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4,200 |
About 60 per cent of the water went as a result of pumping underground reservoirs for ground water, including 1,000 wells in Iraq, and another 20 per cent was due to impacts of the drought including declining snow packs and soil drying up.¶ The NASA satellites have shown for the first time exactly how bad the loss of freshwater reserves in the Middle East has been¶ Nasa satellites have shown for the first time how bad the loss of freshwater reserves in the Middle East is¶ Loss of surface water from lakes and reservoirs accounted for about another fifth of the decline, the study found.¶ 'This rate of water loss is among the largest liquid freshwater losses on the continents,' the authors wrote in the study, noting the declines were most obvious after a drought.
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Daily Mail, 2/13/2013 (“Warnings of severe water shortages in the Middle East after satellites show freshwater reserves the size of the Dead Sea have dried up,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2278040/Nasa-warn-freshwater-shortages-Middle-East-study-shows-diminished-reserves.html, Accessed 2/18/2013, rwg)
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The NASA satellites have shown for the first time exactly how bad the loss of freshwater reserves in the Middle East has been Loss of surface water from lakes and reservoirs accounted for about another fifth of the decline, the study found.¶ 'This rate of water loss is among the largest liquid freshwater losses on the continents,' the authors wrote in the study, noting the declines were most obvious after a drought.
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(--) Massive water loss in the Middle East now:
| 770 | 47 | 419 | 135 | 9 | 72 | 0.066667 | 0.533333 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,201 |
In a devastating assessment on the future for the human race in the early part of the next century Klaus Töpfer, the executive director of the UN environment programme, said yesterday that the main threats to human survival were posed by water shortages, global warming, and a new danger - worldwide nitrogen pollution. "A series of looming crises and ultimate catastrophe can only be averted by a massive increase in political will. We have the technology but we are not applying it," he said.
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Brown 99 (Paul Brown, Environment CorrespondentThursday September 16, 1999 The Guardian HYPERLINK "http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,3902455-107165,00.html" http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,3902455-107165,00.html, accessed 9/15/03)
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century Klaus Töpfer, the executive director of the UN environment programme, said yesterday that the main threats to human survival were posed by water shortages, and a new danger - worldwide nitrogen pollution. "A series of looming crises and ultimate catastrophe can only be averted by a massive increase in political will. We have the technology but we are not applying it
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-Water shortages and Nitrogen pollution lead to extinction
| 494 | 58 | 376 | 84 | 8 | 62 | 0.095238 | 0.738095 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,202 |
Energy plays an important role in the development of any society. It is the primary and universal necessity for all kinds of work ever done by human beings and nature. The rapid industrialization has led to increased use of fossil fuel such as coal, oil and gas to meet the power requirement, which results in depletion of natural resources. Due to increased demand and cost of energy, these resources are not sufficient and becoming more and more expensive. Presently, the country is facing major energy crisis that has seriously affected economic growth and development process. Prolonged load shedding is a routine matter and the reason is continuous decline in oil and gas reserves and vertical increase in prices. Deforestation and emission of hydrocarbon is a continuous threat on environment, considered responsible for ozone depletion. With the increasing fuel demand, available energy sources are not sufficient as being used rapidly.
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Powergrid International, 2013 (“BIOGAS - An emerging alternative technology,” http://www.elp.com/news/2013/02/11/biogas-an-emerging-alternative-technology.html, Accessed 2/19/2013, rwg)
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The rapid industrialization has led to increased use of fossil fuel such as coal, oil and gas Deforestation and emission of hydrocarbon is a continuous threat on environment, considered responsible for ozone depletion.
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(--) The ozone layer is depleting fast—extend our Science Daily evidence from 1/31/2013, a new Penn State study says that a southward shift in the jet stream is proof of depletion of Antarctic ozone, our Levy evidence indicates this is a matter of human survival.
| 943 | 263 | 218 | 149 | 45 | 33 | 0.302013 | 0.221477 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,203 |
One of the most serious threats facing the United States and other¶ countries is the possibility that other nations or terrorist organizations¶ could steal a nuclear warhead or nuclear weapon¶ usable materials from¶ poorly secured stockpiles around the world,¶ Weapon¶ usable nuclear materials are highly enriched uranium, uranium¶ 233, and any¶ plutonium containing less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium¶ 238.¶ Such materials¶ are also often referred to as fissile materials or strategic special nuclear materials.¶ or that nations could divert¶ nuclear material intended for peaceful purposes to the development of¶ nuclear weapons.¶ Terrorists or countries seeking nuclear weapons could¶ use as little as 25 kilograms (Kg) of weapon¶ -¶ grade highly enriched¶ uranium (HEU) or 8 Kg of plutonium to construct a nuclear weapon.¶ Of¶ great concern is that terrorists could fashion a crude nuclear bomb made¶ from either HEU or plutonium into an improvised nuclear device (IND). An¶ IND would create an explosion producing extreme heat, powerful¶ shockwaves and intense radiation that would be immediately lethal to¶ individuals within miles of the explosion, as well as radioactive fallout over¶ thousa¶ nds of square miles.¶ Nonproliferation experts estimate that a¶ successful IND could produce the same force as the equivalent yield of¶ the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945; it could devastate the¶ Page 2¶ GAO¶ -12-512T¶ heart of a medium¶ -¶ sized U.S. city.¶ The explosion could cause hundreds of¶ thousands of deaths and injuries, as well as pose long¶ -¶ term cancer risks¶ to those exposed to the radioactive fallout.
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Statement of Gene Aloise, 3/14/2012 (Director, Natural Resources and Environment, “NUCLEAR¶ NONPROLIFERATION¶ Further Actions Needed by¶ U.S. Agencies to Secure¶ Vulnerable Nuclear and¶ Radiological Materials,” http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb388/docs/EBB034.pdf
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One of the most serious threats facing the United States and other¶ countries is the possibility that terrorist organizations¶ could steal a nuclear warhead or nuclear weapon¶ usable materials from¶ poorly secured stockpiles around the world The explosion could cause hundreds of¶ thousands of deaths and injuries
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(--) Extend our terrorism advantage—our Sid Ahmed evidence says this risks a nuclear response and extinction.
| 1,646 | 109 | 313 | 255 | 16 | 47 | 0.062745 | 0.184314 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,204 |
Even if some of the strongest cynicism about legislative behavior and motivation is overstated, several aspects of the pluralist process nevertheless suggest that statutory override cannot cure all that ails the essentialist model. First, legislatures are frequently too busy, overextended, or inert to respond to an objectionable judicial interpretation. n54 Indeed, there is little reason to believe that legislators systematically monitor judicial interpretations of statutes. n55 Second, [*606] statutory override is an imperfect substitute, and controversial as a normative matter, because the current legislature may have different preferences from the enacting legislature. n56 Third, even when legislators do respond to a particular judicial interpretation, the process does not necessarily end. The new statute might require interpretation, and the process may simply continue. n57
|
Schacter, 1995 (Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, “ARTICLE: METADEMOCRACY: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF LEGITIMACY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION” Harvard Law Review, JANUARY, lexis, Accessed 2/18/2013, rwg)
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statutory override cannot cure all that ails the essentialist model. First, legislatures are frequently too busy, overextended, or inert to respond to an objectionable judicial interpretation there is little reason to believe that legislators systematically monitor judicial interpretations of statutes Second, statutory override is an imperfect substitute, and controversial as a normative matter, because the current legislature may have different preferences from the enacting legislature. Third, even when legislators do respond to a particular judicial interpretation, the process does not necessarily end. The new statute might require interpretation, and the process may simply continue
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(--) We solve: extend our Sylvester evidence—even if the plan isn’t enforced domestically, we still incorporate international law into Supreme Court jurisprudence, solving our international law and right to development advantages.
| 890 | 230 | 693 | 123 | 31 | 94 | 0.252033 | 0.764228 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,205 |
The idea that courts should decline review because they do not want their decisions to be ignored by the political branches is misguided. Congress would rarely risk the public backlash that would come with ignoring a Supreme Court directive. n240 President Nixon, for example, would have found it all but impossible to refuse to provide Congress with his Oval Office tapes. n241 Redish even argues that courts gain from challenging the political branches. n242 Courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are viewed as the final arbiters of the Constitution, and public support will frequently be on their side if they choose to challenge Congress or the executive. n243 Thus, the institutional reasons for granting deference to Congress provide little support for the plenary power doctrine.
|
McFarland, 2008 New York University Annual Survey of American Law editor (Michael, New York University Annual Survey of American Law, "Derivative Citizenship: Its History, Constitutional Foundation, And Constitutional Limitations," 63 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 467, l/n, accessed 2/18/2013, rwg]
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Congress would rarely risk the public backlash that would come with ignoring a Supreme Court directive Nixon, for example, would have found it all but impossible to refuse to provide Congress with his Oval Office tapes
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(--) Other branches will comply—fear of public backlash guarantees:
| 790 | 67 | 218 | 125 | 9 | 36 | 0.072 | 0.288 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,206 |
First, full examination of the revival issue demonstrates the interactive nature of the relationship between judicial invalidation of statutes and majoritarian decision-making. Judicial review is not purely external to the legislative process: the very act of judicial invalidation powerfully shapes subsequent legislative deliberations. Belief in the finality of judicial judgments is so pervasive that, when a statute is struck down or when a judicial decision establishes a rule of law under which a statute is unconstitutional, its opponents frequently act as if the statute were gone for all time. At the very least, even if political actors realize the potential for reversal, the finding of unconstitutionality alters the way in which they spend their political capital. As a result, rather than seek to repeal a statute that appears to be, for all practical purposes, a nullity, they devote their political resources to other - more clearly consequential - matters. Revival in such circumstances can produce a result contrary to what the political process would have produced in the absence of the initial judicial decision.
|
Treanor & Sperling 93 William - Prof Law at Fordham. Gene - Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy. “PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND THE REVIVAL OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATUTES,” Columbia Law Review, Dec 93, lexis
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judicial invalidation shapes deliberations. Belief in the finality of judicial judgments is so pervasive that, when a statute is unconstitutional, its opponents act as if the statute were gone for all time even if actors realize the potential for reversal unconstitutionality alters the way they spend their resources
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(--) Politicians will enforce the counterplan—they’ll act if the statute is gone away for all time:
| 1,132 | 99 | 317 | 174 | 16 | 48 | 0.091954 | 0.275862 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,207 |
Once we know more about the implementation of the Court's decisions in absolute and relative terms, the most important question might well be why implementation is as successful as it is. The Court's limited concrete powers would seem to aggravate the difficulties faced by all organizational leaders, so why do judges and administrators follow the Court's lead so frequently? Within the judiciary, part of the answer undoubtedly lies in selection and socialization processes that enhance agreement about legal policy and acceptance of hierarchical authority. Even the Court's limited powers may be sufficient to rein in administrators, especially in the era of broad legal mobilization that Epp has described: Groups that undertake litigation campaigns to achieve favorable precedents can also litigate against organizations that refuse to accept those precedents. Both judges and administrators may reduce their decision costs by using the Court's legal rules as a guide. In any event, the relationship between the Court and policy makers who implement its policies may be an especially good subject for studies to probe the forces that reduce centrifugal tendencies in hierarchies.
