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2,900 |
Groundwater is extremely important because it is a source of clean drinkable water for human survival. In arid areas especially (like the western U.S.) it has allowed humans to flourish and in the early part of the colonization of the west it was vital to the establishiment of agriculture because we tapped the groundwater by digging wells and then used it to irrigate our crops. It is still important today for this reason (although we also now impond water in dams and divert it for agriculture using aqueducts). As the population of the west has grown, the demands put on groundwater to provide for human well-being have been increasing, and their is great concern today about how long our groundwater will last, and whether or not we can make sure that it is clean and drinkaable over the long term. It is for this reason, one of the most pressing environmental issues faced by citizens the world over.
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Miller ‘4, Prof of Geology, 04 (http://www.geosun.sjsu.edu/~jmiller/Geo1_Lecture12_SurfaceProcesses.html, 08-Dec-2004 EARTH SURFACE PROCESSES II: GROUNDWATER)
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Groundwater is extremely important because it is a source of clean drinkable water for human survival it has allowed humans to flourish and vital to the establishiment of agriculture
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Groundwater contamination causes extinction
| 907 | 44 | 182 | 158 | 4 | 29 | 0.025316 | 0.183544 |
Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013.html5
|
Kansas (JDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,901 |
Predatory fish are at the top of the ocean food chain. They help keep the balance of marine life in check. Without their eating habits, an overabundance of smaller organisms might affect the entire underwater ecosystem. Some scientists say such a shift could lead to a total collapse of the oceans. Yet so far, those in charge of regulating international fisheries have done little to protect at least one endangered species. Scientists say this species is on the brink of extinction… and it is all our fault. "Nobody's free of blame in this game," said Kate Wilson. Kate Willson is an investigative journalist who recently exposed what she says is a $4-billion, black market trade in the sale of bluefin tuna. "Scientists tell us that when a top predator like bluefin or another big fish is depleted, that will affect the entire ecosystem," she said. "Scientists say you better get used to eating jellyfish sashimi and algae burgers if you let these large fish become depleted - because they anchor the ecosystem." Ecosystems are how living things interact with their environments and each other. Scientists agree they can change dramatically if a link disappears from the food chain. Government officials and members of environmental groups met in Paris in mid-November to discuss fishing regulations that may affect all life on Earth. Sue Lieberman is Director of International Policy with the Pew Environment Group: a Washington-based, non-profit agency. She says the bluefin is in jeopardy. "The fish is in worse shape than we thought, and that's why we're calling for the meeting of this commission to suspend this fishery ... to put on the brakes and say, 'let's stop," said Sue Lieberman. "Let's stop mismanaging and start managing the right way to ensure a future for this species.'" Both Lieberman and Willson say that greed, corruption and poor management of fishing quotas brought us to this point. "The quotas are designed to let fish recover, but quotas are more than scientists recommend, but even within quotas, there's consistent lack of enforcement, fraud, fish being traded without documents to the point where it's a multibillion dollar business that will cause the depletion of an incredible species," said Lieberman. Willson says that fishing the bluefin to near-extinction followed increased Japanese demand for fresh sushi - starting in the 1970s and 80s. And - fishing practices that target the two primary regions in which blue fin spawn: the Gulf of Mexico and the Mediterranean Sea. "You don't need a PhD in fisheries to know that's really not very smart," said Sue Lieberman. "If you want the species to continue into the future, you don't take them when they come to breed." And that practice shines light on a bigger problem. "Ninety per cent of all large fish - it's estimated - have been depleted," said Kate Wilson. "Bluefin is just a bellwether for what's happening to what's left of the world's large fish." "We're not saying there should be no fishing, but we are saying there should be no fishing like that," said Lieberman. "This isn't single individuals with a pole and a line; this isn't recreational fishermen; this is massive, industrial scale fishing. Governments can change this; this isn't an environmental threat that we throw up our hands and there's nothing to do about it." "If countries really want to protect the remaining stocks of bluefin, they have to get serious about enforcing the rules and listening to their scientists when they set catch limits," said Wilson. "Management of fish species on the high seas isn't just about making sure people have nice seafood when they go to a restaurant; it's about the very future of our planet," continued Lieberman. "And we have to get management of the oceans correct and we can't keep … and governments can't keep acting like we'll take care of that next year. We'll worry about making money in the short term, we'll listen to the fishing industry; we'll worry about the ocean & the environment later. We don't have that luxury."
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VOA 10 (Voice of America News, “Bluefin Tuna Endangered by Overfishing,” 12/1, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Bluefin-Tuna-Endangered-by-Overfishing--111159869.html)
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Predatory fish are at the top of the ocean food chain. They help keep the balance of marine life in check. Without their eating habits, an overabundance of smaller organisms might affect the entire underwater ecosystem. such a shift could lead to a total collapse of the oceans when a top predator like bluefin is depleted, that will affect the entire ecosystem because they anchor the ecosystem fishing regulations affect all life on Earth the bluefin is in jeopardy. The quotas are designed to let fish recover, but there's consistent lack of enforcement, Management of fish species on the high seas is about the very future of our planet,"
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Specifically, blue-fin tuna gets to extinction
| 4,032 | 46 | 645 | 674 | 6 | 109 | 0.008902 | 0.161721 |
Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013.html5
|
Kansas (JDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,902 |
In this June 27, 2012 file photo, ships bringing oil drilling equipment to Alaska, left, pass through Seattle's Elliott Bay as a Washington State Ferry passes on its way into Seattle. Ships bring oil drilling equipment to Alaska. The lack of infrastructure in the U.S. is leading some oil companies to ship products by rail, but experts say a pipeline is the most efficient way to transport oil and gas. Much has been said of the potential for the United States to become energy independent thanks to the recent boom in domestic energy production. But according to experts, growth in the industry could be stunted without serious expansion in the nation's network of pipelines and other energy infrastructure. While Quinn Kiley, senior portfolio manager at FAMCO MLP, a division of Advisory Research Inc., characterizes advances in the country's infrastructure as "industry and global leading," he says the nation needs to bring additional pipeline capacity online to keep up with the growing domestic production and potential imports flowing from Canada and Mexico. "If you have new and growing production, you need additional infrastructure whether it's from the oil sands or the Bakken Shale," says Kiley, whose firm specializes in energy infrastructure investing. "Today you have a lot of that crude [oil] coming at a very disjointed, nonlinear path to get to where it needs to go." "There's going to be a time where supply is going to outstrip the existing infrastructure and you're going to have to fill that in," Kiley adds. According to Darren Schuringa, the price tag for all the infrastructure improvements needed for the United States to achieve energy independence amounts to around $300 billion over the next decade or so, no small sum considering the still-shaky ground on which the U.S. economy sits. Still, they are key investments to make, argues Schuringa, founder of investment firm Yorkville Capital, especially if the United States wants to free itself of its dependence on unfriendly countries for crucial energy supplies. Proposed pipeline projects such as the Keystone XL could potentially help expedite that process, proponents argue, but construction of the pipeline has been held up for several years due to environmental concerns. Right now, the lack of infrastructure is leading some oil companies to ship product by rail. While that's solved the short-term transportation issues and given U.S. and Canadian railway companies a boost, a longer term solution is needed, experts argue, and a pipeline is the most efficient way to transport oil and gas. [RELATED: New Offshore Leases in U.S. Could Yield 1B Barrels of Oil] "Rail is part of the long-term solution but it's always more efficient to pipe than it is to rail," Kiley says, adding that a type of asset such as the Keystone XL is crucial because it helps connect burgeoning centers of supply with existing and potentially future demand centers. "It's part of a system of pipelines that allows you and I, in different parts of the country, to get access to the same commodities, the same petrochemical products, and natural gas," Kiley says. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, several new pipeline projects already in the works are designed to better regulate the flow of oil through Cushing, Okla., which historically has been the distribution hub for both imported and West Texas oil. In just the past three years, pipeline capacity for getting crude oil to Cushing increased by about 815,000 barrels per day, the EIA reported, mostly thanks to the construction of the southern leg of TransCanada's Keystone pipeline that originates in Alberta, Canada. A slew of other projects to transport crude from Cushing to Gulf Coast refineries are being planned, too. With crude oil output expected to rise 815,000 barrels a day in 2013 to more than 7 million barrels a day, experts say the expanded pipeline capacity will help ease bottlenecks in the system and even help ease some of the pain consumers have been feeling at the gas pump.
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Handley ’13 (Meg Handley, Reporter for U.S. News & World Report, “Infrastructure Upgrades Needed to Fuel Domestic Energy Boom”, February 22, 2013)
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The lack of infrastructure in the U.S. is leading some oil companies to ship products by rail, but experts say a pipeline is the most efficient way to transport oil and gas. Much has been said of the potential for the United States to become energy independent thanks to the recent boom in domestic energy production But according to experts, growth in the industry could be stunted without serious expansion in the nation's network of pipelines and other energy infrastructure. the nation needs to bring additional pipeline capacity online to keep up with the growing domestic production and imports flowing from Mexico you need additional infrastructure whether it's from the oil sands or the Bakken Shale There's going to be a time where supply is going to outstrip the existing infrastructure and you're going to have to fill that in," Kiley adds. Still, they are key investments to make especially if the United States wants to free itself of its dependence on unfriendly countries for crucial energy supplies. Proposed pipeline projects such as the Keystone XL could potentially help expedite that process, proponents argue, but construction of the pipeline has been held up for several years due to environmental concerns. the lack of infrastructure is leading some oil companies to ship product by rail , a longer term solution is needed, experts argue, and a pipeline is the most efficient way to transport oil and gas. experts say the expanded pipeline capacity will help ease bottlenecks in the system and even help ease some of the pain consumers have been feeling at the gas pump.
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Increases United States energy pipelines key to sustain US gas boom
| 4,039 | 68 | 1,593 | 661 | 11 | 265 | 0.016641 | 0.400908 |
Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013.html5
|
Kansas (JDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,903 |
Beyond exploration and production, the pressing need for infrastructure stands out as an area with high potential for bilateral collaboration. First, it is vital that large scale construction of gas pipelines occurs, both within Mexico and across the border. Within Mexico, the Calderon administration identified the need for multi - billion dollar investments in the creation of a truly national gas pipeline network: at the present time the majority of western portion of the country lacks access to natural gas. Secondly, as was made painfully clear to a number of private sector industrial consumers duri ng 2012, during times of short supply, the country lacks the capacity to import extra supplies of gas from the United States due to the limitations of the cross - border pipeline network. In 2012 this led to complaints from companies that they were unable to secure stable and sufficient supplies of gas for their manufacturing processes. The second deficit in energy infrastructure can be found in the refining sector. The much - publicized efforts of the Calderon administration, announced in January 2009, to buil d a new refinery at Tula in the state of Hidalgo that was designed to process up to 300,000 barrels a day of Mexican heavy crude have thus far come to nothing. The project has been repeatedly delayed, first due to problems in securing the land, then due to bureaucratic problems and political wrangling. At the same time, Mexico’s dependence on imported gasoline has increased in line with rising demand. Mexico therefore needs to find a solution to this issue in the near future, and one option that presents it self is the example of the Deer Park refinery complex in Texas where since 1993 Pemex and Shell have worked together in a joint venture to refine 340,000 barrels a day of crude oil. Part of the production of the refinery heads back to Mexico and has become an important source of income for Pemex as well as helping to satisfy the country’s need for refined products. Lastly, Mexico’s petrochemical sector is in urgent need of investment. For many years now the industry has languished due to a lack of funds and a lack of direction from the government. Despite encouraging signs of new investment interest in recent months, the major Mexican petrochemicals project of the last few years, Ethylene XXI, has suffered repeated delays. When completed in 2015, the project will be a private petrochemical complex for the production of polyethylene, producing up to one million tons of polyethylene, and replace up to $2 billion worth of imports resulting in the creation of thousands of jobs. But the prospect of huge supplies of cheap gas from Mexico and the U.S. shale gas industry offers the tantalizing prospect of turning Mexico into a production and export base for these products, and there will be a major opportunity for joint ventures with foreign firms. The prospect of huge supplies of cheap gas from Mexico and the U.S. shale gas industry offers the tantalizing prospect of turning Mexico into a petrochemical production and export platform.
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Wood ’13 (Duncan Wood, the Director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, For 17 years, Dr. Wood was a professor and the director of the International Relations Program at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) in Mexico City, His research focuses on Mexican energy policy and North American relations, “Growing Potential for U.S. - Mexico Energy Cooperation”, January 2013)
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Beyond exploration and production, the pressing need for infrastructure stands out as an area with high potential for bilateral collaboration it is vital that large scale construction of gas pipelines occurs, both within Mexico and across the border. , the Calderon administration identified the need for multi - billion dollar investments in the creation of a truly national gas pipeline network: at the present time the majority of western portion of the country lacks access to natural gas during times of short supply, the country lacks the capacity to import extra supplies of gas from the United States due to the limitations of the cross - border pipeline network companies were unable to secure stable and sufficient supplies of gas for their manufacturing processes. Lastly, Mexico’s petrochemical sector is in urgent need of investment. For many years now the industry has languished due to a lack of funds and a lack of direction from the government. Despite encouraging signs of new investment interest in recent months, the major Mexican petrochemicals project of the last few years, Ethylene XXI, has suffered repeated delays the prospect of huge supplies of cheap gas from Mexico and the U.S. shale gas industry offers the tantalizing prospect of turning Mexico into a production and export base for these products, and there will be a major opportunity for joint ventures with foreign firms. The prospect of huge supplies of cheap gas from Mexico and the U.S. shale gas industry offers the tantalizing prospect of turning Mexico into a petrochemical production and export platform.
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Energy infrastructure and US investment are the key issues- the plan builds pipleines
| 3,089 | 85 | 1,597 | 513 | 13 | 257 | 0.025341 | 0.500975 |
Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013.html5
|
Kansas (JDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,904 |
At the present time, economic sanctions against Tehran have been inhibiting natural gas export project development in Iran. This includes both its previously planned South Pars LNG export projects and a proposed pipeline to Pakistan and India. With no signs of conflict resolution between Iran and the West in sight, it is assumed that the development of Iranian export projects could not begin until 2020 at the earliest.¶ Greater shale gas production in the United States, and eventually Europe, will also make it more difficult for Iran to profit from exporting natural gas. Since Iran is currently hampered by Western sanctions against investment in its energy sector, by the time it can get its natural gas ready for export, the marketing window to Europe will likely be closed by the availability of shale gas. This reality may give the United States and its allies more leverage over Iran for a longer period of time, helping to shape outcomes in the Middle East more positive for U.S. and allied interests.¶ Iran is more likely to become a much larger exporter in the case in which no new shale is developed (Scenario Two), primarily because of greater LNG demand from the United States. In the Reference Case, Iran only emerges as an LNG exporter in the late 2020s and its market position is more limited. However, in the constrained shale case (Scenario Two), Iranian LNG exports grow more quickly and, by 2040, they are about 75 percent higher than in the Reference Case. Thus, shale gas plays an instrumental role in delaying the opening for Iran to sell its natural gas, thwarting its ability in the near term to use natural gas exports as a means to develop bilateral relations with major gas consuming countries and limiting its opportunity to use energy diplomacy to strengthen its regional position29 or buttress its pursuit of nuclear weapons. ¶ Although there are many complex factors that influence Iran’s political leverage globally, the circumstance of lower requirements for Iranian natural gas could make it easier for the United States to achieve buy-in for continued economic sanctions against Iran. Lower interest in Iranian gas reduces the chances that Iran can use its energy resources to drive a wedge in the international coalition against it. By delaying the need for Iranian gas by over a decade, the United States buys time to find a better solution to the Iranian nuclear problem and leaves open the possibility that political change will take place in Iran before its influence as a major global natural gas supplier grows. In addition, the long delay in the commerciality of Iranian gas means that Tehran will have trouble getting Asian pipelines to India or Pakistan off the ground with mutually acceptable terms, thereby reducing—for at least the time being—a potential source of tension between the United States and India.30
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Medlock et al. 11 - Dr. Kenneth B. Medlock, Ph.D. in economics, fellow in Energy and Resource Economics at the Baker Institute, and former advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy and the California Energy Commission, AND*** Amy Myers Jaffe, graduate from Princeton University, fellow of Energy Studies and director of the Energy Forum at the Baker Institute, and associate director of the Rice Energy Program, AND*** Dr. Peter R. Hartley, Ph.D in economics at Rice University, July 2011, "Shale Gas and U.S. National Security,” http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-DOEShaleGas-07192011.pdf
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. Greater shale gas production in the United States, and eventually Europe, will also make it more difficult for Iran to profit from exporting natural gas. Since Iran is currently hampered by Western sanctions against investment in its energy sector, This reality may give the United States and its allies more leverage over Iran for a longer period of time, helping to shape outcomes in the Middle East more positive for U.S. and allied interests.¶ Iran is more likely to become a much larger exporter in the case in which no new shale is developed primarily because of greater LNG demand from the United States. shale gas plays an instrumental role in delaying the opening for Iran to sell its natural gas, thwarting its ability in the near term to use natural gas exports as a means to develop bilateral relations with major gas consuming countries and limiting its opportunity to use energy diplomacy to strengthen its regional position29 or buttress its pursuit of nuclear weapons. lower requirements for Iranian natural gas could make it easier for the United States to achieve buy-in for continued economic sanctions against Iran. Lower interest in Iranian gas reduces the chances that Iran can use its energy resources to drive a wedge in the international coalition against it. By delaying the need for Iranian gas the United States buys time to find a better solution to the Iranian nuclear problem and leaves open the possibility that political change will take place in Iran the long delay in the commerciality of Iranian gas means that Tehran will have trouble getting Asian pipelines to India or Pakistan off the ground with mutually acceptable terms reducing a potential source of tension between the United States and India.30
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US gas supply curbs Iranian gas leverage – contributes to international cooperation to prevent a nuclear Iran
| 2,866 | 110 | 1,743 | 475 | 17 | 290 | 0.035789 | 0.610526 |
Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013.html5
|
Kansas (JDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,905 |
Since the paper's publication, other investigators and studies have weighed in on the matter, including RealClimate's Gavin Smith; the Council on Foreign Relations' Michael Levi;Ramón Alvarez of Environmental Defense Fund and co-authors; and another Cornell scientist, Lawrence Cathles. But a definitive conclusion has been elusive because the actual magnitude of these fugitive emissions remains very poorly defined.
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Chameides, Dean of Duke University’s Nicholas School of the Environment, ‘12
(Bill, “Natural Gas: A Bridge to a Low-Carbon Future or Not?,” 7-20-12, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-chameides/-natural-gas-a-bridge-to_b_1690857.html, accessed 9-20-12) PM
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a definitive conclusion has been elusive because the actual magnitude of these fugitive emissions remains very poorly defined.
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Effect of fugitive emissions small- increased natural gas solves warming in the long term
| 417 | 89 | 126 | 57 | 14 | 18 | 0.245614 | 0.315789 |
Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013.html5
|
Kansas (JDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,906 |
Two months ago, the United States. and Europe were jolted by a revived Russia. Flush with energy money, Moscow announced that it was back as a world power. Georgia was defeated, Ukraine was fearful, the Eastern Europeans were nervous, and the United States and Western Europeans argued over what to do. Was a new cold war imminent? They needn’t have worried. Even then it was obvious that Russia’s offensive power was limited. Its conventional forces have improved over their nadir following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but the Russian military remains no match for that of the United States and only at great cost could Moscow defeat a state with reasonably modern armed forces. Jane’s Strategic Advisory Services recently pointed to weaknesses exposed by the August war, concluding: “Improvements in command, training levels and the employment of flexible, modern weapons systems are required before the Russian military can face any opponents larger or better equipped than the Georgian military.” Moscow’s nuclear force, including a substantial number of tactical warheads, is its principal power tool. However, Russia could ill afford to use nuclear weapons as a substitute for inadequate conventional forces against any of the countries lining its border. Rather, Moscow has a deterrent that would turn any Western response into a dangerous game of geopolitical chicken. Yet relying on nuclear weapons to counter conventional intervention by other nations would be as dangerous for Moscow as for the United States or European states. Moreover, despite the nationalistic adrenaline rush following Moscow’s triumph, Russia’s long-term prospects remain bleak. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has suffered not just a birth dearth, but a sharp rise in mortality rates and drop in life expectancy, what Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute calls a “great leap backwards.” Russia’s population was 145 million in 2002, but fell to 142 million this year. The United Nations figures that Russia’s population is going to drop another 10 million by 2020. Obviously, demographic and health trends can change, but Moscow’s problems are systematic and fundamental. Any turnaround likely will take years. As Eberstadt puts it, “this is not the portrait of a successfully and rapidly developing economy—much less an emerging economic superpower.” A declining population will have serious geopolitical consequences as well. For instance, the relative depopulation of Siberia, adjoining far more populous China, could leave Russia’s expansive eastern territory at risk. But we need not wait until 2020 for evidence of Russian weakness. Economic uncertainty and falling energy prices have combined to deflate Russia’s pretensions of being a great power again. The stock market is down 70 percent from May, with one-time billionaire oligarchs scurrying to the Kremlin begging for relief. The ruble has lost two year’s worth of appreciation as anxious citizens, so recently celebrating their new prosperity, change their savings into dollars and euros. Heretofore abundant foreign-exchange reserves have dissipated as oil prices have fallen by more than half and the government has attempted to prop up the ruble. Investment-rating services are threatening to downgrade Russian debt. As its economy weakens, Russia is less able to threaten its neighbors and the West—by cutting off energy shipments, for instance—should its demands not be met. Moreover, declining revenues will crimp the Kremlin’s plans to sharply enhance its military. Not only will there be less money available overall, but more funds will have to be plowed into business investment and social programs. Economic growth has been the foundation of Vladimir Putin’s popularity. He will be loath to risk popular displeasure by allowing the economy to continue sinking. Indeed, Russia’s present financial difficulties are likely to force Moscow to accelerate economic integration with the West, which will force the Kremlin to moderate its foreign policy. Last year, then–President Putin issued an updated economic development strategy for 2020, which envisioned Russia as sporting one of the globe’s five-largest economies and acting as an international financial center and technological leader. Those are challenging goals under any circumstances, but almost certainly will be impossible to achieve without abundant Western investment, trade and cooperation The image of a new Russian colossus threatening neighbors, Western Europe and the United States never reflected reality. Moscow’s ambitions always were much more limited—ensuring border security and international respect, not reestablishing the Soviet empire. So, too, were its abilities limited, even before the ongoing economic crunch. The incoming U.S. administration should use the present economic uncertainty as an opportunity to refashion relations with Russia. Neither country can afford to finance a further arms buildup or has anything at stake in countries like Georgia and Ukraine that warrants a potential nuclear confrontation, and both nations would benefit greatly from expanded economic and security cooperation in the future. A modus vivendi should be possible—as long as Washington recognizes that diplomacy requires giving as well as taking, especially when the other party has a nuclear arsenal to back up its positions.
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Bandow ‘8 (“The Russian Hangover” by Doug Bandowthe Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire (Xulon Press). 10.28.2008 )
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Russia’s offensive power was limited Its conventional forces have improved but the Russian military remains no match Improvements are required before the Russian military can face any opponents larger or better equipped than the Georgian military.” , Russia could ill afford to use nuclear weapons as a substitute for inadequate conventional forces against any of the countries lining its border Rather, Moscow has a deterrent that would turn any Western response into a dangerous game of geopolitical chicken relying on nuclear weapons to counter conventional intervention by other nations would be as dangerous for Moscow as for the United States or European states despite the nationalistic adrenaline rush following Moscow’s triumph, Russia’s long-term prospects remain bleak Russia has suffered not just a birth dearth, but a sharp rise in mortality rates and drop in life expectancy As its economy weakens, Russia is less able to threaten its neighbors and the West The image of a new Russian colossus threatening neighbors, Western Europe and the United States never reflected reality The incoming U.S. administration should use the present economic uncertainty as an opportunity to refashion relations with Russia Neither country can afford to finance a further arms buildup or has anything at stake in countries like Georgia and Ukraine that warrants a potential nuclear confrontation and both nations would benefit greatly from expanded economic and security cooperation in the future A modus vivendi should be possible—as long as Washington recognizes that diplomacy requires giving as well as taking, especially when the other party has a nuclear arsenal to back up its positions.
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No impact—Russia isn’t a threat
| 5,395 | 31 | 1,692 | 814 | 5 | 261 | 0.006143 | 0.320639 |
Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013.html5
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Kansas (JDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,907 |
Furthermore, rule of law issues are affected not simply by selection bias but by the non-U.S. nature of production of foreign and international sources. In other words, these "laws" were not created under the strictures of the U.S. Constitution. As such, they lack formal elements or intentions as enforceable law.Most often, customary international law outputs are intended only as aspirational or symbolic, rather than drafted as enforceable legal obligations or with the intent of creating liability. n159If these outputs are used as evidence of enforceable customary [*545] international law obligations and liabilities or as authority for the interpretation of U.S. law, courts mangle and inappropriately manipulate their purpose and character. n160 Indeed, allowing judges to use elusive and diffuse principles of human rights to discover applicable international law is beyond their capacity and beyond the power committed to them by the Constitution.
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Kochan, 2006 (Donald J., Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, “SOVEREIGNTY AND THE AMERICAN COURTS AT THE COCKTAIL PARTY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE DANGERS OF DOMESTIC JUDICIAL INVOCATIONS OF FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,” Fordham International Law Journal, February, 29 Fordham Int'l L.J. 507)
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rule of law issues are affected not simply by selection bias but by the non-U.S. nature of international sources laws" were not created under the strictures of the U.S. Constitution. As such, they lack formal elements as enforceable law. customary law outputs are intended only as aspirational or symbolic, rather than drafted as enforceable legal obligations If these are used as evidence of obligations courts mangle and inappropriately manipulate their purpose allowing judges to use elusive and diffuse principles of human rights to discover law is beyond their capacity
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No solvency—Courts can’t create norms or other solid implementation of international law
| 960 | 88 | 574 | 142 | 12 | 89 | 0.084507 | 0.626761 |
Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013.html5
|
Kansas (JDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,908 |
Normative reasoning borrowed from international human rights sources will not necessarily prevail in the process of constitutional interpretation. Other normative considerations omitted there may be relevant, and consensual and institutional factors may also come into play. The Court may conclude that the normatively compelling interpretation of a right cannot be adopted at the constitutional level but, rather, should await political implementation. I emphasize again that the international human rights regime does not call for implementation at the constitutional level, only compliance.Thus, the Supreme Court has reason to examine international human rights norms and decisions interpreting them for the normative and functional insights that they may provide on analogous issues of constitutional right. They certainly cannot control constitutional interpretation, but they may inform it.The use of human rights treaties as an aid in construing constitutional rights might seem superficially in tension with the Supreme Court's reassurance in Reid v. Covert that the treaty power cannot be employed to violate constitutional rights. n31 That appearance should dissolve on closer examination. The treaty makers cannot override constitutional norms, and they cannot order the Supreme Court to alter its interpretation of a constitutional provision. n32 But treaties, like legislation, can contribute to a shift in the factual, institutional, and normative environment within which the Court carries on its task of constitutional interpretation. The resulting doctrinal evolution is unavoidable in any candid account of U.S. constitutional history. Nothing in Reid v. Covert and its progeny precludes this indirect influence of treaty making on constitutional law. Treaties and the case law arising under them thus become data available for the Court's consideration in elaborating the contemporary meaning of constitutional norms. The political branches can neither require the Court to follow international or foreign law in interpreting the Constitution nor prohibit the Court from considering international or foreign law.Under current circumstances, the Supreme Court correctly does not engage in the practice, pursued by some other constitutional courts, of construing constitutional rights for the purpose of judicially implementing the positive international obligations of the nation under human rights treaties. The positive effect of treaty norms differs from the moral or functional insight that they may provide.Human rights treaties do not require implementation at the constitutional level, and in the U.S. legal system Congress retains ultimate control over the means of implementing--or breaching--a treaty. Entrenching positive human rights standards as [*89] constitutional interpretation, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the treaty as such, would deprive the political branches of their authority to choose methods of treaty implementation, and would not be consistent with current constitutional understandings. n33
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Neuman, 2004 (Gerald L. Herber Wechsler Professor of Federal Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law, “THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation,” American Journal of International Law, January, 98 A.J.I.L. 82)
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The Court may conclude that the normatively compelling interpretation of a right cannot be adopted at the constitutional level but should await political implementation the international human rights regime does not call for implementation at the constitutional level, only compliance. international human rights norms cannot control constitutional interpretation, but they may inform it. treaties can contribute to a shift in the factual, institutional, and normative environment within which the Court carries on its task of constitutional interpretation. The resulting doctrinal evolution is unavoidable in any candid account of U.S. constitutional history Under current circumstances, the Supreme Court correctly does not engage in the practice of construing constitutional rights for the purpose of judicially implementing the positive international obligations of the nation under human rights treaties. The positive effect differs from insight that they may provide. Congress retains ultimate control over the means of implementing--or breaching--a treaty. Entrenching positive human rights standards as constitutional interpretation would deprive the political branches of their authority to choose methods of treaty implementation, and would not be consistent with current constitutional understandings
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Only Congress can handle the constitutional questions raised by the Agreement—Courts would create multiple conflicting interpretation
| 3,055 | 133 | 1,311 | 429 | 16 | 177 | 0.037296 | 0.412587 |
Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013.html5
|
Kansas (JDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,909 |
The Evolving Energy Context The past 5 years have seen a revolution in the energy sector globally, with the advent of shale gas and tight oil production dramatically altering the supply outlook. In the case of gas, the success of American firms in drilling for gas in shale formations across the continental United States has meant a flood of new supplies that have caused a major decline in gas prices. From a Henry Hub spot price of over $13 per million British Thermal Units (mmBTUs), the price has fallen to just ove r $2 per mmBTU by the end of 2012. This, in turn, has greatly reduced the cost of generating electricity in the United States and has encouraged utilities to switch to gas from other fuel sources. The United States has also increased its domestic oil produ ction by more than 800,000 barrels per day (bpd) through the exploitation of tight oil reserves in places such as North Dakota, applying latest drilling and hydraulic fracturing (fracking) 39 technologies. Although we have seen this jump in supply in the U.S. , oil prices have remained high due to global demand pressures and the international, rather than regional nature of oil pricing. At the same time as U.S. production has risen, Mexican oil has experienced a precipitous decline. From a level of 3.4 million bpd in 2004, Mexico’s oil production has fallen to only 2.55 million bpd. The stagnation of the national oil company, the prohibition on foreign or private investment and participation in the sector, and the end of easy oil in Mexico has meant that a change in thinking is desperately needed in Mexican hydrocarbons policy. Oil and gas As noted above, the history of cooperation between the United States and Mexico on oil issues has been limited by the historical sensitivity of Mexico’s government and people to any hint of interference from the U.S. in what has traditionally been seen as a central element in the nation’s sovereignty. Nonetheless, recent years have shown a softening on this sensitivity, in part due to generational change, in part due to politi cal change, and in part due to the success of negotiating a Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement in 2012. That agreement laid out a framework for determining the management and exploitation of cross - border oil reserves, and was hailed as a positive develop ment. It was quickly ratified in the Mexican Senate, but is has yet to be ratified in the United States, and so has not yet come into force. Before moving on to discuss new areas of cooperation, it is important that this existing agreement is ratified. It is widely expected that the government of Enrique Peña Nieto will present an energy reform initiative to the Mexican Congress early in 2013. While it is still unknown how ambitious that reform proposal will be, it is thought that the government will presen t an initiative that will be aimed at opening the sector to greater levels of private participation in refining, petrochemicals and even in exploration and production. Such an opening will of course offer significant possibilities for foreign as well as Me xican firms, and will also open the door to new areas of technical and regulatory collaboration between the two countries. Mexico’s energy establis hment, and increasingly it seems, the government, hope that private investment will occur in unconventional hydrocarbons sector. For Mexico the most interesting plays in the future will be found in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, in the as yet untap ped shale reserves that are found throughout the east of the country, and in the geologically - complex fields of Chicontepec, where Pemex has been consistently failing to meet production targets over the past four years. The application of cutting - edge tech nologies and techniques from U.S. firms would likely be important in all three of these areas, and the experience of American firms in shale plays would provide them with an advantage in the event of an opening in that area. It is widely expected that the government of Enrique Peña Nieto will present an energy reform initiative to the Mexican Congress early in 2013. Such an opening will of course offer significant possibilities for foreign as well as Mexican firms, and will also open the door to new areas of technical and regulatory collaboration between the two countries. 40 Of particular interest in this regard is the experience of U.S. firms in the hydraulic fracturing (fracking) business. The ability to extract shale oil and gas in areas that suffer from water shortages (such as Texas) will be crucial to developing shale resources in Mexico, particularl y in the north of the country. In fact existing knowledge of the geological characteristics of the Eagle Ford formation will also be crucial in exploiting its oil and gas reserves in Coahuila, where the formation extends. One Mexican company, Alfa, has already worked extensively with U.S. partners in the shale industry north of the border, and we can expect higher levels of private sector collaboration to develop.
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Wood ’13 (Duncan Wood, the Director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, For 17 years, Dr. Wood was a professor and the director of the International Relations Program at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) in Mexico City, His research focuses on Mexican energy policy and North American relations, “Growing Potential for U.S. - Mexico Energy Cooperation”, January 2013)
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At the same time as U.S. production has risen, Mexican oil has experienced a precipitous decline. From a level of 3.4 million bpd in 2004, Mexico’s oil production has fallen to only 2.55 million bpd. The stagnation of the national oil company, the prohibition on foreign or private investment and participation in the sector, and the end of easy oil in Mexico has meant that a change in thinking is desperately needed in Mexican hydrocarbons policy. recent years have shown a softening on this sensitivity, in part due to generational change, in part due to politi cal change, and in part due to the success of negotiating a Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement in 2012. Such an opening will of course offer significant possibilities for foreign as well as Me xican firms, and will also open the door to new areas of technical and regulatory collaboration between the two countries. Mexico’s energy establis hment, and increasingly it seems, the government, hope that private investment will occur in unconventional hydrocarbons sector The application of cutting - edge tech nologies and techniques from U.S. firms would likely be important in all three of these areas and the experience of American firms in shale plays would provide them with an advantage in the event of an opening in that area. Of particular interest in this regard is the experience of U.S. firms in the hydraulic fracturing (fracking) business. The ability to extract shale oil and gas in areas that suffer from water shortages (such as Texas) will be crucial to developing shale resources in Mexico, particularl y in the north of the country. In fact existing knowledge of the geological characteristics of the Eagle Ford formation will also be crucial in exploiting its oil and gas reserves in Coahuila, where the formation extends. One Mexican company, Alfa, has alr
|
Unconventional hydrocarbons and gas key to PEMEX future
| 5,043 | 55 | 1,842 | 846 | 8 | 304 | 0.009456 | 0.359338 |
Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013.html5
|
Kansas (JDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,910 |
Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and rep resents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of 'deniability' the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote 'stuff happens'. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning.¶ The military stages phirric victories that come at a price of lasting instability. In Afghanistan the US staged a swift settlement by backing and funding the Northern Alliance, which brought warlords and drug lords to power and a corrupt power structure that eventually precipitated the comeback of the Taliban. In Iraq the US backed the Kurds and permitted Shiite militias to operate (until the Samarra bombing of April 2006) and thus created conditions for lasting instability.¶ The American rules of engagement are self-serving. But because the military inhabits a parallel universe and the media are clogged with 'defense experts', discussion of these tactics and hence the capacity for self-correction is limited.¶ Part of the backdrop is the trend of the gradual erosion of state capacities because of 25 years, since the Reagan era, of cutting government services except the military and security. The laissez-faire state in the US has created an imbalance in which the military remains the major growing state capability, which leaves military power increasingly unchecked because monitoring institutions have been downsized or dismantled too. When recently the Pentagon wanted to review all the subcontracts it has outsourced this task was outsourced too. This redistribution of power within the US government played a key part leading up to the war and in the massive failure in Iraq. Diplomacy was under resourced, intelligence was manipulated and the Pentagon and the Office of Strategic Planning ignored experts' advice and State Department warnings on the need for postwar planning (Packer, 2005; Lang, 2004).
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Pieterse 7 [Jan Nederveen, professor of sociology at the University of Illinois, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 14, No. 3, Aug., “Political and Economic Brinkmanship,” p. 473-4]
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That this large security establishment is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny It includes a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with limited checks on its functioning because the military inhabits a parallel universe and the media are clogged with 'defense experts', discussion of tactics and hence the capacity for self-correction is limited The laissez-faire state has created an imbalance in which the military remains the major growing state capability, which leaves military power increasingly unchecked because monitoring institutions have been downsized or dismantled too
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The negs harms claims are manufactured – the threat industry fabricates danger to justify military expansion.
| 3,015 | 109 | 996 | 463 | 16 | 149 | 0.034557 | 0.321814 |
Cuba Embargo Kritik Affirmative - DDI 2013 SS.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,911 |
The idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and [they]he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.” ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because [they’re]he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)
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Hirsh 13 – National Journal chief correspondent, citing various political scientists [Michael, former Newsweek senior correspondent, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital," National Journal, 2-9-13, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207]
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The idea is so poorly defined that pundits often get it wrong pundits talk about how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens political tectonics shift dramatically in very little time Republican members are pushing hard for immigration reform this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence It has almost entirely to do with the breakdown of the Hispanic vote It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. political capital is so poorly defined that pundits often get it wrong political capital misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary It conveys the idea we know more than we really do about the -elusive concept of political power, and discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth Winning wins.” political scientists who study how to pass legislation say political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it there’s no mechanism That makes it useless,” says a government professor at Cornell Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and [they] get it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of other actors If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.” Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because [they’re] aggressive one of the main reasons for that mandate was Johnson’s masterful use of power and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand the way to maximize momentum Momentum It is a controllable fact of political life
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PC theory is false and winners win
| 10,741 | 34 | 2,091 | 1,779 | 7 | 345 | 0.003935 | 0.193929 |
Cuba Embargo Kritik Affirmative - DDI 2013 SS.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
2,912 |
Far from helping to overcome Mexico’s economic backwardness, NAFTA has permanently tied Mexico to a low-wage export strategy. In spite of the export boom, real manufacturing wages in 2002 were 12 percent below the 1994 level, while maquiladora wages only rose by 3 percent.2 In the same period, manufacturing sector employment growth dropped by forty-four thousand jobs while maquiladora employment growth rose by 493,000 jobs—roughly equal to one year’s worth of migration in the first half-decade of the twenty-first century. NAFTA increased exports and foreign investment but it failed to generate significant employment growth because of policy-based wage repression that constrained the domestic market. Labor productivity failed to improve and from 1994 through 2009 employment growth in the formal economy averaged 387,000 jobs per year—absorbing only 38 percent of Mexican youth leaving school for the labor market.3 Furthermore, Mexico deindustrialized under NAFTA because transnational firms began to import more of their inputs and suppliers, almost exclusively relying on a combination of imported components and cheap Mexican labor to process and assemble products for re-export. Approximately 80 percent of Mexico’s exports were for the U.S. market, with foreign-owned firms accounting for 80 percent of total exports. Although Mexico had a $93 billion trade surplus with the U.S. in 2010, overall it suffered a trade deficit.4 It fell from the twelfth largest exporter in 2000 to the fifteenth largest exporter in 2010, with its share of global exports dropping from 2.61 percent to 1.96 percent.5 Cheaper imported consumer and intermediate goods (inputs) also undermined the domestic industrial base. Stagnation, falling wages, a growing “jobs deficit,” and surging migration from 2001 through 2008 demonstrated the failure of NAFTA’s export-led strategy.
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Cypher ’11 (James, economics professor at Fresno State and author of Mexico Since NAFTA: Elite Delusions and the Reality of Decline, Mexico Since NAFTA: Elite Delusions and the Reality of Decline- page 60//NS)
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Far from helping to overcome Mexico’s economic backwardness, NAFTA has permanently tied Mexico to a low-wage export strategy. In spite of the export boom, real manufacturing wages in 2002 were 12 percent below the 1994 level employment growth dropped by forty-four thousand jobs while maquiladora employment growth rose by 493,000 jobs NAFTA increased exports and foreign investment but it failed to generate significant employment growth because of policy-based wage repression that constrained the domestic market Mexico deindustrialized under NAFTA because transnational firms began to import more of their inputs and suppliers, almost exclusively relying on a combination of imported components and cheap Mexican labor to process and assemble products for re-export. Cheaper imported consumer and intermediate goods undermined the domestic industrial base falling wages, a growing “jobs deficit,” and surging migration from 2001 through 2008 demonstrated the failure of NAFTA’s export-led strategy.
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NAFTA failures kills It’s credibility
| 1,871 | 38 | 1,002 | 277 | 5 | 142 | 0.018051 | 0.512635 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Unknown
|
2013
|
2,913 |
Infrastructure¶ The impact of the growth of cross-border economic integration on border infrastructure has been colossal, as has been the increased inspection protocols by U.S. border officials, as dictated by the Department of Homeland Security after September 11. Economic integration has strained the existing infrastructure because economic activity has grown at a faster pace than investment in infrastructure. In addition, border security measures implemented after September 11 have been found to impede the transborder flow of goods and people. A study by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte shows that the efficiency of cross-border infrastructure has decreased over time. Some general findings are that nearly 46 percent of all roads and highways leading to border stations are in poor condition. Fifty-five percent of the municipal roads by which passenger vehicles access border crossings are insufficient for the volume of traffic. Commercial routes also face serious obstacles: 50 percent have excessive traffic, 17 percent have limited road access, and l2 percent have long queues to pass through the port. In regard to pedestrian crossings, there are too few inspection booths at 74 percent of' all U.S.-Mexico border crossings and too few U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors at 80 percent of all ports of' entry. Finally, 86 percent of the border-related national transportation system needs to be improved so that export goods can reach their destination in a timely manner. 16 the current infrastructure is simply insufficient to handle the volume of traffic, and the result is long queues, excessive traffic, and increased vehicular pollution.
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Bronk and Payan 2009—Dr. Christopher Bronk is a Fellow in Society, Technology and Public Policy and the James A. Baker III Institute For Public Policy at Rice University. Dr. Tony Payan is the Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas at El Paso. [“Developing the U.S.-Mexico Border Region for a Prosperous and Secure Relationship. Managing the U.S.-Mexico Border: Human Security and Technology.” April 1, 2009. http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/LAI-pub-BorderSecBronkPayan-040109.pdf]//MM
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The impact of the growth of cross-border economic integration on border infrastructure has been colossal, as has been the increased inspection protocols by U.S. border officials . Economic integration has strained the existing infrastructure because economic activity has grown at a faster pace than investment in infrastructure. In addition, border security measures implemented after September 11 have been found to impede the transborder flow of goods and people nearly 46 percent of all roads and highways leading to border stations are in poor condition. Fifty-five percent of the municipal roads by which passenger vehicles access border crossings are insufficient for the volume of traffic 86 percent of the border-related national transportation system needs to be improved so that export goods can reach their destination in a timely manner. 16 the current infrastructure is simply insufficient to handle the volume of traffic
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NAFTA fails—border infrastructure insufficient
| 1,675 | 46 | 935 | 255 | 4 | 141 | 0.015686 | 0.552941 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Unknown
|
2013
|
2,914 |
The NAFTA labor and environmental side agreements were never de¶ signed to make substantial progress in addressing labor and environ-¶ mental problems. Negotiated primarily to provide political cover for¶ Democratic members of the US Congress to support NAFTA, the side¶ agreements were far from ambitious and were never funded at the level¶ necessary to effectively deal with labor and environmental problems. The¶ labor side agreement is largely hortatory. The environmental side agree-¶ ment is somewhat stronger, but no NAFTA country, least of all the United¶ States, wants intrusive surveillance of its domestic environmental poli-¶ cies. Instead, the side agreements have managed to spotlight selective¶ labor and environmental abuses. Labor unions and some nongovernmen-¶ tal organizations have seized on these shortcomings as a broad rallying¶ cry against "NAFTA failures.
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Hufbauer and Schott ’05 – Hufbauer is Reginald Jones Senior Fellow since 1992, Marcus Wallenberg Professor of International Finance Diplomacy at Georgetown University, deputy assistant secretary for international trade and investment policy of the US Treasury; Schott is a senior fellow since 1983, was senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and international economist at the US treasury (Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J, “NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges,” Chapter 9: Recommendations for North American Economic Integration, Institute for International Economics, October 2005)//ER
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The NAFTA labor and environmental side agreements were never de¶ signed to make substantial progress in addressing labor and environ-¶ mental problems. Negotiated primarily to provide political cover for¶ Democratic members of the US Congress to support NAFTA, the side¶ agreements were far from ambitious and were never funded at the level¶ necessary to effectively deal with labor and environmental problems. The¶ labor side agreement is largely hortatory. The environmental side agree-¶ ment is somewhat stronger, but no NAFTA country, least of all the United¶ States, wants intrusive surveillance of its domestic environmental poli-¶ cies. Instead, the side agreements have managed to spotlight selective¶ labor and environmental abuses.
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NAFTA weak in the squo—Labor and environmental policies
| 880 | 56 | 741 | 128 | 8 | 108 | 0.0625 | 0.84375 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,915 |
Permanent Tribunal for Trade and Investment Disputes. NAFTA established four distinct dispute-settlement mechanisms to deal with problems related to investments, trade remedies, finance, and higher-level trade issues. Chapter 11 of NAFTA provides assurances that a firm’s investment would not be expropriated without prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. While it was mainly intended to reassure foreign investors in Mexico, it has been used against all three countries and in ways that no one had contemplated. The most controversial cases involved firms protesting new environmental rules that were judged “tantamount to expropriation.” In subsequent free-trade agreements with Chile and Central America, the United States revised the wording so as to preclude any effect on environmental or health policies. 42 The three governments should sign a memorandum of agreement that would make NAFTA consistent on this matter with the newer agreements. Chapter 19 was intended to prevent arbitrary, protectionist use of U.S. trade laws, and although it set a limit of 315 days for completion of panel proceedings, the average length has been nearly twice that, and the United States has been reluctant to accept any rulings against it. The most notorious case involved soft-wood lumber “where the United States stalled cases interminably and Canadians eventually were forced to pay $1 billion to settle legal cases they had won before bi-national panels and in U.S. courts.” 43 That $1 billion went to lawyers’ fees and nongovernmental organizations connected to the forestry companies and the George W. Bush administration. This has left a very bad taste in the mouths of Canadians. The current ad hoc dispute-settlement mechanisms rely on temporary panelists that are increasingly likely to have a conflict of interest since many of the panelists have used their past experience to bring cases to the courts. Moreover, it is not possible to establish precedents or build any institutional memory if one uses an ad hoc mechanism. The three North American leaders should therefore establish a Permanent Tribunal for Trade and Investment Disputes and fold the other dispute mechanisms into it. A Permanent Tribunal should prevent the three governments from gaming the system and eroding the region’s confidence in NAFTA. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has established such a permanent court, and it is functioning very effectively. It’s time to apply it to North America.
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Pastor 11 – (Robert Pastor, former US national security advisor and writer on foreign affairs) “North American Idea: A Vision of a Continental Future.” 2011 p. 196 http://site.ebrary.com/lib/umich/Doc?id=10480770&ppg=219
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NAFTA established four dispute-settlement mechanisms Chapter 11 While it was mainly intended to reassure foreign investors in Mexico, it has been used in ways that no one contemplated Chapter 19 was intended to prevent arbitrary use of U.S. trade laws the United States has been reluctant to accept any rulings against it The current ad hoc dispute-settlement mechanisms rely on temporary panelists that are likely to have a conflict of interest it is not possible to establish precedents or build any institutional memory if one uses an ad hoc mechanism A Permanent Tribunal should prevent governments from gaming the system and eroding the region’s confidence in NAFTA. The WTO) has established such a permanent court, and it is functioning very effectively. It’s time to apply it
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Trade disputes within NAFTA are currently handled by ad hoc tribunals, which undermine the agreement’s credibility
| 2,480 | 114 | 784 | 381 | 16 | 126 | 0.041995 | 0.330709 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,916 |
First, Mexico´s manufacturing share in GDP has fallen constantly since the end of the 1980s, from levels above 23 percent to levels below 19 percent in the last quarter of 2008 (and since 2001). In terms of formal permanent employment, the conditions have been harsher: from 1994 to March 2009 manufacturing´s share of total formal and permanent employment fell from 33 to 26 percent. Since its peak in October 2000, the sector lost 1.04 million permanent jobs through March 2009—or 25 percent. In the recent economic crisis, manufacturing has been hit particularly hard, suffering 59 percent of the country’s total employment losses from October 2008 to March 2009. Weakening Integration Second, the integration process within NAFTA, and concretely between Mexico and the United States, has been weakening steadily since 2000. From a Mexican perspective, the share of trade with the United States fell from levels above 86 percent in the 1990s to 73 percent in 2008. In manufacturing the fall has been more substantial, with Mexico’s share of U.S. manufacturing imports dropping from levels above 80 percent in the 1990s to 45 percent in November 2008. Similarly, as measured by the Grubel-Lloyd Index that calculates the percent of trade that is within industries, intra-industry trade (at the four-digit level of the Harmonized Tariff System) reached its highest level in 1998 with 48 percent and fell since then to levels below 43 percent. This trend is a clear indicator of declining economic integration between Mexico and the United States. Dependence on the U.S. Third, these tendencies have been evident in value chains that are of particular regional importance—yarn-textile-garments, electronics, and auto parts-automobiles. The current global crisis has taken a heavy toll on these industries. In automobiles, for example, it is very possible that only one or two of the Big Three U.S. auto companies—GM, Chrysler and Ford—will survive the crisis. Mexico´s auto parts-automobile industry is highly dependent on these three firms, since they account for almost 60 percent of total auto parts and automobile production. New Competitiveness Finally, it is worth remembering that during the period 1994–2000, the implementation of NAFTA helped the auto parts-automobiles, electronics, and yarntextilegarments industries restructure. In both the United States and Mexico, this increasing integration contributed to new competitiveness in North America to better compete with Asia. Causes and Effects A number of factors contribute to these trends. NAFTA made the auto, electronics, and garment industries more dynamic. Yet the dynamism was largely cut off from the broader economy because the firms in this sector tended to ignore Mexico as a source of inputs or markets, preferring to import the majority of its inputs and export the majority of its output. Thus, much of Mexico’s domestic manufacturing sector was hollowed out. This was a result of certain preferential programs in Mexico that favored importing inputs, a persistently overvalued exchange rate due to Mexico’s tight monetary policy, and low tariffs under NAFTA. NAFTA’s investment and intellectual property rules also made it difficult to pursue East Asian-like policies to enhance industrial competitiveness (though it is not clear the Mexican government would have used such policies if they had the space to do so). China’s accession to the WTO accentuated these forces. Mexico’s exchange rate became even more overvalued relative to competitors (China) in the U.S. market. These factors, in addition to the preference toward imports in national programs and in NAFTA, made importing all more important. More importantly, those sectors that experienced dynamism from 1994 to 2000 began to lose competitiveness in the U.S. market with respect to China.5 Manufacturing sectors in all three NAFTA countries are in a deep crisis, a crisis which has been growing since the end of the 1990s. More worrisome than the short term is probably the medium- and long-term state of the sector in terms of its competitiveness in Mexico and in the U.S. market, particularly in comparison with China and the rest of Asia.
