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Finally on April 19th the Office of Foreign Assets Controls [OFAC] released 51 pages of guidelines implementing President Obama's new regulations on purposeful travel announced three months earlier. (Links to full text here and analysis here.)¶ The guidelines are a semi-breakthrough, welcome for what they do, infuriating for what they don't, and frustrating because big questions still remain on what they actually mean in practice.¶ In theory, most Americans should now have an option for legal albeit encumbered travel to Cuba.¶ The guidelines confirm the Obama Administration's significant step forward of granting general licenses for higher education students and all religious organizations -- with which 84% of Americans are affiliated. These provisions offer two broad opportunities to initiate serious engagement between the two countries without obstacles from Washington.¶ The language for specific licenses raises all the predicted problems of cumbersome bureaucracy wasting time on fine tuning the rights of Americans for political purposes and diverting resources from more necessary tasks.¶ Most attention has focused on what will flow from the comprehensive but undefined people-to-people umbrella:¶ OFAC may issue a specific license to an organization that sponsors and organizes programs to promote people-to-people contact authorizing the organization and individuals traveling under its auspices to engage in educational exchanges not involving academic study pursuant to a degree program. In general, licenses issued pursuant to this policy will be valid for one year and will contain no limitation on the number of trips that can be taken. (p 22)¶ Will we soon see the return of a wide range of informational programs allowed before President Bush's crackdown of 2004?¶ ...third party student exchanges, high schools, educators of the retired, college alumni, world affairs councils, museums, chambers of commerce, Rotary Clubs, farm organizations, sports teams, community groups, professional associations, foundations, NGOs, doctors, environmentalists, artists, architects, etc.¶ While general licenses avoid the contradiction between trust building exchanges and system change politics, specific licenses could by granted based on which goal is foremost. The core problem is illustrated by this revealing paragraph:¶ Meeting all of the relevant specific licensing criteria in a given section does not guarantee that a specific license will be issued, as foreign policy considerations and additional factors may be considered by OFAC in making its licensing determinations....specific licenses are not granted as a matter of right. (p 4)¶ As we saw with the denial of a license for Irish American traditional musicians to participate in last week's Celtic Festival in Havana, even the performances criteria can be arbitrary and unfathomable.¶ The test is how promptly and how flexibly OFAC handles applications that have been piling up since January from groups that were licensed during the Clinton administration.¶ The guidelines text itself embodies contradictions that arise from a narrow politicized interpretation of purposeful travel. They are most flagrant in Humanitarian Projects. Some kinds of charity are OK; some are not; collegiality and sharing of skills are outlawed.
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John McAuliff, Founder and Executive Director, Fund for Reconciliation and Development, 4-25-2011 “New OFAC Guidelines Shape Cuba Travel” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-mcauliff/new-guidelines-shape-cuba_b_853387.html
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OFAC] released 51 pages of guidelines implementing new regulations on purposeful travel The guidelines are frustrating because big questions still remain on practice The guidelines confirm Obama significant step forward The language raises predicted problems of cumbersome bureaucracy wasting time on fine tuning and diverting resources from more necessary tasks. The test is how OFAC handles applications that have been piling up The guidelines text itself embodies contradictions that arise from a narrow politicized interpretation of purposeful travel.
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CP causes overstretch—narrow exemptions divert resources from critical tasks.
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Why it is happening, nobody is sure. But the Cuba "People to People" travel program touted so highly by President Obama in 2011 is coming to a screeching halt, drowning in paperwork and non-renewed licenses for travel organizations. ¶ Almost no organizations that got licenses from the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) last year to sponsor trips to Cuba have received renewals. Trips that were advertised have been scrapped. Organizations are left to wait without any updates or information.¶ “We work with about 30 different non-profit organizations that have programs to Cuba in next 12 months, and 100% of them have not received renewals of licenses,” said Jim Friedlander, president of Academic Arrangements Abroad in New York, a travel service provider, late Tuesday. ¶ He said that the practical effect of OFAC’s lack of activity is that it disrupts the entire People to People program. ¶ To me, this is contrary to the whole purpose of the president's 2011 loosening of travel for Americans to Cuba.¶ Because of the outdated U.S. embargo against Cuba that makes it illegal for Americans to travel there, most Americans have never been to Cuba unless on a family or religious visa. The People to People cultural travel program finally allowed thousands of regular travelers to visit last year and early this year, interacting with Cubans in a meaningful way.¶ But in May, the OFAC application for a license to operate trips to Cuba under People to People grew from 6 pages to essentially hundreds of pages. Organizations seeking renewal had to document every minute of every day for every single trip they had done in the past year to prove that they were doing “People to People” activities and not tourism.¶ Then, most of them heard nothing. Weeks and months passed. Licenses lapsed. Since OFAC is notoriously closed-mouth about its work and does not make public its list of licences, applicants have been able to get little information. But gradually they realized they were all in the same predicament.¶ The U.S. Treasury press office on Tuesday did email me a comment from Jeff Braunger, program manager for Cuba Travel Licensing: “We have issued approximately 140 people-to-people licenses. We are doing our best to process both first-time applications and requests to renew existing licenses. We receive numerous such requests which are being handled in turn. It is our goal to respond in a timely matter.’’ ¶ I think this is approximately one paragraph more information than all the organizations waiting for their renewals have gotten from his office.¶ The thing that alarms me most is that the groups I’ve talked to seem intimidated and scared. They are afraid of going public with their concern, worried that if they seem to be complaining about months of delays that have caused them to cancel trips, lose money and lay off staff, that OFAC will punish them by stowing their application on the bottom of a giant pile.¶ I don’t think that’s true, but the very fact that companies are so skittish concerns me greatly. These are not fly-by-night groups. Typical groups that have -- or had -- Cuba “People to People” licenses include Harvard Alumni, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, National Geographic, Insight Cuba and the National Trust for Historic Preservation, all reputable groups that ran ethical and very good culturally-rich trips.¶ Now, a look at their websites tells the story. Harvard has one trip planned for Dec. 27 but with this caveat: “Pending ‘People to People” license renewal.” The Met wiped Cuba off its itinerary for now. National Geographic, which has run 29 trips taking 703 people total in the past year, is taking only preliminary waiting-list reservations for fall trips with no deposit. (A deposit, according to OFAC rules, is engaging in financial transaction with Cuba and illegal if you have no license) Insight Cuba has suspended all trips for the past two months and is on hold, waiting for its renewal that expired in June. National Trust has 4 Cuba trips still on its 2012 itinerary, but with an asterisk: "Pending People to People License Renewal." ¶ Whether you are pro-Cuba travel or anti-Cuba travel, this whole thing should concern you a lot. There is something sinister to me about preventing citizens from traveling, then allowing them to do so, then throwing giant roadblocks to prevent them from going after all. ¶ So why is it happening?¶ It could be election year politics, with OFAC personnel covering their bases in case Democrats are out in November and Republicans take over.¶ It could be undue influence from the small but mighty faction of anti-Cuba types in Congress.¶ It could be the White House consciously deciding to slow down the program for political reasons in exchange for something it wants from Cuba.¶ Or it could just be bureaucratic overload, with hapless workers struggling under an avalanche of paperwork it thought it needed and no deadline, and meanwhile these worthy groups that have done so much work to run People to People trips to Cuba lose money, customers and confidence in their government.
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Ellen Creager¶ Detroit Free Press travel writer Michigan State University¶ BA, Journalism 8-24-2012 “Cuba US People to People Partnership”¶ http://cubapeopletopeople.blogspot.com/2012/08/people-to-people-in-bureaucratic-danger.html
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the Cuba travel program touted by Obama is coming to a screeching halt drowning in paperwork and non-renewed licenses Almost no organizations that got licenses last year have received renewals. this is contrary to the whole purpose of the loosening of travel OFAC is notoriously closed-mouth about its work and does not make public its list of licences, applicants have been able to get little information groups seem intimidated and scared They are afraid of going public with their concern worried that complaining hat OFAC will punish them by stowing their application on the bottom of a giant pile companies are so skittish So why is it happening It could be undue influence from the small but mighty faction of anti-Cuba types in Congress.¶ Or it could just be bureaucratic overload with hapless workers struggling under an avalanche of paperwork meanwhile groups lose money customers and confidence in their government.
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Bureaucracy undermines solvency—chilling effect blocks applications and links to politics.
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The United States has maintained a near-total trade and economic blockade against the Republic of Cuba now for 50 years. An obscure division of the Treasury Department called the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) manages and enforces this embargo.¶ Since President Kennedy imposed the original embargo against Cuba, subsequent presidential administrations have adjusted the regulations in accordance with political realities. For instance, in the early 1980s, President Reagan issued an executive order restricting tourist travel to Cuba by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction; e.g. U.S. citizens and green-card holders. While the regulations don’t prohibit travel to Cuba outright, they forbid U.S. persons or tour groups from spending any money there unless OFAC first issues them a “license.” Historically, these licenses have been very difficult to obtain.¶ However, in the 1990s, OFAC under President Clinton adjusted the regulations to allow “People to People” (P2P) contact between ordinary Americans and ordinary Cubans. Licenses became relatively easy to obtain for these purposes and many groups traveled to Cuba. A decade later, the second Bush administration refused to renew those licenses. The administration also tightened the regulations allowing Americans with Cuban ancestry to visit their families in Cuba. OFAC dutifully brought civil and administrative cases against these “tourist lawbreakers.”¶ By the time the Obama administration assumed office, the political winds had again shifted toward greater accommodation toward Cuba. OFAC began issuing one-year licenses for both P2P and family visits under the more relaxed standards.¶ Over the last few months, however, these licenses have become much more difficult to obtain. OFAC, while not refusing to renew licenses, has imposed new requirements for their issuance. OFAC recently shut down two commercial tour operators because they were using someone else’s license and now requires all publicity be in the name of the license holder. It also now prohibits unlicensed third parties from collecting payments for a group they are sending in cooperation with a licensed P2P.¶ According to John McAuliff of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development, the reasons are highly political. Summarizing McCauliff’s reasoning:¶ 1) The Miami Herald reports that the new guidelines issued in May 2012 are part of a deal with Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) to get him to lift a hold on confirmation of the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Click here for details.¶ 2) Those opposing travel to Cuba spin their arguments to the effect that “…some organizations had violated stipulations that program activities have to be of a cultural or educational nature in which participants interact with Cuban people.” This is nonsense, because OFAC permits only highly programmed group travel. All American trips are organized by one of three Cuban state companies so their itineraries are fundamentally similar.¶ 3) OFAC operates behind an absurd veil of secrecy and non-disclosure. The names of P2P licensees are considered confidential, in contrast with its online and updated listing of Travel Service Providers. Visibility of the list would make it easier to find ways to go to Cuba legally and make more obvious OFAC’s bureaucratic delay, arbitrariness, inconsistency, and probable politicization.¶ 4) The head of OFAC, Adam Szubin, is a Bush appointee and has been responsible for aggressive and petty anti-Cuba actions in recent years. OFAC policy now forbids Cubans from staying in hotels owned and managed by US companies anywhere in the world. Perhaps Szubin is predisposed to listen to Sen. Rubio and has employing delaying tactics in the hope that Mitt Romney will be elected in November.
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Mark Nestmann career as an investigative journalist, international tax consultant, public speaker, and author of like resources spans nearly three decades. He holds a Master of Law (LL.M) in international tax law awarded to him by the Vienna (Austria) University School of Economics & Business Administration. 9-21-2012 “Backroom Deal Leads to Stricter Cuba Travel Restrictions” http://www.nestmann.com/backroom-deal-leads-to-stricter-cuba-travel-restrictions/
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The U S economic blockade against Cuba An obscure division called OFAC manages and enforces this embargo By the time Obama assumed office, the political winds had again shifted toward greater accommodation toward Cuba however licenses have become difficult to obtain OFAC while not refusing to renew licenses, has imposed new requirements According to McAuliff of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development OFAC operates behind an absurd veil of secrecy and non-disclosure The names of licensees are considered confidential the list make obvious OFAC’s bureaucratic delay, arbitrariness, inconsistency, and probable politicization.¶ The head of OFAC is a Bush appointee responsible for aggressive and petty anti-Cuba actions OFAC policy forbids Cubans from staying in hotels owned and managed by US companies
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OFAC doesn’t solve perception—too bureaucratic and politicized.
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A major error by the White House was to leave too much discretion in the hands of OFAC, the understaffed inherently distrustful embargo enforcement arm of the Treasury Department. OFAC is proving to be a choke point rather than a facilitator, perhaps made ever more cautious by rising complaints from hard line opponents of travel in Congress. Based just on our organization's sequential numbering, OFAC received between our first attempt of February 24 (CT-17448) and our sixth revision of January 11 (CT-18987) a total of 1539 applications in less than eleven months. We don't know how many have been rejected, or are in the limbo of “pending”. As one attorney wrote: it's a bureaucratic black hole. it requires persistence. For instance, the regs state clearly one can apply "by letter", and I did, following carefully the instructions. When, months after submitting it, OFAC said it was waiting for my application form, I pointed out that the regs state the application can be by letter. No response yet. With another applicant they said the sample itinerary did not show enough "intimate people contact", which is a mystery because there was clearly all sorts of people contact daily. After an application was rejected, its proponent wrote: OFAC felt the environmental study program, where we met with Cuban professionals and other Cubans every day on mornings, afternoons and evenings, did not have enough intimate contact with Cubans. A common experience is to be "denied without prejudice" because of a subjective judgment that
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John McAuliff 1/22/2012 (Director of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development, "One Year On: the Semi-opening of Cuba Travel" thehavananote.com/2012/01/one_year_semi_opening_cuba_travel)
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A major error by the White House was to leave too much discretion in the hands of OFAC, the understaffed inherently distrustful embargo enforcement arm of the Treasury Department. OFAC is proving to be a choke point rather than a facilitator made ever more cautious by rising complaints from hard line opponents in Congress it's a bureaucratic black hole. it requires persistence the regs state clearly one can apply "by letter", and I did When, months after submitting it, OFAC said it was waiting for my application form, I pointed out that the regs state the application can be by letter. No response yet A common experience is to be "denied without prejudice
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OFAC links to politics and doesn’t solve—Congressional backlash causes delays and bureaucracy.
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If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro. Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become ensnared in blame. Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public. But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve. The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape. What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting. Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll. "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations." Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate while seeming above the fray in his own administration. Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of his administration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants. Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he reminded Americans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug the hole. "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said. But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what government could accomplish. Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal." Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise. A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus of the White House for a full year. At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improved lives in concrete ways. Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shape and more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross domestic product would be about 6.5% lower. Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when something bad doesn't materialize. Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in. "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit. Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible. Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss. But the Obama administration is about one man. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end. So, more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him. He has opined on virtually everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding. Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday, he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times. "Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said in an interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen." A new White House strategy is to forgo talk of big policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestible pieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller parts that may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions. But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda. Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) said: "The man came in promising change. He has a higher profile than some presidents because of his youth, his race and the way he came to the White House with the message he brought in. It's naive to believe he can step back and have some Cabinet secretary be the face of the oil spill. The buck stops with his office."
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Nicholas and Hook 10 (Peter and Janet, Staff Writers – LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3)
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Obama is made of Velcro But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere is his to solve But as a candidate he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve Insulating the president has proved impossible Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss But the Obama administration is about one man. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate So, more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him. Stylistically he creates some of those problems When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen." it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda It's naive to believe he can step back and have some Cabinet secretary be the face of the oil spill. The buck stops with his office
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Process doesn’t shield the link—Obama takes the blame.
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The Washington climate, which led to a party-line vote on the stimulus, has big political implications: It means that Obama will have sole ownership -- whether that means credit or blame -- for all the massive changes in government he envisions over the coming year.
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Politico 9. [2-13-09 -- http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/18827.html]
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The Washington climate has big political implications: It means that Obama will have sole ownership -- whether that means credit or blame -- for all the massive changes in government he envisions over the coming year.
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OFAC links to politics:
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As suggested in the previous section, the democracy promotion infrastructure is also a moving target, as numerous actors are advocating, legislating or announcing changes in the way business is done in this field. Among the issues at play in mid-2005 are the following. 1. Congress/Executive As in most aspects for foreign relations, inherent differences in perspective obtain between legislators (and their staffs) and Administration officials (and the permanent professionals at State, USAID, DOD and the intelligence community) about priorities, budget allocations, reporting and notification requirements, and mechanisms. At mid-summer 2005, the battles are just now being joined between the Congress and the Executive over: ƒ the State Department authorization bill (to which the House has added the ADVANCE Democracy Act); ƒ the Foreign Operations and State Department appropriations bill (to which the Senate Committee has added aspects of the ADVANCE Democracy Act, and substantial earmarks, diverse country-specific policy guidance, including on Iran and central Asia, and operational constraints on USAID); ƒ the UN Reform Act 20 , likely to be added to the State Department authorization (if one is to be enacted this year), in which the UN Democracy Fund, the role of the Democracy Caucus, the composition of the UN Human Rights Commission/Council are all addressed, and the virtues of withholding assessed contributions to the UN as leverage are all considered. Some of the impending tussle will be about specific aspects of the proposals, combined with more general institutional angst in the Executive about how much it can or should tolerate policy direction (often seen as “micromanagement”) from the Congress.
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Melia 5 (George, Inst for Diplomacy-Georgetown, “The Democracy Bureaucracy”, http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/democracy_bureaucracy.pdf)
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inherent differences in perspective obtain between legislators and Administration officials about priorities, budget allocations, reporting and notification requirements, and mechanisms the battles are being joined between the Congress and the Executive over: the impending tussle will be about specific aspects of the proposals, combined with more general institutional angst in “micromanagement”) from the Congress
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Circumvention is an independent link—spurs fights over competing priorities and broader disputes over division of powers.
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It is true that members of Congressdo not cast "yes" or "no" votes on particular rules created by agencies, but they do quite often need to go on record with "yes" or "no" votes that make agency activities possible. Legislators must cast votes to establish executive branch agencies andto givethose agencies the authorityto make regulatory decisions. The democratic controls created by such votes weaken over time. (Most of the voters who voted for the legislators who passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act are now dead). Butmembers of Congress need to take at least one vote per year (on the relevant appropriations bill) in order for any regulatory program to continue, and circumstances sometimes force members to cast additional votes on particular programs. Since no regulatory program can operate without being created and continually authorized by Congress, there is nothing about delegation that prevents an unhappy electorate from holding members of Congress accountable for regulatory power exercised by the agencies.
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Lovell 2K (Assistant Professor of Government, College of William and Mary, George, 17 Const. Commentary 79)
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It is true Congressdo not cast yes" or "no" votes on particular rules created by agencies but they need to go on record with votes that make agency activities possible Since no regulatory program can operate without Congress there is nothing about delegation that prevents an unhappy electorate from holding members of Congress accountable
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Causes congressional backlash—still accountable for regulatory programs.
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OFAC does issue licenses on a case by case basis for educational exchanges not involving academic study pursuant to a degree program when those exchanges take place under the auspices of an organization that sponsors and organizes such programs to promote people-to-people contact. However, those organizations sponsoring and organizing such programs must be careful to ensure that the trips they are organizing are in compliance with the newly amended regulations. Due to the scrutiny OFAC has been placed under by members of Congress, it is likely that they will in turn heavily scrutinize those applying and being granted license to ensure they are in compliance with the new rules. Before advertising your people to people tour in Cuba, it is best to make sure you have the appropriate authorization from OFAC and are in full compliance with the law.
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Ferrari, 11 Erich, attorney specializing in OFAC matters, Ferrari Legal, P.C., 8/10, Sanction Law, http://www.sanctionlaw.com/2011/08/10/cuba-people-to-people-exchanges-begin-this-week/, “Cuba People to People Exchanges Begin This Week,” ADM
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OFAC does issue licenses for educational exchanges organizations sponsoring and organizing such programs must be careful to ensure that the trips they are organizing are in compliance with amended regulations Due to the scrutiny OFAC has been placed under by members of Congress they will heavily scrutinize those applying and being granted license
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OFAC is heavily scrutinized by Congress – specifically true for travel licenses
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The Treasury Department’s fast action through OFAC is a more significant indicator of where the Administration is heading than the fig leaf that Secretary Tim Geithner provided the two rejectionist Democrats, Senators Menendez and Nelson, so they could vote for cloture. It is worth reading his letters carefully as they affirm that a larger change is coming. We are, however, currently reviewing United States policy toward Cuba to determine the best way to foster democratic change in Cuba and improve the lives of the Cuban people. Your views and the views of others on Capitol Hill will be important to that review, and the President remains committed to consulting with you as we consider changes to Cuba policy. (Texts here posted by Jake Colvin.) Of course Senators Menendez, Martinez and Nelson will be consulted, but not more than other Senators like Kerry, Lugar and Dodd. A further encouraging note was in a Miami Herald story: ''The guidance issued yesterday by the Treasury Department was issued pursuant to a law passed by Congress,'' White House spokeswoman Gannet Tseggai said Thursday. ''The president was not involved in the drafting of that provision, and it does not take the place of his own review of family visits and family cash remittances,'' she added. Americans who care need to add their weight to the Administration's discussion so the President does not stop at family travel. A Citizens' Appeal for engagement with President Obama on Cuba can be seen here in the just posted newsletter of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development. The extent to which the other side is in a state of aggressive denial can be seen in a leaked internal memo from the US-Cuba Democracy PAC the mobilization of Democratic Members of Congress, and their aggressive outreach to the White House and Leadership on this issue has made it clear to the Obama Administration that there is a very vocal majority, bipartisan coalition in Congress that opposes even the slightest changes to current policy. Also possible is that the White House concludes that there are a few unreconcilables so married to narrow sectarian interests that they are ready to expose their Party and President to a week of diversionary and politically costly debate about embarrassing Congressional earmarks and ballooning deficits.
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McAuliff, 09 John, active participant in the civil rights, peace and equitable development movements, After graduating from Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota, he registered voters during the Mississippi Summer Project of 1964 with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, then served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Peru, used to work for the Latin American programs at the International Secretariat for Volunteer Service and became a graduate student at the Institute for Policy Studies, directed the Indochina Program in the Peace Education Division of the American Friends Service Committee, 3/15, The Havana Note, http://thehavananote.com/node/330, “Gains in Congress and OFAC Just the Beginning,” ADM
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The Treasury Department’s fast action through OFAC is a significant indicator of where the Administration is heading a larger change is coming The extent to which the other side is in aggressive denial can be seen in a leaked internal memo the mobilization of Democratic Members and their aggressive outreach to the White House has made it clear that there is a very vocal majority, bipartisan coalition in Congress that opposes even the slightest changes to current policy there are a few unreconcilables so married to narrow interests that they are ready to expose their Party and President to a week of diversionary and politically costly debate
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Any changes to current Cuba policy are unpopular – even OFAC action causes backlash
| 2,313 | 83 | 648 | 378 | 14 | 107 | 0.037037 | 0.283069 |
OFAC Cuba Exemption CP - HSS 2013.html5
|
Hoya-Spartan Scholars
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,010 |
Developments since the symposium have highlighted other political aspects of U.S. economic sanctions. One event covered extensively in the mainstream press was Jay-Z and Beyonce’s trip to Cuba. As has been reported in the press, Members of Congress sent a letter to OFAC following the trip to inquire about travel authorization for the pair. While most travel to Cuba is banned under the embargo, travel is allowed for certain purposes, including through educational exchanges. The Cuba sanctions program remains more robust than most, in large part because of the travel ban and the breadth accorded to the sanctions under the Trading With the Enemy Act. But those aspects, in particular the travel ban, seem to be a remnant of past policy that is hard to remove, rather than reflections of current policy. The expansion of certain travel allowances under the Obama administration are reflections of that policy change.
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Maberry and Jensen, 13 J. Scott, International Trade partner in the Government Contracts, Investigations & International Trade Practice Group in the SheppardMullin’s Washington, D.C. office, Mark L., International Trade associate in the Government Contracts, Investigations & International Trade Practice Group in the firm's Washington, D.C. office, Global Trade Law Blog, 5/7, http://www.globaltradelawblog.com/2013/05/07/ofac-gets-hot-bothered-on-iran-and-cuba-how-economic-sanctions-work-today/, “OFAC Gets Hot, Bothered on Iran and Cuba: How Economic Sanctions Work Today,” ADM
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Developments have highlighted political aspects of U.S. economic sanctions One event was Jay-Z and Beyonce’s trip to Cuba Members of Congress sent a letter to OFAC to inquire about travel authorization travel is allowed for certain purposes aspects, in particular the travel ban, seem to be a remnant of past policy that is hard to remove
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Jay-Z trip proves OFAC still receives Congressional scrutiny
| 920 | 60 | 338 | 148 | 8 | 56 | 0.054054 | 0.378378 |
OFAC Cuba Exemption CP - HSS 2013.html5
|
Hoya-Spartan Scholars
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,011 |
In February 2005, OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that TSRA’s term of “payment of cash in advance” means that the payment is received by the seller or the seller’s agent prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at which they are loaded. U.S. agricultural exporters and some Members of Congress strongly objected that the action constituted a new sanction that violated the intent of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba. OFAC Director Robert Werner maintained that the clarification “conforms to the common understanding of the term in international trade.”74 On July 29, 2005, OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in advance” for the commercial sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S. ports as soon as a foreign bank confirms receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action was aimed at ensuring that the goods would not be vulnerable to seizure for unrelated claims while still at the U.S. port. Supporters of overturning OFAC’s February 22, 2005, amendment, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, were pleased by the clarification but indicated that they would still work to overturn the February rule.75
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Sullivan, 11 Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 1/4, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40193.pdf, “Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress,” ADM
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OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that payment of cash means that the payment is received by the seller prior to the shipment of the goods agricultural exporters and Members of Congress strongly objected that the action could jeopardize millions of dollars Supporters were pleased but indicated that they would still work to overturn the rule
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OFAC’s actions are perceived by Congress
| 1,213 | 41 | 361 | 198 | 6 | 58 | 0.030303 | 0.292929 |
OFAC Cuba Exemption CP - HSS 2013.html5
|
Hoya-Spartan Scholars
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,012 |
Under pressure from lawmakers, the Obama administration is defending its decision to grant a lawyer permission to represent the blacklisted Sudanese regime in Washington. Members of Congress have assailed the Treasury Department for granting attorney Bart Fisher a license despite the U.S. sanctions that have been levied against the Republic of Sudan. The license, granted by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), allows Fisher to provide legal services to the Sudanese government in the United States. Lawmakers such as Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.) have hit the Obama administration for the decision, arguing Fisher is a lobbyist for a genocidal regime who should be barred from the halls of power.
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Bogardus, 11 Kevin, The Hill, 12/22, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/200917-obama-administration-defends-license-to-lawyer-for-sudan, “Obama administration defends license to lawyer representing Sudan,” ADM
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the Obama administration is defending its decision to grant a lawyer permission to represent the blacklisted Sudanese regime Members of Congress have assailed the Treasury Department The license allows Fisher to provide legal services Lawmakers have hit the Obama administration for the decision
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OFAC action is tied to Obama – specifically in the case of easing restrictions
| 709 | 78 | 295 | 110 | 14 | 43 | 0.127273 | 0.390909 |
OFAC Cuba Exemption CP - HSS 2013.html5
|
Hoya-Spartan Scholars
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,013 |
NEW YORK – Oil services giant Schlumberger Ltd has improved its ability to collect the money it is owed by Venezuela's state oil company PDVSA and will now be able to recognize all revenue associated with its first-quarter operations in the country, Schlumberger's CEO said on Sunday.¶ Schlumberger Chief Executive Officer Paul Kibsgaard's announcement, published in a press release, follows a warning from the company in its March 18 quarterly earnings report that Venezuelan customers' rates of payment had dropped sharply.¶ "After meetings with PDVSA, the collections have improved to the point that we will recognize all revenue associated with our first-quarter operations," Kibsgaard said in the release.¶ Kibsgaard did not provide any specific information in the statement on how much Schlumberger would collect.¶ "We further expect to finalize a new payment agreement with PDVSA and we anticipate ramping up activity to meet the current and future needs of PDVSA's development and production plans," he added.¶ In its March 18 quarterly report, Schlumberger maintained its forecast for double-digit earnings growth in 2013 but said it was partially contingent upon reaching a solution in Venezuela.¶ PDVSA has faced mounting debts since the 2008 financial crisis. Venezuela's oil minister Rafael Ramirez told reporters on March 22 PDVSA owed a total of $16.5 billion to service providers. Ramirez, who is also PDVSA's president, said the state-owned company was working to set up financing arrangements to help pay off its debts to Schlumberger to keep the oilfield services provider from pulling out of the country.
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Emily Flitter – Reporter for Fox News, March 31, 2013, Schlumberger CEO says Venezuela debt collections improving, http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2013/03/31/schlumberger-ceo-says-venezuela-debt-collections-improving/
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Schlumberger has improved its ability to collect the money by Venezuela's PDVSA and will now be able to recognize all revenue associated with its first-quarter operations We further expect to finalize a new payment agreement with PDVSA Schlumberger maintained its forecast for double-digit earnings growth in 2013 PDVSA's president, said the state-owned company was working to set up financing arrangements to help pay off its debts to Schlumberger to keep the oilfield services provider from pulling out of the country.
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1. Oil companies aren’t going to pull out of Venezuela – solutions are being developed now towards debt relief
| 1,624 | 110 | 520 | 251 | 19 | 80 | 0.075697 | 0.318725 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
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Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,014 |
What to Expect in the Energy Sector¶ The US imported roughly 860,000 barrels of crude per day from Venezuela in 2011, according to the Energy Information Administration, with much of that going to refineries owned or partially owned by PDVSA subsidiary Citgo.¶ There has been some speculation about how the US would deal with the loss of that supply if the situation in Venezuela deteriorated to a point where exports ceased.¶ Replacing the physical barrels does not appear to be a major issue Greg Haas, Manager of Research at Hart Energy, a publisher and consultancy told Breaking Energy. “Barrels from Cushing could make up for about half of a Venezuelan supply disruption and lowering product exports could also help,” he said.¶ The Seaway pipeline – a 50/50 JV between Enterprise Products Partners, the operator, and Enbridge – came online last Friday, with the capacity to transport 400,000 b/d of light and heavy grades from Cushing, OK to Freeport, TX.¶ “But there would be price implications for products and crude,” he said, referring to the price-related quality differential between light and heavy grades, and the fact that refiners would likely seek higher prices domestically for product volumes diverted from export markets.¶ However, the loss of Venezuelan crude imports is viewed as unlikely, Risa Grais-Targow, Venezuela Analyst at political risk consultant Eurasia Group told Breaking Energy. She does not believe there will be a complete political collapse though there will likely be new elections at some point, with Maduro as the Chavez supporters’ candidate and Henrique Capriles representing the opposition.¶ Capriles was defeated by Chavez in the presidential election last October, but was recently reelected Governor of Miranda, one of the country’s most populated states.¶ “We think Maduro will maintain the status quo in energy – policy continuity – and don’t see evidence of more pragmatic or modernist tendencies,” Grais-Targow said.¶ Foreign investors in Venezuela’s energy sector can expect the status quo with regard to political risk – which is relatively high to begin with – to continue.¶ Existing US-Venezuelan energy relations are not likely to be radically altered as part a leadership transition. Despite his bluster, “Chavez has been fairly pragmatic with the US on economics and trade – it appears unlikely this would change,” said Grais-Targow.
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Jared Anderson – Managing Editor, Breaking Energy, covered international oil and natural gas market fundamentals as an Analyst then Senior Analyst in the Research & Advisory division at Energy Intelligence Group. Earlier in his career, Jared spent several years working in the environmental consulting industry. He holds a Master's degree in international relations with a focus on energy from New York University, and is based in New York City, 1/17/13, Venezuela Crisis: What Should Energy Companies Expect?, http://breakingenergy.com/2013/01/17/venezuela-crisis-what-should-energy-companies-expect/
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ere has been some speculation about how the US would deal with the loss of that supply if the situation in Venezuela deteriorated to a point where exports ceased. Replacing the physical barrels does not appear to be a major issue Barrels from Cushing could make up for about half of a Venezuelan supply disruption and lowering product exports could also help,” The Seaway pipeline – a 50/50 JV between Enterprise Products Partners, the operator, and Enbridge – came online last Friday the loss of Venezuelan crude imports is viewed as unlikely Analyst a oes not believe there will be a complete political collapse t Chavez has been fairly pragmatic
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2. Their Metzker evidence says foreign investment is key to revitalizing the oil industry – the plan does nothing to solve this
| 2,390 | 127 | 648 | 376 | 22 | 110 | 0.058511 | 0.292553 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,015 |
What is the impact of oil price shocks on the economies of importing nations? At first glance, there appears to be large-scale and extremely adverse repercussions for rising oil prices. However, a study published this month by researchers in the IMF Working Paper group suggests a different picture altogether (it is worth mentioning that the IMF has not endorsed its findings.) The study (Tobias N. Rasmussen & Agustin Roitman, "Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are They Really That Bad?", IMF Working Paper, August 2011) mentions that “Using a comprehensive global dataset […] we find that the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally small: a 25 percent increase in oil prices typically causes GDP to fall by about half of one percent or less.” The study elaborates on this by stating that this impact differs from one country to another, depending on the size of oil-imports, as “oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although higher oil prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts [represented in new and additional expenditures borne by both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries]”. In other words, the more oil prices increase, benefiting exporting countries, the more these new revenues are recycled, for example through the growth in demand for new services, labor, and commodity imports. The researchers argue that the series of oil price rallies (in 1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) have played an important role in recessions in the United States. However, Rasmussen and Roitman state at the same time that significant changes in the U.S. economy in the previous period (the appearance of combined elements, such as improvements in monetary policy, the institution of a labor market more flexible than before and a relatively smaller usage of oil in the U.S. economy) has greatly mitigated the negative effects of oil prices on the U.S. economy. A 10 percent rise in oil prices before 1984, for instance, used to lower the U.S. GDP by about 0.7 percent over two to three years, while this figure started shrinking to no more than 0.25 percent after 1984, owing to these accumulated economic changes. This means that while oil price shocks continue to adversely impact the U.S. economy, the latter has managed, as a result of the changes that transpired following the first shock in the seventies, to overcome these shocks, and subsequently, the impact of oil price shocks has become extremely limited compared to previous periods
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Walid Khadduri – MEES Consultant, former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, August 23, 2011, “Walid Khadduri: The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations,” Al Arabiya News, http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html, Hensel)
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What is the impact of oil price shocks on the economies of importing nations a study published by researchers in the IMF Working Paper group suggests a different picture Using a comprehensive global dataset the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is small a 25 percent increase in oil prices typically causes GDP to fall by about half of one percent or less although higher oil prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts the more oil prices increase the more these new revenues are recycled through growth in demand for new services, labor, and commodity imports Rasmussen and Roitman state that significant changes in the U.S. economy such as improvements in monetary policy, the institution of a labor market more flexible and a relatively smaller usage of oil in the U.S. economy has greatly mitigated the negative effects of oil prices on the U.S. economy A 10 percent rise used to lower the GDP by about 0.7 percent while this figure started shrinking to no more than 0.25 percent the U.S. economy has managed to overcome these shocks the impact of oil price shocks has become extremely limited
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4. US econ resilient to oil shock
| 2,548 | 33 | 1,167 | 412 | 7 | 196 | 0.01699 | 0.475728 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,016 |
Some analysts argue that a cut in Venezuelan aid might prove beneficial to Cuba in the long run by forcing ruler Raúl Castro to drastically broaden and speed up the reforms toward a market economy that he has been pushing since 2007.¶ Castro’s reforms so far have done little to resolve the massive problems in the economy, from bottom-of-the barrel industrial productivity and salaries to a stalled rural sector that forced Havana to import $1.6 billion worth of agricultural products in 2011.¶ “It’s imperative to have a truly deep opening that would allow Cubans to import and export, professionals to be productive and enterprising citizens to become the motor for the economy,” wrote Emilio Morales, head of the Havana consulting Group in Miami.¶ Havana also might not feel an aid cutoff as sharply as it felt the end of the Soviet subsidies because its good relations with China and Brazil could attract some additional support from them, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit report.¶ And Venezuela may only trim and not totally cut off its assistance because it benefits from the relationship through the Cuban doctors, who treat poor families that tend to vote for Chávez’s party, as well as security, military and other advisers.