|
Lawrence Baum, 2003 Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, June [“The Supreme Court in American Politics,” http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/ doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085526;jsessionid=n1HzQqZJALRe]
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The Court's limited concrete powers would seem to aggravate the difficulties faced by all organizational leaders, so why do judges and administrators follow the Court's lead so frequently? Within the judiciary, part of the answer undoubtedly lies in selection and socialization processes that enhance agreement about legal policy and acceptance of hierarchical authority. Even the Court's limited powers may be sufficient to rein in administrators, Both judges and administrators may reduce their decision costs by using the Court's legal rules as a guide
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(---) Doesn’t matter if lower courts don’t follow:
| 1,184 | 50 | 555 | 179 | 8 | 83 | 0.044693 | 0.463687 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,208 |
(b) Authoritative Legitimacy and Its Limits. - Today, nearly all Supreme Court rulings possess a high degree of authoritative legitimacy, whether in the strong or the weak sense, at least with respect to [*1831] the parties before the Court. n195 In plainer terms, the parties almost always obey the Court's rulings. No logical necessity undergirds this state of affairs. In the past, General Andrew Jackson famously defied a judicial ruling. n196 So did President Abraham Lincoln. n197
|
Fallon, 2005 prof. of Constitutional Law @ Harvard, Harvard Law Review, April 2005, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787; Lexis
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Today, nearly all Supreme Court rulings possess a high degree of authoritative legitimacy at least with respect to the parties before the Court. n195 In plainer terms, the parties almost always obey the Court's rulings.
|
(--) Parties almost always adhere to Court rulings:
| 486 | 51 | 219 | 77 | 8 | 35 | 0.103896 | 0.454545 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,209 |
Throughout constitutional history, Supreme Court Justices have assumed with near unanimity that they are legally authorized and sometimes bound to follow precedents, sometimes even when prior cases were themselves erroneous at the time of their decision. n149 Indeed, I know of no Justice in the history of the Supreme Court who has persistently questioned [*1822] precedent-based decisionmaking. n150 Even leading constitutional originalists - those who maintain that courts otherwise ought to decide cases in accordance with the original understanding n151 - have accepted the authority of judicial precedent, including past decisions that could not themselves be justified under originalist principles. n152
|
Fallon, 2005 prof. of Constitutional Law @ Harvard, Harvard Law Review, April 2005, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787; Lexis
|
Throughout constitutional history, Supreme Court Justices have assumed with near unanimity that they are legally authorized and sometimes bound to follow precedents, sometimes even when prior cases were themselves erroneous at the time of their decision I know of no Justice in the history of the Supreme Court who has persistently questioned precedent-based decisionmaking. Even leading constitutional originalists have accepted the authority of judicial precedent, including past decisions that could not themselves be justified under originalist principles.
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(--) Even if the law is indeterminate, we still solve
| 710 | 53 | 560 | 101 | 10 | 77 | 0.09901 | 0.762376 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,210 |
Constitutional theory lacks an agreed-upon story of constitutional development. n99 Bruce Ackerman has proposed a comprehensive account of "constitutional moments"; and the coeditor in chief of this Journal has noted that we await the "constitutional moment" that will lead American constitutionalism to embrace lawmaking by international organizations. n100 [*108] It is conceivable that some cataclysmic event, rupturing domestic and world public order, will produce such a moment. But there is another route: a slow-moving revolution that, with conscious and careful steps, evolves constitutional law in a direction that our politics will soon demand. What is needed, then, are processes and institutions that can help the next generation of lawyers, policymakers, political leaders, and the public come to see international law as less foreign and more homegrown, as an accepted and acceptable element of the American legal system. The Incompatibility Statute would be one building block of the new narrative.
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T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 2004 (Associate Dean for research @ Georgetown University Law Center, Jan, 98 A.J.I.L. 91, Lexis, Accessed, 7/23/2013, rwg)
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Ackerman has proposed a comprehensive account of "constitutional moments" that will lead American constitutionalism to embrace lawmaking by international organizations. It is conceivable that some cataclysmic event, will produce such a moment. But there is another route: a slow-moving revolution that, with conscious and careful steps, evolves constitutional law in a direction that our politics will soon demand. What is needed, then, are processes and institutions that can help the next generation of lawyers, policymakers, political leaders, and the public come to see international law as less foreign and more homegrown, as an accepted and acceptable element of the American legal system
|
(--) The plan is the constitutional moment that will lead American constitutionalism to embrace international law:
| 1,013 | 114 | 694 | 149 | 16 | 102 | 0.107383 | 0.684564 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,211 |
It is always risky to attempt predictions based on a reading of signs. The history of law, like human history generally, is a set of contingencies. Unforeseen events can cause a disruption; a series of small interpretive choices and popular reactions can add up to a quiet legal revolution. More important, law's appearance can be deceiving. Still, legal symbols do reveal [*1160] gestalts - the particular interaction between law's manifestations and the beliefs they express.
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Tsai, 2005 Assistant Prof. of Law @ University of Oregon School of Law, 2005 (Robert, Iowa Law Review, March 2005; 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1095; Lexis)
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The history of law, like human history generally, is a set of contingencies. Unforeseen events can cause a disruption; a series of small interpretive choices and popular reactions can add up to a quiet legal revolution
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(--) LEGAL PRECEDENTS SNOWBALL:
| 477 | 31 | 218 | 75 | 4 | 36 | 0.053333 | 0.48 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,212 |
Nonetheless, domestic civil litigation in the U.S. plays a part where criminal prosecutions are not feasible or forthcoming and where perpetrators are subject to personal jurisdiction here. By exposing the whereabouts of abusers, civil suits can spur or shame the U.S. government into invoking administrative n133 and/or criminal remedies against identified perpetrators. n134 For example, information gathered in connection with civil lawsuits has assisted the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service) in pursuing actions against abusers for visa fraud. n135 Likewise, the commencement of civil litigation in the U.S. can trigger similar judicial responses in the home countries of defendants. n136
|
Van Schaack, 2004 Assistant Prof. of Law @ Santa Clara University School of Law, Vanderbilt Law Review, November, (Beth, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2305; Lexis)
|
Nonetheless, domestic civil litigation in the U.S. plays a part where criminal prosecutions are not feasible or forthcoming and where perpetrators are subject to personal jurisdiction here. Likewise, the commencement of civil litigation in the U.S. can trigger similar judicial responses in the home countries of defendants.
|
(--) Extend our Barasso evidence—other democracies model the Supreme Court decisions.
| 758 | 85 | 324 | 107 | 11 | 47 | 0.102804 | 0.439252 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,213 |
Klarman largely substantiates his claim that the Plessy Court's civil rights decisions represented "plausible interpretations of conventional legal sources" and accurate reflections of white public opinion, and therefore the corollary that "these rulings were not blatant nullifications of post-Civil War constitutional amendments designed to secure racial equality" (p. 9). But this does not necessarily confirm his broader thesis about the minimal effect of the Plessy-era decisions on the path of history. Klarman's belief in judicial minimalism downplays the import of having the institution of the Supreme Court - and not just southern vigilantes or political demagogues or even Progressive-era reformers - extend the federal government's stamp of constitutional approval to a formal legal system that operated on the basis of the systematic racial subordination of African Americans. [*1411] "Jim Crow legislation was generally more symbolic than functional," according to Klarman, because "white supremacy depended less on law than on entrenched social mores, backed by economic power and the threat and reality of violence" (p. 82). But surely it is not simply a coincidence that a relatively stable racial order marked the four decades between the turn of the twentieth century and the beginning of World War II, the same era during which the Plessy Court's validation of legal segregation and black disfranchisement remained operative. Nor is it incidental that substantial black activism and corresponding white violence marked the fluid and unsettled racial climate that existed during the decades before the Supreme Court's endorsement of segregation and disfranchisement in the late 1890s, and also during the period after the federal judiciary began to chip away at both policies beginning in the 1940s. n35 The Supreme Court's overt willingness to tolerate state-action subterfuges that enforced anti-black discrimination through race-neutral facades also helped to shape the legal underpinnings of racial inequality and provided a segregationist road map for southern (and northern) policymakers throughout the twentieth century. Between 1910 and 1920, the Court issued a series of rulings that invalidated forced peonage laws, grandfather clauses, separate-and-unequal luxury accommodations in railroad cars, and city ordinances mandating residential segregation. n36 These cases, which Klarman aptly characterizes as "concerned more with form than substance," were therefore "easy to circumvent" as long as legislatures continued to pay lip service to constitutional principles (p. 62). For example, beginning in the 1920s the NAACP mounted an aggressive assault on residential segregation, which emerged as a decidedly national phenomenon as a result of urbanization in the South and the First Great Migration of blacks to the North. But the federal courts upheld restrictive racial covenants under the doctrine of private property rights until the late 1940s, and they have never seriously challenged "racially motivated but facially neutral zoning" (p. 92) and other public policies that offer ample evidence of state action. n37 In the area of criminal law, the [*1412] Supreme Court expanded the scope of due process during the interwar period to rescue black victims of grossly unjust trials, but these individual (rather than class-action) cases did almost nothing to remedy the structural racism that pervaded the southern legal system (pp. 117-35, 152-58). During the New Deal era, the justices did signal a greater willingness to consider the state action dilemma in cases involving the all-white primary in Texas and the failure of Missouri to provide a substantively equal law school for a black applicant in the Gaines litigation brought by the NAACP. n38 The civil rights group ensured that voting discrimination and substantive equality in public education would remain on the judicial agenda during and after World War II, the turning point in Klarman's story.
|
Lassiter, 2005 Assistant Professor of History, University of Michigan, Michigan Law Review, May, 2005, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1401
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Klarman's belief in judicial minimalism downplays the import of having the institution of the Supreme Court - and not just southern vigilantes or political demagogues or even Progressive-era reformers - extend the federal government's stamp of constitutional approval to a formal legal system that operated on the basis of the systematic racial subordination of African Americans. The Supreme Court's overt willingness to tolerate state-action subterfuges that enforced anti-black discrimination through race-neutral facades also helped to shape the legal underpinnings of racial inequality and provided a segregationist road map for southern (and northern) policymakers throughout the twentieth century
|
(--) Plessy and other race based decisions prove: the stamp of approval from the Supreme Court has powerful societal consequences:
| 3,995 | 130 | 703 | 596 | 20 | 97 | 0.033557 | 0.162752 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,214 |
One doubts that Robert Carter, Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood Robinson, Jack Greenberg and the rest of the legal team that argued Brown v. Board of Education n1 spent much time thinking about mass torts. Nonetheless, it is entirely appropriate that a commemoration of their achievements include not only that topic but also international human rights and health care, as well as the more expected ones of education and social welfare. Brown was part of a revolution, and revolutions often have collateral effects as important as their immediate consequences. The civil rights movement followed the same pattern. [*1976] As an immediate consequence, that movement brought us school desegregation. Follow-on effects included desegregation of public facilities. These were important milestones in U.S. society. They achieved specific changes, but they also made possible the second civil rights revolution - the legislative actions that have, in the last four decades, transformed U.S. society. Beyond race and civil rights, Brown created several ripples, two of which provide the focus for this Essay. First, Brown and the civil rights litigation movement helped create a renewed belief, not just in the law, but more specifically in litigation as a noble calling and as an avenue for social change. That belief lies open to challenge, and it can leave students and lawyers frustrated at the distance between the aspirations that brought them to law school and the world of practice as they perceive it. But whether or not it is well-founded, this belief, with roots traceable to Brown and civil rights litigation, has endured for several generations. Thus, Brown reshaped the aspirations of lawyers in ways that are still important.