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Peters, 09 – Enrique Dussel, professor at the Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (“Manufacturing Competitiveness: Toward a Regional Development Agenda,” The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, Pardee Center, November 2009, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PardeeNAFTACh2PetersManufNov09.pdf)
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Mexico´s manufacturing share in GDP has fallen constantly since the end of the 1980s from 1994 to March 2009 manufacturing´s share of total formal and permanent employment fell from 33 to 26 percent. Since its peak in October 2000, the sector lost 1.04 million permanent jobs In the recent economic crisis, manufacturing has been hit particularly hard, suffering 59 percent of the country’s total employment losses the integration process within NAFTA, and concretely between Mexico and the U S has been weakening steadily since 2000. Mexican share of trade with the U S fell from levels above 86 percent in the 1990s to 73 percent in 2008. In manufacturing the fall has been more substantial, with Mexico’s share of U.S. manufacturing imports dropping from levels above 80 percent to 45 percent intra-industry trade reached its highest level in 1998 with 48 percent and fell since then a clear indicator of declining economic integration Manufacturing sectors in all three NAFTA countries are in a deep crisis, a crisis which has been growing since the end of the 1990s. More worrisome than the short term is probably the medium- and long-term state of the sector in terms of its competitiveness in Mexico and in the U.S. market, particularly in comparison with China and the rest of Asia.
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NAFTA integration risks failure now – hurts US and Mexican economic competitiveness
| 4,182 | 83 | 1,290 | 653 | 12 | 215 | 0.018377 | 0.32925 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,917 |
One of the Mexican government’s goals in signing NAFTA was to expand its manufacturing sector by stimulating exports. In the early years following implementation, Mexico succeeded in attracting foreign investment and increasing manufacturing exports, with notable expansion in automotive, apparel, and electronics, among others. Yet this apparent success masks fundamental weaknesses, as the three NAFTA countries together have been losing their ability to compete in manufacturing in the global market. This suggests the need for a more proactive and long-term regional response. Even before the recent global financial and economic crisis1, the manufacturing sectors in the NAFTA-region were under similarly extreme pressures. The share of manufacturing in terms of GDP and employment has been falling in the three NAFTA countries, particularly since 2000 (See Figure 1). Contrary to the period 1994–2000, which saw increasing regional integration in a highly competitive global market, from 2000–2009 (March) the NAFTA region together lost 6.3 million jobs in manufacturing, or 27 percent of total employment in the sector.2 This suggests that in general, and in particular since 2000, the process of regional integration has deteriorated; in fact, an increasing process of “disintegration” has been taking place since then. These tendencies have only deepened since the second half of 2008 with the global crisis. In recent years, the original NAFTA integration agenda among the NAFTA countries has given way to one focused on security topics, with little sustained attention to socioeconomic, infrastructure, and other regional development issues.
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Peters, 09 – Enrique Dussel, professor at the Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (“Manufacturing Competitiveness: Toward a Regional Development Agenda,” The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, Pardee Center, November 2009, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PardeeNAFTACh2PetersManufNov09.pdf)
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the three NAFTA countries together have been losing their ability to compete in manufacturing in the global market. Even before the recent global financial and economic crisis manufacturing sectors in the NAFTA-region were under extreme pressures. Contrary to the period 1994–2000, which saw increasing regional integration in a highly competitive global market, from 2000–2009 the NAFTA region together lost 6.3 million jobs in manufacturing 27 percent of total employment in the sector. This suggests that in general since 2000, the process of regional integration has deteriorated an increasing process of disintegration has been taking place These tendencies have deepened with the global crisis the original NAFTA integration agenda has given way with little sustained attention to infrastructure, and other regional development issues
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Economic disintegration is hollowing NAFTA now
| 1,652 | 46 | 840 | 242 | 6 | 122 | 0.024793 | 0.504132 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,918 |
This year marks NAFTA’s 20th anniversary, and we can look back on impressive (if widely unknown) achievements in building a more integrated North American economic system. But to cope with looming continental issues, Canada, the United States, and Mexico need to work even more closely together—simply revamping this two-decade-old agreement won’t be enough. NAFTA wasn’t the beginning of North America’s more integrated economic system. Rather, NAFTA recognized and formalized changes in the structure of the North American economy already underway. Today Mexico, Canada, and the United States are deeply interconnected and interdependent, with an unprecedented degree of collaboration among them. What is particularly important are not just increases in trade in raw materials and finished goods among the three nations, but rather the striking growth in the cross border movement of parts and components. We don’t just sell stuff to each other. We make stuff together. We share integrated energy markets, use the same roads and railroads to transport jointly-made products, fly on the same integrated airline networks, and increasingly meet the same standards of professional practice. This is the true North American “reality.” By the 1990s, key elements of North America’s economy could be visualized as deeply integrated continental supply chains linking production centers and distribution hubs across the continent. No one planned these developments. The most powerful drivers of change were “bottom-up” changes in corporate strategies and structures rather than “top-down” government plans or decisions. This “bottom-up” approach worked well in the 1980s and 90s, when excess capacity existed in our freight transportation system, as new technologies (like doubt stacking containers) came on line, and governments deregulated rail and trucking industries. But that era is over and the bottom up approach no longer suffices to tackle new issues. The problems didn’t begin with September 11th, although post 9-11 regulations have “thickened” borders, making business more expensive and complex. The fundamental flaw in the NAFTA structure has been the failure of the three governments to acknowledge that the trade agreement was only one element of this North American reality, and only a first step toward achieving a stable foundation for continental collaboration and growth. But Ottawa, Washington, and Mexico City continue to emphasize that the three “NAFTA partners” are trading partners, nothing more. This failure of a trilateral vision inhibits efforts to upgrade the NAFTA system. Calls to renegotiate NAFTA after 9-11 led nowhere, and the collapse of the more serious effort to enlarge the scope of North American regulatory and security cooperation in the Security and Prosperity Partnership in 2009 revealed that leaders were not prepared to confront wild accusations that this was a step toward a “North American Union.” The work of the U.S.-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council has been more successful but still modest—bilateral rather than trilateral and focused essentially on making the border more efficient and secure rather than on the issues coming at us. While trade restrictions and border issues remain vital concerns, we must be prepared to face these new, pressing problems: Energy, for example, must be viewed in continental terms. We all benefit from North America’s deeply integrated oil, gas, and electricity systems. In this new energy-rich environment, we must determine an energy mix that optimizes availability, cost, and sustainability for the next generations. Environmental threats cannot be discussed as three separate national issues. We have given surprisingly little attention to building collaborative adaptation mechanisms for dealing with climate change. We have not thought about how to improve our continental supply chains—and, indeed, what shape these might take in the next decades. We need to focus serious attention on learning more about how North America works and on the factors that drive or inhibit our competitive advantage. North Americans face a tremendous infrastructure crisis. Competitiveness requires efficient, safe, and sustainable transport (road, rail, air, and water); logistics systems; border crossings; and energy infrastructure. We have not thought about a 21st century continental infrastructure of roads, rails, and ports. We are all undergoing extensive demographic changes that limit economic growth and fiscal balance and create political, economic, and social turmoil. The issue is not just Mexican immigration to the United States, but aging in all three countries. All three countries experience high levels of internal migration as people follow jobs; all three face growing imbalances of the supply of medical and educational resources and changing levels of demand for these services. As we begin to focus on these issues, efforts to revitalize the movement toward economic integration in North America should not be directed toward the negotiation of a new grand bi- or tripartite trade deal. We cannot think of trying to build a North American version of the European Community. What we need to launch is not a new trade negotiation but a political campaign. First, we must begin with a vision of what North America might look like in the mid-21st century—how efficient, sustainable and secure energy, climate change, supply chain, infrastructure, and demographic-health systems might operate in another 30 or 40 years. Second, instead of compressing many different issues into a single negotiation, discussions must be separated and treated individually. We should begin with a view of three sovereign nations seeking means to confront common, often shared problems. An integrated “North America” should be a vehicle for collaboration rather than the goal of collaboration. We do not suggest that every problem that exists has a North American solution. But we have to stop being afraid to consider continental ideas and approaches to some of our most pressing problems. It should be natural—not unusual—to think of continental collaboration as a tool to deal with particular issues. Third, we must build a much broader base of informed and active constituencies. The NAFTA approach confined discussions about North America to a small number of beltway trade experts. But the issues we face today are large and difficult, and we are burdened with a history of misinformation (for example, about a massive, secret Mexico to Canada trade corridor) and deeply embedded fears (eroded sovereignty in a North American Union). Large constituencies that support North American integration do exist. They consist of companies that run continental production, supply, and marketing systems; cities where jobs depend upon efficient North American transportation and logistics networks; and communities living on the borders. Many government, business, and civil society groups are aware of their roles integrating communities across Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Still for even the most informed, the concept of an integrated North America is limited to more traditional pan-national tasks of getting parts on to loading docks, keeping oil and gas flowing in pipelines, matching electrical demand and supply, considering how weather might affect water flows, and tracking threatening invasive species. The aim should be to mobilize these disconnected groups into coherent communities that recognize interests in continental collaboration. We must stimulate continual conversations among these groups, build ongoing ties with research and teaching institutions, and mobilize constituencies in energy, climate change, supply chains, infrastructure, and demographics. We need to think about how to institutionalize these conversations and thus climb beyond the repetitive, ad-hoc approach that has characterized discussions of North America over the past three decades. Discussions must involve perspectives from different regions, different economic and social sectors, and from those who oppose further integration. If efforts to build a new North American system rest solely on the creation of a new Ottawa-Washington-Mexico City corridor, they will lack legitimacy in many parts of the continent. The issues that we now face cannot be conducted under the legislative and media radar. We must stop being afraid of public debate on the future of North America. If we act like conspirators, we will surely be accused of conspiracy.
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Blank 6/17 (Stephen Blank, Research Professor of National Security Affairs, “North American Solutions”, 6/17/13, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/17/north-american-solutions)
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But to cope with looming continental issues, Canada, the United States, and Mexico need to work even more closely together—simply revamping this two-decade-old agreement won’t be enough. . What is particularly important are not just increases in trade in raw materials and finished goods among the three nations, but rather the striking growth in the cross border movement of parts and components. The fundamental flaw in the NAFTA structure has been the failure of the three governments to acknowledge that the trade agreement was only one element of this North American reality, This failure of a trilateral vision inhibits efforts to upgrade the NAFTA system. Calls to renegotiate NAFTA after 9-11 led nowhere, and the collapse of the more serious effort to enlarge the scope of North American regulatory and security cooperation in the Security and Prosperity Partnership in 2009 revealed that leaders were not prepared to confront wild accusations that this was a step toward a “North American Union instead of compressing many different issues into a single negotiation, discussions must be separated and treated individually Third, we must build a much broader base of informed and active constituencies The NAFTA approach confined discussions about North America to a small number of beltway trade experts. But the issues we face today are large and difficult, and we are burdened with a history of misinformation The aim should be to mobilize these disconnected groups into coherent communities that recognize interests in continental collaboration. Discussions must involve perspectives from different regions, different economic and social sectors, and from those who oppose further integration. If efforts to build a new North American system rest solely on the creation of a new Ottawa-Washington-Mexico City corridor, they will lack legitimacy in many parts of the continent.
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NAFTA doesn’t solve; continental collaboration has to be enforced
| 8,523 | 65 | 1,889 | 1,281 | 9 | 292 | 0.007026 | 0.227947 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,919 |
Mexico’s former president, Carlos Salinas, used to promise that free trade and foreign investment would jump-start this country’s development, empowering a richer and more prosperous Mexico “to export goods, not people.”¶ Fifteen years after the North American Free Trade Agreement took effect, only the first part of that promise has been realized.¶ Mexico’s exports have exploded under Nafta, quintupling to $292 billion last year, but Mexico is still exporting people too, almost half a million each year, seeking opportunities in the United States that they do not have at home.¶ Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton will arrive in Mexico on Wednesday and President Obama will visit next month. Both are expected to emphasize the successes of American-Mexican economic cooperation, but it will be hard to ignore how much in Mexico has not changed under Nafta.¶ Economists here say much of the blame lies with Mexican leaders, unable or unwilling to take on oligarchs and unions controlling key sectors of the economy like energy and telecommunications. But they say some blame goes to the unintended consequences of Nafta.¶ In some cases, Nafta produced results that were exactly the opposite of what was promised.¶ For instance, domestic industries were dismantled as multinationals imported parts from their own suppliers.¶ Local farmers were priced out of the market by food imported tariff-free. Many Mexican farmers simply abandoned their land and headed north.¶ Although one-quarter of Mexicans live in the countryside, they account for 44 percent of the migrants to the United States. The contradictions of Nafta are apparent in Guadalajara and the rich farmland around it.¶ On the road from the airport to the city, Mexico’s second-largest, a well-worn sign welcomes visitors to Mexico’s Silicon Valley. After Nafta went into effect, the comparison seemed ambitious but not out of reach.¶ Global giants spent billions of dollars turning Guadalajara into a manufacturing hub for the information technology industry. The industry boomed, spurred by cheap labor and the sense that Nafta guaranteed investor-friendly policies. Today the city is ringed with low-slung factories that churn out everything from BlackBerrys to digital tape storage libraries for Sun Microsystems.¶ But investors came because the city was already a center of technology. I.B.M, Hewlett-Packard and others had come in the 1960s and 1970s when Mexico’s market was closed.¶ After Nafta, the new factories imported parts from their global suppliers, wiping out local companies that had sold printed circuit boards or assembled computers under tariff protection, said Kevin P. Gallagher, a Boston University professor who has written about the Guadalajara information technology industry.¶ Things grew worse when the tech bubble burst, the American economy cooled and the companies moved to China, where they could pay even lower wages. Once China entered the World Trade Organization, Mexico lost much of the edge in exporting to the United States that Nafta had given it. Employment in Guadalajara’s I.T. factories dropped 37 percent in 2001 and continued to slide for two years.¶ “The agreement could have brought investment with more value here,” including research, testing and design, said Jesús Palomino, the general manager at Intel’s design center in Guadalajara. “But we did not know how to define or negotiate or take advantage of it.”¶ Mr. Palomino argues that attracting multinational manufacturers was too limited a focus. He oversees about 300 young engineers who test future Intel products and carry out research and development. The sophisticated Intel design center is an exception to the city’s assembly plants. Those factories mostly hire low-wage labor.¶ “A new phenomenon has grown up under Nafta — high-productivity poverty,” said Harley Shaiken, chairman of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.¶ Low wages means low purchasing power. “It is not a successful strategy for globalization,” Mr. Shaiken said.¶ Even Nafta’s greatest success — exports — has become a liability, as Mexico feels the full brunt of declining consumption in the United States. The auto industry, for example, which has flourished under Nafta, has ground to a virtual standstill. Over all, Mexican auto exports fell more than 50 percent in the first two months of this year compared with 2008, and production dropped almost 45 percent.¶ The central bank forecasts that as many as 340,000 people could lose their jobs this year, and some investment banks predict the economy could contract as much as 5 percent.¶ That weakness has driven down the peso, which has lost about a quarter of its value in the last six months. Foreign direct investment fell last year to $18.6 billion from $27.2 billion in 2007.¶ Still, economists here say much of the responsibility for the lack of development in the last decade and a half lies largely with Mexican leaders and their unwillingness or inability to enact real reforms. “We have an economy that has atrophied because of the lack of reform,” said Gerardo Esquivel, an economist at the Colegio de México.¶ Other developing countries benefited from globalization, particularly in Asia. But in Mexico, economic growth has averaged about 3 percent a year since Nafta took effect, far below what is needed to create jobs for the million young people who enter the work force each year and the millions more who barely scrape by.¶ As presidential candidates, both President Obama and Mrs. Clinton promised to renegotiate Nafta. But when Mr. Obama arrives next month, he will find Mexico’s leaders reluctant to revisit the agreement. He will also find them seething over his signing of a spending bill that scrapped a pilot program allowing Mexican long-haul trucks to transport cargo throughout the United States. In retaliation, Mexico has imposed punitive tariffs on $2.4 billion worth of American goods.¶ Nafta guaranteed Mexico, Canada and the United States access to one another’s highways for cargo transport by 2000.¶ Perhaps the Mexicans least prepared for globalization were Mexico’s small farmers.¶ “It isn’t possible for a peasant to make a living from the countryside,” said Francisco Vargas, president of an association that groups together 2,500 farmers from Etzatlán, about 90 minutes west of Guadalajara.¶ The farmers hold other jobs to subsidize their farming. Mr. Vargas is a teacher. Another of the group’s leaders is a retired accountant; a third has a sideline renting out construction equipment. Some farmers continue thanks to money sent by relatives working in the United States.¶ Farmers in the region have survived Nafta by raising corn yields through converting to modern farming techniques. They also lobby for government aid and band together to fight private oligopolies that sell seed and buy corn.¶ But their landholdings remain small, sometimes not more than about 10 acres, and they are at the mercy of rising costs and fluctuating prices. Seed is up about 20 percent because of the peso’s devaluation, while corn is off the high of last year as global demand drops.¶ The farmers say that they have raised their yields to double Mexico’s average of three metric tons per hectare, or more. (The average for the United States is more than nine tons per hectare.) Late last year, their high yields caught the attention of the federal government in Mexico City, which has promised new financing for the Etzatlán farmers and other commercial corn farmers.¶ “It’s a race against time,” said Antonio Hernández, an agronomist who advises the farmers for a coalition of farming associations in Jalisco state. “We have to demonstrate this before people abandon the land.”¶ I.T. industry leaders and the local government in Guadalajara are trying to do the same thing: convince Mexicans that there is opportunity at home.¶ The group representing the industry in Mexico, known by its Spanish initials as Canieti, now promotes Guadalajara’s ability to produce customized products for customers in the United States, specialized corporate software and portions of software for operating systems. Canieti officials also promote the advantage for “pizza products,” like new cellphones that must be delivered on time.¶ The government and Canieti have put up $4 million to buy equipment and train 150 young people in computer animation, in a bid to attract joint ventures for co-productions and video games.¶ But Mr. Palomino, the general manager at the Intel design center, argues that the industry should also promote small local companies and encourage them to establish joint ventures in the United States. Those changes would nourish a culture of entrepreneurship that he believes has yet to emerge.¶ Professor Gallagher at Boston University argues that free trade on its own does not bring development. “Nafta was a great opportunity, but you had to build on it,” he said.
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Malkin 9 (Elizabeth Malkin March 23, 2009 “Nafta’s promise unfulfilled” Staff writer for the New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/business/worldbusiness/24peso.html?pagewanted=all)- RT
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it will be hard to ignore how much in Mexico has not changed under Nafta Economists here say much of the blame lies with Mexican leaders, unable or unwilling to take on oligarchs and unions controlling key sectors of the economy like energy and telecommunications. But they say some blame goes to the unintended consequences of Nafta. In some cases, Nafta produced results that were exactly the opposite of what was promised. For instance, domestic industries were dismantled as multinationals imported parts from their own suppliers. Local farmers were priced out of the market by food imported tariff-free. Many Mexican farmers simply abandoned their land and headed north. Although one-quarter of Mexicans live in the countryside, they account for 44 percent of the migrants to the United States. The contradictions of Nafta are apparent in Guadalajara and the rich farmland around it. “A new phenomenon has grown up under Nafta — high-productivity poverty,” said Harley Shaiken, chairman of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Low wages means low purchasing power. “It is not a successful strategy for globalization,” Mr. Shaiken said. Even Nafta’s greatest success — exports — has become a liability, as Mexico feels the full brunt of declining consumption in the United States. . Foreign direct investment fell last year to $18.6 billion from $27.2 billion in 2007. will also find them seething over his signing of a spending bill that scrapped a pilot program allowing Mexican long-haul trucks to transport cargo throughout the United States. In retaliation, Mexico has imposed punitive tariffs on $2.4 billion worth of American goods. Nafta guaranteed Mexico, Canada and the United States access to one another’s highways for cargo transport by 2000. Perhaps the Mexicans least prepared for globalization were Mexico’s small farmers. “It isn’t possible for a peasant to make a living from the countryside,” said Francisco Vargas, president of an association that groups together 2,500 farmers from Etzatlán, about 90 minutes west of Guadalajara. The farmers hold other jobs to subsidize their farming. Mr. Vargas is a teacher. Another of the group’s leaders is a retired accountant; a third has a sideline renting out construction equipment. Some farmers continue thanks to money sent by relatives working in the United States. Farmers in the region have survived Nafta by raising corn yields through converting to modern farming techniques. They also lobby for government aid and band together to fight private oligopolies that sell seed and buy corn. But their landholdings remain small, sometimes not more than about 10 acres, and they are at the mercy of rising costs and fluctuating prices. Seed is up about 20 percent because of the peso’s devaluation, while corn is off the high of last year as global demand drops. The farmers say that they have raised their yields to double Mexico’s average of three metric tons per hectare, or more “Nafta was a great opportunity, but you had to build on it,” he said.
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NAFTA has killed Mexican Small farms—we’re on the brink
| 8,957 | 56 | 3,067 | 1,417 | 9 | 495 | 0.006351 | 0.34933 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,920 |
While 91% of the planet’s 1.5 billion hectares of agricultural¶ land are increasingly being devoted to agroexport crops, biofuels¶ and transgenic soybean to feed cars and cattle, millions of small¶ farmers in the developing world produce the majority of staple¶ crops needed to feed the planet’s rural and urban populations.¶ Of the 960 million hectares of land under cultivation (arable¶ and permanent crops) in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 10-¶ 15% is managed by traditional farmers. In Latin America, about¶ 17 million peasant production units occupying close to 60.5¶ million hectares, or 34.5% of the total cultivated land with average farm sizes of about 1.8 hectares, produce 51% of the¶ maize, 77% of the beans, and 61% of the potatoes for domestic consumption. In Brazil alone, there are about 4.8 million family farmers (about 85% of the total number of farmers) that¶ occupy 30% of the total agricultural land of the country. Such¶ family farms control about 33% of the area sown to maize, 61%¶ of that under beans, and 64% of that planted to cassava, thus¶ producing 84% of the total cassava and 67% of all beans (Altieri¶ 1999) Africa has approximately 33 million small farms, representing¶ 80% of all farms in the region. Despite the fact that Africa now¶ imports huge amounts of cereals, the majority of African farmers (many of them women) who are smallholders with farms¶ below 2 hectares, produce a significant amount of basic food¶ crops with virtually no or little use of fertilisers and improved¶ seed (Benneh 1996). In Asia, the majority of more than 200¶ million rice farmers, each cultivate around 2 hectares of rice¶ making up the bulk of the rice produced by Asian small farmers. Farms of less than 2 hectares constituted 78% of the total¶ number of farms in India but contributed nonetheless to 41%¶ of the national grain production (Greenland 1997).¶ Small increases in yields on these small farms that produce¶ most of the world’s staple crops will have far more impact on¶ food availability at the local and regional levels, than the doubtful¶ increases predicted for distant and corporate-controlled large¶ monocultures managed with such high-tech solutions as genetically modified seeds.
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Altieri 8 (Miguel Altierei Professor of Agro ecology at the Department¶ of Environmental Science, Policy and Management at the University of¶ California, Berkeley since 1981. He is a member of the Steering¶ Committee of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization¶ (FAO)’s Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS)¶ programmer, whose goal is to dynamically conserve the world’s remaining¶ traditional farming systems. He is also President of the Latin American¶ Scientific Society of Agro ecology (SOCLA) and Coordinator of the¶ International Agro ecology Program of the Center for the Study of the¶ Americas in Berkeley. He periodically lectures at universities in the USA,¶ Latin America and Europe, and provides technical expertise to¶ international organizations as well as farmers’ organizations and nongovernmental organizations throughout the world. He is the author of 12¶ books, including Agro ecology: The Science of Sustainable Agriculture¶ and Biodiversity and Pest Management in Agro ecosystems, as well as¶ more than 250 scientific journal articles “Small Farms as a Planetary Ecological¶ Asset: Five Key Reasons Why We Should¶ Support the Revitalisation of Small¶ Farms in the Global South” http://agroeco.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/smallfarmes-ecolasset.pdf)- RT
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millions of small farmers in the developing world produce the majority of staple crops needed to feed the planet’s rural and urban populations. Of the 960 million hectares of land under cultivation (arable and permanent crops) in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 10- 15% is managed by traditional farmers. In Latin America, about 17 million peasant production units occupying close to 60.5 million hectares, or 34.5% of the total cultivated land with average farm sizes of about 1.8 hectares, produce 51% of the maize, 77% of the beans, and 61% of the potatoes for domestic consumption. Such family farms control about 33% of the area sown to maize, 61% of that under beans, and 64% of that planted to cassava, thus producing 84% of the total cassava and 67% of all beans Farms of less than 2 hectares constituted 78% of the total number of farms but contributed nonetheless to 41% of the national grain production ). Small increases in yields on these small farms that produce most of the world’s staple crops will have far more impact on food availability at the local and regional levels, than the doubtful increases predicted for distant and corporate-controlled large monocultures managed with such high-tech solutions as genetically modified seeds.
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Small farms are key to food security—Latin America is key
| 2,222 | 58 | 1,253 | 362 | 10 | 207 | 0.027624 | 0.571823 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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2,921 |
For the Mayans, it was deforestation and soil erosion. As more and more land was cleared for farming to support the expanding empire, soil erosion undermined the productivity of their tropical soils. A team of scientists from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has noted that the extensive land clearing by the Mayans likely also altered the regional climate, reducing rainfall. In effect, the scientists suggest, it was the convergence of several environmental trends, some reinforcing others, that led to the food shortages that brought down the Mayan civilization. 26 Although we live in a highly urbanized, technologically advanced society, we are as dependent on the earth’s natural support systems as the Sumerians and Mayans were. If we continue with business as usual, civilizational collapse is no longer a matter of whether but when. We now have an economy that is destroying its natural support systems, one that has put us on a decline and collapse path. We are dangerously close to the edge. Peter Goldmark, former Rockefeller Foundation president, puts it well: “The death of our civilization is no longer a theory or an academic possibility; it is the road we’re on.” 2 Judging by the archeological records of earlier civilizations, more often than not food shortages appear to have precipitated their decline and collapse. Given the advances of modern agriculture, I had long rejected the idea that food could be the weak link in our twenty-first century civilization. Today I think not only that it could be the weak link but that it is the weak link.
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Brown 11 (Lester R. Brown 2011 Writer for the Earth Policy Institute “World on the Edge: How to prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse” http://www.earth-policy.org/images/uploads/book_files/wotebook.pdf)- RT
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For the Mayans, it was deforestation and soil erosion. As more and more land was cleared for farming to support the expanding empire, soil erosion undermined the productivity of their tropical soils Although we live in a highly urbanized, technologically advanced society, we are as dependent on the earth’s natural support systems as the Sumerians and Mayans were. If we continue with business as usual, civilizational collapse is no longer a matter of whether but when. We now have an economy that is destroying its natural support systems, one that has put us on a decline and collapse path. We are dangerously close to the edge The death of our civilization is no longer a theory or an academic possibility; it is the road we’re on.” 2 Judging by the archeological records of earlier civilizations, more often than not food shortages appear to have precipitated their decline and collapse. Given the advances of modern agriculture, I had long rejected the idea that food could be the weak link in our twenty-first century civilization.
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Food insecurity causes war
| 1,583 | 27 | 1,039 | 259 | 4 | 173 | 0.015444 | 0.667954 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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2,922 |
Pork and beef suffer under NAFTA. Proponents of NAFTA claimed that pork and beef would do particularly well under NAFTA.57 However, U.S. exports of beef and pork to Mexico in the first three years of NAFTA were 13 percent and 20 percent lower, respectively, than beef and pork exports in the three years before NAFTA.58 The 50 percent devaluation of the Mexican peso against the U.S. dollar after NAFTA went into effect staunched the flow of these goods into Mexico.59 Although policymakers should have learned the lesson and inserted provisions against currency manipulation in subsequent trade agreements (NAFTA did not have any), the Korea FTA passed in 2011 also did not discipline currency manipulation, even though Korea is one of only three nations to have ever have been officially certified by the U.S. Treasury Department as a currency manipulator.60 In the first nine months of the Korea FTA, U.S. beef exports to Korea declined by 11 percent in comparison to the same months in 2011, while U.S. pork exports to Korea fell by 17 percent – a combined loss of $96 million in U.S. exports.61
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Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013, http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
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Pork and beef suffer under NAFTA. U.S. exports of beef and pork to Mexico in the first three years of NAFTA were 13 percent and 20 percent lower The 50 percent devaluation of the Mexican peso against the U.S. dollar after NAFTA staunched the flow of these goods into Mexico.
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Specifically pork and beef industries
| 1,099 | 38 | 274 | 185 | 5 | 50 | 0.027027 | 0.27027 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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SAN JERONIMO SOLOLA, Mexico — Look around the rain-fed corn farms in Oaxaca state, and in vast areas of Mexico, and one sees few young men, just elderly people and single mothers.¶ "The men have gone to the United States," explained Abel Santiago Duran, a 56-year-old municipal agent, as he surveyed this empty village in Oaxaca state.¶ The countryside wasn't supposed to hollow out in this way when the North American Free Trade Agreement linked Mexico, Canada and the U.S. in 1994. Mexico, hoping its factories would absorb displaced farmers, said it would "export goods, not people."¶ But in hindsight, the agricultural elements of the pact were brutal on Mexico's corn farmers. A flood of U.S. corn imports, combined with subsidies that favor agribusiness, are blamed for the loss of 2 million farm jobs in Mexico. The trade pact worsened illegal migration, some experts say, particularly in areas where small farmers barely eke out a living.¶ That is the case in the rolling hills of western Oaxaca state, ancestral lands of indigenous Mixtecs who till small plots of corn, beans and squash between stands of jacarandas, junipers and eucalyptus. Eagles soar in the brilliant blue skies. Clumps of prickly pear and organ cactus attest to the sporadic nature of rainfall.¶ When a visitor arrives, the gray-haired men on the veranda of the village hall talk about the exodus of young men.¶ "When they hit 18 and finish secondary school, they leave for the United States or other states of Mexico," Duran said.¶ His cousin, Jesus Duran, said young men see little future as corn farmers and observe with dismay how the government aims subsidies at medium and big farms, leaving only a trickle for small family farms.¶ "If you go to the offices over there and ask for help," Duran said, nodding to the local agriculture agency, "they say there isn't any to give."¶ Mexican negotiators who signed the NAFTA agreement hoped that small corn farmers thrown out of work by rising imports of cheap U.S. corn would be absorbed into jobs in the fruit and vegetable export industry or in manufacturing.¶ "That turned out to be incorrect. The numbers of people displaced from family farming were much, much higher than the number of new wage jobs," said Jonathan Fox, an expert on rural Mexico at the University of California at Santa Cruz.¶ Then U.S. corn imports crested like a rain-swollen river, increasing from 7 percent of Mexican consumption to around 34 percent, mostly for animal feed and for industrial uses as cornstarch.¶ "It's been roughly a tripling, quadrupling, quintupling of U.S. corn exports to Mexico, depending on the year," said Timothy A. Wise, the director of research and policy at the Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University in Medford, Mass. "Is that a river? Yeah, that's a lot of corn."¶ Fox and Wise are among the collaborators on a study, "Subsidizing Inequality: Mexican corn policy since NAFTA," released last autumn.¶ Representatives of small farmers say Mexico's policymakers tossed the dice that trade-spurred growth would take care of rural disruptions — and lost.¶ "The great failure of this supposition is that there wasn't economic growth that would absorb these people," said Victor Suarez, the executive director of the National Association of Rural Producers, which represents 60,000 small farmers. "The result has left rural areas increasingly populated by the elderly and women."¶ Faced with deepening poverty, rural migrants have tried to escape regions of Mexico that never used to be sources of emigration.¶ "In Chiapas, there was hardly any migration before NAFTA," Suarez said, referring to Mexico's southernmost state. "Farm laborers were even brought in from Guatemala. Now, more than 50,000 rural people from Chiapas go each year to the United States."¶ Corn imports from the U.S. are only one component of what scholars say is a complex picture. In fact, Mexican corn production has risen since the trade pact, driven by domestic agribusiness and supported by subsidies biased to favor large producers that by one estimate surpassed $20 billion in the past two decades.¶ The Mexican government also has cash-transfer subsidies, known as ProCampo, for small farmers who are considered the free-trade pact's losers. But they reach only a portion of small corn growers, a quarter of whom are indigenous.¶ Some rural farmers no longer have enough corn to sell, sinking into subsistence living for themselves and their families.¶ "Of my generation," said 33-year-old Baldemar Mendoza, a Zapotec small corn farmer in the Sierra Juarez area of Oaxaca, "many people want nothing to do with farming because it doesn't pay. With all the changes in the weather, there is no certainty that your harvest will be good."¶ Unless the central government tweaks subsidies to make more small family farms economically viable, the result may be sustained migrant flows, experts said.¶ "The government didn't so much pull the plug on corn. The government pulled the plug on family farmers who grow corn because the big guys who grew corn got massive subsidies and protection from imports," Fox said.¶ Under the free-trade umbrella, several Mexican agro-industrial companies have become muscular global conglomerates.¶ "Before NAFTA, Grupo Bimbo was a big company. Now it is the largest industrial user of wheat in the world," Suarez said, referring to the world's No. 1 bread maker. "Maseca was a big company. Now it is a global company with a strong position in cornmeal worldwide."¶ Their powerful position in the market has kept prices high for consumers, while in the countryside, the social fabric frays as families disperse to find jobs.¶ The impact, Fox said, "unravels rural communities, separates families and makes it difficult for young people to see a future in their communities of origin."¶ Josefa Soriano, 74, doesn't need an explanation of what's happening. She sees it with her own eyes. As a rural exodus unfolds, families keep fewer of the animals such as goats, cattle and burros that provided manure for fields. Such livestock must have caretakers.¶ "You have no choice but to buy fertilizer now," she said. "If you don't fertilize, nothing grows, not even fodder."¶ As she ambled through the settlement, Soriano offered a running commentary on those who have migrated.¶ "The village is almost without people," Soriano said. "Many houses are empty. The fathers and the sons have gone."¶ She turned to a visitor and said, "If the young people always leave, what do you think will happen to us?"
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Johnson 11 (Tim Johnson February 1, 2011 Writer for McClatchy Newspapers “Free Trade: As US corn flows south, Mexicans stop farming” http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/02/01/107871/free-trade-us-corn-flows-south.html#.Uc3S9vlHOiN)- RT
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Look around the rain-fed corn farms in Oaxaca state, and in vast areas of Mexico, and one sees few young men, just elderly people and single mothers. "The men have gone to the United States," explained Abel Santiago Duran, a 56-year-old municipal agent, as he surveyed this empty village in Oaxaca state. The countryside wasn't supposed to hollow out in this way when the North American Free Trade Agreement linked Mexico, Canada and the U.S. in 1994. the agricultural elements of the pact were brutal on Mexico's corn farmers. A flood of U.S. corn imports, combined with subsidies that favor agribusiness, are blamed for the loss of 2 million farm jobs in Mexico. The trade pact worsened illegal migration, some experts say, particularly in areas where small farmers barely eke out a living. indigenous Mixtecs who till small plots of corn, beans and squash between stands of jacarandas, junipers and eucalyptus. Eagles soar in the brilliant blue skies. "When they hit 18 and finish secondary school, they leave for the United States or other states of Mexico," Duran said If you go to the offices over there and ask for help," Duran said, nodding to the local agriculture agency, "they say there isn't any to give." Mexican negotiators who signed the NAFTA agreement hoped that small corn farmers thrown out of work by rising imports of cheap U.S. corn would be absorbed into jobs in the fruit and vegetable export industry or in manufacturing. It's been roughly a tripling, quadrupling, quintupling of U.S. corn exports to Mexico, depending on the year," said Timothy A. Wise, the director of research and policy at the Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University in Medford, Mass. "Is that a river? Yeah, that's a lot of corn." Representatives of small farmers say Mexico's policymakers tossed the dice that trade-spurred growth would take care of rural disruptions — and lost. "The great failure of this supposition is that there wasn't economic growth that would absorb these people," said Victor Suarez, the executive director of the National Association of Rural Producers, which represents 60,000 small farmers. ." Faced with deepening poverty, rural migrants have tried to escape regions of Mexico that never used to be sources of emigration. "In Chiapas, there was hardly any migration before NAFTA," Suarez said, referring to Mexico's southernmost state. "Farm laborers were even brought in from Guatemala. Now, more than 50,000 rural people from Chiapas go each year to the United States. In fact, Mexican corn production has risen since the trade pact, driven by domestic agribusiness and supported by subsidies biased to favor large producers that by one estimate surpassed $20 billion in the past two decades. The Mexican government also has cash-transfer subsidies, known as ProCampo, for small farmers who are considered the free-trade pact's losers. But they reach only a portion of small corn growers, a quarter of whom are indigenous. Some rural farmers no longer have enough corn to sell, sinking into subsistence living for themselves and their families. Unless the central government tweaks subsidies to make more small family farms economically viable, the result may be sustained migrant flows, experts said. "The government didn't so much pull the plug on corn. The government pulled the plug on family farmers who grow corn because the big guys who grew corn got massive subsidies and protection from imports several Mexican agro-industrial companies have become muscular global conglomerates. "Before NAFTA, Grupo Bimbo was a big company. Now it is the largest industrial user of wheat in the world, Their powerful position in the market has kept prices high for consumers, while in the countryside, the social fabric frays as families disperse to find jobs. Many houses are empty. The fathers and the sons have gone." She turned to a visitor and said, "If the young people always leave, what do you think will happen to us?"
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NAFTA has killed most of the small farms—cheap imports
| 6,561 | 55 | 3,976 | 1,071 | 9 | 648 | 0.008403 | 0.605042 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,924 |
YECAPIXTLA, Mexico - Cirilo Yanez has been farming sorghum in the sleepy Mexican town of Yecapixtla his whole life, but he expects to be forced out of the business after a new phase of the North American Free Trade Agreement comes into effect on Jan. 1.¶ "As long as I've been alive, I have been in sorghum, as were my parents and as are my children," said the weathered Yanez, 62, who farms seven acres of the grain in central Morelos state and sells it as livestock feed.¶ On the first day of 2003, protective tariffs on imports of sorghum and most other farm goods will disappear under NAFTA and cheaper U.S. imports are expected to flood into Mexico and dominate market share.¶ Yanez says that even now, with protective tariffs on imports, he and other Mexican producers cannot compete with cheaper U.S.-produced sorghum, which is used in snack and baked products, to produce ethanol and as animal feed.¶ Mexican farmers, many of whom till small plots with donkeys and follow ancient traditions such as sowing seeds barefoot, cannot compete with U.S. machinery or infrastructure and, ultimately, in price.¶ In January, import tariffs on apples, wheat, sorghum, rice, soy and many other farm products will drop to zero, from between 1 percent and 2 percent now, in the second phase of trade liberalization between NAFTA members Canada, Mexico and the United States.¶ Chicken and pork imports will see tariffs lowered more drastically, from as high as 49 percent in the case of poultry.¶ Four other products, including powdered milk, corn and beans will get five more years of protection before tariffs go to zero in 2008.¶ DEATH SENTENCE?¶ Producers see a death sentence in the agricultural chapters of NAFTA, signed a decade ago and implemented since 1994, and blame the Mexican government for not preparing them for free trade.¶ "The governments of the recent past and of the present have refused to assume the commitment of rural development; they have refused to assume the responsibility of promoting agricultural activities, as it has been much more comfortable for them to be simple spectators," legislators said in a recent document sent to Mexican President Vicente Fox as part of a petition for more protection of the agriculture sector.¶ "The countryside is being abandoned," said Sergio Ramirez, a sorghum farmer from Yecapixtla, a tiny farming pueblo some 50 miles south of Mexico City. He said he believes he will soon be yet another casualty of NAFTA.¶ Ramirez said more and more sorghum farmers have abandoned their lands in the area since Mexico entered NAFTA because they could not compete with their U.S. counterparts, blessed with economies of scale most Mexican farmers can only dream about.¶ The average farm size per Mexican farmer is between five and seven acres, whereas U.S. and Canadian farmers' properties are normally over 250 acres each.¶ Critics say that, other than some fantastic success stories in fruits and vegetables, the Mexican farm sector is unable to compete virtually across the board.¶ "The Mexican countryside is becoming deserted. Many have gone already," Yanez said. He said disillusioned farmers usually make their way into Mexico City where they do bit jobs, or cross illegally into the United States to find work.¶ The government says it will not attempt to renegotiate NAFTA, but it has announced subsidies to protect some farmers.¶ In November the government announced about $3 billion in agricultural subsidies meant to lower costs and guarantee minimum prices for Mexican farmers in some products amid heightened competition from U.S. farm goods.¶ The subsidies were part of a record 102.6 billion pesos ($10.09 billion) in farm aid for 2003 to support electricity and diesel fuel costs and to offer competitive financing to the struggling agricultural sector.¶ That compares to some $190 billion in U.S. farm subsidies over the next 10 years.¶ The measures have been criticized by many who say the aid is not enough and who speculate it will likely get siphoned off in bureaucratic expenses and by sticky-fingered officials.¶ Some farmers say the aid will never get to the small campesino producers and that it is destined in fact for the large farmers who did manage to boost production efficiency during NAFTA's nascent years.¶ Mexican farmers are suffering what the rest of the developing world has been screaming about, their inability to compete with U.S. and European farm subsidies.¶ MEXICO ILL PREPARED¶ Tariffs have been lowered gradually since 1994, when the treaty went into effect for Mexico, and many question why Mexican farmers are not prepared, and why they are making such a fuss, if they had eight years to prepare for the 2003 opening.¶ Still others say not much will change on Jan. 1.¶ A top U.S. agriculture official said in late November that Mexico could have readied itself more for tariff-free borders.¶ "We're a little perplexed that the campesino groups would come in and say, 'Oh my God, we're going to be destroyed. Come 2003, January 1, the flood gates open,"' a U.S. government official told Reuters.¶ "And our point is, well, no, nothing's really changed."¶ The official, who asked not to be identified, said the only area of real concern at the start of next year was in poultry, which would be unable to handle a zero-tariff imports after protection of 49 percent this year and more than 90 percent last year.¶ "And we're working with the government of Mexico on poultry just so we can try to reduce the sharp impact," he said. "They did feel that they were unprepared to compete. In fact they can't."¶ The U.S. Embassy in Mexico City was a target in recent weeks for protests from farmers demanding the Jan. 1 border opening be postponed, or that NAFTA be renegotiated.¶ Other protests saw the lower house of Congress blockaded by farmers from around the country who rode into the city on horseback, leading cows behind them, to demand more government protection from U.S. competitors in the new year.
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Jordan 02 (Pav Jordan December 28, 2002 “Mexican Farmers See Death Sentence in NAFTA” Writer for Reuters and a Journalist http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1228-07.htm)- RT
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he expects to be forced out of the business after a new phase of the North American Free Trade Agreement comes into effect on Jan. 1. "As long as I've been alive, I have been in sorghum, as were my parents and as are my children," said the weathered Yanez, 62, who farms seven acres of the grain in central Morelos state and sells it as livestock feed. protective tariffs on imports of sorghum and most other farm goods will disappear under NAFTA and cheaper U.S. imports are expected to flood into Mexico and dominate market share he and other Mexican producers cannot compete with cheaper U.S.-produced sorghum, which is used in snack and baked products, to produce ethanol and as animal feed. Mexican farmers, many of whom till small plots with donkeys and follow ancient traditions such as sowing seeds barefoot, cannot compete with U.S. machinery or infrastructure and, ultimately, in price. In January, import tariffs on apples, wheat, sorghum, rice, soy and many other farm products will drop to zero, from between 1 percent and 2 The Mexican countryside is becoming deserted. Many have gone already," Yanez said. He said disillusioned farmers usually make their way into Mexico City where they do bit jobs, or cross illegally into the United States to find work. The government says it will not attempt to renegotiate NAFTA, but it has announced subsidies to protect some farmers In November the government announced about $3 billion in agricultural subsidies meant to lower costs and guarantee minimum prices for Mexican farmers in some products amid heightened competition from U.S. farm goods. The subsidies were part of a record 102.6 billion pesos ($10.09 billion) in farm aid for 2003 to support electricity and diesel fuel costs and to offer competitive financing to the struggling agricultural sector. That compares to some $190 billion in U.S. farm subsidies over the next 10 years. The measures have been criticized by many who say the aid is not enough and who speculate it will likely get siphoned off in bureaucratic expenses and by sticky-fingered officials. say the aid will never get to the small campesino producers and that it is destined in fact for the large farmers who did manage to boost production efficiency during NAFTA's nascent years. A top U.S. agriculture official said in late November that Mexico could have readied itself more for tariff-free borders. "We're a little perplexed that the campesino groups would come in and say, 'Oh my God, we're going to be destroyed. Come 2003, January 1, the flood gates open,"' a U.S. government official told Reuters. "And our point is, well, no, nothing's really changed." The official, who asked not to be identified, said the only area of real concern at the start of next year was in poultry, which would be unable to handle a zero-tariff imports after protection of 49 percent this year and more than 90 percent last year. The U.S. Embassy in Mexico City was a target in recent weeks for protests from farmers demanding the Jan. 1 border opening be postponed, or that NAFTA be renegotiated. Other protests saw the lower house of Congress blockaded by farmers from around the country who rode into the city on horseback, leading cows behind them, to demand more government protection from U.S. competitors in the new
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NAFTA has killed off many small farms—very few have been given aid to keep them afloat
| 5,993 | 87 | 3,298 | 998 | 16 | 555 | 0.016032 | 0.556112 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2,925 |
Francisco Cruz gave up his farm more than a decade ago.¶ Then 20, Cruz had been earning a living as a sharecropper in Oaxaca, giving half his harvest to the landowner. It was a subsistence living that he supplemented by working in construction.¶ But when his wife Azucena announced she was pregnant, he realized his fledgling family could not survive on his meager earnings from the cornfield. Cruz emigrated to Monterey County, a year after passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement.¶ His story is not unique. In the last 13 years, 2 million peasants left Mexico's countryside in search of better opportunities in larger employment centers in Mexico or in the United States, according to Mexico's Statistics Institute. The undocumented population in the U.S. is now estimated at 12 million.¶ Some experts believe the immigration dilemma could be better understood — and perhaps resolved — if more attention was paid to the economic circumstances that bring people here.¶ According to analysts, millions of farmers like Cruz are the casualties of a tide of multinational circumstance: NAFTA, the U.S. Farm Bill and a dearth of effective economic initiatives in Mexico.¶ The combination, which allows for the consolidation of markets, has made it easier for large corporations and farm operations to expand their reach but almost impossible for small producers to survive. These subsistence farmers in turn have abandoned their land in search of better opportunities.¶ Critics point to NAFTA as the biggest example. The "free trade" agreement was promoted as a win-win for both Mexico and the United States, expected to spark an economic renaissance in Mexico and slow the migration of job-hungry Mexicans to the U.S.¶ Instead, according to the critics, NAFTA actually launched a new wave of immigration among undercapitalized farmers in Mexico's agrarian countryside who found it impossible to compete with subsidized U.S. products.¶ "What essentially happened was, as peasant farmers found it harder to make a living, ... more family members were sent off the farm to make money to support the family," said Timothy Wise, deputy director of the Global Development and Environmental Institute at Tufts University. "More of those family members headed for the United States because Mexico was not creating jobs at the rate NAFTA promised."¶ In the balance of farm trade, the majority of Mexican farmers were at a distinct disadvantage, unable to compete with the modern might of U.S. agriculture.¶ "In our country we still find farmers who use oxen to pull carts to farm," said Congresswoman Susana Monreal Avila, who represents one of the largest agricultural states in Mexico.¶ "This is what they use because they don't have the access to other tools and that places (them) at a disadvantage."¶ Speaking to a group of U.S. activists and students touring Mexico with Food First, a Berkeley-based advocacy group that promotes policies to eradicate hunger, Monreal Avila said she's heading a group lobbying to renegotiate the agricultural provisions of NAFTA, which she blames for the deterioration of Mexico's agrarian industry.¶ Former Mexican President Vicente Fox defends NAFTA as a program that has brought progress to the country and increased agricultural trade with the United States.¶ "We are now exporting more than ever," Fox told The Herald during a recent visit to Monterey County. "Maybe those who didn't modernize couldn't compete."¶ Fewer in agriculture|¶ Before NAFTA, agriculture in Mexico accounted for 25 percent of the country's work force. Today, agriculture accounts for 19 percent of employment in the country, according to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, an international group.¶ It's not the first time Mexico has fallen prey to the vagaries of trade policies that have affected its farmers.¶ During the 1980s, United States farmers gained access to new markets under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and used their technological superiority to gain the upper hand in those markets.¶ "The costs of sustaining its own national food system and the availability of subsidized grains from the U.S. ultimately resulted in Mexico becoming even more dependent on grain imports from the United States," according to Ann Aurelia Lopez, a research associate with the Center for Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems at the University of California-Santa Cruz.¶ But U.S. policies are not solely to blame for the destruction of Mexican small farms, some analysts say. The Mexican government has allowed the deterioration of the peasant economy to take place, and it has been slow to react with economic development policies of its own.¶ "People are leaving for the U.S. because Mexico is not creating jobs at the rate NAFTA promised," said Wise. "There's not enough jobs for the people entering the work force and exiting agriculture. That's the real push factor. If there were ... jobs in other parts of Mexico, that's where these migrants would go."¶ NAFTA in place since 1994|¶ Even though NAFTA has been in place since 1994, its impact on Mexico may not be complete. Its remaining trade barriers — put in place to soften the blow to Mexican farmers — are scheduled to be lifted in January. Some fear those changes, coupled with the Farm Bill that continues to subsidize U.S. growers, will spark another wave of immigration from Mexico.¶ "The consequences will be worse," said Victor Quintana, researcher with Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juarez. "We have tariffs on corn but they're going to be eliminated, so there will be a lot more importation of corn. (Local farmers) can't compete with those prices. They can't compete."¶ The Farm Bill — a massive legislative package designed to rule everything in U.S. agriculture from subsidies to rural credit to nutrition programs — expired in September. The new bill is currently being debated in Congress.¶ While controversial on several fronts, small farming advocates believe continued corn-subsidy policies in the bill could put Mexican farmers at a disadvantage — again.¶ They say the subsidies help large agricultural operations in the U.S. sell their commodities abroad at reduced prices. Similar subsidies in previous farm bills have indirectly contributed to the demise of small Mexican farmers, said Alexandra Spieldoch, director of the Trade and Global Governance Program at the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Police in Minnesota.¶ "It's definitely related," said Spieldoch. "Looking at the Farm Bill's overall agenda is to increase exports and expand trade, while Mexico made clear reforms to dismantle domestic supports."¶ Faced with few or no options, many of those farmers have abandoned their land and moved to the United States.¶ "There's a growing awareness in general that the Farm Bill is much more than a farm bill," Spieldoch continued. "People in the U.S. tend to not know a whole lot about trade policy and its impact elsewhere."¶ Debate centers on corn|¶ In particular, the debate centers around corn, which is Mexico's primary food staple. The average Mexican consumes about 280 pounds of corn a year, the second-highest per capita consumption in the world. It is Mexico's primary crop, covering about 60 percent of the country's cultivated area and employing more than 3 million campesinos, according to Mexican researcher Alejandro Nadal.¶ Corn is the largest grain crop grown in the United States. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, corn is grown on 80 million acres and about 20 percent of the production is exported to other countries.¶ Mexico is its second-largest buyer, and the flood of U.S. corn has pushed down local prices. Nadal estimates that the price of Mexican corn dropped 33 percent during a five-year period ending in 2003, while the cost of supplies in the country increased 169 percent.¶ Farm Bill subsidies to corn producers in the United States, coupled with the opening of trade between countries after the North American Free Trade Agreement created a double whammy for corn growers in Mexico, according to critics.¶ But Jack King, manager of national affairs and research for the California Farm Bureau, said that the exodus of Mexicans to the United States should not be blamed on the Farm Bill.¶ "I think Mexico may have some limitations on the crops they can grow, their amount of resources and water," he said. "My guess is that people from Mexico would try to enter the United States for job opportunities even with (a) change of our farm support programs. I can't necessarily draw a straight line between cause and effect there."¶ The Senate is scheduled to continue its debate on the Farm Bill in the coming weeks, but few believe the legislation will be approved by the end of the year.