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Juan Tamayo – Foreign Editor and Chief Correspondents at the Miami Herald, lead person in coverage of Cuban affairs at the University of Miami, Research Associate, 3/5/13, How will the Venezuela-Cuba link fare after Chávez’s death?, Miami Herald, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/05/3268483/how-will-the-venezuela-cuba-link.html#storylink=cpy
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analysts argue that a cut in Venezuelan aid might prove beneficial to Cuba in the long run by forcing ruler Raúl Castro to drastically broaden and speed up the reforms toward economy t Castro’s reforms have done little from bottom-of-the barrel industrial productivity and salaries to a stalled rural sector that forced Havana to import $1.6 billion worth of agricultural products allow Cubans to import and export to become the motor for the economy Havana might not feel an aid cutoff because its good relations with China and Brazil could attract some additional support enezuela may only trim and not cut off its assistance because it benefits from the relationship through the Cuban doctors, who treat poor families that tend to vote for Chávez’s party
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5. The plan just removes debt but it does nothing to solve for the already declining economy – means that debt will continue regardless of the plan
| 1,246 | 147 | 757 | 205 | 27 | 125 | 0.131707 | 0.609756 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,017 |
The Cuban economy has been remarkably resilient over the years surviving a great many difficulties. For many years the country relied on trade with the Soviet Union but when that came to end they had to find different ways to keep their economy going. Despite an embargo by the United States, Cuba has managed to keep its economy afloat. They are one of the few communist countries remaining in the world and it seems unlikely that that is going to change anytime soon. The main driver of the Cuban economy is agriculture. The country is a major producer of several crops but sugar and tobacco are the big money products. Despite not being able to export their products to the United States Cuba has become a major exporter of agricultural products. The downside is that because most of their agricultural production is focused on cash crops they need to import most of their food. This works well for the government from a balance of payments perspective but it is a problem for the people who have to spend a fair chunk of their wages on food. This is unlikely to change in the near future as the Cuban government relies heavily on the cash that is generated by exporting cash crops. There has been an attempt on the part of the Cuban government to diversify their economy and it looks like natural resources will be one way that they can do this. The country has become a major nickel producer and this has quickly become one of their largest exports. There is also the potential for Cuba to become a major oil producer. There are large reserves of oil in the Caribbean that are in Cuba's territorial water. It is very likely that in the near future they will take advantage of these reserves in order to help diversify the economy. In recent years Cuba has become a major tourist destination and this has become an important part of the economy. With the US embargo preventing American visitors from coming to the country the growth of the tourism industry has been slow. However there have been large numbers of visitors from Canada for many years and both European and Chinese visitors are also starting to arrive in large numbers. The main reason is that Cuba is probably the cheapest destination in the Caribbean for tourists. Another of the attractions for tourists to Cuba is the health care. The Cuban health care system is very good and very cheap by western standards. This has resulted in a lot of medical tourists going to the country to get medical procedures that they need. The strength of the Cuban education system has helped to keep the Cuban economy going. They have even started to export skilled workers like doctors and teachers to other Latin American countries in order to bring in the resources that they need.
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Joshi at least 2010 (Milind Joshi, writer for scribd. “The Cuban Economy” http://www.scribd.com/doc/101054363/The-Cuban-Economy#download No idea about date, but has statistics from 12/31/2009
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The Cuban economy has been remarkably resilient over the years surviving a great many difficulties. The main driver of the Cuban economy is agriculture. The country is a major producer of several crops but sugar and tobacco are the big money products. Despite not being able to export their products to the United States Cuba has become a major exporter of agricultural products This works well for the government from a balance of payments perspective but it is a problem for the people who have to spend a fair chunk of their wages on food. This is unlikely to change in the near future as the Cuban government relies heavily on the cash that is generated by exporting cash crops. is also the potential for Cuba to become a major oil producer. There are large reserves of oil in the Caribbean that are in Cuba's territorial water. It is very likely that in the near future they will take advantage of these reserves in order to help diversify the economy. In recent years Cuba has become a major tourist destination and this has become an important part of the economy. With the US embargo preventing American visitors from coming to the country the growth of the tourism industry has been slow The Cuban health care system is very good and very cheap by western standards. This has resulted in a lot of medical tourists going to the country to get medical procedures that they need. The strength of the Cuban education system has helped to keep the Cuban economy going. They have even started to export skilled workers like doctors and teachers to other Latin American countries in order to bring in the resources that they need
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2. Their Gorrell evidence is terrible – at the top of the evidence, it cites the United States embargo as the reason why Cuba’s economic condition is going to worsen – the aff does nothing to solve for this
| 2,738 | 206 | 1,631 | 483 | 39 | 287 | 0.080745 | 0.594203 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,018 |
One hundred and eighty-seven nations are members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank—virtually equivalent to the universal membership of the United Nations. Cuba’s absence from these leading international financial institutions (IFIs) stands out as a stark anomaly. As Section 4 of this paper reveals, Cuban authorities are no longer opposed to engaging with the IFIs. As institutions that pride themselves on their universality, the IFIs ought to reach out to assist Cuba as it strives, however gradually and haltingly, to reform its economic structures. With their deep experience in countries seeking to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of their economies, and to transit to more decentralized modes of economic decision making, the IFIs are natural partners for Cuba today. This paper recommends a step-by-step approach, beginning with modest confidence-building measures, for bridging the gap between the IFIs and Cuba. It also addresses legal and political constraints on U.S. policy, including restrictive Congressional mandates, and suggests practical strategies for overcoming them. Information gaps in the public debate are corrected; in fact, there are viable mechanisms for gradual rapprochement. Many Cubans remain suspicious of the IMF and World Bank, viewing them as agents of “capitalist imperialism.” Yet, the IFIs have worked successfully in promoting poverty alleviation and economic growth in two of Cuba’s closest allies, Vietnam and Nicaragua. To ally Cuban anxieties, Section 5 explores the IFI’s new terms of engagement, designed to be more sensitive to the national institutions and policy priorities of borrowing countries. The IFIs today partner successfully with many countries whose stated goals are growth with equity, efficiency with dignity—the very goals embraced by Cuban authorities.
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Feinburg 11/11 (Richard Feinberg is professor of international political economy at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California. Brookings. “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/11/18-cuba-feinberg 11/2011)
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One hundred and eighty-seven nations are members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Cuban authorities are no longer opposed to engaging with the IFIs. the IFIs ought to reach out to assist Cuba as it strives, however gradually and haltingly, to reform its economic structures the IFIs are natural partners for Cuba today. beginning with modest confidence-building measures, for bridging the gap between the IFIs and Cuba The IFIs today partner successfully with many countries whose stated goals are growth with equity, efficiency with dignity—the very goals embraced by Cuban authorities
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4. Cuba won’t suffer econ collapse, IMF will intervene and solve
| 1,848 | 64 | 609 | 271 | 11 | 94 | 0.04059 | 0.346863 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,019 |
Yet should Chavez really be unable to return to power over the next months, the country could plunge into political chaos, possibly leading to a military takeover, which would be a severe setback for democracy in the region. To begin with, it is entirely unclear who would replace Chavez, as the constitution (written by himself) allows him to appoint either the vice president or anyone else. Since Vice President Elías Jaua is widely seen as a colorless dogmatist, potential candidates include, among many others, Chavez brother, Adán Chavez, or his daughter, Maria Gabriela. Yet none of them seems to have Hugo Chavez' skill to hold together a party that includes many competing interest groups. In addition, the government's popularity has been battered by an unending series of problems, including blackouts, food and housing shortages, high rates of crime, a lack of economic growth, high inflation, prison riots, widespread corruption, and no clear plan how to get out of the mess. Even a healthy Chavez would face a bitter election battle in 2012, as his country is worse off on virtually all counts than when he was first elected in 1998. Now, with the nation's attention focused solely on their leader's health, all of the problems named above - crime and inflation being the most serious - are bound to get worse still due to the leadership vacuum in Caracas. Paradoxically, the new situation does not make life for the opposition any easier. Personal calamity often causes increased popularity, as recently seen in Argentina, when Cristina Fernandez de Kircher's approval rating surged after her husband's unexpected death. Criticizing Chavez may thus backfire and make the opposition seem inhumane at a time when millions of poor Venezuelans pray for their leader's recovery. In addition, an election without Chavez as a candidate would render the opposition's anti-Chavez platform useless, forcing it to adapt to a post-Chavez Venezuela, considerably more difficult to navigate. At a time when the country's democratic institutions are already severely strained, a fair election victory against the incumbent would be an important step towards reestablishing democracy in Venezuela; yet this scenario seems distant at this point. Complicating matters further, the a senior military general declared recently that the military were “wedded” to the revolution and would not accept an opposition government. Under Chavez' Bolivarian Revolution, the military established itself as an important political actor, and it remains to be seen how willing the generals are to see their power reduced under a new administration. In a country awash with guns and several radical factions, serious political strife could emerge in urban areas, turning Venezuela into a rudderless ship. In such a case, Brazil would be the only actor potentially able to contain a fallout. Brazil has important economic interests to defend: Bilateral trade between the two in 2010 has been US $ 4.6 billion in 2010, and many large companies such as Odebrecht and Petrobras have made large investments in the country. While a mercurial Chavez has lambasted investors from many countries and nationalized their operations, he has traditionally been kind to Brazilian undertakings, allowing them to reap huge benefits in a markets with little competition. Yet despite their close alliance, the Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff only found out about Chavez' health after he addressed the nation on television. In order to help stabilize the political situation and avoid a military takeover, Brazil must closely accompany and work with key figures in Venezuela's government, the military, and the opposition movement. Brazil has shown before that it can positively influence its neighbors and avoid political turmoil - for example in Paraguay - and it may be well advised to position itself again as an honest broker between Venezuela's factions, should they be unable to pave the way towards a stable political future.
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Stuenkel 11 (Oliver – Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in São Paulo, Coordinator of the São Paulo branch of the School of History and Social Science (CPDOC) and the executive program in International Relations, non-resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), July 2nd, “Instability in Venezuela could be a test for Brazil’s regional leadership capacity,” Post-Western World, http://www.postwesternworld.com/2011/07/02/instability-in-venezuela-could-be-a-test-for-brazils-regional-leadership-capacity/)
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should the country plunge into political chaos setback for democracy Brazil would be able to contain a fallout. Brazil has important economic interests to defend: In order to help stabilize the political situation and avoid a military takeover, Brazil must closely accompany and work with key figures in Venezuela's government, the military, and the opposition movement. Brazil has shown before that it can positively influence its neighbors and avoid political turmoil it may be well advised to position itself again as an honest broker between Venezuela's factions, should they be unable to pave the way towards a stable political future.
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5. Insert No terminal impact to instability/terror or whatever they run
| 3,997 | 71 | 640 | 631 | 11 | 100 | 0.017433 | 0.158479 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,020 |
Brazil is one of the few countries to possess competencies in all major dimensions of the nuclear fuel cycle, from mineral prospecting to uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication, albeit not yet on an industrial scale. Brazil has never developed nuclear weapons, and there is no evidence that it has the intention to enrich uranium above the 20% level. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Brazil pursued an ambitious program of nuclear technology development, which included construction of an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility under the Navy's direction.[2] However, Brazil has since disavowed nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), and become a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). With Argentina, Brazil also established a bilateral inspection agency (the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)), to verify both countries' pledges to use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. Brazil is also a party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but it has not agreed to sign an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC-540) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Some of the Additional Protocol's provisions, including unannounced inspections, are already included in the Quadripartite Agreement signed in 1991 by Brazil, Argentina, the ABACC, and the IAEA.[3] Some senior officials of current and previous administration have criticized the NPT as unfair, and believe that joining the treaty was a mistake.[4] The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that Brazil will not sign any additions to the NPT until the nuclear weapon states have made progress towards nuclear disarmament.[5] Brazil is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and with neighboring Argentina has firmly opposed the passage of new guidelines that would make the Additional Protocol a condition of supply. In June 2011, the NSG approved revised guidelines for the export of sensitive nuclear technologies, and recognized the Quadripartite Agreement as an alternative to the Additional Protocol.[6]
|
NTI 12 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 2012, “Country Profile: Brazil,” http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/brazil/)
|
Brazil has since disavowed nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), and become a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). With Argentina, Brazil also established a bilateral inspection agency (the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)), to verify both countries' pledges to use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. Brazil is also a party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that Brazil will not sign any additions to the NPT until the nuclear weapon states have made progress towards nuclear disarmament.
|
4. Brazil won’t adopt nuclear weapons – and Argentina checks their impact
| 2,226 | 73 | 789 | 333 | 12 | 118 | 0.036036 | 0.354354 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,021 |
Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said last year that the country intends to keep shipping current amounts of oil to the United States. "We have long-term contracts and we comply with them strictly," Ramirez said.¶ Venezuelan officials did not immediately comment on the latest U.S. statistics, which were posted on the Energy Information Administration's website this week and reported by Venezuelan newspapers on Wednesday.¶ Gustavo Coronel, an energy consultant and former executive of PDVSA, said "the impact of this decline on the U.S. market is small. It is easily compensated by Saudi Arabia, Canada and other suppliers."¶ But he said Venezuela's government is taking a financial hit because officials "are not selling their dwindling volumes of oil at commercial prices." Coronel noted that about 300,000 barrels a day are sold to Caribbean countries under preferential credit terms that mean less cash flowing into Venezuela's coffers.
|
Ian James – Investigative Reporter at the Desert Sun, Bureau Chief of Venezuela at Associated Press, Caribbean correspondent at Associated Press, 2/2/12, Venezuela's oil exports to US decline, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/venezuelas-oil-exports-us-decline
|
Oil Minister said the country intends to keep shipping current amounts of oil to the United States. "We have long-term contracts the impact decline on the U.S. market is small. It is easily compensated by Saudi Arabia, Canada and other supplier
|
5. Watson 2K is tagged as South American arms race causes global nuclear war – you should call for this evidence – nowhere does it mention global war, escalation, or nuclear weapons.
| 949 | 182 | 244 | 145 | 32 | 41 | 0.22069 | 0.282759 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,022 |
Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973.
|
KAHN 2011 (Jeremy Kahn, journalist, “Crude Reality,” February 13, 2011, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full, )
|
The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, But a growing body of economic research suggests that this is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to studies. Scholars have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973.
|
4. The diversification of our labor market and decreased dependence on oil has mitigated the effects of oil shocks – empirical data proves that 25% higher oil prices only have a GDP decrease of LESS THAN ½ PERCENT – that’s our Khadduri evidence, prefer it, it cites multiple empirical sources and data
| 1,299 | 301 | 735 | 218 | 52 | 122 | 0.238532 | 0.559633 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,023 |
Maduro's opponent, Henrique Capriles, ran a credible though unsuccessful campaign against Chávez himself last year, and he has a unified opposition coalition behind him. He promises Brazilian-style social reform -- stable and fiscally responsible -- as an alternative to the somewhat chaotic politics and questionable economics of Chávismo. Campaigning last year, he railed against Chávez's foreign policy for making a "gift" of Venezuelan oil to dubious allies. If he were to win, the special relationship with Cuba would no doubt change. But it might not change as drastically as some think. Cuban doctors and nurses are very popular in the poor barrios of Venezuela. They are known for selfless dedication, living and working in areas where few Venezuelan doctors would deign to venture. They form the backbone of Venezuela's contemporary health care system, and dismantling it by sending the Cubans packing would amount to political suicide. So even a Capriles victory is not likely to lead to a sudden and complete severing of the economic ties between Cuba and Venezuela. But some renegotiating of the exchange rate and the loan program is certain.¶ That by itself would be a blow to Cuba -- not enough to tip the economy into a second Special Period, as some predict, but enough to throw Raúl Castro's economic reform program into doubt. As Cuba moves toward a mixed socialist economy, with upward of half the GDP projected to be in the "nonstate" sector at the end of the decade, the process of reforming, or dismantling, the unproductive state sector is bound to produce social dislocation. Workers laid off from state enterprises will need to find new jobs. Regions remote from the tourist trade are likely to suffer significant unemployment. People on fixed incomes or low state wages -- mainly the elderly, the poor, unskilled youth and working mothers -- are likely to see their standard of living decline before it improves.
|
William M. LeoGrande – Dean of American University School of Public Affairs, specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. policy towards Latin America, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, Ph.D from Syracuse University, 4/2/13, The Danger of Dependence: Cuba's Foreign Policy After Chavez, World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12840/the-danger-of-dependence-cubas-foreign-policy-after-chavez
|
Cuban doctors and nurses are very popular in the poor barrios of Venezuela. They are known for selfless dedication, living and working in areas where few Venezuelan doctors would deign to venture. They form the backbone of Venezuela's contemporary health care system dismantling it would amount to political suicide not likely to lead to a sudden and complete severing of the economic ties between Cuba and Venezuel That itself would not enough to tip the economy but enough to throw Raúl Castro's economic reform program into doubt
|
5. If the economy is already declining, it means debt is inevitable – the plan doesn’t solve for their declining economy, it just removes a portion of their debt.
| 1,938 | 163 | 532 | 317 | 29 | 87 | 0.091483 | 0.274448 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,024 |
It is very unlikely that Cuba will experience another Special Period. Despite the credit limitations Cuba faces, its government has managed to diversify its exports and imports and to balance its trade equitably.¶ In the hypothetical event Cuba lost its oil subsidy and the benefits it secures through its medical aid to Venezuela, the island’s economy will no doubt face a rather complex situation. But this situation, and the absence of an economic alternative, will serve to hasten and intensify the reform process.¶ In any event, if Maduro wishes to keep Chavismo alive, he will have no option but to begin repairing the house from within, sacrificing the gifts Venezuela has been handing out to several Latin American countries, a generosity that is today unsustainable because of internal unproductiveness and inflation.¶ In the new, Post-Chávez age, Maduro has no choice but to re-invest millions in key economic sectors, undertaking emergency measures to keep afloat a country divided and exhausted by a misguided open checkbook policy. Otherwise, his administration will no doubt capsize in the turbulent waters ahead.¶ Cuba will no doubt suffer the consequences of a political crisis or economic debacle in Venezuela, but will not endure the catastrophic onslaught of a new Special Period.
|
Morales 4-19-13 [Emilio, Cuban economist, former head of the Marketing Strategy Planning Department of Cuba’s CIMEX corporation, current president of the Havana Consulting Group, “Cuba, the Crisis in Venezuela and the Specter of the Special Period,” http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=91624]
|
Despite the credit limitations Cuba faces, its government has managed to diversify its exports and imports and to balance its trade equitably this situation will serve to hasten and intensify the reform process Maduro has no choice but to re-invest millions in key economic sectors Cuba will no doubt suffer the consequences of a political crisis or economic debacle in Venezuela, but will not endure the catastrophic onslaught of a new Special Period
|
2. The embargo is the key internal link to the exacerbation of the Cuban economy – the plan can’t solve for this – also there’s no internal link to latin America instability – at best, they can only access Cuban instability – that’s their own gorrell evidence
| 1,299 | 259 | 451 | 205 | 47 | 73 | 0.229268 | 0.356098 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,025 |
CARACAS, Venezuela -- Venezuela says it's ending talks with the United States to restore normal relations because Washington's U.N. ambassador-designate criticized its human rights record. The Foreign Ministry said in a statement late Friday that Samantha Power's remarks compelled it to halt the process begun in Guatemala last month by its foreign minister, Elias Jaua, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. Power said in Senate confirmation hearings Wednesday that Venezuela is guilty of a "crackdown on civil society," along with Cuba, Iran and Russia. Jaua and Kerry had said they would fast-track talks to resume ambassadorial-level ties absent since 2010. Those prospects dimmed after Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro later offered asylum to U.S. leaker Edward Snowden. Kerry subsequently called Jaua and threatened unspecified action if Snowden wound up in Venezuelan hands.
|
AP 7/20/13 (Associated Press, Venezuela halts normalization talks with US, The Sacramento Bee, http://www.sacbee.com/2013/07/20/5582836/venezuela-halts-normalization.html)
|
-- Venezuela says it's ending talks with the United States to restore normal relations because Washington's U.N. ambassador-designate criticized its human rights record. Samantha Power's remarks compelled it to halt the process begun in Guatemala last month by its foreign minister, Elias Jaua, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. Power said in Senate confirmation hearings Wednesday that Venezuela is guilty of a "crackdown on civil society," fast-track talks to resume ambassadorial-level ties dimmed after Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro later offered asylum to U.S. leaker Edward Snowden.
|
5. No terminal impact
| 887 | 21 | 600 | 132 | 4 | 87 | 0.030303 | 0.659091 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,026 |
Yet now, given that they never did get around to ending the Empire, does this alliance still have a future? The answer to this question will be of no small consequence to the world as a whole. It will extend beyond their role as a self-proclaimed rhetorical international disestablishment: an Axis of Insults. The alliance between these two countries has generated concerns beyond the rhetoric. They have provided financial benefits to poorer neighbors and generated security risks to a great many others. Some commentators, more than a few of them Republican congressmen, have publically surmised that Iran might have been using Caracas as a staging ground for terrorist plots throughout the Western hemisphere, although a State Department report g Latin America’s largely undeveloped uranium reserves, in hopes of advancing its ambitions towards the status of a nuclear power. What cannot be denied is that there are, at present, released last week would seem to belie that fact. Others believe that Iran’s true interest’s lies in access in numerous Iranian agents active in Latin America operating at various official levels. The Iranian security apparatus has been instrumental in teaching Chavista security forces to more efficiently repress dissent among their own people. (The Venezuelan Jewish community, once among the largest in Latin America, has been a particular target.) So what happens next? Venezuela’s new president, Nicolas Maduro, has announced that he will meet soon with Iran’s new president-elect, Hassan Rowhani. And while neither country has provided any details, if Rowhani is the moderate he is touted to be, he may well seek better relations with Europe and the United States, advanced economies capable of engaging with Iran on more than a rhetorical level. Meanwhile, barring some unforeseen crisis precipitating the collapse of regime in Caracas, the Venezuelan government seems unlikely to do likewise. Under fire from accusations of having stolen the recent election, Maduro’s domestic legitimacy is predicated primarily on his having been fingered by Chávez himself as successor, rather than on any personal charisma or qualifications. Under these circumstances, seeking rapprochement with “The Empire,” so often vilified by his hallowed predecessor, would be a dangerous game. In geopolitics, much as in interpersonal relationships, countries sometimes outgrow each other. For an Iran that might finally be coming of age, maintaining close ties with declining, unpopular Venezuela, would be no great benefit, and might hold back a more fruitful potential dalliance with the West.
|
Lansberg-Rodriguez and Zonis 7/4/13 (Daniel - fellow at The Comparative Constitutions Project and Marvin - Professor Emeritus at Booth School of Business, “Venezuela and Iran: The End of The Affair,” Economoniter, http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/07/venezuela-and-iran-the-end-of-the-affair/)
|
does this alliance still have a future? Venezuela’s new president, Nicolas Maduro, has announced that he will meet soon with Iran’s new president-elect, Hassan Rowhani. And while neither country has provided any details, if Rowhani is the moderate he is touted to be, he may well seek better relations with Europe and the United States, advanced economies capable of engaging with Iran on more than a rhetorical level. the Venezuelan government seems unlikely to do likewise. In geopolitics, much as in interpersonal relationships, countries sometimes outgrow each other. For an Iran that might finally be coming of age, maintaining close ties with declining, unpopular Venezuela, would be no great benefit, and might hold back a more fruitful potential dalliance with the West.
|
2. Veneuela-Iran relations collapsing now
| 2,613 | 41 | 778 | 401 | 5 | 122 | 0.012469 | 0.304239 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,027 |
The Obama Administration's charm offensive hasn't been a complete failure. Personally, Obama is far more popular overseas than was George W. Bush, and that popularity has brought the nastiness of adversaries like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad into sharper relief. But the very nastiness of those adversaries means that they don't get rattled by low favorability ratings. What's more, Obama's efforts to change America's image have been constrained by his inability to change certain U.S. policies at home. The best way for America to promote its values is "by living them," declares the National Security Strategy, but when it comes to closing Guantánamo Bay or dramatically reducing U.S. carbon emissions, Congress has shown little interest in making Washington a shining city on a hill. These problems, however, pale before the overarching one: despite Obama's personal popularity, American soft power isn't going up; it's going down. The reason is the financial crisis. America's international allure has always been based less on the appeal of the man in the Oval Office than on the appeal of the American political and economic model. Regardless of what foreigners thought of Bill Clinton, in the 1990s America's brand of deregulated democracy seemed the only true path to prosperity. American economists, investment bankers and political consultants fanned out across the globe to preach the gospel of free elections and free markets. America represented, in Francis Fukuyama's famous words, "The End of History." (See pictures of Obama in Russia.) Now it is much less clear that history is marching our way. The financial crisis has undermined the prestige of America's economic model at the very moment that China's authoritarian capitalism is rising. A decade ago, poor governments hungry for trade and aid had no choice but to show up in Washington, where they received lectures about how to make their economies resemble America's. Now they can get twice the money and half the moralizing in Beijing. From Iran to Burma to Sudan, the Obama Administration's charm offensive has been undermined by China's cash offensive.
|
Beinart ’10 [6-21-10, Peter Beinart is an associate professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York and a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, “How the Financial Crisis Has Undermined U.S. Power”, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1995884,00.html]
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Obama's efforts to change America's image have been constrained by his inability to change certain U.S. policies at home when it comes to closing Guantánamo Bay or dramatically reducing U.S. carbon emissions, Congress has shown little interest in making Washington a shining city American soft power it's going down. The reason is the financial crisis. America's international allure has always been based less on the appeal of the man in the Oval Office than on the appeal of the American political and economic model The financial crisis has undermined the prestige of America's economic model at the very moment that China's authoritarian capitalism is rising Obama charm has been undermined by China's cash offensive
|
3. Solvency takeout – their Griffin evidence indicates that relations will never improve as long as the US criticizes Venezuela for the drug trade, violation of human rights, and cooperation with Iran – these are all things the US are doing even now – the plan does nothing to solve this
| 2,120 | 287 | 720 | 334 | 51 | 114 | 0.152695 | 0.341317 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,028 |
Yet such wars haven't quite happened. Aaron Wolf, an Oregon State University specialist in water conflicts, maintains that the last war over water was fought between the Mesopotamian city states of Lagash and Umma 4,500 years ago. Wolf has found that during the twentieth century only 7 minor skirmishes were fought over water while 145 water-related treaties were signed. He argues that one reason is strategic: in a conflict involving river water, the aggressor would have to be both downstream (since the upstream nation enjoys unhampered access to the river) and militarily superior. As Wolf puts it, "An upstream riparian would have no cause to launch an attack, and a weaker state would be foolhardy to do so." And if a powerful downstream nation retaliates against a water diversion by, say, destroying its weak upstream neighbor's dam, it still risks the consequences, in the form of flood or pollution or poison from upstream. So, until now, water conflicts have simmered but rarely boiled, perhaps because of the universality of the need for water. Almost two fifths of the world's people live in the 214 river basins shared by two or more countries; the Nile links ten countries, whose leaders are profoundly aware of one another's hydrologic behavior. Countries usually manage to cooperate about Water, even in unlikely circumstances. In 1957, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam formed the Mekong Committee, which exchanged information throughout the Vietnam War. Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, Israeli and Jordanian officials secretly met once or twice a year at a picnic table on the banks of the Yarmuk River to allocate the river's water supply; these so-called picnic-table summits occurred while the two nations disavowed formal diplomatic contact. Jerome Delli Priscoli, editor of a thoughtful trade journal called Water Policy and a social scientist at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, believes the whole notion of water conflict is overemphasized: "Water irrigation helped build early communities and bring those communities together in larger functional arrangements. Such community networking was a primary impetus to the growth of civilization. Indeed, water may actually be one of humanity's great learning grounds for building community.... The thirst for water may be more persuasive than the impulse toward conflict."
|
Leslie 00 Jacques Leslie, Harper's Magazine, July 1, 2000
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Wolf, an Oregon State University specialist in water conflicts, maintains that the last war over water was fought 4,500 years ago. during the twentieth century only 7 minor skirmishes were fought over water while 145 water-related treaties were signed one reason is strategic: in a conflict involving river water, the aggressor would have to be both downstream and militarily superior. And if a powerful downstream nation retaliates it still risks the consequences, in the form of flood or pollution or poison from upstream. the Nile links ten countries, whose leaders are profoundly aware of one another's hydrologic behavior. Countries usually manage to cooperate even in unlikely circumstances. water may be one of humanity's great learning grounds for building community.... The thirst for water may be more persuasive than the impulse toward conflict."
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5. There’s no logical coherency in their internal link to solving for the impacts outlined in the 1AC – just improving relations with Venezuela can’t solve for diplomatic relations with other countries – you can’t solve for water scarcity and warming just with Venezuela
| 2,362 | 270 | 857 | 371 | 44 | 132 | 0.118598 | 0.355795 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,029 |
The speed and ease with which Iran can acquire nuclear weapons, however, is not simply—or even primarily—a technical one.11 The greatest barrier to weaponization is the risk of detection and interdiction. If Iran began to enrich uranium to weapons grade, the United States would detect it and would be able to intervene to stop the Iranians long before they could complete the task. Knowing this, the Iranians have little incentive to try. Instead, they are likely working to reduce the time it would take for a nuclear “breakout”—that is, the rapid production of the necessary components of a nuclear weapon—without taking steps so provocative that they would invite a preventive military attack. For example, if Iran were to stockpile enough uranium enriched to the 20 percent level for a weapon, it could, using its declared facilities, potentially enrich these stocks to weapons grade in a matter of months. Under existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, however, this would likely be detected within several weeks, giving the United States time to intervene if it chose.12 Iran could shorten the breakout time by deploying more advanced centrifuges, constructing secret enrichment facilities, or stock
|
Reardon ’13, Robert Reardon, postdoctoral research fellow at the Belfer Center, International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013 “Correspondence: Nuclear Negotiations with Iran,” p. 184
|
The speed and ease with which Iran can acquire nuclear weapons, however, is not simply—or even primarily—a technical one The greatest barrier to weaponization is the risk of detection and interdiction. If Iran began to enrich uranium to weapons grade, the United States would detect it and would be able to intervene to stop the Iranians long before they could complete the task Knowing this, the Iranians have little incentive to try Under existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards this would likely be detected within several weeks, giving the United States time to intervene if it chose
|
7. No Iran Prolif – safeguards check
| 1,228 | 36 | 609 | 192 | 7 | 98 | 0.036458 | 0.510417 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,030 |
Soft power is potentially a dangerous idea not because it is unsound, which it is not, but rather for the faulty inference that careless or unwary observers draw from it. Such inferences are a challenge to theorists because they are unable to control the ways in which their ideas will be interpreted and applied in practice by those unwary observers. Concepts can be tricky. They seem to make sense of what otherwise is intellectually undergoverned space, and thus potentially come to control pliable minds. Given that men behave as their minds suggest and command, it is easy to understand why Clausewitz identified the enemy’s will as the target for influence.37 Beliefs about soft power in turn have potentially negative implications for attitudes toward the hard power of military force and economic muscle. Thus, soft power does not lend itself to careful regulation, adjustment, and calibration. What does this mean? To begin with a vital contrast: whereas military force and economic pressure (negative or positive) can be applied by choice as to quantity and quality, soft power cannot. (Of course, the enemy/rival too has a vote on the outcome, regardless of the texture of the power applied.) But hard power allows us to decide how we will play in shaping and modulating the relevant narrative, even though the course of history must be an interactive one once the engagement is joined. In principle, we can turn the tap on or off at our discretion. The reality is apt to be somewhat different because, as noted above, the enemy, contingency, and friction will intervene. But still a noteworthy measure of initiative derives from the threat and use of military force and economic power. But soft power is very different indeed as an instrument of policy. In fact, I am tempted to challenge the proposition that soft power can even be regarded as one (or more) among the grand strategic instruments of policy. The seeming validity and attractiveness of soft power lead to easy exaggeration of its potency. Soft power is admitted by all to defy metric analysis, but this is not a fatal weakness. Indeed, the instruments of hard power that do lend themselves readily to metric assessment can also be unjustifiably seductive. But the metrics of tactical calculation need not be strategically revealing. It is important to win battles, but victory in war is a considerably different matter than the simple accumulation of tactical successes. Thus, the burden of proof remains on soft power: (1) What is this concept of soft power? (2) Where does it come from and who or what controls it? and (3) Prudently assessed and anticipated, what is the quantity and quality of its potential influence? Let us now consider answers to these questions. 7. Soft power lends itself too easily to mischaracterization as the (generally unavailable) alternative to military and economic power. The first of the three questions posed above all but invites a misleading answer. Nye plausibly offers the co-option of people rather than their coercion as the defining principle of soft power.38 The source of possible misunderstanding is the fact that merely by conjuring an alternative species of power, an obvious but unjustified sense of equivalence between the binary elements is produced. Moreover, such an elementary shortlist implies a fitness for comparison, an impression that the two options are like-for-like in their consequences, though not in their methods. By conceptually corralling a country’s potentially attractive co-optive assets under the umbrella of soft power, one is near certain to devalue the significance of an enabling context. Power of all kinds depends upon context for its value, but especially so for the soft variety. For power to be influential, those who are to be influenced have a decisive vote. But the effects of contemporary warfare do not allow recipients the luxury of a vote. They are coerced. On the other hand, the willingness to be coopted by American soft power varies hugely among recipients. In fact, there are many contexts wherein the total of American soft power would add up in the negative, not the positive. When soft power capabilities are strong in their values and cultural trappings, there is always the danger that they will incite resentment, hostility, and a potent “blowback.” In those cases, American soft power would indeed be strong, but in a counterproductive direction. These conclusions imply no criticism of American soft power per se. The problem would lie in the belief that soft power is a reliable instrument of policy that could complement or in some instances replace military force. 8. Soft power is perilously reliant on the calculations and feelings of frequently undermotivated foreigners. The second question above asked about the provenance and ownership of soft power. Nye correctly notes that “soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does.” He proceeds sensibly to contrast the armed forces along with plainly national economic assets with the “soft power resources [that] are separate from American government and only partly responsive to its purposes.” 39 Nye cites as a prominent example of this disjunction in responsiveness the fact that “[i]n the Vietnam era . . . American government policy and popular culture worked at cross-purposes.”40 Although soft power can be employed purposefully as an instrument of national policy, such power is notably unpredictable in its potential influence, producing net benefit or harm. Bluntly stated, America is what it is, and there are many in the world who do not like what it is. The U.S. Government will have the ability to project American values in the hope, if not quite confident expectation, that “the American way” will be found attractive in alien parts of the world. Our hopes would seem to be achievement of the following: (1) love and respect of American ideals and artifacts (civilization); (2) love and respect of America; and (3) willingness to cooperate with American policy today and tomorrow. Admittedly, this agenda is reductionist, but the cause and desired effects are accurate enough. Culture is as culture does and speaks and produces. The soft power of values culturally expressed that others might find attractive is always at risk to negation by the evidence of national deeds that appear to contradict our cultural persona.
|
Gray 2011 – Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. (Colin S., April, “HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY.” Published by Strategic Studies Institute)
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Soft power is dangerous for the faulty inference that careless or unwary observers draw from it. Such inferences are a challenge to theorists because they are unable to control the ways in which their ideas will be interpreted Concepts can be tricky 37 Beliefs about soft power in turn have potentially negative implications for attitudes toward the hard power of military force and economic muscle. soft power does not lend itself to careful regulation, adjustment, and calibration To begin with a vital contrast: whereas military force and economic pressure can be applied by choice as to quantity and quality, soft power cannot hard power allows us to decide how we will play in shaping and modulating the relevant narrative we can turn the tap on or off at our discretion The reality is apt to be somewhat different because, as noted above, the enemy, contingency, and friction will intervene soft power is very different indeed as an instrument of policy the instruments of hard power that do lend themselves readily to metric assessment can also be unjustifiably seductive Soft power lends itself too easily to mischaracterization as the alternative to military power soft power is certain to devalue the significance of an enabling context For power to be influential, those who are to be influenced have a decisive the willingness to be coopted by American soft power varies hugely among recipients. In fact, there are many contexts wherein the total of American soft power would add up in the negative, not the positive soft power capabilities are strong in their values and cultural trappings, there is always the danger that they will incite resentment, hostility, and a potent “blowback American soft power would indeed be strong, but in a counterproductive direction soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does.” America is what it is, and there are many in the world who do not like what it is. The U.S. Government will have the ability to project American values in the hope, if not quite confident expectation, that “the American way” will be found attractive in alien parts of the world
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1NC #2 – Venezuela is not obtaining influence as Iran is which means that iran will inevitably find another ally to negotiate with – this is the basic theory of geopolitics – that’s our Lansberg ’13 evidence
| 6,407 | 207 | 2,144 | 1,042 | 37 | 359 | 0.035509 | 0.34453 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
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Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
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2013
|
4,031 |
The conversations that were started a month and a half ago between Venezuela and the United States have definitively ended, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced yesterday at an event of the Strategic Regions of Integral Defense (REDI) in Cojedes state. “My policy is zero tolerance to gringo aggression against Venezuela. I'm not going to accept any aggression, whether it be verbal, political, or diplomatic. Enough is enough. Stay over there with your empire, don't involve yourselves anymore in Venezuela,” he said. The announcement comes after controversial statements from Samantha Powers, President Barack Obama’s nominee for U.S. envoy to the United Nations, who testified to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Wednesday that she would fight against what she called a “crackdown on civil society being carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela.” In a statement written on Friday that marks the last communication between the two countries, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua wrote, “The preoccupation expressed by the U.S. government regarding the supposed repression of civil society in Venezuela is unacceptable and unfounded. To the contrary, Venezuela has amply demonstrated that it possesses a robust system of constitutional guarantees to preserve the unrestricted practice and the respect of fundamental human rights, as the UN has recognized on multiple occasions.” Jaua spoke with US Secretary of State John Kerry in a meeting in Guatemala last month that Kerry described as the “beginning of a good, respectful relationship.” However, relations cooled after Bolivian President Evo Morales’ presidential plane was prevented from entering the airspace of four European countries following false information that U.S. whistleblower Edward Snowden was on board, and Maduro’s subsequent offer of political asylum to Snowden. “I told Jaua to convey to Kerry [in June] that we are ready to have relations within the framework of equality and respect,” Maduro said yesterday. “If they respect us, we respect them. But the time has run out for them to meddle in the internal affairs of our countries and publically attack us. Their time has run out, in general in Latin America, and in particular with us.” Neither country has had an ambassador in the other nation since 2010, when late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez refused the entrance of newly-appointed US Ambassador to Venezuela Larry Palmer for “blatantly disrespectful” remarks, and Venezuelan Ambassador to the US Bernardo Alvarez was expelled from the country several days later.