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Yeazell, 2004 professor of law @ UCLA, 2004 (Stephen, Vanderbilt Law Review, November, 2004, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1975; Lexis)
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Brown v. Board of Education was part of a revolution, and revolutions often have collateral effects as important as their immediate consequences. The civil rights movement followed the same pattern. As an immediate consequence, that movement brought us school desegregation. Follow-on effects included desegregation of public facilities. These were important milestones in U.S. society. They achieved specific changes, but they also made possible the second civil rights revolution - the legislative actions that have, in the last four decades, transformed U.S. society. Beyond race and civil rights, Brown created several ripples, First, Brown and the civil rights litigation movement helped create a renewed belief, not just in the law, but more specifically in litigation as a noble calling and as an avenue for social change. Brown reshaped the aspirations of lawyers in ways that are still important.
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(--) Court decisions produce massive societal ripple effects: Brown v. Board of education proves:
| 1,730 | 97 | 905 | 271 | 14 | 137 | 0.051661 | 0.505535 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,215 |
Cuba would also benefit immensely in terms of increased trade and economic growth. n262 U.S. tourists would flock to Cuba and bring money with them. Additionally, U.S. companies would export large numbers of goods to Cuba thus increasing the standard of living. This would, in turn, benefit the United States by decreasing the number of refugees and might even encourage the re-patriation of Cuban-Americans.
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Shari-Ellen Bourque, 1995 (Boston University International Law Journal, Spring 1995, 13 B.U. Int'l L.J. 191, Lexis, Accessed 7/21/2013, rwg)
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Cuba would also benefit immensely in terms of increased trade and economic growth .S. tourists would flock to Cuba and bring money with them. Additionally, U.S. companies would export large numbers of goods to Cuba thus increasing the standard of living.
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(--) Lifting the embargo bolsters Cuban economic growth.
| 408 | 56 | 254 | 64 | 8 | 41 | 0.125 | 0.640625 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,216 |
For these reasons also, customary international law has been directly incorporable, at least for civil sanction and jurisdictional purposes, without the need for some other statutory base... Since international law is law of the United States in several senses noted above, the judiciary also has the power to take judicial notice of and, thus, to identify and clarify customary international law. More importantly, such attributes of international law and judicial power compel recognition [as evidenced in numerous cases throughout our history] that the judiciary is bound to identify, clarify and apply customary international law in cases or controversies properly before the courts. n25
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Jordan J. Paust, 1999 (Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center, Michigan Journal of International Law, Winter 1999, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 301, Lexis, Accessed 7/22/2013, rwg)
|
customary international law has been directly incorporable, at least for civil sanction and jurisdictional purposes, without the need for some other statutory base the judiciary also has the power to take judicial notice of and, thus, to identify and clarify customary international law the judiciary is bound to identify, clarify and apply customary international law in cases or controversies properly before the courts
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(--) Supreme Court has the authority to incorporate customary international law:
| 691 | 80 | 421 | 103 | 11 | 63 | 0.106796 | 0.61165 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,217 |
In view of Professor Bradley's theory, it is quite significant that Chief Justice Marshall was among those early in our history who unanimously affirmed that the President and other officials are bound by international law. n149 Marshall also made statements supportive of the primacy of customary international law over acts of Congress, n150 and recognized the competence and duty of our courts to apply customary international law. n151
|
Jordan J. Paust, 1999 (Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center, Michigan Journal of International Law, Winter 1999, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 301, Lexis, Accessed 7/22/2013, rwg)
|
Marshall also made statements supportive of the primacy of customary international law over acts of Congress and recognized the competence and duty of our courts to apply customary international law.
|
(--) Courts are competent and have the duty to apply customary international law:
| 439 | 81 | 199 | 68 | 13 | 30 | 0.191176 | 0.441176 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,218 |
With President Obama’s nomination of Elena Kagan to replace Justice John Paul Stevens, the U.S. Supreme Court is changing (although this change should not significantly alter the ideological balance of the Court). While the Judiciary is usually considered the least pertinent of our government’s three branches to foreign policy issues, the Supreme Court does get to weigh in on international issues from time. Cuba is no exception, and over the nearly fifty years that the U.S. embargo on Cuba has existed, the Supreme Court has heard several cases that challenged the Constitutionality of the travel ban on Cuba.
|
Maliska 10 (May 12, 2010. Nicholas Maliska is a research intern with the New America Foundation/U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative. The Havana Note. “The Supreme Court and the Travel Ban to Cuba” http://washingtonnote.com/guest_post_by_n_3/ Lexis Nexis) NS
|
the U.S. Supreme Court is changing While the Judiciary is usually considered the least pertinent to foreign policy issues, the Supreme Court does get to weigh in on international issues . Cuba is no exception,
|
The Supreme court has jurisdiction over the embargo
| 614 | 51 | 209 | 98 | 8 | 35 | 0.081633 | 0.357143 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,219 |
Despite this recent "Castro Capitalism" evolution, the United States continues to maintain and encourage a strict embargo against Cuba. n5 This embargo serves to stifle the island of Cuba from any further development, and prevents American nationals from engaging in trade and business relations with Cuban nationals. The embargo is a nonsensical and illegal remnant of the Cold War. The embargo is nonsensical because although conservative politicians cling to the belief that continued enforcement of the embargo will hasten Castro's demise, they are mistaken. When American politicians make the assumption that poor economic conditions will turn the Cuban people against Castro, they ignore an important element of Cuban culture. Cuban nationals are unbendingly loyal to Castro given the social welfare programs he instituted in Cuba. n6 In addition, the embargo is illegal because it results in the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws when it prevents third states from trading with Cuba. n7 This extension and imposition of domestic political beliefs (called American foreign policy) onto other foreign sovereigns violates international law as well as U.S. domestic law.
|
Shari-Ellen Bourque, 1995 (Boston University International Law Journal, Spring 1995, 13 B.U. Int'l L.J. 191, Lexis, Accessed 7/21/2013, rwg)
|
conservative politicians cling to the belief that continued enforcement of the embargo will hasten Castro's demise, they are mistaken. When American politicians make the assumption that poor economic conditions will turn the Cuban people against Castro, they ignore an important element of Cuban culture. Cuban nationals are unbendingly loyal to Castro given the social welfare programs he instituted in Cuba
|
(--) Embargo won’t cause the collapse of Castro:
| 1,181 | 48 | 408 | 177 | 8 | 60 | 0.045198 | 0.338983 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,220 |
V. An Alternative Solution to Present U.S.-Cuban Foreign Policy: A Bilateral Investment Treaty¶ One alternative foreign policy available to the United States is a bilateral investment treaty.¶ ¶ Bilateral treaties for the promotion and protection of foreign investment are a prominent feature of current inter-State cooperation on foreign direct investment. Such treaties - which are legally binding on the parties - have been concluded in large numbers mainly between Western countries on the one hand, and developing and Central and Eastern European countries, on the other. Increasingly, however, these treaties are also being concluded between newly industrializing countries and others; developing and Central and Eastern European countries; and between developing countries. n232
|
Shari-Ellen Bourque, 1995 (Boston University International Law Journal, Spring 1995, 13 B.U. Int'l L.J. 191, Lexis, Accessed 7/21/2013, rwg)
|
An Alternative Solution to Present U.S.-Cuban Foreign Policy: A Bilateral Investment Treaty One alternative foreign policy available to the United States is a bilateral investment treaty. Bilateral treaties for the promotion and protection of foreign investment are a prominent feature of current inter-State cooperation on foreign direct investment. Such treaties have been concluded in large numbers mainly between Western countries
|
(--) US should replace the embargo with a Bilateral Investment Treaty:
| 787 | 70 | 436 | 112 | 11 | 60 | 0.098214 | 0.535714 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,221 |
A. What are Bilateral Investment Treaties?¶ A BIT provides for cooperation through the application of guidelines that delineate practices and procedures which apply mutually to each party. The main objective of such treaties is to "obtain legal protection for foreign investment under international law and thus reduce as much as possible the non-commercial risks facing foreign investors in host countries." n233 Bilateral investment treaties provide a means by which states are able to develop mutually beneficial trade relations. BIT's began as instruments by which states resolved legal issues related to the unique relations of foreign investment. n234 In the 1970's, BIT programs gained momentum in response to the expropriation activities of certain countries. n235 These treaties provided additional protection for the assets and property owned by a foreign sovereign's nationals investing abroad. n236 Such protection provides strong incentives for individuals and corporations to invest and expand business opportunities in foreign territories.
|
Shari-Ellen Bourque, 1995 (Boston University International Law Journal, Spring 1995, 13 B.U. Int'l L.J. 191, Lexis, Accessed 7/21/2013, rwg)
|
A BIT provides for cooperation through the application of guidelines that delineate practices and procedures which apply mutually to each party. The main objective of such treaties is to "obtain legal protection for foreign investment under international law and thus reduce as much as possible the non-commercial risks facing foreign investors in host countries." Bilateral investment treaties provide a means by which states are able to develop mutually beneficial trade relations
|
(--) Bilateral Investment Treaties allow states to develop mutually beneficial trade relations:
| 1,054 | 95 | 482 | 151 | 12 | 71 | 0.07947 | 0.470199 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,222 |
The Helms-Burton Act codifies the existing embargo of the United States against Cuba, n28 permits the revocation of visas of the executives of [*916] companies engaged in commercial activities that violate the Act, n29 and creates a process for the United States to provide economic aid to Cuba once the Castro regime no longer governs and the country begins its transition into a democracy. n30 In enacting the Helms-Burton Act, Congress sought to encourage the downfall of the Castro regime and to facilitate Cuba's transition to democracy. n31 A controversial endeavor, Helms-Burton languished in Congress for over a year and a half, n32 until Cuban military [*917] aircraft shot down two United States civilian aircraft on February 23, 1996. n33 President Clinton shortly thereafter signed the Helms-Burton Act into law on March 12, 1996. n34
|
Bret A. Sumner, 1997 (Catholic University Law Review, “DUE PROCESS AND TRUE CONFLICTS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) ACT OF 1996,” 46 Cath. U.L. Rev. 907, Lexis, Accessed 2/25/2013, rwg)
|
The Helms-Burton Act codifies the existing embargo of the United States against Cuba permits the revocation of visas of the executives of companies engaged in commercial activities that violate the Act, and creates a process for the United States to provide economic aid to Cuba once the Castro regime no longer governs and the country begins its transition into a democracy A controversial endeavor, Helms-Burton languished in Congress for over a year and a half, n32 until Cuban military aircraft shot down two United States civilian aircraft on February 23, 1996. President Clinton shortly thereafter signed the Helms-Burton Act into law on March 12, 1996
|
(--) History of Helms-Burton:
| 846 | 29 | 658 | 135 | 4 | 105 | 0.02963 | 0.777778 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,223 |
This Comment suggests that courts may use international comity considerations when defining the boundaries of intended extraterritorial jurisdiction. As a threshold determination, United States courts should weigh international comity concerns within the framework of a new effects analysis to determine whether the exercise of extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction is valid, even when congressional intent for extraterritorial application is clear. Alternatively, international comity considerations should be addressed within a court's personal jurisdiction analysis. This Comment concludes that if Title III of Helms-Burton, or similar overly broad extraterritorial legislation, is enforced, the United States Supreme Court may have the opportunity to develop a coherent analytical framework to determine jurisdictional and due process limitations on extraterritorial legislation.