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Salinas 8 (12/10/2008 CLAUDIA MELÉNDEZ SALINAS In charge of the Herald Salinas Bureau “NAFTA, Farm Bill, lack of other economic opportunities force subsistence producers to find work elsewhere” http://www.montereyherald.com/ci_7616170)-RT
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Francisco Cruz gave up his farm more than a decade ago. Then 20, Cruz had been earning a living as a sharecropper in Oaxaca, giving half his harvest to the landowner. It was a subsistence living that he supplemented by working in construction. Cruz emigrated to Monterey County, a year after passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement. His story is not unique. In the last 13 years, 2 million peasants left Mexico's countryside in search of better opportunities in larger employment centers in Mexico or in the United States, according to Mexico's Statistics Institute. The undocumented population in the U.S. is now estimated at 12 million. Some experts believe the immigration dilemma could be better understood — and perhaps resolved — if more attention was paid to the economic circumstances that bring people here. . These subsistence farmers in turn have abandoned their land in search of better opportunities. Critics point to NAFTA as the biggest example. The "free trade" agreement was promoted as a win-win for both Mexico and the United States, expected to spark an economic renaissance in Mexico and slow the migration of job-hungry Mexicans to the U.S. Instead, according to the critics, NAFTA actually launched a new wave of immigration among undercapitalized farmers in Mexico's agrarian countryside who found it impossible to compete with subsidized U.S. products. "What essentially happened was, as peasant farmers found it harder to make a living, More of those family members headed for the United States because Mexico was not creating jobs at the rate NAFTA promised." In the balance of farm trade, the majority of Mexican farmers were at a distinct disadvantage, unable to compete with the modern might of U.S. agriculture. "In our country we still find farmers who use oxen to pull carts to farm," a Berkeley-based advocacy group that promotes policies to eradicate hunger, Monreal Avila said she's heading a group lobbying to renegotiate the agricultural provisions of NAFTA, which she blames for the deterioration of Mexico's agrarian industry Fewer in agriculture| Before NAFTA, agriculture in Mexico accounted for 25 percent of the country's work force. Today, agriculture accounts for 19 percent of employment in the country, according to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, an international group. It's not the first time Mexico has fallen prey to the vagaries of trade policies that have affected its farmers The Mexican government has allowed the deterioration of the peasant economy to take place, and it has been slow to react with economic development policies of its own. "People are leaving for the U.S. because Mexico is not creating jobs at the rate NAFTA promised," Even though NAFTA has been in place since 1994, its impact on Mexico may not be complete. Its remaining trade barriers — put in place to soften the blow to Mexican farmers — are scheduled to be lifted in January. Some fear those changes, coupled with the Farm Bill that continues to subsidize U.S. growers, will spark another wave of immigration from Mexico. The consequences will be worse," said Victor Quintana, researcher with Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juarez. (Local farmers) can't compete with those prices. They can't compete." The Farm Bill — a massive legislative package designed to rule everything in U.S. agriculture from subsidies to rural credit to nutrition programs — expired in September. The new bill is currently being debated in Congress. While controversial on several fronts, small farming advocates believe continued corn-subsidy policies in the bill could put Mexican farmers at a disadvantage — again. Debate centers on corn|¶ In particular, the debate centers around corn, which is Mexico's primary food staple. average Mexican consumes about 280 pounds of corn a year, the second-highest per capita consumption in the world. It is Mexico's primary crop, covering about 60 percent of the country's cultivated area and employing more than 3 million campesinos, according to Mexican researcher Alejandro Nadal. Corn is the largest grain crop grown in the United States corn is grown on 80 million acres and about 20 percent of the production is exported to other countries Mexico is its second-largest buyer, and the flood of U.S. corn has pushed down local prices.
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NAFTA killed off many small farms —only very few exist
| 8,778 | 55 | 4,333 | 1,415 | 10 | 695 | 0.007067 | 0.491166 |
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Reforms and trends in the agriculture sector during the neoliberal era¶ The Mexican government began applying structural adjustments to the rural sector in the mid-1980s, in the context of the debt crisis. However it was not until Carlos Salinas' presidential term (1988-1994) that the bulk of the reforms were carried out. Subsequent administrations have consolidated these reforms and introduced anti-poverty programmes aimed at rural households living in extreme poverty.¶ When the debt crisis hit in 1982, the Mexican government immediately adopted austerity measures that spelled the demise of rural development programmes that had been operating since the 1970s, including PIDER, COPLAMAR and SAM.4 Then, beginning in the mid-1980s, quotas and tariffs on agricultural imports were gradually reduced, culminating in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which set a 15-year timetable for phasing out remaining protectionist policies. During the same period, dozens of state-owned enterprises linked to the rural sector were dismantled and privatized, including the National Company for Popular Subsistence (CONASUPO), which was in charge of buying, storing and marketing basic grains.¶ Until 1988, Mexican farmers were provided with guaranteed producer prices for twelve crops (maize, beans, wheat, rice, sorghum, safflower, soybean, cotton, sesame, coconuts, sunflower and barley). During Salinas’ presidential term, all of these were eliminated, with the exception of maize and beans. As a result, producer prices dropped throughout the 1990s, as cheap grains flooded in from the United States at levels well above the quotas set by NAFTA. At the same time, farmers were faced with rising input costs.¶ Until the 1990s, agricultural inputs were highly subsidized in Mexico. Publicly owned companies such as Mexican Fertilizers (FERTIMEX) and the National Seeds Producer (PRONASE) provided inputs for the national market, making the country virtually self-sufficient in seed and fertilizer production. Since then, how ever, these state-owned companies have been dismantled or privatized and a handful of large and powerful trans-national corporations (TNCs) have gained control of the national market (for example: Cargill, Archer Daniels, Bayer, Bunge and Dreyfus). Consequently, input costs have increasing dramatically, first in the early 1990s, then again over the past three years.¶ Between 2005 and mid-2008, international prices for basic grains hiked up steeply, leading some analysts to suggest that this would create more favourable market conditions for Mexican farmers. However, what we have seen is that these higher prices have only been weakly transmitted to small-scale producers. As with agricultural inputs, Mexico's domestic grain market has become dominated by a handful of international and (in this case) national corporations, including Cargill, Archer Daniels, Minsa and Maseca. Under oligopolistic conditions, these corporations have been able to squeeze small-scale farmers on both ends (with higher in put costs and lower producer prices) and capture the lion’s share of higher food prices. In this way, in 2008, Cargill's profits increased by 81 per cent, Archer Daniels Midland's by 86 per cent and Bunge's by a stunning 1,452 per cent (Guzman 2008).¶ Lack of credit is another problem. Under Salinas, subsidized agricultural credit was almost completely eliminated, as well as government-backed crop insurance. The National Bank for Rural Credit (BANRURAL) was downsized and reoriented towards medium-sized commercial farmers. Large-scale farmers were expected to obtain credit from private banks, while small amounts of subsidized credit were made available to poor farmers through anti-poverty programmes such as Credit on Word (Credito a Ia Palabra) and Regional Solidarity Funds (Fondos Regionales de Solidaridad). The net result of all of this was a dramatic increase in the real cost of credit, accompanied by a severe contraction in its availability. This situation was exacerbated by the 1995 economic crisis and it has not improved significantly since then. In 2001, BANRURAL was privatized. Today, only 15 per cent of Mexico's farmers have access to seasonal credit and 5 per cent to credit for long-term productive investments and these tend to be the medium and large scale producers.¶ The last element of the neoliberal strategy was to make changes to Article 27 of the Constitution and to the Agrarian Law in order to put an official end to land re distribution and in order to pave the way towards the privatization of the ejido. As part of this reform, the Programme for Certification of Ejidal Rights and Titling of Urban Parcels (PROCEDE) was created in 1993 as a mechanism for strengthening land-tenure security and facilitating the renting and selling of ejida/land. At first there was widespread resistance, not to the programme per se, but rather as an expression of a broader resistance to the neoliberal reforms in their entirety.¶ Entry into PROCEDE was supposed to be voluntary. However, during Ernesto¶ Zedillo's presidential term (1994-2000), government officials began exerting pressure on non-complying ejidos and indigenous communities, inter alia, by threatening to exclude them from exiguous subsidy programmes, most importantly the Programme for Direct Support for Agriculture (PROCAMPO). These heavy-handed tactics provoked internal conflicts in many agrarian communities, and to a large extent they worked: by late 2003, almost 80 per cent of Mexico's thirty-one thousand ejidos and indigenous communities had accepted PROCEDE. Resistance has continued, though, especially in the south, where Mexico's indigenous population is concentrated. In Chiapas and Oaxaca, for example, only 28 and 21 per cent of agrarian communities respectively have accepted the programme (De Ita 2003).¶ Although some critics warned that the changes made to Article 27 of the Constitution would lead to significantly higher land concentration, so far this has not been the case, at least not in terms of land sales. On the other hand, a dramatic in crease in land rentals has led to a de facto concentration of some of the best irrigated land, especially in the north-western states of Sinaloa and Sonora, where up to 80 per cent of ejidalland is rented by large-scale farmers and agribusiness that produce mainly maize and beans (De Ita 2003). In Jalisco, too, there is widespread renting of ejidalland, in this case, by agave producing companies that offer leases of up to eight years, often applying large quantities of agrochemicals to the land in order to get the most out of it during their contract. Farmers who rent their land benefit by securing a low-risk income without having to invest their own time or money. This allows them to search for jobs outside of farming, often implying migration to the United States.¶ In order to help cushion some of the adverse effects of these structural reforms, the Mexican government created a number of agricultural subsidy programmes and focalized anti-poverty programmes. The three most important are the Programme for Direct Support for Agriculture (PROCAMPO), Acquisition of Productive Assets (previously known as Alianza parae/ Campo), and Opportunities.¶ PROCAMPO was created in 1993 in order to help farmers adjust to neoliberal reforms. Originally it was supposed to be terminated in the year 2008, but it is still running and it is unlikely that it will be cancelled any time in the near future, given the Mexican government's current legitimacy crisis and taking into consideration the worldwide food crisis. PROCAMPO provides cash payments of approximately 100 dollars for every hectare of land cultivated, made directly to land owners. The programme benefits approximately 3.3 million Mexican farmers, including about 2 million subsistence producers that had not received any kind of subsidy before the neoliberal reforms. On the other hand, the programme is extremely regressive: farmers with more than I0 hectares - which represent only 8 per cent of the beneficiaries - receive 45 per cent of the money channeled through the programme; whereas farmers with less than 2 hectares - which represent almost 50 per cent of the beneficiaries- only receive 13 per cent (Rosenzweig 2005).¶ For its part, Acquisition of Productive Assets (APA) is a multifaceted programme created in 1996 under the name Alliance for the Countryside, with the following goals in mind: to improve the standard of living in rural areas, to in crease agricultural production, to create jobs , to reduce poverty, and to stimulate exports. As its original name suggests, this programme seeks to forge partnerships between different actors, namely, the federal government, state governments, farmers and the private sector. The main thrust of the programme is to help farmers acquire capital goods such as tractors, irrigation systems, high-yield seeds, and so on. However, as with PROCAMPO, it is highly regressive: farmers with more than 20 hectares of land receive 57 per cent of the funds, while those with less than I0 hectares receive only 2I per cent (FAO 2000). From a different angle, Armando Bartra observes that '70 per cent of the resources go to the richest 20 per cent of the beneficiaries, while the poorest 40 per cent only receive 10 per cent' (2008, 2). Moreover, its budget is very small, especially in the context of its purported objectives, representing only 0.107 per cent of Mexico's GDP in the year 2008.¶ Originally called the National Programme for Education, Health and Food (PROGRESA), Mexico's main anti-poverty programme initiated in I997 was directed in its early years exclusively to extremely poor households in marginalized rural communities. Later, during Vicente Fox's presidency (2000-2006), it was renamed 'Oportunidades' and extended to urban areas. Opportunities provides direct cash transfers to families living in extreme poverty, with a number of strings attached. Basically, the female head of the household- who is the person who directly receives the payments - has to attend a number of workshops, take children under five-years of age to the local health clinic for monthly checkups, and make sure that her older children attend school regularly.¶ The 2008 budget for Opportunities is $3.8 billion, representing 0.43 per cent of the Mexico's GDP. The programme benefits approximately 5 million families, which translates into an average of about 760 dollars annually per family. This is a significant amount of money for families living in extreme poverty. However, to keep things in perspective, it should be noted that, in recent years, the average annual budget for Opportunities has only been equal to about 12 per cent of the annual interest payments that the Mexican government makes to the Savings Protection Banking Fund (FOBAPROA), the notorious public bailout programme for private banks after the 1994-95 crisis. •¶ It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the debates around Opportunities. The programme has been highly touted by the World Bank and it has served as a model for other developing countries. At the same time, it has been criticized by independent academics, inter alia, for being paternalistic and for not addressing the structural causes of poverty (see for example, Valencia et al. 2000, Ornelas Delgado 2006).¶ Taking a step back, now, and looking at the neoliberal reforms in their entirety, we can see what their net implications have been for the agricultural sector. Our first observation is that public investment in Mexico's rural sector dropped in global terms by over 60 per cent between 1982 and 2008 (Chavez 2008). Second, between 1980 and 2006, agricultural production fell by 6.9 per cent in per capita terms (Gonzalez and Macias 2007). Third, although Mexico's food exports more than doubled since NAFTA came into effect (from 3,995 to 9,431 million dollars between 1994 and 2003), food imports increased at an even greater rate (from 4,766 to 12,866 million in the same time period), resulting in an expanding agricultural trade deficit equal to 3,435 million in the year 2004 alone (Quintana 2007), and reaching over 5 billion dollars in 2007. In this way, Mexico's food dependency and vulnerability has increased substantially , not just because of this growing deficit, but also because Mexico tends to export non-strategic items (such as beer, tequila, fruits, vegetables and live beef), while importing strategic items such as basic grains (most importantly, maize, soya, rice and wheat).
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Tetrault 2010—Darcy Victor Tetrault is is professor and researcher at the University of Guadalajara, Mexico. [“European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies”, No. 88 (April 2010), JSTOR]//MM
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Then, beginning in the mid-1980s, quotas and tariffs on agricultural imports were gradually reduced, culminating in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which set a 15-year timetable for phasing out remaining protectionist policies. During the same period, dozens of state-owned enterprises linked to the rural sector were dismantled and privatized, including the National Company for Popular Subsistence (CONASUPO), which was in charge of buying, storing and marketing basic grains , producer prices dropped throughout the 1990s, as cheap grains flooded in from the United States at levels well above the quotas set by NAFTA. At the same time, farmers were faced with rising input costs. Between 2005 and mid-2008, international prices for basic grains hiked up steeply, leading some analysts to suggest that this would create more favourable market conditions for Mexican farmers. However, what we have seen is that these higher prices have only been weakly transmitted to small-scale producers. As with agricultural inputs, Mexico's domestic grain market has become dominated by a handful of international and (in this case) national corporations Under Salinas, subsidized agricultural credit was almost completely eliminated, as well as government-backed crop insurance. The National Bank for Rural Credit (BANRURAL) was downsized and reoriented towards medium-sized commercial farmers. economic crisis and it has not improved significantly since then. In 2001, BANRURAL was privatized. Today, only 15 per cent of Mexico's farmers have access to seasonal credit and 5 per cent to credit for long-term productive investments and these tend to be the medium and large scale producers. The programme benefits approximately 3.3 million Mexican farmers, , the programme is extremely regressive: farmers with more than I0 hectares - which represent only 8 per cent of the beneficiaries - receive 45 per cent of the money farmers with less than 2 hectares - which represent almost 50 per cent of the beneficiaries- only receive 13 per cent (Rosenzweig 2005). : farmers with more than 20 hectares of land receive 57 per cent of the funds, while those with less than I0 hectares receive only 2I per cent that '70 per cent of the resources go to the richest 20 per cent of the beneficiaries, while the poorest 40 per cent only receive 10 per cent' The programme has been highly touted by the World Bank and it has served as a model for other developing countries. At the same time, it has been criticized by independent academics, inter alia, for being paternalistic and for not addressing the structural causes of poverty public investment in Mexico's rural sector dropped in global terms by over 60 per cent between 1982 and 2008 agricultural production fell by 6.9 per cent in per capita terms although Mexico's food exports more than doubled since NAFTA came into effect (from 3,995 to 9,431 million dollars between 1994 and 2003), food imports increased at an even greater rate (from 4,766 to 12,866 million in the same time period), resulting in an expanding agricultural trade deficit equal to 3,435 million in the year 2004 alone (Quintana 2007), and reaching over 5 billion dollars in 2007. In this way, Mexico's food dependency and vulnerability has increased substantially
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NAFTA disproportionally affects small-scale Mexican farmers—large scale bias, cheap American imports, lack of credit
| 12,593 | 116 | 3,290 | 1,954 | 14 | 523 | 0.007165 | 0.267656 |
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Agricultural subsidies in Mexico chalk in much lower than they do in Canada, which according to a 2005 estimate provided $3.7 billion to farmers, and the US, which paid out $19.1 billion in the same year. Mexican farmers, the majority of whom farm plots smaller than five hectares, receive between $78 and $102 per hectare per harvest cycle in government support, according to Herrera. “The peasants are often so poor that what they receive from [PROCAMPO, the federal assistance program for farmers], they use to satisfy their basic consumption needs,” he said.¶ A 2011 study showed that for small farmers in Mexico to produce a kilogram of corn it cost $3.72, compared to $1.67 per kilo in commercial farms. Both groups sell their product at a loss and rely on state support and other income to survive. “I have a hectare that’s maybe a quarter planted, and it gives me a ton (of corn per harvest),” said Pedro Viafuerte, who has land in Mexico State, but who works as a custodian in Mexico City in order to earn an income. “We use it for our personal consumption… and to fatten our livestock, because it doesn’t fetch the price it should.”¶ Because it is so difficult to turn a profit growing traditional foods, according to a report published by the Agriculture, Society and Development journal last year, most Mexican peasants no longer grow corn and beans as a means of economic survival. Instead, “most of the production that peasants obtain from their land plots (maize, beans, kidney beans, etc.) is for self-consumption … the greater part of monetary income is obtained from other activities linked to the land (fruit, flower or vegetable production) or of another type (commerce, paid work in factories or construction in Mexico or the USA).”
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Paley 3/12 (Dawn Paley, Masters in Journalism from the University of British Columbia and BA in arts and women’s studies and first nations studies from Simon Fraser University, “Corn on the Border: NAFTA and Food in Mexico,” 13 March 2013, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/mexico-archives-79/4183-corn-on-the-border-nafta-and-food-in-mexico, AL)
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Mexican farmers, the majority of whom farm plots smaller than five hectares, receive between $78 and $102 per hectare per harvest cycle in government support, according to Herrera. “The peasants are often so poor that what they receive from [PROCAMPO, the federal assistance program for farmers], they use to satisfy their basic consumption needs,” We use it for our personal consumption… and to fatten our livestock, because it doesn’t fetch the price it should.” Because it is so difficult to turn a profit growing traditional foods, according to a report published by the Agriculture, Society and Development journal last year, most Mexican peasants no longer grow corn and beans as a means of economic survival. Instead, “most of the production that peasants obtain from their land plots (maize, beans, kidney beans, etc.) is for self-consumption … the greater part of monetary income is obtained from other activities linked to the land (fruit, flower or vegetable production) or of another type (commerce, paid work in factories or construction in Mexico or the USA).”
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NAFTA subsidies crush Mexican small farms
| 1,753 | 41 | 1,074 | 298 | 6 | 172 | 0.020134 | 0.577181 |
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“NAFTA marked a breaking point … NAFTA privileged commercial agriculture, and small farmers were basically abandoned,” José Herrera Vizcarra, an advisor with the Cardenista Peasant Union in Mexico City, told Watershed Sentinel.¶ NAFTA was preceded by legislative changes allowing for the privatization of collectively-owned land. It also resulted in radical cuts to subsidies and loans for farmers and other supports in seeds, technical assistance, marketing and pricing that the state once provided. The last protections for agricultural products under NAFTA, which were applied to corn and beans, were dropped in 2008. On January 31st of that year, over 200,000 people marched in Mexico City against NAFTA’s final blow to Mexican farmers. Renegotiating NAFTA is a key tenet of those pushing to regain food sovereignty in Mexico.¶ “NAFTA created a disloyal competition, because the United States and Canada continued to subsidize agricultural producers, and we pulled the subsidies,” said Herrera, who has worked in Mexico’s agricultural sector for over 30 years. “It became impossible for small and medium producers to compete with producers from Canada and United States.”
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Paley 3/12 (Dawn Paley, Masters in Journalism from the University of British Columbia and BA in arts and women’s studies and first nations studies from Simon Fraser University, “Corn on the Border: NAFTA and Food in Mexico,” 13 March 2013, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/mexico-archives-79/4183-corn-on-the-border-nafta-and-food-in-mexico, AL)
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“NAFTA marked a breaking point … NAFTA privileged commercial agriculture, and small farmers were basically abandoned,” NAFTA was preceded by legislative changes allowing for the privatization of collectively-owned land. It also resulted in radical cuts to subsidies and loans for farmers and other supports in seeds, technical assistance, marketing and pricing that the state once provided. The last protections for agricultural products under NAFTA, which were applied to corn and beans, were dropped in 2008. On January 31st of that year, over 200,000 people marched in Mexico City against NAFTA’s final blow to Mexican farmers. NAFTA created a disloyal competition, because the United States and Canada continued to subsidize agricultural producers, and we pulled the subsidies,”
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NAFTA killed Mexican small farms
| 1,175 | 32 | 782 | 177 | 5 | 116 | 0.028249 | 0.655367 |
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2,929 |
Family Farmers Hit Hardest¶ Smaller-scale U.S. family farms have been hardest hit by the import influx caused by deals like NAFTA and the WTO. About 170,000 small U.S. family farms have gone under since NAFTA and the WTO took effect, a 21 percent decrease in the total number.7 After the WTO required elimination of various U.S. price support and supply management policies, small farmers were also hard-pressed to survive the increasing year-to-year volatility in prices paid for commodities, making investment and planning more difficult than before the WTO.¶ Food and Agricultural Trade Becomes Chaotic under NAFTA/WTO, Yielding Historic Deficits¶ The United States has experienced wide swings in food and agricultural trade under the WTO. In 2005, the United States became a net food importer for the first time since the U.S. Department of Agriculture started reporting data in 1967.8 Trade deficits have become the norm, meanwhile, for U.S. agriculture under NAFTA, as indicated in the adjacent graph. The average annual U.S. trade deficit in agricultural goods with Canada and Mexico in the five years before NAFTA nearly tripled (a 174 percent increase) in the five years after the deal took effect. Since then, high imports and lackluster exports have continued to wrack U.S. family farmers with deficit surges. The average annual U.S. agricultural deficit with Canada and Mexico under NAFTA’s first 19 years surpassed $800 million, more than twice the pre-NAFTA level.9
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Public Citizen ’13 (“Let them Eat Imports: Food Imports to United States Soar under WTO-NAFTA Model, Threatening American Farmers and Safety,” Public Citizen, May 2013, http://www.citizen.org/food-under-nafta-wto)//ER
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Family Farmers Hit Hardest¶ Smaller-scale U.S. family farms have been hardest hit by the import influx caused by deals like NAFTA and the WTO. About 170,000 small U.S. family farms have gone under since NAFTA and the WTO took effect, a 21 percent decrease in the total number.7 After the WTO required elimination of various U.S. price support and supply management policies, small farmers were also hard-pressed to survive the increasing year-to-year volatility in prices paid for commodities, making investment and planning more difficult than before the WTO.¶ Food and Agricultural Trade Becomes Chaotic under NAFTA/WTO, Yielding Historic Deficits¶ The United States has experienced wide swings in food and agricultural trade under the WTO. In 2005, the United States became a net food importer for the first time since the U.S. Department of Agriculture started reporting data in 1967.8 Trade deficits have become the norm, meanwhile, for U.S. agriculture under NAFTA . The average annual U.S. trade deficit in agricultural goods with Canada and Mexico in the five years before NAFTA nearly tripled (a 174 percent increase) in the five years after the deal took effect. Since then, high imports and lackluster exports have continued to wrack U.S. family farmers with deficit surges. The average annual U.S. agricultural deficit with Canada and Mexico under NAFTA’s first 19 years surpassed $800 million, more than twice the pre-NAFTA level.9
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NAFTA hurts small farmers and increases agricultural trade deficits
| 1,479 | 68 | 1,444 | 232 | 9 | 227 | 0.038793 | 0.978448 |
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How have U.S. agricultural policies affected Mexican producers in an economic environment of liberalized trade? We analyzed eight heavily supported commodities – corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, rice, beef, pork, and poultry – that compete with Mexican production ¶ and that have seen increases in U.S. exports to Mexico of between 159% and 707% since ¶ the early 1990s. Together they represent 52% of the value of U.S. agricultural exports to ¶ Mexico. We examined the extent to which those products were exported to Mexico at prices below production costs between 1997 and 2005. We look at those years because the ¶ period begins after NAFTA’s liberalization was largely implemented and after the 1996 U.S. ¶ Farm Bill, which caused significant changes to U.S. production and prices by bringing a ¶ great deal of land back into agricultural production. The period under study ends before ¶ the recent run-up in commodity prices. ¶ Our goal was to estimate the costs to Mexican producers of domestic farm prices driven ¶ down by below-cost imports from the United States. We estimate the costs at $12.8 billion ¶ from 1997-2005 for the eight products (in constant 2000 US dollars), 10% of the value of ¶ all Mexican agricultural exports to the United States. Corn producers were by far the most ¶ heavily affected, with $6.6 billion in losses, an average of $38 per metric ton, or $99 per ¶ hectare. This is more than the average per-hectare payment to small-scale producers under the Procampo subsidy program.
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Wise ’10 – Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University (Timothy A, “The impacts of U.S. agricultural policies on Mexican producers,” 2010, Wilson Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Subsidizing_Inequality_Ch_8_Wise.pdf)//ER
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We analyzed eight heavily supported commodities – corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, rice, beef, pork, and poultry – that compete with Mexican production ¶ and that have seen increases in U.S. exports to Mexico of between 159% and 707% since ¶ the early 1990s. the ¶ period begins after NAFTA’s liberalization was largely implemented and after the 1996 U.S. ¶ Farm Bill, which caused significant changes to U.S. production and prices by bringing a ¶ great deal of land back into agricultural production. the costs at $12.8 billion ¶ for the eight products 10% of the value of ¶ all Mexican agricultural exports to the United States. Corn producers were by far the most ¶ heavily affected, with $6.6 billion in losse
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NAFTA hurts Mexican Small farms
| 1,509 | 32 | 711 | 252 | 5 | 121 | 0.019841 | 0.480159 |
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Subsidies and NAFTA¶ Farm subsidies in the U.S. help U.S. corn to undersell Mexican. According to Oxfam's Duncan Green, U.S. corn subsidies have allowed U.S. corn to be sold in Mexico at 19% below production cost, which Green says has cost Mexican farmers about $99.00 U.S. per acre.¶ Meanwhile, in its own effort to profit from NAFTA, Mexico's government has focused some of its subsidies on its biggest agribusinesses, making these, including Grupo Bimbo (Mexico's biggest baker goods company) and Grupo Maseca (Mexico's biggest tortilleria), some of the biggest businesses in the world. The result has not always been more jobs either, but again, an equally important issue may be variety.¶ Mexico's Increasing Corn Imports¶ Beginning in 1994 with NAFTA and a desire for less regulation, corn, primarily yellow corn (used in corn starch, corn syrup,and animal feed), has been increasingly imported by Mexico, according to the USDA's Steven Zahniser (2006), while fruit and vegetable products from Mexico have been increasingly imported by the U.S. However since 2001, the sweeter white corn that forms the backbone of many Mexicans' diets has also been imported, Zahniser says. According to Jonathan Fox of the University of California (Santa Cruz; cited by McClatchy's Tim Johnson), since NAFTA, corn imports which made up "7 percent of Mexican consumption" have increased "to around 34 percent," though it's still mostly yellow corn used in animal feed and industry that's being imported.¶ Subsidies of Mexico's Agribusinesses¶ Zahniser nevertheless believes that Mexican corn production has remained mostly steady since NAFTA, because of the Mexican government's own agricultural and consumer subsidies of corn and tortillas. But not as many farmers are growing corn.¶ According to Tracy Wilkinson of the Los Angeles Times (2010), "Procampo" was created in Mexico when NAFTA took effect, with a goal of enabling Mexico's poorest farmers to compete with U.S. farmers. Wilkinson however cites research that suggests that, "as much as 80% of the money went to just 20% of the registered farmers."¶ Wilkinson's sources include the newspaper El Universal, which obtained information "through the Mexican equivalent of the Freedom of Information Act," according to Wilson. Wilson says that subsidies went to, among others, "three siblings of billionaire drug lord Joaquin 'El Chapo' Guzman," who heads the Sinaloa cartel; and to the brother of a former Guzman partner, supposedly to grow corn and other crops. Most of Mexico's organized criminals maintain legitimate agricultural business interest side-by-side their criminal operations, Wilkinson explains. The subsidies are paid on a per "hectare" basis, and only in 2009, says Wilkinson, were any caps placed on how much any one individual or business could receive.¶ NAFTA and Population Displacement, Immigration¶ Currently according to the Wilson Center, which cites population statistics from the Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO; cited in OECD, Agricultural and Fisheries Policies in Mexico), the number of people living in Mexico's rural areas has actually increased slightly, to 24% although that number is projected to decline to 21% by 2030. But, the Wilson Center says, the small farmers in rural areas are asset-poor and increasingly marginalized.¶ According to McClatchy's Tim Johnson (2011), ". . . when the North American Free Trade Agreement linked Mexico, Canada and the U.S. in 1994, . . . Mexico . . . said it would 'export goods, not people.'" But, says Johnson, perhaps two million Mexican farm jobs have been lost since, to U.S. corn imports and to Mexican subsidies which may favor agribusiness.¶ Johnson argues that areas where the poorest farmers live have had the highest rates of migration due to NAFTA and to Mexican subsidy policies. Johnson cites as an example, ". . . the rolling hills of western Oaxaca state, ancestral lands of indigenous Mixtecs who till small plots of corn, beans and squash." In any case, the number of small corn farmers is declining, with many of farmers from the Mexico's south now numbering among agricultural workers coming from Mexico into the United States.¶ Exodus and Increased Fertilizer Use in Mexico¶ Besides planting less corn (and perhaps thus fewer varieties) in Mexico, small farmers since NAFTA have relied more on fertilizers. Johnson explains that, with their caretakers leaving, the number of livestock, "goats, cattle and burros," which previously provided manure for fields, have declined too. "You have no choice but to buy fertilizer now," he quoted elderly Josefa Soriano: "If you don't fertilize, nothing grows, not even fodder."¶ Increased Planting of Illicit Crops?¶ Another result of NAFTA and Mexico's "Procampo" subsidies, according to Wilkinson's Los Angeles Times report, may be increasing growth of marijuana and other illegitimate crops.¶ NAFTA Pluses and Minuses for Mexico¶ The "plus" for Mexico is that corn and tortilla prices, which tend to rise with increasing demand for ethanol (and may be rising ten times as fast as Mexico's minimum wage) may be kept down by imports, says the USDA's Zahniser. The down side of NAFTA includes a possible decline in the genetic diversity of Mexican corn, as small farmers abandon farming. And, while the adoption of higher-tech production methods by Mexican corn farmers may someday enable them to gain a larger share of the market, this may not by itself solve the problem of declining genetic diversity.¶ Increasing Poverty¶ Mexican corn farmers face increasing poverty. A Woodrow Wilson Center report cites a World Bank (2008) World Development Report, which argues that Mexico's farmers need to investigate higher tech methods. (Smaller farmers, the Wilson Center report notes, have limited access to credit however.)
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Whitehead ’13 – holds degrees in education and linguistics (Catherine E, “Mexican Corn: Traditional Farming Practices, NAFTA, Variety,” Suite: Politics and Society, 3/25/13, http://suite101.com/article/mexican-corn--traditional-farming-practices-nafta-variety-a310725)//ER
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Farm subsidies in the U.S. help U.S. corn to undersell Mexican U.S. corn subsidies have allowed U.S. corn to be sold in Mexico at 19% below production cost, which Green says has cost Mexican farmers about $99.00 U.S. per acre.¶ since NAFTA, corn imports which made up "7 percent of Mexican consumption" have increased "to around 34 percent," though it's still mostly yellow corn used in animal feed and industry that's being imported. not as many farmers are growing corn. "as much as 80% of the money went to just 20% of the registered farmers." subsidies went to, among others, "three siblings of billionaire drug lord Joaquin 'El Chapo' Guzman," who heads the Sinaloa cartel the small farmers in rural areas are asset-poor and increasingly marginalized.¶ , perhaps two million Mexican farm jobs have been lost since, to U.S. corn imports and to Mexican subsidies which may favor agribusiness.¶ the number of small corn farmers is declining, with many of farmers from the Mexico's south now numbering among agricultural workers coming from Mexico into the United States.¶ small farmers since NAFTA have relied more on fertilizers the number of livestock have declined too Another result of NAFTA and Mexico's "Procampo" subsidies may be increasing growth of marijuana and other illegitimate crops.¶ The down side NAFTA includes a possible decline in the genetic diversity of Mexican corn, as small farmers abandon farming. Mexican corn farmers face increasing poverty.
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NAFTA kills Mexican corn industry and rural workers – leads to immigration and poverty
| 5,808 | 87 | 1,470 | 908 | 14 | 237 | 0.015419 | 0.261013 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Since the implementation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), the Mexican corn industry has changed dramatically. Many concerns have been raised over the worry of Mexican corn farmers and migration due to the heavy export of U.S corn to Mexico. Since its signing in 1994,NAFTA has loosened trade restrictions on the corn industry, however the Mexican government still holds tight to the policies on agriculture before the implementation of NAFTA. This includes heavy support for Mexican grown corn products such as tortillas, flours and animal feed. However, with the rise of NAFTA, the U.S has heavily subsidised the corn industry, often selling exports at lower the price of production or prices lower than those in Mexico.¶ This has put the country's food self-sufficiency in jeopardy. Many local corn farmers have not been able to keep up with the heavy demands, thus resulting in migrations. There have also been studies which link the rise of U.S corn imports to the heavy demand for yellow corn and animal feed (De Janvry, Sadoulet, Gordillo 1995) . Mexicans primarily use yellow corn for animal consumption, while home grown white corn is used for human feasts. This is linked to Mexico being a key player in the export of hog and cattle meats, thus needing feed for these animals. The demand for feed keeps the cost low, but endangers the Mexican farm industry. However, Zahnsier and Coyle (14 2004) point out that corn prices in Mexico have been adjusted for international prices, thus steadily decreasing. Through a program of loans expanded by former president Vicente Fox, production has remained stable. However, i feel with the heavy import of American corn, many Mexican corn farmers have been made redundant. Farmers are not up against one another but American "dumping"( economic term for exporting a product to another country at a price which is below the price it charges in its home market). The cost of corn production in Mexico does not coincide with the profit made for the demand of local corn. As the demand for Mexican meats are made, the demand for American Yellow corn to feed these animals is also raised. Thus, I feel this puts the country at a disadvantage. NAFTA has crippled Mexico's self-sufficiency.¶ Land has also been affected. With the rise of competing imports, Mexican Farmers have been forced to industrialize, as many cannot afford it. Thus, in order to compete with American boomers, Mexican farmers often rely on growing methods that are heavily chemical dependent. This affects the nature of the land and the water running off into the Gulf of Mexico. (Pollen 2004).
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Cortez ’10 (Jared, “NAFTA and the Decline of internal Corn,” Geneseo Research, 12/10/10, https://wiki.geneseo.edu/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=67112378)//ER
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Since the implementation of NAFTA the Mexican corn industry has changed dramatically. Many concerns have been raised over the worry of Mexican corn farmers and migration due to the heavy export of U.S corn to Mexico. the Mexican government still holds tight to the policies on agriculture before the implementation of NAFTA. This includes heavy support for Mexican grown corn products such as tortillas, flours and animal feed. However, with the rise of NAFTA, the U.S has heavily subsidised the corn industry, often selling exports at lower the price of production or prices lower than those in Mexico.¶ This has put the country's food self-sufficiency in jeopardy. corn farmers have not been able to keep up with the heavy demands, thus resulting in migrations studies link the rise of U.S corn imports to the heavy demand for yellow corn and animal feed The demand for feed endangers the Mexican farm industry. with the heavy import of American corn, many Mexican corn farmers have been made redundant. Farmers are not up against one another but American "dumpin The cost of corn production in Mexico does not coincide with the profit made for the demand of local corn. this puts the country at a disadvantage. NAFTA has crippled Mexico's self-sufficiency.¶ Mexican Farmers have been forced to industrialize, as many cannot afford it. Mexican farmers often rely on growing methods that are heavily chemical dependent. This affects the nature of the land and the water running off into the Gulf of Mexico.
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NAFTA causes a decline in the corn industry – that hurts land and agriculture
| 2,624 | 78 | 1,507 | 435 | 14 | 249 | 0.032184 | 0.572414 |
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Today, perhaps the single most important examples of humans acting as a keystone species are ¶ the agro ecosystems that maintain the world’s crop genetic diversity. Most of the ‘keystone’ ¶ people are small farmers. In part, this is because agricultural biodiversity is concentrated in ¶ regions of the world where small farms still predominate. In part, too, it is because small farmers ¶ have comparative advantages in the cultivation of diversity.¶ The centers of origin of the world’s crops are concentrated in a few places, known as ‘Vavilov ¶ centers’ after the great Russian botanist of the early 20th century, Nikolai Vavilov. Most of the ¶ Vavilov centers are in the developing countries of the global South (see Figure 1). Vavilov ¶ hypothesized that the ancient centers of crop origin tend to be the modern centers of crop ¶ diversity, a suggestion that, by and large, has stood the test of time. The logic behind this ¶ correlation is straightforward: crops evolve as farmers select seed for replanting from individual¶ plants that perform best in the face of local variations in soils, rainfall, altitude, pest populations, ¶ and so on. Diversity tends to be greatest where this process has had the longest time to unfold. In ¶ the Bengal delta, for example, where ‘a few inches difference in elevation in relation to expected ¶ flooding depth and duration can cause farmers to plant different rice varieties,’ some 10,000 ¶ different varieties of rice were being grown in the 1970s (Brammer, 1980, p. 25). ¶ Darwin described this process in the opening chapter of The Origin of Species: ‘The key is man’s ¶ power of accumulative selection: nature gives successive variations; man adds them up in certain ¶ directions useful to him.’ One of Darwin’s examples was the strawberry, a fruit that was growing ¶ in popularity at the time: ‘Gardeners picked out individual plants with slightly larger, earlier, or ¶ better fruit, and raised seedlings from them, and again picked out the best seedlings and bred ¶ from them.’ In this way, Darwin explained, ‘those many admirable varieties of the strawberry ¶ were raised which have appeared during the last half-century’ (Darwin, 1952 [1859], pp. 18, 23). ¶ As Vavilov documented, crop genetic diversity is distributed very unevenly across the globe. ¶ The available data on this point are remarkably sparse, but a rough indicator is the sources of ¶ seed samples that are stored in the world’s largest ‘gene banks’, ex situ (off-site) collections ¶ maintained for possible future use by scientists and plant breeders. In the case of maize, for ¶ example, Mexico accounted for 4220 of the maize accessions held at the International Maize and ¶ Wheat Improvement Center (known by its Spanish acronym, CIMMYT) in the mid-1990s, and ¶ Guatemala for another 590; by contrast, the United States, with more than three times the maize ¶ acreage of Mexico and Guatemala combined, accounted for only 43 samples (Boyce, 1996). ¶ Mexican farmers today are believed to grow roughly 5,000 different varieties of maize, whereas ¶ in the United States – where corn is sown on roughly 70 million acres – more than 70% of the ¶ acreage is planted with varieties ‘based on no more than half a dozen inbred lines’ (Goodman ¶ 1995, p. 200)¶ Around the world, it is generally small farms – especially those in the Vavilov centers – that ¶ practice high-diversity agriculture. Not only do individual small farmers often choose to cultivate ¶ several varieties of the same crop, but also, and probably more importantly, different farmers in a ¶ given locality often cultivate different varieties. Large farms, in contrast, are more likely to sow a ¶ single variety over a wide area. This inverse relationship between farm size and varietal diversity ¶ has several explanations.
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Boyce 2004 (James K Boyce, July 2004 Department of Economics & Political Economy Research and Environmental research at the University of Massachusetts, “A Future for Small Farms? Biodiversity and Sustainable Agriculture”. Political Economic Research Institute, http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_51-100/WP86.pdf)- RT
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the single most important examples of humans acting as a keystone species are the agro ecosystems that maintain the world’s crop genetic diversity. Most of the ‘keystone’ people are small farmers. In part, this is because agricultural biodiversity is concentrated in regions of the world where small farms still predominate. small farmers ¶ have comparative advantages in the cultivation of diversity.¶ Most of the ¶ Vavilov centers are in the developing countries of the global South crops evolve as farmers select seed for replanting from individual¶ plants that perform best in the face of local variations in soils, rainfall, altitude, pest populations, ¶ and so on Diversity tends to be greatest where this process has had the longest time to unfold Gardeners picked out individual plants with slightly larger, earlier, or ¶ better fruit, and raised seedlings from them, and again picked out the best seedlings and bred ¶ from them Mexico accounted for 4220 of the maize accessions held at the International Maize and ¶ Wheat Improvement Center by contrast, the United States, with more than three times the maize ¶ acreage of Mexico and Guatemala combined, accounted for only 43 samples Mexican farmers today are believed to grow roughly 5,000 different varieties of maize, whereas ¶ in the United States – where corn is sown on roughly 70 million acres – more than 70% of the ¶ acreage is planted with varieties ‘based on no more than half a dozen inbred lines’ it is generally small farms that ¶ practice high-diversity agriculture. Not only do individual small farmers often choose to cultivate ¶ several varieties of the same crop, but also, and probably more importantly different farmers in a ¶ given locality often cultivate different varieties Large farms, in contrast, are more likely to sow a ¶ single variety over a wide area
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Small farms are key to biodiversity.
| 3,809 | 36 | 1,842 | 636 | 6 | 305 | 0.009434 | 0.47956 |
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The ongoing conflict between protecting biodiversity on the one-hand and feeding the world through agriculture on the other, presents perhaps the biggest challenge for conservation.¶ This tension has caused some to champion agricultural intensification as a way to protect tropical forests. According to the logic behind this approach, intensified farming increases the amount of food we can produce from a given amount of land, which in turn will free up areas that we can restore and protect for biodiversity.¶ This logic has been used to argue for large-scale, industrial agriculture over small-scale, eco-friendly farming to best support tropical conservation.¶ However, a new article in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, presents a compelling counterargument that demonstrates the misconceptions that underlie this logic.¶ Instead, scientists Ivette Perfecto and John Vandermeer propose an alternative model for conservation in the tropics based on a matrix of small-scale, ecologically friendly farms producing food while providing habitat that complements protected areas. ¶ A false premise of the agricultural intensification model is that it assumes that increased productivity will lead to an abandonment of inefficient farms in the tropics, migration from rural to urban areas, and the return of farms to forests.¶ While there is historical precedence for this occuring in North America and Europe, there is not certainty it will occur in tropical areas. In fact, numerous studies from the Tropics show either "no effect or increased deforestation with either agricultural intensification or rural population decline."¶ The scientists also shoot down a commonly assumed misconception that large-scale industrial agricultural is able to grow more food per acre than alternative approaches.¶ Perfecto and Vandermeer point to a meta-analysis of 300 studies comparing the yields of organic versus conventional farming methods, which generally found no difference between the two approaches.¶ Some proponents of agricultural intensification likely confuse the productivity of land use with the profitability of operations. Large-scale, industrial agriculture may be more profitable because it can grow more food with less labor and other inputs.¶ However the scientists point out that small agriculture may be able to utilize more nuanced farming techniques based on the micro conditions of the property - a level of precision that might not be worth the effort for large-scale operations.¶ This idea is supported by a study across 15 countries, which found that output per unit area decreased with farm size.¶ Furthermore, the authors argue that from a conservation perspective, a matrix of small-scale farms across the landscape with ecologically-friendly practices and integrated habitat features will lead to better outcomes for biodiversity than individual large protected areas within a biological wasteland.¶ The scientists cement their idea within a new theoretical framework, which they term the Matrix Quality Model and present as an alternative to the Agricultural Intensification concept.¶ Their model is rooted in the idea that persistence of species depends on maintaining metapopulations within a matrix of habitat patches across the landscape. The authors write, "A new rurality based on the matrix quality approach is more likely to lead to situations in which biodiversity is conserved at the same time that more food is available to those who need it the most."