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Bercovitch 7/21/13 (Sascha – Contributor for Venezuelanalysis.com, With “Zero Tolerance to Gringo Aggression,” Maduro Cuts Off Venezuela-U.S. Talks, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/9872)
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The conversations that were started a month and a half ago between Venezuela and the United States have definitively ended, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced yesterday My policy is zero tolerance to gringo aggression against Venezuela. I'm not going to accept any aggression, whether it be verbal, political, or diplomatic. Enough is enough. Stay over there with your empire, don't involve yourselves anymore in Venezuela, The announcement comes after controversial statements from Samantha Powers, President Barack Obama’s nominee for U.S. envoy to the United Nations, who testified that she would fight against what she called a “crackdown on civil society being carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela.” Maduro said they respect us, we respect them. But the time has run out for them to meddle in the internal affairs of our countries and publically attack us. Their time has run out with us Neither country has had an ambassador in the other nation since 2010, when late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez refused the entrance of newly-appointed US Ambassador to Venezuela Larry Palmer for “blatantly disrespectful” remarks, and Venezuelan Ambassador to the US Bernardo Alvarez was expelled from the country several days later.
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1NC #5 – The 1AC has no terminal impact which means you should default neg
| 2,599 | 75 | 1,265 | 399 | 15 | 196 | 0.037594 | 0.491228 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
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Dartmouth DDI
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Case Negatives
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2013
|
4,032 |
Despite its popularity, the concept soft power remains a power of confusion. The definition is at best loose and vague. Because of such confusion it is not surprising that the concept has been misunderstood, misused and trivialised (Joffe, 2006a ). Criticisms of soft power centre mainly around three aspects: definition, sources and limitations. There may be little or no relationship between the ubiquity of American culture and its actual influence. Hundreds of millions of people around the world wear, listen, eat, drink, watch and dance American, but they do not identify these accoutrements of their daily lives with America ( Joffe, 2006b ). To Purdy (2001) soft power is not a new reality, but rather a new word for the most efficient form of power. There are limits to what soft power could achieve. In a context dominated by hard power considerations, soft power is meaningless (Blechman, 2004 ). The dark side of soft power is largely ignored by Nye. Excessive power, either hard or soft, may not be a good thing. In the affairs of nations, too much hard power ends up breeding not submission but resistance. Likewise, big soft power does not bend hearts; it twists minds in resentment and rage (Joffe, 2006b ). Nye’s version of soft power that rests on affection and desire is too simplistic and unrealistic. Human feelings are complicated and quite often ambivalent, that is, love and hate co-exist at the same time. Even within the same group, people may like some aspects of American values, but hate others. By the same token, soft power can also rest on fear (Cheow, 2002 ) or on both affection and fear, depending on the context. Much of China’s soft power in south-east Asia testifies to this. Another example is provided by the mixed perception of the United States in China: people generally admire American technological superiority and super brands but detest its policies on Taiwan.
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Fan 7 (Ying, Senior Lecturer in Marketing at Brunel Business School, Brunel University in London, “Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion?”, November 14)
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the concept soft power remains a power of confusion. The definition is loose and vague There may be little or no relationship between the ubiquity of American culture and its actual influence There are limits to what soft power could achieve. In a context dominated by hard power considerations, soft power is meaningless Excessive power, either hard or soft, may not be a good thing , big soft power does not bend hearts; it twists minds in resentment Nye’s version of soft power that rests on affection and desire is too simplistic and unrealistic. Human feelings are complicated love and hate co-exist at the same time. Even within the same group, people may like some aspects of American values, but hate others
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No impact - Soft power is useless
| 1,907 | 33 | 715 | 320 | 7 | 122 | 0.021875 | 0.38125 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
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Dartmouth DDI
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Case Negatives
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2013
|
4,033 |
Like Francis Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History,” soft-power theory was a creative and appealing attempt to make sense of America’s global purpose. Unlike Fukuyama’s theory, however, which the new global order seemed to support for nearly a decade, Nye’s was basicallyrefuted by world events in its very first year. In the summer of 1990, a massive contingent ofSaddam Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait and effectively annexed it as a province of Iraq. Although months earlier Nye had asserted that “geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important,” the fact is that Saddam invaded Kuwait because of its geographic proximity, insubstantial military, and plentiful oil reserves. Despite Nye’s claim that “the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force,” months of concerted international pressure, including the passage of a UN resolution, failed to persuade Saddam to withdraw. In the end, only overwhelming American military power succeeded in liberating Kuwait. The American show of force also succeeded in establishing the U.S. as the single, unrivaled post–Cold War superpower. Following the First Gulf War, the 1990s saw brutal acts of aggression in the Balkans: the Bosnian War in 1992 and the Kosovo conflicts beginning in 1998. These raged on despite international negotiations and were quelled only after America took the lead in military actions. It is also worth noting that attempts to internationalize these efforts made them more costly in time, effectiveness, and manpower than if the U.S. had acted unilaterally. Additionally, the 1990s left little mystery as to how cataclysmic events unfold when the U.S. declines to apply traditional tools of power overseas. In April 1994, Hutu rebels began the indiscriminate killing of Tutsis in Rwanda. As the violence escalated, the United Nations’s peacekeeping forces stood down so as not to violate a UN mandate prohibiting intervention in a country’s internal politics. Washington followed suit, refusing even to consider deploying forces to East-Central Africa. By the time the killing was done, in July of the same year, Hutus had slaughtered between half a million and 1 million Tutsis. And in the 1990s, Japan’s economy went into its long stall, making the Japanese model of a scaled down military seem rather less relevant. All this is to say that during the presidency of Bill Clinton, Nye’s “intangible forms of power” proved to hold little sway in matters of statecraft, whilemodes of traditional power remained as criticalas ever in coercing other nations and affirming America’s role as chief protector of the global order. If the Clinton years posed a challenge for the efficacy of soft power, the post-9/11 age has exposed Nye’s explication of the theory as something akin to academic eccentricity. In his book, Nye mentioned “current issues of transnational interdependence” requiring “collective action and international cooperation.” Among these were “ecological changes (acid rain and global warming), health epidemics such as AIDS, illicit trade in drugs, and terrorism.” Surely a paradigm that places terrorism last on a list of national threats starting with acid rain is due for revision. For what stronger negation of the soft-power thesis could one imagine than a strike against America largely inspired by what Nye considered a great “soft power resource”: namely, “American values of democracy and human rights”? Yet Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, had in fact weighed in unequivocally on the matter of Western democracy: “Whoever claims to be a ‘democratic-Muslim,’ or a Muslim who calls for democracy, is like one who says about himself ‘I am a Jewish Muslim,’ or ‘I am a Christian Muslim’—the one worse than the other. He is an apostate infidel.” With a detestable kind of clarity, Zawahiri’s pronouncement revealed the hollowness at the heart of the soft-power theory. Soft power is a fine policy complement in dealing with parties that approve of American ideals and American dominion. But applied to those that do not, soft power’s attributes become their opposites. For enemies of the United States, the export of American culture is a provocation, not an invitation; self-conscious “example-setting” in areas like nonproliferation is an indication of weakness, not leadership; deference to international bodies is a path to exercising a veto over American action, not a means of forging multilateral cooperation.
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Greenwald 10 (Abe, associate editor of COMMENTARY, “The Soft-Power Fallacy”, July/August, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/the-soft-power-fallacy-15466?page=2)
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Nye’s was basicallyrefuted by world events in its very first year Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait and effectively annexed it as a province of Iraq. ,” months of concerted international pressure, including the passage of a UN resolution, failed to persuade Saddam to withdraw ollowing the First Gulf War, the 1990s saw brutal acts of aggression in the Balkans: . These raged on despite international negotiations and were quelled only after America took the lead in military actions Hutu rebels began the indiscriminate killing of Tutsis in Rwanda. Washington followed suit, refusing even to consider deploying forces to East-Central Africa. By the time the killing was done, in July of the same year, Hutus had slaughtered between half a million and 1 million Tutsis. Nye’s “intangible forms of power” proved to hold little sway in matters of statecraft, whilemodes of traditional power remained as criticalas ever in coercing other nations and affirming America’s role as chief protector of the global order soft power’s attributes become their opposites. For enemies of the United States, the export of American culture is a provocation, not an invitation; self-conscious “example-setting” in areas like nonproliferation is an indication of weakness, not leadership; deference to international bodies is a path to exercising a veto over American action, not a means of forging multilateral cooperation.
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Empirics prove soft power fails
| 4,470 | 31 | 1,404 | 694 | 5 | 217 | 0.007205 | 0.31268 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
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Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,034 |
Focusing on the Iran-Venezuela relationship as a defensive initiative does not give an accurate impression of the whole story, but is, nonetheless, the most controversial aspect of the relationship. Yet this relationship as an aspect of defence policy is not only reasonable, but almost inevitable given Washington’s handling of the two countries in recent years. As Michael Corcoran rightly pointed out in February, despite being lumped in the same basket by much of the Western media, internally the governments of Iran and Venezuela couldn’t be more different. As Corcoran argues: “Venezuela has internationally recognized elections and works to empower the working class and the poor. Chávez’s opponents in Venezuela are free to broadcast their discontent and do. Venezuela may in fact be the only nation where the media could publicly call for a coup of an elected leader, as some Venezuelan media outlets did in 2002, and remain on the air. Certainly, such activities would not be permitted in the United States. In contrast, Iran, an Islamist state, jails dissidents, executes gays, and is ruled with absolute power by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “Yet for the U.S. media, Iran and the left-leaning Latin American governments are all of a piece. This assumption undergirds the demonization of the “pink tide” leaders as dangerous pawns in Iran’s supposed efforts to build nuclear weapons—efforts that are unconfirmed by U.S. intelligence agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency.” I couldn’t put it better myself. Nonetheless, the disdain with which Washington has treated both countries over the last decade has led them to take a number of similar actions in the international theatre. If a global hegemon treats two countries similarly, then it shouldn’t be a mystery when they both respond in similar ways. It really shouldn’t have come as a surprise to anyone to see both Iran and Venezuela pursuing policies of deterrence throughout the last decade. Since the U.S. backed the 2002 coup against Chávez, Venezuela has developed a multifaceted deterrence strategy primarily reliant on developing regional alliances (the drive to modernise the Venezuelan military is supplementary at best). As was blatantly obvious to most observers of this year’s Organization of American States (OAS) summit, this strategy has been nothing short of a spectacular success. From issues ranging from counter-narcotics to free trade, the U.S. and Canada were looking pretty lonely. However, Iran’s attempts to integrate into the international community have failed, largely due to U.S.-Israeli efforts. Hence, while Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro enjoys strong support from most of Latin America (for proof, look no further than his tour of the Southern Cone, which VA covered here and here), Iran is encircled by U.S.-aligned regimes in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, contrary to Noriega’s fear mongering, as Bloomberg recently reported, even the State Department has conceded that “Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning”. In such a context, if Iran is developing nuclear weapons (which there is scant evidence of) then it’s largely the result of U.S. policy. If the country’s atomic energy program really is peaceful, then the Iranian leadership is in desperate need of some kind of effective deterrence model; especially when Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be under the impression that Iran’s leaders are plotting a second holocaust. The supreme leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei only needs to look next door to Iraq to see what happens when U.S/Israeli hawks come knocking and you don’t have any WMD’s. Indeed, if Saddam Hussein actually had WMD’s, the likelihood that even the hawks would have risked their deployment with an invasion is remote. So, while there are still plenty in Washington who are eager to beat the drums of war, in reality both Venezuela and Iran are pursuing defensive policies in the face of very real U.S. aggression. For Iran, Washington’s aggression manifests mostly in its policy of encirclement, and the ever tightening economic sanctions, which have put millions of lives at risk. These are supplemented by Israeli aggression, most notably in the form of Mossad support of groups like the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, which has carried out a number of terrorist attacks on Iranian soil.
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Mallett-Outtrim 7/21/13 (Ryan - Australian activist and independent journalist, “The Myth And Reality Of Venezuela-Iran Ties – Analysis,” Eurasia Review and Analysis, http://www.eurasiareview.com/21072013-the-myth-and-reality-of-venezuela-iran-ties-analysis/)
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Iran-Venezuela relationship as a defensive initiative is not only reasonable, but almost inevitable given Washington’s handling of the two countries in recent years. , If a global hegemon treats two countries similarly, then it shouldn’t be a mystery when they both respond in similar ways. It really shouldn’t have come as a surprise to anyone to see both Iran and Venezuela pursuing policies of deterrence throughout the last decade. Since the U.S. backed the 2002 coup against Chávez, Venezuela has developed a multifaceted deterrence strategy if Iran is developing nuclear weapons (which there is scant evidence of) then it’s largely the result of U.S. policy. the Iranian leadership is in desperate need of some kind of effective deterrence model The supreme leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei only needs to look next door to Iraq to see what happens when U.S/Israeli hawks come knocking and you don’t have any WMD’s. So, while there are still plenty in Washington who are eager to beat the drums of war, in reality both Venezuela and Iran are pursuing defensive policies in the face of very real U.S. aggression.
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Turn – US hegemony creates backlash and forces Venezuela and Iran to ally with one another and form deterrence policies
| 4,464 | 119 | 1,113 | 703 | 20 | 183 | 0.02845 | 0.260313 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
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Dartmouth DDI
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Case Negatives
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2013
|
4,035 |
CARACAS, Venezuela — Venezuela announced late Friday that it was stopping the latest round of off-again-on-again efforts to improve relations with the United States in reaction to comments by the Obama administration’s nominee for United Nations ambassador.CARACAS, Venezuela — Venezuela announced late Friday that it was stopping the latest round of off-again-on-again efforts to improve relations with the United States in reaction to comments by the Obama administration’s nominee for United Nations ambassador. The nominee, Samantha Power, speaking before a Senate committee on Wednesday, said part of her role as ambassador would be to challenge a “crackdown on civil society” in several countries, including Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro had already lashed out on Thursday at Ms. Power for her remarks, and late on Friday the Foreign Ministry said it was terminating efforts to improve relations with the United States.¶ Those efforts had inched forward just last month after Secretary of State John Kerry publicly shook hands with the Venezuelan foreign minister, Elías Jaua, during an international meeting in Guatemala — one of the highest-level meetings between officials of the two countries in years.¶ Venezuela “will never accept interference of any kind in its internal affairs,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement, adding that it “considered terminated the process begun in the conversations in Guatemala that had as their goal the regularization of our diplomatic relations.”¶ Relations with Venezuela have long been troubled, although the country has remained a major supplier of oil to the United States. Under the previous president, Hugo Chávez, a longtime nemesis of the United States, relations were bumpy, especially after the Bush administration tacitly supported a coup that briefly ousted him.¶ Mr. Maduro, Mr. Chávez’s handpicked successor, has given mixed messages about relations with the United States.¶ In March, when Mr. Maduro was vice president, he kicked out two American military attachés, accusing them of seeking to undermine the government. After he was elected in April, he ordered the arrest of an American documentary filmmaker whom officials accused of trying to start a civil war. The filmmaker, Tim Tracy, was later expelled from the country.¶ And in recent days, in a sharp escalation of the war of words with Washington, Mr. Maduro has said he would give asylum to Edward J. Snowden, the former American intelligence contractor who leaked secrets about American intelligence programs and is staying at a Moscow airport.¶ The United States and Venezuela have not had ambassadors in each other’s capitals since 2008, when Mr. Chávez expelled the American envoy, accusing the United States of backing a group of military officers he said were plotting against him. The United States responded at the time by expelling Venezuela’s ambassador.¶ In the Guatemala meeting, Mr. Kerry said he hoped the two countries could rapidly move toward exchanging ambassadors again. But those talks never had time to gain traction. On July 12, Mr. Kerry telephoned Mr. Jaua to express concern over the asylum offer to Mr. Snowden.¶ This is not the first time that Venezuela has backed off the idea of renewed relations with the United States. The two countries quietly began talks late last year aimed at improving relations, although those ground to a halt after the health of Mr. Chávez, who had cancer, deteriorated in December.¶ After Mr. Chávez’s death in March, a State Department official said the United States hoped that the election to replace him would meet democratic standards — prompting Mr. Jaua to angrily announce that Venezuela was halting the talks between the two countries. Venezuelan officials have repeatedly said relations with the United States should be conducted on a basis of respect.
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William Neuman – writer for New York Times, 7/20/13, New York Times, Venezuela Stops Efforts to Improve U.S. Relations, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/americas/venezuela-stops-efforts-to-improve-us-relations.html?_r=0
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Venezuela announced it was stopping efforts to improve relations United Nations ambassador Samantha Power aid her rol would be to challenge a “crackdown on civil society Maduro lashed out when Mr. Maduro was vice president, he kicked out two American military attachés, accusing them of seeking to undermine the government he ordered the arrest of an American documentary filmmaker whom officials accused of trying to start a civil war. in recent days Mr. Maduro has said he would give asylum to Edward J. Snowden,
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Efforts at improving relations have been destroyed by talks of regime transformation and Edward Snowden’s asylum
| 3,852 | 112 | 514 | 603 | 16 | 84 | 0.026534 | 0.139303 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
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Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
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2013
|
4,036 |
There is a consensus in Washington's foreign policy circles that the Congress that took office earlier this month after the GOP victory in the midterm election will put pressure on the administration to take a harder line on the authoritarian regimes of Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba.¶ Key congressional committees have changed hands, and are now led by Republican foreign policy hawks who have long criticized President Barack Obama for allegedly being too soft on Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez and his allies in the region.¶ In an interview last week, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Miami, the new chairwoman of the House's powerful Committee on Foreign Affairs, told me that there will be subcommittee hearings and investigations into issues such as Chavez's suspected aid to Middle Eastern terrorist groups and his links to Iran's secret nuclear weapons program.¶ "It will be good for congressional subcommittees to start talking about Chavez, about (Bolivian President Evo) Morales, about issues that have not been talked about," she said. "We are going to have a discussion about all of these issues."¶ Ros-Lehtinen, who has scheduled a trip to Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and Honduras in March, said that the House subcommittee on Western Hemisphere affairs is likely to hold hearings on whether to place Venezuela on the State Department's list of terrorist countries.¶ The subcommittee's new chairman, Rep. Connie Mack of Florida, supports the idea. Ros-Lehtinen suggested to me that she doesn't, for practical reasons.¶ The House is also likely to hold hearings on whether to impose economic sanctions on Venezuela's oil monopoly PDVSA and Venezuelan banks, she said.¶ Won't these discussions be counterproductive, and give Chavez great ammunition to support his claims that he is a victim of the "U.S. empire," I asked her.¶ "The United States must have principles. It's very nice to think that one can be friends of the entire world, but if we do that, we don't have principles," she said. She added that Chavez and his allies are going to blame the United States for everything anyway, regardless of what Washington does.¶ Ros-Lehtinen will not be the only new powerful voice in Congress demanding a tougher line on Venezuela.¶ The new Republican chairmen of the House's Intelligence Committee and Judiciary Committee are also more likely to press for inquiries into Venezuela's ties with Iran and terrorism, Republican foreign affairs analysts say.¶ "They will start asking questions, and they will make a difference," says Roger Noriega, who was head of the State Department's Latin American affairs during the George W. Bush administration. "They will demand accountability from the administration, and that will bring about consequences."¶ Obama supporters concede that the new Congress is likely to have an impact on the administration's Latin America policy, but warn that it will be a negative one.¶ "Ileana Ros-Lehtinen has already said that she wants to cut the State Department budget and foreign assistance," said Jeffrey Davidow, who served as head of the State Department's Latin American affairs office during the Clinton administration.
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Oppenheimer 11 Andres Oppenheimer – Latin American editor and syndicated foreign affairs columnist for Miami Herald, Former Miexo City bureau chief, foreign correspondent, and business writer, co-winner of 1987 Pulitzer Prize as a member of the Miami Herald that uncovered the Iran-Contra scandal, Master’s degree from Columbia University, 2011, New Congress to push Obama on Latin America, New York Times, http://www.newstimes.com/opinion/article/New-Congress-to-push-Obama-on-Latin-America-964030.php] January 18
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There is a consensus in Washington's that the Congress will put pressure on the administration to take a harder line on the authoritarian regimes of Venezuela Key congressional committees have changed hand and are now led by Republican foreign policy hawks who have criticized Obama for being too soft on Venezuela's Chavez We are going to have a discussion about all of these issues."¶ os-Lehtinen will not be the only new powerful voice in Congress demanding a tougher line on Venezuela. The new Republican chairmen of the House's Intelligence Committee and Judiciary Committee are also likely They will demand accountability from the administration, Obama supporters concede that the new Congress is likely to have an impact on Latin America policy, but warn that it will be a negative one.¶ Lehtinen has already said that she wants to cut the State Department budget and foreign assistance
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Congress will hate the plan – they prefer hard policy towards Venezuela
| 3,174 | 71 | 893 | 498 | 12 | 145 | 0.024096 | 0.291165 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,037 |
U.S. senators are warning Latin American nations against deepening financial and military ties with Iran, pledging heightened U.S. vigilance of Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere. The Senate's Foreign Relations Subcommittee took a close look on February 16 at Tehran’s dealings with Latin America. Iran’s increasingly isolated regime retains friends in Latin America, most notably Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.¶ U.S. Democratic Senator Robert Menendez had a stern message for the region. “Unfortunately, there are some countries in this hemisphere that, for political or financial gain, have courted Iranian overtures. They proceed at their own risk: the risk of sanctions from the United States, and the risk of abetting a terrorist state,” he said.¶ Republican Senator Marco Rubio echoed that message. “The leaders of these [Latin American] countries are playing with fire,” Rubio said.¶ Researcher Douglas Farah said Iran's intentions in Latin America are twofold. “To develop the capacity and capability to wreak havoc in Latin America and possibly the U.S. homeland, if the Iranian leadership views this as necessary to the survival of its nuclear program, and to develop and expand the ability to blunt international sanctions that are crippling the regime’s economic life,” Farah said.¶ Of particular concern: Iran’s quest for raw nuclear materials and what U.S. National Intelligence Director James Clapper recently described as Iran’s increasing willingness to mount attacks on U.S. soil.
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Michael Bowman – 2/16/2012, “U.S. Congress Warns Venezuela over Ties with Iran,” http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=72042&pageid=17&pagename=News)
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U.S. senators are warning Latin American nations against deepening financial and military ties with Iran Iran retains friends in Latin America, most notably Venezuelan President Chavez Democratic Senator had a stern message for the region. proceed at their own ris Republican Senator Marco Rubio echoed “The leaders of these [Latin American] countries are playing with fire,”
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Democratic and Republican opposition to Venezuela
| 1,511 | 49 | 375 | 225 | 6 | 56 | 0.026667 | 0.248889 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,038 |
Other witnesses emphasized that the US will need to not make other countries feel it is not interfering in their internal affairs as it offers encouragement and assistance. That may prove difficult as China and other countries from outside the region negotiate resource agreements with teams of state energy companies and national banks, they conceded.¶ "The US still leads the world in energy technology," said David L. Goldwyn, the Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs at the State Department during 2009-11 who now heads Goldwyn Strategies LLC. "It also has a business development model that is more favorable than China's, which is increasingly seen as colonial with employees who keep to themselves and don't work to help develop local economies."
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Nick Snow – Washington Editor, 4/29/2013, Nick, US can play constructive Western Hemisphere role, House panel told, http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-4d/general-interest/us-can-play-constructive-western-hemisphere.html
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the US will need to not make other countries feel it is not interfering in their internal affairs as it offers encouragement and assistance. That may prove difficult as China and other countries from outside the region negotiate resource agreements with teams of state energy companies and national banks
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Plan will be seen as interference by China
| 778 | 42 | 304 | 122 | 8 | 49 | 0.065574 | 0.401639 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,039 |
With Venezuela’s inflation rate for May soaring to 6.1%, first quarter growth stagnating at 0.7%, and shortages afflicting a number of basic goods, speculation has been rife regarding the country’s economic future. Critics from the right and left have argued these are all signs that Chavismo (the name given to the radical project for change spearheaded by former president Hugo Chavez) has reached its limits. In most cases, economic woes are primarily attributed to bad policies that have led to an excessively centralised economy presided over by a bureaucratic state increasingly dependent on oil revenue. However, placing the blame solely on the government ignores the neo-colonial economy inherited by Chavismo. It also conceals the ongoing economic war by Venezuela’s elites, who are seeking to regain control over the country’s prize possession ― oil wealth. This goal requires dismantling Chavismo, which represents an attempt by Venezuela’s historically excluded poor majority to capture the state, stem the flow of oil wealth out of the country and re-orientate it towards meeting their needs. Oil impacts The rise of oil production in the 1920s dramatically transformed Venezuela’s economy. Agricultural production slumped as foreign oil companies poured into the country to extract cheap oil and high profits. Rather than develop local industries, Venezuela’s elites preferred to take part of this oil wealth for themselves. They used some of it to import goods from abroad to sell in the domestic market. Venezuela’s oil-based economy took the form of neo-colonial capitalism: formally an independent nation, Venezuela’s economy was dominated by and dependent upon the economies of imperialist countries ― especially the United States, the main destination for oil exports and origin of imported basic goods. This economic set-up also profoundly shaped the state and society in Venezuela. As oil transnationals extracted the oil, the state took on the role of making sure that, via taxes, royalties and regulations, some of Venezuela’s oil wealth stayed in the country. Local business elites, however, became increasingly reliant on their connections to the state in order to secure some of this wealth. This led to a fusion of power and wealth within the state. It spawned a parasitic capitalist class that sought to accumulate capital largely through siphoning off the state’s oil-based revenue. The state also became a vehicle for creating a new middle class, whose position in society was tied to the state bureaucracy. Further down the ladder were marginalised popular classes, driven from the countryside into the city in search of a livelihood and what they felt was their rightful share of oil wealth. For many, the state was viewed as a means to lift them out of poverty. This led to a pervasive culture of “clientalism” (whereby access to jobs and services was tied to which political group you supported) and corruption. An extensive array of legal and illegal channels were established to appropriate and and re-distribute the oil money that remained in the country, with the lion’s share going to the elites. Various bids to develop other sectors of the economy did little to fundamentally alter this scenario. Neocolonial economy Instead, “developmentalist” policies (whether aimed at import substitution or export promotion) served to disguise the deepening of the rentier and neo-colonial nature of Venezuela’s capitalist economy. Policies such as market protection, overvalued currency, low taxes and access to cheap foreign exchange, which were supposed to promote import substitution, simply became vehicles to bolster the flow of oil rent to the local elites. One form this took was buying foreign exchange at the overvalued exchange rate and selling imports at inflated prices. But an overvalued currency made exports expensive, and the limited size of the local economy meant industrial development was dependent on rent transfer. In both cases, connections to the state, rather than competitiveness, was decisive to economic success. This helped the rise of a few powerful groups of conglomerates with close connections to the state, rather than internal economic development. The push towards export production fared no better; instead they reflected shifts in the international market. With some industries proving too expensive to run elsewhere, such as the auto-industry, companies decided to shift production to places such as Venezuela on the proviso that national protection barriers were removed and cheap natural resources made available. From the start, these new enterprises were to be integrated into globalised production chains, orientated towards exporting goods and profits back to the global North. One important change that occurred was the state gradually became an important economic agent in its own right. Its presence in the economy grew with the oil nationalisation of 1974 and large investment in heavy industries such as steel and aluminium. The aim was to expand the state bureaucracy’s economic base. This led to tensions with private capital (which generally appeared to be fights against corruption or for greater state efficiency). It served to heighten conflicts within the state between different fractions of capital over priorities (such as state investment in heavy industry versus subsidies for consumer goods industries). High oil prices helped dampen these conflicts, all the while funding the steady reproduction of this model. However, when oil prices tumbled down in the late 1970s and '80s, the state became completely dependent on foreign loans. This led to a severe crisis of the state. Foreign capital used the state’s debt and deficit crisis to impose harsh austerity measures against the poor, while squeezing more and more wealth out of the country.
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Fuentes 7/8/2013 (Federico – editor for Venezuelanalysis.com, “Venezuela: War for oil fuels economic crisis,” http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/9820)
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With Venezuela’s inflation rate for May soaring to 6.1%, first quarter growth stagnating at 0.7%, and shortages afflicting a number of basic goods, speculation has been rife regarding the country’s economic future. placing the blame solely on the government ignores the neo-colonial economy inherited by Chavismo. It also conceals the ongoing economic war by Venezuela’s elites, who are seeking to regain control over the country’s prize possession ― oil wealth. Agricultural production slumped as foreign oil companies poured into the country to extract cheap oil and high profits. Rather than develop local industries, Venezuela’s elites preferred to take part of this oil wealth for themselves. Venezuela’s oil-based economy took the form of neo-colonial capitalism: formally an independent nation, Venezuela’s economy was dominated by and dependent upon the economies of imperialist countries ― especially the United States, the main destination for oil exports and origin of imported basic goods. This economic set-up also profoundly shaped the state and society in Venezuela. Instead, “developmentalist” policies (whether aimed at import substitution or export promotion) served to disguise the deepening of the rentier and neo-colonial nature of Venezuela’s capitalist economy. Policies such as market protection, overvalued currency, low taxes and access to cheap foreign exchange, which were supposed to promote import substitution, simply became vehicles to bolster the flow of oil rent to the elites This helped the rise of a few powerful groups of conglomerates with close connections to the state, rather than internal economic development. new enterprises were to be integrated into globalised production chains, orientated towards exporting goods and profits back to the global North. Foreign capital used the state’s debt and deficit crisis to impose harsh austerity measures against the poor, while squeezing more and more wealth out of the country.