|
Bret A. Sumner, 1997 (Catholic University Law Review, “DUE PROCESS AND TRUE CONFLICTS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) ACT OF 1996,” 46 Cath. U.L. Rev. 907, Lexis, Accessed 2/25/2013, rwg)
|
This Comment suggests that courts may use international comity considerations when defining the boundaries of intended extraterritorial jurisdiction. As a threshold determination, United States courts should weigh international comity concerns within the framework of a new effects analysis to determine whether the exercise of extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction is valid This Comment concludes that if Title III of Helms-Burton, or similar overly broad extraterritorial legislation, is enforced, the United States Supreme Court may have the opportunity to develop a coherent analytical framework to determine jurisdictional and due process limitations on extraterritorial legislation.
|
(--) Court should narrowly limit the application of Helms-Burton Act:
| 890 | 69 | 695 | 114 | 10 | 92 | 0.087719 | 0.807018 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,224 |
Although a clear showing of congressional intent to apply United States laws extraterritorially will defeat international law arguments advanced in United States courts, n104 Congress and the courts may not disregard constitutional due process protections afforded foreign defendants haled into United States courts. n105 The Due Process Clause protects defendants [*935] from unfair and unreasonable jurisdictional assertions. n106 A foreign defendant haled into the United States court system is entitled to the same due process protections afforded United States citizens. n107 Thus, [*936] when examining legislation clearly intended to have an extraterritorial effect, the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction must be distinguished. n108 Congress's power to link personal jurisdiction to subject matter jurisdiction is constrained by the Due Process Clause in order to protect foreign defendants from arbitrary and unfair litigation. n109
|
Bret A. Sumner, 1997 (Catholic University Law Review, “DUE PROCESS AND TRUE CONFLICTS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) ACT OF 1996,” 46 Cath. U.L. Rev. 907, Lexis, Accessed 2/25/2013, rwg)
|
Although a clear showing of congressional intent to apply United States laws extraterritorially will defeat international law arguments advanced in United States courts Congress and the courts may not disregard constitutional due process protections afforded foreign defendants haled into United States courts. The Due Process Clause protects defendants from unfair and unreasonable jurisdictional assertions. A foreign defendant haled into the United States court system is entitled to the same due process protections afforded United States citizens Congress's power to link personal jurisdiction to subject matter jurisdiction is constrained by the Due Process Clause in order to protect foreign defendants from arbitrary and unfair litigation
|
(--) Helms-Burton must be constrained to due process analysis:
| 976 | 62 | 746 | 135 | 9 | 104 | 0.066667 | 0.77037 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,225 |
The revisionists' proposals vary. Bradley and Goldsmith argue that CIL should be understood as common law in an Erie sense--available to states if they choose to adopt it, but not constituting a part of federal law and not binding on the states under the Supremacy Clause. n18 Kelly urges that CIL be flatly abandoned as a source of international law. n19 Phillip Trimble has argued that CIL should be applied by the courts "only when its application can be satisfactorily justified on the basis of an independent domestic source of authority." n20 Adopting any of these proposals would represent not only a dramatic shift in traditional thinking about customary international law but also a blow to the international human rights movement, which has sought to rely on CIL to impose norms through U.S. courts that the United States has not accepted in conventions.
|
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 2004 (Associate Dean for research @ Georgetown University Law Center, Jan, 98 A.J.I.L. 91, Lexis, Accessed, 7/23/2013, rwg)
|
Bradley and Goldsmith argue that CIL should not constituting a part of federal law and not binding on the states under the Supremacy Clause Adopting any of these proposals would represent not only a dramatic shift in traditional thinking about customary international law but also a blow to the international human rights movement, which has sought to rely on CIL to impose norms through U.S. courts that the United States has not accepted in conventions.
|
A) US adherence to customary international law is critical to the international human rights movement.
| 864 | 102 | 455 | 143 | 15 | 75 | 0.104895 | 0.524476 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,226 |
The second effect of institutionalized protections of human rights is to set a minimum floor of treatment for all citizens within the domestic polity. Even in a non-democracy, minimum human rights protections ensure that [*266] rights are accorded to individuals not directly represented by the government. By ensuring a minimum treatment of the unrepresented, human rights protections prevent the government from externalizing the costs of aggressive behavior on the unrepresented. In human rights respecting states, for example, unrepresented individuals cannot be forced at gunpoint to fight or be bound into slavery to generate low-cost economic resources for war, and thus restrain the state from engaging in aggressive action. On the other hand, in a state where power is narrowly concentrated in the hands of a political elite that systematically represses its own people, the state will be more able to bear the domestic costs of war. By violating the human rights of its own citizens, a state can force individuals to fight or support the military apparatus in its war-making activities. Similarly, by denying basic human rights, a state may be better able to bear the political costs of war. Even if such a state had fair elections, denial of freedom of thought and expression might well insulate the government from the electoral costs of an aggressive foreign policy.
|
William W. Burke-White, 2004 Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University The Harvard Environmental Law Review Spring, 2004 LN
|
By ensuring a minimum treatment of the unrepresented, human rights protections prevent the government from externalizing the costs of aggressive behavior on the unrepresented. In human rights respecting states, for example, unrepresented individuals cannot be forced at gunpoint to fight or be bound into slavery to generate low-cost economic resources for war, and thus restrain the state from engaging in aggressive action. On the other hand, in a state where power is narrowly concentrated in the hands of a political elite that systematically represses its own people, the state will be more able to bear the domestic costs of war. By violating the human rights of its own citizens, a state can force individuals to fight or support the military apparatus in its war-making activities. Similarly, by denying basic human rights, a state may be better able to bear the political costs of war. Even if such a state had fair elections, denial of freedom of thought and expression might well insulate the government from the electoral costs of an aggressive foreign policy.
|
Human rights prevent global slavery and war.
| 1,381 | 45 | 1,072 | 219 | 7 | 173 | 0.031963 | 0.789954 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,227 |
The Founders, the text and structure of the Constitution, and the overwhelming patterns of legal expectation since the dawn of the United States support trends in judicial decision using customary international law as law of the United States. Human rights, of fundamental importance to the Founders and the preferred consequences of democracy, are reflected in long-term and widespread patterns of judicial use that, in comparison to new and radical theories scantily dressed in supposed historic veils, are thunderous in their affirmation of the competence and responsibility of the judiciary to identify, clarify, and apply customary [*336] international law. As our first Chief Justice rightly affirmed, the customary law of nations is part of the law of the United States, even with respect to private duties. n178 Later, Chief Justice Marshall assured that our courts "are established .. to decide on human rights." n179
|
Jordan J. Paust, 1999 (Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center, Michigan Journal of International Law, Winter 1999, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 301, Lexis, Accessed 7/22/2013, rwg)
|
the overwhelming patterns of legal expectation since the dawn of the United States support trends in judicial decision using customary international law as law of the United States. Human rights, are reflected in long-term and widespread patterns of judicial use that, are thunderous in their affirmation of the competence and responsibility of the judiciary to identify, clarify, and apply customary international law
|
(--) Counterplan doesn’t solve the AFF: Sylvester cites three reasons:
| 926 | 70 | 418 | 143 | 10 | 62 | 0.06993 | 0.433566 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,228 |
Still, it is worth considering Brown's at best partial success and wondering whether integration would have been more successful if Congress had more aggressively assisted the Court. n110 Indeed, the steps Congress did take - most notably the conditioning of federal education funds on desegregation - helped quicken the pace of change. n111 This is not to say that integration would have occurred immediately, peacefully, and comprehensively had the effort been led by Congress. The anti-Brown rhetoric of segregationists, criticizing Brown as a judicial usurpation, n112 was largely opportunistic - that is, much, if not most, of that opposition was based on the rejection of integration itself, not the fact that integration was being "illegitimately" imposed by courts.
|
Araiza, 2005 Professor of Law @ Loyola Law School, 2005 (William, Tulane Law Review, February 2005, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 519; Lexis)
|
it is worth considering Brown's at best partial success and wondering whether integration would have been more successful if Congress had more aggressively assisted the Court Indeed, the steps Congress did take - most notably the conditioning of federal education funds on desegregation - helped quicken the pace of change. n111 This is not to say that integration would have occurred immediately, peacefully, and comprehensively had the effort been led by Congress. The anti-Brown rhetoric of segregationists, criticizing Brown as a judicial usurpation, n112 was largely opportunistic - that is, much, if not most, of that opposition was based on the rejection of integration itself, not the fact that integration was being "illegitimately" imposed by courts
|
(---) PERMUTE: DO BOTH—CONGRESSIONAL AND COURT LED SOCIAL CHANGE IS THE BEST OPTION:
| 773 | 84 | 759 | 118 | 13 | 116 | 0.110169 | 0.983051 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,229 |
For internationalists, justification for the Incompatibility Statute would run along familiar grounds. First, the statute would make clear only what has been law from the start: that international law is part of the "law of the land." n76 Second, application of CIL in federal courts would enhance the U.S. position in the world community by demonstrating that the United States is serious about following international norms. Third, as a matter of substantive law, the United States would benefit from the rich and textured international discussion of human rights; applying CIL would add a progressive push to the development of rights in the U.S. legal system. One could add to these the claim pressed by the Blair government in urging adoption of the HRA: that permitting European Convention claims to be heard in UK courts would allow British judges to play a role in the explication of Convention rights. n77 Similarly, a full debate over the content and scope of CIL in U.S. federal courts would undoubtedly influence discussions of CIL in other jurisdictions.
|
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 2004 (Associate Dean for research @ Georgetown University Law Center, Jan, 98 A.J.I.L. 91, Lexis, Accessed, 7/23/2013, rwg)
|
application of CIL in federal courts would enhance the U.S. position in the world community by demonstrating that the United States is serious about following international norms Similarly, a full debate over the content and scope of CIL in U.S. federal courts would undoubtedly influence discussions of CIL in other jurisdictions.
|
Doesn’t solve soft power:
| 1,067 | 25 | 331 | 173 | 4 | 51 | 0.023121 | 0.294798 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,230 |
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
|
Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995
|
a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts , U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange
|
B) US leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange.