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Goldstein 10 (2010 Rob Goldstein Writer for conservation maven- conservation research and news “Small-scale, eco-friendly farms key to preserving tropical biodiversity” http://conservationmaven.com/frontpage/small-scale-eco-friendly-farms-key-to-preserving-tropical-bi.html)-RT
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The ongoing conflict between protecting biodiversity on the one-hand and feeding the world through agriculture on the other, presents perhaps the biggest challenge for conservation. This tension has caused some to champion agricultural intensification as a way to protect tropical forests. intensified farming increases the amount of food we can produce from a given amount of land, which in turn will free up areas that we can restore and protect for biodiversity. a new article in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, presents a compelling counterargument that demonstrates the misconceptions that underlie this logic. Instead, scientists Ivette Perfecto and John Vandermeer propose an alternative model for conservation in the tropics based on a matrix of small-scale, ecologically friendly farms producing food while providing habitat that complements protected areas. A false premise of the agricultural intensification model is that it assumes that increased productivity will lead to an abandonment of inefficient farms in the tropics, migration from rural to urban areas, and the return of farms to forests. numerous studies from the Tropics show either "no effect or increased deforestation with either agricultural intensification or rural population decline." The scientists also shoot down a commonly assumed misconception that large-scale industrial agricultural is able to grow more food per acre than alternative approaches a meta-analysis of 300 studies comparing the yields of organic versus conventional farming methods, which generally found no difference between the two approaches. Some proponents of agricultural intensification likely confuse the productivity of land use with the profitability of operations. Large-scale, industrial agriculture may be more profitable because it can grow more food with less labor and other inputs. However the scientists point out that small agriculture may be able to utilize more nuanced farming techniques based on the micro conditions of the property - a level of precision that might not be worth the effort for large-scale operations. This idea is supported by a study across 15 countries, which found that output per unit area decreased with farm siz a matrix of small-scale farms across the landscape with ecologically-friendly practices and integrated habitat features will lead to better outcomes for biodiversity than individual large protected areas within a biological wasteland. The scientists cement their idea within a new theoretical framework, which they term the Matrix Quality Model and present as an alternative to the Agricultural Intensification concept. Their model is rooted in the idea that persistence of species depends on maintaining metapopulations within a matrix of habitat patches across the landscape
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Small farms key to biodiversity
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So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” 13 Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's wellstocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where cancer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.14
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Takacs 96 (Instructor in Department of Earth Systems Science and Policy at California State-Monterey Bay [David, 1996 Philosophies of Paradise, pg. http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm]
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biodiversity keeps the world running. by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures the extinction of species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization. if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to nuclear winter civilization will disappear not with a bang but a whimper.14
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Loss of biodiversity causes extinction
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The most important question not raised during the swine-flu panic could have been asked by a 6-year-old: where do viruses come from? The answer, it turns out, is simple, and scary: viruses come from a giant wellspring of diseases—also known as the environment—that grown-ups should be very careful not to disturb. Pathogens—viruses, bacteria and a wide variety of other parasites—appear in nature as unpredictable, minimalist terrors equipped with little genetic material of their own but the ability to make things up as they go. A bird-flu virus can rest coolly in pigs, then flare up in humans, scrambling genes from all three species in ways impossible to fully anticipate with vaccines. The SARS virus bided its time among palm civets (a kind of mongoose) and horseshoe bats before killing humans in 2002. And possibly the most diminutive of all, the retrovirus HIV emerged from the blood of wild monkeys to become the most efficient destroyer of the human immune system. With strong enough poison and infinitely transmutable genes, a single pathogen could lay deadly siege to the rest of the living world. The reason this has yet to happen in our lifetimes is that, brilliant as nature is at devising ways to kill, it has also come up with countless ways to cope and survive. Put all the living species together and you have an impressive array of mechanisms to fend off pathogens or contain them in particular ecosystems that have defenses built in. This arrangement, however, is now under serious threat: humans, moving ever deeper into the wild to level forests, extract minerals and plant crops, are changing the balance of ecosystems the world over and taking these defenses apart. These warped ecologies become ground zero for new and deadly infectious diseases, which emerge and spread at an ever-greater rate. This amounts to "Armageddon in slow motion," says Eric Chivian, head of the Center for Health and the Global Environment at Harvard Medical School. Chivian, who shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985 for alerting the public to the dangers of nuclear proliferation, now says the danger to human health posed by a degraded planet is "no less devastating than a nuclear war … the ultimate impact might be just as catastrophic." The evidence is already in. Malaria, currently the most prevalent cause of death in the world, can be ascribed almost entirely to human acts of deforestation, which produces stagnant pools of water and allows more sunlight to reach water surfaces. This intensifies the growth of algae and forms the perfect nursery for Anopheles mosquitoes, potent vectors for the malaria parasite. Anopheles barely had a foothold in the ecosystem in its former state, but when conditions changed—as in the Amazon, East Africa and Southeast Asia—vector mosquitoes quickly displaced other benign species. The spread of other diseases has followed a similar trajectory. Some snails, for instance, harbor parasitic worms called schistosomes, which infect the human bladder or intestines. In the Senegal River basin, populations of vector snails exploded upon construction of the Diama Dam in 1985, which made the water less saline. The region became a hotbed for schistosomiasis where it didn't exist before; currently, more than 200 million people are victims. Among flies, too, malignant species are winning out: as a result of deforestation, sand flies have surged into human populations in South America and South Asia, infecting millions each year with leishmaniasis, a protozoan parasite that causes skin ulcers and attacks the liver, spleen, and bone marrow. With ecological collapse, the rapid proliferation of disease agents is only half of the gruesome picture; the other is the demise of nonthreatening species. In recent years, disease ecologists Richard Ostfeld and Felicia Keesing have shown how a diversity of species in an ecosystem actually works to suppress infectious diseases. Since not all animals are good reservoirs or vectors for pathogens, the more species there are, the better the chances for a pathogen to be blocked. Ostfeld and Keesing call this the "dilution effect." In healthy ecosystems—say, one with a high diversity of snails or mosquitoes where the dilution effect is strong and infectious disease is better contained—competition from nonvector snails or mosquitoes keeps the vector populations in check. So the loss of biodiversity is itself a threat to public health, and not only in the deforested Amazon; the denatured suburbs of the United States bear increasing risks, too. Throughout the U.S., the patchy woodlands interspersed among suburban homes are breeding grounds for Lyme disease, a flulike illness that can produce neurological disorders and become impossible to cure. The ideal incubator for the Lyme bacterium is the white-footed mouse, a remarkable survivor in fragmented habitats. Infected mice don't get sick, but they allow the pathogen to multiply and pass it on to ticks who feed on all the local mammals, including humans. Other kinds of forest life—opossums, thrushes, flying squirrels—don't transmit the disease as well to ticks (they're "incompetent hosts"), but fewer and fewer of them remain in the forests. The rising incidence of Lyme disease—27,000 cases in the U.S. in 2007—is a direct result of disappearing forests and the decline of species. "The more nonmouse hosts you have in an ecosystem," Ostfeld says, "the more of the ticks' blood meals will be taken off a host that will not infect them. That will make more of the ticks harmless." Instead, ticks are finding their way to more disease-bearing mice because the mice are increasingly rid of both their competitors and their predators—foxes, weasels, owls. A one- or two-acre scrap of forest poses five times more risk for Lyme disease than a habitat of even five or six acres, with just a few more diverse species. A similar lack of ecological complexity is responsible for the respiratory disease caused by hantavirus—which has a staggering mortality rate of one in three cases—and the neurological disease caused by West Nile virus. These are not risks limited to bushwhackers and remote rice farmers. West Nile virus landed in New York City in 1999 and, by 2004, reached the West Coast, having found ready reservoir hosts in several common bird species and effective mosquito carriers. "We had vectors, in a sense, sitting in wait," says Ostfeld. "All we needed was the virus to jump the pond." The risk of infection rises as the number of bird species falls: living in a town with more than just the common run of birds—American robins, house sparrows, blue jays and common grackles—makes you 10 times less likely to be infected. But there's a reason that most populated areas don't have much more than the common run, Ostfeld explains. "Those happen to be the bird species that do really well in human-disturbed landscapes."
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Huang 09, “Rise of the Bugs”, Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/id/202865/page/1
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Pathogens—viruses, bacteria and a wide variety of other parasites—appear in nature as unpredictable, minimalist terrors equipped with little genetic material of their own but the ability to make things up as they go. A bird-flu virus can rest coolly in pigs, then flare up in humans, scrambling genes from all three species in ways impossible to fully anticipate with vaccines. , a single pathogen could lay deadly siege to the rest of the living world. The reason this has yet to happen in our lifetimes is that, brilliant as nature is at devising ways to kill, it has also come up with countless ways to cope and survive. Put all the living species together and you have an impressive array of mechanisms to fend off pathogens or contain them in particular ecosystems that have defenses built in. . Malaria, currently the most prevalent cause of death in the world, can be ascribed almost entirely to human acts of deforestation, which produces stagnant pools of water and allows more sunlight to reach water surfaces. This intensifies the growth of algae and forms the perfect nursery for Anopheles mosquitoes, potent vectors for the malaria parasite. Anopheles barely had a foothold in the ecosystem in its former state, but when conditions changed—as in the Amazon, East Africa and Southeast Asia—vector mosquitoes quickly displaced other benign species. The spread of other diseases has followed a similar trajectory. Some snails, for instance, harbor parasitic worms called schistosomes, which infect the human bladder or intestines. In the Senegal River basin, populations of vector snails exploded upon construction of the Diama Dam in 1985, which made the water less saline. The region became a hotbed for schistosomiasis where it didn't exist before; currently, more than 200 million people are victims. Among flies, too, malignant species are winning out: as a result of deforestation, sand flies have surged into human populations in South America and South Asia, infecting millions each year with leishmaniasis, a protozoan parasite that causes skin ulcers and attacks the liver, spleen, and bone marrow With ecological collapse, the rapid proliferation of disease agents is only half of the gruesome picture; the other is the demise of nonthreatening species. In recent years, disease ecologists Richard Ostfeld and Felicia Keesing have shown how a diversity of species in an ecosystem actually works to suppress infectious diseases. the more species there are, the better the chances for a pathogen to be blocked. Ostfeld and Keesing call this the "dilution effect." In healthy ecosystems—say, one with a high diversity of snails or mosquitoes where the dilution effect is strong and infectious disease is better contained—competition from nonvector snails or mosquitoes keeps the vector populations in check. So the loss of biodiversity is itself a threat to public health, and not only in the deforested Amazon; the denatured suburbs of the United States bear increasing risks, the patchy woodlands interspersed among suburban homes are breeding grounds for Lyme disease, a flulike illness that can produce neurological disorders and become impossible to cure. The ideal incubator for the Lyme bacterium is the white-footed mouse, a remarkable survivor in fragmented habitats. Infected mice don't get sick, but they allow the pathogen to multiply and pass it on to ticks who feed on all the local mammals, including humans. Other kinds of forest life—opossums, thrushes, flying squirrels—don't transmit the disease as well to ticks (they're "incompetent hosts"), but fewer and fewer of them remain in the forests.
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Biodiversity is key to stop catastrophic pandemics—malaria and lyme disease prove
| 6,885 | 81 | 3,631 | 1,115 | 11 | 575 | 0.009865 | 0.515695 |
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While industrial agriculture contributes directly to climate¶ change through no less than one-third of total emissions of the¶ major greenhouse gases — carbon dioxide (CO2¶ ), methane (CH4¶ ),¶ and nitrous oxide (N2¶ O), small biodiverse organic farms have¶ the opposite effect by increasing the sequestration of carbon in¶ soils. Small farmers usually treat their soils with organic compost materials which absorb and sequester carbon better than¶ soils that are farmed with conventional fertilizers. Researchers¶ have suggested that the conversion of 10,000 small-to-medium sized farms to organic production, would allow to store so much¶ carbon in the soil that it would be equivalent to taking 1,170,000¶ cars off the road (Rosenzweig and Hillel 1998).¶ Further climate amelioration contributions by small farms accrue from the fact that most use significantly less fossil fuel in¶ comparison to conventional agriculture mainly due to a reduction of chemical fertilizer and pesticide use, relying instead on¶ organic manures, legume-based rotations and diversity schemes¶ to enhance beneficial insects. Farmers that live in rural communities near cities and towns and linked to local markets,¶ avoid the energy wasted and the gas emissions associated with¶ transporting food hundreds and even thousands of miles.
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Altieri 8 (Miguel Altierei Professor of Agro ecology at the Department¶ of Environmental Science, Policy and Management at the University of¶ California, Berkeley since 1981. He is a member of the Steering¶ Committee of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization¶ (FAO)’s Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS)¶ programmer, whose goal is to dynamically conserve the world’s remaining¶ traditional farming systems. He is also President of the Latin American¶ Scientific Society of Agro ecology (SOCLA) and Coordinator of the¶ International Agro ecology Program of the Center for the Study of the¶ Americas in Berkeley. He periodically lectures at universities in the USA,¶ Latin America and Europe, and provides technical expertise to¶ international organizations as well as farmers’ organizations and nongovernmental organizations throughout the world. He is the author of 12¶ books, including Agro ecology: The Science of Sustainable Agriculture¶ and Biodiversity and Pest Management in Agro ecosystems, as well as¶ more than 250 scientific journal articles “Small Farms as a Planetary Ecological¶ Asset: Five Key Reasons Why We Should¶ Support the Revitalisation of Small¶ Farms in the Global South” http://agroeco.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/smallfarmes-ecolasset.pdf)- RT
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industrial agriculture contributes directly to climate¶ change through no less than one-third of total emissions of the¶ major greenhouse gases — carbon dioxide (CO2¶ ), methane (CH4¶ ),¶ and nitrous oxide (N2¶ O), small biodiverse organic farms have¶ the opposite effect by increasing the sequestration of carbon in¶ soils. Small farmers usually treat their soils with organic compost materials which absorb and sequester carbon better than¶ soils that are farmed with conventional fertilizers. the conversion of 10,000 small-to-medium sized farms to organic production, would allow to store so much¶ carbon in the soil that it would be equivalent to taking 1,170,000¶ cars off the road Further climate amelioration contributions by small farms accrue from the fact that most use significantly less fossil fuel in¶ comparison to conventional agriculture mainly due to a reduction of chemical fertilizer and pesticide use, relying instead on¶ organic manures, legume-based rotations and diversity schemes¶ to enhance beneficial insects Farmers that live in rural communities near cities and towns and linked to local markets,¶ avoid the energy wasted and the gas emissions associated with¶ transporting food hundreds and even thousands of miles.
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Small farms are key to cool the climate—independently key to slow down global warming
| 1,316 | 86 | 1,245 | 195 | 14 | 186 | 0.071795 | 0.953846 |
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The Energy Secretary predicted that UK will be “exposed to the shocking and alarming” consequences of a warmer world. Unchecked, climate change poses “a systemic threat” to the international order, he said.¶ Mr Huhne made the prediction in a speech to the Royal United Services Institute, a military think-tank.¶ The speech is meant to pave the way for a White Paper next week that will set out plans to boost the use of nuclear power and “renewable” energy sources like wind farms.¶ “With luck, the UK may well escape the worst physical impacts. But in a connected world, we will be exposed to the global consequences. And they are both alarming and shocking,” he said.¶ “A changing climate will imperil food, water, and energy security. It will affect human health, trade flows, and political stability.”¶ A hotter planet will mean that crop failures are more common and water is more scarce, Mr Huhne predicted. That could mean conflicts between states for such resources.¶ That could also mean huge movements of populations, with people fleeing the worst-hit areas for those less affected.¶ “The knock-on effects will not stop at our borders,” Mr Huhne said. “Climate change will affect our way of life – and the way we order our society. It threatens to rip out the foundations on which our security rests.”
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Kirkup 11 (July 7, 2011 James Kirkup Political Correspondent for the Telegraph “Chris Huhne: Climate change threatens UK security” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/8622945/Chris-Huhne-Climate-change-threatens-UK-security.html)- RT
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exposed to the shocking and alarming” consequences of a warmer world Unchecked, climate change poses “a systemic threat” to the international order But in a connected world, we will be exposed to the global consequences. And they are both alarming and shocking,” he said. “A changing climate will imperil food, water, and energy security. It will affect human health, trade flows, and political stability.” A hotter planet will mean that crop failures are more common and water is more scarce That could mean conflicts between states for such resources. That could also mean huge movements of populations, with people fleeing the worst-hit areas for those less affected. “The knock-on effects will not stop at our borders,” Mr Huhne said. “Climate change will affect our way of life – and the way we order our society. It threatens to rip out the foundations on which our security rests.”
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Climate Change causes conflict
| 1,312 | 31 | 888 | 221 | 4 | 147 | 0.0181 | 0.665158 |
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Nanotechnology, often touted as a key to maintaining the United States' global lead in industrial productivity, is far from a sure thing for the U.S., according to the warnings of experts who last week offered lawmakers varying assessments of the likelihood that the country will be able to capture nano's economic benefits and varying prescriptions for doing so. "The manufacturing train has already left the station" in some fields of nanomaterials, Matthew Nordan of New York-based Lux Research Inc. told the House Science Subcommittee on Research at a June 29 hearing titled "Nanotechnology: Where Does the U.S. Stand?" Any revitalization of the U.S. manufacturing base through nanotechnology could end up limited to "pilot-scale manufacturing and manufacturing where specific skills are required," he testified, characterizing these activities as "generally low volume." When it comes to the production of more basic nanoproducts, he stated, "the U.S.'s economic opportunity is in coming up with the ideas that may be implemented in manufacturing plants on other shores." Nordan's fellow witnesses -- venture capitalist Floyd Kvamme, who co-chairs the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and Sean Murdock, executive director of the nanotechnology policy and commercialization advocacy group NanoBusiness Alliance -- appeared less "prepared to cede the manufacturing of nanotechnology-enabled products here in the United States," as Murdock put it. But the three did agree in their fundamental assessment of the present: All view the United States as the world leader in nanotechnology up to now, and all regard its lead as imperiled. Kvamme, citing an estimate contained in the review of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) published by PCAST in May, testified that the $1 billion in federal funding for nano R&D in Fiscal Year 2005 "is roughly one-quarter of the current global investment by all nations." He placed the U.S.'s overall annual nano R&D effort at $3 billion, "one-third of the approximately $9 billion in total worldwide spending by the public and private sectors." Additionally, the U.S. "leads in the number of start-up companies based on nanotechnology and in research output as measured by patents and publications." Still, Kvamme said, the U.S. is coming under "increased competitive pressure," as "other countries are aggressively chasing [its] leadership position," both by beefing up coordinated national programs and by focusing investments on "areas of existing national economic strength." The U.S. lead in patents and publications, he added, "appears to be slipping." According to Nordan, whose company's figures were cited repeatedly by PCAST it its report, even the U.S.'s current R&D spending lead is open to question. On the basis of purchasing-power parity, 2004 government spending on nano R&D in the U.S., at $5.42 per capita, came in below South Korea's $5.62, Japan's $6.30, and Taiwan's $9.40. "The $130 million in estimated government spending on nanotech last year in China equaled $611 million at purchasing-power parity, or 38 percent of U.S. expenditure," Nordan noted. That nations like China are free to direct "initial capital investments toward the instrumentation needed for nanotechnology research, without having to maintain technology infrastructures and skill sets that were cutting-edge 20 years ago" could add to the comparative bang they're getting for their bucks. A figure cited in Murdock's testimony seems to corroborate this assumption. In the period January to August 2004, China led the world in research papers on nanotechnology, presenting 14 percent more than the U.S. And while the U.S., according to the NanoBusiness Alliance's database, accounted for 613 of 1,175 companies worldwide that are "involved with nanotechnology," Murdock said that "if one is to believe the announcements made at the ChinaNano2005 trade expo," China now has almost 800 such companies. Keeping the edge in R&D is critical to Nordan because he believes that, for the U.S., the economic advantage to be derived from nanotechnology begins and ends with intellectual property (IP). He pointed to Japan's Frontier Carbon, whose 40-ton-per-year capacity for the manufacture of fullerenes, based on a process licensed from an MIT spinoff company, surpasses last year's total world demand by more than 25 times. "It's unlikely," he told the subcommittee, "that you're going to find U.S.-based companies investing that far ahead of demand in order to attain manufacturing dominance" in basic nanomaterials. The U.S. cannot maintain an edge, he argued, by offering "low labor costs or tax advantages for capital investment in manufacturing facilities" in an attempt to "go toe-to-toe against...countries that have more runway to go down in terms of economic development based on nanotechnology." Nor, he said, can it prevent the transfer overseas of research, whether "through a patent process [or] to a country that perhaps does not have the respect for intellectual property rights that Western European and U.S. nations hold." Instead, the U.S. should seek "to have an unremitting, relentless flow of novel ideas that take time and keep us continually two, three, five years ahead of what other countries can attain," Nordan maintained. "The achievement that we can drive toward is to always be ahead and always be first to market with those novel ideas, and through that I think we'll attain economic rewards." Murdock, while concurring on the importance of enforcing IP laws, countered that keeping manufacturing in the U.S. is critical to the nation's economic health. "I believe that we need to endeavor to be more than just IP companies," he stated, in view of a projection by Nordan's firm that "new, emerging nanotechnology applications will...becom[e] incorporated into 15 percent of global manufacturing output totaling $2.6 trillion in 2014." "If you look at the total value associated with any product, most of the value tends to accrue to those that are closest to the customer -- that, in fact, make it. And while IP may have higher margins, ultimately there is a big value pool out there, and we need to ensure that we're taking steps to capture the value. "Furthermore, IP is not the only source of intellectual capital," Murdock added. "There is know-how. And that is the reason for the importance of manufacturing. Ultimately, when we move from the knowledge or the proof of principle into making the stuff, we develop process knowledge. That process knowledge helps us to refine and improve both the quality of the product and the throughput, and it increases the marginal productivity of the labor. That is what enables us to pay high wages and keep jobs here. "So while we need to be realistic and understand that this is a global economy, we also need to take steps to do what we can to ensure that we do commercialize and manufacture the set of technologies that we can here."
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Manufacturing and Technology News 5 (“Lack of Manufacturing Base Imperils U.S. Lead in Nanotechnology” pg online @ http://www.manufacturingnews.com/news/05/0708/art1.html //um-ef)
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Nanotech often touted as a key to maintaining the United States' global lead in industrial productivity, is far from a sure thing for the U.S The manufacturing train has already left the station" in some fields of nanomaterials, Any revitalization of the U.S. manufacturing base through nanotechnology could end up limited to "pilot-scale manufacturing and manufacturing where specific skills are required All view the United States as the world leader in nanotechnology up to now, and all regard its lead as imperiled the U.S. "leads in the number of start-up companies based on nanotechnology and in research output as measured by patents and publications." the U.S. is coming under "increased competitive pressure," as "other countries are aggressively chasing [its] leadership position by beefing up coordinated national programs and by focusing investments on "areas of existing national economic strength." The U.S. lead appears to be slipping "The $130 million in estimated government spending on nanotech last year in China equaled $611 million at purchasing-power parity, or 38 percent of U.S. expenditure That nations like China are free to direct "initial capital investments toward the instrumentation needed for nanotechnology research, without having to maintain technology infrastructures and skill sets that were cutting-edge 20 years ago" could add to the comparative bang they're getting for their bucks China now has almost 800 such companies. Keeping the edge in R&D is critical for the U.S., the economic advantage to be derived from nanotechnology begins and ends with intellectual property (IP). The U.S. cannot maintain an edge by offering "low labor costs or tax advantages for capital investment in manufacturing facilities" in an attempt to "go toe-to-toe against...countries that have more runway to go down in terms of economic development based on nanotechnology Instead, the U.S. should seek "to have an unremitting, relentless flow of novel ideas that take time and keep us continually two, three, five years ahead of what other countries can attain," Furthermore, IP is not the only source of intellectual capital," Murdock added. "There is know-how. And that is the reason for the importance of manufacturing. Ultimately, when we move from the knowledge or the proof of principle into making the stuff, we develop process knowledge That process knowledge helps us to refine and improve both the quality of the product and the throughput, and it increases the marginal productivity of the labor. That is what enables us to pay high wages and keep jobs here we also need to take steps to do what we can to ensure that we do commercialize and manufacture the set of technologies that we can here."
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Manufacturing base key to prevent Chinese Leadership in nanotech and ensure U.S. Leadership
| 6,980 | 91 | 2,728 | 1,099 | 13 | 432 | 0.011829 | 0.393085 |
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“We at the Center for the Survival of Western Democracies, Inc., believe that the West being what it is at present, there is only one scenario. Two countries could develop nuclear weapons by 1945: the United States and Germany. The latter did not launch a Manhattan Project, since no one could vouch to Hitler in 1939 that nuclear weapons were possible within a few years, and he committed all available resources to the conventional war for world domination. The U.S. Manhattan Project started up, and finally, in 1942, came into its own for fear that Germany would develop nuclear weapons ahead of the United States. Similarly, two countries can develop molecular nano assemblers: the United States and China. The latter launched in 1986 Project 863, a Manhattan Project for the development of post-nuclear superweapons in seven fields, and, at the close of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st, molecular nano technology became the eighth field. The United States has not launched a Manhattan Project for the development of any post-nuclear superweapons, and certainly not, of molecular nanoweapons. In 1969 President Nixon announced the U.S. termination of development of post-nuclear weapons, and it has been terminated, according to my research, not my benevolence. Just as Lloyd George in England up to 1939 dreamed aloud about having a statesman as great as Hitler at the head of the British government, the Western political establishment has been in love with the dictatorship of China. So, the United States has no need for molecular nano assemblers and the defense against them. In 1939 Hitler made a fatal mistake: he grabbed Òthe rump of Czechoslovakia,Ó and the democratic West woke up. Imagine the dictatorship of China suddenly invading Mexico! But the Chinese strategists regard such a war as purely Western and old-fashioned (see ÒUnrestricted WarfareÓ). In a modern war (which, ironically, the United States initiated by using nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945), a geostrategist confronts the enemy with annihilation or unconditional surrender. Let us now look at the article ÒResponsible Nanotechnology.Ó At the CSWD, Inc., we believe that the only responsible molecular nanotechnology is for the U.S. government to launch a nanotech Manhattan Project on the basis of the Foresight Institute, with Eric Drexler, the founder of nanotechnology, at the head of the Project. Incidentally, the Advisory Board of the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology consists of distinguished, gifted individuals who might become the core of the nanotech Manhattan Project. Great was my shock when I had read the article posted by or on behalf of CRN. Here are its eight ÒscenariosÓ of the future of mankind (which the article presents out of numerical sequence): Scenario 6. ÒMolecular manufacturingÓ develops Òquickly enough,Ó but mankind lives happily ever after. But what about the possibility of a molecular nano attack, launched by the dictatorship of China on the West? What? Don't you know that China is as peaceful as the democratic West thought Germany was peaceful in 1938? Scenario 5. The same as Scenario 6 but Òmolecular manufacturing technologyÓ develops slowly, which is even better. Scenario 4. The leading world powers take a close look at the first three scenarios we've described [the article describes 4 after 6 and 5], decide to avoid them at all costs, and agree to work together to avoid geopolitical meltdown. We at CRN believe that sovereign nations ultimately may cooperate in this way, since the alternatives appear to suck! Again, China is no problem even if China gets molecular manufacturing capability first. Surely China will not annihilate the West even in this case, but will work together. What about the United States? Even [!] if the United States gets molecular manufacturing capability first, and certain elements inside the government intend to oppress the rest of the world with it, we can hope that other powerful entities in the U.S. will be more sensible and influential. The above suggests that the form of government in the United States is much more dangerous for the world than that in China, the largest dictatorship in world history. Inside the U.S. government Òcertain elementsÓ may Òintend to oppress the rest of the world.Ó Not inside the government of China, which presumably consists of American liberal Democrats and peaceniks only. Scenario 3. Two or more competent nations develop molecular manufacturing capability at about the same time. Fearing the potential military advantage this could provide for their adversary, they each begin rapid and massive development of hideously powerful new weaponry. The resulting arms race is almost certain to be highly unstable, for several reasons. This scenario can be considered an existential risk for the human race. Can you imagine the dictators of China, hearing of Òexistential risk for the human raceÓ? They will develop a severe depression, and the American doctors talking depression on TV will have to treat them. Scenario 2 A major Asian nation achieves robust molecular nanotechnology manufacturing ahead of anyone else, and as a result the U.S. becomes something of a backwater. As I was reading this, I could imagine only China in this role. I guessed right! But never mind, for China (if it's them) could turn increasingly open/democratic as they continue to develop economically and scientifically isn't it? Of course! Remember how increasingly open/democratic Germany turned as it developed economically and scientifically after 1933? If one knows nothing about a foreign country, he or she can well daydream about its being open/democratic. Remember how President Roosevelt's spouse and his ambassador in Moscow admired and extolled openness and democracy in Stalin's Russia? Scenario 1. The United States of America is the first to develop molecular technology manufacturing, and as a result can rule the world. Surely this is better than the nano annihilation..”
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Lev Navrozov 2004 (Winner of the Albert Einstein Prize for Outstanding Intellectual Achievements, “The Center for Responsible Nanotechnology ‘Plans Ahead’
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the West being what it is at present, there is only one scenario. two countries can develop molecular nano assemblers: the United States and China he United States has not launched a Manhattan Project for the development of any post-nuclear superweapons, and certainly not, of molecular nanoweapons. In a modern war a geostrategist confronts the enemy with annihilation or unconditional surrender believe that the only responsible molecular nanotechnology is for the U.S. government to launch a nanotech Manhattan Project on the basis of the Foresight Institute what about the possibility of a molecular nano attack, launched by the dictatorship of China on the West? even if China gets molecular manufacturing capability first. Surely China will not annihilate the West even in this case, but will work together. What about the United States? Even [!] if the United States gets molecular manufacturing capability first, and certain elements inside the government intend to oppress the rest of the world with it, we can hope that other powerful entities in the U.S. will be more sensible and influential ajor Asian nation achieves robust molecular nanotechnology manufacturing ahead of anyone else, and as a result the U.S. becomes something of a backwater I could imagine only China in this role for China (if it's them) could turn increasingly open/democratic as they continue to develop economically and scientifically isn't it If one knows nothing about a foreign country, he or she can well daydream about its being open/democratic. Remember how President Roosevelt's spouse and his ambassador in Moscow admired and extolled openness and democracy in Stalin's Russia? Scenario 1. The United States of America is the first to develop molecular technology manufacturing, and as a result can rule the world. Surely this is better than the nano annihilation..”
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Chinese Leadership guarantees extinction
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The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as the U.S. defense industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past. Defense industrial issues are too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts. But the overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces utilize does have national security resonance. Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military technology has become an essential element of American military power in the modern era—not only for winning wars but for deterring them. That requires world-class scientific and manufacturing capabilities—which in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace.
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O’Hanlon et al 12 (Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute Rebecca Grant, IRIS Research Robert P. Haffa, Haffa Defense Consulting Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution Peter W. Singer, The Brookings Institution Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting Barry Watts, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments “The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense Industrial Policy January 2012,” pg online @ http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon //um-ef)
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the U.S. defense industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past Defense industrial issues are too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts But the overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces utilize does have national security resonance Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military technology has become an essential element of American military power in not only for winning wars but for deterring them That requires world-class manufacturing capabilities—which in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities for the U S in a globalized marketplace
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Manufacturing capabilities key to technology necessary for U.S. deterrence
| 859 | 74 | 689 | 132 | 9 | 108 | 0.068182 | 0.818182 |
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Since the 1950s, the US defense industrial base has been a source of long-term strategic advantage for the United States, just as it was during World War II. American defense companies provided the bombers and missiles on which nuclear deterrence rested and armed the US military with world-class weapons, including low-observable aircraft, wide-area surveillance and targeting sensors, and reliable guided munitions cheap enough to be employed in large numbers. They also contributed to the development of modern digital computers, successfully orbited the first reconnaissance satellites, put a man on the moon in less than a decade, and played a pivotal role in developing the worldwide web. Critics have long emphasized President Eisenhower’s warning in his farewell television address that the nation needed to “guard against the acquisition of undue influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.” Usually forgotten or ignored has been an earlier, equally important, passage in Eisenhower’s January 1961 speech: A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. Eisenhower’s warning about undue influence, rather than the need to maintain American military strength, tends to dominate contemporary discussions of the US defense industrial base. While the percentage of US gross domestic product going to national defense remains low compared to the 1950s and 1960s, there is a growing list of defense programs that have experienced problems with cost, schedule, and, in a few cases, weapon performance. In fairness, the federal government, including the Department of Defense and Congress, is at least as much to blame for many of these programmatic difficulties as US defense firms. Nevertheless, those critical of the defense industry tend to concentrate on these acquisition shortcomings. The main focus of this report is on a larger question. How prepared is the US defense industrial base to meet the needs of the US military Services in coming decades? The Cold War challenge of Soviet power has largely ebbed, but new challenges have emerged. There is the immediate threat of the violence stemming from SalafiTakfiri and Khomeinist terrorist groups and their state sponsors, that have consumed so much American blood and treasure in Iraq; the longer-term challenge of authoritarian capitalist regimes epitomized by the rise of China and a resurgent Russia; and, not least, the worsening problem of proliferation, particularly of nuclear weapons. In the face of these more complex and varied challenges, it would surely be premature to begin dismantling the US defense industry. From a competitive perspective, therefore, the vital question about the defense industrial base is whether it will be as much a source of long-term advantage in the decades ahead as it has been since the 1950s.
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Watts 2008 (Senior Fellow @ The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Barry D, “The US Defense Industrial Base, Past, Present and Future,” CBA, __http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In.pdf__)
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the US defense industrial base has been a source of long-term strategic advantage for the United States American defense companies provided the bombers and missiles on which nuclear deterrence rested and armed the US military with world-class weapons, including low-observable aircraft, wide-area surveillance and targeting sensors, and reliable guided munitions cheap enough to be employed in large numbers A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction The main focus of this report is on a larger question. How prepared is the US defense industrial base to meet the needs of the US military Services in coming decades? challenges have emerged There is the immediate threat of the violence stemming from terrorist groups and their state sponsors, the rise of China and a resurgent Russia; and, not least, the worsening problem of proliferation In the face of these more complex and varied challenges, it would surely be premature to begin dismantling the US defense industry the vital question about the defense industrial base is whether it will be as much a source of long-term advantage in the decades ahead as it has been since the 1950s
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Defense industrial base deters war with Russia
| 2,973 | 46 | 1,289 | 460 | 7 | 210 | 0.015217 | 0.456522 |
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Manufacturing, R&D and the U.S. Innovation Ecosystem Perhaps the greatest contribution of manufacturing to the U.S. economy as a whole involves the disproportionate role of the manufacturing sector in R&D. The expansion in the global market for high-value-added services has allowed the U.S. to play to its strengths by expanding its trade surplus in services, many of them linked to manufacturing, including R&D, engineering, software production and finance. Of these services, by far the most important is R&D. The United States has long led the world in R&D. In 1981, U.S. gross domestic expenditure on R&D was more than three times as large as that of any other country in the world. And the U.S. still leads: in 2009, the most recent year for which there is available data, the United States spent more than 400 billion dollars. European countries spent just under 300 billion dollars combined, while China spent about 150 billion dollars.14 In the United States, private sector manufacturing is the largest source of R&D. The private sector itself accounts for 71 percent of total R&D in the United States, and although U.S. manufacturing accounts for only 11.7 percent of GDP in 2012, the manufacturing sector accounts for 70 percent of all R&D spending by the private sector in the U.S.15 And R&D and innovation are inextricably connected: a National Science Foundation survey found that 22 percent of manufacturers had introduced product innovations and the same percentage introduced process innovations in the period 2006-2008, while only 8 percent of nonmanufacturers reported innovations of either kind.16 Even as the manufacturing industry in the United States underwent major changes and suffered severe job losses during the last decade, R&D spending continued to follow a general upward growth path. A disproportionate share of workers involved in R&D are employed directly or indirectly by manufacturing companies; for example, the US manufacturing sector employs more than a third of U.S. engineers.17 This means that manufacturing provides much of the demand for the U.S. innovation ecosystem, supporting large numbers of scientists and engineers who might not find employment if R&D were offshored along with production. Why America Needs the Industrial Commons Manufacturing creates an industrial commons, which spurs growth in multiple sectors of the economy through linked industries. An “industrial commons” is a base of shared physical facilities and intangible knowledge shared by a number of firms. The term “commons” comes from communallyshared pastures or fields in premodern Britain. The industrial commons in particular in the manufacturing sector includes not only large companies but also small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which employ 41 percent of the American manufacturing workforce and account for 86 percent of all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. Suppliers of materials, component parts, tools, and more are all interconnected; most of the time, Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih point out, these linkages are geographic because of the ease of interaction and knowledge transfer between firms.18 Examples of industrial commons surrounding manufacturing are evident in the United States, including the I-85 corridor from Alabama to Virginia and upstate New York.19 Modern economic scholarship emphasizes the importance of geographic agglomeration effects and co-location synergies. 20 Manufacturers and researchers alike have long noted the symbiotic relationship that occurs when manufacturing and R&D are located near each other: the manufacturer benefits from the innovation, and the researchers are better positioned to understand where innovation can be found and to test new ideas. While some forms of knowledge can be easily recorded and transferred, much “know-how” in industry is tacit knowledge. This valuable tacit knowledge base can be damaged or destroyed by the erosion of geographic linkages, which in turn shrinks the pool of scientists and engineers in the national innovation ecosystem. If an advanced manufacturing core is not retained, then the economy stands to lose not only the manufacturing industry itself but also the geographic synergies of the industrial commons, including R&D. Some have warned that this is already the case: a growing share of R&D by U.S. multinational corporations is taking place outside of the United States.21 In particular, a number of large U.S. manufacturers have opened up or expanded R&D facilities in China over the last few years.22 Next Generation Manufacturing A dynamic manufacturing sector in the U.S. is as important as ever. But thanks to advanced manufacturing technology and technology-enabled integration of manufacturing and services, the very nature of manufacturing is changing, often in radical ways. What will the next generation of manufacturing look like? In 1942, the economist Joseph Schumpeter declared that “the process of creative destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.” By creative destruction, Schumpeter did not mean the rise and fall of firms competing in a technologically-static marketplace. He referred to a “process of industrial mutation— if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the new one.” He noted that “these revolutions are not strictly incessant; they occurred in discrete rushes that are separated from each other by spaces of comparative quiet. The process as a whole works incessantly, however, in the sense that there is always either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution.”23 As Schumpeter and others have observed, technological innovation tends to be clustered in bursts or waves, each dominated by one or a few transformative technologies that are sometimes called “general purpose technologies.” Among the most world-transforming general purpose technologies of recent centuries have been the steam engine, electricity, the internal combustion engine, and information technology.24 As epochal as these earlier technology-driven innovations in manufacturing processes and business models proved to be, they are rapidly being superseded by new technologydriven changes as part of the never-ending process of Schumpeterian industrial mutation. The latest wave of innovation in industrial technology has been termed “advanced manufacturing.” The National Science and Technology Council of the Executive Office of the President defines advanced manufacturing as “a family of activities that (a) depend on the use and coordination of information, automation, computation, software, sensing, and networking, and/or (b) make use of cutting edge materials and emerging capabilities enabled by the physical and biological sciences, for example, nanotechnology, chemistry, and biology. It involves both new ways to manufacture existing products and the manufacture of new products emerging from new advanced technologies.”25 Already computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) programs, combined with computer numerical control (CNC), allow precision manufacturing from complex designs, eliminating many wasteful trials and steps in finishing. CNC is now ubiquitous in the manufacturing sector and much of the employment growth occurring in the sector requires CNC skills or training. Information technology has allowed for enterprise resource planning (ERP) and other forms of enterprise software to connect parts of the production process (both between and within a firm), track systems, and limit waste when dealing with limited resources. Other areas in which advanced manufacturing will play a role in creating new products and sectors and changing current ones are: Supercomputing. America’s global leadership in technology depends in part on whether the U.S. can compete with Europe and Asia in the race to develop “exascale computing,” a massive augmentation of computer calculating power that has the potential to revolutionize predictive sci ences from meteorology to economics. According to the Advanced Scientific Computing Advisory Committee (ASCAC), “If the U.S. chooses to be a follower rather than a leader in exascale computing, we must be willing to cede leadership” in industries including aerospace, automobiles, energy, health care, novel material development, and information technology.26 Robotics: The long-delayed promise of robotics is coming closer to fulfillment. Google and other firms and research consortiums are testing robotic cars, and Nevada recently amended its laws to permit autonomous automobiles.27 Amazon is experimenting with the use of robots in its warehouses.28 Nanotechnology may permit manufacturing at extremely small scales including the molecular and atomic levels.29 Nanotechnology is also a key research component in the semiconductor indusmanutry, as government funding is sponsoring projects to create a “new switch” capable of supplanting current semiconductor technology.30 Photonics or optoelectronics, based on the conversion of information carried by electrons to photons and back, has potential applications in sectors as diverse as telecommunications, data storage, lighting and consumer electronics. Biomanufacturing is the use of biological processes or living organisms to create inorganic structures, as well as food, drugs and fuel. Researchers at MIT have genetically modified a virus that generates cobalt oxide nanowires for silicon chips.31 Innovative materials include artificial “metamaterials” with novel properties. Carbon nanotubes, for example, have a strength-to-weight ratio that no other material can match.32 Advanced manufacturing using these and other cuttingedge technologies is not only creating new products and new methods of production but is also transforming familiar products like automobiles. The rapid growth in electronic and software content in automobiles, in forms like GPS-based guidance systems, information and entertainment technology, anti-lock brakes and engine control systems, will continue. According to Ford, around 30 percent of the value of one of its automobiles is comprised by intellectual property, electronics and software. In the German automobile market, electronic content as a share of production costs is expected to rise from 20-30 percent in 2007 to 50 percent by 2020.33
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Lind 12 (Michael Lind is policy director of New America’s Economic Growth Program and a co-founder of the New America Foundation. Joshua Freedman is a program associate in New America’s Economic Growth Program. “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing Future,” pg online @ http://growth.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Lind,%20Michael%20and%20Freedman,%20Joshua%20-%20NAF%20-%20Value%20Added%20America%27s%20Manufacturing%20Future.pdf //um-ef)
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Perhaps the greatest contribution of manufacturing to the U.S. economy as a whole involves the disproportionate role of the manufacturing sector in R&D The expansion in the global market for high-value-added services has allowed the U.S. to play to its strengths by expanding its trade surplus in services linked to manufacturing, including R&D by far the most important is R&D. R&D spending by the private sector in the U.S And R&D and innovation are inextricably connected: A disproportionate share of workers involved in R&D are employed directly or indirectly by manufacturing companies the US manufacturing sector employs more than a third of U.S. engineers. manufacturing provides much of the demand for the U.S. innovation ecosystem, supporting large numbers of scientists and engineers who might not find employment if R&D were offshored along with production An “industrial commons” is a base of shared physical facilities and intangible knowledge shared by a number of firms The industrial commons in particular in the manufacturing sector includes not only large companies but also small and medium sized enterprises which employ 41 percent of the American manufacturing workforce and account for 86 percent of all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. Suppliers of materials, component parts, tools, and more are all interconnected Modern economic scholarship emphasizes the importance of geographic agglomeration effects and co-location synergies Manufacturers and researchers alike have long noted the symbiotic relationship that occurs when manufacturing and R&D are located near each other the manufacturer benefits from the innovation, and the researchers are better positioned to understand where innovation can be found and to test new ideas This valuable tacit knowledge base can be damaged or destroyed by the erosion of geographic linkages, which in turn shrinks the pool of scientists and engineers in the national innovation ecosystem a growing share of R&D by U.S. multinational corporations is taking place outside of the United States. Next Generation Manufacturing A dynamic manufacturing sector in the U.S. is as important as ever The latest wave of innovation in industrial technology has been termed “advanced manufacturing.” physical and biological sciences, for example, nanotechnology, chemistry, and biology. It involves both new ways to manufacture existing products and the manufacture of new products emerging from new advanced technologies areas in which advanced manufacturing will play a role are: Supercomputing America’s global leadership in technology depends in part on whether the U.S. can compete with Europe and Asia in the race to develop “exascale computing If the U.S. chooses to be a follower rather than a leader in exascale computing, we must be willing to cede leadership” in industries including aerospace, automobiles, energy, health care, novel material development, and information technology Robotics: The long-delayed promise of robotics is coming closer to fulfillment. Nanotech may permit manufacturing at extremely small scales including the molecular and atomic levels Biomanufacturing is the use of biological processes or living organisms to create inorganic structures, as well as food, drugs and fuel
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All levels of manufacturing and R&D are interconnected – a sustainable manufacturing base in the U.S. is critical to Advanced Manufacturing and R&D
| 10,440 | 147 | 3,272 | 1,531 | 23 | 488 | 0.015023 | 0.318746 |
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Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost every aspect of the sub-field. 2 First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. 3 Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them. 4 Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. 5 Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on international scene. 6 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on international relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding causal variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. 7 At the very least, they describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics. 8 Jervis tells us that the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. 9 Walt agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the international balance of threats. 10 Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. 11 Technology also lowers information & transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. 12 And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence 13 or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. 14 Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”, Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation; 15 to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technology inevitably drives nations to form a world state. 16 However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology changes people’s identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics. 17 Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as running between economic classes rather than nation-states. 18 Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place
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Taylor 2k4 (Mark, Professor of Political Science – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Politics of Technological Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions”, 4-1, http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor)
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Tech innovation is of central importance to the study of IR), affecting almost every aspect of the sub-field a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess tech capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states and hence have a role in calculations of war and alliance formation a nation’s tech ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them history also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on international scene shifts in both relative and absolute tech capability have a major impact on i r the importance of tech innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists tech is the very cornerstone of great power domination and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. tech change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the international balance of threats Tech lowers information & transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of international institutions Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue to Wendt’s tech inevitably drives nations to form a world state most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology changes people’s identities within society thereby affecting international politics. Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course of history,
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Independently, that innovation solves great power wars
| 4,513 | 54 | 1,811 | 655 | 7 | 272 | 0.010687 | 0.415267 |
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The convergence of "exponentially advancing technologies" will form a "super-intelligence" so formidable that it could avert war, according to one of the world's leading futurists. Dr. James Canton, CEO and chairman of the Institute for Global Futures, a San Francisco-based think tank, is author of the book "The Extreme Future" and an adviser to leading companies, the military and other government agencies. He is consistently listed among the world's leading speakers and has presented to diverse audiences around the globe. He will address the Air Force Command and Control Intelligence, Survelliance and Reconnaissance Symposium, which will be held Sept. 28 through 30 at the MGM Grand Hotel at Foxwoods in Ledyard, Conn., joining Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz and a bevy of other government and industry speakers. He offered a sneak preview of his symposium presentation and answered various questions about the future of technology and warfare in early August. "The superiority of convergent technologies will prevent war," Doctor Canton said, claiming their power would present an overwhelming deterrent to potential adversaries. While saying that the U.S. will build these super systems faster and better than other nations, he acknowledged that a new arms race is already under way. "It will be a new MAD for the 21st century," he said, referring to the Cold War-era acronym for Mutually Assured Destruction, the idea that a nuclear first strike would trigger an equally deadly response. It's commonly held that this knowledge has essentially prevented any rational state from launching a nuclear attack. Likewise, Doctor Canton said he believes rational nation states, considering this imminent technology explosion, will see the futility of nation-on-nation warfare in the near future. Plus there's the "socio-economic linking of the global market system." "The fundamental macroeconomics on the planet favor peace, security, capitalism and prosperity," he said. Doctor Canton projects that nations, including those not currently allied, will work together in using these smart technologies to prevent non-state actors from engaging in disruptive and deadly acts. As a futurist, Doctor Canton and his team study and predict many things, but their main area of expertise -- and the one in which he's personally most interested -- is advanced and emerging technology. "I see that as the key catalyst of strategic change on the planet, and it will be for the next 100 years," he said. He focuses on six specific technology areas: "nano, bio, IT, neuro, quantum and robotics;" those he expects to converge in so powerful a way. Within the information technology arena, Doctor Canton said systems must create "meaningful data," which can be validated and acted upon. "Knowledge engineering for the analyst and the warfighter is a critical competency that we need to get our arms around," he said. "Having an avalanche of data is not going to be helpful." Having the right data is. "There's no way for the human operator to look at an infinite number of data streams and extract meaning," he said. "The question then is: How do we augment the human user with advanced artificial intelligence, better software presentation and better visual frameworks, to create a system that is situationally aware and can provide decision options for the human operator, faster than the human being can?" He said he believes the answers can often be found already in what he calls 'edge cultures.' "I would look outside of the military. What are they doing in video games? What are they doing in healthcare? What about the financial industry?" Doctor Canton said he believes that more sophisticated artificial intelligence applications will transform business, warfare and life in general. Many of these are already embedded in systems or products, he says, even if people don't know it.
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Paone 9 (Chuck, 66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs for the US Air Force, 8-10-09, “Technology convergence could prevent war, futurist says,” http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123162500)
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The convergence of "exponentially advancing technologies" will form a "super-intelligence" so formidable that it could avert war according to Dr. James Canton He is consistently listed among the world's leading speakers The superiority of convergent technologies will prevent war," their power would present an overwhelming deterrent to potential adversaries rational nation states, considering this imminent technology explosion, will see the futility of nation-on-nation warfare in the near future Doctor Canton main area of expertise is advanced and emerging technology as the key catalyst of strategic change on the planet He focuses on six specific technology areas: "nano, bio, IT, neuro, quantum and robotics;" those he expects to converge in so powerful a way "Knowledge engineering for the analyst and the warfighter is a critical competency that we need to get our arms around more sophisticated artificial intelligence applications will transform business, warfare and life in general
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And, advanced manufacturing technology will make war IMPOSSIBLE (This card is dumb)
| 3,895 | 83 | 995 | 618 | 12 | 146 | 0.019417 | 0.236246 |
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Michigan (7-week)
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The ruthless mercantilism practiced by the CCP is thus a form of economic warfare. China's rulers seek to move as much of the world's manufacturing base to their country as possible, thus increasing the PRC's "comprehensive national strength" at the same time that it undermines U.S. national security by hollowing out America's industrial base in general and key defense-related sectors of the economy in particular. China will not lightly abandon this policy, which strengthens China as it weakens the U.S., and is an integral part of China's drive for Hegemony. China is Acquiring the Means to Project Force Far Beyond Taiwan. Many of China's military modernization efforts supersonic anti- ship cruise missiles, stealthy submarines, theater based missiles with terminal guidance systems are aimed specifically at U.S. forces and bases. By is acquiring weapons designed to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, the PRC is clearly preparing for a contest with the United States. Beijing is interested in deterring, delaying, or complicating U.S. assistance to Taiwan in the event of an invasion, so as to force a quick capitulation by the democratically elected Taiwan government. But while the near-term focus is Taiwan, many of China's new lethal capabilities are applicable to a wide range of potential operations beyond the Taiwan Strait. As the 2005 Report to Congress of the USCC report notes, "China is in the midst of an extensive force modernization program aimed at increasing its force projection capabilities and confronting U.S. and allied forces in the region." The rapid growth in China's military power not only threatens Taiwan and by implication the U.S. but U.S. allies throughout the Asian Pacific region. China possesses regional, even global ambitions, and is building a first-rate military to realize those ambitions. It is naive to view the PRC's military build-up as "merely" part of the preparations for an invasion of Taiwan in which American military assets in the Asian- Pacific will have to be neutralized.
