection This agency monitors all nuclear stockpiles and facilities in these two countries, and it would be likely to detect theft of nuclear technology or materials. initial rationale for abandoning the pursuit of nuclear weapons in Argentina and Brazil was to safeguard democracy The developing security communit means that any territorial defense or deterrence rationales for nuclear weapons acquisition have faded. The resolution of all territorial disputes between the major regional powers (Argentina, Brazil, Chile limit the possibility that new conflict dynamics will lead States in the region to seek nuclear weapons. Brazil‟s constitution bans the development of nuclear weapons, and both Argentina and Brazil are committed to sophisticated nuclear safeguards	*No risk of Latin American nukes – Brazil and Argentina won’t pursue them and regional institutions prevent theft	3,135	113	1,773	476	18	272	0.037815	0.571429	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,988	Taken together, these factors have led some outside observers to claim that Venezuela is a potential nuclear proliferation risk. If we evaluate the contemporary domestic and international political context, it seems unlikely. At the international level, Argentina and Brazil have reacted very cautiously to the Venezuelan nuclear proposal. On the one hand, they would like the business for economic reasons, but on the other they are concerned about Chávez‟s ambitions. As members of the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSP), Argentina and Brazil are likely to insist on strong international safeguards on any nuclear technology sold to Caracas.13 However, neither the Argentine nor the Brazilian governments have opposed Venezuela‟s nuclear ambitions publicly, both because they are vulnerable domestically on their left flank, where Hugo Chávez has numerous sympathizers, and because internationally they still have common economic interests with Venezuela. Other potential suppliers of nuclear technology are also problematic for Venezuela. Members of the NSG such as France or even Russia are likely to insist on strong oversight of any Venezuelan nuclear program, and the United States has conceded that a peaceful civilian nuclear program would be unobjectionable if strong safeguards were in place.14 However, given President Chávez‟s nationalist tendencies, Venezuela might try to avoid accepting strong oversight and seek assistance from non-NSG countries. Some commentators have pointed to Iran and North Korea as potential partners for Venezuela, but neither country has a track record of successfully exporting its nuclear technology.15 Also, their programs are among the most highly surveilled in the world, increasing the probability that any such partnership would be quickly exposed to the international community, at great risk to all involved. On the domestic front, there is no constituency for a nuclear program in Venezuela outside of Chávez‟s inner circle. The stated objective of increasing energy resources is not credible to most Venezuelans, who see their country as one of the richest in oil and hydroelectric energy resources in the world. The Chávez administration has carefully avoided any public statements about acquiring nuclear technology as a means to deter external aggression, and there is no public groundswell in favor of such development, as has occurred in Iran.16 There are no bureaucratic structures in Venezuela that promote the acquisition of nuclear power. The country‟s civilian nuclear research program was dismantled decades ago, so there is no scientific constituency advocating such a program. Historically, there has been no constituency within the Armed Forces that seeks to acquire nuclear technology for military purposes. As the history of nuclear technology development in Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, and India suggests, a constituency inside and outside of government favoring nuclear development is a critical element in ensuring its continuity, while also realizing that mastering the needed technology can take decades. To succeed, any nuclear program would have to extend well beyond the tenure of Chávez, even if he wins the 2012 presidential elections and his personal health recovers. 17 Venezuela also lacks the technical or managerial capacity for a nuclear technology development program even if Chávez or his successors had the political will to pursue it. It is true that in the past, Venezuela has maintained sophisticated industrial and scientific development programs, especially within its oil industry. However, the 2003 oil industry strike and the mass purge of upper- and mid-level employees from the industry by the government have greatly reduced the managerial and technical talent pool on which the Venezuelan government could draw.18 The absence of any pool of nuclear scientists to contribute to sustaining such a program means Caracas would essentially have to start such a program from scratch. It would also require investing in educating a cadre of scientists and technology workers. This would lengthen the time horizon to the acquisition of any kind of indigenous nuclear program, and would require the Chavez administration to change its attitude towards expert knowledge. The decisions made by President Chávez repeatedly demonstrate that political criteria trump technical competence and bureaucratic autonomy in today‟s Venezuela, much to the detriment of many of the programs the Venezuelan government has undertaken since 1999.	Trinkunas, ’11. Harold Trinkunas is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. “Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions.” Florida International University 9-1-2011 http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=whemsac – clawan	Venezuela nuclear proliferation risk. seems unlikely Argentina and Brazil have reacted very cautiously to the Venezuelan nuclear proposal As members of the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group Argentina and Brazil are likely to insist on strong international safeguards on any nuclear technology sold to Caracas Other potential suppliers of nuclear technology are also problematic for Venezuela. Members of the NSG such as France or even Russia are likely to insist on strong oversight of any Venezuelan nuclear program, Some commentators have pointed to Iran and North Korea as potential partners for Venezuela, but neither country has a track record of successfully exporting its nuclear technology. Also, their programs are among the most highly surveilled any such partnership would be quickly exposed to the international community there is no constituency for a nuclear program in Venezuela outside of Chávez‟s inner circle There are no bureaucratic structures in Venezuela that promote the acquisition of nuclear power. The country‟s civilian nuclear research program was dismantled decades ago, so there is no scientific constituency advocating such a program. mastering the needed technology can take decades Venezuela also lacks the technical or managerial capacity for a nuclear technology development program even if Chávez or his successors had the political will to pursue it. The absence of any pool of nuclear scientists to contribute to sustaining such a program means Caracas would essentially have to start such a program from scratch. It would also require investing in educating a cadre of scientists and technology workers. This would lengthen the time horizon and would require the Chavez administration to change its attitude towards expert knowledge.	