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Any debt relief to Venezuela echoes the neoliberal policies of the U.S. in the past – causes social stratification and foreign dependence
| 5,836 | 137 | 1,966 | 905 | 22 | 291 | 0.024309 | 0.321547 |
Venezuela Debt Relief Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
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Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,040 |
The mobilization of an external threat, real or fictitious, and the belief in its intrinsic superiority have historically been important aspects of the discourse of U.S. policy, from the notion of the “savage” Native Americans to the Monroe Doctrine and the postulates of Manifest Destiny to the Huntingtonian elaboration that, by stressing cultural differences, suggests the capacity to harbor in its historical mission the germ of a “superior culture.”¶ After 1989, U.S. hegemony, in its search for a redefinition of the enemy, found in terrorism the threat it required to further its policy. The construction of this threat has not been free of inaccuracies and exaggerations. The most blatant example is that of the “weapons of mass destruction” supposedly in the hands of the deposed Baghdad regime, which, according to Washington, represented a real threat to U.S. security but which turned out to exist only in the political laboratory of the presidential team.¶ The new geostrategic order is overwhelmingly unilateral from the point of view of the political-military, financial, and technological power of the United States. The emergent polarities are fragmented and barely sketch a relative economic and commercial hierarchy, especially with regard to China, Japan, and Germany. At the same time, various indicators suggest a decline in the U.S. economy. The dynamic of these changes has important consequences for the conceptualization of the security issue.¶ During the cold war, “security” meant the traditional “state security.” It consisted of the perception of threats superimposed on the identification of internal conflicts that were treated as “subversive threats” supported from outside. Schematically, this was the general logic of the hegemonic notion of security that involved the “containment of communism” as an ideology. A political framework referred to as “national security doctrine” served as a model for the conduct of the majority of Latin American governments. The hypothesis of “civil war,” which gave rise to the “fight against subversion,” justified the installation or survival of dictatorships.¶ Recently, others attempting to identify structural causes for the conflicts that threaten security have revised this conceptualization. The context for this redefinition is globalization and its implication of interdependence. It is in this context that we can situate terrorism as a “global threat” articulated as a component of a security policy.¶ Finally, the transition to democracy has not resulted in a substantial restructuring of the armed forces. Despite the beneficent dimensions of the political changes in terms of human rights and a democratic rearrangement of the civil-military relationship (Tulchin, 2002), there is no indication of a significant change in the doctrinal framework that guided the actions of the armed forces up to the 1980s. Although there is no homogeneity within military institutions, a conceptual and doctrinal framework is maintained as a general rule. This is an advantage for the new security strategy connected with the fight against terrorism, given that its conception continues to be part of its capacity to control the conduct of others—in other words, to orchestrate its hegemony.¶ FREE TRADE AND SECURITY¶ The post–cold-war period has been characterized by the indisputable dominance of financial capital in the development of the global economy. The free circulation of unrestricted capital constitutes the motor of the model. The globalization of markets involves privatization and deregulation of the international financial system on a primarily speculative basis. The movement of international capital has been freed from the variables of the economy whose operation remained largely beyond the control of the national authorities in charge of economic policy, variables that Treasury secretaries often refer to in terms of a “difficult environment.” The proposal to transform the Latin American region into a free-trade zone is a reflection of this climate that, since 1989 and especially since the Washington Consensus, has been deployed as the ideology of neoliberalism and then as a policy converted into action (Cademartori, 2004).¶ In fact, U.S. conceptions of security and economic-commercial policy constitute an integrated geostrategic whole; the expansion of global commerce is part of the security strategy of the United States (Salinas, 2002). The project is aimed at standardizing the development of the world in terms of criteria that favor the economic-political configuration of the principal world power (Chossudovsky, 2002). Proposals of integration are not related exclusively to commercial issues. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which should not be considered abandoned, and other free-trade treaties should be considered geopolitical mechanisms for developing a large-scale project of domination. These mechanisms range from the strictly economic to those concerning labor legislation, state reform, laws concerning intellectual property, the environment, natural and energy resources, knowledge, and culture. The free-trade treaties signed so far, Chile’s among them, endorse the totalizing character intended by Washington and Wall Street (Weintraub and Prado, 2005).¶ It is exactly from this angle that the core of this geostrategic conception can be appraised. Its most acute expression was in the formulation of the concept of the “preventive war,” which in the case of Iraq was carried out at the margins of international legality, confirming the unilateralism that is fundamental to decision making in the new geostrategic order.¶ Antiterrorist policy operates as a coercive force that has an impact on regimes whose margins of self-determination are most precarious. The comprehensive treatment of these challenges is expressed in the context of the fragmentation of Latin American foreign policy in the face of the pragmatic U.S. prioritization of drug trafficking, terrorism, and migration.¶ Since 9/11 the United States has attempted to implement its national security policy without much concern for the establishment of agreements. This course of action was ratified both in the Conference on Hemispheric Security in 2003 and in the meeting of secretaries of defense in 2004. Lack of concordance in the treatment of an agenda shared with the United States necessarily turns into a sounding board for a social and political imbalance that disturbs more than the surface of diplomacy. This may be responsible for the strong social pressure to reconsider military spending in the countries of Latin America given their serious deficiencies with regard to social welfare, stability, and security. In the face of this deficit, the significance of military spending as a percentage of the global product since 2001 cannot be overlooked (IISS, 2004).¶ For Latin America, a security setting excluding the United States would be unthinkable. It is appropriate, then, to identify some complications associated with this problem.¶ 1. If the principle of dissuasion no longer seems useful in the struggle against terrorism, it is clear that, despite the prioritization of military force, a policy of alliance is required. In this sense, Latin America is an essential area for the United States because of the importance of its “great southern border.” The historical influence of the United States in the area, beyond its actual strategic supremacy and the agreements already subscribed to, is the best breeding ground for a campaign in favor of validation of the concept of security embodied in the policy of “preventive war.” The demand for collaboration stems from its imperative character, which does not admit different views because those who are not friends are enemies.¶ 2. Multilateralism has lost its force, and its political-diplomatic tools have been debilitated. Although there is no concerted regional capacity to avoid the imposition of unilateralism, countertrends and doubts are arising that release new forms of interaction and collaboration, primarily in the Andes and South America (Rojas, 2003).¶ 3. The sovereignty of the other loses its legitimacy if there is a presumption in the North that under its protection terrorism is being covered up or supported or if there is suspicion concerning the construction of weapons of mass destruction. From this perspective, one of the principal dangers for the security of Latin America stems not from foreign armies or from guerrillas but from criminal organizations. The danger of this perspective is the possibility of criminalizing the social struggle that has been unleashed in the region.¶ 4. The limits of the policy have opened a space for the absolutization of “hard power”—in other words, military force—in the new model and the antiterrorist struggle. From a Latin American viewpoint, security requires a multidimensional reading that transcends the view entailed by that struggle.¶ The significance for U.S. policy assumed by the struggle against terrorism as a “war of global reach” or a “global enterprise of uncertain duration” is inseparable from the previous points (NSC, 2002). These statements are translated into the identification of threats or zones of threat in Latin America as follows:¶ 1. The “triple border” of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has long been a path for unregulated trade on a grand scale—in other words, for contraband of all types. Similar cases include the Tabatinga-Leticia corridor on the Brazilian border with Colombia, the Lake Agrio zone between Ecuador and Colombia, and the Darien Jungle.¶ 2. The current government of Venezuela, because of its alleged support of the Colombian guerrillas and for setting a bad political example for the region as a whole. Its economic and political initiatives potentially constitute expressions of a counter-balance to hegemonic politics, which may explain the intrusive and destabilizing harassment to which it is subject.¶ 3. The Cuban government, for its alleged support of international terrorism and the meaning of its politics.¶ 4. “Latin American terrorist organizations,” among them the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army in addition to drug traffickers and paramilitaries. This point implicates Colombia and its neighboring countries, along with the Caribbean basin, as an extraordinarily significant area for U.S. security policy. The U.S. resources destined for Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative and a sordid struggle for the drug market, added to the climate of war and violence, reflect a situation with the capacity to produce dynamics that unbalance the strategic perspective of regional stability.
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Figueredo 7 [Darío Salinas, Professor in the Graduate Program in Social Sciences at the Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, specialist in Latin American Studies at the CONACYT National System of Researchers, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 152, Vol. 34 No. 1, January, “Hegemony in the Coordinates of U.S. Policy: Implications for Latin America,” Translated by Marlene Medrano, p. 95-98]
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The mobilization of an external threat and the belief in its intrinsic superiority have historically been important aspects of the discourse of U.S. policy, from the notion of the “savage” Native Americans to the Monroe Doctrine and the postulates of Manifest Destiny to the Huntingtonian elaboration that suggests the historical mission of a “superior culture The construction of this threat has not been free of inaccuracies and exaggerations The most blatant example is the w m d of Baghdad A political framework referred to as “national security doctrine” served as a model for the conduct of the majority of Latin American governments The hypothesis of “civil war justified the installation or survival of dictatorships a conceptual and doctrinal framework is maintained as a general rule This is an advantage for the new security strategy connected with the fight against terrorism, given that its conception continues to be part of its capacity to control the conduct of others The proposal to transform the Latin American region into a free-trade zone is a reflection of this climate U.S. conceptions of security and economic-commercial policy constitute an integrated geostrategic whole the expansion of global commerce is part of the security strategy of the U S The project is aimed at standardizing the development of the world in terms of criteria that favor the economic-political configuration of the principal world power Proposals of integration should be considered geopolitical mechanisms for developing a large-scale project of domination These mechanisms range from the strictly economic to those concerning labor state reform intellectual property the environment natural and energy resources knowledge and culture It is from this angle that the core of this geostrategic conception can be appraised Its most acute expression was in the concept of preventive war Antiterrorist policy operates as a coercive force in the context of Latin America the U S has attempted to implement its national security policy Latin America is an essential area for the U S because of the importance of its “great southern border The historical influence of the U S it is the best breeding ground for a campaign in favor of validation of the concept of security embodied in the policy of “preventive war.” The demand for collaboration stems from its imperative character, which does not admit different views because those who are not friends are enemies The sovereignty of the other loses its legitimacy if there is a presumption in the North that under its protection terrorism is being covered up or supported or if there is suspicion concerning the construction of w m d From this perspective, one of the principal dangers for the security of Latin America stems not from foreign armies or from guerrillas but from criminal organizations The danger of this perspective is the possibility of criminalizing the social struggle that has been unleashed in the region The limits of the policy have opened a space for the absolutization of “hard power” in other words, military force in the new model and the antiterrorist struggle From a Latin American viewpoint, security requires a multidimensional reading that transcends the view entailed by that struggle The significance for U.S. policy assumed by the struggle against terrorism translated into the identification of threats or zones of threat in Latin America The current government of Venezuela, because of its alleged support of the Colombian guerrillas and for setting a bad political example for the region as a whole. Its economic and political initiatives potentially constitute expressions of a counter-balance to hegemonic politics which may explain the intrusive and destabilizing harassment to which it is subject The Cuban government, for its alleged support of international terrorism and the meaning of its politics
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Security driven economic engagement with Latin America authorizes international violence while criminalizing dissent – the 1AC exhibits a discourse of security that provides the rationale for global domination.
| 10,742 | 210 | 3,888 | 1,626 | 28 | 615 | 0.01722 | 0.378229 |
Security Kritik Generic - DDI 2013.html5
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Dartmouth DDI
|
Kritiks
|
2013
|
4,041 |
No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... 7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " 8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.
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Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)
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No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated sovereign states to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature In its name, w m d have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact in its name millions killed while intellectual dissent muted We have inherited an ontotheology of security an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it within security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security in recognition of the world as it is I am not in search of an "alternative security." everything is dangerous in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers we might be able to construct a form of security based on appreciation rather than the extirpation of difference method is to destabilize the fictional identities created out of fear and to affirm differences the terror of death triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness
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Security politics authorizes limitless global destruction.
| 4,983 | 58 | 1,425 | 809 | 6 | 228 | 0.007417 | 0.281829 |
Security Kritik Generic - DDI 2013.html5
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Dartmouth DDI
|
Kritiks
|
2013
|
4,042 |
The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.¶ This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.¶ Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.¶ For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143
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Neocleous 8 [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, Critique of Security, p. 185-186]
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The only way out is to eschew the logic of security altogether to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up That is something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term Security politics suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’ Security politics is an anti-politics dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination We therefore need to get beyond security politics not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift
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Reject the Aff’s security discourse – abandoning the attempt to eradicate insecurity is a prerequisite to meaningful political engagement.
| 5,279 | 138 | 3,971 | 881 | 19 | 658 | 0.021566 | 0.746879 |
Security Kritik Generic - DDI 2013.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Kritiks
|
2013
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4,043 |
Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) `remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,"6 then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general population:' This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not `Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On."" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse – agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering:' Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life . . . [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations:' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone:' Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power;' Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population:'8 For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.
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Coviello 00 (Peter, Professor of English and Acting Program Director of Africana Studies at Bowdoin College, Queer Frontiers, p. 40-41)
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, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general population in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful through the perpetual threat of destruction through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone: Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or potentially annihilating genocide is indeed the dream of modern power this is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without
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Fear of apocalypse causes endless violence in the name of security
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I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated.¶ Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."^^¶ For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely.¶ Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist, on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives.¶ Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.
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Pan 4 [Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, Alternatives 29, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” p. 325-326, Ebsco]
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the "China threat" argument is derived from a discursive construction of otherness This construction is predicated on a narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the U S Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the U S nd the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible
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Portraying China as a threat makes war more likely – critical questioning is a prerequisite to forging the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the US and China.
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China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S. international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it.*¶ While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."^¶ Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality.¶ And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt.¶ I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature.¶ More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions.¶ These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations.* Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical refiection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics.^ It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.¶ I begin with a brief survey of the "China threat" argument in contemporary U.S. international relations literature, followed by an investigation of how this particular argument about China is a discursive construction of other, which is predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the universal, indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute certainty and security. Finally, this article will illustrate some of the dangerous practical consequences of the "China threat" discourse for contemporary U.S.-China relations, particularly with regard to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident.
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Pan 4 [Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, Alternatives 29, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” p. 305-307, Ebsco]
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debates over whether China is threat have been underpinned by common ground especially in terms of a positivist epistemology they believe that China is a knowable object whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies are neutral, passive descriptions of reality they rarely raise the question of "what the U S is the meaning of the U S is believed to be certain and beyond doubt U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe the U.S. "China threat" literature have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical refiection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics this argument about China is a discursive construction of other, which is predicated on the predominant way in which the U S imagines itself as the universal, indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute certainty and security
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Describing China as a threat fosters a self-fulfilling prophecy – their purportedly neutral descriptions provide the foundations for hostility between the US and China.
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In what follows, I want to examine the meaning and use of the concept of `competitiveness'. The analysis claims, in essence, that the term is not merely an `objective' description of a fact of economic life, but also part of a discursive strategy that constructs a particular understanding of reality and elicits actions and reactions appropriate to that understanding. This is followed by a discussion of why the discourse has the power that it does and how it may influence how we think about and act in the world. I then work through some examples of how an unexamined acceptance of a discursive convention may obscure as much as it reveals.¶ II Competitiveness as an economic category and discursive strategy¶ I'm going to make this as simple as possible for myself by reducing the whole problem of discourse to one word: competitiveness. For economic geographers in general and for me in particular, the categories of competition, competitive strategy and competitiveness have a great deal of importance and might even be thought to pervade our work, even when they are not directly under analysis. All sorts of industrial and spatial economic outcomes are implicitly or explicitly linked to some notion of `competitiveness' (cf. Krugman, 1994). The rise and decline of particular industrial regions have something to do with the competitiveness of the labour force (generally understood in terms of comparative costs and unionization), which (for geographers if for no one else) has something to do with the competitiveness of the region in the first place, understood as its particular mix of resources, infrastructure, location and cost profile.¶ More than that, though, `competitiveness' seems to me a term that has become truly hegemonic in the Gramscian sense. It is a culturally and socially sanctioned category that, when invoked, can completely halt public discussion of public or private activities. There is virtually no counterargument available to the simple claim that `doing X will make us uncompetitive,' whatever X and whomever `us' might be.2¶ In a capitalist society, of course, it is more than reasonable to be concerned with competition and competitiveness. No matter what your theoretical orientation, mainstream to Marxist, these must be seen as real forces shaping real outcomes in society. They are not just intellectual constructs that lend a false sense of order to a messy world. On the other hand, we can also analyse them as elements of a discursive strategy that shapes our understanding of the world and our possibilities for action in it. In that case, it seems to me the first questions to ask are whose discursive strategy is it, what do they really mean by it, where does its power come from, and what kinds of actions does it tend to open up or foreclose.¶ 1 Whose discourse?¶ The discourse on competitiveness comes from two principal sources and in part its power is their power. In the first instance, it is the discourse of the economics profession which doesn't really need to analyse what it is or what it means socially. The market is the impartial and ultimate arbiter of right behaviour in the economy and competitiveness simply describes the result of responding correctly to market signals.¶ The blandness of this `objective' language conceals the underlying harshness of the metaphor. For Adam Smith, the idea of competition plausibly evoked nothing more disturbing than a horse race in which the losers are not summarily executed. Since then, the close identification of marginalist economics with evolutionary theory has unavoidably imbued the concept with the sense of a life or death struggle (cf. Niehans, 1990).3 In short, on competitiveness hangs life itself. As Krugman (1994: 31) defines it: `. . . when we say that a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is . . . unsustainable ± that unless it improves its performance it will cease to exist.'¶ As with evolutionary theory, our ability to strip the moral and ethical content from the concepts of life and death is not so great as the self-image of modern science suggests. Competitiveness becomes inescapably associated with ideas of fitness and unfitness, and these in turn with the unstated premise of merit, as in `deserving to live' and `deserving to die'.¶ Secondly, competitiveness is the discourse of the business community and represents both an essential value and an essential validation. More generally, it serves as an all-purpose and unarguable explanation for any behaviour: `We must do X in order to be competitive.' Again, the implied `or else' is death.¶ As hinted, though, the discourse of competitiveness has seeped out beyond these sources and is becoming socially pervasive. University presidents, hospital administrators and government bureaucrats also discourse quite fluently now about competitiveness and its related accoutrements: customers, total quality, flexibility and so forth.¶ It will be objected that competitiveness is a deeply ingrained social category and value in the USA and elsewhere and there is no particular reason to single out economists and business persons as culprits in its dissemination. That objection is true enough, and no doubt contributes to the general power of the discourse since it resonates so well with this broader heritage. But `competitiveness' in the sense of `deserving to live' is not what was commonly meant by this more diffuse social understanding. It is, however, what is meant in economic analysis and business life, and it is increasingly what is meant in other institutional and social settings as well.
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Schoenberger 98 [Erica, Professor in the Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering at The Johns Hopkins University, Progress in Human Geography 22(1), “Discourse and practice in human geography,” p. 3-4]
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the concept of `competitiveness' is not merely an `objective' description of a fact of economic life, but also part of a discursive strategy that constructs a particular understanding of reality and elicits actions and reactions appropriate to that understanding competitiveness' seems a term that has become truly hegemonic It is a culturally and socially sanctioned category that can completely halt public discussion of public or private activities competition and competitiveness must be seen as elements of a discursive strategy that shapes our understanding of the world and our possibilities for action in it blandness of `objective' language conceals the underlying harshness of the metaphor the close identification of marginalist economics with evolutionary theory has unavoidably imbued the concept with the sense of a life or death struggle on competitiveness hangs life itself Competitiveness becomes inescapably associated with ideas of fitness and unfitness, and these in turn with the unstated premise of merit, as in `deserving to live' and `deserving to die' competitiveness serves as an all-purpose and unarguable explanation for any behaviour the discourse of competitiveness is becoming socially pervasive competitiveness' in the sense of `deserving to live' is what is meant in economic analysis and business life, and it is increasingly what is meant in other institutional and social settings as well
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The discourse of competitiveness structures social reality, condemning those who are not competitive to death.
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As the preceding discussion demonstrates, power is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Though divergent ways of thinking and talking about power highlight different facets of this phenomenon, the schema outlined above provides an effective vocabulary for distinguishing between the relational and distributive dimensions of power. Given that our ways of thinking and talking about a subject influence the ways we act in relation to that subject, this schema has significant implications for social practice. Consider the practical implications of the conventional focus on adversarial power relations. Based on this relatively one-dimensional understanding of human relations, Western-liberal theorists have generally assumed that the ideal forms of social organization are those that harness competitive impulses in a manner that promotes the maximum social good. Based on this assumption, Western-liberal societies have structured their political systems as partisan contests, their justice systems as contests of legal advocacy, their economic systems as contests of material production and consumption, and their educational systems as contests of intellectual achievement (all reinforced by the fact that most recreation activities are structured as contests of physical or mental performance). This “culture of contest” (Karlberg, 2003) has become so naturalized that it is difficult for most people to imagine alternative models of social organization. But are these contest models sustainable in an age of increasing social and ecological interdependence? And do these models really derive from an essentially competitive and adversarial human nature? In other words, are they the best that we can do as a species? In response to the first of these questions, a look around at current world conditions should at least raise some concerns about the social and ecological sustainability of this culture of contest. Steadily growing extremes of wealth and poverty, both within and between virtually every country on earth, should certainly raise some concerns. Our ongoing inability to address the root causes of war, terrorism, and other social conflicts, should raise further concerns. And our frustrated efforts to respond in a collective and coordinated manner to mounting ecological crises (on local, national, and global scales) should raise still more concerns. Though only time will tell whether these contest models prove sustainable under conditions of increasing social and ecological interdependence, it seems that we would do well to at least start examining and experimenting with alternatives – if for no other reason than to hedge our bets.
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Karlberg 5 (Michael Karlberg is a professor in the Department of Communication at Western Washington University. He completed his Ph.D. in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, Canada. His research examines the struggle to create a more just and sustainable social order in an age of increasing global interdependence, Spring/Summer 2005, International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 10, Number 1, “THE POWER OF DISCOURSE AND THE DISCOURSE OF POWER: PURSUING PEACE THROUGH DISCOURSE INTERVENTION”)
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Western-liberal theorists have generally assumed that the ideal forms of social organization are those that harness competitive impulses in a manner that promotes the maximum social good Based on this assumption, Western-liberal societies have structured their economic systems as contests of material production and consumption and their educational systems as contests of intellectual achievement This “culture of contest” ) has become so naturalized that it is difficult for most people to imagine alternative models of social organization But are these contest models sustainable in an age of increasing social and ecological interdependence? a look at current world conditions should raise some concerns about the social and ecological sustainability of this culture of contest Steadily growing extremes of wealth and poverty should raise concerns Our ongoing inability to address the root causes of war, terrorism, and other social conflicts, should raise concerns And our frustrated efforts to respond in a collective and coordinated manner to mounting ecological crises should raise more concerns we would do well to start examining and experimenting with alternatives
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The quest for competitiveness makes it impossible to address the root causes of war and environmental destruction – forging alternative modes of social organization is key.
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Despite all that is devaluing the word democracy day after day and in front of our eyes, there is no doubt that this word remains the dominant emblem of contemporary political society. An emblem is the "untouchable" in a symbolic system, a third rail. You can say what you like about political society display unprecedented "critical" zeal, denounce the "economic horror," you'll always earn pardon as long as you do so in the name of democracy. The correct tone is something like: "How can a society that claims to be democratic be guilty of this or that?" Ultimately you will be seen to have judged society in the name of its emblem and therefore itself. You haven't gone beyond the pale, you still deserve the appellation of citizen rather than barbarian, you're standing by at your democratically assigned place. Be seeing you at the next election. Well, I say this: before one can even begin to apprehend the reality of our societies, it's necessary, as a preliminary exercise, to dislodge their emblem. The only way to make truth out of the world we're living in is to dispel the aura of the word democracy and assume the burden of not being a democrat and so being heartily disapproved of by "everyone" (tout le monde). In the world we're living in, tout le tnonde doesn't make any sense without the emblem, so "everyone" is democratic. It's what you could call the axiom of the emblem. But our concern is le tnonde, the world that evidently exists, not tout le monde, where the democrats (Western folk, folk of the emblem) hold sway and everyone else is from another world—which, being other, is not a world properly speaking, just a remnant of life, a zone of war, hunger, walls, and delusions. In that "world" or zone, they spend their time packing their bags to get away from the horror or to leave altogether and be with—whom? With the democrats of course, who claim to run the world and have jobs that need doing. What they then find out the hard way is that, warm and cosy in the shelter of their emblem, the democrats don't really want them and have little love for them. Basically, political endogamy obtains: a democrat loves only another democrat. For the others, incomers from zones of famine and killing, the first order of business is papers, borders, detention camps, police surveillance, denial of family reunion. One must be "integrated." Into what? Into democracy, clearly. To be admitted, and perhaps on some distant day greeted, one requires training in democracy at home, long hours of arduous toil before the notion of coming to the real world can even be entertained. Study your integration manual, the good little democrat's handbook, in the intervals between bursts of lead, landings by humanitarian paratroopers, famine, and disease! You've got a stiff exam ahead of you and still no guarantee that you won't find the passage from the false world to the "real" one blocked. Democracy? Sure. But reserved for democrats, you understand. Globalization of the world? Certainly, but only when those outside finally prove they deserve to come inside. In sum, if the world of the democrats is not the world of everyone, if tout le monde isn't really the whole world after all, then democracy, the emblem and custodian of the walls behind which the democrats seek their petty pleasures, is just a word for a conservative oligarchy whose main (and often bellicose) business is to guard its own territory as animals do, under the usurped name world. With the emblem dislodged, and the territory seen plainly for what it is—a landscape filled with democrats bustling and reproducing—we can turn to important matters: what conditions must a territory meet before it can present itself speciously as part of tout le monde under the democratic emblem? Or to twist the thought a bit: of what objective space, of what settled collectivity, is democracy the democracy^ At this point we may turn (back) to the moment in philosophy when the democratic emblem was first dislodged: book 8 of Plato's Republic. Plato applies the term demokratia to a way of organizing the business of the polis, a certain type of constitution. Lenin said the same thing long after: democracy is no more than a particular form of State. But both Ptattf and Lenin are more interested in the subjec- tive impact of this State form than they are in its objective status. Thought must shift the focus from the legal framework to the emblem or from democracy to the democrat. The capacity of the democratic emblem to do harm lies in the subjective type it molds; and, not to mince words, the crucial traits of the democratic type are egoism and desire for petty enjoyments.
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Badiou 11 [Alain, professor at European Graduate School, former chair of Philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure, Democracy in What State?, “The Democratic Emblem,” p. 6-8]
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Despite all that is devaluing the word democracy this word remains the dominant emblem of contemporary political society An emblem is the "untouchable" in a symbolic system before one can even begin to apprehend the reality of our societies, it's necessary, as a preliminary exercise, to dislodge their emblem The only way to make truth out of the world we're living in is to dispel the aura of the word democracy and assume the burden of not being a democrat and so being heartily disapproved of by "everyone a democrat loves only another democrat. For the others, incomers from zones of famine and killing, the first order of business is borders, detention camps, police surveillance democracy is just a word for a conservative oligarchy whose main business is to guard its own territory With the emblem dislodged, and the territory seen plainly for what it is we can turn to important matters Thought must shift the focus from the legal framework to the emblem
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Discourse of democracy authorizes global violence in its name – criticizing democracy is a prerequisite to meaningful analysis.
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All of this suggests that it is advisable to take a more radical and critical approach to contemporary discourses on democracy and, in particular, the relationship between democracy and violence. In recent years there has been a growth of literature that seeks to address and challenge the consensus-based rationalism of much liberal democratic theory (Ranciere 1999; Mouflfe 2000, 2005; Badiou 2005). In general these radical theories eschew perceptions of democracy that focus on the form of political institutions and focus instead on the way in which democracies tend to exclude or marginalize oppositional voices in the process of legitimizing existing institutions. Here procedures are used to police the boundaries of political discourse and the appropriateness of challenging or critical perspectives. Thus, the procedures that exist in liberal democracies are established as just (and sometimes as neutral) and promoted as the most legitimate methods of acting politically. In this sense democracy serves to censor the articulation of opposition and to question the legitimacy of voices that find no expression in formal political discourse. Moreover, it does so in such a manner in liberal democratic theory to suggest that these processes generate social and political consensus, that is, that lead to rational and agreed upon understandings of how society should be organized. This 'common sense' approach feeds into 'a doctrine of consensus, which is in effect the dominant ideology of contemporary parliamentary States' (Badiou 2005: 18). On the contrary, radical democratic arguments tend to concur with Foucault's approach: We have to interpret the war that is going on beneath the peace; peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another; a battle- front runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts all of us on one side or the other. There is no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone's adversary. (Foucault 2004: 50) It is important to note however that democracies do not necessarily have to resort to overt violence to repress critical voices. In this vein Judith Butler notes not only the importance of dissent to democratic politics, but also the way in which it has been marginalized in the wake of the 2001 attacks in New York. Various labels have been attached to certain critical arguments concerning American policy and these labels have become censorious means of silencing alternative perspectives. Butler points out that one way of quelling dissent is to label the critic with 'an uninhabitable identification', which can preclude them from public debate or discourage them from engaging in democratic politics." Thus: To decide what views will count as reasonable within the public domain ... is to decide what will and will not count as the public sphere of debate ... The foreclosure of critique empties the public domain of debate and democratic contestation itself, so that debate becomes the exchange of views among the like-minded, and criticism, which ought to be central to any democracy, becomes a fugitive and suspect activity. (Butler 2004: xx) It should not be lost on the world given recent events that the failure to engage with alternative perspectives and beliefs to our own can generate aggressive and often bloody reactions. This is not to say that engagement alone can prevent violent atrocities but that it is possible that such interaction may lessen the propensity of those who reject the modus operandi of liberal democracy to countenance such strategies. This requires an opening out of democracy and a willingness to interact with perspectives that are critical of democracy itself.'^ It demands recognition that democracy is an 'unfinished project' that can be refined and improved through engagement with critics. Moreover, it implies that there is not a simplistic, clear-cut distinction between democracy and violence. Instead we need to appreciate the murky complexities of politics and with that the capacity of political actors to move from violent methods to peaceful ones and back again. Democracy, then, should not be conceived as the antithesis of violence; instead the two cohabit the space of politics.
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Little 6 [Adrian, Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Melbourne, Theoria, December, “Theorizing Democracy and Violence: The Case of Northern Ireland,” p. 72-73, Ebsco]
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it is advisable to take a more radical and critical approach to contemporary discourses on democracy democracies tend to exclude oppositional voices in the process of legitimizing existing institutions procedures are used to police the boundaries of political discourse and the appropriateness of or critical perspectives democracy serves to censor the articulation of opposition and to question the legitimacy of voices that find no expression in formal political discourse democracies do not necessarily have to resort to overt violence to repress critical voices labels have been attached to critical arguments and these labels have become censorious means of silencing alternative perspectives The foreclosure of critique empties the public domain of debate and democratic contestation itself the failure to engage with alternative perspectives and beliefs to our own can generate aggressive and often bloody reactions to prevent violent atrocities requires an opening out of democracy and perspectives that are critical of democracy itself there is not a simplistic, clear-cut distinction between democracy and violence
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Uncritical affirmations of democracy affirm global violence – criticism must be directed at democracy itself.
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The United States has become infected with virus metaphors. Authors compare destructive computer programs, non-normative sexual behaviors, illegal drug use, gangs, overpopulation, governmental economic intervention, 5 and even unequal personal relationships 6 to viruses to convey the idea of danger efficiently. Lethal new viruses have become a hot topic for science best-sellers, medical research, action movies, and science fiction. The recent slew of popular science writing on viruses includes Laurie Garrett's Coming Plague, Peter Radetsky's Invisible Invaders: Viruses and the Scientists Who Pursue Them, and Richard Preston's Hot Zone, as well as numerous articles in both natural science and general interest magazines. 7 Virology has been a medical subspecialty for half a century, but now "emerging" viruses have attained a certain chic among the medical set, meriting their own conferences and edited volumes in the years since the recognition of AIDS; in addition, articles by emerging-virus specialists appear in refereed, general science journals like Nature and Science. 8 On the big screen, virus thrillers like Outbreak and Twelve Monkeys [End Page 94] have attracted major stars and large audiences. 9 Should the choice of topic itself not imply sufficiently that viruses matter, the authors almost invariably assert the momentous relevance of viruses to the present time; as Ann Giudici Fettner assures us in Viruses: Agents of Change, "Today is the day of the virus." 10 I would like to examine the significance of our current fascination with viruses within the context of the work on immune system discourses by feminist science studies scholars Donna Haraway and Emily Martin. Both Haraway's "Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: Constitutions of Self in Immune System Discourse" and Martin's Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture argue that immune system discourse reflects changing ideas about the qualities that comprise identity and selfhood. 11 In addition, they probe the depictions of the immune system's relationship with the non-self. Critical evaluations of the criteria for self and non-self have long been an important and necessary component of feminist analysis, not least because Western women were frequently shunted into that non-self category. The developing global consciousness of Western feminism in the past decades has also led feminist scholars increasingly to consider the status of others classified politically, socially, and even biologically as outsiders on the basis of race, ethnicity, sexual practice, class, and so forth. This growing awareness reflects not simply general humanitarian concerns but also the realization that our destinies are intertwined in a symbiotic manner, not in a free market structure where only the "fittest" survive. Applying natural selection to social groups turned out to be a trick to divide and conquer us, since the lucky few to succeed turned out to be even fewer than we had been promised. Many feminist scholars have also built on the poststructuralist insight that self/non-self distinctions are socially [End Page 95] constructed ways of making sense of the world; while such distinctions are therefore deeply permeated by existing power relations, they are also subject to change. Working from this historical position, Haraway and Martin carefully examine new discourses on identity to see who or what gets targeted as outsiders, non-selves. Though they both recognize potential danger in the practices of some scientists and journalists, whose use of military metaphors for understanding the immune system perpetuates outdated, aggressive, Cold War mindsets, these scholars see signs of hope in alternate interpretations of the immune system. Martin and Haraway offer examples of some scientists, SF writers, and nonexperts who have begun to perceive the immune system--and, by extension, our own interaction with the world--in ways that accommodate multiplicity, situated knowledges, and multivocal communication. Although I like the implications of Haraway's and Martin's analyses, an examination of immune system discourses is incomplete without a complementary appraisal of the immune system's most formidable non-self: the virus. The self/non-self dichotomy has been so extensively explored by historians and mined of its last glitter of insight by theoreticians that we might easily be tempted to dismiss its continued operation in our everyday lives as the tailings from an abandoned excavation. Such dismissal would be a mistake. Society still deploys binarisms in blatant disregard of decades of sound, decisive scholarship. Debates about national and personal boundaries are unfolding within our anxious apprehensions of an approaching viral pandemic. The virus emerges as a dangerous foreign being: a fecund, primitive yet evolving, hungry, needy, African predator unleashed by modern travel from the last recesses of the wild. It wants to immigrate, with or without a visa. It demands attention in the form of resistance or capitulation. While ostensibly pondering the possible overthrow of the food chain, virus discourse imagines the overthrow of the social order. Viruses represent social change--frightening and enormous social change--and our drastic fear of viral epidemics is in part a reactionary response to the possibility of such change. Virus discourse has become a covert means of negotiating identity and contact in the increasing multiculturalism of the global village. Western ideas of the non-self, the external threat, have not kept pace with the postmodern flexible self. The Other is still that same, tired old Other, that dark, unknowable native lurking in that dark, unknowable continent,waiting to erode our identity and leave us degenerated or reborn. Marlow or Tarzan, the Westerner who makes contact with the indefinable essence of Africa has always emerged a transformed soul. The only postmodern element of virus discourse is that now the African transformative [End Page 96] being has become a global passenger with no need for a green card. Virus discourse is retelling old imperialist nightmares that, neutralized under cover of medical common sense, seem to justify exclusionary practices, surveillance, and general prejudice that we would otherwise find inexcusable as well as politically untenable.
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Schell 97 [Heather, PhD in Modern Thought at Stanford, “Outburst! A Chilling True Story About Emerging Virus-Narratives and Pandemic Social Change”, Configurations 5(1)]
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The U S has become infected with virus metaphors Lethal viruses become a hot topic for action movies, and science fiction Debates about national and personal boundaries are unfolding within our anxious apprehensions of an approaching viral pandemic. The virus emerges as a dangerous foreign being: a predator unleashed by modern travel from the last recesses of the wild. , virus discourse imagines the overthrow of the social order. Viruses represent social change--frightening Western ideas of the external threat have not kept pace The Other is still that same, tired old Other, that dark, unknowable native lurking in that dark waiting to erode our identity Virus discourse is retelling old imperialist nightmares that, neutralized under cover of medical common sense, seem to justify exclusionary practices, surveillance, and general prejudice that we would otherwise find inexcusable
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Representations of disease are colonialist and play upon fear of Otherness to justify exclusion and violence
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The ascendancy of the unilateral idealists and the securitisation of US globalisation policies—that is over key elements of its foreign economic policy—can be found in a number of empirical contexts. It is the contention of this section of the paper that US policy towards the Asian regional agenda is significantly shaped by the influences outlined in parts 1 and 2 of the paper. At one level it is inevitable that the reassertion of the geo-security agenda over the geo-economic agenda (that prevailed in the 1990s heyday of neo-liberal globalisation) should result in policy change. Moreover, the weakened US economy (which is not a contradiction with the argument that we live in a unipolar hegemonic moment) since the collapse of the high tech boom has seen the Administration think more about the degree to which the security agenda could also be a prop to the domestic economy, even prior to 9/11.¶ On this reading of US policy in the contemporary era, the uni-polar moment would appear to have tempted the hegemon to adopt a stronger unilateralist posture and to integrate economic and security policy more closely than had been the case under conditions of multi-polarity. We are witnessing a ‘securitisation’ of economic policy; that is, the process by which economic policy is framed as a security question. Globalisation is now seen not simply through rose tinted neo-liberal economic lenses, but also through the less rosy coloured lenses of the national security agenda of the US. Specifically, economic globalisation is seen not only as an economic benefit, but also as a security ‘problem’. In the context of New Security Agenda, economic policy becomes an explicit arm of security policy. Rather than being a mere instrument of economic relations and statecraft it becomes a part of the armoury of influence that the US is using to develop a strategy towards potential challengers. This trend can be seen in across the spectrum of US economic policy: ¶ In its responses towards the neo-liberal economic globalisation project in general. ¶ In policies towards the international economic institutions (the IMF, the World Bank) and especially towards the WTO in the Doha MTN round. ¶ In bilateral economic relations. For example, with the EU, where the nexus between economic and security relations is now an integral part of its wider security agenda in the wake of the split over military involvement in Iraq. ¶ Finally, in its relations towards Asia. ¶ While policy towards Asia is the empirical case study of this paper it is worth offering a brief insight into the other elements of policy.