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Steven Mosher 2/14/06 (President of the Population Research Institute, CQ Congressional Testimony, “Chinese Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy” pg lexis)
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China's rulers seek to move as much of the world's manufacturing base to their country as possible by hollowing out America's industrial base and key defense-related sectors of the economy this policy is an integral part of China's drive to Project Force Far Beyond Taiwan Beijing is interested in deterring, delaying, or complicating U.S. assistance to Taiwan in the event of an invasion, so as to force a quick capitulation by the democratically elected Taiwan government The rapid growth threatens Taiwan and the U.S
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Loss of manufacturing Risks a China-Taiwan War
| 2,030 | 46 | 519 | 319 | 7 | 84 | 0.021944 | 0.263323 |
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Why should those who support limited government and liberty care about what happens to manufacturing in America? Because manufacturing is a crucial component of who we are as a country. As far back as Alexander Hamilton, our founders understood that America’s merchants and industrialists would shape American society directly by providing jobs and indirectly by enhancing our nation’s economic might. Today, manufacturing continues to play that role as part of a maturing and stable manufacturing sector. Additionally, this key sector of the economy continues to provide Americans with better jobs and a greater quality of life. And despite what you may think, manufacturing today isn’t a small part of our economy. It is the key engine. If American manufacturing was its own country, it would have the world’s 8th-largest economy. With a manufacturing output nearly as great as the entire GDP of China and more than the economies of Australia, Belgium and Brazil combined, “made in America” is more than a slogan, it’s the American way. Yes, America is the world’s No. 1 manufacturer—its activities accounting for a staggering one-quarter of all manufacturing on the planet as recently as 2004. As significant as it is worldwide, it is its effects on our economy at home that are more noteworthy. Domestic manufacturing is vital to the rest of our economy. Nearly 14.5 million Americans work directly in the manufacturing industry and another 8 million do so in related industries such as wholesaling and finance. A phenomenon economists refer to as the multiplier effect causes the growth and expansion in the manufacturing sector to generate significant salutary effects on other sectors, resulting in more jobs, investment and innovation in those sectors as well. Today the manufacturing sector is responsible for 70 percent of all U.S. private-sector research and development. And more than half of all U.S. exports stem from domestic manufacturing. Much of America’s energy conservation activity is found here; American manufacturing is the center for a range of innovative technologies that reduce energy use and promote a cleaner environment. Letting this powerful engine slip away would be disastrous. But as the attentive reader knows, all is not well with American manufacturing. Although many claim it is the manufacturing sector itself which is to blame, the evidence rebuts this argument. U.S. companies are not running away from America. The latest available data indicates that U.S. manufacturers invested about $170 billion in factories and equipment in the United States in 2005, while their foreign investment to the rest of the world was only $39 billion. That means more than 80 percent of the investment by American firms stayed here at home. The truth is that a combination of recessions in the United States, strikingly high energy prices along with the predatory trading practices of many other countries have significantly eroded American manufacturing influence. Reaching a high of 53 percent of the economy in 1965, domestic manufacturing accounts for only 9 percent of GDP 40 years later. Not since the beginning of the industrial revolution has a lower percentage of Americans worked in American manufacturing as they do today. Tellingly, just since 2000, the manufacturing sector has lost nearly 3 million jobs. There can be no doubt, however, the manufacturing sector is under siege. The losses over time have been quite substantial. Now some in Washington wonder if manufacturing can make it all. Worse, they openly speculate it wouldn’t be missed. The idea that manufacturing can’t make it here in America is wrong-headed and dangerous. But perhaps greater than the economic disruption in the lives of the workforce and their companies is the incalculable loss of a manufacturing base for our nation as a whole. There are those in Washington who fail to appreciate the attendant decline in our nation’s security and flexibility in foreign affairs that results from the collapse of this sector. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the unipolarity that resulted presents the United States far greater responsibilities and concerns than those that existed during the Cold War. Yet, our failure to sustain our domestic manufacturing base and instead pursuing a strategy of relying on other countries for military products and technologies isn’t just short-sided, it’s dangerous. This decline in our country’s military readiness is a signal to the rest of the world that we may not be capable of defending our interests or allies. And perhaps one of the greatest lessons of the 20th century is that weakness at home is provocative. Essentially, we provoke rogue nations into taking ill-advised actions that must inevitably be countered by America’s military might. A policy that results in a diminished security for Americans, fewer jobs, a declining tax base for communities and states and that rejects our nation’s history is a policy that should be reassessed. Supporters of liberty and freedom recognize that American ingenuity and know-how is a core ingredient of our manufacturing sector and has led to much of the high standard of living we Americans take for granted. At our country’s founding and for much of its history, we’ve recognized the benefits of a strong and robust manufacturing sector. It is the mainstay for our nation’s exports, provides salaries nearly 25 percent higher than other sectors, supports the tax base in communities across the nation, and is essential to our nation’s security needs. It is a sector that should be welcomed and encouraged today.
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Cooper 7 (Horace Cooper, Senior Fellow and deputy director of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, “Making it in America”, April 04, 2007, http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/articles/making-it-america)
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manufacturing is a crucial component of who we are as a country manufacturing continues to play that role as part of a maturing and stable manufacturing sector. this sector of the economy continues to provide Americans with better jobs and a greater quality of life. today isn’t a small part of our economy. It is the key engine. If American manufacturing was its own country, it would have the world’s 8th-largest economy. With a manufacturing output nearly as great as the entire GDP of China and more than the economies of Australia, Belgium and Brazil combined, “made in America” is more than a slogan, it’s the American way America is the world’s No. 1 manufacturer—its activities accounting for a staggering one-quarter of all manufacturing on the planet As significant as it is worldwide, it is its effects on our economy at home that are more noteworthy. Domestic manufacturing is vital to the rest of our economy perhaps greater than the economic disruption in the lives of the workforce and their companies is the incalculable loss of a manufacturing base for our nation as a whole There are those in Washington who fail to appreciate the attendant decline in our nation’s security and flexibility in foreign affairs that results from the collapse of this sector our failure to sustain our domestic manufacturing base and instead pursuing a strategy of relying on other countries for military products and technologies isn’t just short-sided, it’s dangerous This decline in our country’s military readiness is a signal to the rest of the world that we may not be capable of defending our interests or allies. weakness at home is provocative. , we provoke rogue nations into taking ill-advised actions that must inevitably be countered by America’s military might A policy that results in a diminished security for Americans, fewer jobs, a declining tax base for communities and states and that rejects our nation’s history is a policy that should be reassessed.
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Manufacturing key to the economy and military readiness
| 5,605 | 55 | 1,971 | 895 | 8 | 326 | 0.008939 | 0.364246 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2,948 |
For two centuries, industrial and military self-sufficiency was America’s policy. It succeeded brilliantly. It protected against European adventurism in the 19th century. It enabled the nation to become the richest, most industrialized country in the world. And it allowed America to be the arsenal of democracy in the 20th century. Even when America disarmed following World War I and again after World War II, it still had the industrial capacity -- the potential -- to re-arm quickly if a threat emerged. And when one did, America’s factories quickly converted to war production, allowing the Allied forces to out produce and ultimately overwhelm the Axis powers in the 1940s and hold off the enemy during the Korean War. Following the Korean War, the U.S. defense industrial base was repeatedly modernized, again enabling the USA to cope with any foreign threat. And self-sufficiency was taken a step further during the Cold War as the United States actively led Europe, Japan and others in denying the Soviet Union the technologies, machinery, skills, and research they needed to keep apace — economically and militarily. That policy of strength and containment succeeded, too. The Soviet Union could not match the West, its people grew weary, and that empire broke into pieces. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, America seems to have quickly forgotten the older lessons and policies that long served it well. In a very real way, the mood of America in these first days of the 21st century is akin to that of America in the 1920s. Then, the "war to end wars" had ended. The threat was gone. America could return to the business of America, which was perceived to be business. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, America remains the sole super power. Americans are generally prosperous. And while as recently as the 1980s, the global competitiveness of domestic industries was a top concern of national leaders, their successors now focus on assuring stockholders higher share prices and American consumers a steady flow of inexpensively produced goods, regardless of where they are made. Once again, the business of America seems to be business. Today, a smaller, simpler, more trusting, view dominates. Terrorists are seen as the principal threat to national security. The emergence of China -- a one-party, repressive, Communist state — as an economic and military power is mainly seen not as a danger, but as a business opportunity. And global economics is treated as something analogous to celestial mechanics -- a self-driven, self-correcting system in which markets balance supply and demand, assuring ever more growth and development. But there is also something different about what America is doing now from what it did after World War I and World War II. Then, the United States shifted military production back to civilian uses and even though military expenditures were cut, the U.S. industrial base remained in America. The long-held policy of self-sufficiency was not disturbed. Unlike in the past, however, now that the Cold War is over, the U.S. industrial base is being taken apart, piece-by-piece, and relocated to other nations. In the process, much of American’s industrial and military production base is being sold to foreign interests, and more important a significant portion of it is being physically relocated into other nations, including our most likely strategic rival — China.
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Choate 2002 (Pat Choate, director of the Manufacturing Policy Project and Edward Miller, president of DSI, former economic treaty negotiator, 2002, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/reports/analysis.htm)
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For two centuries, industrial and military self-sufficiency was America’s policy. It succeeded brilliantly. It protected against European adventurism it allowed America to be the arsenal of democracy in the 20th century. Even when America disarmed following World War I and again after World War II, it still had the industrial capacity -- the potential -- to re-arm . And when one did, America’s factories quickly converted to war production allowing the Allied forces to out produce and ultimately overwhelm the Axis powers in the 1940s and hold off the enemy during the Korean War. the U.S. defense industrial base was repeatedly modernized, again enabling the USA to cope with any foreign threat And self-sufficiency was taken a step further during the Cold War as the United States actively led Europe, Japan and others in denying the Soviet Union the technologies, machinery, skills, and research they needed to keep apace — economically and militarily America seems to have quickly forgotten the older lessons and policies that long served it well the mood of America in these first days of the 21st century is akin to that of America in the 1920s With the collapse of the Soviet Union, America remains the sole super power Americans are generally prosperous Terrorists are seen as the principal threat to national security And global economics is treated as something analogous to celestial mechanics -- a self-driven, self-correcting system in which markets balance supply and demand, assuring ever more growth and development. the U.S. industrial base is being taken apart, piece-by-piece, and relocated to other nations. much of American’s industrial and military production base is being sold to foreign interests, and more important a significant portion of it is being physically relocated into other nations, including our most likely strategic rival — China
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Declining manufacturing competitiveness devastates the US economy and global leadership
| 3,423 | 87 | 1,873 | 554 | 10 | 297 | 0.018051 | 0.536101 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,949 |
I would like to begin my statement with a review of why manufacturing is vital to the U.S. economy. Since manufacturing only represents about 16 percent of the nation's output, who cares? Isn't the United States a post-manufacturing services economy? Who needs manufacturing? The answer in brief is that the United States economy would collapse without manufacturing, as would our national security and our role in the world. That is because manufacturing is really the foundation of our economy, both in terms of innovation and production and in terms of supporting the rest of the economy. For example, many individuals point out that only about 3 percent of the U.S. workforce is on the farm, but they manage to feed the nation and export to the rest of the world. But how did this agricultural productivity come to be? It is because of the tractors and combines and satellite systems and fertilizers and advanced seeds, etc. that came from the genius and productivity of the manufacturing sector. Similarly, in services -- can you envision an airline without airplanes? Fast food outlets without griddles and freezers? Insurance companies or banks without computers? Certainly not. The manufacturing industry is truly the innovation industry, without which the rest of the economy could not prosper. Manufacturing performs over 60 percent of the nation's research and development. Additionally, it also underlies the technological ability of the United States to maintain its national security and its global leadership. Manufacturing makes a disproportionately large contribution to productivity, more than twice the rate of the overall economy, and pays wages that are about 20 percent higher than in other sectors. But its most fundamental importance lies in the fact that a healthy manufacturing sector truly underlies the entire U.S. standard of living -because it is the principal way by which the United States pays its way in the world. Manufacturing accounts for over 80 percent of all U.S. exports of goods. America's farmers will export somewhat over $50 billion this year, but America's manufacturers export almost that much event month! Even when services are included, manufacturing accounts for two-thirds of all U.S. exports of goods and services. If the U.S. manufacturing sector were to become seriously impaired, what combination of farm products together with architectural, travel, insurance, engineering and other services could make up for the missing two-thirds of our exports represented by manufactures? The answer is "none." What would happen instead is the dollar would collapse, falling precipitously -- not to the reasonable level of 1997, but far below it -and with this collapse would come high U.S. inflation, a wrenching economic downturn and a collapse in the U.S. standard of living and the U.S. leadership role in the world. That, most basically, is why the United States cannot become a "nation of shopkeepers."
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Franklin J. Vargo, 10/01/03, National Association of Manufacturers, FNS, l/n
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manufacturing is vital to the U.S. economy the U S economy would collapse without manufacturing, as would our national security and our role in the world manufacturing is really the foundation of our economy, both in terms of innovation and production and in terms of supporting the rest of the economy The manufacturing industry is truly the innovation industry, without which the rest of the economy could not prosper Manufacturing performs over 60 percent of the nation's r and d it also underlies the technological ability of the U S to maintain its national security and its global leadership Manufacturing makes a disproportionately large contribution to productivity, more than twice the rate of the overall economy, and pays wages that are about 20 percent higher than in other sectors If the U.S. manufacturing sector were to become seriously impaired the dollar would collapse, falling precipitously and with this collapse would come high U.S. inflation, a wrenching economic downturn and a collapse in the U.S. standard of living and the U.S. leadership role in the world
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Manufacturing key to the U.S. Economy and Global Leadership
| 2,953 | 59 | 1,082 | 467 | 9 | 175 | 0.019272 | 0.374732 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,950 |
Beneath the forests of Alberta, 2,300 miles miles northwest of Buffalo, you’ll find the latest black gold: a mix of sand and oil being mined as a new kind of gusher.¶ And Alberta’s Athabasca Oil Sands are just part of a petroleum boom that has made Canada the world’s top supplier of oil to the United States.¶ The boom could make its way to Buffalo through two proposed pipelines that would carry Canadian oil through Western New York to refineries in the Philadelphia area.¶ The boom also serves as a backdrop for two of the big issues in the U. S. presidential race between Sens. Barack Obama and John McCain: the future of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the U. S. oil supply.¶ NAFTA became a punching bag during the Democratic primary battle between Obama and Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton. But the treaty is one reason why the United States buys more oil from Canada than from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates — combined. The trade deal prohibits Canada from hoarding its oil reserves in these times of tight supplies and high prices, which might explain why Obama, the presumptive Democratic nominee, has backed away from his harsh rhetoric about the agreement.¶ But he has not backed away from questioning Canada’s mining of the carbon-laden heavy crude that it gets from the oil sands — which environmentalists consider a far greater contributor than traditional crude to global warming.¶ Thousands of U. S. jobs¶ Add it all up, and the next energy debate may not be about the oil the United States gets from the Arab nations in the Middle East, but the oil it gets from its neighbor to the north.¶ “Thousands upon thousands of jobs in the U. S. rely on that oil,” said Christopher Sands, a senior fellow at the Washington- based Hudson Institute think tank who specializes in¶ U. S.-Canadian relations. “And 25 percent of all of our untapped resources are there. That’s a big deal.”¶ While Congress has been mired in never-ending debates about drilling in Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and, more recently, off the U. S. coasts, Canada outstripped Saudi Arabia in 2004 as the top U. S. oil supplier.¶ Canada still pumps plenty of oil the traditional way, but now nearly half its output comes from the oil sands. Found beneath a vast forest the size of Florida, the sands contain an estimated 170 billion barrels of oil — the second largest reserve in the world, after Saudi Arabia.¶ For decades, the oil beneath that forest appeared too expensive to extract. But as oil prices have increased and supplies have dwindled, oil companies are expected to invest $100 billion in the coming years in the oil sands.¶ They’re mining near the surface — or more often, drilling deep underground — to extract an oil as thick as peanut butter. Once it’s processed to resemble traditional crude oil, much of it goes to refineries in the West and Midwest, then on to gas stations and to other uses.¶ ‘Proportionality clause’¶ With daily production projected to rise over the next decade to 4 million barrels from 1.3 million barrels, oil and pipeline companies have proposed 36 new pipeline projects — including two that cut through Western New York –to get that oil to potential customers.¶ Sunoco has proposed a 24- inch pipeline to carry Canadian crude from Buffalo to its Philadelphia refinery, possibly as soon as 2012. The pipeline would use the same right of way as the pipeline that brings gasoline to the Buffalo area from Philadelphia, said Thomas Golembeski, a Sunoco spokesman.¶ Enbridge, Canada’s leading pipeline company, has proposed a 30-inch pipeline using the same route.¶ The proposal is one of the company’s three alternatives for bringing crude from the oil sands into the Northeast, said Jennifer Varey, a company spokeswoman.¶ “We’re always looking for ways to expand our system,” Varey said. “And we’re seeing tremendous interest in getting Canadian crude into the Philadelphia market.”¶ Refineries there now rely on overseas imports that are increasingly being tapped by China and India. That can’t happen to the same degree to Canadian crude — all because of NAFTA.¶ The trade deal includes a “proportionality clause” that bars Canada from reducing its oil and gas shipments to the U. S. while increasing its domestic supply.¶ “We looked at whether Canada could reduce exports for the sake of conservation or environmental policy . . . or even for household heating. We cannot,” said John Dillon, co-author of a report on the issue published by the University of Alberta’s Parkland Institute and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.¶ But Canada might want to change all that if American politicians insist on renegotiating the trade deal.¶ Perhaps not surprisingly, Obama — who called NAFTA “devastating” and “a big mistake” during his campaign against Clinton — softened his criticism once he clinched the Democratic nomination.¶ “Sometimes during campaigns, the rhetoric gets overheated and amplified,” he told Fortune magazine in June, saying he was simply interested in “opening up a dialogue” with Canada and Mexico “and figuring out how we can make this work for all people.”¶ Campaign aides to McCain, the presumed Republican nominee, did not respond to a request for comment, but others suggested that, for Obama, a more careful approach to NAFTA only made sense.¶ “The Canadians might look for other options if we became difficult customers,” said Sands, of the Hudson Institute.¶ Yet while easing off his aggressive anti-NAFTA rhetoric, Obama remains likely to be a difficult customer for the Canadian oil industry. A strong proponent of developing alternative energy sources, the likely Democratic nominee appears concerned about a possible overreliance on the Canadian oil sands.¶ The oil from the sands contains more carbon, which makes it a bigger contributor than traditional sweet crude to global warming. Alberta, therefore, plans to spend $2 billion to capture and store the carbon removed from the oil.¶ “If it turns out that these technologies don’t advance, and the only way to produce these resources would be at a significant penalty to climate change, then we don’t believe that those resources are going to be part of the long-term . . . future,” Jason Grumet, Obama’s senior energy adviser, told reporters in June.¶ Environmental issues¶ Obama is not alone in worrying about the potential environmental cost of oil from the oil sands.¶ The U. S. Conference of Mayors passed a resolution in June encouraging mayors to refrain from buying higher-carbon fuels for municipal vehicles.¶ And Liz Barratt-Brown, a senior attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said: “There is a huge infrastructure investment being made in a fuel that, in our view, is taking us in the wrong direction. It’s making it more difficult for us to fully address the global warming issue.”¶ Environmentalists say Alberta’s “dirty oil” contains three times as much carbon as sweet crude, and they note that its production essentially involves strip-mining Alberta’s boreal forest and disrupting, if not destroying, all the wildlife there.¶ Oil industry officials and Alberta provincial leaders counter by saying they are doing everything they can to reduce the oil sands’ carbon footprint and protect the environment.¶ “Yes, it’s a heavier oil,” said Greg Stringham, vice president of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, who, nevertheless, disputes the notion that it has three times as much carbon than light sweet crude.¶ Taking into account transportation and production impacts, the carbon footprint of the sands oil is only about 10 percent greater than that of oil from other parts of the world, Stringham said.¶ He said he was confident that the Canadian oil will be seen as clean enough to be used in the United States for decades to come. And with the U. S. facing a dwindling oil supply from the Middle East and troublesome suppliers like Venezuela and Nigeria, some say it may have no choice but to look to Canada to provide a bridge to an oil-free future.
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Zremski 8- Staff Writer for the Buffalo News (Jerry “NAFTA paves U. S. route to energy from north”, August 17, 2008, http://oilsandstruth.org/nafta-paves-u-s-route-energy-north-0)//RT
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Alberta’s Athabasca Oil Sands are just part of a petroleum boom that has made Canada the world’s top supplier of oil to the United States. The boom could make its way to Buffalo through two proposed pipelines that would carry Canadian oil through Western New York to refineries in the Philadelphia area. The boom also serves as a backdrop for two of the big issues in the U. S. presidential race between Sens. Barack Obama and John McCain: the future of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the U. S. oil supply. NAFTA became a punching bag during the Democratic primary battle But the treaty is one reason why the United States buys more oil from Canada than from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates — combined. The trade deal prohibits Canada from hoarding its oil reserves in these times of tight supplies and high prices, Canada’s mining of the carbon-laden heavy crude that it gets from the oil sands — which environmentalists consider a far greater contributor than traditional crude to global warming. “Thousands upon thousands of jobs in the U. S. rely on that oil Canada outstripped Saudi Arabia in 2004 as the top U. S. oil supplier Canada still pumps plenty of oil the traditional way, but now nearly half its output comes from the oil sands. the sands contain an estimated 170 billion barrels of oil , the oil beneath that forest appeared too expensive to extract. But as oil prices have increased and supplies have dwindled, oil companies are expected to invest $100 billion in the coming years in the oil sands. They’re mining near the surface — or more often, drilling deep underground — to extract an oil as thick as peanut butter With daily production projected to rise over the next decade to 4 million barrels from 1.3 million barrels, oil and pipeline companies have proposed 36 new pipeline projects — including two that cut through Western New York –to get that oil to potential customers Refineries there now rely on overseas imports that are increasingly being tapped by China and India. That can’t happen to the same degree to Canadian crude — all because of NAFTA. The trade deal includes a “proportionality clause” that bars Canada from reducing its oil and gas shipments to the U. S. while increasing its domestic supply. A strong proponent of developing alternative energy sources, the likely Democratic nominee appears concerned about a possible overreliance on the Canadian oil sands. The oil from the sands contains more carbon, which makes it a bigger contributor than traditional sweet crude to global warming. Alberta, therefore, plans to spend $2 billion to capture and store the carbon removed from the oil. here is a huge infrastructure investment being made in a fuel that, in our view, is taking us in the wrong direction. It’s making it more difficult for us to fully address the global warming issue.” Environmentalists say Alberta’s “dirty oil” contains three times as much carbon as sweet crude, and they note that its production essentially involves strip-mining Alberta’s boreal forest and disrupting, if not destroying, all the wildlife there Oil industry officials and Alberta provincial leaders counter by saying they are doing everything they can to reduce the oil sands’ carbon footprint and protect the environment. Taking into account transportation and production impacts, the carbon footprint of the sands oil is only about 10 percent greater than that of oil from other parts of the world, Stringham said. He said he was confident that the Canadian oil will be seen as clean enough to be used in the United States for decades to come. And with the U. S. facing a dwindling oil supply from the Middle East and troublesome suppliers like Venezuela and Nigeria, some say it may have no choice but to look to Canada to provide a bridge to an oil-free future.
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NAFTA is key to the Canadian Oil Sands
| 8,059 | 39 | 3,837 | 1,333 | 8 | 652 | 0.006002 | 0.489122 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2,951 |
GLOBAL warming isn’t a prediction. It is happening. That is why I was so troubled to read a recent interview with President Obama in Rolling Stone in which he said that Canada would exploit the oil in its vast tar sands reserves “regardless of what we do.” ¶ If Canada proceeds, and we do nothing, it will be game over for the climate.¶ Canada’s tar sands, deposits of sand saturated with bitumen, contain twice the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by global oil use in our entire history. If we were to fully exploit this new oil source, and continue to burn our conventional oil, gas and coal supplies, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere eventually would reach levels higher than in the Pliocene era, more than 2.5 million years ago, when sea level was at least 50 feet higher than it is now. That level of heat-trapping gases would assure that the disintegration of the ice sheets would accelerate out of control. Sea levels would rise and destroy coastal cities. Global temperatures would become intolerable. Twenty to 50 percent of the planet’s species would be driven to extinction. Civilization would be at risk.¶ That is the long-term outlook. But near-term, things will be bad enough. Over the next several decades, the Western United States and the semi-arid region from North Dakota to Texas will develop semi-permanent drought, with rain, when it does come, occurring in extreme events with heavy flooding. Economic losses would be incalculable. More and more of the Midwest would be a dust bowl. California’s Central Valley could no longer be irrigated. Food prices would rise to unprecedented levels.¶ If this sounds apocalyptic, it is. This is why we need to reduce emissions dramatically. President Obama has the power not only to deny tar sands oil additional access to Gulf Coast refining, which Canada desires in part for export markets, but also to encourage economic incentives to leave tar sands and other dirty fuels in the ground.
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Hansen, 12 --- directs the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (5/9/2012, James, NYT, “Game Over for the Climate,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html?_r=0)
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Obama said Canada would exploit the oil in its vast tar sands reserves If Canada proceeds it will be game over for the climate Canada’s tar sands contain twice the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by global oil use in our entire history concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere eventually would reach levels higher than in the Pliocene era when sea level was at least 50 feet higher than it is now. That level of heat-trapping gases would assure that the disintegration of the ice sheets would accelerate out of control. Sea levels would rise and destroy coastal cities. Global temperatures would become intolerable. Twenty to 50 percent of the planet’s species would be driven to extinction. Civilization would be at risk. the Western U S and the semi-arid region from North Dakota to Texas will develop semi-permanent drought, with rain occurring in extreme events with heavy flooding. Economic losses would be incalculable Food prices would rise to unprecedented levels If this sounds apocalyptic, it is.
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Impact is extinction from runaway climate change
| 1,971 | 48 | 1,019 | 331 | 7 | 167 | 0.021148 | 0.504532 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2,952 |
Canadian Mining Invasion¶ Not only did NAFTA usher a flood of lower-priced staple foods into Mexico and increase migration away from rural areas, it also opened the door to a massive expansion in the mining sector. Canadian companies dominate this sector, making up the majority of foreign mining companies in the country.¶ In Oaxaca, Vancouver-based Fortuna Silver has been at the centre of a deadly split between townspeople who are for and against the mine. I had the chance to meet Bernardo Vแsquez, a prominent community activist and budding avocado farmer, before he was killed in March, 2012. He explained to me how the government of Oaxaca claims his community – the rural Zapotec village of San Jos้ del Progreso – is poor, but the people who live there have very basic needs and desires that could be fulfilled if locals had better access to irrigation and fair supports from government.¶ “The government calls us poor but we live well,” said Vแsquez. “The people say ‘we don’t want luxurious houses, or luxurious cars, we need water for our crops, we need fuel,’ that’s all we want, we don’t even need work. There’s a lot of work! What we don’t have is someone to pay us for it.”¶ Vแsquez was clear about how people in his community need access to money in order to supplement the crops they grow for sustenance. The mining company, he said, didn’t bring anything worthwhile to the table. Instead, it divided the community. “We have fields and lands, we have work, what we don’t have is cash to get paid in, and the company isn’t giving us money, they’ll give you chickens or little things like that, which the people don’t need,” he told me in an interview in February, 2012.¶ About a month after our interview, Vแsquez was murdered when an unknown assailant shot up his car on the road to San Jos้ Progreso. His cousin and brother, who were travelling with him, were both wounded in the attack.¶ Instead of contributing to improving the situation of rural farmers, mega-mining projects have time and again exacerbated local conflicts and created long term environmental and water management problems.
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Paley ’13 – editor-member of the Media Co-op (Dawn, “NAFTA AND FOOD IN MEXICO,” Third World Network Features, 3/7/13, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/susagri/2013/susagri261.htm)//ER
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Not only did NAFTA usher a flood of lower-priced staple foods into Mexico and increase migration away from rural areas, it also opened the door to a massive expansion in the mining sector. Canadian companies dominate this sector, making up the majority of foreign mining companies in the country.¶ the people who live there have very basic needs and desires that could be fulfilled if locals had better access to irrigation and fair supports from government.¶ people in his community need access to money in order to supplement the crops they grow for sustenance. The mining company, didn’t bring anything worthwhile to the table. Instead, it divided the community. Vแsquez was murdered when an unknown assailant shot up his car on the road to San Jos้ Progreso nstead of contributing to improving the situation of rural farmers, mega-mining projects have time and again exacerbated local conflicts and created long term environmental and water management problems.
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NAFTA causes Canadian Mining – leads to conflict and environmental and water disputes
| 2,113 | 86 | 965 | 362 | 13 | 155 | 0.035912 | 0.428177 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,953 |
Major international oil companies are buying off governments, according to the world's most prominent climate scientist, Prof James Hansen. During a visit to London, he accused the Canadian government of acting as the industry's tar sands salesman and "holding a club" over the UK and European nations to accept its "dirty" oil.¶ "Oil from tar sands makes sense only for a small number of people who are making a lot of money from that product," he said in an interview with the Guardian. "It doesn't make sense for the rest of the people on the planet. We are getting close to the dangerous level of carbon in the atmosphere and if we add on to that unconventional fossil fuels, which have a tremendous amount of carbon, then the climate problem becomes unsolvable."¶ Hansen met ministers in the UK government, which the Guardian previously revealed has secretly supported Canada's position at the highest level.¶ Canada's natural resources minister, Joe Oliver, has also visited London to campaign against EU proposals to penalise oil from Alberta's tar sands as highly polluting. "Canada can offer energy security and economic stability to the world," he said. Oliver also publicly threatened a trade war via the World Trade Organisation if the EU action went ahead: "Canada will not hesitate to defend its interests."¶ The lobbying for and against tar sands has intensified on both sides of the Atlantic as the EU moves forward on its proposals, which Canada fears could set a global precedent, and Barack Barack Obama considers approving the Keystone XL pipeline to transport tar sands oil from Canada to the US gulf coast refineries and ports. Canada's prime minister, Stephen Harper, was met by protesters when he visited New York last week to tell audiences that KXL "absolutely needs to go ahead".¶ Canada's tar sands are the third biggest oil reserve in the world, but separating the oil from the rock is energy intensive and causes three to four times more carbon emissions per barrel than conventional oil. Hansen argues that it would be "game over" for the climate if tar sands were fully exploited, given that existing conventional oil and gas is certain to be burned.
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Carrington, 13 (5/19/2013, Damian, “Tar sands exploitation would mean game over for climate, warns leading scientist; Prof James Hansen rebukes oil firms and Canadian government over stance on exploiting fossil fuel, which he says would make climate problem unsolvable,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/may/19/tar-sands-exploitation-climate-scientist, JMP)
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Major international oil companies are buying off governments, according to the world's most prominent climate scientist, Prof Hansen "Oil from tar sands makes sense only for a small number of people who are making a lot of money from that product," We are getting close to the dangerous level of carbon in the atmosphere and if we add on to that unconventional fossil fuels, which have a tremendous amount of carbon, then the climate problem becomes unsolvable." separating the oil from the rock is energy intensive and causes three to four times more carbon emissions per barrel than conventional oil. Hansen argues that it would be "game over" for the climate if tar sands were fully exploited, given that existing conventional oil and gas is certain to be burned.
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Canadian oil sands makes climate change unsolvable
| 2,183 | 50 | 768 | 364 | 7 | 129 | 0.019231 | 0.354396 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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As President Barack Obama faces a decision on whether to approve the Alberta-to-Texas Keystone XL pipeline, a study said Canadian oil sands release more planet-warming gases compared to other crudes than originally thought.¶ Oil sands refined in the United States released 9 percent more greenhouse gases last year than the average of other crudes processed in the country, according to the study released Wednesday by IHS CERA, an energy research group.¶ In 2010, the group estimated that the emissions from oil sands refined in the United States were only 6 percent higher than those from other crudes.¶ IHS CERA analyzed data from government, academic and industry sources to that conclude oil sands were more carbon intensive than thought two years ago.¶ Many environmentalists oppose oil sands crude projects because they believe the fuel is higher in emissions.¶ Still, IHS CERA played down the findings in the updated report. When it comes to emissions, oil sands crude is still in the league of many crude oils refined in the United States including petroleum from Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq and heavy oil from California, the group said.¶ "Although the numbers have shifted slightly ... the relative position of the oil sands compared to all the other sources of crude hasn't changed much," said IHS CERA director Jackie Forrest, an author of the report called "Oil Sands, Greenhouse Gases, and U.S. Oil Supply: Getting the Numbers Right -- 2012 Update."¶ Canada's energy sector is seeking new markets for its oil sands crude, with such projects as TransCanada Corp's Keystone XL pipeline to Texas and Enbridge Inc's Northern Gateway pipeline to Canada's Pacific Coast.¶ Obama blocked the Keystone XL in January, citing environmental concerns about the project in Nebraska. Obama will likely decide on the project, which supporters say will offer thousands of jobs, early in his second term.¶ Ahead of Obama's decision, green groups hope to persuade the administration that stopping the Keystone XL could reduce emissions by keeping some Canadian crude in the ground.¶ The Natural Resources Defense Council, an environmental group, has said life cycle emissions of oil sands are 8 to 37 percent higher than other crudes processed in the United States.¶ Responding to the IHS Cera report Bill McKibben, an author and environmental activist, called "tar sands fuel is the dirtiest fuel on Earth." His group plans to protest at the White House on Sunday about climate and Keystone XL.¶ Oil sands supporters say even if Keystone XL is stopped the Canadian petroleum will eventually be sent to the United States in other pipelines or get sent to other buyers such as China, making the "keep it underground" argument moot.¶ One supporter said the IHS CERA report simply reflected more accurate data now available.¶ Greg Stringham, vice president of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, the industry's main lobby group, said he is not alarmed by the higher average.¶ "We see it as being a similar range," compared to the earlier study, Stringham said. "But it does show that we need to push on the technology side to make sure that we continue to drive down to our objective to get that number smaller," he said.
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Reuters 12—Found on Fox Business, News Website( “U.S. Oil Sands Release More Greenhouse Gasses Than Other Crudes”, November 15, 2012, http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/11/15/us-oil-sands-release-more-greenhouse-gasses-than-other-crudes/)//RT
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Canadian oil sands release more planet-warming gases compared to other crudes than originally thought Oil sands refined in the United States released 9 percent more greenhouse gases last year than the average of other crudes processed in the country environmentalists oppose oil sands projects oil sands crude is still in the league of many crude oils refined in the United States including petroleum from Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq and heavy oil from California ." Canada's energy sector is seeking new markets for its oil sands crude green groups hope to persuade the administration that stopping the Keystone XL could reduce emissions by keeping some Canadian crude in the ground. . Oil sands supporters say even if Keystone XL is stopped the Canadian petroleum will eventually be sent to the United States in other pipelines or get sent to other buyers such as China, making the "keep it underground" argument moot But it does show that we need to push on the technology side to make sure that we continue to drive down to our objective to get that number smaller," he said.
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Canadian oil Sands release a hug amount of GHG’s
| 3,224 | 49 | 1,076 | 526 | 9 | 181 | 0.01711 | 0.344106 |
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One can imagine a scenario for global catastrophe that runs similarly. If the human race adopted a mentality like the crew aboard the ship Californian-as some urge, saying that both ozone hole and global warming will disappear if statistics are properly examined, and we need do nothing about either-the following scenario could occur. The world goes on its merry way and fossil fuels continue to power it. Rather than making painful or politically difficult choices, such as investing ill fusion research or enacting a rigorous plan of conserving, the industrial world chooses to muddle through the temperature climb. Let's imagine that America and Europe are too worried about economic dislocation to change course. The ozone hole expands, driven by a monstrous synergy with global warming that puts more catalytic ice crystals into the stratosphere, but this affects the far north and south and not the major nations' heartlands. The seas rise, the tropics roast but the media networks no longer cover it. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall, but profits rise for those who can provide it in bottles. An equatorial high pressure zone forms, forcing drought in central Africa and Brazil, the Nile dries up and the monsoons fail. Then inevitably, at some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected event occurs-a major volcanic eruption, a sudden and dramatic shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid impact (those who think freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life or Mars), or a nuclear war that starts between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia . . . Suddenly the gradual climb in global temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release large amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide from their lower depths into the atmosphere. Oxygen levels go down precipitously as oxygen replaces lost oceanic carbon dioxide. Asthma cases double and then double again. Now a third of the world fears breathing. As the oceans dump carbon dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases, which further warms the oceans, causing them to dump even more carbon. Because of the heat, plants die and burn in enormous fires which release more carbon dioxide, and the oceans evaporate, adding more water vapor to the greenhouse. Soon, we are in what is termed a runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago. The last two surviving scientists inevitably argue, one telling the other, "See! I told you the missing sink was in the ocean!" Earth, as we know it, dies. After this Venusian excursion in temperatures, the oxygen disappears into the soil, the oceans evaporate and are lost and the dead Earth loses its ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the Sun for it to be the second Venus for long. Its atmosphere is slowly lost-as is its water-because of ultraviolet bombardment breaking up all the molecules apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere becomes thin, the Earth becomes colder. For a short while temperatures are nearly normal, but the ultraviolet sears any life that tries to make a comeback. The carbon dioxide thins out to form a thin veneer with a few wispy clouds and dust devils. Earth becomes the second Mars-red, desolate, with perhaps a few hardy microbes surviving.
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Brandenburg & Paxson ’99 [John (physicist & rocket scientist) & Monica (award-winning author & expert on global warming), Dead Mars, Dying Earth, p. 232]
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The ozone hole expands, driven by a monstrous synergy with global warming that puts more catalytic ice crystals into the stratosphere, but this affects the far north and south and not the major nations' heartlands. The seas rise, the tropics roast but the media networks no longer cover it. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall, but profits rise for those who can provide it in bottles. An equatorial high pressure zone forms, forcing drought in central Africa and Brazil, the Nile dries up and the monsoons fail. Then inevitably, at some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected event occurs-a major volcanic eruption, a sudden and dramatic shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid impact (those who think freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life or Mars), or a nuclear war that starts between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia . . . Suddenly the gradual climb in global temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release large amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide from their lower depths into the atmosphere. Oxygen levels go down precipitously as oxygen replaces lost oceanic carbon dioxide. Asthma cases double and then double again. Now a third of the world fears breathing. As the oceans dump carbon dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases, which further warms the oceans, causing them to dump even more carbon. Because of the heat, plants die and burn in enormous fires which release more carbon dioxide, and the oceans evaporate, adding more water vapor to the greenhouse. Soon, we are in what is termed a runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago. The last two surviving scientists inevitably argue, one telling the other, "See! I told you the missing sink was in the ocean!" Earth, as we know it, dies. After this Venusian excursion in temperatures, the oxygen disappears into the soil, the oceans evaporate and are lost and the dead Earth loses its ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the Sun for it to be the second Venus for long. Its atmosphere is slowly lost-as is its water-because of ultraviolet bombardment breaking up all the molecules apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere becomes thin, the Earth becomes colder. For a short while temperatures are nearly normal, but the ultraviolet sears any life that tries to make a comeback. The carbon dioxide thins out to form a thin veneer with a few wispy clouds and dust devils. Earth becomes the second Mars-red, desolate, with perhaps a few hardy microbes surviving
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Warming causes extinction – oceans dry up and oxygen disappears.
| 3,288 | 64 | 2,569 | 544 | 10 | 431 | 0.018382 | 0.792279 |
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Consequences of global warming are far more serious than previously imagined. These consequences relate to the newly discovered properties of the "inner core" of our planet. It is a well established fact, verified by decades of seismic measurements, that the Earth's inner core is a nearly spherical solid of about 1220 km radius that occupies the central position of our planet. The generally accepted view today is that this solid grew slowly to its current size as a result of the "crystallization" of the surrounding liquid. The "latent heat" of this "crystallization" allegedly explains how the inner core generates heat. This article considers global hydro-gravitational equilibrium conditions for the Earth's inner core and presents a proof that the solid core of our planet could never be smaller or lighter than a certain minimum, otherwise the core would not be able to remain in the center of the planet. Since the inner core could have only been larger and heavier in the past than it is today - it cannot be the result of any "crystallization". This simple conclusion has astonishing consequences. Imagine a gigantic object of 1220 km radius that slowly becomes smaller, lighter and gives off heat for millions of years. What could it be? It can only be an object that generates heat by nuclear decay. The main consequence of the above is that all heat generated inside Earth is of radionic origin. In other words, Earth in its entirety can be considered a nuclear reactor fuelled by spontaneous fission of various isotopes in the super-heavy inner core, as well as their daughter products of decay in the mantle and in the crust. Life on Earth is possible only because of the efficient cooling of this reactor - a process that is limited primarily by the atmosphere. Currently this cooling is responsible for a fine thermal balance between the heat from the core reactor, the heat from the Sun and the radiation of heat into space, so that the average temperature on Earth is about 13 deg C. Since the radionic heat is generated in the entire volume of nuclear fuel (the entire Earth) and cooling can occur only at the surface, the hottest point of the planet should be in the very center of the planet. This article examines the possibility of the "meltdown" of the central part of the inner core due to the reduced cooling capacity of the atmosphere, which traps progressively more solar heat due to the so-called greenhouse effect. Factors that can accelerate the meltdown process, such as an increased solar activity coinciding with increased emissions of greenhouse gasses are discussed. The most serious consequence of such a "meltdown" could be a gravity-buoyancy based segregation of unstable isotopes in the molten inner core. Such a segregation can "enrich" the nuclear fuel in the core to the point of creating conditions for a chain reaction and a gigantic atomic explosion. Can Earth become another "asteroid belt" in the Solar system? It is a common knowledge (experiencing seasons) that solar heat is the dominant factor that determines temperatures on the surface of Earth. In the polar regions however, the contribution of solar heat is minimal and this is where the contribution of the heat from the inside of our planet can be seen best. Raising polar ocean temperatures and melting of polar caps should therefore be the first symptoms of overheating of the inner core reactor. While politicians and businessmen still debate the need for reducing greenhouse emissions and take pride to evade accepting any responsibility, the process of overheating of the inner core reactor has already begun - polar oceans have become warmer and polar caps have begun to melt. Do we have enough imagination, intelligence and integrity to comprehend the danger before the situation becomes irreversible?
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Chalko ’01 [Tom, Head of Geophysics Division, Scientific E Research, Apr 8, “No second chance: can Earth explode as a result of Global Warming?” http://sci-e-research.com/geophysics.html]
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Consequences of global warming are far more serious than previously imagined. These consequences relate to the newly discovered properties of the "inner core" of our planet This article considers global hydro-gravitational equilibrium conditions for the Earth's inner core and presents a proof that the solid core of our planet could never be smaller or lighter than a certain minimum, otherwise the core would not be able to remain in the center of the planet. Since the inner core could have only been larger and heavier in the past than it is today - it cannot be the result of any "crystallization". This simple conclusion has astonishing consequences. Imagine a gigantic object of 1220 km radius that slowly becomes smaller, lighter and gives off heat for millions of years. What could it be? It can only be an object that generates heat by nuclear decay. The main consequence of the above is that all heat generated inside Earth is of radionic origin. In other words, Earth in its entirety can be considered a nuclear reactor fuelled by spontaneous fission of various isotopes in the super-heavy inner core, as well as their daughter products of decay in the mantle and in the crust. Life on Earth is possible only because of the efficient cooling of this reactor - a process that is limited primarily by the atmosphere Since the radionic heat is generated in the entire volume of nuclear fuel (the entire Earth) and cooling can occur only at the surface, the hottest point of the planet should be in the very center of the planet The most serious consequence of such a "meltdown" could be a gravity-buoyancy based segregation of unstable isotopes in the molten inner core. Such a segregation can "enrich" the nuclear fuel in the core to the point of creating conditions for a chain reaction and a gigantic atomic explosion. Can Earth become another "asteroid belt" in the Solar system Raising polar ocean temperatures and melting of polar caps should therefore be the first symptoms of overheating of the inner core reactor. While politicians and businessmen still debate the need for reducing greenhouse emissions and take pride to evade accepting any responsibility, the process of overheating of the inner core reactor has already begun - polar oceans have become warmer and polar caps have begun to melt. Do we have enough imagination, intelligence and integrity to comprehend the danger before the situation becomes irreversible
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Warming causes planetary explosion.
| 3,828 | 35 | 2,445 | 633 | 4 | 406 | 0.006319 | 0.64139 |
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In the last year we have seen radical changes in public opinion about global warming. It is now widely accepted that human activity is causally connected to global climate change. I will take it for granted that global warming is real and largely caused by human beings burning [End Page 79] fossil fuel for energy. Grim forecasts include environmental changes on a scale unprecedented in human history, including melting polar ice caps, increased desertification, rising sea levels, and mass species extinction. The consequences for human beings and other life on Earth are potentially catastrophic. Global warming poses a threat of outstanding magnitude. While some features of this threat are expressed in descriptive predictions about a wide variety of ecological changes and potential consequences thereof, still another aspect of the threat posed by global warming is an existential one connected to our moral responsibility.
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Thompson ‘9 [Allen, Assistant professor of philosophy at Clemson University, “Responsibility for the End of Nature: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Global Warming”, Volume 14, Number 1, Spring 2009, Muse]
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It is now widely accepted that human activity is causally connected to global climate change Grim forecasts include environmental changes on a scale unprecedented in human history including extinction The consequences for life on Earth are potentially catastrophic Global warming poses a threat of outstanding magnitude a aspect of the threat posed by global warming is an existential one connected to our moral responsibility.
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Warming causes extinction – moral obligation
| 931 | 44 | 427 | 143 | 6 | 64 | 0.041958 | 0.447552 |
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This weekend's Summit of the Americas aims to extend a NAFTA-style free trade area to¶ the entire Western Hemisphere. As Secretary of State Colin Powell recently put it, ''We¶ will be able to sell American goods, technology, and services without obstacles or¶ restrictions from the Arctic to Cape Horn.''¶ And foreign businesses will likewise be able to sell goods and services in the United States¶ ''without obstacles or restrictions.'' But one person's restrictions are another person's vital social¶ safeguards.¶ Here is a short list of ''obstacles and restrictions'' that constrain American corporations - and¶ represent a century of struggle to make America a more decent society:¶ We allow workers to organize unions.¶ We limit the pollutants that corporations can dump into the environment.¶ We have regulations protecting employees from unsafe working conditions.¶ We assure consumers safe food, and drugs, and drinking water, and other products.¶ We require business to partly underwrite social insurance, such as Social Security, Medicare,¶ and unemployment compensation.¶ Each of these protections was initially opposed by organized business in the United States.¶ And international business works hard to prevent such safeguards from being enacted in Third¶ World countries.¶ NAFTA has indeed opened commercial trade flows between Mexico, Canada, and the United¶ States. But it has also functioned as a convenient battering ram for business to resist social¶ regulation.¶ The Ethyl Corp. used NAFTA to pressure Canada to end a ban on a toxic gasoline additive,¶ MMT, which is not banned in the United States. Metalclad Corp., also based in the United¶ States, filed suit in a Mexican state court demanding to be permitted to open a toxic waste¶ dump. The suit held that even Mexico's still rudimentary environmental protections violated¶ property rights under NAFTA.¶ NAFTA pays lip service to labor and environmental protections, but the weak laws on¶ Mexican lawbooks are honored more in the breech. As a result, American companies that shift¶ production to Mexico outrun hard-won labor and environmental protections in the United¶ States.¶ Business, in other words, is keen to harmonize property rights, but not labor, environmental, or¶ consumer rights. And if NAFTA becomes a hemisphere-wide arrangement, the social balance¶ tilts even more dramatically to business, at the expense of both sovereignty and social¶ regulation.
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Kuttner 1 (Robert Kuttner, 12/9/01, Robert Kuttner is co-founder and co-editor of The American Prospect, as well as a distinguished senior fellow of the think tank Demos. He was a longtime columnist for Business Week and continues to write columns in The Boston Globe. He is the author of Obama's Challenge and other books, “NAFTA Style Trade Deal Bad for Democracy”, http://prospect.org/article/nafta-style-trade-deal-bad-democracy(
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This weekend's Summit of the Americas aims to extend a NAFTA-style free trade area to the entire Western Hemisphere. ''We will be able to sell American goods, technology, and services without obstacles or restrictions from the Arctic to Cape Horn.'' foreign businesses will likewise be able to sell goods and services ''without obstacles or restrictions.'' But one person's restrictions are another person's vital social safeguards. Here is a short list of ''obstacles and restrictions'' that constrain American corporations to make America a more decent society: unions. limit the pollutants that corporations can dump regulations protecting employees from unsafe working conditions. assure consumers safe food, and drugs, and drinking water, and other products require business to partly underwrite social insurance international business works hard to prevent such safeguards from being enacted in Third¶ World countries.¶ NAFTA has also functioned as a convenient battering ram for business to resist social regulation. The Ethyl Corp. used NAFTA to pressure Canada to end a ban on a toxic gasoline additive, MMT, which is not banned in the United States. Metalclad Corp., filed suit be permitted to open a toxic waste dump. NAFTA pays lip service to labor and environmental protections if NAFTA becomes a hemisphere-wide arrangement, the social balance tilts even more dramatically to business, at the expense of both sovereignty and social regulation.