No Venezuelan prolif – laundry list	4,528	35	1,774	676	6	269	0.008876	0.397929	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,989	The only circumstance under which the Argentine government might face some internal pressure to develop a nuclear weapons program of its own would be in response to a Brazilian decision to acquire such forces. Here, its latent competition with Brazil, concern over Brazilian rearmament, and own pursuit of prestige could conceivably prompt a reinvigoration of its nuclear programs. However, the profoundly anti-militarist cast of public opinion in Argentina, the continuing civilian elite distrust of the military, and the prospective cost of the program would generally discourage such a move. Under such circumstances, Argentina might simply decide to bandwagon with Brazil when it comes to security issues, much as it already does, and use the mechanisms in ABACC to achieve some level of confidence as to the status of a developing Brazilian arsenal.	Trinkunas, ’11. Harold Trinkunas is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. “Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions.” Florida International University 9-1-2011 http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=whemsac – clawan	The only circumstance under which the Argentine government might face some internal pressure to develop a nuclear weapons program of its own would be in response to a Brazilian decision to acquire such forces However, the profoundly anti-militarist cast of public opinion in Argentina and the prospective cost of the program would generally discourage such a move. Argentina might simply decide to bandwagon with Brazil when it comes to security issues and use the mechanisms in ABACC to achieve some level of confidence as to the status of a developing Brazilian arsenal.	Argentina won’t trigger Latin American prolif	854	45	572	132	6	92	0.045455	0.69697	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,990	Overall, the probability of further nuclear proliferation in Latin America is low because the combination of both capability and intention to develop nuclear forces is not found in any of the possible proliferators. The two countries that have the capability to pursue such a program, Argentina and Brazil, gave up the pursuit of nuclear weapons two decades ago, and they are not likely to resume this path given their historical experience and the geopolitical threat environment. Venezuela, whose intentions in the nuclear arena are suspected by some, lacks all indigenous capability to pursue nuclear weapons development at this time. Even with the assistance of outside powers, the likelihood that it could put such a system in place undetected within the next ten to twenty years is almost nil. While Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela have been on friendly terms during the past decade, there is no indication that they have any interest in helping Venezuela obtain nuclear weapons. Moreover, the possibility that non-State actors (such as the private sector or organized crime) within Argentina and Brazil might form part of such a network without State knowledge, as has been detected in the former Soviet Union states and demonstrated by the A. Q. Khan network, is lower than in many other regions of the world because of two decades of nuclear mutual confidence-building and mutual inspection through permanent bi-national agency, Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Côntrole de Materiais Nucleares (ABACC). This agency monitors all nuclear stockpiles and facilities in these two countries, and it would be likely to detect theft of nuclear technology or materials.	Trinkunas, ’11. Harold Trinkunas is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. “Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions.” Florida International University 9-1-2011 http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=whemsac – clawan	the probability of further nuclear proliferation in Latin America is low to pursue nuclear weapons development the likelihood that it could put such a system in place undetected within the next ten to twenty years is almost nil the possibility that non-State actors (such as the private sector or organized crime) might form part of such a network without State knowledge is lower than in many other regions of the world because of two decades of nuclear mutual confidence-building and mutual inspection through permanent bi-national agency This agency monitors all nuclear stockpiles and facilities in these two countries, and it would be likely to detect theft of nuclear technology or materials.	No nuke terror in Latin America – regional institutions detect	1,684	62	698	263	10	111	0.038023	0.422053	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,991	lding on the interaction between levels of destruction and war, Intriligator and Brito derive the conditions for stable and unstable deterrence. Their model indicates explicitly how stability has been enhanced by the deployment of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the model explains why, in the period of nuclear monopoly, the United States relied on a policy of Massive Retaliation and why, in periods of relative balance, the United States, the Soviet Union, and increasingly, China and France have come to rely on Mutual Assured Destruction. Retaliation is critical to this argument. During the transition from the region of forced initiation to the cone of mutual deterrence, war can only be averted when the stronger party pursues a policy of retaliation and self-restraint. Note, though, that if the stronger party initiates a war during such a transition period, the conflict will most likely be short and decisive: if the weaker actor does not yield when faced with the prospect of a onesided nuclear confrontation, it will capitulate soon after the unilateral use of nuclear weapons. One very important (and frequently unrecognized) implication of this model concerns the impact of nuclear proliferation. Like some other classical deterrence theorists (e.g., Waltz, 1981, or Bueno de Mesquita and Riker, 1982), Intriligator and Brito (1981) argue that, under specified conditions, the proliferation of nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of nuclear war.3 Counterintuitively, when only a few actors have nuclear weapons, and stockpiles are limited, the likelihood of war increases because nuclear powers might be tempted to use them preemptively to resolve a serious dispute. But, as the number of actors with large nuclear stockpiles increases, the probability of war actually decreases and eventually approaches zero (Intriligator and Brito, 1981, p. 256; Berkowitz, 1985).4 The classical model also suggests that the risk of war is reduced as the destructive capability of strategic weapon systems increases. During readjustment periods outside the cone of stability, preemptive or preventive nuclear wars are possible. Once the cone is reached, however, the deployment of more potent strategic weapons enhances deterrence. Indeed, the balance of terror is most stable when it assures an "overkill" capacity that not only insures a second-strike capability but also provides a cushion that minimizes any disturbances introduced by technological breakthroughs or by the uneven deployment of new generations of strategic weapons.	