| 1,111 | 65 | 460 | 180 | 10 | 71 | 0.055556 | 0.394444 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,231 |
Professor Bradley notes that the interpretive role of customary law recognized in The Charming Betsy had been recognized three years [*333] earlier in Talbot v. Seeman. n152 The Talbot court stated: "The laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the common principles and usages of nations." n153 The Court continued: "By this construction the act of Congress will never violate those principles which we believe, and which it is our duty to believe, the legislature of the United States will always hold sacred." n154 In Talbot, there was no notion expressed of a power of Congress to override international law. Indeed, as Professor Bradley cautiously admits, the phrase "it is our duty to believe" suggests that the Court recognized that Congress cannot override international law and that courts, at least, must not permit such a result. n155 That the opinion of the Court was written by Chief Justice Marshall is also informing. Later in a circuit court decision it was declared that a court "cannot give to .. orders a construction that will lead to ... the executive abrogating" a right vested by the modern law of war. n156 Professor Bradley also recognizes that even earlier in Rutgers v. Waddington, n157 while construing a state statute so as to avoid a conflict with the Treaty of Paris, the Rutgers court stated "the repeal of the law of nations, or any interference with it, could not have been in contemplation .. when the Legislature passed this statute; and we think ourselves bound to exempt that law from its operation...." n158 Such language also supports the predominant view at the time that domestic legislation cannot obviate the domestic effect of customary international law, and that the courts have a responsibility to assure that customary law prevails.
|
Jordan J. Paust, 1999 (Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center, Michigan Journal of International Law, Winter 1999, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 301, Lexis, Accessed 7/22/2013, rwg)
|
Professor Bradley notes that the interpretive role of customary law the Court recognized that Congress cannot override international law and that courts, at least, must not permit such a result Such language also supports the predominant view at the time that domestic legislation cannot obviate the domestic effect of customary international law, and that the courts have a responsibility to assure that customary law prevails.
|
(--) Agent counterplans are illegitimate
| 1,830 | 40 | 428 | 305 | 5 | 65 | 0.016393 | 0.213115 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,232 |
Yet congressional action is impeded by the very text that it could potentially rejuvenate. The fact that Congress's power is limited to "enforcing" the Equal Protection Clause means that that power is necessarily tied to the meaning of that provision. By itself this requirement is unremarkable: all it means is that when Congress seeks [*524] to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, its action must have some link to the meaning of equal protection. But because the Fourteenth Amendment also includes a judicially enforceable component, questions about the acceptable range of congressional action inevitably require consideration of how the courts have understood that guarantee. In turn, if the meaning of the Amendment is thought to depend solely and completely on what the Court says the Clause means - in other words, if we adopt a juricentric model - then lack of clarity in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence necessarily infects, and thus impedes, congressional attempts to breathe new life into it.
|
Araiza, 2005 Professor of Law @ Loyola Law School, 2005 (William, Tulane Law Review, February 2005, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 519; Lexis)
|
congressional action is impeded by the very text that it could potentially rejuvenate. The fact that Congress's power is limited to "enforcing" the Equal Protection Clause means that that power is necessarily tied to the meaning of that provision But because the Fourteenth Amendment also includes a judicially enforceable component, questions about the acceptable range of congressional action inevitably require consideration of how the courts have understood that guarantee lack of clarity in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence necessarily infects, and thus impedes, congressional attempts to breathe new life into it.
|
(---) Court will check the Congress—blocks solvency:
| 1,015 | 52 | 629 | 160 | 7 | 91 | 0.04375 | 0.56875 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,233 |
The Ninth Circuit in Allen appeared to be voicing this concern when it stated that intermediate courts should decline the invitation to rely on foreign authority. n80 I recently had a conversation with one Ninth Circuit judge who expressed great caution about relying on any persuasive authority, much less authority from outside the United States. Most constitutional [*661] cases can be resolved through the existing interpretive canons of text, structure, history, precedent, and national experience. For those cases that cannot, persuasive authority from other U.S. jurisdictions will often be available. Thus, those instances in which it will be useful to rely on comparative experiences to fill a void will be extraordinarily rare. The Supreme Court, of course, shares this commitment to judicial precedent but has greater freedom to depart from precedent. It is worth noting that the three most significant instances of constitutional comparativism in recent years - Atkins v. Virginia, Lawrence, and Roper - were all examples of the Supreme Court reversing its own precedent. Even assuming lower courts were sympathetic to this methodological approach and the outcome that flowed therefrom, it is doubtful that lower courts perceive themselves as having the same institutional freedom to depart from precedent. Unlike the Supreme Court, lower courts will almost never rely on foreign or international law to depart from binding Supreme Court precedent. n81
|
Roger P. Alford, 2008 Professor of Law @ the Pepperdine University School of Law, November 2008, Fordham Law Review, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 647
|
n80 I recently had a conversation with one Ninth Circuit judge who expressed great caution about relying on authority from outside the United States cases can be resolved through the existing interpretive canons of text, structure, history, precedent, and national experience For those cases that cannot, persuasive authority from other U.S. jurisdictions will often be available those instances in which it will be useful to rely on comparative experiences to fill a void will be extraordinarily rare Supreme Court shares this commitment to judicial precedent but has greater freedom to depart from precedent Even assuming lower courts were sympathetic to this methodological approach and the outcome that flowed therefrom, it is doubtful that lower courts perceive themselves as having the same institutional freedom to depart from precedent. lower courts will almost never rely on foreign or international law to depart from binding Supreme Court precedent n81
|
Extend our Sylvester evidence—the counterplan doesn’t solve at all…
| 1,466 | 67 | 963 | 223 | 9 | 146 | 0.040359 | 0.654709 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,234 |
As this history demonstrates, Congress’s political responsiveness makes it the object of social movement mobilization and a unique register of the nation’s evolving constitutional understandings. The policentric model of Section 5 power holds that Congress and the Court may each consider and incorporate the other’s views, while retaining autonomy in judgment, so that the Court remains free to strike down any law that it believes threatens individual liberties or impairs structural values such as separation of powers or federalism. The policentric model thus preserves both the nation’s rich legacy of legislative constitutionalism and the judicially enforced rights on which we have come to depend.
|
Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegal, June 8, 2003 [The Yale Law Journal, “Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act,” p. 112]
|
Congress’s political responsiveness makes it the object of social movement mobilization and a unique register of the nation’s evolving constitutional understandings. The policentric model of Section 5 power holds that Congress and the Court may each consider and incorporate the other’s views, while retaining autonomy in judgment, The policentric model thus preserves both the nation’s rich legacy of legislative constitutionalism and the judicially enforced rights on which we have come to depend.
|
(--) Permutation is the best option: best preserves constitutionalism and rights:
| 704 | 82 | 499 | 104 | 11 | 72 | 0.105769 | 0.692308 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,235 |
The overwhelming weight of research and scholarly discourse on the subject of the U.S. embargo of Cuba has exposed a very damning pattern of behavior on the part of the United States. n103 By the standards [*442] of nearly every government in the world except the United States, the comprehensive embargo on Cuba incontrovertibly violates international human rights law and international humanitarian law due to its devastating humanitarian impact. n104 In reality, the views of the world community and those of the United States may not be as far apart as commentators might suggest. The government does continue to argue publicly that its conduct is wholly consistent with international law. n105 Recent modifications to the embargo undertaken for "humanitarian reasons," however, undercut this position. n106 At least with respect to the embargo's humanitarian consequences, there is evidence the United States appreciates that its embargo may violate certain international legal norms. n107¶ [*443] Yet, the international community's efforts to impel the United States to lift its embargo for humanitarian reasons, and the United States's efforts to minimize the humanitarian impact of the embargo, have only addressed violations of a discrete set of international legal norms. n108 Even if the United States were somehow able to mitigate, or eliminate entirely, the ruinous consequences the embargo has on the Cuban people, such a comprehensive embargo would nevertheless be illegal under international law. n109 In other words, the illegality of such measures under international law is not simply predicated on its effect on the Cuban people on a micro-level--it also is established by reference to the nation-state itself and the macro-level concept of development. n110¶ Because the embargo of the Cuban nation completely inhibits the country's ability to pass from a third-world service and agricultural economy to more advanced stages of development, it violates international law to which the United States is bound by both treaty and custom. n111 First and foremost among such violations has been the abrogation [*444] of its duties under the Charter of the United Nations. n112 Having signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United States has further breached its international obligations codified in treaties. n113 While the United States has resisted the codification of the right to development in more specific instruments and the evolution of the right into a legitimate norm of international law, its often sole opposition to the right has not prevented it from becoming customary international law binding on the United States. n114
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BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
|
By the standards of nearly every government in the world except the U S the comprehensive embargo on Cuba incontrovertibly violates international human rights law and international humanitarian law due to its devastating humanitarian impact Recent modifications to the embargo undertaken for "humanitarian reasons," however, undercut this position Yet, the U S 's efforts to minimize the humanitarian impact of the embargo, have only addressed violations of a discrete set of international legal norms Even if the U S were somehow able to mitigate, or eliminate entirely, the ruinous consequences the embargo has on the Cuban people, such a comprehensive embargo would nevertheless be illegal under international law. In other words, the illegality of such measures under international law is not simply predicated on its effect on the Cuban people on a micro-level--it also is established by reference to the nation-state itself and the macro-level concept of development Because the embargo of the Cuban nation completely inhibits the country's ability to pass from a third-world service and agricultural economy to more advanced stages of development, it violates international law to which the U S is bound by both treaty and custom
|
(--) Doesn’t subordinate the US to international law—our Sylvester evidence says the US has to subordinate itself to international law to solve.
| 2,781 | 144 | 1,236 | 427 | 22 | 191 | 0.051522 | 0.447307 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,236 |
Since the 1990s and the experience with the 661 regime in Iraq, a profusion of scholarship and political discourse has decried the use of comprehensive unilateral and multilateral trade sanctions because of the crippling effects such measures have on a target country's population. n1 [*418] Consequently, these all-encompassing, blanket sanctions have been almost universally rejected as the economic weapon of choice in international affairs. n2 Both as a member of the U.N. Security Council and in its sovereign capacity, the United States has tacitly recognized the potential violations of international law occasioned by blanket measures. n3 Even with respect to Cuba, a country on which it has maintained a comprehensive embargo despite widespread international opposition, the United States has made "humanitarian" exceptions to its embargo. n4¶ Yet the United States's efforts to bring its embargo on Cuba more in line with international human rights and international humanitarian legal norms have missed a critical point: the illegality of the embargo under international law is not predicated exclusively, or even primarily, on its humanitarian impact. n5 This Comment argues that the comprehensive [*419] embargo on Cuba could have no negative "humanitarian" consequences whatsoever, and yet it would violate international law because it undermines a nation's ability to develop. n6
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BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
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all-encompassing, blanket sanctions have been almost universally rejected as the economic weapon of choice in international affairs Both as a member of the U.N. Security Council and in its sovereign capacity, the United States has tacitly recognized the potential violations of international law occasioned by blanket measures. Even with respect to Cuba the United States has made "humanitarian" exceptions to its embargo. the illegality of the embargo under international law is not predicated exclusively, or even primarily, on its humanitarian impact This Comment argues that the comprehensive embargo on Cuba could have no negative "humanitarian" consequences whatsoever, and yet it would violate international law because it undermines a nation's ability to develop.