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NAFTA economic gains trade-off with loss of democracy—prevents safeguards in Mexico and Canada
| 2,447 | 94 | 1,461 | 371 | 13 | 220 | 0.03504 | 0.592992 |
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Referring specifically to NAFTA, Faux asks: "How will this new political economy be governed, and in whose interest?" As with other skeptics of globalization, he is troubled that multinational corporations may be able to operate in a laissez-faire business climate beyond the legal jurisdiction of any one legitimate national authority. (He clearly lacks confidence in the American legal profession, whose ingenuity in discovering ways of bringing suit against anyone, anywhere for almost any reason is legendary.)¶ Faux, it should be noted, was a co-founder of the Economic Policy Institute, a Washington think tank closely associated with organized labor. In writing for the American Prospect - the magazine in which his article originally appeared - Faux is preaching to a choir he himself describes as the "progressive" or "social-democratic" left. Probably for that reason, he regrettably lapses into intellectual short-hand, fashioning his argument from the familiar slogans of previous debates and drawing from a list of old canards aimed variously over the years at capitalism, free trade, and now globalization.¶ Thus, he laments how "American and Canadian corporations have moved production and jobs south to take advantage of cheap Mexican labor." But it's not clear what bothers him more: that non-unionized Mexican workers got a lot of unionized American jobs or that faceless corporations have presumably been raking in huge profits by playing an elaborate international game of musical chairs with people's jobs. It's a toss-up. The latter certainly grates acutely on Faux's ideological bias, even though his populist - indeed, nationalist - heart definitely regrets that American workers lost good jobs to foreigners.¶ Consider next Faux's contention that U.S. companies unfairly use the threat of moving production to Mexico or even farther offshore to leverage wage concessions from their employees and wheedle tax and regulatory relief from state and local governments in the U.S. NAFTA, he writes, "is a potential battering ram aimed at destroying domestic protections that temper modern capitalism."¶ Faux is, of course, right to suspect that big business is probably up to no good. After the ceaseless cascade of corporate scandals the past couple of years served to reveal how many of the chieftains running U.S. companies have been crooks, thieves, embezzlers and incompetents, who can really argue with the contention that corporate America should not be trusted with the nation's welfare? That animal depicting the true nature of Wall Street these days is neither a bull nor a bear, but a rather mangy weasel.¶ Still, it is when Faux offers up his solutions for the wrongs he perceives in global trade that he reveals that strange brew of elitism, disingenuity and naivete not altogether uncommon among his progressive audience.¶ To prevent companies from abusing treaties like NAFTA, Faux evidently wants our trading partners to agree to abide by roughly the same social, labor, environmental and other regulatory constraints that we have here in America. In other words, he would like to deprive U.S. companies of any incentive to move away, and he presumably wants countries like Mexico - whose chief comparative advantage is precisely their more congenial regulatory regimes and a lower cost of doing business - to accede to this gambit.
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O’Connell 3 (Jock O’Connell, Writer for Sacramento Bee, “Is NAFTA Good For Democracy?”, http://www.jockoconnell.com/Forum03232003.html)
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Referring specifically to NAFTA, Faux asks: "How will this new political economy be governed, and in whose interest?" he is troubled that multinational corporations may be able to operate in a laissez-faire business climate beyond the legal jurisdiction of any one legitimate national authority. "American and Canadian corporations have moved production and jobs south to take advantage of cheap Mexican labor." But it's not clear what bothers him more: that non-unionized Mexican workers got a lot of unionized American jobs or that faceless corporations have presumably been raking in huge profits by playing an elaborate international game of musical chairs with people's jobs. U.S. companies unfairly use the threat of moving production to Mexico or even farther offshore to leverage wage concessions from their employees and wheedle tax and regulatory relief from state and local governments in the U.S. .S. companies have been crooks, thieves, embezzlers and incompetents, who can really argue with the contention that corporate America should not be trusted with the nation's welfare? prevent companies from abusing NAFTA, Faux evidently wants our trading partners to agree to abide by roughly the same social, labor, environmental and other regulatory constraints that we have here in America. he would like to deprive U.S. companies of any incentive to move away, and he presumably wants countries like Mexico - to accede to this gambit.
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NAFTA violates basic democracy—lack of foreign regulations
| 3,367 | 58 | 1,446 | 526 | 7 | 224 | 0.013308 | 0.425856 |
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While business interests mobilize to defend Chapter 11, and even expand its reach, opposition is emerging -- sometimes from the most unlikely places. Documents recently posted online at the U.S. State Department Web site reveal the dubiousness with which factions, even inside the federal government, hold for investor protections found in Chapter 11.¶ In the government's Statement of Defense in the Methanex case, attorneys for the United States write that Methanex's claim "does not remotely resemble" the type of grievance for which NAFTA parties created Chapter 11. They deem "absurd" the notion that "whenever a state takes action to protect the public health or environment, the state is responsible for damages." Even a participant in the NAFTA negotiations, Daniel Esty, a professor of environmental law and policy at Yale University who was the EPA's lead negotiator, now believes that Chapter 11 "could have been and should have been more tightly crafted" and that these "significant negative precedents" should not be replicated in the FTAA.¶ In his State of the Union address, President Bush urged Congress to grant him "trade promotion authority" to expedite the completion of trade agreements like the FTAA. Yet in the fight over construction of the FTAA, unlike the debate over NAFTA, environmentalists believe they are ready to thwart investment conditions that threaten the sanctity of environmental legislation.¶ They need to convince Congress to include restrictions on investment that protect environmental, health, and safety laws in the authorization it grants the president to negotiate trade agreements. As Dan Seligman of the Sierra Club puts it, environmentalists need to ensure that they "hold negotiators accountable to listen to a broad array of public interests." Wagner, the Earthjustice attorney, is cautiously optimistic about the inclusion of the safeguards and believes that at this point legislators would have to be "blind or completely in the pocket of the corporate lobby" to allow FTAA to pass with investment conditions intact.¶ The long-term ramifications of Chapter 11 are uncertain, but the danger it poses to environmental standards, our judicial system, and to democracy at large has convinced its detractors to argue for its demise. Sen. Kuehl from California said, "If I were a smart United States, I would move to amend NAFTA." Dan Seligman went further, saying, "If we knew then what we now know, NAFTA would have been defeated."
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Gerdes ‘2 – journalist specializing in clean energy solutions, work has appeared at Yale Environment 360, the Guardian, Forbes.com, MotherJones.com, ChinaDialogue, GreenBiz.com, Earth2Tech.com, Living Energy, and Santa Clara Magazine (Justin, “OPINION: NAFTA's Chapter 11 Threatens Environment and Democracy,” Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, 2/22/02, ProQuest)//ER
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Daniel Esty, a professor of environmental law and policy at Yale University who was the EPA's lead negotiator, now believes that Chapter 11 "could have been and should have been more tightly crafted" and that these "significant negative precedents" should not be replicated in the FTAA. the fight over construction of the FTAA, unlike the debate over NAFTA, environmentalists believe they are ready to thwart investment conditions that threaten the sanctity of environmental legislation. They need to convince Congress to include restrictions on investment that protect environmental, health, and safety laws point legislators would have to be "blind or completely in the pocket of the corporate lobby" to allow FTAA to pass with investment conditions intact. the danger it poses to environmental standards, our judicial system, and to democracy at large has convinced its detractors to argue for its demise. If I were a smart United States, I would move to amend NAFTA. If we knew then what we now know, NAFTA would have been defeated."
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NAFTA undermines democracy and kills the environment
| 2,480 | 52 | 1,037 | 388 | 7 | 166 | 0.018041 | 0.427835 |
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The corporate takeover of Mexico's food system has led to the food and health catastrophe. Transnational food corporations not only import freely into Mexican food markets, they are now the producers, exporters, and importers all in one, operating inside the country.¶ Since NAFTA, corporations have gobbled up human and natural resources on an almost unbelievable scale. Livestock production has moved from small farms for local markets to Tyson, Smithfield, and Pilgrims Pride. The massive use and contamination of water and land has led to health and environmental disasters across the country. Millions of jobs have been lost to concentration and industrialized farming methods.¶ Take the case of Corn Products International (CPI). The transnational filed a NAFTA claim against the Mexican government in 2003, claiming a loss to its business due to a tax levied on high fructose corn syrup in beverages. Mexico's reason for imposing the tax was to save a sugarcane industry that provided jobs for thousands of citizens and played a crucial economic role in many regions. The government was also frustrated by its failure under NAFTA to access the highly protected U.S. sugar market.¶ A 2008 NAFTA tribunal ruled that Mexico had to pay $58.4 million to CPI. The government paid up on January 25, 2011. CPI posted $3.7 billion dollars in net sales the year of the decision. The fine paid by the Mexican government could have provided a year's worth of the basic food basket to more than 50,000 poor families.¶ CPI's wholly owned subsidiary Arancia Corn Products is among the most powerful food transnationals operating in the country, along with Maseca/Archers Daniel Midland and Cargill. Large agribusiness companies allegedly played a key role in the 2007 tortilla crisis by hoarding harvest as the international price went up, artificially drying up the national market and selling at nearly double the price they paid for the harvest. That crisis brought tens of thousands of poor Mexicans out into the streets to protest a 50 percent rise in the price of tortillas.¶ NAFTA and other FTAs give corporations the power to define what we eat, what we buy at the store, who will have a job and who won't, and whether a village sustained by local food production will survive or witness the end of generations of livelihoods.
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Carlsen ’11 – Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Laura Carlsen is director of the Americas Program for the Center for International Policy in Mexico City (Laura, “NAFTA Is Starving Mexico,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 9/20/11, ProQuest)//ER
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The corporate takeover of Mexico's food system has led to the food and health catastrophe. Transnational food corporations not only import freely into Mexican food markets, they are now the producers, exporters, and importers all in one, operating inside the country.¶ Since NAFTA, corporations have gobbled up human and natural resources on an almost unbelievable scale. . The massive use and contamination of water and land has led to health and environmental disasters across the country. Millions of jobs have been lost to concentration and industrialized farming methods.¶ The government was also frustrated by its failure under NAFTA to access the highly protected U.S. sugar market.¶ NAFTA and other FTAs give corporations the power to define what we eat, what we buy at the store, who will have a job and who won't, and whether a village sustained by local food production will survive or witness the end of generations of livelihoods.
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NAFTA kills Mexico’s domestic food production, health, agribusiness, job supply, and the environment
| 2,326 | 100 | 943 | 381 | 13 | 152 | 0.034121 | 0.39895 |
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2,962 |
Along with the devastation of Mexico’s rural economy, NAFTA has had a major impact on its ecology. Agrobiodiversity is gravely threatened as a small number of imported corn varieties root out the enormous diversity of corn in the countryside; and as imported genetically modified and corporate patented varieties mix with centuries old varieties developed by generations of Mexican farmers and indigenous peoples. The stakes are enormous.¶ Food insecurity, especially around diet staples poses a grave risk. Last summer, tortilla prices skyrocketed, and the growing pressure to convert corn from food to fuel for ethanol and the increasing corporate concentration of food systems and supply can only make matters much worse. Already, more than one-third of the population suffers from malnutrition and anemia; and in the rural sector, mainly among indigenous peoples, this figure rises to over 50%.¶ Today, Grassroots’ partners and their allies argue, peasants and indigenous peoples need a new social compact with the Mexican State that respects their human rights including resource rights and food sovereignty; that recognizes the role and rights of rural Mexicans, including indigenous peoples, as food producers and stewards of biodiversity who play a vital role in Mexico’s social and economic well being and political sovereignty. As they point out: “the freedom to choose the quality, quantity and price of our food depends on our ability to produce them: without a healthy and fair national production of maize, Mexico can not continue to exist as the diverse and rich country we love.”
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Aziz 7 (Nikhil Aziz, Nikhil Aziz has been Executive Director of Grassroots International since 2005. Before joining Grassroots, Nikhil was Associate Director at Political Research Associates, where he led a team that studied the conservative movement and the political right in the United States, “NAFTA is Killing Tradition of Corn in Mexico,” 9 November 2007, http://www.grassrootsonline.org/news/articles/nafta-killing-tradition-corn-mexico)
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NAFTA has had a major impact on its ecology. Agrobiodiversity is gravely threatened as a small number of imported corn varieties root out the enormous diversity of corn in the countryside; and as imported genetically modified and corporate patented varieties mix with centuries old varieties developed by generations of Mexican farmers and indigenous peoples Food insecurity, especially around diet staples poses a grave risk. Last summer, tortilla prices skyrocketed, and the growing pressure to convert corn from food to fuel for ethanol and the increasing corporate concentration of food systems and supply can only make matters much worse. Already, more than one-third of the population suffers from malnutrition and anemia; and in the rural sector, mainly among indigenous peoples, this figure rises to over 50% as food producers and stewards of biodiversity who play a vital role in Mexico’s social and economic well being and political sovereignty. As they point out: “the freedom to choose the quality, quantity and price of our food depends on our ability to produce them: without a healthy and fair national production of maize, Mexico can not continue to exist as the diverse and rich country we love.”
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Causes Mexican food insecurity
| 1,595 | 30 | 1,213 | 248 | 4 | 193 | 0.016129 | 0.778226 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,963 |
MEXICO CITY – Economy Secretary Ildefonso Guajardo said on Wednesday that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has weakened Mexican agriculture, as producers haven’t been able to take advantage of the trade pact.¶ A lack of public policies to strengthen the industry has led to a dependency on imported foods that were once produced in Mexico, Guajardo said at a meeting with the National Farmers Confederation (CNC).¶ “I was a negotiator in the NAFTA talks 20 years ago,” Guajardo said. “Rather than talk about how we went wrong in the agricultural sector, it’s more about how we made a mistake in implementing public policies to give more viability to the agricultural sector to address exactly what was happening from the point of view of social integration. “The government should have, from the agreement’s signing onward, invested money in a strategic sector to achieve a transformation of productive efforts and take advantage” of the situation, he said.¶ The secretary added that there have been conflicts among industry leaders and inconsistent food health standards, which have led to increases in some prices in the basic food basket. “We made our agricultural industry weak, made the budget weak and, after 20 years, (the agreement) surpassed us, without being able to find the best way to integral trade in this key sector,” he said.
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Zayas 5/16 (Rocío Zayas, writer for thenews.com, “NAFTA weakened Mexican agriculture,” 16 May 2013, http://thenews.com.mx/index.php/home-articulos/9620-‘nafta-weakened-mexican-agriculture’)
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NAFTA) has weakened Mexican agriculture producers haven’t been able to take advantage of the trade pact.¶ A lack of public policies to strengthen the industry has led to a dependency on imported foods that were once produced in Mexico The government should have invested money in a strategic sector to achieve a transformation of productive efforts and take advantage” of the situation there have been conflicts among industry leaders and inconsistent food health standards, which have led to increases in prices We made our agricultural industry weak, made the budget weak
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NAFTA weakened Mexican agriculture
| 1,357 | 34 | 573 | 221 | 4 | 91 | 0.0181 | 0.411765 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,964 |
With the opening of the Mexican economy under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexican agriculture came under new competitive pressures from U.S. exports. High U.S. farm subsidies for exported crops, which compete with Mexican products, have prompted charges that the level playing field NAFTA was supposed to create is in fact tilted heavily in favor of the United States. This paper assesses the costs of U.S. agricultural policies to Mexican producers by examining the extent to which the United States exported agricultural products to Mexico at prices below their costs of production, one of the definitions of “dumping” in the WTO. ¶ We estimate “dumping margins” for eight agricultural goods – corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, cotton, beef, pork, and poultry – all of which are heavily supported (directly or indirectly) by the U.S. government, were produced in Mexico in significant volumes before NAFTA, and experienced dramatic increases in U.S. exports to Mexico after the agreement. We find that:¶ U.S. exports of the eight supported commodities analyzed here have increased dramatically since the early 1990s, rising between 159% and 707%.¶ For supported crops, the “dumping margins” – the percentage by which export prices are below production costs – from 1997-2005 ranged from 12% for soybeans to 38% for cotton.¶ Assuming Mexican producer prices were depressed by the same percentage as the dumping margins, below-cost exports cost Mexican producers of corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton and rice an estimated $9.7 billion from 1997-2005, just over $1 billion per year. ¶ Corn showed the highest losses. Average dumping margins of 19% contributed to a 413% increase in U.S. exports and a 66% decline in real producer prices in Mexico from the early 1990s to 2005. The estimated cost to Mexican producers of dumping-level corn prices was $6.6 billion over the nine-year period, an average of $99 per hectare per year, or $38 per ton.¶ Meats were exported at below-cost prices because U.S. producers benefited from below-cost soybeans and corn, key components in feed. This so-called implicit subsidy to meat producers resulted in dumping margins of 5-10% on exported meat. This cost Mexican livestock producers who did not use imported feed an estimated $3.2 billion between 1997 and 2005. The largest losses were in beef, at $1.6 billion, or $175 million per year.¶ We estimate total losses to Mexican producers from dumping-level U.S. export prices at $12.8 billion from 1997-2005 for the eight products (in constant 2000 US dollars). To put these losses in context, the average annual loss of $1.4 billion is equivalent to 10% of the value of all Mexican agricultural exports to the United States and greater than the current value of Mexican tomato exports to the United States.
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Wise 10 (Timothy Wise, Mexican Rural Development Research Report No. 7, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010, “Agricultural Dumping Under NAFTA: Estimating the Costs of U.S. Agricultural Policies to Mexican Producers, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/AgNAFTA.html
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With the opening of the Mexican economy under NAFTA), Mexican agriculture came under new competitive pressures from U.S. exports. High U.S. farm subsidies for exported crops, which compete with Mexican products tilted heavily in favor of the United States. dumping margins” for eight agricultural goods – corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, cotton, beef, pork, and poultry – all of which are heavily supported (directly or indirectly) by the U.S. government, were produced in Mexico in significant volumes before NAFTA, and experienced dramatic increases in U.S. exports to Mexico after the agreement. U.S. exports have increased dramatically since the early 1990s, rising between 159% and 707%.¶ below-cost exports cost Mexican producers of corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton and rice an estimated $9.7 billion from 1997-2005, just over $1 billion per year. The estimated cost to Mexican producers of dumping-level corn prices was $6.6 billion over the nine-year period Meats resulted in dumping margins of 5-10% This cost Mexican livestock producers who did not use imported feed an estimated $3.2 billion between 1997 and 2005. We estimate total losses to Mexican producers from dumping-level U.S. export prices at $12.8 billion from 1997-2005 for the eight products the average annual loss equivalent to 10% of the value of all Mexican agricultural exports to the United States and greater than the current value of Mexican tomato exports to the United States.
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High U.S. farm subsidies from NAFTA hurts Mexican agricultural exports
| 2,805 | 70 | 1,452 | 449 | 10 | 225 | 0.022272 | 0.501114 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,965 |
Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became the law of the land, millions of Mexicans have joined the ranks of the hungry. Malnutrition is highest among the country's farm families, who used to produce enough food to feed the nation.¶ As the blood-spattered violence of the drug war takes over the headlines, many Mexican men, women, and children confront the slow and silent violence of starvation. The latest reports show that the number of people living in "food poverty" (the inability to purchase the basic food basket) rose from 18 million in 2008 to 20 million by late 2010.¶ About one-fifth of Mexican children currently suffer from malnutrition. An innovative measurement applied by the National Institute for Nutrition registers a daily count of 728,909 malnourished children under five for October 18, 2011. Government statistics report that 25 percent of the population does not have access to basic food.¶ Since the 2008 food crisis, there has been a three percent rise in the population without adequate access to food. The number of children with malnutrition is 400,000 kids above the goal for this year. Newborns show the highest indices of malnutrition, indicating that the tragedy begins with maternal health.¶ The dramatic change in Mexican eating habits since NAFTA is not only reflected in the millions who go to bed hungry. On the other side of the scale, Mexico has in just a decade and a half become second only to the United States worldwide in morbid obesity. Child obesity, overweight, and diabetes now constitute major health problems, alongside the more traditional problem of hunger.¶ It's not that the rich are getting too fat and the poor too thin, although inequality plays a role in the erosion of healthy diets for all. Fatness no longer represents abundance. It is the poor who drink cheap Coca Cola when they do not have access to potable water or who give their kids a bag of potato chips when local fresh food is no longer available. The International Journal of Obesity finds that worldwide the spread of what they call "the Western diet" ("high in saturated fats, sugar, and refined foods but low in fiber) has meant that "the burden of obesity is shifting towards the poor." The NAFTA generation reflects the paradigm so eloquently described by food researcher and activist Raj Patel of "stuffed and starved".¶ With another food crisis looming due to rising international prices, Mexico could face food riots as well as the spread of starvation and its consequences over the coming year. Unless the riots turn violent or spark more widespread social upheaval as they did in Arab countries, it's not likely that the news media will pay any attention.
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Carlsen ’11 – Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Laura Carlsen is director of the Americas Program for the Center for International Policy in Mexico City (Laura, “NAFTA Is Starving Mexico,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 9/20/11, ProQuest)//ER
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Malnutrition is highest among the country's farm families, who used to produce enough food to feed the nation Mexican men, women, and children confront the slow and silent violence of starvation. The latest reports show that the number of people living in "food poverty rose one-fifth of Mexican children currently suffer from malnutrition The dramatic change in Mexican eating habits since NAFTA is not only reflected in the millions who go to bed hungry. On the other side of the scale, Mexico has in just a decade and a half become second only to the United States worldwide in morbid obesity. Child obesity, overweight, and diabetes now constitute major health problems, alongside the more traditional problem of hunger.¶ inequality plays a role in the erosion of healthy diets for all. Fatness no longer represents abundance the Western diet has meant that "the burden of obesity is shifting towards the poor." With another food crisis looming due to rising international prices, Mexico could face food riots as well as the spread of starvation and its consequences over the coming year. Unless the riots turn violent or spark more widespread social upheaval as they did in Arab countries, it's not likely that the news media will pay any attention.
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NAFTA causes starvation, food riots, and obesity in Mexico
| 2,709 | 58 | 1,254 | 451 | 9 | 207 | 0.019956 | 0.45898 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,966 |
Something has gone terribly wrong. The nation that was slated for prosperity when it signed NAFTA has become an international example of severe structural problems in the food chain, from how it produces its food to what and how much (or how little) it consumes.¶ Mexican malnutrition has its roots in the way NAFTA and other neoliberal programs forced the nation to move away from producing its own basic foods to a “food security” model. “Food security” posits that a country is secure as long as it has sufficient income to import its food. It separates farm employment from food security and ignores unequal access to food within a country.¶ The idea of food security based on market access comes directly from the main argument behind NAFTA of “comparative advantage.” Simply stated, economic efficiency dictates that each country should devote its productive capacity to what it does best and trade liberalization will guarantee access across borders.¶ Under the theory of comparative advantage, most of Mexico was deemed unfit to produce its staple food crop, corn, since its yields were way below the average for its northern neighbor and trade partner. Therefore, Mexico should turn to corn imports and devote its land to crops where it supposedly had a comparative advantage, such as counter-seasonal and tropical fruits and vegetables.¶ Sounds simple. Just pick up three million inefficient corn producers (and their families) and move them into manufacturing or assembly where their cheap labor constitutes a comparative advantage. The cultural and human consequences of declaring entire peasant and indigenous communities obsolete were not a concern in this equation.¶ Seventeen years after NAFTA, some two million farmers have been forced off their land by low prices and the dismantling of government supports. They did not find jobs in industry. Instead most of them became part of a mass exodus as the number of Mexican migrants to the United States rose to half a million a year. In the first few years of NAFTA, corn imports tripled and the producer price fell by half.¶ Conversion to other crops turned out to take years in most cases. Prices were volatile and harvests unreliable. It was not feasible at all on many small, often rocky plots where corn guarantees a subsistence diet for farm families. Niche markets failed to grow to much more than 2 percent of total agricultural production.¶ The areas that adapted successfully to industrial agriculture and agroexport crops are characterized by flagrant violation of the labor rights of migrant farm workers, widespread pollution and water waste, and extreme concentration of land and resources.¶ For the hungry, this means that prices set on the international market determine who eats and who starves. Mexican consumers now pay more for tortillas and food in general. Price hikes on the international market push basic food out of reach for the millions of poor in the country.
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Carlsen 11 (Laura Carlsen, Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Laura Carlsen is director of the Americas Program for the Center for International Policy in Mexico City, “NAFTA Is Starving Mexico,” 20 October 2011, http://fpif.org/nafta_is_starving_mexico/, AL)
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The nation that was slated for prosperity when it signed NAFTA has become an international example of severe structural problems in the food chain, from how it produces its food to what and how much (or how little) it consumes. Mexican malnutrition has its roots in the way NAFTA and other neoliberal programs forced the nation to move away from producing its own basic foods to a “food security” model. “Food security” posits that a country is secure as long as it has sufficient income to import its food The idea of food security based on market access comes directly from the main argument behind NAFTA of “comparative advantage.” Simply stated, economic efficiency dictates that each country should devote its productive capacity to what it does best and trade liberalization will guarantee access across borders. Under the theory of comparative advantage, most of Mexico was deemed unfit to produce its staple food crop, corn, since its yields were way below the average for its northern neighbor and trade partner Just pick up three million inefficient corn producers (and their families) and move them into manufacturing or assembly where their cheap labor constitutes a comparative advantage. The cultural and human consequences of declaring entire peasant and indigenous communities obsolete were not a concern in this equation. Seventeen years after NAFTA, some two million farmers have been forced off their land by low prices and the dismantling of government supports. They did not find jobs in industry The areas that adapted successfully to industrial agriculture and agroexport crops are characterized by flagrant violation of the labor rights of migrant farm workers, widespread pollution and water waste, and extreme concentration of land and resources. For the hungry, this means that prices set on the international market determine who eats and who starves
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NAFTA increases food prices
| 2,952 | 27 | 1,878 | 479 | 4 | 299 | 0.008351 | 0.624217 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,967 |
Regardless of the difficulties they face, farmers make up 20 per cent of Mexico’s labour force, compared with two per cent in Canada and the US. Small, medium, and large farmers throughout Mexico harvest a total of just over 20 million hectares of land each year, according to INEGI, the country’s national statistics agency. Almost eight million hectares of corn are planted in Mexico every year, followed by pastures for ranching, sorghum, and beans. Mexico is widely known as the birthplace of corn, over 52 races of corn grow here, some of which may be uniquely suited to withstand the impacts of climate change.¶ That genetic wealth and diversity of Mexican corn stocks, however, is also under threat. It has been over 10 years since researchers began publishing peer-reviewed articles proving that the DNA from genetically modified (GM) corn had begun mixing with indigenous species of corn in remote mountain areas of Oaxaca. The fight against genetically modified corn has been ongoing since the first evidence of GM corn was discovered. Some say this corn was introduced in Mexico through aid programs, where farmers were given corn seeds without being warned that they were genetically modified seeds.¶ According to Greenpeace Mexico, the world’s largest agro-business outfits, like Monsanto, Pioneers, and Dow Agribusiness, have put pressure on Mexico’s new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, to allow commercial planting and harvesting of genetically modified corn. A recent action to keep up the pressure against genetically modified corn saw tens of thousands march in Mexico City as well as a rotating hunger strike under the enormous Angel of Independence Statue.¶ “We believe that the only relation that we, as the growers, have with Mother Earth are the natural seeds,” hunger striker Francisco Jiménez Murillo told Democracy Now! “We have to remember that Mexico has 60 distinct varieties of corn that we have cultivated over the last 10,000 years, and with this, we have fed the world. It is a struggle for the life and health of our country.”¶ The struggle for food sovereignty and health is one that is reflected in every facet of life in Mexico. These days, markets like the one around the corner from where I live face stiff competition from big box grocery stores popping up all over the country. In 2011 alone, Wal-Mart opened one store a day in Mexico and Central America.¶ In the face of these changes, some farmers organize against genetically modified seeds, others get by, planting traditional crops, while still others have packed up and moved away, mostly to the US, but others to Canada, where they work to earn remittances for their families. The changes to Mexico’s agricultural and food systems over the past 30 years have been severe, but they are not irreversible.
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Paley 3/12 (Dawn Paley, Masters in Journalism from the University of British Columbia and BA in arts and women’s studies and first nations studies from Simon Fraser University, “Corn on the Border: NAFTA and Food in Mexico,” 13 March 2013, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/mexico-archives-79/4183-corn-on-the-border-nafta-and-food-in-mexico, AL)
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Regardless of the difficulties they face, farmers make up 20 per cent of Mexico’s labour force, compared with two per cent in Canada and the US. Small, medium, and large farmers throughout Mexico harvest a total of just over 20 million hectares of land each year That genetic wealth and diversity of Mexican corn stocks, however, is also under threat. It has been over 10 years since researchers began publishing peer-reviewed articles proving that the DNA from genetically modified (GM) corn had begun mixing with indigenous species of corn in remote mountain areas of Oaxaca. , Enrique Peña Nieto, to allow commercial planting and harvesting of genetically modified corn. A recent action to keep up the pressure against genetically modified corn saw tens of thousands march in Mexico City as well as a rotating hunger strike under the enormous Angel of Independence Statue. “We believe that the only relation that we, as the growers, have with Mother Earth are the natural seeds,” These days, markets like the one around the corner from where I live face stiff competition from big box grocery stores popping up all over the country. In the face of these changes, some farmers organize against genetically modified seeds, others get by, planting traditional crops, while still others have packed up and moved away, mostly to the US, but others to Canada, where they work to earn remittances for their families. The changes to Mexico’s agricultural and food systems over the past 30 years have been severe, but they are not irreversible.
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Kills Mexico’s corn economy
| 2,799 | 28 | 1,538 | 460 | 4 | 255 | 0.008696 | 0.554348 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,968 |
Our study focuses on the deregulation of US-Mexico trade in used cars and trucks¶ following the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In accordance with¶ the conditions of NAFTA, in August 2005 Mexico issued a decree allowing vehicles¶ 10–15 years old to be imported from the United States and Canada. This represented¶ a dramatic break from the previous policy that prohibited entry for all used vehicles¶ except for certain vehicles used in agriculture. Virtually overnight a vigorous trade¶ flow emerged and we document that between 2005 and 2008 over 2.5 million used¶ vehicles were exported from the United States to Mexico.¶ To evaluate the environmental consequences of this trade pattern, we assemble¶ the most comprehensive dataset ever compiled on North American trade in used¶ vehicles and vehicle emissions. Our dataset allows us to identify, at the vehicle level¶ (using the vehicle identification number (VIN)), which vehicles were traded. The¶ results show that traded vehicles are higher-emitting per mile than the stock of vehicles¶ in the United States, but lower-emitting per mile than the stock of vehicles in¶ Mexico. As a result, when a vehicle is traded, average vehicle emissions per mile¶ tend to decrease in both countries. We also show that vehicles that are exported to¶ Mexico are more likely to have failed emissions testing. This provides evidence for¶ the pollution havens hypothesis, the idea that trade liberalization causes pollution to¶ move to countries with lax environmental standards. The paper then goes on to examine vehicle retirement in both countries and new¶ vehicle sales in Mexico. Measuring changes in vehicle retirement and purchase¶ behavior is challenging because one must construct a credible counterfactual to¶ describe what would have happened in the absence of trade. Here we rely heavily¶ on before and after comparisons. The results indicate that the number of vehicles¶ in circulation in the United States changed little after 2005, suggesting that most of¶ the vehicles exported to Mexico were vehicles that would have been scrapped otherwise.¶ In addition, there is no evidence that the increased availability of used vehicles¶ has decreased sales of new vehicles in Mexico. These findings seem reasonable, but¶ it is important to be upfront about the limitations of these before and after comparisons.¶ Although we can and do control for covariates that are changing over time, these results will be biased if there are unobservable time-varying factors that affect¶ vehicle retirement and purchase behavior.¶ Overall, the analysis suggests that trade has led to an increase in total emissions.¶ While trade decreases emissions in the United States, this is not enough to offset¶ the increase in emissions in Mexico. Moreover, emissions increases are highly¶ persistent because of low vehicle retirement rates in Mexico. We document that¶ vehicle retirement rates in Mexico are much lower than vehicle retirement rates in¶ the United States and illustrate how this can have a large impact on lifetime vehicle¶ emissions. These results highlight the importance for policy makers of recognizing¶ the synergies between environmental legislation and free trade legislation. For¶ example, our findings suggest that unilateral policies in the United States aimed¶ at reducing carbon emissions will increase exports of fuel-inefficient vehicles to¶ Mexico, consistent with an emerging literature on carbon leakage.3 If the goal of¶ US carbon policy is to minimize global emissions, then such trade effects must be¶ anticipated. Our study is germane to a substantial literature on trade and the environment.¶ Whereas most previous studies have focused on how trade affects where goods¶ are produced, this study focuses on how trade affects where goods are consumed.¶ Several theoretical contributions have recognized the role of consumption-based¶ pollution (Brian R. Copeland and M. Scott Taylor 1995; Carol McAusland 2008;¶ Scott Holladay 2008), but empirical studies in this area have typically been limited¶ by the lack of available data. Holladay (2008) explains that, “high quality measures¶ of emissions from consumption rarely exist, making empirical work difficult.”¶ Our focus on vehicles is valuable because vehicle emissions are well understood¶ and vehicles have VIN numbers that allow them to be tracked consistently across¶ countries. Similar methods could be used to examine emissions from other forms¶ of transportation equipment, as well as a broad class of residential and commercial¶ durable goods.¶
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Davis and Kahn ’10 – Lucas W. Davis is an Associate Professor, Harold Furst Chair in Management Philosophy and Values, Economic Analysis and Policy Group, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Faculty Affiliate at Energy Institute at Haas, Research Associate at National Bureau of Economic Research. Matthew E. Kahn is Professor, Institute of the Environment, Department of Public Policy, Department of Economics (Lucas W. and Matthew E., “International Trade in Used Vehicles: The Environmental Consequences of NAFTA,” American Economic Journal, 11/10, ProQuest)//ER
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Mexico issued a decree allowing vehicles¶ 10–15 years old to be imported from the United States and Canada. a vigorous trade¶ flow emerged we assemble¶ the most comprehensive dataset ever compiled on North American trade in used¶ vehicles and vehicle emissions. traded vehicles are higher-emitting per mile than the stock of vehicles¶ in the United States vehicles that are exported to¶ Mexico are more likely to have failed emissions testing. This provides evidence for¶ the pollution havens hypothesis, the idea that trade liberalization causes pollution to¶ move to countries with lax environmental standards Overall, the analysis suggests that trade has led to an increase in total emissions.¶ While trade decreases emissions in the United States, this is not enough to offset¶ the increase in emissions in Mexico. , emissions increases are highly¶ persistent because of low vehicle retirement rates in Mexico These results highlight the importance for policy makers of recognizing¶ the synergies between environmental legislation and free trade legislation unilateral policies in the United States aimed¶ at reducing carbon emissions will increase exports of fuel-inefficient vehicles to¶ Mexico If the goal of¶ US carbon policy is to minimize global emissions, then such trade effects must be¶ anticipated. Our study is germane to a substantial literature on trade and the environment.¶
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NAFTA leads to emissions increases and harms the environment
| 4,580 | 61 | 1,392 | 698 | 9 | 211 | 0.012894 | 0.302292 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,969 |
The global scale and severity of environmental degradation and poverty are unprecedented in human history. Major adverse consequences are not inevitable, but they are likely if these problems are not addressed. Many civilizations collapsed or were severely weakened because they exhausted or degraded the natural resource base on which they depended. n76 In addition, substantial economic and social inequalities have caused or contributed to many wars and revolutions. n77 These problems are intensified by the speed at which they have occurred and are worsening, making it difficult for natural systems to adapt. The complexity of natural and human systems also means that the effects of these problems are difficult to anticipate. The potential impact of global warming on the transmission of tropical diseases in a time of substantial international travel and commerce is but one example.
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Dernbach 98, Associate Professor of Law at Widener University, ’98 (John, Fall, “Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance” Case Western University Law Review, Vol 49 p 16, lexis)
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The global scale and severity of environmental degradation and poverty are unprecedented in human history. Major adverse consequences are not inevitable, but they are likely if these problems are not addressed. Many civilizations collapsed or were severely weakened because they exhausted or degraded the natural resource base on which they depended. n76 In addition, substantial economic and social inequalities have caused or contributed to many wars and revolutions. n77 These problems are intensified by the speed at which they have occurred and are worsening, making it difficult for natural systems to adapt
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Environmental Degradation causes Extinction
| 892 | 44 | 613 | 136 | 4 | 92 | 0.029412 | 0.676471 |
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,970 |
MIAMI — There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaida and Hezbollah could form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist attacks, U.S. officials said Wednesday.
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Anderson, 8 (10/8/2008, Curt, AP, “US officials fear terrorist links with drug lords,” http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-08-805146709_x.htm)
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There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaida and Hezbollah could form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist attacks
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That results in WMD terrorist attacks
| 226 | 37 | 186 | 35 | 6 | 29 | 0.171429 | 0.828571 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,971 |
With an approving nod from the United States, Mexican President Felipe Calderon has thrown his army into the fight against the cartels, but the well-armed gangs are fighting back. And according to some U.S. officials and experts, the Drug barons are winning.¶ In Washington, where policy debates involving Mexico have been confined mostly to trade and immigration for the past two decades, sudden awareness of the Drug war has produced some alarming assessments. Retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who was the Drug czar in the Clinton White House, warned recently that unless the Mexican government gains control of the Drug gangs, the United States could, within a decade, be confronting on its southern border a “narco-state” — meaning an area controlled by Drug cartels. The Pentagon envisions an even worse scenario: Mexico and Pakistan, it says, are the countries most at risk of swiftly collapsing into “failed states” — those whose central governments are so weak they have little practical control over most of their territory.¶ Beset as he is at home by the credit crisis and plunging economy, President Obama’s response to the chaos in Mexico has so far been to continue some George W. Bush administration policies while beginning a search for others. He is expected to focus on possible regional approaches when he attends a Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago next month.¶ Experts on the region, though, say the magnitude of the Drug war in Mexico and its danger to the United States far exceed the reach of existing federal policies, perhaps even the policies the new administration is considering, such as stepped-up military aid and regional cooperation.¶ Uncontrolled Drug violence in Mexico, these experts say, might result in tens of thousands of refugees surging across the border, adding to the estimated 12 million immigrants already in the country illegally. U.S. Drug officials say that a narco-state in Mexico could turn the ungoverned territory along the border into a permanent springboard for Mexican Drug traffickers smuggling their goods north into California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. And economic analysts say that should the Mexican government completely collapse, it would jeopardize oil exports from Mexico, from which the United States receives a third of its supply.¶ “Any descent by Mexico into chaos,” the Pentagon’s Joint Forces Command wrote in November, “would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.”
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Broder, 9 senior editor for defense and foreign policy at Roll Call. Before joining Congressional Quarterly in 2002, he worked as an editor at National Public Radio in Washington and as a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press, NBC News and the Chicago Tribune, based in Jerusalem, Beirut and Beijing. graduate of the University of Virginia and studied international relations at Harvard University. (Jonathan, “Mexico's Drug War: Violence Too Close to Home” 3/9/09 http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003069323.) // czhang
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gangs are fighting back the Drug barons are winning.¶ unless the Mexican government gains control of the Drug gangs, the United States could, within a decade, be confronting on its southern border a “narco-state” — meaning an area controlled by Drug cartels Mexico and Pakistan are the countries most at risk of swiftly collapsing into “failed states” — those whose central governments are so weak they have little practical control over most of their territory.¶ the magnitude of the Drug war in Mexico and its danger to the United States far exceed the reach of existing federal policies, perhaps even the policies the new administration is considering, such as stepped-up military aid and regional cooperation.¶ Uncontrolled Drug violence in Mexico might result in tens of thousands of refugees surging across the border a narco-state in Mexico could turn the ungoverned territory along the border into a permanent springboard for Mexican Drug traffickers smuggling their goods north into California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas Mexican government completely collapse, it would jeopardize oil exports from Mexico, from which the United States receives a third of its supply.¶
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Drug trade violence turns Mexico into a failed state and destabilizes the US
| 2,504 | 76 | 1,180 | 398 | 13 | 185 | 0.032663 | 0.464824 |
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There is one dynamic in the literature of weak and failing states that has received relatively little attention, namely the phenomenon of “rapid collapse.” For the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods. The collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems. The collapse of Yugoslavia into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities in 1990 suggests how suddenly and catastrophically state collapse can happen - in this case, a state which had hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics at Sarajevo, and which then quickly became the epicenter of the ensuing civil war. In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico. Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons. That “perfect storm” of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used. The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by the Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone. Yes, the “rapid collapse” of Mexico would change everything with respect to the global security environment. Such a collapse would have enormous humanitarian, constitutional, economic, cultural, and security implications for the U.S. It would seem the U.S. federal government, indeed American society at large, would have little ability to focus serious attention on much else in the world. The hypothetical collapse of Pakistan is a scenario that has already been well discussed. In the worst case, the U.S. would be able to isolate itself from most effects emanating from south Asia. However, there would be no running from a Mexican collapse.
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Haddick 8 - a contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command who wrote the “This Week at War” column for Foreign Policy - (Robert, “Now that would change everything” December 2008, http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/12/now-that-would-change-everything.html)//WL
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. The Mexican government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. Any descent by the Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone the “rapid collapse” of Mexico would change everything with respect to the global security environment. a collapse would have enormous humanitarian, constitutional, economic, cultural, and security implications for the U.S. the U.S. government , would have little ability to focus serious attention on much else in the world the U.S. would isolate itself there would be no running from a Mexican collapse
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Collapses hegemony – the US will be too busy dealing with Mexico to project power in other places
| 2,484 | 97 | 699 | 398 | 18 | 106 | 0.045226 | 0.266332 |
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US.-Mexican Transboundary Resource Depletion¶ As NAFTA has spurred economic growth in the U.S.-Mexican border¶ region, transboundary political tensions over water allocation and¶ management also have grown. Both sides of the border are running out¶ of water both for agricultural and municipal use, and the scarcity is¶ creating a series of unresolved disputes between agricultural and mu-¶ nicipal users. NAFTA's implementation and its resulting impact on¶ growth in border region aggravated the demand for water for both uses but did not cause it. Even so, failure to address the water manage-¶ ment issue over the next decade will have an adverse impact on the abil-¶ ity of the United States and Mexico to continue their process of¶ economic integration or to sustain regional economic growth.¶ The problem is more acute on the Mexican side of the border because¶ existing supplies are threatened by municipal contamination. Mexico's¶ National Water Commission reported in 2001 that Mexico's northern¶ border towns and cities, strapped for funds, could adequately treat less¶ than 35 percent of the sewage generated daily (Thompson 2001). One¶ area of growing concern was Ciudad Juarez, across the Rio Grande¶ from El Paso, Texas. As of 2001, this city of 1.3 million residents was¶ growing by about 50,000 people a year, but the underground aquifer¶ that supplies the city and El Paso was declining by about 5 feet per year.¶ City officials estimated that the aquifer would contain no usable water in 20 years (Thompson 2001). ¶ Water is running short on the U.S. side of the border as well. Failure¶ t0 conserve water and failure to regulate underground water pumping¶ are two of the issues that threaten to limit economic development in the¶ southwestern United States. U.S. per capita use of water declined from¶ 1,900 gallons of water per person per day in 1980 to 1,500 gallons per¶ day in 1995, but by global standards, the United States is one of the¶ world's most gluttonous water users (Jehl 2002).
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Gilbreath and Ferretti ‘4 – Gilbreath was a secior associate of the CSIS, currently serves as an international policy specialist for the US EPA, Ferretti is the chief of the environment division of the Inter-American Development Bank (Jan and Janine, “Mixing Environment and Trade Policies under NAFTA,” Chapter 4 of “NAFTA’s Impact on North America: The First Decade,” edited by Sidney Weintraub, published 2004, CSIS)//ER
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transboundary political tensions over water allocation and¶ management have grown. Both sides of the border are running out¶ of water both for agricultural and municipal use, and the scarcity is¶ creating a series of unresolved disputes between agricultural and mu-¶ nicipal users. NAFTA's implementation and its resulting impact on¶ growth in border region aggravated the demand for water failure to address the water manage-¶ ment issue over the next decade will have an adverse impact on the abil-¶ ity of the United States and Mexico to continue their process of¶ economic integration or to sustain regional economic growth.¶ The problem is more acute on the Mexican side of the border because¶ existing supplies are threatened by municipal contamination. Mexico's northern¶ border towns and cities, strapped for funds, could adequately treat less¶ than 35 percent of the sewage generated daily the underground aquifer was declining by about 5 feet per year. City officials estimated that the aquifer would contain no usable water in 20 years Water is running short on the U.S. side of the border as well. Failure¶ t0 conserve water and failure to regulate underground water pumping¶ are two of the issues that threaten to limit economic development in the¶ southwestern United States. by global standards, the United States is one of the¶ world's most gluttonous water users
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NAFTA depletes water resources
| 2,012 | 31 | 1,379 | 327 | 4 | 219 | 0.012232 | 0.669725 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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In 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was sold to the American public with grand promises. NAFTA would create tens of thousands of good jobs here. U.S. farmers would export their way to wealth. NAFTA would bring Mexico’s standard of living up, providing new economic opportunities there that would reduce immigration to the United States. NAFTA was an experiment, establishing a radically new “trade” agreement model. It exploded the boundaries of past trade pacts, which had focused narrowly on cutting tariffs and quotas. In contrast, NAFTA contained chapters that created new privileges and protections for foreign investors; required the three countries to waive domestic procurement preferences, such as Buy American; limited regulation of services, such as trucking and banking; extended medicine patent monopolies and limited food and product safety standards and border inspection. After nineteen years of NAFTA, we can measure its actual outcomes. The grand promises made by proponents remain unfulfilled. Many outcomes are exactly the opposite of what was promised. Many U.S. firms used the new investor protections to relocate production to Mexico to take advantage of its low wages and weak environmental standards and to attack NAFTA countries’ environmental and health laws in foreign tribunals. Over $340 million in compensation to investors has been extracted from NAFTA governments via these “investor-state” challenges.
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Public Citizen ’13 (Organization in DC devoted to the protection/welfare of citizens “NAFTA’s Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement” http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf accessed 7/21 //NS)
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NAFTA) was sold to the American public with grand promises After nineteen years of NAFTA, we can measure its actual outcomes. The grand promises made by proponents remain unfulfilled. Many outcomes are exactly the opposite of what was promised. Many U.S. firms used the new investor protections to relocate production to Mexico to take advantage of its low wages and weak environmental standards and to attack NAFTA countries’ environmental and health laws in foreign tribunals. Over $340 million in compensation to investors has been extracted from NAFTA governments via these “investor-state” challenges.
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NAFTA destroys the environment
| 1,456 | 31 | 606 | 217 | 4 | 92 | 0.018433 | 0.423963 |
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Harmonization takes two or more differing standards or procedures and converts them into a single, uniform standard. While TTIP could offer an opportunity to elevate regulations in the U.S. and the EU, the harmonization of regulatory standards to the "lowest-common denominator" has often been the result of recent U.S. trade agreements, decreasing the level of protection afforded to the public in favor of private interests. n3 Other agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), failed to harmonize standards between Mexico, the U.S. and Canada, which has resulted in the transfer of dangerous and environmentally unsound industrial activity to Mexico. n4 This poses a serious threat to the environment, working families, and communities. It is therefore imperative not only that regulations are harmonized upward, but also that any convergence of regulations serves as a regulatory floor that allows governments the flexibility to develop more ambitious environmental and public interest policies in the future.
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 7/24 (“House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade Hearing; "The U.S.-E.U. Free Trade Agreement: Tipping Over the Regulatory Barriers."; Testimony by Carroll Muffett, President and CEO, Center for International Environmental Law”, Congressional Documents and Publications, section: U.S. House of Representatives documents, LEXIS // NS)
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(NAFTA), failed to harmonize standards between Mexico, the U.S. and Canada, which has resulted in the transfer of dangerous and environmentally unsound industrial activity to Mexico. n4 This poses a serious threat to the environment, working families, and communities. It is therefore imperative not only that regulations are harmonized upward, but also that any convergence of regulations serves as a regulatory floor that allows governments the flexibility to develop more ambitious environmental and public interest policies in the future.