Kugler and Zagare, 90. JACEK KUGLER Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University and FRANK C. ZAGARE Department of Political Science, State University of New York, 1990. “THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF DETERRENCE.” http://pluto.fss.buffalo.edu/classes/psc/fczagare/Articles/The%20LongTerm%20Stability%20of%20Deterrence.PDF – clawan	stability has been enhanced by the deployment of nuclear weapon in the period of nuclear monopoly, the United States relied on a policy of Massive Retaliation and why, in periods of relative balance, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and France have come to rely on Mutual Assured Destruction. Retaliation is critical the proliferation of nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of nuclear war. when only a few actors have nuclear weapons, and stockpiles are limited, the likelihood of war increases because nuclear powers might be tempted to use them preemptively as the number of actors with large nuclear stockpiles increases, the probability of war actually decreases and eventually approaches zero the risk of war is reduced as the destructive capability of strategic weapon systems increases the deployment of more potent strategic weapons enhances deterrence the balance of terror is most stable when it assures an "overkill" capacity that not only insures a second-strike capability but also provides a cushion that minimizes any disturbances introduced by technological breakthroughs or by the uneven deployment of new generations of strategic weapons.	Prolif good – spread of nukes secures stability and discourages preemptive strikes	2,533	82	1,169	382	12	179	0.031414	0.468586	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,992	The foiled terrorist plot, with its Latin American connections, focused new attention on what had until then been a largely overlooked political phenomenon: the intrusion of the Islamic Republic of Iran into the Western Hemisphere. An examination of Tehran's behavioral pattern in the region over the past several years reveals four distinct strategic objectives: loosening the U.S.-led international noose to prevent it from building nuclear weapons; obtaining vital resources for its nuclear project; creating informal networks for influence projection and sanctions evasion; and establishing a terror infrastructure that could target the U.S. homeland. BUILDING WESTERN HEMISPHERE ALLIANCES Outreach to Latin America is seen by the Iranian regime first and foremost as a means to lessen its deepening international isolation. Since 2003, when its previously clandestine nuclear program became a pressing international issue, Tehran has sought to mitigate the mounting political and economic restrictions levied against it by the United States and its allies through intensified diplomatic outreach abroad. Due to its favorable geopolitical climate-typified by vast ungoverned areas and widespread anti-Americanism--Latin America has become an important focus of this effort. Over the past decade, the regime has nearly doubled the number of embassies in the region (from six in 2005 to ten in 2010) and has devoted considerable energy to forging economic bonds with sympathetic regional governments.2 Far and away the most prominent such partnership has been with Venezuela. Since Hugo Chavez became president in 1999, alignment with Tehran has emerged as a cardinal tenet of Caracas's foreign policy. The subsequent election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in 2005 kicked cooperation into high gear with dramatic results. Today, the two countries enjoy an extensive and vibrant strategic partnership. Venezuela has emerged as an important source of material assistance for Tehran's sprawling nuclear program as well as a vocal diplomatic backer of its right to atomic power.3 The Chavez regime also has become a safe haven and source of financial support for Hezbollah, Iran's most powerful terrorist proxy.4 In turn, Tehran's feared Revolutionary Guard has become involved in training Venezuela's secret services and police.5 Economic contacts between Caracas and Tehran likewise have exploded--expanding from virtually nil in the early 2000s to more than $20 billion in total trade and cooperation agreements today.6	Berman, ’12. Ilan Berman, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, a non-profit U.S. foreign policy think tank in Washington, DC. 2012. “Iran Courts Latin America.” Middle East Quarterly. Summer2012, Vol. 19 Issue 3, p63-69. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=3d95e418-fac3-4dec-864c-a41d0f37500b%40sessionmgr110&vid=1&hid=119&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#anchor=bib1up&db=aph&AN=76317156 – clawan	a largely overlooked political phenomenon: the intrusion of the Islamic Republic of Iran into the Western Hemisphere Tehran's loosening the U.S.-led international noose to prevent it from building nuclear weapons; obtaining vital resources for its nuclear project and establishing a terror infrastructure that could target the U.S. homeland. Outreach to Latin America is seen by the Iranian regime first and foremost as a means to lessen its deepening international isolation Tehran has sought to mitigate the mounting political and economic restrictions levied against it by the United States Latin America has become an important focus of this effort with Venezuela the two countries enjoy an extensive and vibrant strategic partnership. Venezuela has emerged as an important source of material assistance for Tehran's sprawling nuclear program as well as a vocal diplomatic backer of its right to atomic power. The Chavez regime become a safe haven and source of financial support for Hezbollah, Iran's most powerful terrorist proxy Tehran's Revolutionary Guard has become involved in training Venezuela's secret services	Iran is rapidly expanding influence in Venezuela – desire for a bomb and terrorist influence means a massive security threat	2,539	124	1,124	373	20	168	0.053619	0.450402	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,993	Since the start of the international crisis over Iran's nuclear ambitions nearly nine years ago, it has become an accepted belief that Tehran's atomic program is now largely self-sufficient and that its progress is, therefore, largely inexorable. This, however, is far from the truth; in fact, the Iranian regime currently runs a considerable, and growing, deficit of uranium ore, the critical raw material needed to fuel its atomic effort. According to nonproliferation experts, Tehran's indigenous uranium ore reserves are known to be both "limited and mostly of poor quality."12 When Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi mapped out an ambitious national plan for nuclear power in the 1970s, his government was forced to procure significant quantities of the mineral from South Africa. Nearly four decades later, this aging stockpile has reportedly been mostly depleted.13 As a result, in recent years, Tehran has embarked on a widening quest to acquire uranium ore from abroad. In 2009, for example, it is known to have attempted to purchase more than 1,000 tons of uranium ore from the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan at a cost of nearly half-a-billion dollars.14 In that particular case, deft diplomacy on the part of