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(--) Doesn’t solve the OAS advantage—doesn’t get rid of the embargo, so it solves none of the OAS advantage.
| 1,394 | 108 | 771 | 207 | 19 | 112 | 0.091787 | 0.541063 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
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Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,237 |
n150 See generally The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14 (documenting the ire of the international community with respect to the Cuban embargo). No other modern act of state has provoked such widespread, unanimous condemnation by the international community. See CHOMSKY, supra note 88, at 83 (noting that the United States is "100 percent isolated" in its stance toward Cuba, and further that Israel-the only country that purportedly supports the U.S. position-regularly violates the embargo).
|
BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
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the ire of the international community with respect to the Cuban embargo). No other modern act of state has provoked such widespread, unanimous condemnation by the international community
|
(--) Extend our Manchak evidence the Cuban embargo is crucial to demonstrate to the world the US commitment to take international law seriously—the counterplan doesn’t demonstrate to the world that we take international seriously.
| 499 | 230 | 187 | 74 | 34 | 28 | 0.459459 | 0.378378 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,238 |
The obstinacy of the United States in maintaining the Cuban blockade in the face of mounting, and ultimately near absolute international opposition, is one of the most egregious examples of such realpolitik in the history of the United Nations. n83 Beginning in 1992, at the request of Cuba, the U.N. General Assembly began voting annually on a resolution calling for the end of the U.S. embargo on Cuba. n84 The first vote, recorded in November 1992, was fifty-nine in favor, three opposed, with seventy-one abstentions. n85 Over the course of the next seventeen years, the vote shifted dramatically in favor of ending the embargo as the abstaining countries lined up to condemn the United States's policy toward Cuba. n86 In 2009, 187 countries voted to end the [*439] embargo, with two countries abstaining. n87 The only two countries in the world to vote with the United States were Israel and Palau, and Israel openly violates the embargo contrary to its vote. n88
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BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
|
The obstinacy of the United States in maintaining the Cuban blockade in the face of mounting, and ultimately near absolute international opposition, is one of the most egregious examples of such realpolitik in the history of the United Nations Over the course of the next seventeen years, the vote shifted dramatically in favor of ending the embargo as the abstaining countries lined up to condemn the United States's policy toward Cuba In 2009, 187 countries voted to end the embargo, with two countries abstaining.
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(--) Near universal international opposition to the Cuban embargo:
| 969 | 66 | 516 | 162 | 9 | 84 | 0.055556 | 0.518519 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,239 |
[The] long-standing economic, commercial and financial embargo [of Cuba] has been consistently rejected by a growing number of Member States to the point at which the opposition has become almost unanimous. Thus, the need to respect international law in the conduct of international relations has been recognized by most members of this body, as has been evidenced by the growing support for the draft resolution [condemning the embargo] . . . . I believe that the presence of such a large number of Member States in this Hall today and their participation in these deliberations are indications of their opposition to unilateral extraterritorial measures. They express their firm opposition to unilateral measures as a means of exerting pressure on developing countries, as such measures are contrary to international law, international humanitarian law, the United Nations Charter and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States.
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BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
|
[The] long-standing economic, commercial and financial embargo [of Cuba] has been consistently rejected by a growing number of Member States to the point at which the opposition has become almost unanimous. Thus, the need to respect international law in the conduct of international relations has been recognized by most members of this body, as has been evidenced by the growing support for the draft resolution [condemning the embargo]
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(--) Near unanimous consensus among other nations that the embargo violates international law:
| 954 | 94 | 437 | 146 | 13 | 68 | 0.089041 | 0.465753 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,240 |
F. Third Party States' Criticism of the Embargo and its Violation of International Law¶ The substance and illegality of the embargo receive much global criticism. One critic declared:¶ ¶ By making the blockade even tighter and more oppressive than ever, the United States hopes to create such severe conditions of misery and hunger... We could ask ourselves on what ethical and moral bases can [the blockade] be carried out? What laws back them up? ... How can they talk about human rights when they are trying to starve a whole people? n201¶ ¶ In addition, the Cuban Representative to the U.N. points out in a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations that:¶ ¶ the embargo has caused Cuba substantial material losses and has obliged it to make extraordinary efforts to change its economic relations... [It] constitutes a flagrant violation of the principles of sovereign equality of states and non-intervention in their internal affairs, and is a constant source of tension that impairs the normal development of international relations. n202¶ ¶ This letter clearly refers to state autonomy and the crippling effect on the Cuban economy resulting from the indirect intervention enforced through the embargo. The harm to Cuba's economy generated by the embargo demonstrates the great harm that may result when one country applies policies that violate fundamental international law principles.¶ 1. Third Party Reactions to the Torricelli Bill and Recent Legislation¶ The Cuban Democracy Act proved so extreme that it attracted a good deal of attention from the United Nations General Assembly. In response to this U.S. action, the Assembly approved a resolution which called for an end to the embargo. n203 The final resolution condemns " "the promulgation and application by member states of laws and regulations whose extrajudicial effects affect the sovereignty of other states.' " n204 It also demands that U.N. members "refrain from applying such measures "in conformity with their obligations under the U.N. Charter'... ." n205 This resolution asked all member states to repeal any laws or policies which extended extrajudicial effects onto foreign sovereigns. n206¶ In the aftermath of the passage of the Torricelli Bill, the international community responded to the measure with disdain. The U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the embargo by an 88-44 vote. n207 Although the U.N. resolution is not legally binding, n208 it does carry a strong message encouraging the international community to defy U.S. sanctions. Reactions from Cuban exiles residing in the United States have been mixed. On one hand, they support the measure because it threatens the survival of the Castro regime; n209 on the other hand they do not support the use of an illegal measure as a means of fighting the Cuban government. n210¶ The European Community also protested the Cuban Democracy Act by stating:¶ ¶ the European Community and its Member States cannot accept the extraterritorial extension of U.S. jurisdiction as a matter of law and policy... The Bill ... would also prohibit any vessel from engaging in trade with the United States if the vessel has entered a port in Cuba during the preceding 180 days. Such a measure would be inconflict with long-standing rules on comity and international law... n211¶ ¶ Arguably, the criticism directed against the United States is well-deserved. The Torricelli Bill's imposition of sanctions onto third countries violates international law and encourages the economic isolation of Cuba. In addition, this policy clearly imposes U.S. domestic law onto sovereign states by making foreign investors and businessmen suffer should they choose to engage in business relations with Cuba. The Bill, there- fore, removes the element of free choice from business decisions of companies outside of U.S. territory.
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Shari-Ellen Bourque, 1995 (Boston University International Law Journal, Spring 1995, 13 B.U. Int'l L.J. 191, Lexis, Accessed 7/21/2013, rwg)
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The substance and illegality of the embargo receive much global criticism. We could ask ourselves on what ethical and moral bases can [the blockade] be carried out? What laws back them up? ... How can they talk about human rights when they are trying to starve a whole people? the Cuban Representative to the U.N. points out in a letter the embargo constitutes a flagrant violation of the principles of sovereign equality of states and non-intervention in their internal affairs, and is a constant source of tension that impairs the normal development of international relations The harm to Cuba's economy generated by the embargo demonstrates the great harm that may result when one country applies policies that violate fundamental international law principles The U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the embargo by an 88-44 vote. it does carry a strong message encouraging the international community to defy U.S. sanctions
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(--) Embargo receives a great deal of global criticism:
| 3,875 | 55 | 943 | 612 | 9 | 150 | 0.014706 | 0.245098 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,241 |
In order to proceed, while not ignoring state and lower federal courts, I will concentrate on the US Supreme Court/ Like the Congress and the presidency, the supreme court, while not the only institution of its kind in the American Political system, is the most visible and important one. It sits atop a hierachal structure, and decisions of lower courts involving significant social reform seldom escape its scrutiny. Also, because it is the most authoritative US court, it is the most concerned with public policy. Hypotheses that concern the courts and social reform must first deal with the Supreme court and then turn to the ramifications of its decisions elsewhere in the judiciary
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Rosenberg 91 (Gerald N., Associate Professor in Political Science @ U of Chicago, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?)
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Like the Congress and the presidency, the supreme court, while not the only institution of its kind in the American Political system, is the most visible and important one. It sits atop a hierachal structure, and decisions of lower courts involving significant social reform seldom escape its scrutiny. because it is the most authoritative US court, it is the most concerned with public policy. Hypotheses that concern the courts and social reform must first deal with the Supreme court and then turn to the ramifications of its decisions elsewhere in the judiciary
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(--) Doesn’t capture our Supreme Court solvency
| 687 | 47 | 565 | 113 | 7 | 92 | 0.061947 | 0.814159 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,242 |
What judges do do is arrive at incremental, highly reiterative policy guesses. Stare decisis or precedential reasoning and explanation is central to the economies of all judiciaries organized hier-archically and even most of those that are not. If lower courts did not follow the previous decisions of higher courts, the certainty of law, which is one reason we choose to live by rules in the first place, would be undermined. Even more importantly the failure of lower courts to practice vertical stare decisis would result in far more cases being pushed on to the highest court than any highest court could handle. Thus even in legal systems in which the highest court is vested with the sole jurisdiction over certain legal issues, as with the preliminary ruling system of the European Court of Justice and the Kelsenian jurisdictional arrangements of continental constitutional courts, decision making under the constraints of vertical stare decisis tends to migrate downward to lower courts. For otherwise the highest court would have to take case after case after case after case deciding exactly the same thing in exactly the same way rather than issuing commanding precedents. Whatever its virtues or vices vertical stare decisis is a necessity of judicial economy.
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Martin Shapiro 2003 James W. and Isobel Coffroth Professor of Law University of California, Berkeley 03 https://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/events/archives/ShapiroTalk.pdf.
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. Stare decisis or precedential reasoning and explanation is central to the economies of all judiciaries organized hier-archically lower courts did not follow the previous decisions of higher courts, the certainty of law, would be undermined more importantly the failure of lower courts to practice vertical stare decisis would result in far more cases being pushed on to the highest court than any highest court could handle. decision making under the constraints of vertical stare decisis tends to migrate downward to lower courts. For otherwise the highest court would have to take case after case after case after case deciding exactly the same thing in exactly the same way rather than issuing commanding precedents. Whatever its virtues or vices vertical stare decisis is a necessity of judicial economy.