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NAFTA undermines environmental policies and has poor working conditions
| 1,038 | 71 | 542 | 155 | 9 | 79 | 0.058065 | 0.509677 |
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United States-Canada Growth in Pollution and¶ Resource Deterioration¶ In U.S.-Canada relations, successful economic integration and eco-¶ nomic growth in both countries since the inception of the Canada-U/S¶ Free Trade Agreement in 1989 are generating new environmental chal-¶ lenges in the energy and logging sectors, and in an overall rise in land-¶ based toxic chemical releases. The CEC monitors some of these trends,¶ accepts citizen complaints about each government's resolve to enforce¶ its own environmental laws, and urges all three of the NAFTA countries¶ to consider the environmental consequences of increasing electricity-¶ generating capacity over the next several years."¶ The growth in timber cutting during the past decade in both the¶ United States and Canada has drawn the ire of many environmental¶ groups in both countries, who have filed complaints with the CEC al-¶ leging that both governments are failing to protect wildlife as the log-¶ ging sector booms. High-profile complaints have been filed against¶ logging operations in British Columbia and Ontario, and one against¶ the U.S. government for broad-scale failure to protect migratory birds¶ during logging operations." ln the most recent complaint, against On~¶ tario, the CEC asked the Canadian federal government to defend itself¶ against allegations that it allows 85,000 nests containing eggs and baby¶ birds to be destroyed every year. A coalition of environmental groups¶ claimed the federal government does not enforce the Migratory Birds¶ Convention Act against Ontario forestry companies that destroy nests¶ by clear cutting. But forestry companies say that while some nests are¶ destroyed when trees are cut down, the companies follow regulations¶ that protect the overall migratory bird habitat (Jaimet 2002). Rising energy demand in all three NAFTA countries is creating tri-¶ lateral tensions over pollution from new electricity-generating facili-¶ ties. The CEC addressed this issue in a 2002 report on electricity¶ generation in North America, warning that the continent's air quality¶ will worsen with the addition of 2,000 new power plants over a five-year¶ period beginning in 2002 (Leatherclale 2002). The growth of the energy¶ sector is a reflection not only of growth-led demand in all three coun-¶ tries but also of the recent deregulation of electricity in 16 U.S. states¶ and the Canadian provinces of Alberta and Ontario. In all, the CEC¶ l'€P0rt predicted that electricity demand will grow during the next de~¶ Cade by 66 percent in Mexico, 21 percent in the United States, and 14¶ percent in Canada.
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Gilbreath and Ferretti ‘4 – Gilbreath was a secior associate of the CSIS, currently serves as an international policy specialist for the US EPA, Ferretti is the chief of the environment division of the Inter-American Development Bank (Jan and Janine, “Mixing Environment and Trade Policies under NAFTA,” Chapter 4 of “NAFTA’s Impact on North America: The First Decade,” edited by Sidney Weintraub, published 2004, CSIS)//ER
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successful economic integration and eco-¶ nomic growth in both countries since the inception of the Canada-U/S¶ Free Trade Agreement in 1989 are generating new environmental chal-¶ lenges in the energy and logging sectors, and in an overall rise in land-¶ based toxic chemical releases. The CEC urges all three of the NAFTA countries¶ to consider the environmental consequences of increasing electricity-¶ generating capacity over the next several years."¶ growth in timber cutting during the past decade in both the¶ United States and Canada has drawn the ire of many environmental¶ groups in both countries, who have filed complaints with the CEC al-¶ leging that both governments are failing to protect wildlife as the log-¶ ging sector booms. High-profile complaints have been filed against¶ logging operations in British Columbia and Ontario, and one against¶ the U.S. government for broad-scale failure to protect migratory birds¶ during logging operations." A coalition of environmental groups¶ claimed the federal government does not enforce the Migratory Birds¶ Convention Act against Ontario forestry companies that destroy nests¶ by clear cutting. Rising energy demand in all three NAFTA countries is creating tri-¶ lateral tensions over pollution from new electricity-generating facili-¶ ties. the continent's air quality¶ will worsen with the addition of 2,000 new power plants over a five-year¶ period beginning in 2002 electricity demand will grow during the next de~¶ Cade by 66 percent in Mexico, 21 percent in the United States, and 14¶ percent in Canada.
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NAFTA leads to environmental challenges for Canada and the US – pollution, chemicals, and resource deterioration
| 2,609 | 112 | 1,573 | 398 | 16 | 239 | 0.040201 | 0.600503 |
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The S.D. Myers case essentially undermined Canada's environmental regulations and "obligations under international law to prohibit the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes" using NAFTA Chapter 11, a provision meant to protect investors against takings by a foreign government. Canada's motives may not have been purely environmental when passing the regulation, but the fact remains that an environmental regulation, a matter of sovereign control, was nullified quickly and effectively by a tribunal because of a single complaint brought 61 by a lone foreign company.¶ S.D. Myers points to the strong ability of foreign investors to circumvent environmental regulations that post-date the investment in the host State; those investors can then exit a problematic situation with cash in hand. Perhaps of even greater concern is the fact that domestic entities may not be able to get similar treatment because they are limited to domestic courts and do not have NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions to protect their interests as strongly. This creates a strong competitive advantage for any foreign entity in comparison to their domestic rivals, since foreign companies do not have to "just live with" environmental regulations. This advantage is particularly pronounced in chemical-related businesses, where a business is just one high-profile study away from being dismantled.
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Kagalwalla 2009—Adnan Kagalwalla, JD The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law [Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 112 2008-2009/lexis]//MM
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The S.D. Myers case essentially undermined Canada's environmental regulations and "obligations under international law to prohibit the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes" using NAFTA Chapter 11 Canada's motives may not have been purely environmental when passing the regulation, but the fact remains that an environmental regulation, a matter of sovereign control, was nullified quickly and effectively by a tribunal because of a single complaint Perhaps of even greater concern is the fact that domestic entities may not be able to get similar treatment because they are limited to domestic courts and do not have NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions to protect their interests as strongly
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Chapter 11 damages environmental regulations
| 1,373 | 44 | 689 | 205 | 5 | 104 | 0.02439 | 0.507317 |
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NAFTA requires access to U.S. roads for trucks without safety or environmental standards. The NAFTA truck saga provides an example of how NAFTA reaches “behind the border” to undermine important domestic environmental and safety policies, and how Congress can lose control of such¶ domestic policies if they are implicated by a trade pact. NAFTA’s service sector chapter included a requirement that all three countries’ highways be fully accessible to vehicles of trucking companies based in any NAFTA nation by 2000, an item pushed by large U.S. trucking firms seeking deregulation and lower wages.75 NAFTA also recommended, but did not require, that Mexican and U.S. truck safety, emissions and driver standards be harmonized (i.e. made uniform). That provision had no deadline, nor did it require that Mexican standards be brought up rather than U.S. standards brought down.76 Post- NAFTA negotiations on the standards issues went nowhere.77 The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Inspector General (IG) conducted studies that repeatedly revealed severe safety and environmental problems with Mexico’s truck fleet and drivers’ licensing.78 For instance, Mexico’s commercial drivers’ licenses permitted 18-year-old drivers and required no medical exam or drug testing. Nor did the government have a system for tracking driver violations, insurance or hours of service. The Clinton administration relied on the IG reports and did not implement the NAFTA trucking rules.79
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Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013, http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
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NAFTA requires access to U.S. roads for trucks without safety or environmental standards . NAFTA’s service sector chapter included a requirement that all three countries’ highways be fully accessible to vehicles of trucking companies NAFTA also recommended, but did not require, that Mexican and U.S. truck safety, emissions and driver standards be harmonized That provision had no deadline, nor did it require that Mexican standards be brought up rather than U.S. standards brought down.76 Post- NAFTA negotiations on the standards issues went nowhere.
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NAFTA trucking hurts the environment
| 1,473 | 37 | 553 | 219 | 5 | 83 | 0.022831 | 0.378995 |
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Mexico uses NAFTA dispute to supersede U.S. standards. To enforce its NAFTA-granted rights, Mexico launched a formal NAFTA dispute resolution case. In 2001 a three-person NAFTA tribunal ruled that the United States was required to allow full access to U.S. roads for Mexican-domiciled trucks or face trade sanctions.80 Shortly after entering office, George W. Bush sought to implement the NAFTA tribunal order.81 Public Citizen, Sierra Club and a coalition of other consumer, labor and environmental groups successfully sued in U.S. federal court to block the order based on the administration’s failure to conduct an environmental impact assessment as required by the National Environmental Policy Act. At issue was the prospect that Mexico-domiciled trucks driving throughout the United States would exacerbate air pollution, since the Mexican truck fleet is older and emits greater quantities of pollutants, including nitrogen oxide and particulate matter.82 Some U.S. border states supported the suit, as the influx of these trucks was projected to put them out of compliance with the Clean Air Act. This victory for safety and the environment was later overturned by a 2004 Supreme Court ruling.83 In a chilling ruling with implications¶ for a wide array of domestic policies implicated by NAFTA and other FTAs, the court concluded that the executive branch had significant discretion on this domestic highway safety policy because it implicated the president’s foreign affairs authority relating to enforcement of an international agreement.84
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Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013, http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
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Mexico uses NAFTA dispute to supersede U.S. standards. In 2001 a three-person NAFTA tribunal ruled that the United States was required to allow full access to U.S. roads for Mexican-domiciled trucks or face trade sanctions Public Citizen successfully sued in U.S. federal court to block the order based on the administration’s failure to conduct an environmental impact assessment as required by the National Environmental Policy Act. Some U.S. border states supported the suit, as the influx of these trucks was projected to put them out of compliance with the Clean Air Act. This victory for safety and the environment was later overturned by a 2004 Supreme Court ruling.83
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Mexico uses NAFTA to supersede US standards
| 1,549 | 44 | 675 | 233 | 7 | 108 | 0.030043 | 0.463519 |
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“Pilot” program favors NAFTA compliance over safety and environmental concerns. During Bush’s second term, his administration worked with the Mexican government to finalize a controversial pilot program for Mexico-domiciled trucks to be allowed access – despite ongoing safety concerns.85 A bipartisan coalition in Congress intervened, setting specific safety and environmental conditions that had to be met before the program could go into effect. In response, a private Mexican association of truck drivers launched a case against the United States under the investor-state privileges of NAFTA, demanding $6 billion in damages from U.S. taxpayers for their representatives’ failure to implement the¶ NAFTA “open-border” trucking policy.86 Meanwhile, environmental and consumer groups filed another lawsuit against the so-called pilot program for its failure to meet basic statutory requirements for a pilot program, such as providing safety data to determine if congressional requirements were met to transition the test period into a permanent policy. The Bush administration implemented its “pilot program” anyway, claiming congressional dictates only applied to a final open border policy, not a test program.
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Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013, http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
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“Pilot” program favors NAFTA compliance over safety and environmental concerns. During Bush’s second term, his administration worked with the Mexican government to finalize a controversial pilot program for Mexico-domiciled trucks to be allowed access – despite ongoing safety concerns environmental and consumer groups filed another lawsuit against the so-called pilot program for its failure to meet basic statutory requirements for a pilot program, such as providing safety data to determine if congressional requirements were met to transition the test period into a permanent policy
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Destroys safety and environmental concerns
| 1,214 | 43 | 587 | 173 | 5 | 84 | 0.028902 | 0.485549 |
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Obama administration caves to Mexico’s $2.4 billion NAFTA trade sanctions threat, allows NAFTA trucks to run over safety and health concerns. In March 2009, after years of congressional pressure, President Obama signed into law a bill that ended Bush’s 18-month “pilot” truck program. A few days later, Mexico announced that it would impose tariffs on U.S. trade worth $2.4 billion in retaliation. 87 The sanctions initially targeted exports from the states of House and Senate members that had voted in favor of the measure to forbid access until safety and environmental improvements were made.88 In April 2010, 78 members of Congress, including Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.), then-Chairman of the Highways and Transit Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, sent a letter to¶ Department of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, urging them to negotiate with Mexico to remove the cross-border trucking provisions from NAFTA. They asked the administration to swap improved access in another sector to “buy back” the policy space to maintain U.S. highway safety. Such negotiated compensation is allowed under NAFTA. The administration refused, instead allowing the sanctions to remain in place. Then, in a shocking move, the Obama administration caved to NAFTA in 2011 by signing a deal to allow Mexican-domiciled trucks into the U.S. interior for three years despite the unresolved safety and environmental concerns, thereby imperiling highway safety and clean air for the sake of NAFTA’s extreme provisions.89 The first Mexico-domiciled truck crossed into the U.S. interior in October 2011 without needing to show it was built to U.S. safety standards, while Public Citizen, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the Sierra Club filed a lawsuit to block the dangerous new “pilot” program. The program does not even serve its stated purpose of evaluating the ability of Mexico-domiciled trucks to operate safely in the United States, since there is no plan to collect a statistically valid sample of program participants.90
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Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013, http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
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Obama administration caves to Mexico’s $2.4 billion NAFTA trade sanctions threat, allows NAFTA trucks to run over safety and health concerns. the Obama administration caved to NAFTA in 2011 by signing a deal to allow Mexican-domiciled trucks into the U.S. interior for three years despite the unresolved safety and environmental concerns, thereby imperiling highway safety and clean air for the sake of NAFTA’s extreme provisions.89 The first Mexico-domiciled truck crossed into the U.S. interior in October 2011 without needing to show it was built to U.S. safety standards
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Trucks run over safety and health concerns
| 2,101 | 43 | 574 | 321 | 7 | 88 | 0.021807 | 0.274143 |
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The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect on January 1, 1994, required the elimination of most tariffs and other trade barriers on products and services traded between Mexico, Canada and the United States. While trade agreements have the potential to promote more sustainable and just development, NAFTA did very little to safeguard our environment or communities that depend on it. It transferred enormous power from democratic governments to multinational corporations and faceless global market forces - and today communities across North America are at greater risk. NAFTA has allowed environmentally irresponsible companies to continue their offenses outside U.S. borders where regulations are less stringent or poorly enforced. Health officials are now investigating a link between the swine flu outbreak and an industrial pig farm in Mexico, run by a subsidiary of the U.S.-based Smithfield Farms. Smithfield Farms is notorious for its environmental record in the U.S., having committed 6,900 violations of the U.S. Clean Water Act for dumping hog waste into a tributary of the Chesapeake Bay. Following passage of NAFTA, the company was able to easily set-up operations in Mexico, circumventing U.S. regulations that force them to properly treat hog waste. NAFTA also gave multinational corporations the power to by-pass the domestic judicial system and directly challenge environmental and public interest laws in secret tribunals. For example, Dow AgroSciences LLC, a U.S. company, recently filed a $2 million dollar lawsuit against Canada, in light of Québec's ban on cosmetic lawn pesticides containing the dangerous chemical, 2, 4-D. The pesticide was banned in Québec due to 2, 4-D's link to leukemia, respiratory problems, and neurological disorders, among other health-related problems. However, this move by the Canadian province to protect its citizens from potentially devastating health problems is now being contested under NAFTA's Chapter 11 investment provisions. In another example, California's new low-carbon fuel rules (LCFR) may violate NAFTA's "national treatment" provisions. The LCFR rules require refineries, producers and importers of motor fuel sold in the state to reduce the "carbon intensity" of their products by 10 percent by 2020. Since synthetic crude from Alberta's oil sands emits more carbon than conventional oil, the new rules would force those Canadian refiners to produce cleaner oil for export to California. Since Canadian refiners may need to spend more money than competitors in order to make their oil clean enough for export to California, Canadian trade officials contend that the LCFR rules are unfair. This dispute highlights the disconnect between citizens' ability to fight global warming and current international trade rules outlined in NAFTA. See "NAFTA's Corporate Investor Rights and Their Threat to the Environment," below. We can do better! In an increasingly globalized world, global warming and environmental degradation have no borders, and it is vital that our trade agreements reflect that reality. Trade agreements should promote a higher quality of life for all, not simply serve as vehicles to increase corporate profits. We must learn from the failed trade agreements of the past and stake out a different course for a future where people's lives and livelihoods are protected and respected.
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Sierra Club 2013 – one of the oldest grassroots environmental organizations in the U.S. (“RESPONSIBLE TRADE PROGRAM: THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT” http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/globalization/nafta.aspx //SRM)
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While trade agreements have the potential to promote more sustainable and just development, NAFTA did very little to safeguard our environment or communities that depend on it. It transferred enormous power from democratic governments to multinational corporations today communities across North America are at greater risk NAFTA has allowed environmentally irresponsible companies to continue their offenses outside U.S. borders where regulations are poorly enforced Health officials are now investigating a link between the swine flu outbreak and an industrial pig farm in Mexico, run by a subsidiary of the U.S.-based Smithfield Farms. Smithfield Farms is notorious for its environmental record in the U.S., having committed 6,900 violations of the U.S. Clean Water Act for dumping hog waste into a tributary of the Chesapeake Bay Following passage of NAFTA, the company was able to easily set-up operations in Mexico, circumventing U.S. regulations that force them to properly treat hog waste. NAFTA also gave multinational corporations the power to by-pass the domestic judicial system and directly challenge environmental and public interest laws in secret tribunals Dow AgroSciences pesticide was banned due to link to leukemia, respiratory problems, and neurological disorders, among other health-related problems However, this move to protect citizens is now being contested under NAFTA's Chapter 11 investment provisions In an increasingly globalized world, global warming and environmental degradation have no borders, and it is vital that our trade agreements reflect that reality Trade agreements should promote a higher quality of life for all, not simply serve as vehicles to increase corporate profits We must stake out a different course for a future
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NAFTA kills the environment
| 3,396 | 28 | 1,767 | 514 | 4 | 262 | 0.007782 | 0.509728 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,983 |
The placement of Canada in the quadrant next to Australia, indicating that these countries have low visibility but very positive valence, is not based on a detailed content analysis of international media coverage, but rather is suggestive and based on what little empirical evidence exists (e.g., a search of the New York times database would reveal very few stories on Canada’s politics or economics, but those that exist would be more positive than negative). Positioning Australia, a country with two-thirds of Canada’s gross domestic product, next to Canada suggests that Australia (especially after having hosted the Olympic Games) receives at least as much positive international media coverage in Canada (in other words, there are probably as many positive mentions). In contrast, it would not be incorrect to suggest that Mexico belongs in quadrant two. Mexico’s image within the English-language elite media (e.g. the New York Times, The Financial Times of London, The Economist) is that of a country that exports impoverished citizens to the United States and is home to violent drug cartels, an image that is difficult for the Mexican government to shake at the same time that it is billing itself as a trade and investment partner in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Canada, on the other hand, stands to see an improvement in their international perception from the North American Free Trade Agreement. Right now, ountries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany garner significantly more sustained international media coverage than Canada; China and Russia receive considerable international media coverage, but with a mixture of negative and positive stories, given the attention that is paid both to their economic development as well as their military build-ups and human rights records. NAFTA can provide Canada with the necessary components to give the country a higher visibility in addition its high positive valence. The United States, on the other hand, by far the most visible country in the international media, is a magnet for both negative and positive coverage. Judging by the Pew Research Center’s global surveys, since the invasion of Iraq, the United States’ national image as constructed by the global mass media is probably more negative than positive.
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Potter 9 (Evan J. Potter, “Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s Soft Power Through Public Diplomacy”)
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The placement of Canada in the quadrant next to Australia, indicating that these countries have low visibility but very positive valence is suggestive and based on what little empirical evidence exists Canada , stands to see an improvement in their international perception from the North American Free Trade Agreement. Right now, ountries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany garner significantly more sustained international media coverage than Canada NAFTA can provide Canada with the necessary components to give the country a higher visibility in addition its high positive valence.
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NAFTA key to Canada’s soft power
| 2,301 | 32 | 598 | 363 | 6 | 90 | 0.016529 | 0.247934 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,984 |
This report discusses developments in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of the Cold War and analyses some of the underlining causes of mistrust, misunderstanding, hostility, and emerging rivalry between these two major Asia powers. It presents a preliminary assessment of the key issues and controversies ranging from Chinese views on the evolving U.S.-Japan military alliance, Japan's aspiration to become a normal state and its pursuit of greater international role and enhancement of military capabilities, to historical legacies and rising nationalism in both countries, unresolved territorial disputes and competition for resources, and growing Japan-Taiwan ties. The report argues that the end of the Cold War, the changing international security environment in East Asia, domestic politics and leadership transition in both China and Japan, especially China's rise as a major power, present serious challenges for the regional balance of power and the need for adaptation and adjustments to the power shift and transformation. This dramatic shift in the power balance also leads to worst-case interpretations by both Beijing and Tokyo of the other's intentions and behavior. Under such circumstances, the old wounds of history are further aggravated by new nationalism, personality, and changing domestic foreign policy making processes where societal pressures impose significant constraints on conciliatory gestures and "new thinking" on managing bilateral relations. The report also reviews and evaluates the validity of limited confidence building measures and security dialogue between Beijing and Tokyo and concludes that their utility is constrained by the overall political relationship between the two countries. At the same time, the report also notes that growing economic interdependence, the recognition that continued deterioration of relations serves neither side's interests; consequently, the resolve of Chinese and Japanese leaders in the post-Koizumi era to mend fences and promote common interests at least for now have prevented the free fall in Asia's most important bilateral relationship. Sino-Japanese relations have important implications for Canada's interests. Canada has long maintained good relationships with both China and Japan for economic and politico-security reasons. Japan has been a traditional trading partner of Canada while China's phenomenal growth over the last quarter century has drawn significant interest from Canadian businesses. Ottawa made significant efforts in promoting its ties with Asian Pacific countries in the 1990s, as well as participated in and introduced multilateral security institution-building. In this context, the continuing free fall of the Sino-Japanese relationship could seriously affect Canadian interests in the region. Canada remains a "stakeholder" in the future developments in Sino-Japanese relations for at least three reasons: China's rise and its future direction affect both regional peace and stability and the geo-strategic landscape at the global level. China has become an important trading partner for Canada and Canadian "soft power" in engaging and encouraging China to adopt a multilateral approach to regional security and good governance has achieved important results. Ottawa should continue to play an active role in engaging Beijing to promote a disarmament agenda and encourage military transparency so that China's emergence could be better integrated into the existing international norms and frameworks, values a middle power such as Canada holds dear. Japan and Canada share many common values and interests. Both are members of the G-8 and OECD, and are concerned with emerging non-traditional security challenges, human security, and international peacekeeping. However, Ottawa and Tokyo have placed different emphasis and have different priorities due to their respective threat perceptions, geography and alliance commitments. Continued Sino-Japanese rivalry has serious implications for Canadian interests. Prolonged instability and deteriorating security in that region would negatively affect Canada's interests. Intensified disputes leading to militarized conflicts between China and Japan could result in a number of negative developments. There is the potential for an arms race. Japan strives for greater military capabilities, including nuclear and missile capabilities as Tokyo's confidence in U.S. nuclear umbrella and the alliance protection wanes.
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FATDC 12 – Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Stopping the Free-Fall Implications of SinoJapanese Rivalry for Regional Stability and Canadian Interests, 2012-09-14 http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/intl_security-securite_int/yuan2007/section1a.aspx?lang=eng)//A-Berg
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Sino-Japanese relations misunderstanding, hostility, and emerging rivalry between these two major Asia powers Sino-Japanese relations have important implications for Canada's interests. Canada has long maintained good relationships with both China and Japan for economic and politico-security reasons. the continuing free fall of the Sino-Japanese relationship could seriously affect Canadian interests in the region. China's rise and its future direction affect both regional peace and stability and the geo-strategic landscape at the global level. China has become an important trading partner for Canada and Canadian "soft power" in engaging and encouraging China to adopt a multilateral approach to regional security and good governance has achieved important result Ottawa should continue to play an active role in engaging Beijing to promote a disarmament agenda and encourage military transparency so that China's emergence could be better integrated into the existing international norms and frameworks Intensified disputes leading to militarized conflicts between China and Japan could result in a number of negative developments. There is the potential for an arms race. Japan strives for greater military capabilities, including nuclear and missile capabilities as Tokyo's confidence in U.S. nuclear umbrella and the alliance protection wanes.
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Canada’s soft power prevents Sino-Japan war---it goes nuclear.
| 4,475 | 62 | 1,354 | 634 | 8 | 190 | 0.012618 | 0.299685 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,985 |
According to IMPACS, “Canada has the resources and capability to play a lead role in conflict prevention internationally. It could provide support by delivering training or by building local capacities and developing local assets. Canada should support initiatives related to media and peacebuilding, dialogues and roundtable sessions, mediation efforts, etc”. In general, many of the respondents had basically positive things to say about Canada’s role in conflict prevention. Often this also included ways to increase effectiveness, or to capitalize on what one respondent described as the ‘deferring’ to Canada on certain issues in multilateral fora. Basically, the responses leave the impression that respondents believe that Canada and Canadians have made a good start and are generally motivated by the right intentions but that more could be done. Particular suggestions included pushing for inclusion of women’s rights in international treaties, strengthening of the UN and its procedures, the championing of international law and the encouragement of other states to adopt international treaties relating to the safety and security of people around the globe. The overriding theme that appeared in several of the responses was that Canada should support the work of international and regional organizations. UNICEF stated that by using soft power, “Canada is in a strong position to champion international laws and treaties through the UN and other regional and international bodies”. CUSO’s response reflected similar views, stating; “Canada is respected internationally for being a promoter of peace and human security, and should continue this role. It should continue to work within multi-lateral frameworks, including the UN, ensuring rule of law is adhered to in all its conflict prevention and interventions. Canada should support the reform of the UN in order to make it a more effective international body capable of effecting positive change in today's world. Canada should be more active in ensuring that people around the world share equitably in its resources. Canada should promote human rights and democratic development in all its international dealings including in trade and development.” Theresa Dunn expressed a related opinion, saying she believes Canada is strategically placed to become a leader in conflict prevention through its role as peacebuilder and often impartial agent. She went on to say that because of Canada’s size and commitment to conflict resolution through collaboration “we are able to move internationally with knowledge and expertise”. These views are fairly representative of a major portion of the responses received.
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Carment* and Marriott** 2003, *is the Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton University, where he is Associate Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, **is a graduate of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, (David B. and Koren “Conflict Prevention in Canada A Survey of Canadian Conflict Prevention Professionals,” September 2003, http://http-server.carleton.ca/~dcarment/papers/conflictpreventionsurvey1.pdf)
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Canada has the resources and capability to play a lead role in conflict prevention internationally Canada should support initiatives related to peacebuilding, dialogues and roundtable sessions, mediation efforts Canada’s role in international treaties, strengthening of the UN and its procedures, the championing of international law and the encouragement of other states to adopt international treaties relating to the safety and security of people around the globe by using soft power, “Canada is in a strong position to champion international laws and treaties through the UN and other regional and international bodies Canada is respected internationally for being a promoter of peace and human security, and should continue this role It should continue to work within multi-lateral frameworks, including the UN, ensuring rule of law is adhered to in all its conflict prevention and interventions Canada should support the reform of the UN in order to make it a more effective international body capable of effecting positive change in today's world. Canada is strategically placed to become a leader in conflict prevention through its role as peacebuilder and often impartial agent. Canada’s size and commitment to conflict resolution through collaboration “we are able to move internationally with knowledge and expertise”
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Canada soft power is k/t UN cred and conflict prevention
| 2,671 | 56 | 1,328 | 401 | 10 | 199 | 0.024938 | 0.496259 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,986 |
The Asia Pacific region is in the most broadly peaceful era in its history – it has experienced thirty years without interstate conflict. Extraordinary economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. Notwithstanding this striking record, however, a host of long-running, low-level internal conflicts continue in Southeast Asia, and several South Pacific states have recent experience of instability. Significant tensions also exist at the inter-state level, which could be amplified by a raft of growing transnational threats such as climate change and resource scarcity. Dramatic shifts in regional power dynamics are also creating new uncertainty. While for several decades, U.S military strength and its network of alliances have underpinned stability in the region, the rise of China and India may signal the end of this period of American predominance. By 2025 China and India will probably both have overtaken the GDP of all states except the US and Japan;1 by 2030, China’s economy could overtake that of the US.2 The global financial crisis appears to have accelerated China and India’s rise, and China is on track this year to overtake Japan to become the second largest economy globally.3 The Asia Pacific’s growing economic dominance is accompanied by increasing diplomatic and strategic clout, and the 2009 US National Intelligence Community Estimate describes the region as ‘poised to become the long-term power center of the world.’4 China and India’s emergence is also recasting Southeast Asia’s geopolitical landscape, as both compete for energy, markets, diplomatic influence, and naval access. States in the region apprehend this strategic flux and the uncertainty surrounding continued US strategic primacy. A number, including Australia, Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, have increased their defense spending, amplifying the very strategic uncertainty for which they are preparing.5 Who will take responsibility for conflict prevention and conflict management in this transitional period? During any power shift, major power competition can complicate or obstruct efforts to tackle conflicts, even where robust international or regional mechanisms have been established for prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping. In the Asia Pacific, the existing conflict management mechanisms are under-developed.6 A review of operational conflict prevention efforts in the region shows that while international organizations, particularly the UN, and regional organizations perform some conflict prevention roles in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, these roles are circumscribed.7 The constraints upon them flow from the high degree of respect for sovereignty prevalent in the Asia Pacific, but they also have historical, institutional, and political underpinnings. The UN itself faces particular skepticism, including the charge that it and the other Bretton Woods institutions have a relative disinterest in the region, as well as having governance structures that have yet to accommodate the Asia Pacific’s accelerating economic and geostrategic importance.8 Structural prevention initiatives have been less constrained, with a plethora of actors, including the UN, using statebuilding and development tools to build state resilience, manage transnational threats, and avert violence.9 A number of multilateral ‘track two’ networks and confidence-building processes also contribute to conflict prevention in the region. But the sum of all these efforts is still limited. Given the long-running conflicts and sources of tension in the Asia Pacific, the limited conflict prevention role played by international and regional institutions in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific is at first glance surprising. Yet, as this paper argues, a fair amount of conflict prevention activity has taken place in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, though less by grand design than in an ad hoc fashion, as opportunities have arisen. In the absence of a major, formalized role for international and regional organizations, regional crisis management has drawn in a variety of other actors, including states and NGOs, and seen ad hoc, multi-actor mechanisms assume a particular prominence. A series of case-specific, multi-actor mechanisms have worked well in the region; their good track record and the ongoing features of the Asia Pacific suggest that they are likely to remain the region’s primary conflict management vehicles. What role can the UN and regional organizations play in this context? This paper argues that in spite of their limitations, they can still make a significant contribution to conflict prevention and management in the Asia Pacific. Their priorities should be to strengthen existing prevention mechanisms; support other actors on a caseby-case basis; and flexibly add in capabilities to facilitate prevention efforts led by others. This report concludes with recommendations on how the UN and other actors can develop new tools and networks to underpin a flexible strategy for prevention in the Asia Pacific. The first recommendation stresses the importance in the Asia Pacific of a focus on cooperation in functional areas, such as civil-military cooperation in a disaster response context. Such functional cooperation is less constrained by regional sensitivities than full-scale political or security cooperation, and offers the prospect of enabling future political/security cooperation in the region, by allaying concerns about outside involvement. The analysis within this paper falls into two parts. First, it reviews the nature of crises in the region – highlighting the complexity and diversity of current and potential conflicts, and noting how growing transnational threats may exacerbate these. Second, it analyzes existing conflict prevention mechanisms, beginning with the UN and regional organizations, but also considering states, NGOs and financial institutions as preventive actors. This paper shows that there are significant resources for conflict prevention in the Asia Pacific. The challenge is to harness these in a period of growing strategic uncertainty. 1. Regional Crises Since the end of the Cold War, low-level internal violence has been the prevailing type of conflict in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. This has arguably contributed to the fragmented nature of conflict prevention in the region: case-specific coalitions of actors have emerged to help deal with specific low-level conflicts. In some cases, conflict management processes have been complicated by tensions arising from poor socio-economic conditions. There is also a risk of inter-state conflict in the region, while transnational issues such as resource scarcity and climate change may foster instability and even conflict. a. Internal conflicts, current and potential Internal conflicts persist in the southern part of Thailand, Mindanao in the Philippines, Papua in Indonesia, and in Myanmar. All involve separatist insurgencies fuelled by enduring grievances about representation, access to resource-derived revenues, or employment opportunities, and all have ethnic and/or religious dimensions. In Southern Thailand, violence between the militants and the Thai central government continues, with over 3,400 deaths since the conflict rekindled five years ago.10 The crisis within the Thai political system has reduced attention to the conflict and slowed peace negotiations. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government declared itself open to dialogue with the militants, and formulated fresh guidelines towards the conflict, which focus more on education, justice and development. However, the central political turmoil has made the government loath to move too far on this issue, lest it be used against them in a domestic political dispute. This has left the Thai military in charge of the response in the south. On the Philippine island of Mindanao, fighting reignited between the Philippine army and a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rogue command in 2008 after the Philippine Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Philippine government-MILF draft peace agreement. The court decision damaged the credibility of moderate MILF members who support negotiation, and burnished the credibility of those that want to fight. Contact between the government and the MILF has resumed – talks were held in December 2009, notwithstanding the pall cast by the massacre by the private militia of a local warlord in Maguindanao a few weeks prior. An International Contact Group comprised of Japan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the NGOs the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), the Asia Foundation, Conciliation Resources, and Muhammadiyah has been established to assist with the negotiations process.11 The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), from which the MILF splintered, is also still an actor in Mindanao’s four-decade, stop-start separatist insurgency. The 1976 Philippine government-MNLF agreement has not been fully implemented and has yet to resolve that dimension of the conflict. In addition, the Philippines continues to experience a Communist insurgency, particularly in its south: the New People’s Army (NPA) has been battling government forces for 40 years, and anticipated formal talks, the first in five years, have yet to take place. Myanmar remains embroiled in the world’s longestrunning contemporary conflict – over 60 years – with numerous ethnic groups against the military regime. Myanmar’s junta has concluded ceasefires with over a dozen of these ethnic groups, but these ceasefires are fragile. Political and development promises made to various groups by the junta have not materialized, and over the last year the military has launched fresh offensives against some of the groups. With elections scheduled for this year and ethnic groups supposed to play an opposition role, Myanmar is heading into a period of considerable uncertainty. In the Indonesian province of Papua,12 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has repaired some of the damage wrought by previous efforts to undermine the 2001 special autonomy initiative.13 A number of Free Papua Movement’s (Organisasi Papua Merdeka’s or OPM’s) political demands have been met, and the President has stated that the over 40-year separatist struggle requires a political rather than military solution. The focus in the province is also shifting from political issues to development, and there has been an increase in development spending. However, violence (by the fragmented OPM or its affiliates against the security sector; as well as ethnic Papuans against immigrants; intra-Papuan tensions; and the targeting of the resources sector, especially Freeport mine) increased in 2009, particularly in the lead up to the legislative elections last April. The military reaction was robust, with accusations of Indonesian security sector intimidation.14 So while the last few years have seen a more positive political and development trajectory in Papua, the situation remains volatile. Timor-Leste and the provinces of Aceh in Indonesia and Bougainville in Papua New Guinea are all in the consolidating phase after their respective conflicts. Timor-Leste in particular has a tumultuous recent history, and around 550 Australian and New Zealand military personnel remain on the ground, at the Timorese government’s request, to help maintain security. TimorLeste has stabilized politically since the 2006 security crisis and the 2008 assassination attempt on President Jose Ramos Horta, and the Timorese government has taken more of a leading role over the UN mission – for example, the government has assumed responsibility for policing. Many serious problems remain, however. These include a young and largely unemployed population (nearly half of whom are under 15); significant land and food pressures; quasi-militias in the form of martial arts groups; and a highly problematic security sector, which is politicized and rife with internal tensions, and in which the roles of the police and military are still blurred. Aceh, meanwhile, is enjoying the results of a reasonably successful peace process, with the incorporation of Free Aceh Movement (GAM) militants into democratic political structures. The disarmament of GAM and decommissioning of its weapons, and relocation of nonorganic military and police contributed to an upswing in security.15 Occasional violence in Aceh tends now to stem more from elite competition for Aceh’s revenues than from actions against the state. Aceh’s growing prosperity has helped to reinforce the peace, as has public distaste for the involvement of former GAM militants in illegal activities and intimidation. The winding up of the post-tsunami funding apparatus has created some uncertainty in Aceh, and a few aspects of the peace agreement, such as a truth and reconciliation commission, have not been implemented. And while dramatic post-tsunami reconstruction has helped to reinforce the peace in tsunami-affected communities, a number of conflict- but not tsunami-affected communities have not received a similar level of donor support, and there is a risk that growing disparity in support and poverty levels might undermine the peace process. Furthermore, the recent discovery of a terrorist training camp in Aceh indicates that such a fragile post-conflict setting can be attractive to terrorists and transnational criminal elements.16 Notwithstanding these risks, however, the autonomy framework is by and large working, and in the July 2009 presidential election, the reelected Indonesian President received a greater percentage of the votes in Aceh – 90% – than in any other part of Indonesia.17 While the 2001 peace agreement in Bougainville also involved the granting of autonomy, the situation on the ground is not as positive as in Aceh.18 Nor has Bougainville received a similar amount of attention from the international donor community or its national government, and its interim decentralization framework and the PNG government-Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) relationship are dysfunctional. Bougainville has not seen a significant improvement in development since the 2005 withdrawal of the UN observer mission,19 and the south of the province has been restive, with little economic activity or government service provision. The ongoing presence of weapons – with new ones coming in from neighboring Solomon Islands – continues to destabilize the province, particularly its south. The election of President James Tanis in December 2008 resolved an ABG leadership vacuum, and there are signs that some of these problems might be addressed. But Bougainville remains fragile as it moves towards its 2012 referendum on possible independence, and ongoing challenges include youth unemployment, and weapons collection and disposal. Internal conflicts will likely remain the most common type of conflict in the Asia Pacific region in the medium term. Domestic political imperatives have inhibited resolution of the conflicts in Mindanao and Southern Thailand, for example, and Papua (where political concessions have been made and the state-periphery relationship is sounder) and Myanmar both experienced an upsurge in violence last year. In addition to post-conflict Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific contain a number of other fragile states, including Cambodia, Laos and Papua New Guinea, which have weak institutions of governance and jobless young populations. With limited state resilience, there is a risk such states might experience heightened social and political instability, even conflict, if faced with a significant shock. b. Inter-state tensions in the Asia Pacific While internal conflict is the predominant type of conflict in the region, multiple inter-state territorial disputes persist and occasionally escalate. The starkest recent example is the 2008 Thai-Cambodia border crisis, in which the UNESCO World Heritage listing of the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia rekindled Thai contestation of the temple and its nearby border, and the situation escalated into a military standoff. Cambodia brought the issue to ASEAN and the UN Security Council, whereas Thailand sought to handle the issue bilaterally. While the two states eventually held bilateral negotiations and tensions lessened, Cambodia has not formally withdrawn its request for the matter to be on the Security Council agenda, so the issue continues to simmer. Thai-Cambodian relations have been further exacerbated by the Cambodian Prime Minister’s appointment of ousted former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as economic advisor, and Cambodia’s subsequent rejection of Thailand’s request for Thaksin’s extradition. Other territorial disputes in the region include the islands and waters of the South China Sea, which are contested by the Southeast Asian states of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as by China and Taiwan; the energy-rich Gulf of Thailand, contested by Thailand and Vietnam; and the Ambalat maritime area, over which ongoing Indonesian-Malaysian tensions heightened last year, with Indonesia accusing Malaysia of a naval incursion into its waters.20 In North Asia, territorial disputes persist (such as those between China-Japan and Japan-South Korea), and traditional regional flashpoints include Taiwan and North Korea. With enduring territorial disputes and a shifting geostrategic landscape dominated by China and to a lesser extent India’s rise, Asia’s continuing peaceful trajectory is by no means guaranteed.21 Discontinuities are always possible, and potential threats to stability are many. At the great power level, China-Japan relations are still fraught, though they have improved from their low point of several years ago; and the US-China relationship, as US President Obama recently declared, will ‘shape the 21st Century.’22 For several decades Asia-Pacific stability has been premised on US strategic primacy, and the US has managed the region with a traditional hub-andspokes alliance model. But China, if its rise continues, will at some point challenge this US primacy, while India’s rise is complicating the regional picture further. c. Transnational security challenges Southeast Asia and the South Pacific also face a host of pressing transnational challenges including food, water and energy scarcity; climate change; lingering effects of the global financial crisis; terrorism; transnational crime; and pandemics. A number of these challenges are interconnected and can exacerbate each other.23 The 2008 food crisis hit Southeast Asia hard, with protests over soybean scarcity in Indonesia and government crackdowns on those hoarding rice in the Philippines.24 Potable water availability and transboundary water management are growing problems throughout the region. Along the Mekong river basin, for example, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar are downstream of Chinese dam projects which will control the river’s flow and have a potentially dramatic effect on those countries’ fresh water and food supplies. Southeast Asia and the South Pacific will be among the regions most affected by climate change and the attendant increase in the number and strength of natural disasters. The Asia Pacific broadly defined is the most natural disaster-prone region – in the last ten years, the region has experienced more than half of the world’s disasters.25 Urbanization and high-density living in Southeast Asia make its population highly vulnerable to such events. Flooding is expected to increase in coastal areas, particularly affecting the low-lying megadelta regions in Southeast Asia and coastal Pacific island villages.26 Rising temperatures and rising sea levels will increase the risk of illnesses such as malaria, and likely force mass people movements throughout the region.27 Some of Indonesia’s smaller islands and whole Pacific Island states will probably be subsumed. Climate change is therefore regarded in the South Pacific as an existential threat.28 The effects of climate change are already being felt by the archipelagic states of Southeast Asia and the low-lying atolls of the South Pacific. Storms are intensifying in the South China Sea, and their patterns are altering: cyclones which once passed over the Philippines on their way to Vietnam are now bouncing back to batter the Philippines a second time, in effect doubling its number of storm events. Rising sea levels are starting to submerge Pacific Island atolls such as Tuvalu and the Carteret Islands within PNG, coastal villages in the South Pacific are emptying as waters rise (the evacuation of Carteret Islanders has already begun), and states such as Kiribati are making plans to relocate its population. Food, water and energy scarcity are all linked challenges, and climate change will serve as a ‘major threat multiplier’.29 Climate change is already exacerbating existing water problems such as the salination of the Mekong Delta; salt water is contaminating acquifers across the region, compromising drinking water.30 Experts predict that climate change will also cause food shortages in the region due to lower crop yields and declining fish populations. The risk of significant political and social instability in the region from the global financial crisis has diminished as the recovery has proceeded. In fact Asia, in particular China, India and Indonesia, has experienced the world’s most pronounced economic recovery, and has driven a significant amount of broader global growth.31 However, the financial crisis amplified the stresses on a number of other regional states – including Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia and Timor-Leste, which all experienced a rise in the numbers of people in poverty32 – and increased the possibility of instability within those states. Southeast Asia also faces an ongoing threat from Islamic terrorist groups with links to Al-Qaeda. The threat from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has diminished, due in large measure to regional law enforcement cooperation and Indonesia’s policing and deradicalization efforts. JI retains some capability, however, as the hotel bombings in Jakarta last July demonstrated, and the recent discovery of an Acehbased terrorist training camp – seemingly a new grouping which includes disaffected former members of JI and other groups – indicates the durability of the terrorist threat.33 The militant group Abu Sayaff also remains active in southern Philippines, and the Philippine military has launched further operations against it. Transnational crime, including drug production and trafficking, sex trafficking, money laundering and identity fraud, is also a serious problem in the region, particularly emanating from states with weak security infrastructure and control over their territory. Laos, for example, has porous borders with its five neighbors, and over recent years, there has been a significant increase in opium poppy cultivation and opium production and trafficking. Cambodia is susceptible to money laundering as well as drug trafficking. Large-scale quantities of heroin and metamphetamines are produced in territory controlled by the Wa ethnic group within Myanmar, and then trafficked throughout the region and beyond. Piracy had long plagued the Malacca Straits, one of the world’s most heavily used and strategic waterways, through which the vast majority of sea-borne energy passes from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific. The number of attacks has decreased markedly over the last few years, however, as a result of a concerted regional effort that will be discussed later in this paper. Finally, human proximity to birds and livestock in Asia make it the world’s greatest reservoir of viruses transmissible to humans. As SARS and the Avian flu virus showed, Asia is a likely source of future pandemics which have the potential to overwhelm the health systems of fragile states. All of these transnational threats have significant implications for regional security and could exacerbate the region’s ongoing conflicts. Natural disasters occurring in Mindanao, Southern Thailand, and Bougainville, for instance, can contribute to instability and worsen the plight of those affected by conflict. Recent flooding in Mindanao has displaced thousands of people already displaced by the conflict there, increasing upheaval and the risk of disease.34 Climate change is now expected to have major geostrategic implications, such as the destabilization of state governments, the fuelling of terrorism, and the mass movement of refugees and internally displaced persons.35 The US Department of Defense is factoring climate change into US national security strategy.36 US defense planners are concerned that the humanitarian and relief operations required after climate change-associated events will pose a significant burden on the US military, including its transportation and support assets, and consequently affect its combat readiness posture.37 Transnational threats are also likely to be among the drivers of future instability and possibly internal conflict. A major shock to a fragile state’s system, for example from a severe pandemic or water shortage, could significantly weaken governments and their institutions, and overwhelm a fragile state’s already-reduced capacity to function. Growing food, water and energy scarcity could likewise cause an internal crisis if sub-state groups come into competition over access. And threats such as water and energy scarcity have the potential to inflame interstate tensions. The continuing drive for energy security, for instance, is intensifying competition between India and China within Myanmar, and could cause conflict between states contesting energy-rich territory such as the South China Sea. The above analysis suggests that, while the main challenge in the Asia Pacific in the near to medium term is likely to remain low-level internal conflicts, there is also a risk of rising inter-state tensions and even inter-state conflicts. The region’s many transnational challenges could also generate or exacerbate instability. But these transnational challenges – for example, piracy, resource scarcity and climate change – are also opening up new opportunities for functional cooperation between both Asia Pacific and outside actors.
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Wainwright 10 - Elsina, Deputy Director for Personnel and a Senior Fellow in the Statebuilding Program at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, Adjunct Associate Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies (CISS) at the University of Sydney, Australia. PhD at Oxford University in International Relations, Conflict Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific April 2010, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E9F30DCAFE830FC9492577140018C276-Full_Report.pdf)//A-Berg
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a host of long-running, low-level internal conflicts continue in Southeast Asia, Significant tensions exist at the inter-state level amplified by growing transnational threats Dramatic shifts in regional power dynamics are also creating uncertainty the rise of China and India may signal the end of this period of American predominance the region as ‘poised to become the long-term power center of the world China and India’s emergence is also recasting Southeast Asia’s geopolitical landscape, as both compete for energy, markets, diplomatic influence, and naval access uncertainty surrounding continued US strategic primacy have increased their defense spending power competition can complicate efforts to tackle conflicts In the Asia Pacific, the existing conflict management mechanisms are under-developed the sum of all these efforts is still limited. Given the long-running conflicts and sources of tension in the Asia Pacific, the limited conflict prevention role played by international and regional institutions in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific is surprising the UN and regional organizations can still make a significant contribution to conflict prevention and management in the Asia Pacific This paper shows that there are significant resources for conflict prevention in the Asia Pacific. 1. Regional Crises low-level internal violence has been the prevailing type of conflict in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. This has contributed to the fragmented nature of conflict prevention in the region conflict management processes have been complicated by tensions inter-state conflict in the region, while transnational issues may foster instability and even conflict. potential Internal conflicts persist in Thailand the Philippines Indonesia and Myanmar separatist insurgencies violence between the militants and central government continues Myanmar remains embroiled in the world’s longestrunning contemporary conflict ceasefires are fragile Political and development promises made to various groups have not materialized Myanmar is heading into a period of considerable uncertainty a fragile post-conflict setting can be attractive to terrorists and transnational criminal elements Internal conflicts will likely remain the most common type of conflict in the Asia Pacific Southeast Asia and the South Pacific contain a number of other fragile states, including Cambodia, Laos and Papua New Guinea With limited state resilience, there is a risk such states might experience heightened social and political instability even conflict Inter-state tensions in the Asia Pacific persist and occasionally escalate territorial disputes in the region include the islands and waters of the South China Sea contested by the ast Asian states of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as by China and Taiwan; the ulf of Thailand, contested by Thailand and Vietnam; and the Ambalat maritime area, territorial disputes persist between China-Japan and Japan-South Korea and traditional regional flashpoints include Taiwan and North Korea With enduring territorial disputes and a shifting geostrategic landscape dominated by China and extent India’s rise, Asia’s continuing peaceful trajectory is by no means guaranteed. Discontinuities are always possible Southeast Asia and the South Pacific also face a host of pressing transnational challenges including food, water and energy scarcity; climate change; lingering effects of the global financial crisis; terrorism; transnational crime; and pandemics these challenges are interconnected and exacerbate each other food crisis hit Southeast Asia hard Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar are downstream of Chinese dam projects which will have a dramatic effect on those countries’ fresh water and food supplies natural disasters force mass people movements throughout the region the South Pacific as an existential threat Storms are intensifying in the South China Sea Food, water and energy scarcity are all linked climate change will serve as a ‘major threat multiplier’ exacerbating existing problems the financial crisis amplified the stresses increased the possibility of instability Southeast Asia also faces an ongoing threat from terrorist groups Transnational crime, including drug production and trafficking, sex trafficking, money laundering and identity fraud, is also a serious problem in the region Piracy had long plagued the Malacca Straits, one of the world’s most heavily used and strategic waterways, through which the vast majority of sea-borne energy passes from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific Asia is a likely source of future pandemics which have the potential to overwhelm the health systems of fragile states these transnational threats have significant implications for regional security and could exacerbate the region’s ongoing conflicts Natural disasters contribute to instability A major shock to a fragile state’s system could significantly weaken governments and their institutions, and overwhelm a fragile state’s already-reduced capacity to function scarcity could likewise cause an internal crisis into competition over access scarcity have the potential to inflame interstate tensions there is a risk of rising inter-state conflicts
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Southeast Asia is on the track to collapse---multiple regional and interstate hotspots are on the brink---effective UN conflict prevention is key
| 26,371 | 145 | 5,256 | 3,909 | 21 | 757 | 0.005372 | 0.193656 |
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The new international environment has altered the concept of national security. Threats to international peace and security now emanate not from strategic confrontation between the major powers, but from regional conflicts and tensions and the spread of violent extremism by nonstate actors, threatening nation-states from within and transcending state boundaries and international security. In recent years, the levels of security enjoyed by various states have become increasingly asymmetric—some enjoy absolute security, others none at all. This environment of security imbalance has forced weaker states to adopt a repertoire of strategies for survival and national security that includes alliances and strategic partnerships, supporting low-intensity conflicts, and engaging in limited wars and nuclear deterrence. South Asia has witnessed increased regional tensions, a rise in religious extremism, a growing arms race, crisis stand-offs, and even armed conflict in recent years. Nuclear tests did not bring an era of genuine stability between India and Pakistan, though military crises in the region did not escalate into full-fledged wars, underscoring the need for greater imagination to rein in the risks due to the fragility of relations between two nuclear neighbors in an increasingly complex set of circumstances. Pakistan’s primary and immediate threat now is from within. Its western borderlands are rapidly converting into a battleground where ungoverned tribal space in proximity to the porous and disputed border is degenerating into insurgency both to its east into Pakistan as well as to its west into Afghanistan. The al Qaeda threat has now metastasized into a spreading insurgency in the tribal borderlands, which is taking a heavy toll on both Pakistan and Western forces in Afghanistan. The newly elected government in Pakistan has hit the ground running; but still mired in domestic politics, it has been unable to focus on the al Qaeda and Taliban threat that is rapidly expanding its influence and targeting strategy. The most tragic aspect of this conundrum is the success of al Qaeda in creating cracks of misunderstanding between Pakistan and the Western allies, while exacerbating tensions and mistrust between Pakistan’s traditional adversaries, India and Afghanistan.1 For example, Pakistan’s security nightmare which perceives India-Afghanistan collusion in squeezing Pakistan is exacerbated, while the Indian and Afghan security establishments perceive Pakistani Intelligence malfeasance as perpetuating the Afghan imbroglio. Worse, the outcome of this confusion and blame generates real advantage for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Any terrorist act that pits Kabul, New Delhi, and Islamabad against each other and intensifies existing tensions and crises also throws Washington off balance, allowing al Qaeda and its sympathizers the time and space to recoup, reorganize, and reequip, and continue to survive. The only silver lining in this unhealthy regional security picture is the slowly improving relationship between India and Pakistan, which has developed over the past 4 years. Though relations are tense and still fragile, there is a glimmer of hope in this overall crisis-ridden region. The dialogue process between India and Pakistan has been somewhat resilient in the face of significant setbacks and changing domestic, political, and international landscapes within each. It is very improbable that a nuclear war between Pakistan and India would spontaneously occur. The history of the region and strategic nuclear weapons theories suggest that a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would result from an uninhibited escalation of a conventional war vice a spontaneous unleashing of nuclear arsenals. However, this region seems to be the one place in the world most likely to suffer nuclear warfare due to the seemingly undiminished national, religious, and ethnic animosities between these two countries. Furthermore, lack of transparency in nuclear programs leaves room to doubt the security surrounding each country’s nuclear arsenal and the safeguards preventing accidental launches. Therefore, discussions aimed at mitigating a catastrophic nuclear war in South Asia should focus mostly on the unilateral and bilateral anti-escalation measures Pakistan and India can take regarding existing issues. Additionally, each country’s perception of its security is interwoven with the political, diplomatic, and strategic movements of the external powers that wield significant influence in the region. Coherent and consistent behavior that discourages conventional and nuclear escalation, although sometimes imperceptibly, is needed from the United States, China, and Russia. Without this, both Pakistan and India are unlikely to feel confident enough to reduce the aggressive posturing of their conventional forces over existing cross-border issues, leaving the escalation from conventional warfare to nuclear warfare a very real possibility.