Washington and its European allies helped stymie Tehran's efforts--at least for the time being. The Iranian quest, however, has not abated. In February 2011, an intelligence summary from a member state of the International Atomic Energy Agency reaffirmed the Islamic regime's continued search for new and stable sources of uranium to fuel its nuclear program.15 This effort has recently focused on two principal geographic areas. The first is Africa where Tehran has made concerted efforts to engage a number of uranium producers such as Zimbabwe, Senegal, Nigeria, and the Democratic People's Republic of Congo.16 The second is Latin America where Tehran now is exploring and developing a series of significant resource partnerships. The best known of these partnerships is with Venezuela; cooperation on strategic resources has emerged as a defining feature of the alliance between the Islamic Republic and the Chavez regime. The Iranian regime is currently known to be mining in the Roraima Basin, adjacent to Venezuela's border with Guyana. Significantly, that geological area is believed to be analogous to Canada's Athabasca Basin, the world's largest deposit of uranium.17	Berman, ’12. Ilan Berman, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, a non-profit U.S. foreign policy think tank in Washington, DC. 2012. “Iran Courts Latin America.” Middle East Quarterly. Summer2012, Vol. 19 Issue 3, p63-69. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=3d95e418-fac3-4dec-864c-a41d0f37500b%40sessionmgr110&vid=1&hid=119&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#anchor=bib1up&db=aph&AN=76317156 – clawan	Iranian regime currently runs a considerable, deficit of uranium ore Tehran's indigenous uranium ore reserves are known to be both "limited and mostly of poor quality procure significant quantities of the mineral from South Africa. Nearly four decades later, this aging stockpile has reportedly been mostly depleted Tehran has embarked on a widening quest to acquire uranium ore from abroad. Islamic regime's continued search for new and stable sources of uranium to fuel its nuclear program Latin America where Tehran now is exploring and developing a series of significant resource partnerships. Venezuela cooperation on strategic resources has emerged as a defining feature The Iranian regime is currently known to be mining in that geological area large deposit of uranium	Iran is cooperating with Venezuela to secure fissile material for a bomb	2,397	72	776	374	12	119	0.032086	0.318182	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,994	Conventional wisdom in Washington has long held that Tehran's activism in the Americas is opportunistic--rather than operational. Yet Iran's growing asymmetric capabilities throughout the region have the potential to be directed against the U.S. homeland. This was hammered home by the foiled October 2011 plot, an attack which--had it been successful--would potentially have killed scores of U.S. citizens in the nation's capital in the most significant terrorist event since 9/11. The incident represents a seismic shift in Tehran's strategic calculations. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper observed in his January 2012 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in response to mounting international pressure and asymmetric activity against Tehran's nuclear program, it appears that "Iranian officials--probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i--have changed their calculus and are now willing to conduct an attack in the United States."29 Latin America figures prominently in this equation. The foiled October 2011 plot suggests that Tehran increasingly deems the region an advantageous operational theater. Moreover, as its influence and activities there intensify, the Iranian regime will be able to field a progressively more robust operational presence in the Americas. Clapper concluded his Senate testimony with an ominous warning: "The Iranian regime has formed alliances with Chavez, Ortega, Castro, and Correa that many believe can destabilize the hemisphere," he noted. "These alliances can pose an immediate threat by giving Iran--directly through the IRGC, the Qods force, or its proxies like Hezbollah--a platform in the region to carry out attacks against the United States, our interests, and allies."30	Berman, ’12. Ilan Berman, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, a non-profit U.S. foreign policy think tank in Washington, DC. 2012. “Iran Courts Latin America.” Middle East Quarterly. Summer2012, Vol. 19 Issue 3, p63-69. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=3d95e418-fac3-4dec-864c-a41d0f37500b%40sessionmgr110&vid=1&hid=119&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#anchor=bib1up&db=aph&AN=76317156 – clawan	Iran's growing asymmetric capabilities throughout the region have the potential to be directed against the U.S. homeland Director of National Intelligence James Clapper observed in 2012 Iranian officials have changed their calculus and are now willing to conduct an attack in the United States Latin America as its influence and activities there intensify, the Iranian regime will be able to field a progressively more robust operational presence in the Americas. "The Iranian regime has formed alliances with Chavez, Ortega, Castro, and Correa that many believe can destabilize the hemisphere," These alliances can pose an immediate threat by giving Iran a platform in the region to carry out attacks against the United States	Iran will use Latin America as a jumping-off point for attacks against the U.S.	1,764	79	727	253	14	112	0.055336	0.442688	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,995	U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has increased significantly as a result of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime assistance package for Mexico and Central America first funded in FY2008. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on training and equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing the weak institutions and underlying societal problems that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico. The Mérida strategy now focuses on: (1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) building a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and resilient communities. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to intensify its anticrime efforts and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has vowed to continue U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, albeit with a new focus on reducing violent crime in Mexico. Peña Nieto has reformed the structure of Mexico’s security apparatus, placing the Federal Police and intelligence services under the authority of the Interior Secretary. He also intends to create a gendarmerie (militarized police) to gradually replace military forces engaged in public security efforts and to help states form unified police commands. Peña Nieto’s security strategy prioritizes crime prevention and human rights protection; it also seeks to advance judicial reform. As the Peña Nieto government adjusts Mexico’s security strategy, bilateral efforts and U.S. programs may need to be adjusted. Mexico’s new administration also supports efforts to enact gun control in the United States.	