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Higgott 3 [Richard, Professor in the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, CSGR Working Paper No. 124/03, September, “American Unilateralism, Foreign Economic Policy and the ‘Securitisation’ of Globalisation,” http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1997/1/WRAP_Higgott_wp12403.pdf]
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securitisation of US globalisation policies that is over key elements of its foreign economic policy can be found in a number of empirical contexts in the contemporary era, the uni-polar moment would appear to have tempted the hegemon to adopt a stronger unilateralist posture and to integrate economic and security policy more closely than had been the case under conditions of multi-polarity We are witnessing a ‘securitisation’ of economic policy that is, the process by which economic policy is framed as a security question Globalisation is now seen not simply through rose tinted neo-liberal economic lenses, but also through the less rosy coloured lenses of the national security agenda of the US economic globalisation is seen not only as an economic benefit but also as a security ‘problem’ In the context of New Security Agenda, economic policy becomes an explicit arm of security policy Rather than being a mere instrument of economic relations and statecraft it becomes a part of the armoury of influence that the US is using to develop a strategy towards potential challengers
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Framing the economy as a security priority makes it a tool of geopolitical dominance.
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There are tangible, and often painful, fundamentals that determine the course of the economy — unemployment, interest rates, housing prices, inflation, industrial production, government debt. But more than anything else, markets are psychology, and an atmosphere of fear and panic among producers and consumers leads to scaling back of purchases, which further exacerbates a downturn. Over the past few years in particular, there have been plenty of messages of impending doom circulating through the mass media. Like Eeyore, the miserable mule from Winnie-the-Pooh, many pundits ignore any bright spots and flood the airwaves with grim predictions of imminent collapse and despair just around the corner. In an economy heavily tied to consumer confidence, such talk could have far-reaching consequences. Such downbeat messages may eventually result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, actually translating into job losses. A new analysis by Sylvain Leduc and Zheng Liu, analysts at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco, says there is a statistically measurable impact from “talking down” the economy. The economists say that the atmosphere of uncertainty in the recent downturn of 2008-2009 added at least one to two percentage points to the unemployment rate: “During the Great Recession, the increase in uncertainty appears to have been much greater in magnitude…. Our model estimates that uncertainty has pushed up the U.S. unemployment rate by between one and two percentage points since the start of the financial crisis in 2008. To put this in perspective, had there been no increase in uncertainty in the past four years, the unemployment rate would have been closer to 6% or 7% than to the 8% to 9% actually registered.” Policymakers and pundits can’t be pollyanish in the face of economic troubles, of course. But the Fed authors suggest that as media channels fill up with dire and downbeat talk, fear levels go up, and people start to lose their jobs. “Heightened uncertainty acts like a decline in aggregate demand because it depresses economic activity and holds down inflation,” the Fed economists observe. Another thing is clear as well: when analysts and pundits put their Eeyore faces on, it doesn’t help anybody. What is needed is more discussion and ideas about solutions and disruptive innovation that create opportunities, improve our world, and provide people more control over their economic destiny.
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Mckendrick 12 [Joe Mckendrick, An independent analyst who tracks the impact of information technology on management and markets. He is the author of the SOA Manifesto and has written for Forbes, ZDNet and Database Trends & Applications. 9/18/12. Are economic downturns self-fulfilling prophecies http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/business-brains/are-economic-downturns-self-fulfilling-prophecies/26329] MN
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markets are psychology, and an atmosphere of fear and panic among producers and consumers leads to scaling back of purchases, which further exacerbates a downturn there have been plenty of messages of impending doom pundits ignore any bright spots and flood the airwaves with grim predictions of imminent collapse and despair just around the corner uch talk could have far-reaching consequences downbeat messages result in a self-fulfilling prophecy actually translating into job losses new analysis by analysts at the Federal Reserve Bank says there is a statistically measurable impact from “talking down” the economy as media channels fill up with dire and downbeat talk, fear levels go up, and people start to lose their jobs
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Rhetoric of an economic collapse fosters a self fulfilling prophecy – only the alt solves.
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Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state: The most serious consequence of thinking of global change and other environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized governmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environmental problems, particularly those that have a global character. 44 Moss goes on to warn that "the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to global environmental problems." 45 It might, he points out, even lead to militarization of environmental problems. 46
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Waever 1998 ,Ole, professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” on security lipschutz http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]
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the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state The most serious consequence is that the governmental responses are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems when responding to environmental threats centralized regulatory agencies would seem logical in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environmental problems "the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats might lead to militarization of environmental problems. 46
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Environmental Security leads to ineffective state intervention and militarism of the environment
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Ironically, security is an unstable foundation for the very institutions—the separation of powers, constitutionalism, federalism, civil society — that liberals have sought to rehabilitate. The current way of thinking about security is to isolate the individual from society and, consequently, to make any legal, political, or social arrangement relative to the security of that individual. If these institutions stand in the way of achieving security, then they must, at least temporarily, be set aside. That is why the politics of security is actually associated with a more, not less, arbitrary exercise of power. If there is no higher conception of freedom and the social relationships that realize this freedom — be they private property and the market or collective ownership and democratic control—defining and delimiting the meaning of security, then there is no absolute limit to the exercise of power in security’s name. Nevertheless, liberal societies have been unable to resist seeking out moral and political renewal through making physical security a priority, especially as they have abandoned commitments to the idea of the rational, self-determining individual. Antipolitics Our politics of fear takes the old idea of separating fear and morality and combines it with a more recent definition of security as physical rather than institutional security. The consequence of this new security paradigm is an intensification of antipolitical impulses in our society. Those who actually have to govern amid “moral doubt and political sluggishness” are drawn to the possibility that the struggle for existence, the preservation of bare life, itself might transcend social divisions and unite the public.22 This is a politics of fear, not in the immediate sense of being paranoid, but in the broader sense in which public life is organized around survival. When the security of the individual is made our first principle, then all uncertainties — known and unknown unknowns—take on a dangerous aspect and must be controlled. Risk assessments are not undertaken on a rational basis. Political power is applied for the sake of reassuring us and to minimize even the most improbable risks. The more we elevate sustaining and nourishing bare life into an achievement, the more we continuously defer properly political questions about power, freedom, and equality. Thus political activity itself reproduces the very condition that directs politicians toward a preoccupation with security. It is not hard to see the conservative dimensions of this kind of politics. Foreclosing on political debate of higher ideals favors the status quo. Moreover, no social change is possible without a great deal of uncertainty; indeed, it is always possible that collective efforts lead to the opposite of what was intended. But this conservatism is derived from the deeper, antipolitical essence of this political outlook, which is why the politics of fear is not exclusively a right-wing phenomenon. Environmentalism Environmentalism is one of the few movements on the left that presents itself in the same totalizing political terms that the war on terror does on the right. In the American Prospect, the environmental author Ross Gelbspan writes that “humanity is standing at a crossroads between a more just, peaceful world and an increasingly chaotic, turbulent, and authoritarian future driven by a succession of climate-driven emergencies.”23 Every political issue is or can be a green issue. Moreover, environmentalism appears to offer a cooperative, pacific alternative to the fractious militarism of the war on terror. Friedman’s solution for overcoming the “trauma and divisiveness of the Bush years” is “a new green ideology, [which,] properly defined, has the power to mobilize liberals and conservatives, evangelicals, and atheists, big business and environmentalists around an agenda that can both pull us together and propel us forward.”24 Gelbspan and Friedman sound the themes of green revival — peace, unity, and moral renewal. If the connection with the politics of fear is not immediately apparent, let us take environmentalism’s current prophet, Al Gore, as the focal point, as he can neither be dismissed as fringe nor be accused of selling out. In what amounted to a coming-out piece in Vanity Fair in 2006, Gore wrote: There are dire warnings that the worst catastrophe in the history of human civilization is bearing down on us, gathering strength as it comes. . . . This crisis is bringing us an opportunity to experience what few generations in history ever have the privilege of knowing: a generational mission; the exhilaration of a compelling moral purpose; a shared and unifying cause; the thrill of being forced by circumstances to put aside the pettiness and conflict that so often stifle the restless human need for transcendence; the opportunity to rise.25 Even as this passage eloquently condenses the key features of environmentalism as a political ideology, it reproduces the central elements of the security paradigm. Displacing Society in the Name of Security First, notice how the phrase “pettiness and conflict” implies that normal social divisions are meaningless and banal. It is through social categories like class, race, and religion that we normally experience power and inequality and out of which therefore grow political conflicts and social movements. Yet the assertion of any of these divisions is seen as not just petty but, by implication, selfish in the face of a transcendent threat. In fact, the political emptiness of normal social life is a recurrent trope of environmental thought that dates back to its genesis in the New Left. For example, C. B. Macpherson ended his otherwise masterful and influential analysis of “possessive individualism,” first published in 1962, with what at the time no doubt sounded like an eccentric claim: “Technical change . . . has created a new equality of insecurity among individuals, not merely within one nation but everywhere.”26 A book that was largely about key modern debates over property, individualism, and inequality ended with the claim that these political conflicts over equal freedom and social justice now mattered less than mere human survival. Macpherson continued, “The destruction of every individual is now a more real and present possibility” than was once imagined, and it transcends all other issues.27 The claim that universal risks—especially environmental ones — transcend conflicts of national, religious, and class interest is now part of mainstream political sociology. The paradigmatic “supra-national and non-class-specific global hazards” that Ulrich Beck identifies as the defining feature of our “risk society” are the unintended environmental effects of industrialization.28 Moreover, with Friedman and Gore, Beck believes that these global hazards promise “a new type of social and political dynamism” that transcends all social differences.29 This argument perfectly reproduces the antipolitical elements of the politics of fear. Not only is security prior to politics, and politics made to serve the cause of security—understood as physical survival—but all political institutions and social organizations are sacrificed to the task. For Beck, parliamentary democracy loses its validity because of its inability to respond to and handle the complex risks facing society. Writing in the same American Prospect issue as Gelbspan, Thomas Geoghegan advocates in a back-page editorial that “we give up the anachronism of ratifying treaties” and instead essentially ask Congress to grant the president fast-track authority, so that we can make Kyoto domestic law.30 Never mind that the effect of such processes would be to strengthen the executive vis-à-vis the legislature and generally reduce democratic influence over foreign affairs. A Morality of Security Returning to the Gore passage, if normal politics is understood as selfish and corrupt, then from where comes the “compelling moral purpose”? This purpose is defined partially in the negative—as a transcendence of the mucky realm of power and interest. In the positive, this compelling moral purpose is nothing more than a collective struggle for survival. For a brief period after 9/11, commentators on the left and the right believed that America had a chance to attain real unity. After the attacks, the journalist George Packer wrote of the general state of alertness that “what I dread now is a return to the normality we’re all supposed to seek.”31 Disaster comes in many forms—terrorism or ecological catastrophe — but in both cases, the moral purpose it generates is one that is supposed to take us out of our self-regarding, daily existence. Yet this purpose is more meaningless than the ordinary life it condemns. It cannot make sense of our political and social institutions — why we are divided, what to do about inequality and unfreedom—it can only demand that we set those issues aside because something more important — our sheer survival — is at stake. In this sense, environmentalism is as antipolitical as the war on terror. Rather than assess our actual social existence, and make a properly political choice among real alternatives, environmentalism demands that we set all this aside and orient ourselves toward the question of how we are to survive. Scaring Us into Action/Submission Gore’s passage further reveals how environmentalism is another incarnation of the politics of fear. We act, according to Gore, because “the worst catastrophe in the history of human civilization is bearing down on us.”32 Crisis consciousness is a common refrain in environmental thought, and it has made a strong impact on wider culture. From the Day after Tomorrow to Underworld, the cultural representation of environmental disaster has become the newest genre of popular feature films. As Slavoj Žižek has observed, “It seems easier to imagine the ‘end of the world’ than a far more modest change in the mode of production.”33 The authors of the environmentalist self-critique The Death of Environmentalism write: “Most people wake up in the morning trying to reduce what they have to worry about. Environmentalists wake up trying to increase it. We want the public to care about and focus not only on global warming and rainforests but also species extinction, non-native plant invasives, agribusiness, overfishing, mercury, and toxic dumps.”34 Indeed, we might say that the orientation toward catastrophism was highly developed well before terrorists ever reached our shores. The point is not just that environmentalism indulges in a hysterical, cultural impulse. Rather, when catastrophe becomes the cause of political action, it once again serves to repress instead of open up politics. What’s more, as Gore describes it, in the face of environmental crisis we do not make a choice, we simply must act. We are even supposed to experience “the thrill of being forced by circumstances” to engage politically. The blind necessity of acting to save individual and collective existence is supposed to substitute for appealing to the will and reason of human beings. Fundamentally, the impulse here is not to win an argument, and impel people to choose as free beings, but rather to terrorize us into action. Arguing from catastrophe is as morally coercive as the famous “ticking time bomb” torture scenario. Just as Jayasuriya said of the war on terror that there is no time to debate properly political issues of “power and distribution,” the same goes for environmental catastrophe. In the New Left Review, George Monbiot writes that “our proposals and methods must be debated fiercely. . . . But we have so little time.”35 A properly political choice also carries with it the force of necessity. But that kind of necessity means that social conflict has gotten to the point where individuals must recognize their social existence and use their powers of reason and judgment to choose between alternatives. If they are forced by circumstance to act politically, how they act is still a matter of choice, and political choice is presumed to be deliberate choice. That is different from “being forced by circumstance” to act in a particular way. Gore’s “thrill” is not the courageous stance of responsible persons but the exultation of being liberated from the burden of having to choose by the sheer overwhelming force of external necessity—the juggernaut of eco-apocalypse. This “thrill” is just fear — fear that one’s life will be destroyed by nature’s revenge for our moral lassitude. This is not politics, and it is hardly the basis for a moral rejuvenation of an unequal and unjust society.
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Gourevitch 10 [Alex, PhD from Columbia University, teaches at Harvard University, Public Culture 22:3, Fall, “Environmentalism — Long Live the Politics of Fear,” p. 418-424]
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The current way of thinking about security is to isolate the individual from society and, consequently, to make any legal, political, or social arrangement relative to the security of that individual there is no absolute limit to the exercise of power in security’s name liberal societies have been unable to resist seeking out moral and political renewal through making physical security a priority The consequence of this new security paradigm is an intensification of antipolitical impulses in our society Those who govern are drawn to the possibility that the struggle for existence, the preservation of bare life might transcend social divisions and unite the public This is a politics of fear in the sense in which public life is organized around survival When the security of the individual is made our first principle, then all uncertainties take on a dangerous aspect and must be controlled Risk assessments are not undertaken on a rational basis Political power is applied for the sake of reassuring us and to minimize even the most improbable risks The more we elevate sustaining and nourishing bare life into an achievement, the more we continuously defer properly political questions about power, freedom, and equality Thus political activity itself reproduces the very condition that directs politicians toward a preoccupation with security It is not hard to see the conservative dimensions of this kind of politics Foreclosing on political debate of higher ideals favors the status quo Moreover, no social change is possible without a great deal of uncertainty; indeed, it is always possible that collective efforts lead to the opposite of what was intended But this conservatism is derived from the deeper, antipolitical essence of this political outlook, which is why the politics of fear is not exclusively a right-wing phenomenon Environmentalism is one of the few movements on the left that presents itself in the same totalizing political terms that the war on terror does on the right key features of environmentalism as a political ideology reproduces the central elements of the security paradigm It is through social categories like class, race, and religion that we normally experience power and inequality and out of which therefore grow political conflicts and social movements. Yet the assertion of any of these divisions is seen as not just petty but, by implication, selfish in the face of a transcendent threat In fact, the political emptiness of normal social life is a recurrent trope of environmental thought the claim that political conflicts over equal freedom and social justice now mattered less than mere human survival The claim that universal risks—especially environmental ones — transcend conflicts of national, religious, and class interest is now part of mainstream political sociology This argument perfectly reproduces the antipolitical elements of the politics of fear Not only is security prior to politics, and politics made to serve the cause of security—understood as physical survival—but all political institutions and social organizations are sacrificed to the task democracy loses its validity because of its inability to respond to and handle complex risks Disaster comes in many forms—terrorism or ecological catastrophe — but in both cases, the moral purpose it generates is one that is supposed to take us out of our self-regarding, daily existence Yet this purpose is more meaningless than the ordinary life it condemns It cannot make sense of our political and social institutions why we are divided, what to do about inequality and unfreedom it can only demand that we set those issues aside because something more important our sheer survival is at stake In this sense, environmentalism is as antipolitical as the war on terror. Rather than assess our actual social existence, and make a properly political choice among real alternatives, environmentalism demands that we set all this aside and orient ourselves toward the question of how we are to survive environmentalism is another incarnation of the politics of fear when catastrophe becomes the cause of political action, it once again serves to repress instead of open up politics The blind necessity of acting to save individual and collective existence is supposed to substitute for appealing to the will and reason of human beings. Fundamentally, the impulse here is not to win an argument, and impel people to choose as free beings, but rather to terrorize us into action Arguing from catastrophe is as morally coercive as the famous “ticking time bomb” torture scenario
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Framing the environment as a security issue is anti-political – it sacrifices all other considerations while re-installing the worst elements of the status quo.
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Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the "reluctant imperialist."10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes-not reluctantly at all-in "Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society."11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image.¶ This is also a narrative about race. The images of an unruly world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority from earlier colonial discourses about races who are incapable of governing themselves, Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law," or Roosevelt's "loosening ties of civilized society," in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "The American Empire," Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle "The Burden" but insisted that "America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man's burden."12 Denial and exceptionalism are apparently alive and well. In American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized through the interplay of templates of U.S. racial codes and colonial Orientalism.¶ These narratives of the origins of the current empire-that is, the neoconservative and the liberal interventionist-have much in common. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability, that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights, liberalism, and democracy, the "indispensable nation," in Madeleine Albright's words. In this logic, the United States claims the authority to "make sovereign judgments on what is right and what is wrong" for everyone else and "to exempt itself with an absolutely clear conscience from all the rules that it proclaims and applies to others."13 Absolutely protective of its own sovereignty, it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus deems the entire world a potential site of intervention. Universalism thus can be made manifest only through the threat and use of violence. If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world, then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U.S. imperial actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world's problems. According to this logic, resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule; rather, resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values.¶ Although these narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best, they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for the British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U.S. imperialism by appropriating a progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history. As part of the "coming-out" narrative, the message is: "Hey what's the big deal. We've always been interventionist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson's 'empire for liberty.' Let's just be ourselves." A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U.S. war against the Philippines in its struggle for independence a century ago. This is a chapter of history long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration, one that American studies scholars here and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose, which gained special resonance during the U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century. As Max Boot concludes in Savage Wars of Peace, "The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign-one that was bigger and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future."14 Historians of the United States have much work to do here, not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present, and in showing how U.S. interventions have worked from the perspective of comparative imperialisms, in relation to other historical changes and movements across the globe.¶ The struggle over history also entails a struggle over language and culture. It is not enough to expose the lies when Bush hijacks words such as freedom, democracy, and liberty. It's imperative that we draw on our knowledge of the powerful alternative meanings of these key words from both national and transnational sources. Today's reluctant imperialists are making arguments about "soft power," the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values. As Ignatieff writes, "America fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires."15 The work of scholars in popular culture is more important than ever to show that the Americanization of global culture is not a one-way street, but a process of transnational exchange, conflict, and transformation, which creates new cultural forms that express dreams and desires not dictated by empire.¶ In this fantasy of global desire for all things American, those whose dreams are different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself. As one of the authors of the Patriot Act wrote, "when you adopt a way of terror you've excused yourself from the community of human beings."16 Although I would not minimize the violence caused by specific terrorist acts, I do want to point out the violence of these definitions of who belongs to humanity. Often in our juridical system under the Patriot Act, the accusation of terrorism alone, without due process and proof, is enough to exclude persons from the category of humanity. As scholars of American studies, we should bring to the present crisis our knowledge from juridical, literary, and visual representations about the way such exclusions from personhood and humanity have been made throughout history, from the treatment of Indians and slaves to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.¶ Thus the current discourse about the American Empire embodies fantasies of a global monolithic order extending outward from a national center. How can we draw on our knowledge of the past to bring a sense of contingency to this idea of empire, to show that imperialism is an interconnected network of power relations, which entail engagements and encounters as well as military might and which are riddled with instability, tension, and disorder-as in Iraq today? And we must further understand how empire doesn't just take place in faraway battlefields, but how it exerts its power at home-in fact, in the interconnections between the domestic and the foreign, words already freighted with imperial meanings, and for which we need better vocabularies.
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Kaplan 4 [Amy, Department Chair in the Department of English and Edward W. Kane Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania, American Quarterly, 56:1, March, “Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,” Literature Online]
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A dominant narrative about empire told by liberal interventionists is that of the "reluctant imperialist." In this version, the U S never sought an empire but it had the burden thrust upon it The U S is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative backed by unparalleled force, the U S can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an uncivilized state This is a narrative about race The images of an unruly world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority These narratives take American exceptionalism to new heights its paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time They share a teleological narrative of inevitability, that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights, liberalism, and democracy the U S deems the entire world a potential site of intervention Universalism thus can be made manifest only through the threat and use of violence. If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world, then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U.S. imperial actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world's problems According to this logic resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values Today's reluctant imperialists are making arguments about "soft power," the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values In this fantasy of global desire for all things American, those whose dreams are different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself Although I would not minimize the violence caused by specific terrorist acts, I do want to point out the violence of these definitions of who belongs to humanity the accusation of terrorism alone without due process and proof is enough to exclude persons from the category of humanity Thus the current discourse about the American Empire embodies fantasies of a global monolithic order extending outward from a national center imperialism is an interconnected network of power relations, which entail engagements and encounters as well as military might and which are riddled with instability, tension, and disorder
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Defenses of hegemony are rooted in presumptions of racial inferiority – this logic conceals massive international violence while foreclosing opportunities for political contestation and resistance.
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We have already explored via Agamben’s work how rendering life bare can be seen as the originary activity of sovereign power. What can be brought to light here, in relation to our discussion of human security above, is that the life lived by the subjects of the human security discourse can be seen as life lived as ‘bare’ inasmuch as this discourse is not meant to qualify political life. As explored previously, life through the lens of human security is understood primarily in terms of providing for the basic sustenance of day-to-day life. Brought into the post-9/11 context, what this enables is an opening towards mapping global order in a way that apportions this bare life in relation to zones of exceptionality amenable to the logic of an exercise of sovereign power. This is reflected in the way development objectives and humanitarian goals now tend to submit more directly to the dictates of the management of global order. Instead of targeting populations that are most insecure as measured by the human security discourse and viewing the provision of security to those populations as an end in itself, the targeting is now overridden by the hard security concerns of homelands and ends understood increasingly in terms of the aims of the ‘global war on terror’.14 While the human security discourse could always be critically interpreted as prioritizing its responses to populations that are threatened in relation to servicing the maintenance of the global liberal order (Chandler, 2004), the shift here can be understood as one where this servicing reveals a more intimate connection between sovereign power, biopolitics and the maintenance of post-9/11 order. This connection comes in the way in which the human security discourse prepares conceptually a form of life that is at hand for the mounting of proactive interventions of pre-emption and prevention.¶ We can see elements of this shift in the most recent institutional developments of the human security discourse within the UN. To be certain, the post-9/11 moment can be taken as a movement away from a further codification of grounds for humanitarian intervention that would have as its objective the health and welfare of populations as an end in itself. As Alex Bellamy (2006: 165) chronicles, the language of the World Summit Outcome Document as it relates to the model of humanitarian intervention outlined in the 2001 ICISS report was watered down in favour of reinforcing not only the principle that the burden of protecting populations fell chiefly on individual states, but also the idea that the threshold for interventions on humanitarian grounds should be high. Thus, there was a clear shift in the document away from what was meant to be shared responsibility between the international community and the host state through a re-emphasis of the responsibility of the latter. At the same time, the document also moved towards safeguarding the Security Council’s political discretion to choose when and whether it would intervene rather than endorsing binding criteria that would compel the Council to act in cases of clear humanitarian emergencies, as prescribed in the ICISS report (Bellamy, 2006: 166–167). While these changes can be seen as weakening the case for binding the Council to intervene on humanitarian grounds, they can also be read as broadening the scope for interventions on discretionary grounds. They do this by further codifying the range of justifications for intervention that emerged from Security Council resolutions during the 1990s while simultaneously reaffirming the Council’s ability to choose which cases merit its attention. Perhaps most importantly, the outcome document retains the understanding of sovereignty as responsibility outlined in the ICISS report, reinforcing the notion that it is the host state that has the primary responsibility to protect. The test of responsibility here remains couched in terms of the biopolitical functions of the state insofar as what is measured is the latter’s ability or inability to provide for the health and welfare of the populations within its care. As recounted by Bellamy (2006: 164–167), the negotiations leading to the final draft of the outcome document came as a result of pressure from representatives of states that wanted either a free hand to determine whether and when to intervene (the USA) or to retain the traditional supremacy of sovereignty in terms of political and legal autonomy (Russia and China). Although this can be taken as a deferral to the norms of territorial inviolability, there is a continued adherence to an understanding of sovereignty that is qualified in line with the state’s biopolitical functions, in that ‘each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ (United Nations, 2005b: para. 138). Combined with the endorsement of the Security Council’s political discretion on intervention, these most recent institutional developments could also be read as a codification of sovereignty in biopolitical terms, and thus as reinforcing the linkages between sovereign power and biopower.¶ The second area of complementarity can be seen as relating to the manner in which Agamben articulates the relationship between bare life and the exercise of sovereign power as one that operates through the state of exception. What we argue here is that human security is instrumental in sovereign power’s ability to delineate the circumstances in which such a state of exception can be proclaimed. What the discourse of human security does, whether broad or narrow, is to help define the exceptional circumstances that require the international community’s intervention, whether on behalf of humanitarian imperatives as initially conceived or in the service of maintaining global order as made evident more recently. It does so by initially constructing the terms that inform the exceptional circumstances that define the range of threats to human life. In turn, it contributes to the labour of defining and authorizing when the suspension of conventional international law of nations can occur. The question that surfaces at this juncture is what authorizes the suspension of the law in the name of human security when the discourse of human security has yet to find its codification as international law? In other words, what allows human security to stand before the law? Returning to Agamben, human security can be understood here as participating in the institution of a form of sovereign power insofar as it simultaneously operates within and outside the law. It points towards a zone of indistinction in relation to its efforts to codify the authorization of a form of international intervention that becomes apparent in the fact that this authorization has yet to receive the status of international law while, at the same time, it must invoke the force that law normally assumes. The human security discourse thus finds itself in an aporia in relation to international law, which it must suspend while simultaneously invoking its force.¶ On this point, Agamben’s reading of the relationship between sovereign power and biopower clearly brings back an element of analysis that is intentionally left aside in Foucault’s biopoliticization of sovereign power highlighted through his reading of racism noted earlier. Agamben allows us to reintroduce the connection between the institution of the juridico-political order and biopower, which much of Foucault’s work on modern forms of power ‘under the rubric of a multiplicity of force relations’ sought to sever (Neal, 2004: 375). Having said that, Agamben’s reading is not entirely satisfactory either, which leads us to the final element of the assemblage between sovereign power and biopower brought to light by the human security discourse.¶ Following Connolly’s critique noted earlier, Agamben appears to maintain a view of the logic and paradox of sovereign power as coherent and ultimately centred on the sovereignty of the state. The cartography of the form of sovereign power that articulates itself through the human security discourse would seem to complicate this view. Human security can be read as informing the institution of a form of sovereign power that ultimately has as its plane of exercise the globe. This element of globality emerges most clearly in the manner in which the human security discourse articulates threats. Constituting threats specifically in terms of threats to human life means that the human security discourse, through a categorization and accounting of such threats, must constitute them with a view of (in)security that is global. In conceptual terms, viewing human life as a grounds upon which the (in)security dilemma is played out makes the life of the human species the referent of security (Dillon, 2007). To be sure, the human security discourse in practice identifies these threats as emanating from specific locales insofar as its interventions target delimited non-Western populations, and thus the Western state clearly continues to play a central role in mounting the recent series of international interventions. However, too much emphasis on the state misses how such interventions have come to depend upon ‘strategic complexes’ of global governance that bring together ‘state and non-state actors, public and private organizations, military and civilian organisations’ (Duffield, 2001: 45). In helping to constitute key elements of the state of exception, the human security discourse prepares the conceptual ground upon which such complexes are bound up with instituting a form of global sovereign power unmoored from the formal juridico-political sovereignty of any one state or coalition of states. Within the post-9/11 moment, then, human security can be seen as having laid the conceptual terrain for a form of human subjectivity amenable to the exercise of global sovereign rule. Rather than seeing a disjuncture between pre- and post-9/11, human security proposes a form of life that is intimately connected to the assemblages of biopower and sovereign power that mark this rule.
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de Larrinaga & Doucet 8 [Miguel, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Ottawa, & Marc G., Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at Saint Mary’s University, Security Dialogue 39(5), “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security,” p. 530-533]
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rendering life bare can be seen as the originary activity of sovereign power life lived by the subjects of the human security discourse can be seen as life lived as ‘bare’ inasmuch as this discourse is not meant to qualify political life life through the lens of human security is understood primarily in terms of providing for the basic sustenance of day-to-day life Brought into the post-9/11 context, what this enables is an opening towards mapping global order in a way that apportions this bare life in relation to zones of exceptionality amenable to the logic of an exercise of sovereign power This connection comes in the way in which the human security discourse prepares conceptually a form of life that is at hand for the mounting of proactive interventions of pre-emption and prevention there is a continued adherence to an understanding of sovereignty that is qualified in line with the state’s biopolitical functions these developments could be read as a codification of sovereignty in biopolitical terms, and thus as reinforcing the linkages between sovereign power and biopower human security is instrumental in sovereign power’s ability to delineate the circumstances in which such a state of exception can be proclaimed What the discourse of human security does, whether broad or narrow, is to help define the exceptional circumstances that require the international community’s intervention, whether on behalf of humanitarian imperatives or in the service of maintaining global order Human security can be read as informing the institution of a form of sovereign power that ultimately has as its plane of exercise the globe This element of globality emerges most clearly in the manner in which the human security discourse articulates threats Constituting threats specifically in terms of threats to human life means that the human security discourse, through a categorization and accounting of such threats, must constitute them with a view of (in)security that is global In conceptual terms viewing human life as a grounds upon which the (in)security dilemma is played out makes the life of the human species the referent of security To be sure, the human security discourse in practice identifies these threats as emanating from specific locales insofar as its interventions target delimited non-Western populations, and thus the Western state clearly continues to play a central role in mounting the recent series of international interventions In helping to constitute key elements of the state of exception, the human security discourse prepares the conceptual ground upon which such complexes are bound up with instituting a form of global sovereign power unmoored from the formal juridico-political sovereignty of any one state or coalition of states Within the post-9/11 moment, then, human security can be seen as having laid the conceptual terrain for a form of human subjectivity amenable to the exercise of global sovereign rule Rather than seeing a disjuncture between pre- and post-9/11, human security proposes a form of life that is intimately connected to the assemblages of biopower and sovereign power that mark this rule
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Discourse of human security lays the terrain for western military interventions across the globe, authorizing force in the maintenance of bare life.
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The implicit assumptions about human subjectivity that human security inherits from the liberal humanist tradition from which it emerged are strikingly reminiscent of the Kantian conception of the universal, rational subject –‘a self-enclosed ego that inhabits but is distinct from a body’ (Young, 2005: 5). Feminist theorists have problematized this model of the human subject as a projection of masculine (and Western) ideals masquerading as gender-neutral description (Lloyd, 1986; Battersby, 1998; Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Peterson and Parisi, 1998: 6), and have argued that this model of subjectivity has functioned as a ‘universal norm’ in Western philosophical and political thought (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000: 11; Schott, 1997: 321). Such norms are instrumental in the construction of the human as an exclusionary category, because not everyone meets the standards set by the norm. Thus human security reproduces an Enlightenment model of human subjectivity that, ‘in masking its specificity behind a veneer of universality … functions coercively to suppress different others’, and that has been shown to be ‘complicit with structures of domination and subordination, in particular with the suppression of others – women, colonial subjects, blacks, minority groups – who are deemed incapable of achieving rational self-mastery’ (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000: 11). The normative projection of the autonomous, rational subject in Western metaphysics is both constitutive of and ‘an effect of particular gender relations’ (Schott, 1997: 321). Feminist theory has shown this subject to be implicated in a masculinist system of binaries (subject/object, culture/ nature, self/other), ‘whose discursive application has practical effects’ across numerous fields of social and political life (Young, 2005: 5) and that both underpin and legitimate gender hierarchies (and other kinds of shifting and unstable hierarchies that are gendered in complex ways) and enable the constitution of the self through the constitution of an (abject) Other (Lloyd, 1986; Battersby, 1998; Peterson, 1992). The ‘rationality’ in which this model of subjectivity inheres has historically been constructed as characteristically masculine, in that it amounts to no less than the transcendence of all that is coded feminine (Lloyd, 1986), representing ‘an expression of the flight of masculinity from the temporal, embodied, uncertain realm of phenomenal existence’ (Schott, 1997: 321).
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Marhia 13 [Natasha, PhD in gender and human security at the Gender Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Security Dialogue 44(1), “Some humans are more Human than Others: Troubling the 'human' in human security from a critical feminist perspective,” p. 26-27]
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The implicit assumptions that human security inherits from the liberal humanist tradition are strikingly reminiscent of the Kantian conception of the universal, rational subject Feminist theorists have problematized this model of the human subject as a projection of masculine (and Western) ideals masquerading as gender-neutral description this model of subjectivity has functioned as a ‘universal norm’ in Western philosophical and political thought human security reproduces an Enlightenment model of human subjectivity that, ‘in masking its specificity behind a veneer of universality … functions coercively to suppress different others’, and that has been shown to be ‘complicit with structures of domination and subordination, in particular with the suppression of others – women, colonial subjects, blacks, minority groups – who are deemed incapable of achieving rational self-mastery’ ). Feminist theory has shown this subject to be implicated in a masculinist system of binaries ‘whose discursive application has practical effects’ across numerous fields of social and political life that both underpin and legitimate gender hierarchies The ‘rationality’ in which this model of subjectivity inheres has historically been constructed as characteristically masculine, in that it amounts to no less than the transcendence of all that is coded feminine
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Human security’s idea of a universal, rational, male subject suppresses women, minorities, and colonial subjects
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In (re)defining the threats to human life as its most basic operation, the discourse of human security must begin by defining and enacting the human in biopolitical terms. The target of human security, whether broad or narrow, is to make live the life of the individual through a complex of strategies initiated at the level of populations. In defining and responding to threats to human life, these strategies have as their aim the avoidance of risk and the management of contingency in the overall goal of improving the life lived by the subjects invoked in their own operation. In this sense, as with Foucault’s understanding of the biopolitical, the health and welfare of populations is human security’s frame of intervention; however, until its recent institutionalization within the UN, the human security discourse, from the vantage point of the international, has been marked mostly by defining and identifying the global patterns and trends of human insecurity. In other words, the human security discourse’s initial move is found in creating the measurements that aggregate the threats to human life. The clearest example of this initial labour in relation to the narrower understanding of human security can be found in the Human Security Report in 2005, which boasts that ‘no annual publication maps the trends in the incidence, severity, causes and consequences of global violence as comprehensively’ (Human Security Centre, 2005: viii). This quest to properly order, categorize and account for the ‘true’ threats to human life in the post-Cold War world is also exemplified in the series of UNDP reports. As Mark Duffield & Nicholas Waddell (2006: 5) point out, ‘the UNDP . . . launched its annual Human Development Report in 1990, dedicating it to “. . . ending the mismeasure of human progress by economic growth alone”’. It is through this mapping that the human security discourse then advocates on behalf of specific areas of strategic intervention in the name of the health and welfare of targeted populations. Although still in their infancy, the strategies are meant to foster development as a means of securing the health and welfare of targeted populations. Recent programmes detailed by the Human Security Unit include preventing the abuse of illicit drugs in Afghanistan; addressing the health of women and adolescents affected by HIV in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala; contributing to the provision of more secure access to small-scale energy services for local basic necessities in Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Guinea; combating the trafficking of women and children in Cambodia and Vietnam; providing access to education in Kosovo; integrating displaced peoples in Colombia; promoting the radio broadcasting of information covering humanitarian issues in areas of Africa and Afghanistan; building civic participation and self-reliance in Timor-Leste; and stabilizing refugee host communities through a multifaceted strategy that includes the reduction of small arms and the provision of basic education, food and environmental security in Tanzania (United Nations Human Security Unit, 2006). Such programmes operate at the level of the chronic insecurities in the day-to-day life of targeted populations. They envision human security as part of ‘comprehensive, integrated, people-centered solutions’ (United Nations Human Security Unit, 2006: 2) that are meant to provide a measure of remedy to quotidian threats. While the programmes target specific populations in delimited locales, the threats are themselves framed in regards to circulation and seek to ultimately distinguish the bad from the good flows in terms of (in)security. In this scenario, following from the programme examples above, ‘good circulation’ would include information on humanitarian issues, civic participation and self-reliance; ‘bad circulation’ would entail, inter alia, trafficking, illicit drugs and small arms. Returning to Foucault’s understanding of security and circulation elaborated earlier, the frame of intervention of the human security discourse, in seeking to maximize the positive elements and minimize the risks to human life, operates on a terrain of calculability that attempts to manage the incalculable through probabilities. In its initial stages, the objective of the human security discourse, in seeking to distinguish between bad and good circulation, had as its primary grammar of reference sustainable human development.12 With the post-9/11 moment and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, however, the distinction between good and bad circulation tends to take as its frame of reference global order. With the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, as well as the subsequent bombings in Madrid and London, the globality of the circulation of threats for the ‘West’ becomes more explicit, and consequently a new cartography of threats and vulnerabilities is drawn up and rationalities and technologies are deployed to counter them. As Duffield & Waddell (2006: 10) explain in relation to the ‘war on terrorism’: predominance of security concerns, especially homeland security, means that issues of global circulation – of people, weapons, networks, illicit commodities, money, information, and so on – emanating from, and flowing through the world’s conflict zones, now influence the consolidating biopolitical function of development. Unlike Duffield & Waddell’s work, the tack we would like to follow in the section below is not directed towards tracing the biopolitical function of international development practices in relation to the ‘war on terror’, but to the way in which the human security discourse participates in setting the terrain for and the deployment of sovereign power.