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(--) Turn: Court Clog
| 1,273 | 21 | 810 | 204 | 4 | 128 | 0.019608 | 0.627451 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
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Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,243 |
The number of immigration trials have spiked since 2005, a result of a federal program called Operation Streamline that puts illegal immigrants on a fast track to prosecution, detention and deportation. In the first seven months of 2008, the government reported 38,443 new immigration prosecutions. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, a data research organization at Syracuse University, estimates there will be 65,902 immigration cases this year, a 65 percent increase over last year and a 216 percent increase over 2003. For the Department of Homeland Security, Operation Streamline is an indispensable tool needed to secure the border. In the past year, the government says, the deterrent of prison time has dramatically decreased the number of the people trying to cross the border from Mexico. Critics, however, contend that the increased number of cases strain an already burdened judicial system, depriving lawyers and judges of ample time to hear cases and denying defendants the right to a fair trial. They also contend that resources have been diverted from pursuing offenders more dangerous than the typical migrant worker and that prosecutors cannot use their own discretion in choosing which violators to go after. "I'm all for national security and border security," said Brack, who was appointed to the bench in 2003 by President Bush. "The people I generally see are humble people who have no criminal offenses other than coming back and forth to pick chili. We're spending a lot of time catching these folks when we could concentrate on those penetrating our border to do us harm."
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Goldman 8 Russell, What's Clogging the Courts? Ask America's Busiest Judge, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5429227
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the increased number of cases strain an already burdened judicial system, depriving lawyers and judges of ample time to hear cases and denying defendants the right to a fair trial. They also contend that resources have been diverted from pursuing offenders more dangerous prosecutors cannot use their own discretion in choosing which violators to go after. "I'm all for national security and border security The people I generally see are humble people who have no criminal offenses other than coming back and forth to pick chili. We're spending a lot of time catching these folks when we could concentrate on those penetrating our border to do us harm."
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Court clog undermines the ability to fight terrorism
| 1,610 | 52 | 654 | 256 | 8 | 108 | 0.03125 | 0.421875 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,244 |
The use of precedent by courts in the United States of America should be viewed as a tradition or a practice, rather than a legal doctrine in the strictest sense of the word, because it is so deeply embedded in the culture of the legal profession and the judiciary that it takes place without much reflection by judges. In its simplest and most important sense, the doctrine of stare decisis requires all tribunals of inferior jurisdiction to follow the precedents of courts of superior jurisdiction, to accept the law as declared by superior courts, and not to attempt to overrule their decisions. n159 American lawyers have come to believe that "the slightest deviation from this rigid rule would destroy the sanctity of the judicial practice. There would be no finality or stability in the law and the court system would be chaotic in its operation and unstable and inconsistent in its decisions." n160 This strict rule of stare decisis, which governs lower courts in all common-law, statutory and constitutional cases, does not clarify the circumstances in which courts may overrule their own previous decisions, or deviate from their own precedents. Americans have never wandered very far down the Benthamite road of extreme stare decisis, which once bound English common-law courts to respect their own erroneous or unreasonable precedents. n161 Perhaps this distinction between English and American practice arose in part from amorphousness [*87] of the English Constitution, which leaves Parliament free to correct any perceived errors of the judiciary, n162 but the more fundamental difference follows from the American view of law as intimately connected to reason, not a command, but truth as revealed by experience. "It is more important that the Court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations. Those doctrines only will eventually stand which bear the strictest examination and the test of experience." n163
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Mortimer Sellers, Fall 2006 (Student note, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 67, LEGAL HISTORY AND LEGAL THEORY: The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America)
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the doctrine of stare decisis requires all tribunals of inferior jurisdiction to follow the precedents of courts of superior jurisdiction, to accept the law as declared by superior courts, and not to attempt to overrule their decisions. n159 the slightest deviation from this rigid rule would destroy the sanctity of the judicial practice. There would be no finality or stability in the law and the court system would be chaotic in its operation and unstable and inconsistent in its decisions n160 n161 n162
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(--) Extend our Bhagwat evidence—lower court refusal to follow Supreme Court precedent undermines the rule of law.
| 1,998 | 114 | 508 | 317 | 17 | 83 | 0.053628 | 0.26183 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
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Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,245 |
What to do with today's lost neighborhoods? It is the late dawn of the twenty-first century, when integration is stronger and civil rights laws are weaker, when local government budgets are dwarfed by demands. Suing local governments or lobbying them, two of the most important strategies of twentieth-century advocacy for social justice, have been weakened by judicial and political hostility to redistributive claims. Yet state and local government law retains malleability and promise. Laws governing the allocation of power among local agencies exert significant influence over unincorporated urban areas in particular and spatial polarization by race and class more generally.
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Michelle Wilde Anderson, 2010 (Assistant Professor of Law @ UC Berkeley Law School, “MAPPED OUT OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY,” Stanford Law Review, April 2010, Lexis/Nexis, rwg)
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What to do with today's lost neighborhoods? It is the late dawn of the twenty-first century, when integration is stronger and civil rights laws are weaker, when local government budgets are dwarfed by demands. Suing local governments or lobbying them, two of the most important strategies of twentieth-century advocacy for social justice, have been weakened by judicial and political hostility to redistributive claims
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(--) Doesn’t capture our Supreme Court solvency
| 681 | 47 | 418 | 100 | 7 | 63 | 0.07 | 0.63 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
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Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,246 |
State courts often interpret language in state constitutions in order to grant protection to rights and privileges that is broader than that afforded by the Supreme Court under the United States Constitution. n1 However, state courts tend to be guided (if not controlled) by United States Supreme Court interpretations of analogous language in the United States Constitution. n2 In other words, state courts have traditionally used Supreme Court precedents as "doctrinal security blankets," looking to Court precedent for legal support for decisions on state constitutional questions, even when there is no legal necessity for doing so.
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Bill Swinford, 1994 (Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Richmond, Temple Law Review, “SHEDDING THE DOCTRINAL SECURITY BLANKET: HOW STATE SUPREME COURTS INTERPRET THEIR STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE SHADOW OF RODRIGUEZ,” 67 Temp. L. Rev. 981; Lexis, rwg)
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state courts tend to be guided (if not controlled) by United States Supreme Court interpretations of analogous language in the United States Constitution. In other words, state courts have traditionally used Supreme Court precedents as "doctrinal security blankets," looking to Court precedent for legal support for decisions on state constitutional questions, even when there is no legal necessity for doing so.
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(--) FIAT Abuse: all 50 state courts wouldn’t take the same action at the same time
| 636 | 83 | 412 | 96 | 16 | 61 | 0.166667 | 0.635417 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
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Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,247 |
The adjudication of claims under state constitutions involving equal protection of the law provides a prominent example of the growing pains faced by state courts. n7 As in other areas, state courts in the 1970s and 1980s began hearing more equal protection claims on the basis of state constitutional language alone. But the lack of independent state-level doctrine in this area, combined with the legal tradition of deference to the United States Supreme Court, made it difficult, for those state courts who desired to do so, to depart from federal standards for equal protection. n8
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Bill Swinford, 1994 (Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Richmond, Temple Law Review, “SHEDDING THE DOCTRINAL SECURITY BLANKET: HOW STATE SUPREME COURTS INTERPRET THEIR STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE SHADOW OF RODRIGUEZ,” 67 Temp. L. Rev. 981; Lexis, rwg)
|
The adjudication of claims under state constitutions involving equal protection of the law provides a prominent example of the growing pains faced by state courts But the lack of independent state-level doctrine in this area, combined with the legal tradition of deference to the United States Supreme Court, made it difficult, for those state courts who desired to do so, to depart from federal standards for equal protection.
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(--) States won’t depart from federal standards—the counterplan can’t solve on its own:
| 585 | 87 | 427 | 95 | 13 | 68 | 0.136842 | 0.715789 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
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Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,248 |
Shall 'shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong. Should 'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better.
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Sudison, 7/18/2006 (http://sudison.blogspot.com/2006_07_01_archive.html)
|
'shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. 'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified
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(--) Perm- do the CP--“Should” means “ought to”
| 937 | 47 | 338 | 152 | 8 | 50 | 0.052632 | 0.328947 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,249 |
The right to development is an inalienable human right intrinsically linked to a peoples' sovereignty. n19 A state's right to development occupies an exalted position in international law; it is protected in several of international law's foundational documents including the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. n20 In addition to the legitimacy [*425] as a principle of international law, which it derives from its inclusion in the International Bill of Human Rights, the right to development has been further entrenched as an international legal norm by later, more specific treaties and resolutions. n21 By the early 1970s, the right to development [*426] was undergoing a more formal, comprehensive articulation in the specific language of human rights. n22 Over the course of the next fourteen years, the right to development was proclaimed in various texts, including regional multilateral instruments. n23 In 1986, the overwhelming majority of nations, acting through the U.N. General Assembly, built upon the foundation laid in the International Bill of Human Rights and certified the right to development as a human right. n24 Since the passage of the Declaration on the Right to Development, the right has become a fixture in the pantheon of internationally-recognized human rights, regularly appearing in such texts as multilateral treaties, declarations of international conferences and summits, annual resolutions of the General Assembly, reports of the Secretary General, and annual reports of the Human Rights Council. n25
|
BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
|
The right to development is an inalienable human right intrinsically linked to a peoples' sovereignty A state's right to development occupies an exalted position in international law; it is protected in several of international law's foundational documents including the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, In addition to the legitimacy as a principle of international law, the right to development has been further entrenched as an international legal norm by later, more specific treaties and resolutions the right has become a fixture in the pantheon of internationally-recognized human rights, regularly appearing in such texts as multilateral treaties, declarations of international conferences and summits, annual resolutions of the General Assembly, reports of the Secretary General, and annual reports of the Human Rights Council
|
(--) None of their evidence assumes the court—no reason to believe the court conditions rulings or consults on issues before it rules.
| 1,689 | 134 | 858 | 253 | 22 | 124 | 0.086957 | 0.490119 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,250 |
[*427] Because of its ubiquity and broad-based acceptance by the international community, the right to development has undoubtedly risen to the level of customary international law. n26 The development of norms of customary international law is a fluid, evolutionary process, which is ascertained by reference to the general practice of states rooted in a sense of legal obligation over a period of time. n27 The right to development is clearly traceable in this manner. n28 It has been over sixty years since the foundations of the right were laid in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and over forty years since they were strengthened in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [*428] and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights. n29 It has been thirty-eight years since the right was proposed using the specific language of human rights, twenty-four years since the international community recognized the right in a formal, broad-based multinational instrument, and seventeen years since a consensus involving all governments was reached on the right to development. n30 The right is consistently invoked by states as a rule of international law. n31 Indeed, the right is so fundamental, so inviolable, and so broadly accepted, it may even be properly considered a jus cogens norm. n32 States are therefore bound both by treaty and customary international law to respect the fundamental right of other nations to pursue economic and social development in accordance with their own sovereign volition. n33
|
BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
|
Because of its ubiquity and broad-based acceptance by the international community, the right to development has undoubtedly risen to the level of customary international law The development of norms of customary international law is a fluid, evolutionary process The right is consistently invoked by states as a rule of international law. the right is so fundamental, so inviolable, and so broadly accepted States are therefore bound both by treaty and customary international law to respect the fundamental right of other nations to pursue economic and social development in accordance with their own sovereign volition
|
(--) Right to development has risen to the level of customary international law:
| 1,570 | 80 | 620 | 247 | 13 | 94 | 0.052632 | 0.380567 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,251 |
n5 See U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 2, 3, 7, 9-11, 13, 15, 18, 20, 23, 25. In denouncing the U.S. embargo of Cuba, a majority of the nations presenting at the General Assembly, including Egypt, Guyana (speaking on behalf of the fourteen member states of the Caribbean Community), Vietnam, China, Algeria, India, Angola, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Cuba, France, Laos, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Belarus, referred to the U.S. embargo's effects on Cuba's right to development as a reason for its illegitimacy under international law. See id. Yet, the delegation from the United States completely ignored the issue of development and focused only on humanitarian questions raised by the other countries. See id. at 14-15.