Seelke and Finklea 13 (Clare Ribando, Clare Ribando Seelke is a specialist in Latin American Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, the research arm of the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. , Seelke holds a Master of Public Affairs and Master of Arts in Latin American Studies from the University of Texas at Austin	U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has increased significantly as a result of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative Whereas U.S. assistance places emphasis on addressing the weak institutions and underlying societal problems that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico The Mérida strategy focuses on 1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) building a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and resilient communities the Mexican government pledged to intensify its anticrime efforts and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand Nieto has vowed to continue U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, He also intends to create a gendarmerie to gradually replace military forces engaged in public security efforts and to help states form unified police commands Peña Nieto’s security strategy prioritizes crime prevention and human rights protectio	Nieto’s reforms solve drug trafficking	1,774	38	929	259	5	133	0.019305	0.513514	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,996	When considering an economic development strategy, we should remember that since drug problem is a world problem, the development effort is best served when it is brought about with the cooperation of the international community. This way the chances for diverse capital and broad in scope development are increased. Within the drug producing and trafficking countries the principal reason for the lack of cooperation lies in the U.S. government's willingness to compromise and its refusal to use financial leverage against foreign governments. Take the case of Mexico, through which the majority of the Andean cocaine enters the U.S. The Mexican Government does little to deter illegal drug transactions within and outside of its country. In spite of this the U.S. certifies the corrupt Mexican Government as fully cooperating in drug enforcement, which gives Mexico preferred trade status and allows it to bypass certain money borrowing restrictions. For more than 14 years the U.S. financed drug control program in Mexico remains a relative failure. This being the case, and with the President's drug war announcement, why then are Mexico and other similar countries not isolated and punished? First, U.S. banking institutions are afraid that the application of too much pressure from the U.S. will cause the Mexican Government to default on its huge and increasing debt. Second, the US. Government is afraid that any decline in the Mexican economy will be an open invitation to a leftist insurrection. Neither reason however is sufficient to continue to undermine the U.S. drug strategy and American society and compromise our own national standards. Narrow business interests and the always convenient threat of communism cause the U.S. to turn a blind eye and weaken the effectiveness of our foreign policy and drug control efforts. This shortcoming has and continues to prevent any "real" international cooperation in the drug fight.	Messing and Hazelwood 12 (F. Andy Messing is the Executive Director of the National Defense Council Foundation, Bruce Hazelwood wa a member of the Milgroup at the U.S. Embassy, “US Drug Control Policy and International Operations” 2012 http://ndcf.dyndns.org/ndcf/Publications/US_Drug_Control_Policy_and_Int_Ops.htm#_Toc449503510\\CLans)	since drug problem is a world problem effort is best served when it is brought about with the cooperation of the international community the lack of cooperation lies in the U.S. government's willingness to compromise and its refusal to use financial leverage against foreign governments Take the case of Mexico which the majority of the Andean cocaine enters the U.S. the U.S. certifies the corrupt Mexican Government as fully cooperating in drug enforcement For more than 14 years the U.S. financed drug control program in Mexico remains a relative failure. U.S. banking institutions are afraid that the application of too much pressure from the U.S. will cause the Mexican Government to default the US. Government is afraid that any decline in the Mexican economy will be an open invitation to a leftist insurrection. Neither reason however is sufficient to continue to undermine the U.S. drug strategy and American society business interests and the always convenient threat of communism cause the U.S. to turn a blind eye This shortcoming has and continues to prevent any "real" international cooperation	Drug trafficking inevitable- US turns a blind eye	1,940	50	1,108	304	8	177	0.026316	0.582237	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,997	Mexico’s suffering from the violence caused by organized crime has approached Colombian proportions in just a few years. In his contribution, Eduardo Guerrero, based on current trends, estimates that between end-2006 and end-2012, the number of deaths related to the activities of organized crime will reach 64,000 in Mexico. Guerrero as well as Aguilar Camín certainly acknowledge the association between the explosion of violence in Mexico and the extraordinary flow of money, Rethinking the “War on Drugs” through the US-Mexico Prism 13 corruption and criminal opportunities stemming from drug trafficking. But they insist on the importance of other factors that have played a role, not least the way in which the Mexican government has combated organized crime since 2006, along with the country’s institutional weaknesses. Jorge Hernández Tinajero’s criticism of the Mexican government’s current strategy extends beyond its use of military force to control the problem. He believes that drug consumption in Mexico has reached a level truly warranting a more enlightened and ambitious public health approach. He is equally troubled by the social impact – biased in his view towards the incarceration of small-scale dealers – of the present strategy. If, sadly, Central America is bound to become the next important battleground for the “war on drugs,” then the picture portrayed by Joaquín Villalobos on violence in Central America should be a very worrisome one. For the developmental, historical and cultural reasons discussed by this participant, it is not hard to infer that a greater presence of drug-related organized crime would cause enormous economic, institutional and human devastation in the Central American Republics, similar to how they suffered when they became a battleground for the cold war during the 1970’s and 1980’s. It would be a great injustice if Central America were to suffer deeply again from someone else’s policy failures. Although all the authors agreed that the US demand for prohibited substances is a chief cause of the violence and corruption associated with drug trafficking in Mexico, Colombia and Central America, there are differences of opinion on how to address that root cause and its consequences. Reuter, for example, informs that there is very little evidence that enforcement can raise prices or reduce availability. Over the 25-year period from 1980 to 2005, the number of people incarcerated for drug offences in local jails and state and federal prisons increased by a factor of 10, and this figure does not include those