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de Larrinaga & Doucet 8 [Miguel, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Ottawa, & Marc G., Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at Saint Mary’s University, Security Dialogue 39(5), “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security,” p. 528-530]
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In (re)defining the threats to human life as its most basic operation, the discourse of human security must begin by defining and enacting the human in biopolitical terms The target of human security, whether broad or narrow, is to make live the life of the individual through a complex of strategies initiated at the level of populations In defining and responding to threats to human life, these strategies have as their aim the avoidance of risk and the management of contingency in the overall goal of improving the life lived by the subjects invoked in their own operation the health and welfare of populations is human security’s frame of intervention the human security discourse’s initial move is found in creating the measurements that aggregate the threats to human life . It is through this mapping that the human security discourse then advocates on behalf of specific areas of strategic intervention in the name of the health and welfare of targeted populations the strategies are meant to foster development as a means of securing the health and welfare of targeted populations While the programmes target specific populations in delimited locales, the threats are themselves framed in regards to circulation and seek to ultimately distinguish the bad from the good flows in terms of (in)security In this scenario ‘good circulation’ would include information on humanitarian issues, civic participation and self-reliance; ‘bad circulation’ would entail, inter alia, trafficking, illicit drugs and small arms the frame of intervention of the human security discourse, in seeking to maximize the positive elements and minimize the risks to human life, operates on a terrain of calculability that attempts to manage the incalculable through probabilities With the post-9/11 moment and the ensuing ‘war on terror’ the distinction between good and bad circulation tends to take as its frame of reference global order predominance of security concerns, especially homeland security, means that issues of global circulation of people, weapons, networks, illicit commodities, money, information, and so on emanating from, and flowing through the world’s conflict zones now influence the consolidating biopolitical function of development human security discourse participates in setting the terrain for and the deployment of sovereign power
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Discourse of “human security” authorizes biopolitical techniques of population management through the targeting and eradication of unpredictability by sovereign intervention.
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The formal origins of the concept of human security are to be found in the worldview of an international organization that was concerned with post Cold War humanitarian issues, and only subsequently became enmeshed in the discourse of national foreign policy concerns and academic debates on security. Generally attributed to the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report and some of the concurrent writings of Mahbub ul-Haq, the initial impulse was to shift the referent from the state to the ‘legitimate concerns of ordinary people who s[eek] security in their daily lives’ (UNDP, 1994: 22). In other words, the objective was to bring security down to the level of human life by seeking to develop strategies in the provision of both ‘safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression’ and ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes and jobs or in communities’ (UNDP, 1994: 23). In so doing, security was to be decoupled from the particular national interest of states and tied to the ‘universal concern[s]’ (UNDP, 1994: 22) of all people. In articulating itself universally, human security was therefore initially meant to be built upon the bedrock of universal human rights. This move would be accompanied by efforts to identify a comprehensive list of threats that the ‘all encompassing’ (UNDP, 1994: 24) concept of human security would respond to – that is, economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (UNDP, 1994: 24–25). Clear connections were made between severe impediments to human development and pervasive and chronic threats to the fulfilment of human potential. Such a broad formulation sought to transcend the state, insofar as it brought into question its role as a provider of security relative to other actors – for example, international organizations, NGOs and non-military government agencies – while simultaneously identifying the state itself as a potential source of insecurity. This elision of the state also served to make the quotidian the object of security. Whereas security tended to be understood in terms of defining historical moments centred around the survival and integrity of the state, we now see emerging an understanding of (in)security that ‘arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event’ (UNDP, 1994: 22). In this way, human security certainly participated in the broader redefinition of security begun in the 1970s and 1980s; however, it also set off on new terrain, in that shifting its referent to the individual introduces as threats a host of contingencies that emerge from daily life. This initial deployment of the concept in the mid-1990s was subsequently accompanied by other efforts to theorize human security in ways that would be more amenable to the multilateral and middle-power approaches found in the foreign policy concerns of certain states. Examples like the Responsibility To Protect generally moved away from the broader development concerns of the Human Development Report towards a more narrow focus on introducing a new set of international norms on intervention that would guide and restrict the conduct of the state and the international community in ‘extreme and exceptional cases’ (ICISS, 2001: 31). Here, the threats are concomitantly narrowed down to ‘violent threats to individuals’ (Human Security Center, 2005: viii), such as ‘mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease’ (United Nations, 2004: 65). Emphasis shifts from an understanding of threats that stem from a broad set of quotidian political, social, economic and environmental contingencies, to what are deemed to be ‘avoidable catastrophe[s]’ (United Nations, 2004: 65). Within this context, there is a partial but significant return to the state, in that it is through the nexus of the state that the provision of both security and insecurity, by state and non-state actors, is predominantly understood. The traditional apparatus of the state as concerns its monopoly over the (il)legitimate use of violence also makes its return in the form of military intervention as a response of last resort to the extreme violation of rights that are held as inviolable. This then enables the shift towards tying security to the notion of the state’s ability or inability to fulfil its responsibility to protect the human beings within its care.9 In this sense, the referent and threats continue to be articulated in non-territorial forms, as within the broader notion of human security, but the responses are framed within the nexus of the state and therefore call forth a statist conception of security. This return to the state is made all the more evident in the manner in which the narrower concept of human security centres around (re)defining norms surrounding the legitimacy of the international community’s right to intervention. Such an effort attempts to inaugurate and codify a new law around a set of norms that simultaneously requires the suspension of certain foundational elements of international law in ‘cases of violence which so genuinely “shock the conscience of mankind”, or which present such a clear and present danger to international security, that they require coercive military intervention’ (ICISS, 2001: 31) on the part of the international community. It is the concept of human security that serves to define and identify the extreme and exceptional circumstances that it itself requires in the subsequent formulation of its responses. In so doing, the human security discourse participates in setting the conditions for both the suspension of the law and the authorization of its refounding in the form of new norms of intervention. As we will explore below, this marks a key dimension of the operation of the concept of sovereign power elaborated earlier.
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de Larrinaga & Doucet 8 [Miguel, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Ottawa, & Marc G., Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at Saint Mary’s University, Security Dialogue 39(5), “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security,” p. 525-527]
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the concept of human security became enmeshed in the discourse of national foreign policy concerns the initial impulse was to shift the referent from the state to the ‘legitimate concerns of ordinary people security was to be decoupled from the particular national interest of states and tied to the ‘universal concern[s]’ of all people In articulating itself universally, human security was therefore initially meant to be built upon the bedrock of universal human rights Such a broad formulation sought to transcend the state insofar as it brought into question its role as a provider of security relative to other actors while simultaneously identifying the state itself as a potential source of insecurity This elision of the state also served to make the quotidian the object of security Examples like the Responsibility To Protect generally moved away from the broader development concerns towards a more narrow focus on introducing a new set of international norms on intervention that would guide and restrict the conduct of the state and the international community in ‘extreme and exceptional cases’ the threats are concomitantly narrowed down to ‘violent threats to individuals’ such as ‘mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease’ Emphasis shifts from an understanding of threats that stem from a broad set of quotidian political, social, economic and environmental contingencies, to what are deemed to be ‘avoidable catastrophe[s]’ Within this context, there is a partial but significant return to the state, in that it is through the nexus of the state that the provision of both security and insecurity, by state and non-state actors, is predominantly understood The traditional apparatus of the state as concerns its monopoly over the (il)legitimate use of violence also makes its return in the form of military intervention as a response of last resort to the extreme violation of rights that are held as inviolable This then enables the shift towards tying security to the notion of the state’s ability or inability to fulfil its responsibility to protect the human beings within its care In this sense, the referent and threats continue to be articulated in non-territorial forms, as within the broader notion of human security, but the responses are framed within the nexus of the state and therefore call forth a statist conception of security This return to the state is made all the more evident in the manner in which the narrower concept of human security centres around (re)defining norms surrounding the legitimacy of the international community’s right to intervention Such an effort attempts to inaugurate and codify a new law around a set of norms that simultaneously requires the suspension of certain foundational elements of international law in ‘cases of violence which so genuinely “shock the conscience of mankind”, or which present such a clear and present danger to international security, that they require coercive military intervention’ on the part of the international community It is the concept of human security that serves to define and identify the extreme and exceptional circumstances that it itself requires in the subsequent formulation of its responses In so doing, the human security discourse participates in setting the conditions for both the suspension of the law and the authorization of its refounding in the form of new norms of intervention this marks a key dimension of the operation of the concept of sovereign power
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Calls for the state to assure “human security” provide the rationale for military intervention – “human security” re-installs traditional discourses of state security.
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According to the literature on risk in anthropology, shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back, at least, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.¶ The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five countries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. According to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China) promised to assist other signatories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international inspections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric —designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers—the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics—the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World—the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. military programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995).¶ Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side. However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998).¶ The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries. This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.¶ Following Anthony Giddens (1979), I define ideology as a way of constructing political ideas, institutions, and behavior which (1) makes the political structures and institutions created by dominant social groups, classes, and nations appear to be naturally given and inescapable rather than socially constructed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit massive, binary confrontations (i.e., revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimates domination. The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in all four of these senses: (1) it makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable while problematizing attempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody's; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underdeveloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers.
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Gusterson 99 [Hugh, associate professor of anthropology at MIT, Cultural Anthropology 14(1), “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” p. 113-115, Wiley]
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shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared reactions in the West to nuclear tests are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. military programs in the post-Cold War world in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries This inscription of Third World nations as ineradicably different from our own has been labeled "Orientalism" orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics contemporary orientalist ideology is found in U.S. national security discourse The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in four senses 1 it makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable 2 it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody's 3 it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underdeveloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation and 4 it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers
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Anti-proliferation discourse conforms to patterns of thought that legitimize the wholesale degradation and marginalization of other peoples while authorizing Western dominance.
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'The paradox of hegemony' It will be clear from what precedes that neo-conservatives are not interested in America being merely first among many — a great powers' great power, so to speak. Their goal is comprehensive hegemony, in which America's military might is so great as to make balancing pointless, and in which its 'universal' values inform the wholesale reform of the global political and economic order; Their view of hegemony, however, is curious to say the-least. On the one hand, the possessiveness, materialism, subjectivity and asocial nature of their theory of power fits neatly with the idea that hegemony is simply the material capacity of a dominant state to dictate the rules of the international system. Or, as Krauthammer put it, 'unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being_ prepared to enforce them'.41 On the other hand, there is a perverted Gramscian strand to the neo-conservative view of American hegemony. American power is thought to rest in part on the magnetic attraction of its culture and the universality of its values, suggesting that it has a consensual basis. But, as we have seen, neo-conservatives have no notion of a social world beyond the United States, and without such a notion consent is reduced to nothing more than hungry reception. Because this view of hegemony is informed by the neo-conservative theory of power, we should not be surprised that it suffers from precisely the same problematic assumptions. It too rests on the beliefs that power resources unproblematically deliver political influence, that legitimacy is self-ordained and that cultural magnetism is so mesmerizing as to produce unreflective acquiescence to American foreign policy. It is interesting to note here that the neoliberal alternative to this view of hegemony — articulated most prominently by Nye — suffers from similar problems. Unlike neo-conservatives, Nye does define power_in terms of political influence, rather than just resources. Yet, for all of his talk about public-minded foreign policies and multilateral engagement, his view of American hegemony still fails to comprehend the politics of legitimacy, or to move far beyond the neo-conservative view of cultural magnetism. On the former, he would certainly not endorse the idea that America's foreign policy is legitimate simply because its national interests are universal. However, his view of legitimacy is not especially social either. American power would be deemed legitimate, he seems to believe, if the United States provides global public goods, defined as something that 'everyone can consume without diminishing its availability to others'.42 There is, however, no notion in Nye's writings that these goods would have to be negotiated internationally — they are treated as though they are objective and uncontroversial. One might ask, though, whether the maintenance of the balance of power, promotion of an open international economy, and maintenance of international rules and institutions — all of which he lists — fit this bill. Would it not be necessary to negotiate the nature of the balance of power, open economy and international institutions before their maintenance could become a source of secure legitimacy? On the question of cultural magnetism, Nye's position is not dissimilar to that of the neo-conservatives, who borrow much from his early book Bound to Lead. America's use of its soft power resources is a crucial source of political influence, enabling it to change others' preferences and hence their behaviour: 'If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to.'43 Lost altogether here is any sense of the cultural agency or autonomy of the world's peoples, and Nye seems unaware of the ethical, and hence political, problems of seeking to change others' preferences to achieve America's ends.
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Reus-Smit 4 [Christian, Professor of International Relations at Australian National University, American Power and World Order, p. 63-65]
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comprehensive hegemony in which 'universal' values inform the wholesale reform of the global political and economic order is simply the material capacity of a dominant state to dictate the rules of the international system neo-conservatives have no notion of a social world beyond the U S consent is reduced to nothing more than hungry reception this view of hegemony suffers from problematic assumptions that power resources unproblematically deliver political influence, that legitimacy is self-ordained and that cultural magnetism is so mesmerizing as to produce unreflective acquiescence to American foreign policy. the neoliberal alternative view articulated by Nye suffers from similar problems for all of his talk about public-minded foreign policies and multilateral engagement his view of American hegemony still fails to comprehend the politics of legitimacy, or to move far beyond the neo-conservative view of cultural magnetism American power would be deemed legitimate if the United States provides global public goods America's use of its soft power resources is a crucial source of political influence Lost altogether here is any sense of the cultural agency or autonomy of the world's peoples, and ethical, and political, problems of seeking to change others' preferences
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“Soft power” discourse reduces the rest of the world to appendages of American power. Implied cultural universality quashes ethical and political difference under the dominance of American values.
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In addition to these reconsiderations of strategies for cultivating attraction are reconsiderations of strategies for deploying soft power. For instance. Nye (2004c), among others, has been rather vocal about the importance of stockpiling soft power. Implicit in this logic is that soft power ought to be treated (1.5 if it were military power - as something that should be kept in reserve and ready to go in situations where it is appropriate. But where attractiveness and, thus, soft power are a matter of representational force, stockpiling appears impossible, or at least counterproductive. After all, where soft power is more accurately based on representational force, it exists only for as long as the coerced victims continue to feel the threat to their subjectivity. As soon as a victim ceases to feel trapped by the threat in the representational force that led him to submit in the first place, he will most likely no longer feel like he must comply. This eventuality arises from the fact that victims' subjectivities, like all sociolinguistic "realities”, change over time. Given the changeability of selves. a more efficacious approach would be to cultivate attraction and use the 'soft' power it yields on an as needed basis. Finally, thinking about soft power through a sociolinguistic lens has some striking normative implications. Understood through the conventional lens, soft power has appeared as an alternative to the raw-power politics that so frequently characteristic world politics. It has thus been embraced by ethically minded scholars and policy-makers. But the realization that soft power is not so soft encourages some critical rethinking about its ethical value. Where soft power is indebted to representational force, it promulgates a form of “power politics of identity” that operates on the level of subjectivity. It promotes a power politics of identity' in which domination is played out through the representations that narrate “reality”. In my opinion, a power politics of identity, however unappealing, is normatively more appealing than the power politics of war, empire and physical conquest. But even so. one must still question the moral logic of representational force. Given that soft power may, in the end, not be that soft, it is worth considering the ethical dimensions and dilemmas that arise when using it as 'a means to success in world politics'.
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Mattern 5 [Janice Bially Mattern, Department of International Relations at Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA, USA, June 2005“Why soft power isn’t so soft: representational force and attraction in world politics” Millennium - Journal of International Studies June 2005 vol. 33 no. 3]
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soft power exists only for as long as the coerced victims continue to feel the threat to their subjectivity as a victim ceases to feel trapped by the threat in the representational force will most likely no longer comply the realization that soft power is not so soft encourages some critical rethinking about its ethical value Where soft power is indebted to representational force, it promulgates a form of “power politics of identity” that operates on the level of subjectivity It promotes a power politics of identity' in which domination is played out through the representations that narrate “reality one must question the moral logic of representational force Given that soft power may not be that soft, it is worth considering the ethical dimensions and dilemmas that arise when using it as 'a means to success in world politics
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Soft power is a thin veil to mask the militarization of the globe and the cultural coercion of other people
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The amorphousness of the war on terrorism carries with it a paranoid edge, the suspicion that terrorists and their supporters are everywhere and must be preemptively attacked lest they emerge and attack us. Since such a war is limitless and infinite—extending from the farthest reaches of Indonesia or Afghanistan to Hamburg, Germany, or New York City, and from immediate combat to battles that continue into the unending future—it inevitably becomes associated with a degree of megalomania as well. As the planet's greatest military power replaces the complex world with its own imagined stripped-down us-versus-them version of it, our distorted national self becomes the world. Despite the Bush administration's constant invocation of the theme of "security," the war on terrorism has created the very opposite—a sense of fear and insecurity among Americans, which is then mobilized in support of further aggressive plans in the extension of the larger "war." What results is a vicious circle that engenders what we seek to destroy: our excessive response to Islamist attacks creating ever more terrorists and, sooner or later, more terrorist attacks, which will in turn lead to an escalation of the war on terrorism, and so on. The projected "victory" becomes a form of aggressive longing, of sustained illusion, of an unending "Fourth World War" and a mythic cleansing of terrorists, of evil, of our own fear. The American military apocalyptic can then be said to partner with and act in concert with the Islamist apocalyptic.
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Lifton 3 [Robert Jay, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World, p. 115-116]
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The amorphousness of the war on terrorism carries with it a paranoid edge, the suspicion that terrorists are everywhere and must be preemptively attacked lest they attack Since such a war is limitless and infinite it inevitably becomes associated with megalomania our distorted national self becomes the world Despite the invocation of "security," the war has created the very opposite fear and insecurity which is mobilized in support of aggressive plans in war What results is a vicious circle that engenders what we seek to destroy: our excessive response creating ever more terrorists and attacks which lead to escalation of war "victory" becomes sustained illusion
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Terror impact claim are self-fulfilling prophecies and make global violence inevitable
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Armed with their simple master narrative about the inexorable force of economic globalization, neoliberals famously hold that the global extension of free-market reforms will ultimately bring worldwide peace and prosperity. Like Modernity and Development before it, Globalization is thus narrated as the force that will lift the whole world out of poverty as more and more communities are integrated into the capitalist global economy. In the most idealist accounts, such as those of New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (1999:xviii), the process of marketized liberalization is represented as an almost natural phenomenon which, “like the dawn,” we can appreciate or ignore, but not presume to stop. Observers and critics of neoliberalism as an emergent system of global hegemony, however, insist on noting the many ways in which states actively foster the conditions for global integration, directly or through international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (Gill 1995). Under what we are identifying as neoliberal geopolitics, there appears to have been a new development in these patterns of state-managed liberalization. The economic axioms of structural adjustment, fiscal austerity, and free trade have now, it seems, been augmented by the direct use of military force. At one level, this conjunction of capitalism and war-making is neither new nor surprising (cf Harvey 1985). Obviously, many wars—including most 19th- and 20th-century imperial wars—have been fought over fundamentally economic concerns. Likewise, one only has to read the reflections of one of America’s “great” generals, Major General Smedley Butler, to get a powerful and resonant sense of the long history of economically inspired American militarism. “I served in all commissioned ranks from Second Lieutenant to Major General,” Butler wrote in his retirement, [a]nd during that period, I spent most of that time being a high-class muscle-man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the Bankers. In short I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I suspected I was part of a racket at the time. Now I am sure of it. I helped make Honduras “right” for American fruit companies in 1903. I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. In China I helped to see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested. (quoted in Ali 2002:260). If it was engaged in a kind of gangster capitalist interventionism at the previous fin-de-siècle, today’s American war-making has been undertaken in a much more open, systematic, globally ambitious, and quasi-corporate economic style. Al Capone’s approach, has, as it were, given way to the new world order of Jack Welch. To be sure, the Iraq war was, in some respects, a traditional national, imperial war aimed at the monopolization of resources. It was, after all, partly a war about securing American control over Iraqi oil. Russia’s Lukoil and France’s TotalFinaElf will thereby lose out vis-à-vis Chevron and Exxon; more importantly, the US will now be able to function as what Christian Parenti (2003) calls an “energy gendarme” over key oil supplies to East Asia and Europe. Other, still more narrowly national circuits of American capitalism benefited from the war—including, for example, Kellogg Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Vice President Dick Cheney’s Halliburton that, having helped the Pentagon orchestrate the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure, is now receiving generous contracts to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure using proceeds from Iraq’s “liberated” oil sales. But these classically imperial aspects of the hostilities are not our main focus here. Instead, our central concern is with how a neoliberal world vision has served to obscure these more traditional geopolitics beneath Panglossian talk of global integration and (what are thereby constructed as) its delinquent others. In the neoliberal approach, the geopolitics of interimperial rivalry, the Monroe doctrine, and the ideas about hemispheric control that defined Butler’s era are eclipsed by a new global vision of almost infinite openness and interdependency. In contrast also to the Cold War era, danger is no longer imagined as something that should be contained at a disconnected distance. Now, by way of a complete counterpoint, danger is itself being defined as disconnection from the global system. In turn, the neoliberal geopolitical response, it seems, is to insist on enforcing reconnection—or, as Friedman (2003:A27) put it in an upbeat postwar column, “aggressive engagement.” It would be wrong, of course, to suggest that even this vision is brand new. Much like the broken neoliberal record of “globalization is inexorable,” the vision can be interpreted as yet another cover for the century-old package of liberal development nostrums that critics (eg Smith 2003) and apologists (eg Bacevich 2002) alike argue lie at the defining heart of “American Empire.” But what distinguishes this moment of neoliberal geopolitics is that the notion of enforced reconnection is today mediated through a whole repertoire of neoliberal ideas and practices, ranging from commitments to market-based solutions and public-private partnerships to concerns with networking and flexibility to mental maps of the planet predicated on a one-world vision of interdependency. Thomas Barnett merely represents one particularly audacious and influential embodiment of this trend.
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Roberts, Secor and Sparke 3 [Professor and Chair Department of Geography, Assistant professor at University of Kentucky in the department of Geography and Matthew is a professor at the University of Washington. “Neoliberal Geopolitics” 2003. http://faculty.washington.edu/sparke/neoliberalgeopolitics.pdf] MN
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Armed with their simple master narrative about the inexorable force of economic globalization, neoliberals famously hold that the global extension of free-market reforms will ultimately bring worldwide peace and prosperity Globalization is narrated as the force that will lift the whole world out of poverty as more and more communities are integrated into the capitalist global economy the process of marketized liberalization is represented as an almost natural phenomenon critics insist on noting the many ways in which states actively foster the conditions for global integration economic axioms of structural adjustment, fiscal austerity, and free trade have been augmented by the direct use of military force today’s American war-making has been undertaken in a systematic, globally ambitious economic style a neoliberal world vision has served to obscure geopolitics beneath talk of global integration and its delinquent others the geopolitics of interimperial rivalry, the Monroe doctrine, and ideas about hemispheric control are eclipsed by a new global vision of almost infinite openness and interdependency danger is no longer imagined as something that should be contained at a disconnected distance danger is itself being defined as disconnection from the global system the neoliberal geopolitical response is to insist on enforcing reconnection aggressive engagement what distinguishes this moment of neoliberal geopolitics is that the notion of enforced reconnection is today mediated through a whole repertoire of neoliberal ideas and practices, ranging from commitments to market-based solutions and public-private partnerships to concerns with networking and flexibility to mental maps of the planet predicated on a one-world vision of interdependency
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Economic globalization and free trade are deployed as a ruse to authorize military intervention and global violence.
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What we will do here is focus more narrowly on the ways in which the concept of ‘‘integration’’ is deployed in Barnett’s work and the specification of the US’s role in assuring such integration e at home, abroad, and by all means necessary. Barnett’s cartography of international relations is of a disarming simplicity, rendered in map form as a globe divided into a ‘‘Functioning Core’’ and a ‘‘Non-Integrating Gap’’: the Core torn by the ‘‘Gap’’, figured as a dark stain spreading from the equator, spanning most of Latin America, Africa and Asia, and leaching into the Balkans and Central Asia.¶ ‘‘Non-Integrating’’ areas are those which are, in the words of Barnett (2004: 8), ‘‘disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability’’. But disconnection is not only a ‘‘problem’’ for these societies alone: ‘‘In this century, it is disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their control. Eradicating disconnectedness, therefore, becomes the defining security task of our age’’ (Barnett, 2004: 8).¶ Disconnection from the global community – or, as Roberts et al. (2003) argue, the global economy – also brings with it disconnection from the ‘‘rule sets’’ governing ‘‘proper’’ international behaviour: ‘‘enunciating that rule set is the most immediate task in this global war on terrorism, and promoting the global spread of that security rule set through our use of military force overseas (e.g. pre-emptive war against regimes that openly transgress the rule set) is our most important long-term goal in this struggle’’ (Barnett, 2004: 25). As noted above, the American role in the enunciation of a new ‘‘global rule set’’ has been the guiding preoccupation of the Project for the New American Century since its inception: a preoccupation which has been materialized within a number of the National Security Strategies (including the most recent iteration issued in March 2006).¶ It is far from a selfish task, however; Barnett argues that it is America’s ‘‘moral responsibility’’ to ‘‘share’’ the rule set: ‘‘[as] America seeks to export this new security rule set called pre-emptive war, we are very careful in making sure this strategic concept is correctly understood. In short, pre-emptive war is not a tool for reordering the Core’s security structure as some fear. Rather, it is an instrument by which the Core should collectively seek to extend its stable security rule set into the essentially lawless Gap’’ (Barnett, 2004: 7, 40).¶ As for Robert Kagan, for Barnett the United States’ role is predicated upon, above all, a privileged knowledge of the rule sets (the ability to define ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ states), a privileged understanding of ‘‘the ways the world works’’, but also the willingness to enforce those rule sets. America is the Gap’s Leviathan: ‘‘if other Core powers want a greater say in how we exercise that power, they simply need to dedicate enough defense spending to develop similar capabilities. Absent that, America earns a certain right for unilateralism in the Gap’’ (Barnett, 2004: 173, 174). Similarly echoing Robert Kagan’s dismissal of Europeans’ ‘‘Kantian illusions’’, Barnett is even more resolute in affirming that such ‘‘illusions’’ have no place in today’s chaotic and dangerous world. In justifying the United States resistance to the International Criminal Court, Barnett suggests that it is not a question of American ‘‘exceptionalism’’ but rather the fact ‘‘that America needs special consideration for the security roles it undertakes inside the Gap. In effect, we don’t want fellow Core members applying their Kantian rule sets to our behavior inside the Hobbesian Gap’’ (Barnett, 2004: 174). Barnett suggests that the stakes are high – ‘‘One of us must die. Either the Core assimilates the Gap, or the Gap divides the Core’’ – and that the only response is to exterminate the ‘‘cancer’’; shrink the gap and thus face up to the reality of the new world situation (Barnett, 2004: 249, 250). As Roberts et al. (2003: 888) suggest, this geopolitics of absolutes is at play beneath the talk of global integration and ‘‘neoliberal world vision’’.¶ Conflict is therefore inevitable: it is a foundational truth confirmed by the severed map. Barnett’s cartography thus serves as both a description of today’s world and a prescription for its proper ordering. As Roberts et al. (2003: 890) argue, ‘‘the map is both that which is to be explained and the explanation itself, descriptive of the recent past and predictive of future action’’. Insecurity comes not from a specific threatening other but from all those unwilling to integrate; all those refusing their (prescribed) place on the map. As Monmonier puts it, the map’s ‘‘lines and labels not only rationalize the current [Iraqi] occupation, but also argue for future interventions throughout the Gap’’ (Monmonier, 2005: 222). This understanding was clearly articulated in Barnett’s first book (Barnett, 2004), but is even more explicit in the follow-up volume, revealingly entitled Blueprint for Action (Barnett, 2005). US interventions are thus presented as inevitable, until the messiness of the world is made to match the geometries of the Pentagon’s New Map.
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Bialasiewicz et al. 7 [Luiza, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography at Royal Holloway University of London, David Campbell, Professor of Cultural and Political Geography at Durham University, Stuart Elden, Professor in the Department of Geography at Durham University, Stephen Graham, Professor of Human Geography in the Department of Geography at Durham University, Alex Jeffrey, Lecturer in the School of Geography, Politics and Sociology at Newcastle University, Alison J. Williams, Post-Doctoral Research Associate in the International Boundaries Research Unit of the Geography Department at Durham University, Political Geography 26, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy,” p. 413-414]
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the concept of ‘‘integration’’ is rendered in map form as a globe divided into a ‘‘Functioning Core’’ and a ‘‘Non-Integrating Gap’’ the Core torn by the ‘‘Gap’’, figured as a dark stain spreading from the equator, spanning most of Latin America, Africa and Asia, and leaching into the Balkans and Central Asia ‘‘Non-Integrating’’ areas are those which are ‘‘disconnected from the global economy Eradicating disconnectedness becomes the defining security task Disconnection from the global economy brings with it disconnection from the ‘‘rule sets’’ governing ‘‘proper’’ international behaviour the U S role is predicated upon a privileged knowledge of the rule sets but also the willingness to enforce those rule sets this geopolitics of absolutes is at play beneath the talk of global integration Conflict is therefore inevitable: it is a foundational truth confirmed by the severed map cartography serves as both a description of today’s world and a prescription for its proper ordering Insecurity comes not from a specific threatening other but from all those unwilling to integrate; all those refusing their (prescribed) place on the map US interventions are thus presented as inevitable
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Framing trade with Latin America as a security priority authorizes military aggression in the name of ‘integration’.