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Khan 09 – Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services Headquarters, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, fellow at Wilson Center (Feroz Hassan, Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia, December 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a3-9328-19cc-a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=112786)//A-Berg
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Threats to international peace and security now emanate from regional conflicts and tensions and the spread of violent extremism by nonstate actors, threatening nation-states from within and transcending state boundaries and international security This environment of security imbalance has forced weaker states to adopt a repertoire of strategies for survival and national security that includes alliances and strategic partnerships, supporting low-intensity conflicts, and engaging in limited wars and nuclear deterrence. South Asia has witnessed increased regional tensions, a rise in religious extremism, a growing arms race, crisis stand-offs, and even armed conflict in recent years. Nuclear tests did not bring an era of stability the fragility of relations threat now is from within the porous and disputed border is degenerating into insurgency both to its east into Pakistan as well as to its west into Afghanistan The most tragic aspect of this conundrum is the success of al Qaeda in creating cracks of misunderstanding between Pakistan and the Western allies, while exacerbating tensions and mistrust between Pakistan’s traditional adversaries, India and Afghanistan relations are tense and still fragile a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would result from escalation of a conventional war this region seems to be the one place in the world most likely to suffer nuclear warfare due to the seemingly undiminished national, religious, and ethnic animosities lack of transparency in nuclear programs leaves room to doubt the security surrounding each country’s nuclear arsenal and the safeguards preventing accidental launches a catastrophic nuclear war in South Asia is interwoven with the political, diplomatic, and strategic movements of the external powers that wield significant influence in the region nuclear escalation Pakistan and India are unlikely to feel confident enough to reduce the aggressive posturing of their conventional forces over existing cross-border issues, leaving the escalation from conventional warfare to nuclear warfare a very real possibility.
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South Asia tension causes nuclear war - low-intensity conflict, terrorism, cross-border spillover
| 4,995 | 97 | 2,100 | 728 | 12 | 307 | 0.016484 | 0.421703 |
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This is how wars usually start: with a steadily escalating stand-off over something intrinsically worthless. So don't be too surprised if the US and Japan go to war with China next year over the uninhabited rocks that Japan calls the Senkakus and China calls the Diaoyu islands. And don't assume the war would be contained and short. Of course we should all hope that common sense prevails. It seems almost laughably unthinkable that the world's three richest countries - two of them nuclear-armed - would go to war over something so trivial. But that is to confuse what starts a war with what causes it. The Greek historian Thucydides first explained the difference almost 2500 years ago. He wrote that the catastrophic Peloponnesian War started from a spat between Athens and one of Sparta's allies over a relatively insignificant dispute. But what caused the war was something much graver: the growing wealth and power of Athens, and the fear this caused in Sparta. The analogy with Asia today is uncomfortably close and not at all reassuring. No one in 431BC really wanted a war, but when Athens threatened one of Sparta's allies over a disputed colony, the Spartans felt they had to intervene. They feared that to step back in the face of Athens' growing power would fatally compromise Sparta's position in the Greek world, and concede supremacy to Athens. The Senkakus issue is likewise a symptom of tensions whose cause lies elsewhere, in China's growing challenge to America's long-standing leadership in Asia, and America's response. In the past few years China has become both markedly stronger and notably more assertive. America has countered with the strategic pivot to Asia. Now, China is pushing back against President Barack Obama's pivot by targeting Japan in the Senkakus. The Japanese themselves genuinely fear that China will become even more overbearing as its strength grows, and they depend on America to protect them. But they also worry whether they can rely on Washington as China becomes more formidable. China's ratcheting pressure over the Senkakus strikes at both these anxieties. The push and shove over the islands has been escalating for months. Just before Japan's recent election, China flew surveillance aircraft over the islands for the first time, and since the election both sides have reiterated their tough talk. Where will it end? The risk is that, without a clear circuit-breaker, the escalation will continue until at some point shots are exchanged, and a spiral to war begins that no one can stop. Neither side could win such a war, and it would be devastating not just for them but for the rest of us. No one wants this, but the crisis will not stop by itself. One side or other, or both, will have to take positive steps to break the cycle of action and reaction. This will be difficult, because any concession by either side would so easily be seen as a backdown, with huge domestic political costs and international implications. It would therefore need real political strength and skill, which is in short supply all round - especially in Tokyo and Beijing, which both have new and untested leaders. And each side apparently hopes that they will not have to face this test, because they expect the other side will back down first. Beijing apparently believes that if it keeps pushing, Washington will persuade Tokyo to make concessions over the disputed islands in order to avoid being dragged into a war with China, which would be a big win for them. Tokyo on the other hand fervently hopes that, faced with firm US support for Japan, China will have no choice but to back down. And in Washington, too, most people seem to think China will back off. They argue that China needs America more than America needs China, and that Beijing will back down rather than risk a break with the US which would devastate China's economy. Unfortunately, the Chinese seem to see things differently. They believe America will not risk a break with China because America's economy would suffer so much. These mutual misconceptions carry the seeds of a terrible miscalculation, as each side underestimates how much is at stake for the other. For Japan, bowing to Chinese pressure would feel like acknowledging China's right to push them around, and accepting that America can't help them. For Washington, not supporting Tokyo would not only fatally damage the alliance with Japan, it would amount to an acknowledgment America is no longer Asia's leading power, and that the ''pivot'' is just posturing. And for Beijing, a backdown would mean that instead of proving its growing power, its foray into the Senkakus would simply have demonstrated America's continued primacy. So for all of them, the largest issues of power and status are at stake. These are exactly the kind of issues that great powers have often gone to war over.
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White 12 professor of strategic studies at Australian’s National University, visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute (Hugh White, 26 December 2012, “Caught in a bind that threatens an Asian war nobody wants,” The Sydney Morning Herald, http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/caught-in-a-bind-that-threatens-an-asian-war-nobody-wants-20121225-2bv38.html#ixzz2GAKA8VUy)//KP
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This is how wars usually start: with a steadily escalating stand-off over something intrinsically worthless. don't be too surprised if the US and Japan go to war with China next year over the Senkakus don't assume the war would be contained and short. The Senkakus issue is likewise a symptom of tensions whose cause lies elsewhere, in China's growing challenge to America's long-standing leadership in Asia, and America's response China has become both markedly stronger and notably more assertive China is pushing back against Obama's pivot by targeting Japan in the Senkakus. without a clear circuit-breaker, the escalation will continue until at some point shots are exchanged, and a spiral to war begins that no one can stop. Neither side could win such a war, and it would be devastating not just for them but for the rest of us. the crisis will not stop by itself any concession by either side would so easily be seen as a backdown, with huge domestic political costs and international implications. It would therefore need real political strength and skill, each side expect the other side will back down first. the Chinese believe America will not risk a break with China because America's economy would suffer so much These mutual misconceptions carry the seeds of a terrible miscalculation, as each side underestimates how much is at stake for the other the largest issues of power and status are at stake. These are exactly the kind of issues that great powers have often gone to war over.
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Military conflict will occur by the end of the year and will escalate to great power war
| 4,862 | 88 | 1,501 | 818 | 17 | 253 | 0.020782 | 0.309291 |
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The danger of a nuclear war in the world will remain even if Russia and the United States agree to reduce their strategic offensive arms. Asia’s nuclear powers - India and Pakistan – do not intend to follow the example of the two superpowers. The ongoing standoff in South Asia may lead to catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The conflict between India and Pakistan lasts for over 60 years already. Their confrontation became especially dangerous after 1998, when both India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests and showed the world their ability to build nuclear weapons. India has never concealed an intention to possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear doctrine was approved in the nation in 2001. It is worthy of note that India never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Indian government believes that it has a full right to possess nuclear arms just like Russia, the USA, China, France and Great Britain. In accordance with the nuclear doctrine, India ’s nuclear arsenal will have the air, the ground and the sea constituents. The country’s Air Force already has nuclear-capable Mirage-2000, MiG-27 and Jaguar aircraft. It also has ground-based ballistic missiles. India does not have nuclear submarines yet, but it may become a reality very soon. Pakistan is India’s primary potential enemy. China can also be a threat to one of Asia’s largest nations. The Indian nuclear program of the 1960s was a response to its own defeat, which the nation suffered as a result of the border war with China in 1962. Several dozens of nuclear warheads will be enough for India to contain Pakistan. Even if Pakistan launches a massive attack against India’s vast territory, it will be impossible to destroy most of the Indian strategic nuclear arms. Quite on the contrary: India’s nuclear retaliation with the use of 15-20 nukes will cause much bigger damage to Pakistan, which is a lot smaller in size. India has 115 nukes at the moment. About 80 warheads will be enough to destroy Pakistan entirely. However, India will not be able to attack China afterwards. The latter has 410 nuclear warheads. Therefore, India will most likely try to enlarge its nuclear potential. Unlike India, Pakistan does not have its nuclear doctrine officially documented. There is not enough information about the details and the structure of the nuclear forces of this country either. Official spokesmen for the Pakistani authorities say that the development of the nation’s nuclear forces will fully depend on the actions of the Indian government. Pakistan possesses nuclear arms as a nuclear deterrent against a possible attack from India. In addition, Pakistan aims to reduce India’s predominance in other arms. Pakistan has all chances to build 40-45 nuclear warheads. The country has ballistic missiles too A nuclear blow in South Asia can result in a global catastrophe. The population of India and Pakistan totals over one billion people. The two countries do not have any means of protection against a nuclear attack. Even a minor nuclear explosion will kill millions of people and trigger a humanitarian catastrophe.
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Anokhin 09 – Pravda.Ru columnist, (Vladimir, “Nuclear war to break out in South Asia,” 12.05.2009 http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/12-05-2009/107537-nuclear_war-0/)//A-Berg
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The danger of a nuclear war will remain Asia’s nuclear powers do not intend to follow the example of the two superpowers The ongoing standoff in South Asia may lead to catastrophic consequences for the whole world. Pakistan is India’s primary potential enemy. China can also be a threat to one of Asia’s largest nations. Several dozens of nuclear warheads retaliation India has 115 nukes at the moment. About 80 warheads will be enough to destroy Pakistan entirely. However, India will not be able to attack China afterwards. The latter has 410 nuclear warheads. Therefore, India will most likely try to enlarge its nuclear potential. A nuclear blow in South Asia can result in a global catastrophe. The population of India and Pakistan totals over one billion people. The two countries do not have any means of protection against a nuclear attack. Even a minor nuclear explosion will kill millions
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It goes nuclear --- tensions escalate.
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But there’s more to the Chasma reactor dispute than the question of equity between India and Pakistan—the deal goes to the heart of concerns over civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation in Asia. Chinese assertions of the need to maintain a nuclear balance between Pakistan and India reflect the interconnected nature of these three countries’ nuclear programmes. After the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s, the Chinese Communists redoubled their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons to counter the USSR’s superiority in nuclear and conventional force. China’s successful development of an atomic bomb in 1964 in turn persuaded Indian leaders to pursue nuclear weapons. After India detonated a non-deliverable fission device in May 1974 at its Pokhran testing site, China increased its sharing of nuclear material and technology with Pakistan, allowing Islamabad to respond quickly when India finally detonated several deliverable nuclear warheads in May 1998. Indian policymakers cited China’s actions, including its growing nuclear weapons capacity and Beijing’s transfer of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies to Pakistan, as the reasons for their tests (and in the process implied that New Delhi was seeking the capacity to target China with nuclear weapons). But what’s perhaps the most fundamental point about the dispute with Pakistan is that it could so easily apply to many other Asian countries that might plausibly seek nuclear weapons—after all, its successful acquisition of an expanding nuclear force encourages other governments to believe they too could acquire a nuclear arsenal and overcome the resulting international opprobrium. That’s not all. Nuclear proliferation anywhere increases the risk that a non-rational actor, whether a leader of a state or a terrorist group, will acquire nuclear weapons. Everything being equal, the risk of nuclear accidents or nuclear weapons diversion to non-state actors rises with the increase in the number of nuclear weapons states. Both these considerations also apply to India, North Korea, Iran and other potential new nuclear weapons states. In addition, Pakistan’s sometimes acute political instability raises the risk of regime collapse followed by the transfer of Pakistani nuclear weapons to a less moderate government, domestic extremists, or foreign countries or non-state actors such as an international terrorist group or transnational criminal organization. The larger Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the more difficult it becomes for Islamabad to secure all its weapons adequately. But it wouldn’t even take regime collapse for extremists to possibly gain control of a Pakistani nuclear weapon. In its 2008 report, the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism describes Pakistan as ‘the geographic crossroads for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction’ given the presence of so many Islamist extremists, with suspected sympathizers in the government and armed forces, in a country with a rapidly growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. Yet even setting aside the question of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands, nuclear competition between India and Pakistan is especially dangerous. Active (and ongoing) political disputes between the two countries have resulted in three past wars as well as numerous proxy conflicts. Pakistani leaders in particular have concluded that their nuclear arsenal has deterred India from again using its conventional forces to attack Pakistani territory. As a result, Pakistan’s implicit nuclear doctrine presumes the possible first use of nuclear weapons. The risks of such tensions are compounded by the physical proximity of the two countries, as well as their reliance on ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles, which means that early warning times might be as little as five to ten minutes. Although it remains unclear whether India or Pakistan have combined its nuclear warheads with their assigned delivery systems, such a precarious stance would increase the risks of both accidental and catalytic war (a nuclear conflict between both governments precipitated by a third party, such as a terrorist group). Throw China into the mix, with Pakistan at risk of viewing its own nuclear programme as increasingly inadequate as India seeks to achieve mutual deterrence with China, and the picture becomes more complicated. And add in the risk of widespread political disorder in either India or Pakistan, which could see a dangerous political adventurism as political leaders look to rally domestic support, and the peculiar challenges posed by the region become clearer. The fact is South Asia is particularly prone to a destabilizing arms race. And perhaps nuclear war.
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Weitz, 10 - director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, (Richard, “South Asia’s Nuclear War Risk,” July 12, 2010, http://thediplomat.com/2010/07/12/south-asia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-war-risk/?all=true
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concerns over civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation in Asia. Chinese assertions of the need to maintain a nuclear balance between Pakistan and India reflect the interconnected nature of these three countries’ nuclear programmes. many Asian countries might seek nuclear weapons— Nuclear proliferation anywhere increases the risk that a non-rational actor, whether a leader of a state or a terrorist group, will acquire nuclear weapons Active (and ongoing) political disputes between the two countries have resulted in three past wars as well as numerous proxy conflicts. a precarious stance would increase the risks of both accidental and catalytic war (a nuclear conflict between both governments precipitated by a third party, such as a terrorist group Throw China into the mix, with Pakistan at risk of viewing its own nuclear programme as increasingly inadequate as India seeks to achieve mutual deterrence with China, and the picture becomes more complicated. And add in the risk of widespread political disorder in either India or Pakistan, which could see a dangerous political adventurism South Asia is particularly prone to a destabilizing arms race. And nuclear war.
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Disputes ensure nuclear escalation
| 4,724 | 35 | 1,185 | 712 | 4 | 181 | 0.005618 | 0.254213 |
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Great. At a time when Chinese authorities seem to be making efforts to dial down tensions with Japan over disputed islands, could a war between East Asian superpowers be sparked by accident -- by some frigate commander gone rogue? That nuclear war could come about in just such a scenario was, of course, a major concern during the Cold War. But decades of tension, as well as apocalyptic visions of global annihilation as a result of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. locking horns, produced carefully designed systems to minimize the damage any one rogue actor could inflict (only the president can access the nuclear codes), and to minimize misunderstandings from more minor incidents (the Kremlin-White House hotline). But East Asia -- relatively free of military buildup until recently -- doesn't have these same systems in place. A soon-to-be-released report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies highlights the danger that emerges when a region's military systems develop faster than its communication mechanisms, and finds that accidental war in East Asia is a real possibility: Across East Asia, advanced military systems such as anti-ship missiles, new submarines, advanced combat aircraft are proliferating in a region lacking security mechanisms that could defuse crises. Bilateral military-to-military ties are often only embryonic. There is a tangible risk of accidental conflict and escalation, particularly in the absence of a strong tradition of military confidence-building measures."
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Wittmeyer 3/19/13 Assistant Editor at Foreign Policy Magazine (Alicia P.Q. Wittmeyer, 19 March 2013, “Why Japan and China could accidentally end up at war,” Foreign Policy, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/19/china_japan_accidental_war_islands)//KP
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could a war between East Asian superpowers be sparked by accident That nuclear war could come about in just such a scenario was a major concern during the Cold War decades of tension, as well as apocalyptic visions of global annihilation as a result of the U.S. and U.S.S.R produced carefully designed systems to minimize the damage any one rogue actor could inflict ( But East Asia doesn't have these same systems in place. A report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies highlights the danger that emerges when a region's military systems develop faster than its communication mechanisms, and finds that accidental war in East Asia is a real possibility: anced military systems such as anti-ship missiles, new submarines, advanced combat aircraft are proliferating in a region lacking security mechanisms that could defuse crises There is a tangible risk of accidental conflict and escalation
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Lack of communication means accidental war and escalation is probable
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There are dangers for the United States and Japan in underestimating or confronting China. The Abe government’s interest in changing the postwar Japanese Constitution threatens relations not only with China but also with the U.S. Despite the optimists, military conflict in the region would be uncontainable. Any form of confrontation involving China would likely spiral out of control and engulf the entire region, if not the world. Since the Liberal Democratic Party was last in power, the world has profoundly changed. The first noticeable change is that the U.S. is in serious, perhaps irretrievable trouble. Much has been said about how the Chinese giant awoke and arose, but much less has been said about what happens when the U.S. giant stumbles and falls. The decline of the U.S. has sent shock waves around the world, and even America’s enemies shudder. The cumulative effects of poor financial decisions, social fragmentation, national debt and overseas conflict have taken their toll, injecting a profound and deleterious sense of uncertainty. The second noticeable change is the immaturity of Chinese ambition. China has risen during a time of peace. U.S.-sanctioned free trade underpinned this success. Instead, Beijing talks of islands, oceans, and territories in terms of rights to ownership. This reflects an immature China that coexists alongside a confident, global-oriented China. Politically, Chinese leadership is dysfunctional. China has effectively dominated the global economy, but it seems obsessed with a few islands of minimal value in the East and South China Seas. Both the uncertain path ahead for the U.S. and the immature ambitions of China threaten the future of Japan. Changing the Constitution would inject further uncertainty into an already tense region.
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Sutton 4/3/13 Ph.D., visiting fellow at the World Trade Organization Research Center, former assistant professor of International Relations (Michael Sutton, 3 April 2013, “War with China is not inevitable, so tread carefully,” The Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/03/commentary/war-with-china-is-not-inevitable-so-tread-carefully/#.UdSgl_m1Fsk)
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There are dangers for the United States and Japan in underestimating or confronting China military conflict in the region would be uncontainable. Any form of confrontation involving China would likely spiral out of control and engulf the entire region, if not the world. The cumulative effects of poor financial decisions, social fragmentation, national debt and overseas conflict have taken their toll, injecting a profound and deleterious sense of uncertainty. The second noticeable change is the immaturity of Chinese ambition. China has risen during a time of peace. Beijing talks of islands, oceans, and territories in terms of rights to ownership. This reflects an immature China that coexists alongside a confident, global-oriented China. Politically, Chinese leadership is dysfunctional. China has effectively dominated the global economy, but it seems obsessed with a few islands of minimal value in the East and South China Seas.
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Any conflict in the region escalates
| 1,791 | 36 | 939 | 277 | 6 | 142 | 0.021661 | 0.512635 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
|
2,993 |
As Congress crafts comprehensive immigration legislation, Democrats and Republicans must keep in mind that Mexico is changing rapidly, and policies crafted to reflect yesterday's Mexico will not help the U.S. make the most of the potential of today's and tomorrow's Mexico. Mexico's future is bright, and tapping into this growth and economic prosperity is vital to U.S. competitiveness. But the U.S. needs immigration reform to build on its huge bilateral trade with Mexico -- more than $1 billion in goods and services each day, or $45 million an hour. Mexico's President Enrique Peña Nieto has achieved in less than five months in office what eluded previous administrations for six years. In the second half of 2013, he hopes to add energy to the improvements in education and telecommunications that are sailing through under the umbrella of the Pact for Mexico political agreement.
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Marczak 4/18 - director of policy at Americas Society and Council of the Americas, senior editor of the AS/COA policy journal, Americas Quarterly, and managing editor of AQ Online (Jason, “Immigration Reform get U.S. in on Mexico’s Boom”, 4/18/13; < http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/18/opinion/marczak-immigration-the-new-mexico>)//Beddow
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Mexico is changing rapidly Mexico's future is bright, and tapping into this growth and economic prosperity is vital to U.S. competitiveness.
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Mexican growth is key to the US economy.
| 887 | 41 | 140 | 142 | 8 | 21 | 0.056338 | 0.147887 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Unknown
|
2013
|
2,994 |
The counterargument to contagion is the ‘risk-sharing’ argument. It suggests that while trade and financial linkages may spread a crisis, this creates a cushioning effect that, overall, minimizes the effects on any individual state. In other words, interdependence creates shock-absorbing linkages that soften a state’s vulnerability to dramatic economic downturns (see, e.g., Kelemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, & Yosha, 2003). Gallegati, Greenwald, Richiardi, and Stiglitz (2008) have made a convincing observation that would appear to clarify this debate. They have provided statistical modeling indicating that risk-sharing and contagion are in fact two sides of the same coin. When economic times are good, inter-linkages provide mechanisms for the diffusion of individual agents that face a liquidity crisis. A leader can request a creditor defer payment, whereas a creditor can then transfer this cost on to other agents. As such the system would absorb the crisis. When liquidity is relatively more scarce during down times, a sufficiently large negative shock will use those very same inter-linkages to transmit that shock to other agents in the system. As a result, ‘risk sharing is beneficial only when the overall economic environment is favourable, while in harsh times it might be better to stay alone… [linkage during market downturns] becomes socially detrimental; not only is it that the expected number of defaults is higher when the economic agents are connected, but defaults become a systemic failure’ (Gallegati et al., 2008. Pp.5. 16). Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) considered the same question and found only mild support for risk-sharing and only among developed, industrial economies. They found no evidence that developing, non-industrial countries are able to share risk. The authors break relatively new ground in suggesting why this is the case for non-industrial states: One possibility is that these countries rely more on less stable capital such as bank loans and other forms of debt that may not allow for efficient risk sharing. Indeed, we break up stocks of external assets and liabilities into different categories – FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, etc. – we find that the underlying composition of capital flows influences the ability of developing countries to share risk. In particular, external debt appears to hinder the ability of emerging market economies to share their consumption risk. (Kose, Prasad, & Terrones, 2009. P. 259) One reason why interdependent states may not be well-suited to share risk is due to the fact that interdependence leads to economic specialization and reliance on external financing. Gande, John, and Senbet (2008) and Corsetii et al. (1999) provide conceptual and analytical links between specialization, moral hazard, and contagion. Thus, the answer to the first question set out at the beginning of this section, whether economic integration and economic crises are linked, seems reasonably well-established. Substantial recent scholarship indicates a positive association between economic interdependence and economic crises. What then about the second question? Is there a positive correlation between economic crises and armed conflict? The impacts at an individual level and on a state level are intuitive and well-documented (See, e.g., Richards & Gelleny, 2006). Rodrik (1997a, 197b), among others, argues that the instability in the global economic system contributes to social disintegration and political conflict.’ Social unrest, regime changes, and even civil war have directly resulted from the vagaries of economic integration. Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could user in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess., 2002, p. 89). Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises, and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
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Royal 10 – Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy, US-Department of Defense, policy advisor (Jedidiah, “Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives”, pg. 212-214; Print.)//Beddow
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while trade and financial linkages may spread a crisis, this creates a cushioning effect that, overall, minimizes the effects on any individual state. In other words, interdependence creates shock-absorbing linkages that soften a state’s vulnerability to dramatic economic downturns statistical modeling indicating that risk-sharing and contagion are in fact two sides of the same coin. When economic times are good, inter-linkages provide mechanisms for the diffusion of individual agents that face a liquidity crisis. When liquidity is relatively more scarce during down times, a sufficiently large negative shock will use those very same inter-linkages to transmit that shock to other agents in the system. As a result, ‘risk sharing is beneficial only when the overall economic environment is favourable, while in harsh times it might be better to stay alone… [linkage during market downturns] becomes socially detrimental the instability in the global economic system contributes to social disintegration and political conflict.’ Social unrest, regime changes, and even civil war have directly resulted from the vagaries of economic integration. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could user in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect . supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.
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Economic decline breaks down cooperation and leads to war – heg decline, falling trade, rising protectionism, and diversionary tactics.
| 8,053 | 135 | 4,174 | 1,188 | 19 | 617 | 0.015993 | 0.51936 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
|
2,995 |
In terms of schooling, 39 percent of the population aged fifteen years and older born in Mexico and residing in the United States have attained a level higher than a high school diploma. This figure rises to 52 percent if the full spectrum of the population of Mexican origin in the United States is taken into consideration. By contrast, the average figure for Mexico is 28 percent, which means that in general, and in contrast to what is commonly believed, more qualified workers are leaving than remaining in the country. In other words, there is a clear selective trend, in line with the underlying rationale behind international migrations. It should also be noted, however, that in comparison to other immigrant groups in the United States, the Mexican contingent is the one with the lowest average levels of schooling. ¶ One high-profile form of migration that does not fall in with the stereotypes involves Mexican residents in the United States who have university degrees or postgraduate qualifications. This population includes slightly more than 385,000 individuals born in Mexico. Of those, 86,000 have postgraduate studies, and 10,000 have doctorates (Current Population Survey, http://www.census.gov/cps). This indicates that "brain drain" is beginning to emerge as a major problem.
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Wise and Cypher 2007—Dr. Raúl Delgado Wise is president of the International Network on Migration and Development; UNESCO Chair on Migration, Development and Human Rights; and Professor of the Doctoral Programme in Development Studies at the Autonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico. Dr. James M. Cypher received his Ph.D. degree in economics from the University of California, Riverside in 1973. His B.A. and M.A. degrees were awarded by University of California, Santa Barbara. His early research interests were focused on the macroeconomic impacts of US military spending, and he has published numerous articles in this area. Since the late 1980s he has concentrated on the Mexican Economy and issues of internationalization and economic development of poor nations. His book, State and Capital in Mexico (Westview, 1990) was published in Mexico by Siglo XXI publishers. He has taught or worked at several universities in Latin America, and is currently engaged in a large project to assess the pattern of industrialization in Chile. The senior member of the Department’s faculty, Dr. Cypher has devoted his career to undergraduate teaching for over three decades. With James Dietz he co-authored a text, The Process of Economic Development (Routledge) the second edition of which will appear in 2003. [“The Strategic Role of Mexican Labor under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on Current Economic Integration.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 610, NAFTA and Beyond: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development (Mar., 2007), pp. 120-142]//MM
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39 percent of the population aged fifteen years and older born in Mexico and residing in the United States have attained a level higher than a high school diploma. . By contrast, the average figure for Mexico is 28 percent more qualified workers are leaving than remaining in the country there is a clear selective trend, in line with the underlying rationale behind international migrations , the Mexican contingent is the one with the lowest average levels of schooling Mexican residents in the United States who have university degrees or postgraduate qualifications This indicates that "brain drain" is beginning to emerge as a major problem.
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NAFTA created poor Mexican schooling and a brain drain
| 1,297 | 54 | 646 | 204 | 9 | 105 | 0.044118 | 0.514706 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
|
2,996 |
Using these measures, I analyzed the effects of NAFTA on the growth of maquiladoras. The final results of¶ this econometric analysis indicate that a negative correlation exists between maquiladora employment and the¶ wage variables with a positive correlation between maquiladora employment and demand. What is most¶ interesting about the results, however, is the persistently negative and insignificant role of NAFTA in the recent¶ growth in maquiladora employment. This finding runs contrary certainly to the allegations of NAFTA¶ opponents such as H. Ross Perot and others.4¶ While no one can deny that the rate of growth in maquiladora¶ employment has been remarkably rapid since the implementation of the North American Free Trade¶ Agreement in 1994, the expansion apparently has little to do with the agreement itself.
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Gruben ’98 – Assistant Vice President, Director, Center for Latin American Economics, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (William C, “NAFTA Revisited: The Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on Maquiladora Employment, Texas Business Review, December 1998, Google Scholar)//ER
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I analyzed the effects of NAFTA on the growth of maquiladoras. a negative correlation exists between maquiladora employment and the¶ wage variables with a positive correlation between maquiladora employment and demand What is most¶ interesting about the results is the persistently negative and insignificant role of NAFTA in the recent¶ growth in maquiladora employment. This finding runs contrary certainly to the allegations of NAFTA¶ opponents such as H. Ross Perot and others While no one can deny that the rate of growth in maquiladora¶ employment has been remarkably rapid since the implementation of the North American Free Trade¶ Agreement in 1994, the expansion apparently has little to do with the agreement itself.
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NAFTA has no effect on maquiladoras
| 824 | 36 | 726 | 125 | 6 | 112 | 0.048 | 0.896 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,997 |
The founders of NAFTA did not consider the possibility of a financial crisis in the United States; nor did they imagine that the headquarters of international banks with subsidiaries in Mexico could face bankruptcy or nationalization. In reality, this sui generis process of financial integration between Mexico and the United States has left the country with a neocolonial financial system controlled by absentee owners, which is based on rent-seeking activities, particularly those related to international arbitrage. Financial authorities have been complacent, lacking independence and legal instruments to act with.¶ In the course of the financial crisis period of 2007–8, the local subsidiaries of global banks have been rapidly reducing their credit portfolios, although their capture of deposits continues to increase unabated. They are quickly increasing their cash holdings in foreign accounts, and their profits have repatriated to headquarters during successive quarters (Mexico Securities and Banking Commission 2008). At the same time, economic activity fell abruptly in the last months of 2008, along with the export sector and related economic actors. Particularly hard hit have been the automobile and auto parts industries. ¶ The financial conditions of the country continue to deteriorate day by day as its economic model is sustained by a constant inflow of dollars (as has happened in other instances of dollarization in Latin America). All the principal sources of dollars have been contracting abruptly, including the export of crude oil, worker remittances, and foreign direct and portfolio investment. Meanwhile, all the obligations that imply capital outflows have continued or sharpened, including the import of food and energy, the payment of dividends and earnings of subsidiaries of global corporations (including banks), the outflow of portfolio investment, and the interest on external debt, both public and private. The domestic currency depreciated in relation to the U.S. dollar by almost 50 percent from September 2008 to March 2009 but then was propped up and stabilized at about two-thirds of its ¶ 2008 value until May 2009.¶ Mexico’s central bank has spent more than $18 billion (equivalent to 21 percent of its international reserves) to sustain the exchange rate. To understand the magnitude of the problem, one only has to consider that the size of short-term private debt has surpassed $20 billion, and interest payments on external debt are estimated at $14 billion in 2009. Portfolio investment in government bonds of foreign residents is estimated at $27 billion in the third quarter of 2008. None of this takes into consideration the large dollar requirements that an abrupt seizure of positions in the derivatives market would demand. ¶ The global crisis of the originate–distribute financial model also represents an endogenous financial crisis in Mexico, of a still undetermined size. As often happens with banking crises, the amount of losses becomes known only once they are all brought to light. However, the consequences can be clearly seen on the horizon: contraction in employment, salaries, and levels of well-being; lower levels of economic activity; and a growing deterioration in the fundamental functions of the government, including ensuring security and territorial integrity, among other factors. These considerations are highlighted by the growing fears that Mexico could become a failed state or at least a failed government (Brogan, Dolan, Helman, and Vardi 2008; Enfoque 2009; Kurtzman 2009).¶ The financial and trade opening, the commitments derived from NAFTA, and the balanced budget law severely limit the ability of the government authorities to address the economic crisis with a well-directed and sufficiently large countercyclical program. However, the same authorities broadly endorse the policies of the IMF, and as such they have no intention of committing themselves to even minimal countercyclical measures. At least for the moment, even the large domestic corporations are being left with no support. Such is the case of the Vitro group, one of the ten largest groups in the country and in operation for over one hundred years, which recently declared a moratorium on several bonds, is selling assets at fire-sale prices and, barring unforeseen developments, could declare bankruptcy in the coming months.¶ NAFTA might be seen as an innocuous part of the global financial crisis, but it is not. NAFTA created an unequal financial integration between Mexico and the United States, and that must be changed to build more equal economic relations within the North American economic region.
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Correa and Seccareccia 2009—Mario Seccareccia has been teaching at the University of Ottawa since 1978. He has authored/co-authored or co-edited some eight books or monographs, and has published some 75 articles or chapters of books. He is also editor of the New York-based International Journal of Political Economy. His principal research interests are in the areas of monetary economics, history of economic thought and methodology, labour economics, and Canadian economic history. Eugenia Correa is a professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. ["The United States Financial Crisis and Its NAFTA Linkages." International Journal Of Political Economy 38.2 (2009): 70-99. Political Science Complete. JSTOR. 27 July 2013]//MM
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this sui generis process of financial integration between Mexico and the United States has left the country with a neocolonial financial system controlled by absentee owners, which is based on rent-seeking activities, particularly those related to international arbitrage. Financial authorities have been complacent, lacking independence and legal instruments to act with. economic activity fell abruptly in the last months of 2008, along with the export sector and related economic actors. Particularly hard hit have been the automobile and auto parts industries. The financial conditions of the country continue to deteriorate day by day as its economic model is sustained by a constant inflow of dollars (as has happened in other instances of dollarization in Latin America). All the principal sources of dollars have been contracting abruptly, including the export of crude oil, worker remittances, and foreign direct and portfolio investment. Meanwhile, all the obligations that imply capital outflows have continued or sharpened, including the import of food and energy, the payment of dividends and earnings of subsidiaries of global corporations (including banks), the outflow of portfolio investment, and the interest on external debt, both public and private. None of this takes into consideration the large dollar requirements that an abrupt seizure of positions in the derivatives market would demand the amount of losses becomes known only once they are all brought to light. However, the consequences can be clearly seen on the horizon: contraction in employment, salaries, and levels of well-being; lower levels of economic activity; and a growing deterioration in the fundamental functions of the government, including ensuring security and territorial integrity, among other factors. These considerations are highlighted by the growing fears that Mexico could become a failed state or at least a failed government ). The financial and trade opening, the commitments derived from NAFTA, and the balanced budget law severely limit the ability of the government authorities to address the economic crisis with a well-directed and sufficiently large countercyclical program. However, the same authorities broadly endorse the policies of the IMF, and as such they have no intention of committing themselves to even minimal countercyclical measures NAFTA created an unequal financial integration between Mexico and the United States, and that must be changed to build more equal economic relations within the North American economic region.
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NAFTA resulted in uneven financial integration, hurting Mexico’s economy in the long run
| 4,668 | 88 | 2,551 | 715 | 13 | 379 | 0.018182 | 0.53007 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,998 |
Implications for Mexico ¶ In its essence, the labor export-led model gives rise to a process of disaccumulation as the economic surplus is transferred abroad, depriving Mexico of potential multiplier and spread effects through forward and backward linkages. Surplus transference has taken many forms, including net reallocation of profits, interest income, licensing fees, and disguised profits through transfer pricing and intrafirm transactions in the maquiladora and disguised maquila firms. ¶ Net transference also entails the derived benefits from education, health care, and the nurturance of children to maturity. An impressively large fund of social capital created in Mexico is then reassigned to the United States as emigrants produce there while the costs of their training are paid in Mexico. Substantial levels of spending by the Mexican State on education and health care are essentially subsidized inputs into the U.S. transnational production system. ¶ To the above transfers should be added the subsidies and lost tax revenues that the Mexican government has permitted to continue up to the present. Firms operating in the maquila and disguised maquila sector pay no tariff charges, are exempt from the value added tax, and pay no income tax. For the maquila sector in 2000, the value of subsidies received exceeded taxes paid to the degree that these firms had a net profit tax rate of -7.2 percent (Dussel Peters 2003, 334; Schatan 2002). ¶ Inside Mexico, the labor export-led model has involved collateral costs in terms of deindustrialization and rising unemployment, along with deskilling as industrial workers are forced to shift to the informal sector or to underemployment—in effect dismantling much of the productive apparatus of Mexico. Making matters worse, neoliberal policy makers have imposed very restrictive monetary policies in their single-minded effort to contain inflationary pressures. The result has been a long-term overvaluation of the peso—estimated to be 30 percent—which has undercut the export market for Mexican producers, particularly medium-sized producers who might otherwise be able to generate employment through the export of Mexican-made products. For these Mexican producers, a second impact is that imported inputs are essentially subsidized, making it extremely difficult for these firms to play the role of domestic suppliers to either the transnational or the Mexican conglomerates (Dussel Peters 2006a).16 Furthermore, these firms, as well as numerous small firms, have every incentive to buy imported inputs, further strengthening the vicious circle. ¶ All this points to a process of asymmetric and subordinated integration in Mexico—a process to a great degree accelerated by NAFTA and the neoliberal policies that created the framework for the NAFTA accord. At the same time, the process captures the passivity and emptiness of state policy making in Mexico—the adoption of a neoliberal horizontal stance where there will be no intervention to attempt to direct production by way of the creation of new forms of dynamic competitive advantage, or to forestall processes that are clearly undermining Mexico's production base. Instead, the Mexican state has adopted a posture wherein it is assumed that the dynamic external effects of new forms of production directed toward the foreign market will bring automatically—through the forces of the market—a positive restructuring of Mexico's economy. State policy has been limited to a series of opportunistic maneuvers: seeking more maquilas, pursuing more foreign direct investment, using the boom in oil prices to cover the public sectors' debt and boost the economy through government spending that generally will not build vital skills or infrastructure, and relying upon massive inflows of foreign remittances from emigrants to create an informal social welfare system.
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Wise and Cypher 2007—Dr. Raúl Delgado Wise is president of the International Network on Migration and Development; UNESCO Chair on Migration, Development and Human Rights; and Professor of the Doctoral Programme in Development Studies at the Autonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico. Dr. James M. Cypher received his Ph.D. degree in economics from the University of California, Riverside in 1973. His B.A. and M.A. degrees were awarded by University of California, Santa Barbara. His early research interests were focused on the macroeconomic impacts of US military spending, and he has published numerous articles in this area. Since the late 1980s he has concentrated on the Mexican Economy and issues of internationalization and economic development of poor nations. His book, State and Capital in Mexico (Westview, 1990) was published in Mexico by Siglo XXI publishers. He has taught or worked at several universities in Latin America, and is currently engaged in a large project to assess the pattern of industrialization in Chile. The senior member of the Department’s faculty, Dr. Cypher has devoted his career to undergraduate teaching for over three decades. With James Dietz he co-authored a text, The Process of Economic Development (Routledge) the second edition of which will appear in 2003. [“The Strategic Role of Mexican Labor under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on Current Economic Integration.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 610, NAFTA and Beyond: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development (Mar., 2007), pp. 120-142]//MM
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the labor export-led model gives rise to a process of disaccumulation as the economic surplus is transferred abroad, depriving Mexico of potential multiplier and spread effects through forward and backward linkages Net transference also entails the derived benefits from education, health care, and the nurturance of children to maturity. An impressively large fund of social capital created in Mexico is then reassigned to the United States Inside Mexico, the labor export-led model has involved collateral costs in terms of deindustrialization and rising unemployment, along with deskilling as industrial workers are forced to shift to the informal sector or to underemployment—in effect dismantling much of the productive apparatus of Mexico. neoliberal policy makers have imposed very restrictive monetary The result has been a long-term overvaluation of the peso which has undercut the export market for Mexican producers All this points to a process of asymmetric and subordinated integration in Mexico—a process to a great degree accelerated by NAFTA the process captures the passivity and emptiness of state policy making in Mexico—the adoption of a neoliberal horizontal stance where there will be no intervention State policy has been limited to a series of opportunistic maneuvers
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NAFTA led to a subordinated integration of Mexico, laundry list of effects
| 3,882 | 74 | 1,291 | 586 | 12 | 193 | 0.020478 | 0.329352 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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2,999 |
Financial Liberalization in Mexico and NAFTA¶ Financial Liberalization and Integration¶ The original designers of NAFTA conceived of an economic and financial structure that did not take into account the possibility of financial crises. In any case, such crises were assumed to result merely from errors of economic policy and would generate fluctuations that would eventually be self-correcting. The recurring tendency for Mexico to run a current account deficit was taken into consideration under NAFTA, and the establishment of a credit line of $6 billion from the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada was envisioned. When NAFTA began in 1994, this amount was the equivalent of only three months of external debt payment and was used for the first time in April 1994. ¶ Months later, this amount proved to be absurdly small in the face of the large financial commitments that were put in evidence by the rescue package of $50 billion offered by the Fed, Bank for International Settlements, IMF, Citibank, and JPMorgan in January 1995 and that covered the amortization of part of the public and private short-term external debt for several months. This package of loans was fundamental in avoiding a default, which among other things would have jeopardized the financial investments of Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and other investment funds such as Fidelity, Scudder, Oppenheimer, and Putman (Girón et al. 1995). This is the size of the hole in the NAFTA financial chapter that nobody wants to face, until the financial crisis explodes. Indeed, as recently as February 2009, the Fed extended $30 billion on its line of credit to the Mexican central bank. Although debates on and analyses of the financial aspects of NAFTA during the past fifteen years have been abundant and diverse, in this paper we consider only three of its fundamental components.¶ First, NAFTA requires and forces the maintenance of the free movement of capital. No restriction can be imposed unless it is general and temporary and is accompanied by an immediate negotiation with the IMF to return to this original state. This obligation is naturally of the greatest interest, not for the expansion of direct and portfolio investment but rather for the free flow of footloose financial capital and for the outflow of earnings, dividends, and profits of all types. Such a guarantee at the level of an international commercial treaty is difficult to justify under any circumstances, but, in the case of Mexico, it also subordinates monetary and fiscal policy to the maintenance of macroeconomic stability (balanced budgets or surpluses), growing external indebtedness (private and public), and the permanent desirability of external capital inflows (foreign direct and portfolio investments).¶ Second, NAFTA committed Mexico to the opening up of its domestic financial market, or rather to the participation of foreign bank subsidiaries through their association with local banks or via the acquisition of established banks. Original provisions created a transitional period to protect the national ownership of banks. However, the reality of the 1995 banking crisis modified the time frames and accelerated the entrance of foreign banks. At the same time, the government’s bailout of banks through capitalization and the purchase of assets increased foreign banks’ interest in a greater positioning in the domestic banking sector, whose balances had just been restored to health via public funds. The first to arrive were the Spanish banks, which sought wider markets in the face of the new competition envisioned with the creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union. Later, the large global players such as Citibank and HSBC came into the domestic market, by buying large local banks, along with the Canadian bank (Scotiabank). This change of ownership among the largest Mexican banks increased foreign ownership of the local financial system to around 80 percent over the course of some six years, bypassing the clauses for the protection of the payments system in the original NAFTA (Correa 2004).¶ Third, NAFTA consolidated the dual monetary system, making the dollar the dominant currency, and thereby shaped the perspectives and dynamics of business profit generated in the local currency. This dual currency system also provides an important control over the payment of wages and the level of earnings of medium- to low-income sectors in local currency. This type of control cannot be achieved under the modalities of dollarization as it existed in Argentina or currently exists in Ecuador.¶ Therefore, NAFTA was an instrument of financial integration between Mexico and the United States, with very specific characteristics that were not necessarily planned or agreed upon. But due to this process of integration, the financial system in Mexico has now become part of the geoeconomic territory of the current financial crisis and not simply a victim of current circumstances. This is a relevant issue that we will consider further.
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Correa and Seccareccia 2009—Mario Seccareccia has been teaching at the University of Ottawa since 1978. He has authored/co-authored or co-edited some eight books or monographs, and has published some 75 articles or chapters of books. He is also editor of the New York-based International Journal of Political Economy. His principal research interests are in the areas of monetary economics, history of economic thought and methodology, labour economics, and Canadian economic history. Eugenia Correa is a professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. ["The United States Financial Crisis and Its NAFTA Linkages." International Journal Of Political Economy 38.2 (2009): 70-99. Political Science Complete. JSTOR. 27 July 2013]//MM
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case, such crises were assumed to result merely from errors of economic policy and would generate fluctuations that would eventually be self-correcting. The recurring tendency for Mexico to run a current account deficit was taken into consideration under NAFT This is the size of the hole in the NAFTA financial chapter that nobody wants to face, until the financial crisis explodes. Indeed, as recently as February 2009, the Fed extended $30 billion on its line of credit to the Mexican central bank. NAFTA requires and forces the maintenance of the free movement of capital. No restriction can be imposed unless it is general and temporary and is accompanied by an immediate negotiation with the IMF to return to this original state. This obligation is naturally of the greatest interest, for the free flow of footloose financial capital and for the outflow of earnings, dividends, and profits of all types. Such a guarantee at the level of an international commercial treaty is difficult to justify under any circumstances, but, in the case of Mexico, it also subordinates monetary and fiscal policy NAFTA committed Mexico to the opening up of its domestic financial market, or rather to the participation of foreign bank subsidiaries through their association with local banks or via the acquisition of established banks. Original provisions created a transitional period to protect the national ownership of banks the large global players such as Citibank and HSBC came into the domestic market, by buying large local banks, along with the Canadian bank (Scotiabank). This change of ownership among the largest Mexican banks increased foreign ownership of the local financial system to around 80 percent over the course of some six years, bypassing the clauses for the protection of the payments system in the original NAFTA , NAFTA consolidated the dual monetary system, making the dollar the dominant currency This dual currency system also provides an important control over the payment of wages and the level of earnings of medium- to low-income sectors in local currency. NAFTA was an instrument of financial integration between Mexico and the United States, with very specific characteristics that were not necessarily planned or agreed upon. But due to this process of integration, the financial system in Mexico has now become part of the geoeconomic territory of the current financial crisis and not simply a victim of current circumstances.
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NAFTA resulted in uneven financial integration—free flow of capital, opening of domestic financial market, dollarization
| 5,030 | 120 | 2,455 | 794 | 15 | 392 | 0.018892 | 0.493703 |
NAFTA Good-Bad - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
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Michigan (7-week)
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Unknown
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2013
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