incarcerated for so-called drug-related crimes, such as robbery to get the money to buy the drugs. During this period of massively increased intensity in enforcement, the price of heroin and cocaine fell around 70%. The price declines, he submits, have been parallel, even though those drugs are not good substitutes for one another.14 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization Notwithstanding that evidence, some of our authors warned that the status quo in drug policy is still favored by not a few in the United States. Quoting a former head of the White House National Drug Policy Office, Donohue includes in his contribution a typical example of the still-recalcitrant supporters of the “war on drugs.” Another of our authors, Humphreys, who served in the same office but in the Obama administration, places at zero the probability of seeing any time soon a radical change in the policy towards cocaine, the drug whose US market provides at least half of the Mexican drug gangs’ total revenue. Caulkins is not only skeptical of the political feasibility of legalization, in general, of illegal drugs, but also provides what he believes are the arguments to sustain that position. He is convinced that prohibition drives prices up far above legal levels; that the taxes necessary to prevent a price collapse, if drugs were legalized, are uncollectable; that the demand for drugs may be more price elastic than what has been estimated with historical data – a concern also shared by Pacula and Reuter in this volume; that legalization is an “irreversible game” in the sense that some drug use induced by legalization would remain even if that policy change were later undone; and finally that after all, present policies have permitted the overall levels of use in the United States to stabilize for a number of years . This author, in short, from the US perspective would not advise policymakers “to roll the dice” on legalization. Furthermore, Caulkins goes so far as to question whether the considerably less impossible endeavor of legalizing marijuana in the US would, in fact, reduce violence in Mexico on the basis that revenues for Mexican crime organizations derived from marijuana exports are much less than conventionally estimated – around 20 percent rather than 60 percent of total revenues. He also believes that legalizing marijuana would only modestly impact drug harms in the US, considering that it represents only about 8% of drug-related imprisonment, one-sixth of user spending, about 16% of treatment admissions, and is even less implicated in other drivers of drug-related social costs, like HIV/AIDS transmission and overdose deaths. Kleiman and Reuter also doubt that legalization constitutes a viable policy option. Donohue, who shares such skepticism, suggests that popular support for Rethinking the “War on Drugs” through the US-Mexico Prism 15 legalization or decriminalization is so low because that policy shift would redistribute the social costs of drug use from the government and those involved in the drug trade – mostly poor and minorities – to the middle and higher income sectors of US society. Miron does not buy the arguments of those opposing legalization and his text reiterates the classical economic case for a laissez faire approach on this issue. It stems from the uncontested fact that prohibition does not eliminate drug markets, but simply drives them underground thus causing a range of highly negative side effects: huge black market rents appropriated by organized crime; illegal and violent conflict resolution mechanisms; massive corruption; fostering of other forms of criminality; severe health, safety, civil liberty and economic risks and costs for drug users; and disrespect for the law, among others. Miron is convinced that there are alternatives to prohibition that can achieve a better balance between positive and negative consequences. In particular, he endorses legalization with a sin tax on drugs sufficiently stiff to yield a price as high as under prohibition and believes, unlike Caulkins, that evasion of the sin tax can be prevented successfully through sufficient enforcement. Without endorsing outright legalization, other authors nevertheless do provide sensible arguments for moving away from the status quo in a direction that would address the consequences of black markets, as outlined by Miron. After reporting that 56.6 per cent of the estimated cost of illegal drug use in the US (estimated for 2002 as 217 billion of 2008 US dollars) was due to crime-related costs and only 8.7 per cent was caused by health costs, Donohue admits serious concerns about the balance of overall US drug policy. This author insists on the fundamental question of how can it be possible to have falling prices of illegal drugs in the face of intense enforcement efforts – carrying an annual budgetary cost of more than $40 billon. He also gives at least the benefit of the doubt to Miron’s submission that, according to cross-country comparisons, there is a strong connection between criminalization of drugs and violent crime. Interestingly, Donohue evokes an earlier study by Caulkins and others that found that an additional $1 million spent on treatment and demand reduction reduced net 16 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization cocaine consumption by 103.6 kg while the same amount of money spent on longer sentences reduced consumption by just 12.6 kg. Reuter invites us to recognize that current policies actually cause great harm in the United States and are quite ineffective considering that this country has the worst drug problem in the developed world and has not been able rapidly to reduce it. Babor’s succinct and well documented review of the international experience, decanted into eight key findings, not only highlights the significant pitfalls of the present strategy but also points plainly in the direction that policy should move to be more effective. This author makes clear that notwithstanding the fact that large-scale supply-control interventions absorb most of the resources spent on drug control in most nations, there are serious questions about the effectiveness of such policies. In particular, he reports that once drugs are made illegal, increasing enforcement and incarceration yield diminishing returns. On demandfocused policies, Babor offers good evidence that, contrary to claims in other studies, some approaches to prevent, or at least delay, consumption do work and, furthermore, that treatment for drug dependence is effective.	Zedillo, ’12. Ernesto Zedillo is the Frederick Iseman '74 Director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization; Professor in the Field of International Economics and Politics; Professor of International and Area Studies; and Professor Adjunct of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University. Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook. The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization (YCSG) was established in 2001 to enhance understanding of this fundamental process and to promote exchanges of information and ideas about globalization between Yale and the policy world. http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/rethinking-war-on-drugs.pdf – clawan	Mexico’s suffering from the violence caused by organized crime has approached Colombian proportions in just a few years. number of deaths related to the activities of organized crime will reach 64,000 in Mexico. the US demand for prohibited substances is a chief cause of the violence and corruption associated with drug trafficking in Mexico, Colombia and Central America there is very little evidence that enforcement can raise prices or reduce availability During period of massively increased intensity in enforcement, the price of heroin and cocaine fell around 70%. current policies actually cause great harm in the United States and are quite ineffective considering that this country has the worst drug problem in the developed world and has not been able rapidly to reduce it. once drugs are made illegal, increasing enforcement and incarceration yield diminishing returns	U.S. can’t resolve drug war – increases violence	9,120	48	881	1,439	8	136	0.005559	0.09451	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,998	Why? Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo suggests that the Mexican war on drugs activated different “killing machines” in the country. We assume that fundamental illegal agreements were broken between different factions, not only cartels and gangs associated with drug trafficking, but also other armed groups that had attained a status of operative stability that was destroyed or unbalanced, ending up in homicidal decisions in an effort to restore the previous under-the-table stability. The point is we are not talking about drug traffickers only. There are other armed groups: clandestine loggers, bootleggers of different goods, workers and workers unions, peasants and rural communities, urban juvenile gangs, and different types of municipal, state and private police. And, of course, we should include in this list the military and its deserters who are professionally trained in the use of arms. All of them, Escalante says, belong to a rarely recognized, socially blurred category of people that we could label “workers of violence” -- all those who depend on the use of force to make a living. We don’t know exactly what is happening with those armed groups, but we do know, because it has been very well documented by Eduardo Guerrero, what’s happening with drug cartels and the war against drugs.2 The main goal of the 0 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization federal government’s strategy in this matter is being achieved. The goal was to transform the national security problem posed by drug trafficking cartels in some parts of the country into a public security issue that would be manageable by local governments. The strategic decision was to pressure and fight the big drug cartels in order to fragment them, to behead them, turning them into organizations less capable of controlling territories and corrupting local authorities or federal police forces. The consequence of this successful strategy is that cartels have been fragmented and beheaded -- they are weaker now -- but they have extended to new territories and they have become more violent in businesses different from drug trafficking. That’s why we have horrible stories about extortion involving illegal immigrants and the brutal homicides associated with the process of gangs collecting illegal rents or fighting for control of streets, corners, cities and roads. We are right now in the middle of this strategy. Cartels are fragmented, they are less powerful and not as efficient as they were, but they are more violent than ever and more dangerous for the general population. The question is, when is this going to revert? When will this homicidal wave stop and decline so that we can say the strategy has worked, not only from the standpoint of fragmenting the cartels, but also from the point of view of giving back to society the security that it lost? This is the moment the country is living through. The federal strategy is working, but what society accurately perceives is greater insecurity, more violence and a higher homicide rate. The natural consequence is, of course, unprecedented public turmoil and fierce disagreement regarding the results and the methods of this war. One fundamental disagreement is between the federal and local governments who simply do not want to be part of the war. The local governments prefer to knuckle under without facing the consequences of the hostilities, leaving the political responsibility to the federal government. The federal government is beginning to say that the brunt of the work is getting done and it is now the turn ethinking the “War on Drugs” through the US-Mexico Prism 51 of the local governments to finish the job by controlling the fragmented cartels. Neither of these two premises is true. The local governments cannot do anything yet against those groups, nor has the federal government really fragmented and weakened them completely. Meanwhile the cost of this strategy rises every day. Politically, the disagreement is wider than ever and the next presidential elections will be mainly about that disagreement. Socially, there is a growing perception of insecurity and lack of certainty. The cost of this strategy has reached such a level that we can say it is not viable in terms of politics, and not tolerable in terms of social perception. It is a burden no one can bear. A profound change is needed and fresh promises and alternative solutions will be the central issues of the country’s future agenda.	Camin, ’12. Hector Aguilar Camín, is a Mexican writer, journalist and historian. In 1986 he received Mexico's Cultural Journalism National Award. “On Mexican Violence” in Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook. The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization (YCSG) was established in 2001 to enhance understanding of this fundamental process and to promote exchanges of information and ideas about globalization between Yale and the policy world. http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/rethinking-war-on-drugs.pdf – clawan	the Mexican war on drugs activated different “killing machines” in the country The strategic decision was to pressure and fight the big drug cartels in order to fragment them, The consequence of this successful strategy is that cartels have been fragmented but they have extended to new territories and they have become more violent in businesses different from drug trafficking. extortion involving illegal immigrants and the brutal homicides associated with the process of gangs Cartels are more violent than ever and more dangerous for the general population. The federal strategy is working, but what society accurately perceives is greater insecurity, more violence and a higher homicide rate The natural consequence is, unprecedented public turmoil the cost of this strategy rises every day Politically, the disagreement is wider than ever there is a growing perception of insecurity and lack of certainty. this strategy is not viable in terms of politics, and not tolerable in terms of social perception	Drug policies fail – only increase violence and social instability	4,461	66	1,010	724	10	157	0.013812	0.216851	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013