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Climate change has been identified as a top military concern. We should be worried. In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2009, US President Barack Obama stressed the importance of climate change to national security, and the military’s growing interest in the issue.2 Then, on February 1, 2010 the US Pentagon released its Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) that includes, for the first time ever, climate change as a military concern.3. The QDR is a powerful document that shapes the military’s operating principles and budgets for the next four years. The 2010 QDR argues that military roles and missions on the battlefield will need to be reformulated to address changing environmental conditions. Climate change is presented as a ‘threat multiplier’ that will propel food and water scarcity, environmental degradation, poverty, the spread of disease, and mass migration. Each of these could contribute to ‘failed state’ scenarios which will demand military intervention. In an earlier report of high-ranking admirals and generals at the Center for Naval Analyses, upon which the QDR builds, this ‘threat multiplier’ effect and ‘failed state’ scenario is also directly linked to future acts of extremism and terrorism (CNA, 2007; see also CNA, 2009; Korb et al, 2009; Warner and Singer, 2009; Parthemore and Rogers, 2010).¶ While the US military’s interest in climate change has escalated, it is not alone. In 2007, the Australian Defence Force produced a 12 page study, Climate Change, the Environment, Resources and Conflict that proposed a new role for the military in resource protection, eg tackling illegal fishing as fish stocks relocate due to the changing climate. Two years later, a Department of Defence white paper identified climate change as a ‘threat multiplier,’ especially in the ‘fragile states’ of its neighbouring South Pacific islands (Australian Government, 2009). In the UK, the DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036 report—issued from within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and considered to be a source document for national defence policy—has asserted a future role for military engagement in climate change-related scenarios around humanitarian and disaster relief, and for protecting oil and gas resources in insecure areas (see also MoD, 2010). The DCDC report even indicated that intervention in outer space might be required so as ‘to mitigate the effects of climate change, or to harness climatological features in the support of military or strategic advantage’ (MoD 2006: 65). Other governments discussing militarization include Germany, France, and perhaps also, secretly, India and China (Mabey 2007: 9). Military experts from across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the US have issued a joint statement warning of the impending security impact of climate change.4 There was even a special session on “Climate change and the military” organized by the Brookings Institution, Chatham House, and the Institute for Environmental Security at the COP15 meetings in Copenhagen in December 2009.5¶ What to make of this growing military interest in climate change? There is a longstanding literature that addresses the linking of environment and security discourses (eg Käkönen, 1994; Deudney, 1999; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Barnett, 2001, 2006; Dalby, 2002, 2009; Davis, 2007). Although cautionary in their approach, many of these authors suggest that linking the two concepts makes it possible to open up questions around both security and the environment. Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch, for example, broaden the security debate to address human security, which takes account of matters relating to issues such as migration, disease, food security (Nordås and Gleditsch, 2007). Others argue that hiving climate change to national security discourses may galvanize more public interest (Dalby, 2009)—something that has been attempted with the Kerry-Graham-Lieberman climate bill in the US. But while the literature on security and environment raises some important questions, I want to problematize both the way that security is being constituted through the military, and the concept of the environment that is being mobilized, by paying particular attention to how militarization is unfolding in the US.¶ First, the military’s interest in climate change resurrects a narrow concept of security. Although the 2010 QDR recognizes impending concerns associated with human security (eg migration, disease and food security), it models the anticipated conflict through a traditional state-to-state war scenario, refracted through a neo-Malthusian conflict over resources (Dalby, 2009; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Resource conflict and other climate change impacts are mapped onto already vulnerable places in Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia (Broder, 2009; CNA, 2007; Podesta and Ogden, 2007-08; Werz and Manlove, 2009), where, it is argued, they will act as ‘threat multipliers’ that will escalate into ‘failed state’ scenarios. This perpetuates a model whereby the enemy to the nation is elsewhere, and that ‘environmental threats are something that foreigners do to Americans or to American territory,’ not as a result of domestic policies (Eckersley 2009: 87). In this vein, the CIA has established a Center on Climate Change and National Security to collect foreign ‘intelligence’ on the national security impact of environmental change in other parts of the world.6¶ The bifurcation of domestic security and external threat reinforces a fiction of territorial and nationalist integrity, and works against thinking about climate change as a global problem with a need for global responsibility and global solutions (Dalby 2009: 50; Deudney 1999: 189).7 Moreover, the model of external threats coheres easily with the competitive frame that has been established between China and the US, as they vie not only for economic ascendency and resource-acquisition, but also for energy security and environmental policies and initiatives.8 In this vein, Thomas Freidman has proposed a militant green nationalism, something along the lines of a triumphalist Green New Deal that will recapture US global hegemony (Friedman, 2009).9 Achieving this result requires, however, more political agreement across US Democrats and Republicans, and it is precisely here that reframing climate change as a military issue seems to be an effective strategy for cross-partisan agreement.10 But what are the costs when militarization becomes necessary to legitimize climate change action?¶ The upshot is that the military is also legitimized, to the detriment of formal and informal politics. In a secretive and hierarchical military framework there is limited scope for public participation or legislative debate (UNEP 2007: 403). Militaries are about the ‘maintenance of elite power’ (Barnett 2001: 25). Issues regarding social justice are disregarded in favour of national objectives, while the vulnerabilities institutionalized through climate change are perpetuated (Barnett, 2006). This is particularly apparent vis-à-vis environmental refugees, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates will swell to 150 million by 2050 (Reuveny, 2007). Militarism encourages the use of force against foreigners, with barriers erected to exclude those who bear the immediate impact of climate change, even though they are usually the least responsible for climate change. As Paul Smith notes, Operation Seal Signal, which the US deployed in 1994 to deal with 50,000 refugees from Haiti and Cuba, offers an instructive example of how the military addresses refugees, most of whom were held at Guantanamo Bay while their cases were processed (Smith, 2007). The responses to human tragedy in Haiti and Hurricane Katrina, when military priorities took hold over the immediate needs of the racialized, impoverished victims, speaks to the dangers of concocting security threats so that abandonment is prioritized over assistance (Giroux, 2006; Hallward, 2010). This is part of a worrisome trend of the rise of an ‘aid-military complex’ and military ‘encroachment’ on civilian-sponsored development (Hartmann 2010: 240).¶ Finally, the military’s approach to climate change does not lend itself to addressing fundamental social structures that perpetuate environmental degradation: oil dependency, oil colonialism, and the deepening international fragmentation of rich and poor. The conditions that entrench insecurity are thus left unchallenged. Rather, attention is directed to long term defensive planning and risk scenarios around potential disaster outcomes with the military presented as the only, or simply the best and most capable, institution for dealing with the scope of the adversity (QDR 2010: 86). Since Robert Kaplan’s polemic ‘The Coming Anarchy,’ much of the literature invokes similar disaster scenarios (Kaplan, 1994, see also 2008; Schwartz and Randall, 2003; Campbell et al, 2007; Dwyer, 2008). Security exercises are used to model these disasters; eg a 2008 exercise at the National Defense University in Washington that anticipated that refugees escaping flooding in Bangladesh would lead to religious and political conflict at the Indian border (Werz and Manlove, 2009). Worst possible outcomes are thus anticipated, and they these become the basis for actions in the present (de Goede 2008: 159). As Melinda Cooper writes vis-à-vis the worst-case security scenarios of the Schwartz and Randall report, ‘It recommends that we intervene in the conditions of emergence of the future before it gets a chance to befall us; that we make an attempt to unleash transformative events on a biospheric scale before we get dragged away by nature’s own acts of emergence’ (Cooper 2006: 126).¶ Cooper’s argument introduces my second concern regarding the militarization of climate change: the ways that the environment is being mobilized. As noted above, the focus on resource wars casts the environment as a ‘hostile power’ (Eckersley 2009: 87). Or, scarcity and degradation are ‘naturalised,’ while institutional causes are obscured (Hartmann 2010: 235). Either way, nature is an externality to be managed as the resurrection of the concept of ‘the commons’ in these debates affirms (see Posen, 2003). Advocacy groups and government representatives alike are using the ‘commons’ to inform their perspectives on climate change security. Abraham Denmark and James Mulvenon explicitly delineate the concept’s legacy to Garrett Hardin’s controversial piece, ‘The tragedy of the commons,’ and his argument that ‘Freedom in a commons brings ruins to all’ (Denmark and Mulvenon 2010: 7-8). Rather than privatization, the contemporary version of the polemic posits that military force is necessary to prevent the misuse and abuse of navigable passageways. In a web article entitled ‘The Contested Commons’ that is linked to the QDR2010, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy of the United States Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley suggest that since WWII, US grand strategy has ‘centered on creating and sustaining an international system that facilitates commerce, travel, and thus the spread of Western values including individual freedom, democracy, and liberty.’11 This ‘uncontested access to and stability within the global commons’ of air, sea, space and cyberspace has only been possible because of US military power. As the emergent multipolar world challenges its hegemony, they argue, it is in the US’s interest to shore up its military and defend the ‘global commons,’ in partnership with its allies (see also Denmark and Mulvenon, 2010).12 The military build-up in the Arctic, where states are jockeying over access to previously unnavigable passageways and resources, is held out as an example of how emergent resource conflicts are taking shape, but also the need for a coordinated US approach to protect its interests (Carmen et al, 2010; Paskal, 2007).¶ The discourse around the ‘commons’ reinforces the idea that the environment is to be controlled and managed. This is equally the case with respect to how the militarization of climate change is also reshaping domestic politics and society. Catherine Lutz reflects that ‘As or more important than the efficacy of a mode of warfare... has been the form of life it has encouraged inside the nation waging it’ (Lutz 2002: 727). Her own critical work on militarism examines the social formations that are organized around the military, eg the racialized and gender labour economies of suburban US formed around the production of nuclear weapons. Environmental relations need also be taken into consideration: they are constituted through the military which is charged with bringing nature under control: to model it, to manage it and to make it predictable in the name of security, albeit an anthropocentric security that is only ‘understood in human terms’ (Barnett 2001: 65; emphasis in the original). That the US military is increasingly becoming a site and source for new ‘green’ technologies is just one such manifestation of the orchestration of life for military purposes, and is suggestive of the problematic deepening and extension of the military-industrial-academic-scientific complex.¶ The QDR sets out the complex web of collaborations that will tackle climate change: the ‘DoD will partner with academia, other U.S. agencies, and international partners to research, develop, test, and evaluate new sustainable energy technologies’ (QDR 2010: 87). Military innovations such as GPS, radar and the Internet are offered as comparable examples of transformative technological innovation that have had immense social benefit (Warner and Singer 2009: 6). This provides a rationalization for the millions of dollars that are being siphoned into the military so that it can be at the frontlines of developing alternative energy projects. For example, the largest existing solar panel project in the US is at the Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, where 70,000 solar panels are spread out across 140 acres to generate 14 megawatts (about 45 million KWh) a year.13 A $2 billion agreement signed in 2009 between DoD and Irwin Energy Security Partners will make Fort Irwin—the army’s largest training camp located in California’s Mojave Desert— energy independent by 2022, with a 500MW solar project on 21 square miles.14 Zero-energy homes are being built on US military bases.15 A project is underway to introduce 4,000 electric cars into the armed forces to create one of the largest such fleets in the world (Pew 2010: 13). The first hybrid Navy vessel, a Wasp class amphibious assault ship, is already on the water (Rosenthal, 2010). In Iraq, the Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery (or ‘tiger’) is converting garbage to biofuel to power generators.16 In Helmand Province, Afghanistan, solar panels are being used on tents, for recharging computers and other equipment (Rosenthal, 2010). The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the research and development office of the military in change of technological advancement—is developing alternative fuel sources, from products such as algae and rapeseed that are less carbon-intensive.17 The objective of biofuels development is to make military transport more sustainable, like the ‘Great Green Fleet’ of aircraft carriers and support ships that is in development for 2016 (Shachtman, 2010).¶ It is not that this ‘greening’ of the military is unwarranted, or that these technological developments are not desirable. If there is to be a military at all, it might as well be more sustainable. As it is, the US military is the world’s single largest energy consumer—it consumes more than any other private or public institution, and more than 100 nations (Warner and Singer 2009: 1; see also Deloitte, 2009; Sanders, 2009). This comprises 0.8% of total US energy, and about 78% of government energy use—roughly 395,000 barrels of oil a day, equivalent to all of Greece (Warner and Singer 2009: 2). Its operations abroad are equally rapacious. In the first-ever energy audit in a war zone it was revealed that US marines in Afghanistan used 800,000 gallons of fuel each day.18 Figures from Iraq show that between 2003 and 2007 the war generated 141 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent—more than 139 countries (Reisch and Kretzmann 2008: 4). There is thus a clear case for reducing the military’s damaging impact on the landscape.¶ The question that the ‘greening’ of the military sidesteps, however, is whether there should indeed be a military at all. Moreover, even if the military persists, should it be where climate change innovations are located? Should public funds be directed into the military to fight climate change? In a speech on energy security in March, 2010, President Obama lauded the $2.7 billion already spent that year by the DoD on energy efficiency measures.19 This investment is being used to support select military partnerships, with a strong emphasis on privatization. The solar panel project at Nellis Air Force Base Nevada, mentioned above, is a privately financed and owned initiative by MMA Renewables, with equity investments from Citi and Allstate.20 The panels will be owned by the financiers; Nellis will lease the land, and purchase the power. The Fort Irwin project agreed to in October 2009 operates along similar lines, and is a partnership with the Clark Energy Group and Acciona Solar Power.21 The zero-energy homes being installed in Kentucky are a public-private partnership between the US Army and Actus Lend Lease.22 Universities are also complicit: the Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery at¶ the Victory Base Camp in Baghdad, for example, has been developed in conjunction with Purdue University.23¶ When environmental issues are filtered through the military, however, less money is available for innovation in other sectors, unless they are working in partnership with the military. Military investment in green initiatives, for example, is not likely to develop innovations around public transport, but rather focus on the kind of transportation required for military needs, which will then become available to consumers—much as Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) are an offshoot of four-wheel drive military vehicles. Moreover, a military-driven agenda contributes to a more protectionist approach around technological innovation that is exacerbated alongside an uneven landscape of investment (UNEP 2007: 404).24¶ The priorities around climate change are thus skewed by the military. As President Obama affirmed in his March 2010 speech, the primary national interest is really with energy independence, not energy reduction.25 At the same time that he was applauding the greening of the military, the President announced the expansion of offshore oil and gas exploration, including in the Bay of Mexico. (This expansion was later suspended in wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, before being resumed.) The military has also presented a case for mitigating the reliance on (foreign) oil and developing renewable energy, which has more to do with the impact on military personnel in the field than with ecological principles. In the last five years, fuel consumption at US forward operating bases in conflict zones has increased from 50 million gallons to 500 million gallons a year (Deloitte 2009: 15). This creates a dangerous situation for the ‘long tail’ of convoys that are needed to supply these bases (Pew 2010: 7). Some reports indicate that more than three quarters of US casualties in war zones are the result of supply vehicles that have been targeted by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and convoys have been identified by Commandant General James Conway as ‘one of his most pressing problems related to risk of casualties’ (Deloitte 2009: 15; see also CNA, 2009). Shachtman (2010) reports that in Iraq, ‘In one month, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost.’ This is a problem that the QDR takes explicitly on board. Whereas climate change is presented as a ‘threat multiplier,’ energy efficiency is described as a ‘force multiplier, because it increases the range and endurance of forces in the field and can reduce the number of combat forces diverted to protect energy supply lines, which are vulnerable to both asymmetric and conventional attacks and disruptions’ (QDR 2010: 87). The reduction of casualties is thus propelling much of the impetus for renewable energy, even though it is couched in climate change rhetoric (see also Warner and Singer 2009: 2; Deloitte 2009: 27). Notably, there is no mention, across any of the policy documents that have appeared, about the devastating environmental impact of war upon the landscapes where it takes place, and the need to prevent or even mitigate this destruction.¶ Back at home, military personnel returning from war are being enrolled as climate ‘warriors.’ During the 2009 election campaign Obama announced a ‘Green Vets Initiative’ that would provide ‘green’ training and jobs in the private sector for the 837,000 vets of Iraq and Afghanistan. While this exact initiative has not been introduced, the government has promoted ‘Green Energy Jobs’ through its Veterans Workforce Investment Program and through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.26 This is a reconfiguration, and privatization, of the civilian-military pact of cradle-to-grave provision of social welfare (see Lutz 2002: 730). To this end, programs have begun popping up across the US. The ‘Green Collar Vets’ is a non-profit organization in Texas that helps retrain and reskill vets for the green economy.27 The organization ‘Veterans Green Jobs,’ in partnership with several educational institutions and organizations such as Walmart, Whole Foods, and the Sierra Club, provides vets of four states with training opportunities for the ‘green’ economy. What differentiates their program, they argue, is that their keystone course ‘Green 101,’ makes explicit the links between green programs and national security. 28 Veterans are also taking on a more activist role to promote the shift to renewable energy. A group of US Vets, sponsored by Operation Free (whose mission is ‘to secure America with clean energy’), travelled to Copenhagen to discuss the national security dimensions of climate change (and groups have also travelled across the US to visit Senate Offices, and to the White House).29¶ Domestic programs for vets, and resource and research investments for ‘greening’ the military point to some fundamental ways that domestic social formations are being reorganized in support of the militarization of climate change. This is part of militarism’s typical ‘double move’: on the one hand, war is projected as being ‘over there’ while the ‘second move saturates our daily lives with war-ness’ (Ferguson 2009: 478). Domestic measures to address energy security are put forward as calculable, rational and even compassionate measures, while the ‘foreign’ threat is presented as non-state, elusive, and undetermined—and hence coherent with much of the discourse around diffuse ‘new wars’ and terrorist threats (Kaldor, 2006). At the same time, there is also greater convergence between the inside and the outside, and between the environment and the military in the ways that the discourses are mobilized and mapped out (Cooper, 2006). Indeed, as Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen notes, there is a coherence between pre-emptive military doctrines and precautionary environmental strategies: both are based upon a rationale for urgent action based on anticipated future disaster scenarios (Rasmussen 2006: 124). Notably, however, it is only when environmental issues are harnessed to security claims that the precautionary approach gains traction.¶ Hiving climate change to national security ensures that environmental issues will garner more attention, as is argued by many of the experts on the environment and security noted above. But as I have sought to illustrate in this paper, instead of opening up questions regarding security or the environment, these are foreclosed by a military approach. It reduces the concept of security to a nationalist, defensive strategy modelled on future disaster scenarios of resource conflict. Moreover, it perpetuates an externalized concept of nature that is to be commanded and controlled, with no real sense of ecological prioritization. Rather, energy security emerges as the primary focus for innovation and investment to combat geopolitical concerns around the reliance on foreign oil and the threat to military personnel in the field. At the same time, increased spending on the military is legitimized as it becomes a source of ‘green’ initiatives. Where does this leave politics, and more precisely, as Melinda Cooper asks, ‘What becomes of an anti-war politics when the sphere of military action infiltrates the ‘grey areas’ of everyday life, contaminating our ‘quality of life’ at the most elemental level?’ (Cooper 2006: 129). If we support climate change initiatives, are we then pro-military? If we are anti-military, do we jeopardize climate change action? As the militarization of climate change unfolds, it is this interpenetration that needs to be disrupted, both with respect to martial approaches to the environment, and with respect to the troubling attempts to use the mobilization of climate change to re-moralize war and the military.
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Gilbert 12 [Emily, Director of the Canadian Studies Program in the Graduate Program in Geography at the University of Toronto, ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 11(1), “The Militarization of Climate Change,” p. 1-10]
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Climate change has been identified as a top military concern We should be worried Climate change is presented as a ‘threat multiplier’ that will propel food and water scarcity, environmental degradation, poverty, the spread of disease, and mass migration Each of these could contribute to ‘failed state’ scenarios which will demand military intervention interest in climate change resurrects a narrow concept of security it models the anticipated conflict through a traditional state-to-state war scenario, refracted through a neo-Malthusian conflict over resources Resource conflict and other climate change impacts are mapped onto already vulnerable places in Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia where, it is argued, they will act as ‘threat multipliers’ that will escalate into ‘failed state’ scenarios This perpetuates a model whereby the enemy to the nation is elsewhere, and that ‘environmental threats are something that foreigners do to Americans not as a result of domestic policies The bifurcation of domestic security and external threat reinforces a fiction of territorial and nationalist integrity, and works against thinking about climate change as a global problem with a need for global responsibility and global solutions the model of external threats coheres easily with the competitive frame that has been established between China and the US, as they vie not only for economic ascendency and resource-acquisition, but also for energy security and environmental policies and initiatives the military is legitimized, to the detriment of formal and informal politics In a secretive and hierarchical military framework there is limited scope for public participation or legislative debate Issues regarding social justice are disregarded in favour of national objectives, while the vulnerabilities institutionalized through climate change are perpetuated Militarism encourages the use of force against foreigners, with barriers erected to exclude those who bear the immediate impact of climate change The responses to human tragedy in Haiti and Hurricane Katrina, when military priorities took hold over the immediate needs of the racialized, impoverished victims, speaks to the dangers of concocting security threats so that abandonment is prioritized over assistance the military’s approach to climate change does not lend itself to addressing fundamental social structures that perpetuate environmental degradation The conditions that entrench insecurity are thus left unchallenged attention is directed to long term defensive planning and risk scenarios around potential disaster outcomes with the military presented as the only, or simply the best and most capable, institution for dealing with the scope of the adversity Security exercises are used to model disasters Worst possible outcomes are anticipated, and they these become the basis for actions in the present the focus on resource wars casts the environment as a ‘hostile power’ scarcity and degradation are ‘naturalised,’ while institutional causes are obscured nature is an externality to be managed the contemporary version of the polemic posits that military force is necessary to prevent the misuse and abuse of navigable passageways the militarization of climate change is reshaping domestic politics and society That the US military is increasingly becoming a site and source for new ‘green’ technologies is just one such manifestation of the orchestration of life for military purposes, and is suggestive of the problematic deepening and extension of the military-industrial-academic-scientific complex This provides a rationalization for the millions of dollars that are being siphoned into the military so that it can be at the frontlines of developing alternative energy projects It is not that this ‘greening’ of the military is unwarranted, or that these technological developments are not desirable The question that the ‘greening’ of the military sidesteps, however, is whether there should indeed be a military at all even if the military persists Should public funds be directed into the military to fight climate change? When environmental issues are filtered through the military less money is available for innovation in other sectors, unless they are working in partnership with the military a military-driven agenda contributes to a more protectionist approach around technological innovation that is exacerbated alongside an uneven landscape of investment The priorities around climate change are thus skewed by the military Whereas climate change is presented as a ‘threat multiplier,’ energy efficiency is described as a ‘force multiplier there is no mention, across any of the policy documents that have appeared, about the devastating environmental impact of war upon the landscapes where it takes place, and the need to prevent or even mitigate this destruction domestic social formations are being reorganized in support of the militarization of climate change This is part of militarism’s typical ‘double move’ on the one hand, war is projected as being ‘over there’ while the ‘second move saturates our daily lives with war-ness’ Domestic measures to address energy security are put forward as calculable, rational and even compassionate measures, while the ‘foreign’ threat is presented as non-state, elusive, and undetermined—and hence coherent with much of the discourse around diffuse ‘new wars’ and terrorist threats At the same time, there is also greater convergence between the inside and the outside, and between the environment and the military in the ways that the discourses are mobilized and mapped out there is a coherence between pre-emptive military doctrines and precautionary environmental strategies: both are based upon a rationale for urgent action based on anticipated future disaster scenarios instead of opening up questions regarding security or the environment, these are foreclosed by a military approach It reduces the concept of security to a nationalist, defensive strategy modelled on future disaster scenarios of resource conflict Moreover, it perpetuates an externalized concept of nature that is to be commanded and controlled, with no real sense of ecological prioritization Rather, energy security emerges as the primary focus for innovation and investment to combat geopolitical concerns around the reliance on foreign oil and the threat to military personnel in the field At the same time, increased spending on the military is legitimized as it becomes a source of ‘green’ initiatives As the militarization of climate change unfolds, it is this interpenetration that needs to be disrupted, both with respect to martial approaches to the environment, and with respect to the troubling attempts to use the mobilization of climate change to re-moralize war and the military
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Framing climate change in terms of security legitimizes preemptive military doctrines to ‘contain’ anticipated threats while foreclosing attention to the institutional drivers of environmental degradation – rejecting the militarization of warming is a prerequisite to forging effective political responses to ecological destruction.
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My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87¶ ¶ What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.¶ ¶ The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.¶ ¶ But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly 89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.¶ ¶ When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90¶ ¶ This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?
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Burke 7 [Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, Theory & Event, 10:2, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Muse]
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war is the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us violent ontologies dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come to stand in for progress, modernity and reason the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence It creates both discursive constraints available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy policy choice can be all too often limited; they can remain confined within the overarching strategic and security paradigms a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it
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Security politics is the root cause of war and environmental destruction – criticism is a prerequisite to reducing global violence.
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Security is, to put Wæver's argument in other words, a socially constructed concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context. 18 It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them. 19 To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there." 20 But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions. 21 That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with theirs.
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Lipschutz 98 [Ronnie D., Assistant Professor of Politics and Director of the Adlai Stevenson Program on Global Security at the University of California – Santa Cruz, “On Security,” in On Security, ed. Lipshutz, p. 10]
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Security is a socially constructed concept It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them while interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions Enemies "create" each other via the projections of their worst fears onto the other their relationship is intersubjective To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character
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Attempts to secure security provoke self-fulfilling prophecies – projections of enmity provide the rationale for escalating hostilities.
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More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations.¶ Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35]¶ Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.¶ In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[ 36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.
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Dillon & Reid 00 [Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, & Julian, Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 25:1, Jan-Mar, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency,” Ebsco]
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where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise a policy problematic will emerge Policy domains turn epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require continuous attention of policymakers there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy "paralysis of analysis" is what policymakers seek to avoid Yet serial policy failure the fate and the fuel of all policy compels them into a continuous search for new analysis Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that policy science will ultimately overcome Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process that changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate As a particular kind of intervention into life global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems nonlinear economy of power/knowledge it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously problematized by it In consequence thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems
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Security politics assures the constant reproduction of the very problems it seeks to eradicate – serial policy failure guts Aff solvency.
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The peace movement also has denigrated the value of civil defence, apparently, in part, because a realistic examination of civil defence would undermine beliefs about total annihilation. The many ways in which the effects of nuclear war are exaggerated and worst cases emphasized can be explained as the result of a presupposition by antiwar scientists and activists that their political aims will be fulfilled when people are convinced that there is a good chance of total disaster from nuclear war.[7] There are quite a number of reasons why people may find a belief in extinction from nuclear war to be attractive.[8] Here I will only briefly comment on a few factors. The first is an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the population of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. This is quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World. The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world. Symptomatic of this orientation is the belief that, without Western aid and trade, the economies and populations of the Third World would face disaster. But this is only Western self-centredness. Actually, Third World populations would in many ways be better off without the West: the pressure to grow cash crops of sugar, tobacco and so on would be reduced, and we would no longer witness fresh fish being airfreighted from Bangladesh to Europe. A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I disagree, both morally and politically, with the stance that preventing nuclear war has become the most important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war. Nuclear war may be the greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor, nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues are more pressing. In political terms, to give precedence to nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in major social institutions, including the state, capitalism, state socialism and patriarchy. If war is deeply embedded in such structures - as I would argue[9] - then to try to prevent war without making common cause with other social movements will not be successful politically. This means that the antiwar movement needs to link its strategy and practice with other movements such as the feminist movement, the workers' control movement and the environmental movement. A focus on nuclear extinction also encourages a focus on appealing to elites as the means to stop nuclear war, since there seems no other means for quickly overcoming the danger. For example, Carl Sagan, at the end of an article about nuclear winter in a popular magazine, advocates writing letters to the presidents of the United States and of the Soviet Union.[10] But if war has deep institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of success. This has been amply illustrated by the continual failure of disarmament negotiations and appeals to elites over the past several decades. Just about everyone, including generals and prime ministers, is opposed to nuclear war. The question is what to do about it. Many people have incorporated doomsday ideas into their approaches. My argument here is that antiwar activists should become much more critical of the assumptions underlying extinction politics.
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Martin 84 (Brian, research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, and a member of SANA, “Extinction Politics,” Scientists Against Nuclear Arms Newsletter, number 16, May, pp. 5-6, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/84sana1.html)
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The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the population of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union This is quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white West is claimed to be a problem for all the world the belief that, without Western aid populations of the Third World would face disaster But this is only Western self-centredness linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war to give precedence to nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in major social institutions, including the state, capitalism and patriarchy war is deeply embedded in such structures A focus on nuclear extinction encourages a focus on appealing to elites as the means to stop nuclear war But if war has deep institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of success.
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Their focus on nuclear war authorizes structural violence.
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You cannot work for one day with the violent people who fill our prisons and mental hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcibly and constantly reminded of the extreme poverty and discrimination that characterize their lives. Hearing about their lives, and about their families and friends, you are forced to recognize the truth in Gandhi’s observation that the deadliest form of violence is poverty. Not a day goes by without realizing that trying to understand them and their virulent behavior in purely individual terms is impossible and wrong-headed. Any theory of violence, especially a psychological theory, that evolves from the experience of men in maximum security prisons and hospitals for the criminally insane must begin with the recognition that these institutions are only microcosms. They are not where the major violence of our society takes place, and the perpetrators who fill them are far from being the main causes of most violent deaths. Any approach to a theory of violence needs to begin with a look at the structural violence of this country. Focusing merely on those relatively few men who commit what we define as murder could distract us from examining and learning from those structural causes of violent death that are far more significant from a numerical or public health, or human, standpoint By “structural violence” I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstratably large portion of them) are a function of class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society’s collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting “structural” with “behavioral violence,” by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. Structural violence differs from behavioral violence in at least three major respects The lethal effects of structural violence operate continuously rather than sporadically, whereas murders, suicides, executions, wars, and other forms of behavioral violence occur one at a time. Structural violence operates more or less independently of individual acs; independent of individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose decisions may nevertheless have lethal consequences for others. Structural violence is normally invisible, because it may appear to have had other (natural or violent) causes. Neither the existence, the scope and extent, nor the lethal power of structural violence can be discerned until we shift our focus from a clinical or psychological perspective, which looks at one individual at a time, to the epidemiological perspective of public health and preventative medicine. Examples are all around us. [Continues – Page 195] The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those caused by genocide---or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000 deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 deaths, and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetuated on the week and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence—structural or behavioral—is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.
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Gilligan 96 (James, Faculty – Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes, p. 191-196)
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war cannot begin to compare with structural violence every fifteen years as many people die because of poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war This is the equivalent of an ongoing, unending accelerating, thermonuclear war perpetuated on the week and poor Structural violence is also the main cause of war and genocide violence structural or behavioral are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.
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Structural violence outweighs war.
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Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that political arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made increasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seems to require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom, inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surrender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterised by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further—the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible—and that this found its paradigmatic expression, for example, in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. This logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics—the axioms of inter-State security relations, popularised, for example, through strategic discourse— even if the details have changed.
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Dillon 96 [Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, p. 26]
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what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a mere species of calculation For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that political arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made increasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seems to require the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom, inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible found its paradigmatic expression in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War where everything up to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security This logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics
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Security politics destroys value to life, reducing humans to units of calculation.
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This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is.¶ ¶ I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth' 18 in its most sweeping and powerful form.¶ ¶ I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being.¶ ¶ This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21¶ ¶ What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action.¶ ¶ The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22¶ ¶ The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.¶ ¶ The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.
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Burke 7 [Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, Theory & Event, 10:2, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Muse]
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'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity ontologies statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind ontology is the 'politics of truth' in its most sweeping and powerful form I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such he dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence joined to an ontology of violence In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political
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Crafting political strategies geared toward promoting security makes violence inevitable – criticism is a prerequisite to sustainable peace.
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It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21
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Biswas 7 [Shampa, Professor of Politics – Whitman College, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist”, Millennium, 36(1), p. 117-125]
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Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites there seems to be amnesia about the discipline, and its complicities in the production of empire Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine global power. this is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have circumscribed the ability of scholars to actually think globally and politically IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’ as a disturber of the status quo self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent The academy has become a particularly embattled site with the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ what has made possible the encroachment of such statist agendas has been a larger history of professionalisation Reid has critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’ is the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and willingness to be seduced by power This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but a larger question of intellectual orientation It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their conclusions entirely in terms of policy wisdom Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts resonant in the contemporary context critical appraisal wherein ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised IR scholars need to pay particular heed to understanding intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise
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Exclusively focusing on policymaking crowds outs critical questioning.
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“we are the war” does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society – Which would be equilavent to exonerating warlords and politicans and profeteers or, as , Ulrich beck says, upholding the notion of ‘collective irresponsibility’, where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyses the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective ‘assumption’ of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major drams of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own spehere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility – leading to the well-know illusions of our apparent ‘powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens – even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somolia. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatiaon president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment and thus into underatting the responsibility we have within our own sphere of action, in particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls ‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongerers, For we tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation, because we are not where the major decisions are made, Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of “what would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?” Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN – finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’ ‘We are this war’, however , even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our ‘non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ – our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for regugees, one for our own and one violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the violence. So if we move beyond the usual frame of violence, towards the structures of thought employed in decisions to act, this also means making an analysis of action. This seems all the more urgent as action seems barely to be perceived any longer. There is talk of the government doing ‘nothing’ of it’s ‘inaction’, of the need for action, the time for action, the need for strategies, our inability to act as well as our desire to become ‘active’ again/ we seem to deem ourselves in a kind of action vacuum which, like the cosmic black hole, tends to consume any renewed effort only to increase its size/ hence this increase its size. Hence this is also an attempt to shift the focus again to the fact that we are continually action and doing, and that there is no such thing as not acting or doing nothing
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Kappeler 95 (Susanne Kappeler - lecturer in English at the University of East Anglia and an Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University 1995, “The Will to Violence : The politics of Personal Behavior”)
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our habit of focusing on the stage where the major drams of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own spehere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-know illusions of our apparent ‘powerlessness’ and political disillusionment Single citizens have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for large-scale political events our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a general or president tends to mislead us into thinking that we have no responsibility at all thus underatting the responsibility we have within our own sphere of action it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions It shows that we participate in organized irresponsibility’ It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongerers tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything because we are not where the major decisions are made Which is why many engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of “what would I do if I were the president Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’ what I could do seems petty and futile our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer we are continually action and doing there is no such thing as not acting or doing nothing
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Focus on government action fosters a disavowal of personal responsibility – our confidence and ability to effect change is lost in a fantasy world where we can only produce change if we’re politicians.
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This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?
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Bruce 96 [Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9]
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The inability to give meaning reflects the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts where entry is gained by learning to speak a exclusionary language that debate will be furthered only through a critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives This is not conventional in the sense of offering sets of neat alternative solutions in familiar format, to problems This expectation is part of the problem to be analysed experts Before engaging in policy debate critics need to reframe the terms of reference positivism and rationalism have lost their allure security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on security This questions distinctions between policy practice and academic theory theory is integral to the practice of policy prescription The book calls on policy-makers to think critically to recognise that what is involved is not to identify a replacement but a realisation that concepts of security are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills There are none ritualistic security mind-sets are dressed up as new thinking attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized underlying assumptions need to be recognized and questioned doubt in place of confident certainty is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow we need to look not so much at contending policies but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives interpretations of “reality” their meaning
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Criticism is a prerequisite to effective policymaking.
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These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth ... the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophobic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.
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Burke 7 [Anthony, Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and Professor of International Relations at University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4]
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It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches optimistic accounts of globalisation or centrist Israeli security discourses based on compromise The surface appearance of lively debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophobic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique
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Including the Aff wards off critique.
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But what if at the heart of the logic of security lies not a vision of freedom or emancipation, but a means of modelling the whole of human society around a particular vision of order? What if security is little more than a semantic and semiotic black hole allowing authority to inscribe itself deeply into human experience? What if the magic word ‘security’ serves merely to neutralise political action, encouraging us to surrender ourselves to the state in a thoroughly conservative fashion?20 And what if this surrender facilitates an ongoing concession to authority and the institutional violence which underpins the authority in question, and thus constitutes the first key step in learning how to treat people not as human beings, but as objects to be administered? In other words, what if the major requirement of our time is less an expanded, refined, or redefined vision of security, and nothing less than a critique of security? Corey Robin points out that when a particular idea routinely accompanies atrocities then some real critical engagement with the idea would seem to be in order.21 And since there is a clear and not particularly long line linking the idea of security and the atrocities being carried out in Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib and the other ‘security centres’ at which people are currently being held, never mind the long history of states slaughtering millions in the name of security, then the time must be right for a critique of security.¶ The starting point of the critique is to see it not as some kind of universal or transcendental value, but rather as a mode of governing, a political technology through which individuals, groups, classes, and, ultimately, modern capital is reshaped and reordered. As a principle of formation, as Mick Dillon calls it,22 security is a technique of power; a political enactment deployed and mobilised in the exercise of power. Extending an argument I have made elsewhere,23 I want to show the extent to which security has facilitated a form of liberal order-building, and to develop a critique of the constant re-ordering of politics and reshaping of society in the name of security. In so doing I aim to challenge the ways in which security has become the master narrative through which the state shapes our lives and imaginations (security risks here, security measures there, security police everywhere), producing and organising subjects in a way that is always already predisposed towards the exercise of violence in defence of the established order. As such, the critique of security is part and parcel of a wider critique of power. This requires taking on the thinkers, groups and classes which have accepted and peddled the security fetish: security-obsessed politicians and policy wonks, the security and intelligence services, the security industry and security intellectuals; the ‘security Fuckers’, as James Kelman calls them.¶ Such a critique must stand at a critical distance from critical security studies (and thus act as a kind of ‘critique of critical criticism’, in the sense in which Marx meant it in 1845). This ‘school’ of thought argues that security has to be oriented around the notion of emancipation. Ken Booth has argued that since ‘security’ is the absence of threats and ‘emancipation’ is the freeing of people from human and physical constraints, ‘security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security’. He adds that this equation can be sustained empirically: ‘emancipation, empirically, is security’.24 This seems to me to be as about as mistaken as one can possibly be about security; as we will see in Chapter 1, it is in fact far closer to classical liberalism than it is to critical theory.25 Part of the argument here is that security and oppression are the two sides of the same coin.¶ Any argument of this kind needs to go well beyond the places in which security is usually studied. ‘Security studies’ as such has tried a little too hard to understand itself as a discipline, and in so doing has tended to replicate the various schools or positions found in the study of international relations, offering up its own version of the narrow and deeply disciplinary ‘name, school and subfield’ approach without which most academics seem lost. And yet the proliferation of work aiming to expand security has quickly run into difficulties of definition. For example, the United Nations tells us that ‘human security’ has two aspects: ‘first, safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression’ and, second, ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities’.26 Whatever logic the first aspect may have, the second aspect appears to turn all human being and social interaction into a security problematic (neatly handing them over, of course, to the institutions which like to claim the power and right to secure). At the same time, one finds people working on security and yet seemingly talking about very different things. The extent to which ‘security’ has been ‘disciplined’ over the years27 has been used to ‘discipline’ people in turn, encouraging intellectuals to retreat so far into their fields of expertise that, for example, people working on ‘social security’ have absolutely no contact with people working on ‘national security’ (just one of the many instances in which the division of intellectual labour in the university reflects nicely the desire of the state to keep these things apart, to draw a veil over the unity of state power). Rather than seek to be part of a discipline or school centred on security – of the traditional, critical, or expanded type; of the national or social kind – the critique of security ranges widely and wildly through and around security studies and international political economy; history, law and political theory; international relations and historical sociology, in a seriously ill-disciplined manner which will no doubt annoy the Guardians of Discipline and Professors of Good Order (the ‘security guards’ of the modern academy). Academic disciplines are part of a much broader problem of the compartmentalisation of knowledge and division of the intellect against which critical theory must struggle. This book is therefore not even meant to be an inter-disciplinary text; rather, it is anti-disciplinary. It is a work of critique.¶ Marx once described Capital as ‘a critique of economic categories or, if you like, a critical exposé of the system of bourgeois economy’.28 He saw critique as a method for simultaneously unmasking ideas and rooting them within the context of class society and the commodity form. This book is an attempt at a critique of one of the key political categories of our time, as a simultaneous critical exposé of the system of bourgeois politics. In that sense it is meant as an unmasking of the ideology and a defetishising of the system of security. One of the features of ideology is that it imposes an obviousness or naturalness on ideas without appearing to do so – a double victory in which the obviousness of the ideas in question is taken as a product of their ‘naturalness’, and vice versa: their obviousness is obvious because they are so natural.29 This is nowhere truer than with security, the necessity of which appears so obvious and natural, so right and true, that it closes off all opposition; it has to remain unquestioned, unanalysed and undialectically presupposed, rather like the order which it is expected to secure. And if opposition to security is closed off, then so too is opposition to the political and social forces which have placed it at the heart of the political agenda. I want to write against this ideology by writing about the ways in which security has been coined, shaped and deployed by political, commercial and intellectual forces. The book is therefore written against the security-mongering – in the literal sense of the ‘monger’ as one who traffics in a petty or discreditable way – that dominates contemporary politics. I will perhaps be charged with not taking insecurity seriously enough. But to take security seriously means to take it critically, and not to cower in the face of its monopolistic character. This is to hold true to the idea of critique as a political genre that aims to resist the course of a world which continues to hold a gun to the heads of human beings.30
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Neocleous 8 [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, Critique of Security, p. 4-7]
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at the heart of the logic of security lies not a vision of freedom or emancipation, but a semantic and semiotic black hole allowing authority to inscribe itself ‘security’ serves merely to neutralise political action, encouraging us to surrender ourselves to the state this surrender facilitates an ongoing concession to authority and the institutional violence which underpins the authority in question, and thus constitutes the first key step in learning how to treat people not as human beings, but as objects the major requirement of our time is when a particular idea routinely accompanies atrocities then some real critical engagement with the idea would seem to be in order And since there is a clear linking security and atrocities carried out in Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib and other ‘security centres’ at which people are held, never mind the long history of states slaughtering millions in the name of security, then the time must be right for a critique of security The starting point of the critique is to see it not as some kind of universal or transcendental value, but rather as a mode of governing, a political technology through which individuals, groups, classes, and, ultimately, modern capital is reshaped and reordered As a principle of formation security is a technique of power a political enactment deployed and mobilised in the exercise of power security has become the master narrative through which the state shapes our lives and imaginations producing and organising subjects in a way that is always already predisposed towards the exercise of violence in defence of the established order Such a critique must stand at a critical distance from critical security studies This ‘school’ of thought argues that security has to be oriented around the notion of emancipation Booth has argued that security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin This seems to me to be as about as mistaken as one can possibly be about security security and oppression are the two sides of the same coin with security, the necessity of which appears so obvious and natural, so right and true, that it closes off all opposition it has to remain unquestioned, unanalysed and undialectically presupposed, rather like the order which it is expected to secure And if opposition to security is closed off, then so too is opposition to the political and social forces which have placed it at the heart of the political agenda to take security seriously means to take it critically, and not to cower in the face of its monopolistic character This is to hold true to the idea of critique as a political genre that aims to resist the course of a world which continues to hold a gun to the heads of human beings
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Security does not promote emancipation – it authorizes violence and forecloses meaningful political contestation.