1,999	The White House wants the world to believe drug prohibition works, and to forget the murderous legacy of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Central and Latin America. The CIA and the DEA have been directly involved in drug trafficking in the region for decades. They've trained, armed and funded death squads and right-wing paramilitary groups that share control of the lucrative drug trade. Corrupt officials at the highest levels of government and sections of the business class also profit enormously from the illicit drug trade. Latin America has borne the brunt of the U.S.-led war on drugs that has turned several countries into virtual war zones full of massacres and mayhem. Drug cartels operate with near impunity and assassinate judges, journalists, mayors, police and anyone unlucky enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. No country wants to become the "next Mexico," where more than 60,000 people have died in gruesome, drug-fueled violence. Over 250,000 have been internally displaced, and kidnapping for ransom is rife. In many parts of Mexico, drug cartels now battle openly with government forces for control of cities and towns. The effects on the Mexican economy, in particular tourism, have been devastating. In Acapulco last year, 15 decapitated bodies were found on a walkway to a popular beach. Another 12 victims, including two police officers, were killed in the city on the same day. The drug war has turned Mexico into vast killing fields and economic wastelands. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT Otto Peréz Molina won the presidency in 2011 on the promise to crack down on the drug cartels. The symbol of his campaign was an iron fist with the slogan "Mano Dura" or "strong hand." But the drug war in Mexico has crossed the border and is wreaking havoc in Guatemala. In the town of Coban, the Guatemalan military declared a two-month "state of siege" to drive out the Mexican drug gang Los Zetas. The assassination of a prominent Guatemalan businessmen and a district attorney shocked the country. Honduras is a central transit hub for drug shipments into Mexico and the United States. The country has the highest per capita murder rate in Central America and is the second-poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Thousands of poor Hondurans are locked up in overcrowded and dangerous prisons for drug-related crimes. A horrifying fire in the Comayagua prison in February killed over 357 prisoners. Just six guards were responsible for unlocking cells that contained 852 prisoners. The Obama administration is ramping up the drug war in Honduras in partnership with Honduran president Porfirio Lobo--even though officials of the Lobo government are widely believed to be involved in drug trafficking. The U.S. military recently sent 600 troops to the country to set up three "forward operating bases" to interdict drug smuggling. According to the New York Times: Conducting operations during a recent day at the outpost were members of the Honduran Tactical Response Team...They were working alongside the Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team, or FAST, created by the DEA to disrupt the poppy trade in Afghanistan...FAST members were in Honduras to plan interdiction missions in Central America. The injection of FAST teams into Honduras, a country wracked with state-sponsored violence, repression and massive poverty is a time-tested recipe for an increase in human rights violations. During a recent joint commando-style raid by DEA agents and Honduran counter-narcotics officers, four people, including two pregnant women, were killed. The U.S. State Department claimed that the DEA wasn't involved in the shooting and played only an "advisory" and "support" role in the counter-narcotics operation. The killings set off a backlash against the drug war in the country. The indigenous peoples of the Mosquito Coast set government buildings on fire and demanded that the DEA leave Honduras. American drug warriors often tout Colombia as a "success" in the war on drugs. Nothing could be further from the truth. In 2000, President Bill Clinton authorized "Plan Colombia." It was a military assault on the cocaleros (coca-farming peasants) funded by $1.3 billion in American taxpayer money that supplied the Colombian military with high-tech weapons, speedboats, helicopters and surveillance technology. Aerial spraying of drug crops with the herbicide glyphosate, better known as Roundup, was used to fumigate thousands of hectares of coca plants. Roundup is toxic to humans and the environment. The spraying of coca forced more cultivation into the Amazon and has accelerated the deforestation of this fragile ecosystem. Despite eradication and interdiction efforts, cocaleros continued to produce record harvests. Colombia produces 80 percent of the world's supply of cocaine and supplies 90 percent of the cocaine and 50 percent of the heroin sold in the United States. Plan Colombia was a deadly and expensive failure. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AT THE end of March, Guatemalan President Molina hosted a meeting with other presidents in Central America to discuss the violence, crime and corruption of the drug war--and the prospects for drug legalization to undercut the power of the kingpins. It's not that Molina, a former military general who has been accused of torture and implicated in acts of genocide, is suddenly concerned about the welfare of Guatemalans. Instead, he and the other presidents of Central and Latin America have begrudgingly acknowledged the futility of combating the narcotraficantes. Three decades of the "war on drugs" with no victory in sight, and the fact that drugs are as plentiful and cheap as ever, has led to some re-examination of the drug war. These politicians are concerned about stability in the region and the drug war is one of the leading drivers of instability--of social and economic disruption, the collapse of judicial systems and widespread, record-levels of violence against civilians and state security forces.	Redmond, ’12. Helen Redmond is an US journalist, commentator, and drug and health policy analyst. “Drug war devastation in Latin America.” 5/31/12. http://socialistworker.org/2012/05/31/drug-war-devastation. – clawan	The White House wants the world to believe drug prohibition works, and to forget the murderous legacy of the CIA and DEA The CIA and the DEA have been directly involved in drug trafficking in the region for decades. They've trained death squads and right-wing paramilitary groups Corrupt officials profit enormously from the illicit drug trade. Latin America has borne the brunt of the U.S.-led war on drugs Drug cartels operate with near impunity Mexico ore than 60,000 people have died in drug-fueled violence. Over 250,000 have been internally displaced backlash against the drug war in the country American drug warriors often tout Colombia as a "success" in the war on drugs. Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite eradication and interdiction efforts, cocaleros continued to produce record harvests. Three decades of the "war on drugs" with no victory in sight, and the fact that drugs are as plentiful and cheap as ever, has led to some re-examination of the drug war. the drug war is one of the leading drivers of instability economic disruption, the collapse of judicial systems and violence	Turn – increased U.S. involvement in war on drugs exacerbates instability – militarization and backlash means that initiatives will fail	6,089	136	1,112	983	20	183	0.020346	0.186165	Mexico Guest Workers Negative - HSS 2013.html5	Hoya-Spartan Scholars	Case Negatives	2013

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