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Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. 74 History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so. This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.
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Kraig 2 (Robert Alexander, Instructor in Communication at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, State Political Director at the Service Employees International Union, “The Tragic Science: The Uses of Jimmy Carter in Foreign Policy Realism”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 5(1), Spring)
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realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated Realists argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power the realist/idealist dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes realism claims to be rooted in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is its fatalism here is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility Like environmental determinism political realism presumes that human social nature even if ethically deplorable cannot be significantly improved upon The implications of this social philosophy are stark Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself Second alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate Third, the environmental determinism of political realism is antihumanist Foreign policy realism presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism What is needed is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be
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Realism’s not inevitable – their argument is merely an excuse for ceaseless global violence.
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Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas ‘something’ needs to be done here and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of ‘short-termism’ in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as ‘approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation’. Viewed as such, short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating.¶ The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the instability they have caused. Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state ‘failure’.¶ Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of ‘state failure’ in relation to different time increments shaping policy-making might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167–170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa’eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, ‘strong’/’weak’ states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also distorts information.¶ Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the ‘war on terror’ be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories.¶ Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode ‘wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds’, towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to ‘failed states’, the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of ‘failure’ raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention from practitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.
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Bilgin & Morton 4 [Pinar, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, & Adam David, Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, Politics, 24(3), “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism,” p. 176-178]
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Calls for alternative approaches are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas ‘something’ needs to be done here and now it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of ‘short-termism’ in the conduct of current policy short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating a truly strategic approach requires more sensitive consideration of long-term implications whilst also addressing root causes policymakers bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that distorts information policy responses are subject fundamental epistemological concerns Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode towards the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems
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Focus on short-term impacts is epistemologically bankrupt – greater attention to structural conditions and root causes is key.
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The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means combining ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to remain mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and policy relevance. Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of political structures. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one's feet firmly on the ground, not constructing castles in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete alternatives. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a coherent response to many of the central problems of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘how security is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers are insufficiently challenged to question the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102 Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, non-partisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly ‘critical’ approach, such as those from conflict resolution studies who, despite working within a ‘traditional’ framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security to a broader understanding of human security and placing violence in its wider social context.103 Thus, a poststructuralist has no greater claim to be part of this ‘critical’ field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between the violent group and their wider social constituency.104
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Gunning 7 [Jeroen, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales, Government and Opposition 42.3, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?”]
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The notion of emancipation crystallizes the need for policy engagement unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to remain mired in critique without moving beyond this to policy relevance Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of political structures That is the meaning of immanent critique which involves ‘the discovery of latent potentials to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable this means building with one's feet firmly on the ground, not constructing castles in the air Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must also concern itself with offering concrete alternatives it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a coherent response to many of the central problems of political life’ the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars The result is that policy makers are insufficiently challenged to question the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow critical security studies bringing together ‘many perspectives This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, non-partisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly ‘critical’ approach who, despite working within a ‘traditional’ framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security a poststructuralist has no greater claim to be part of this ‘critical’ field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between the violent group and their wider social constituency
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Criticism ought to be channeled toward policy alternatives that reign in international violence – refusing to offer concrete alternatives constitutes an abandonment of hope that forecloses the possibility for institutional change.
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Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations" (italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action."¶ Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain.¶ Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"¶ The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."
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McClean 1 [David E., member of the American Philosophical Practitioners Association, M.A. in Liberal Studies with a concentration in philosophy from New York University, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm]
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These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings this is a disastrous conclusion for our social hopes Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class
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Policy focus key to education – channeling theoretical insights into policy prescriptions is key avert disengagement from the political institutions that inevitably shape peoples’ lives.
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A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use are in no need of such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to go back to the literature. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly influence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of European politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copenhagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European security as it is currently developing. That inevitably requires a more consistent interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The danger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘traditional’ sector of security policymaking, unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.
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Knudsen 1 [Olav. F., Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]
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A danger in focusing on the state is building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls But the state concepts we should use are in no need of such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to go back to the literature. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank assessment of the transnational politics which significantly influence the domestic political agenda the sum of the list of sins amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security the attention to agenda-setting draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of security as it is currently developing. That requires a more consistent interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘traditional’ sector of security policymaking, unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds
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Without alternative security policy options, the security sector will be dominated by the most conservative policymakers.
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In the post-Cold War period, agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the concept; the change in security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parliaments before the concept was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the post-Cold War period. Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Wæver’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the utterance itself that is the act.’ The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Wæver’s joint article of the same year. As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Wæver himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article. This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Wæver first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the consequent ‘politics of panic’, as Wæver aptly calls it. Now, here – in the case of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Wæverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Wæver’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Wæver does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.
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Knudsen 11 [Olav. F., Prof at Södertörn Univ College, Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 360]
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emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat threats refer to ‘real’ phenomena Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them
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Threats aren’t arbitrary – we need to develop strategies for coping with threat perceptions.
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The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life-determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to the extent their life choices and changes are taken away; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats – whether these are the lack of food for one’s children, or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people’s lives. This allows for individual and collective human becoming – the capacity to have some choice about living differently – consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusion follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is not synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming. As an instrumental value, security is sought because it free people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security–and security is always relative –gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to choose to be or become, other than merely surviving as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.
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Booth 5 [Ken, visiting researcher - US Naval War College, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22]
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The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities Look around What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity as a life-determining condition is universal The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people’s lives This allows for individual and collective human becoming the capacity to have some choice about living differently security can be understood as an instrumental value it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored security is not synonymous simply with survival One can survive without being secure Security is therefore more than mere animal survival It is survival-plus the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming As an instrumental value, security is sought because it free people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being The achievement of a level of security gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to choose to be or become, other than merely surviving as human biological organisms Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological
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Security is not about mere survival – rather, some degree of relative security is a prerequisite to human becoming and emancipation.
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The final ethical position — the polar opposite of the first — holds that the exercise of hegemonic power is never ethically justifiable. One source of such a position might be pacifist thought, which abhors the use of violence even in unambiguous cases of self-defence. This would not, however, provide a comprehensive critique of the exercise of hegemonic power, which takes forms other than overt violence, such as economic diplomacy or the manipulation of international institutions. A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination. Postmodernists (and anarchists, for that matter) might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity. Radical liberals might contend that the exercise of power by one human over another transforms the latter from a moral agent into a moral subject, thus violating their integrity as self-governing individuals. Whatever the source, these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form. The idea that the state is a source of individual security is replaced here with the idea of the state as a tyranny; the idea of hegemony as essential to the provision of global public goods is A framework for judgement Which of the above ideas help us to evaluate the ethics of the Bush Administration's revisionist hegemonic project? There is a strong temptation in international relations scholarship to mount trenchant defences of favoured paradigms, to show that the core assumptions of one's preferred theory can be adapted to answer an ever widening set of big and important questions. There is a certain discipline of mind that this cultivates, and it certainly brings some order to theoretical debates, but it can lead to the 'Cinderella syndrome', the squeezing of an ungainly, over-complicated world into an undersized theoretical glass slipper. The study of international ethics is not immune this syndrome, with a long line of scholars seeking master normative principles of universal applicability. My approach here is a less ambitious, more pragmatic one. With the exceptions of the first and last positions, each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy, and to consider how they might stand in order of priority. The following discussion takes up this challenge and arrives at a position that I tentatively term 'procedural solidarism'. The first and last of our five ethical positions can be dismissed as unhelpful to our task. The idea that might is right resonates with the cynical attitude we often feel towards the darker aspects of international relations, but it does not constitute an ethical standpoint from which to judge the exercise of hegemonic power. First of all, it places the right of moral judgement in the hands of the hegemon, and leaves all of those subject to its actions with no grounds for ethical critique. What the hegemon dictates as ethical is ethical. More than this, though, the principle that might is right is undiscriminating. It gives us no resources to determine ethical from unethical hegemonic conduct. The idea that might is never right is equally unsatisfying. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power. But like its polar opposite, it is utterly undiscriminating. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with one blanket assessment. No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. This is a deeply impoverished ethical posture, as it raises the critique of power above all other human values. It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide, would this not have been ethically justifiable? If one answers no, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost a million people to be massacred. If one answers yes, then one is admitting that a more discriminating set of ethical principles is needed than the simple yet enticing proposition that might is never right.
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Reus-Smit 4 [Christian, Senior Fellow in International Relations at the Australian National University, American Power and World Order p. 109-115]
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A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination Postmodernists might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity , these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy The idea that might is never right is equally unsatisfying. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power like its polar opposite, it is utterly undiscriminating. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with one blanket assessment No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. This is a deeply impoverished ethical posture as it raises the critique of power above all other human values It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide, would this not have been ethically justifiable one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost a million people to be massacred
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Their blanket kritik of hegemony is ethically unjustifiable – reigning in the worst aspect of global dominance solves their offense, but preserves ethical good of avoiding conflict.
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Perhaps the most hideous image of the congruity of insecurity and the determined life in the Western imagination was that of the inmates of the Nazi death-camps. Years after the war, Primo Levi related how, driven by thirst on his first day in Auschwitz, he reached for an icicle. A guard snatched it away. When Levi asked 'Warum? the guard pushed him away: 'Hier ist kein wanim' ('There is no why here)." Here was survival, for a shorter or longer time, but definitely no security, not even the choice of asking 'Why?' The determined life in extrernis of the death- camp inmate is rare, though not as rare as one would hope. Nonetheless, people can live honourable lives surviving in extreme insecurity. There is some space for human dignity in the death-camp, in the trenches, or grubbing for food on rubbish tips. But there is not much Such a life is not much different from that of non-human animals existing only to feed and protect their young, driven by some biological imperative to survive. Since the earliest times societies have shared the belief that human being/being human should be more than this. 22 The most basic task for emancipatory politics must therefore be to create conditions in which sentient bodies are never driven into sites of insecurity where the freedom to ask Why?' and to live in dignity is never present. It is important here to distinguish between insecurity that is enforced and life-determining, and danger that is chosen. Insecurity of the sort discussed above and elective danger are not synonymous When people choose risky pastimes or when powerful states choose to take on ambitious foreign interventions, they place themselves in some danger, but they are not facing insecurity in the sense discussed above. Elective dan- ger is synonymous with a sort of freedom. The insecure of the earth have neither the time nor the resources to engage in Formula One car racing, nor in organising expeditions to climb the highest peaks. There is all the difference in the world between those who go into the mountains for recreation and challenge - and have the time and money to do so - and those Kurds who went into the mountains to flee from Saddam Hussein's forces in 1991. Security allows choice, and some choices (the result of security rather than insecurity) may be life-threatening. Elective danger is a privilege of the secure; direct and unavoidable danger is the determining condition of the world's insecure. Those whose lives are dominated by the search for scraps of food on a refuse tip on the edges of Sao Paulo have no choice about what to do. There is no money to buy hooks, or the opporhinity to go across the city to attend the theatre. Such opportunities were also denied the family in Glasgow mentioned earlier, and the woman working in the rnaquiladora. If one lives in an autocratic. state, which punishes those who think unacceptable thoughts, it is necessary to self-police those thoughts. Equally, weak states have to defer to mighty and ambitious neighbours. Manipulating insecurity may of course be functional for the powerful (individuals regimes, and states) by helping to keep the weak 'in their place' through deference and self-policing. But such insecurity obstructs the opportunities for the victims to achieve self-realisation in their lives. A determined life is not one in which humans, in whole or in part, can flourish. Those in such a situation are never even given the opportunity to know 'Why?' because they do not have the power to ask the question in the first place.
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Booth 7 (Ken, IR @ Aberystwyth, Theory of World Security, p. 104-105)
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There is some space for human dignity in the death-camp, in the trenches, or grubbing for food on rubbish tips. But there is not much The most basic task for emancipatory politics must therefore be to create conditions in which sentient bodies are never driven into sites of insecurity where the freedom to ask Why?' and to live in dignity is never present. It is important here to distinguish between insecurity that is enforced and life-determining, and danger that is chosen. Insecurity and elective danger are not synonymous When people choose risky pastimes or when powerful states choose to take on ambitious foreign interventions, they place themselves in some danger, but they are not facing insecurity The insecure of the earth have neither the time nor the resources to engage in Formula One car racing, nor in organising expeditions There is all the difference in the world between those who go into the mountains for challenge and those Kurds who went into the mountains to flee from Saddam Hussein's forces Security allows choice Elective danger is a privilege of the secure; direct and unavoidable danger is the determining condition of the world's insecure
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Embracing insecurity is a strategy of the privileged. Their alternative presumes some degree of personal security necessary for the freedom to live life as you choose.
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Postmodern/poststructural engagement with the subject of security in international relations has been characterized by some of the general problems of the genre, notably obscurantism, relativism, and faux radicalism.26 What has particularly troubled critics of the postmodern sensibility has been the latter's underlying conception of politics.27 Terry Eagleton, for one, has praised the "rich body of work" by postmodern writers in some areas but at the same time has contested the genre's "cultural relativism and moral conventionalism, its scepticism, pragmatism and localism, its distaste for ideas of solidarity and disciplined organization, [and] its lack of any adequate theory of political agency."28 Eagleton made these comments as part of a general critique of the postmodern sensibility, but I would argue that specific writing on security in international relations from postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives has generally done nothing to ease such concerns. Eagleton's fundamental worry was how postmodernism would "shape up" to the test of fascism as a serious political challenge. Other writers, studying particular political contexts, such as postapartheid South Africa, have shown similar worries; they have questioned the lack of concrete or specific resources that such theories can add to the repertoire of reconstruction strategies.29 Richard A. Wilson, an anthropologist interested in human rights, has generalized exactly the same concern, namely, that the postmodernist rejection of metanarratives and universal solidarities does not deliver a helpful politics to people in trouble. As he puts it, "Rights without a metanarrative are like a car without seat-belts; on hitting the first moral bump with ontological implications, the passenger's safety is jeopardised."30 The struggle within South Africa to bring down the institutionalized racism of apartheid benefited greatly from the growing strength of universal human rights values (which delegitimized racism and legitimized equality) and their advocacy by groups in different countries and cultures showing their political solidarity in material and other ways. Anxiety about the politics of postmodernism and poststructuralism is provoked, in part, by the negative conceptualization of security projected by their exponents. The poststructuralist approach seems to assume that security cannot be common or positive-sum but must always be zero-sum, with somebody's security always being at the cost of the insecurity of others. At the same time, security itself is questioned as a desirable goal for societies because of the assumption of poststructuralist writers that the search for security is necessarily conservative and will result in negative consequences for somebody. They tend also to celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a middle-class affront to the truly insecure.31
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Booth 5 (Kenneth, Professor of International Politics – University of Wales-Aberystwyth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 270-271, footnote on 277)
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poststructural engagement with security has been characterized by faux radicalism writers have questioned the lack of concrete or specific resources that such theories can add to the repertoire of reconstruction strategies postmodernist rejection does not deliver a helpful politics to people in trouble Rights without a metanarrative are like a car without seat-belts; on hitting the first moral bump with ontological implications, the passenger's safety is jeopardised The poststructuralist approach seems to assume that security must always be zero-sum poststructuralist writers tend to celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a middle-class affront to the truly insecure
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Criticizing security is a privilege of the secure – the alternative offers no mechanism for reducing global suffering.
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Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public, whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions, not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name, although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.
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Guzzini 98 [Stefano, Assistant Professor at Central European Univ., Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, p. 212]
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it is impossible to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew This is a non option realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of practitioners and observers of international affairs it is a world view which permeates our daily language Realism is alive in the collective memory and self understanding of our i.e. Western foreign policy elite and public we cannot but deal with it academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions, not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions this understanding is a prerequisite for their very profession it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name of realism
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Realism inevitable – abandoning it means we can never appeal to those who control foreign policy or the public.
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While not without analytical purchase and some degree of normative appeal, however, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of the politics of security — of what security does — is problematic. Put simply, the suggestion that security has an inherent, universal logic (associated with urgency and exceptionalism, for example) is a claim that lacks attention to the multiple ways in which security is understood and practised in world politics. Here, and to reiterate a core claim of this article, greater attention is needed to the varied social, historical and political contexts in which security is constructed. A range of authors utilizing broadly constructivist insights, for example, have pointed to the ways in which different discourses of security have radically different implications in terms of the types and boundaries of communities they serve to construct, the limits of ethical concern for outsiders, and the types of policies and practices that might flow from them. Nils Bubandt (2005), for example, suggests that different forms or ‘scales’ of political community — ranging in his analysis from the global to the national to the local — can be constructed through representations of security, often in competing or contradictory ways. Maria Julia Trombetta (2008), meanwhile, has argued convincingly that rather than environmental issues being militarized through being defined as security threats, the logic associated with such issues might encourage alternative logics of security. Roxanne Doty (1998/9) points out that alternative US government policies towards Haitian refugees in the 1990s should be understood as representative of changing security discourses (from national to human security). Stefan Elbe (2006) has shown how the securitization of HIV/AIDS has in some contexts resulted in problematic policies that have constituted those infected with the virus as potential threats to national security to be excluded, while in others it has encouraged states to focus resources on tackling the virus in ways that would have been unlikely if it remained treated as just another public health issue. And, as Rita Abrahamsen (2002) has noted, the Copenhagen School’s strong distinction between the realm of ‘security’ on the one hand and ‘politics’ on the other paints a simplistic image of politics more broadly, limiting the extent to which we can recognize alternative logics at work (such as that of ‘risk’, for example).¶ Taking this criticism further, it is possible to argue that there is something of a tension here between the development of a framework that allows us to make sense of the changing content of security over time and space on the one hand and a commitment to the idea that there is a fixed logic to security on the other that should encourage us to resist or escape it.3 To a significant degree, the belief in a negative and exclusionary security logic is a claim that is arguably parasitic upon security being equated in a timeless and abstract sense with a dominant discourse of security (tied to the nation-state and its preservation).¶ The above is indeed a criticism advanced stridently by Welsh School theorists, who suggest that security can and should be associated with emancipation rather than the mechanisms of the state (Bilgin, 2008; Booth, 2005, 2007; Wyn Jones, 2005). For these theorists, the profound scepticism towards security characteristic of theorists working in the tradition of post-structuralism or with the Copenhagen School framework is only justified to the extent that a narrow, exclusionary and statist vision of security is accepted as timeless and inevitable. And yet in subsequently equating security with the concept of emancipation, Welsh School theorists arguably similarly endorse a set logic of security. Specifically, they can be accused of ignoring the possibility of negative implications flowing from an association of a particular issue with the language and logic of security (see Aradau, 2004; CASE Collective, 2006: 456; Neocleous, 2008). And in attempting to use (the power of) security to advance emancipatory ends, little attention is given to the question of whether a better pragmatic basis for realizing such ends might be through the language of justice, human rights or even economics, for example.¶ Ultimately, the tendency to characterize the politics of security as either benign (in the case of the Welsh School) or pernicious (in the case of the Copenhagen School or post-structuralists) suggests a problematic binary in the critical security studies project. These positions serve to either deny an association of security with a (sedimented) realist security discourse or a logic of exceptionalism (in the case of the Welsh School) or perversely require that discourse and logic to remain dominant across time and space for the broader rejection of security to make sense (in the case of post-structuralism and the Copenhagen School). While this oversimplifies matters somewhat, missing in such accounts is recognition of the temporal and spatial specificity of security logics. In short, missing is recognition that security does different things at different times and in different places (see Ciuta, 2009). While this is a particularly striking omission for approaches that have precisely set themselves the task of exploring the politics of security and the implications of securitization, it is an omission that questions the capacity of the critical security studies project as a whole to develop a convincing account of the politics of security. In the final pages, we suggest the need for the critical security studies project to better recognize these variegated security logics, and to come to terms with the (albeit complex) relation- ship between sedimented and dominant security discourses on the one hand, and the possibilities for change and difference on the other.
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Browning & McDonald 11 [Christopher S., Associate Professor in International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK, & Matt, Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, European Journal of International Relations, 19(2), “The future of critical security studies: Ethics and the politics of security,” p. 241-243]
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the suggestion that security has an inherent, universal logic is a claim that lacks attention to the multiple ways in which security is understood and practised in world politics greater attention is needed to the varied social, historical and political contexts in which security is constructed. different discourses of security have radically different implications in terms of the types and boundaries of communities they serve to construct, the limits of ethical concern for outsiders, and the types of policies and practices that might flow from them different forms or ‘scales’ of political community can be constructed through representations of security, often in competing or contradictory ways the strong distinction between the realm of ‘security’ on the one hand and ‘politics’ on the other paints a simplistic image of politics more broadly, limiting the extent to which we can recognize alternative logics at work there is something of a tension etween the development of a framework that allows us to make sense of the changing content of security over time and space on the one hand and a commitment to the idea that there is a fixed logic to security on the other that should encourage us to resist or escape it the belief in a negative and exclusionary security logic is a claim that is arguably parasitic upon security being equated in a timeless and abstract sense with a dominant discourse of security the profound scepticism towards security is only justified to the extent that a narrow, exclusionary and statist vision of security is accepted as timeless and inevitable the tendency to characterize the politics of security as either benign or pernicious suggests a problematic binary missing in such accounts is recognition of the temporal and spatial specificity of security logics missing is recognition that security does different things at different times and in different places
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The kritik’s portrayal of security as monolithic and inherently exclusionary forecloses the possibility of crafting alternative logics in concrete political contexts.
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Violence is, most of the time, a wilful choice, especially if it is made by an organisation. Individuals present the scholar with a more difficult case to argue for. Scholars of violence have now a wide variety of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even biology – and should escape easy judgements. However, the fundamental difficulty for all of us is the absence of a synthetic, general theory able of integrating less complete theories of violent behaviour. In the absence of such a general theory, researchers should bear in mind that violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations. Future research on violence will have to take in account the variety of approaches, since they each offer some understanding of the logic of violence.
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Muro-Ruiz 2 [Diego, London School of Economics, “The Logic of Violence”, Politics, 22(2), p. 116]
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Scholars of violence have now a wide variety of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even biology – and should escape easy judgements the fundamental difficulty for all of us is the absence of a general theory able of integrating theories of violent behaviour violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations
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No single cause of violence
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Mixing signals, that is, combining coercion and accommodation in an uncoordinated, ad hoc fashion, can undermine credibility (Kriesberg, 1992, pp. 111–112). In his first letter to Reagan, Gorbachev cautioned him against inflammatory language, “for trust is an especially sensitive thing, keenly receptive to both deeds and words. It will not be enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages: one—for private contacts, and the other, as they say—for the audience” (Shultz, 1993, p. 534). In short, noise reduces the impact and credibility of conciliatory actions. How the other side responds to the state’s efforts at conciliation depends on how the former interprets its actions. People do not usually reciprocate gifts or favors if they believe that the donor has ulterior motives or is trying to manipulate them to do something that is contrary to their interests (Nemeth, 1970; Schopler & Thompson, 1968; Brehm & Cole, 1966). Similarly, if a state perceives that another state is pursuing a deceptive strategy, it will be reluctant to acknowledge the gesture or to reciprocate. The state may also ignore the other’s unilateral concession if it believes that the other state is militarily inferior and is trying to obtain an arms control agreement to reduce its vulnerability. Pg. 723
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Larson 97 - Professor of political science @ UCLA [Deborah Welch Larson, “Trust and Missed Opportunities in International Relations,” Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997]
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Mixing signals combining coercion and accommodation in an uncoordinated, ad hoc fashion, can undermine credibility trust is an especially sensitive thing, keenly receptive to both deeds and words. It will not be enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages noise reduces the impact and credibility of conciliatory actions People do not usually reciprocate gifts or favors if they believe that the donor has ulterior motives or is trying to manipulate them Similarly, if a state perceives that another state is pursuing a deceptive strategy, it will be reluctant to acknowledge the gesture or to reciprocate
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The perm sends mixed signals
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At the margins, “conditionalities” inducing adherence to codes of conduct and sanctions blur together. For instance, while selective purchasing need not constitute a boycott, the Burma and South Africa procurement regimes discussed above are clearly designed to curtail economic engagement with unpalatable regimes. Measures insisting on divestment cross a subtle boundary, going beyond the “mitigation” goal of the second prong of responsible engagement. They clearly constitute sanctions, the propriety of which must be scrutinized with an eye to the various concerns about sanctions, their effectiveness and secondary effects.
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Greg Forcese, 2002, BA, McGill; MA, Carleton; LL.B., Ottawa; LL.M., Yale; Member of the Bars of New York, Ontario and the District of Columbia. Associate, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, LLP, Washington, Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal, “Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration,” p. 42
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conditionalities” inducing adherence to codes of conduct the Burma and South Africa procurement regimes discussed above are clearly designed to curtail economic engagement with unpalatable regimes
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Have to have conditions
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A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16)
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Resnick 01 (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 54:2, J.C)
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A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement
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Precision is key—a broad definition destroys the topic and creates confusion
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A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT¶ In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:¶ DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS¶ Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations¶ Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes¶ Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa¶ MILITARY CONTACTS¶ Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa¶ Arms transfers¶ Military aid and cooperation¶ Military exchange and training programs¶ Confidence and security-building measures¶ Intelligence sharing¶ ECONOMIC CONTACTS¶ Trade agreements and promotion¶ Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants¶ CULTURAL CONTACTS¶ Cultural treaties¶ Inauguration of travel and tourism links¶ Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)¶ Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.¶ This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)¶ Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.¶ This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.
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Resnick 01 (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 54:2, 559-61, J.C)
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we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural The following might include Extension of diplomatic recognition Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions meetings Visits of senior military officials Arms transfers¶ Military aid and cooperation Intelligence sharing Trade agreements Foreign economic and humanitarian aid Cultural treaties Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence culminating in normalized relations characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains Engagement is a exchange relationship the target state wants resources while the sender state seeks to modify policy behavior of the target state This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument First the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires
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Engagement is a mutual exchange between two states.
| 4,480 | 52 | 1,496 | 665 | 8 | 214 | 0.01203 | 0.321805 |
Engagement Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,096 |
In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion . They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.
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Resnick 01 (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 54:2, J.C)
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In matters of national security establishing a clear definition is a precondition for effective policymaking Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic fashion . They risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error dercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.
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Defining engagement as a mutual exchange between two states is key to good policymaking and avoiding error replication.
| 522 | 120 | 488 | 75 | 18 | 69 | 0.24 | 0.92 |
Engagement Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,097 |
It appears that Western imaginative geographies of foreign aid have, for the most part, failed to recognise the presence and activities of a substantial range of Southern and other non-DAC donors. However, this situation has changed sharply in the last few years, and the NDDs are now an increasingly visible part of the aid landscape. A major driver of this new visibility has been China’s rise. Although development cooperation constitutes only a small proportion of China’s portfolio of activities, it is still sizeable in absolute terms, and furthermore has often been significantly exaggerated (Bra ̈ utigam 2009). The burgeoning interest in China’s ‘aid’ has spilt over into a growing awareness of other emerging powers, and other¶ Emma Mawdsley¶ non-DAC donors. Additional factors have also contributed to the growing shift in awareness of ‘new’ development actors, including the accession of ten ‘new’ EU states, requiring that they (re-)cre- ate development institutions and funding; Hugo Chavez’s positioning of Venezuelan aid as an open challenge to US hegemony in Latin America; and the growing surveillance of official and private Arab aid following 9⁄11. Various initiatives are now emerging within the traditional centres of the development industry in response to the issue of non-DAC donors (Fues and Cooper 2008; Fues and Wolff 2010; Le Pere et al. 2010; Grimm et al. 2009). Debates and programmes to engage them are evident in the newly created UN Development Cooperation Forum, the OECD’s Global Forum on Development, and the Development Committee of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In 2005 DAC announced that outreach to the non-DAC donors was now a formal policy agenda. In 2006, under the auspices of the Russian Presi- dency, the G8, the OECD and the World Bank held a conference on ‘Emerging Donors in the Global Development Community’; and in 2011 DFID announced a major policy shift in its intent to work with and in the ‘emerging powers’ (Mitchell 2011). For their part, some of the NDDs are keen to collaborate and move closer to the DAC community, including Turkey and Russia. Others are cautious about aligning with the ‘mainstream’. According to Rowlands, Brazil and South Africa are more open to ‘trilateral’ cooperation, but even here,¶ Though less reticent [than China and India], Brazil remains wary of such arrangements, and takes care to ensure that it is not simply re-establishing older hierarchical relations wherein it plays a subordinate role to a traditional donor. (2008, 16)¶ Others, such as Venezuela, openly reject cooperation with what they see as the highly discredited policies and practices of the Western-dominated aid community (see Glennie 2008; Woods 2008). To date, China and India have mostly refused to enter into collaborative donor arrangements on the grounds of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other nations.
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Mawdsley 2012 [Emma, Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography, Cambridge University, "The Changing Geographies Of Foreign Aid And Development Cooperation: Contributions From Gift Theory." Transactions Of The Institute Of British Geographers 37.2 (2012): 256-272.]
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Additional factors have also contributed to the growing shift in awareness of ‘new’ development actors, including the accession of ten ‘new’ EU states, requiring that they (re-)cre- ate development institutions and funding; Hugo Chavez’s positioning of Venezuelan aid as an open challenge to US hegemony in Latin America; and the growing surveillance of official and private Arab aid following 9⁄11. In 2005 DAC announced that outreach to the non-DAC donors was now a formal policy agenda. In 2006, under the auspices of the Russian Presi- dency, the G8, the OECD and the World Bank held a conference on ‘Emerging Donors in the Global Development Community’; and in 2011 DFID announced a major policy shift in its intent to work with and in the ‘emerging powers’ Venezuela, openly reject cooperation with what they see as the highly discredited policies and practices of the Western-dominated aid community
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Venezuela would reject the aff’s perception of engagement from the U.S.
| 2,903 | 71 | 906 | 459 | 11 | 145 | 0.023965 | 0.315904 |
Engagement Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,098 |
A second objection is that engagement should be conditioned on North Korean behavior . In the past, Washington has conditioned engagement with North Korea on progress in denuclearization . This strategy puts the cart before the horse, and has been unsuccessful . It has the perverse result of strengthening arguments inside North Korea that the country needs a strong deterrent to protect itself from outside threats . The U .S . can better advance its aims by opening the space for change to take place from the ground up . While some engagement should continue to be conditioned on progress on the nuclear and other fronts, many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached . Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement, and particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and should proceed now, without any conditionality, as first steps in a process of phased engagement.
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Shirk, 9 -- Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation director [Susan, et al, "North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement," Independent Task Force, Dec 2009, asiasociety.org/files/pdf/North_Korea_Inside_Out.pdf]
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A second objection is that engagement should be conditioned While some engagement should continue to be conditioned many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and should proceed without any conditionality
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Economic engagement need not include conditions
| 913 | 47 | 340 | 152 | 6 | 51 | 0.039474 | 0.335526 |
Engagement Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,099 |
While the determinants and effectiveness of economic sanctions have been the subject of a substantial and growing literature in international relations, much less attention has been given to economic engagement strategies, where a country deliberately expands economic ties with an adversary to change the target’s behavior. This article develops a theoretical framework that distinguishes between three types of engagement strategies: conditional policies that directly link economic ties to changed behavior in the target state; unconditional policies where economic interdependence is meant to act as a constraint on the behavior of the target state; and unconditional policies where economic interdependence is meant to effect a transformation in the foreign policy goals of the target state.
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Kahler 6 (Miles Kahler, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, Scott L. Kastner, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, 2006, Journal of Peace Research, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait,” 43(5), p. 523, this evidence was obtained at http://bauscharddebate.com/2013/03/defining-economic-engagement/)
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economic engagement where a country deliberately expands economic ties with an adversary to change the target’s behavior. This article distinguishes between three types of engagement strategies: conditional policies that directly link economic ties to changed behavior in the target state; unconditional policies where economic interdependence is meant to act as a constraint on the behavior of the target state; and unconditional policies where economic interdependence is meant to effect a transformation in the foreign policy goals of the target state.
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Economic engagement can be both conditional and unconditional
| 796 | 61 | 556 | 114 | 8 | 80 | 0.070175 | 0.701754 |
Engagement Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
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