|
BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
|
In denouncing the U.S. embargo of Cuba, a majority of the nations presenting at the General Assembly, referred to the U.S. embargo's effects on Cuba's right to development as a reason for its illegitimacy under international law
|
(--) Other nations denounce the embargo on the grounds that it violates international law because of the right to development:
| 736 | 126 | 228 | 119 | 20 | 37 | 0.168067 | 0.310924 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,252 |
Throughout the term, but mostly during the last months of the term—May, June, and, if necessary, July—the Court announces its opinions. The decision of the Court is subsequently published, first as a slip opinion, and subsequently in the United States Reports. In recent years, opinions have been available on the Supreme Court's website and other legal websites on the morning they are announced.
|
Wikipedia, 7/24/2012 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Procedures_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_ United_States#Announcement_of_opinions, Accessed 7/25/2012, rwg)
|
mostly during the last months of the term—May, June, and, if necessary, July—the Court announces its opinions.
|
(--) Normal means is announcing the plan in May or June—after their politics scenario:
| 397 | 86 | 110 | 63 | 14 | 17 | 0.222222 | 0.269841 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,253 |
What can the courts do for a resilient regime? Presidents and Congress have limited time and political energy. They will spend them on what they regard as central issues. But at any time there will be "outliers" - geographic regions as yet uncommitted to the regime's constitutional understandings, or substantive areas that plainly require change if those understandings are to become deeply implanted in society, yet politically too touchy [*347] or relatively unimportant to Congress. "For the affiliated leader, enhancing judicial authority to define and enforce constitutional meaning provides an efficient mechanism for supervising and correcting those who might fail to adhere to the politically preferred constitutional vision" (pp. 105-06). The courts can serve as a convenient but essentially administrative mechanism for bringing these outliers into the constitutional order. n16¶ In addition, the courts may have rhetorical resources unavailable to presidents. Their obligation to explain their decisions, and the fact that they make decision after decision, means that they have an opportunity to develop a reasonably general account of the resilient regime's constitutional understandings. In Whittington's words, "It is the classic task of judges within the Anglo-American tradition ... to render new decisions and lay down new rules that can be explicated as a mere working out of previously established legal principles" (p. 84). Presidents, in contrast, only sporadically make speeches illuminating those understandings.¶ More boldly, affiliated presidents may try to use the courts to "overcomee gridlock" (p. 124) caused by the strategic positions recalcitrant opponents of the new constitutional regime may occupy. And, if not "use the courts," at least rely on the courts to take the initiative, because "the Court can sometimes move forward on the constitutional agenda where other political officials cannot" (p. 125). "Coalition leaders might be constrained by the needs of coalition maintenance," but "judges have a relatively free hand" (p. 125). This "use" of the courts, though, poses risks. The courts may push the regime's constitutional principles further and faster than is politically wise, and the regime's political leaders may find themselves on the defensive. Indeed, in this way the courts can contribute to making a resilient regime vulnerable, which may be part of the story about the Warren Court and the demise of the New Deal/Great Society regime. n17¶ [*348] Preemptive presidents face a special strategic problem. Sometimes they take office because they manage to persuade the public that they remain committed to a resilient regime's constitutional vision even if in their hearts they want to transform the regime. n18 At other times they take office as a regime becomes vulnerable, but do not themselves have the program, vision, or charisma to be reconstructive presidents themselves. n19 They are likely to face opposition in Congress and to some degree in the courts. But they can turn divided government to their advantage by seeking judicial confirmation of executive prerogative. The judges in place might be sympathetic to such claims for doctrinal and political reasons. They will have "inherited from affiliated administrations" (p. 169) doctrines supporting executive authority. And, though Whittington doesn't make this point explicitly, they may see the preemptive president as an accident, soon to be replaced by an affiliated one whose exercises of presidential power they will want to endorse. Finally, preemptive presidents need to get their authority from somewhere when they face congressional opposition, as they will. They don't have much of their own, but they can try "to borrow from the authority of the courts in order to hold off their political adversaries" (p. 195).¶ One final point before I move to some speculations about the future of judicial supremacy. Whittington emphasizes the growth of judicial supremacy during the twentieth century, both in terms of the judges' self-understanding and, perhaps more importantly, in terms of the degree of political commitment to judicial supremacy (p. 25). He suggests that politicians have had increasingly strong reasons to support the Supreme Court. The reconstructive presidency of Ronald Reagan was less ambitious than that of Franklin Roosevelt (p. 232), assuring the American people that Reagan's policies would strengthen rather than destroy the social safety nets that Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson's regimes had created. Even a reconstructive president could hope that the Supreme Court would assist in articulating regime principles in the way the Court ordinarily does for affiliated presidents. Further, drawing again on Skowronek's account of the [*349] ways in which regimes leave a residue even after they have been displaced, Whittington describes the doctrinal thickening that occurred during the twentieth century with respect to essentially every possible ideological and political commitment a President could have (p. 283). Doctrinal thickening means that every member of a ruling coalition will have some basis in constitutional law for its assertions that the Constitution requires satisfaction of its policy preferences, and that the Court cannot possibly satisfy all the demands on it. n20 So, for the future, we might expect Presidents to have increasingly ambivalent views about the Supreme Court. In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court will be useful and annoying to every President - useful because the Court can do some policy work that Presidents would rather not expend time and political capital on, and annoying because the Court's failure to satisfy all the demands emanating from a President's political supporters will put pressure on the President to do something about the Court.
|
Tushnet, 2008 (law professor at Harvard, Mark, “THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY AND THE ROBERTS COURT: SOME HINTS FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREM-ACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY”, Summer, 25 Const. Commentary 343, lexis, Accessed 2/18/2013, rwg)
|
What can the courts do for a resilient regime? Presidents and Congress have limited time and political energy. at least rely on the courts to take the initiative, because "the Court can sometimes move forward on the constitutional agenda where other political officials cannot" politicians have had increasingly strong reasons to support the Supreme Court. In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court will be useful to every President - useful because the Court can do some policy work that Presidents would rather not expend time and political capital on,
|
(--) ZERO LINK AT ALL: The Supreme Court does the plan—Obama doesn’t use any capital to push the plan.
| 5,846 | 102 | 559 | 888 | 19 | 89 | 0.021396 | 0.100225 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,254 |
Independent and active judicial review generates position-taking opportunities by reducing the policy responsibility of the elected officials. They may vote in favor of a bill that they personally dislike secure in the knowledge that it will never be implemented. State statutes regulating abortion after the Roe decision, for example, were often pure symbolism, though they could also play a more productive role in pressing the Court to refine its doctrine or in filling in the lacuna left by judicial decisions. More subtly, the judicial backstop allows legislators to focus on some dimensions of the proposed policy (the most optimistic and politically popular) while downplaying others (the constitutionally subversive and treacherous). Legislators even gain a political windfall when the courts actually act to strike down the popular law. The visibility of the exercise of judicial review creates another opportunity for legislators to publicize their position on the issue, this time by bewailing the Court’s actions.
|
Keith E. Whittington, 2007 politics at Princeton University, (Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, p. 137-39)
|
Independent and active judicial review generates position-taking opportunities by reducing the policy responsibility of the elected official They may vote in favor of a bill that they personally dislike secure in the knowledge that it will never be implemented the judicial backstop allows legislators to focus on some dimensions of the proposed policy (the most optimistic and politically popular) while downplaying others (the constitutionally subversive and treacherous Legislators even gain a political windfall when the courts actually act to strike down the popular law The visibility of the exercise of judicial review creates another opportunity for legislators to publicize their position on the issue, this time by bewailing the Court’s actions.
|
(--) Turn: the plan bolsters political capital by allowing politicians to blame the court:
| 1,025 | 91 | 755 | 154 | 14 | 111 | 0.090909 | 0.720779 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,255 |
In previous work on support for institutions and leaders, scholars have demonstrated the crucial effects of discrete political events and circumstances on the rise and decline of public confidence. For example, Mueller (1973) persuasively argues that crises in foreign affairs result in "rallying-around-the-flag" and a subsequent increase in the popularity of the incumbent chief executive (cf. Parker, 1977). Unfortunately for the purposes of analysis, events normally associated with the Court seldom cause a splash of the dimensions of the Mayaguez incident or the Cuban missile crisis, Particular decisions sometimes do gain a fair amount of attention in the elite media of communications, but few single cases-with the exception of a bombshell such as Dred Scott-have sufficient weight to shift public attitudes one way or the other. Even if we could isolate a number of crises or landmark decisions, the polling organizations have not gathered data on support for the Court often enough to permit a precise reading on the influence of salient events.
|
Gregory Caldeira, 1986 Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University, [The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., pp. 1209-1226; “Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court”; Jstor]
|
In previous work on support for institutions and leaders, scholars have demonstrated the crucial effects of discrete political events and circumstances on the rise and decline of public confidence. events normally associated with the Court seldom cause a splash Particular decisions sometimes do gain a fair amount of attention in the elite media of communications, but few single cases have sufficient weight to shift public attitudes one way or the other. Even if we could isolate a number of crises or landmark decisions, the polling organizations have not gathered data on support for the Court often enough to permit a precise reading on the influence of salient events.
|
(--) Court action doesn’t link to politics- individual rulings don’t draw attention
| 1,058 | 84 | 676 | 163 | 12 | 108 | 0.07362 | 0.662577 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,256 |
The justices themselves were implicated in the speculation because clerks would have more to lose by talking to the press. A decision has never leaked before the court announced it publicly; the explanation for that fact is that justices have nothing to gain and clerks would be throwing away promising careers by leaking.
|
Sam Baker, 7/4/2012 (staff writer, “Supreme Court healthcare ruling leaks have DC buzzing: Who is the culprit?” http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/legal-challenges/236197-supreme-court-talk-has-dc-buzzing-who-is-the-leaker, rwg)
|
A decision has never leaked before the court announced it publicly; the explanation for that fact is that justices have nothing to gain and clerks would be throwing away promising careers by leaking
|
(--) Decisions never leak before they are announced:
| 322 | 53 | 198 | 53 | 8 | 33 | 0.150943 | 0.622642 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,257 |
That could foreshadow the court's response to a chief argument by state attorneys – that the court should butt out and leave school finance to the Legislature. A court finding against the state would put the ball back in the hands of lawmakers, who have tended to put off dealing with problems in schools, prisons and mental health facilities until state or federal judges forced them to act. "It's the classic political response to problems they don't want to deal with," said Maurice Dyson, a school finance expert and assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University. "There is no better political cover than to have a court rule that something must be done, which allows politicians to say their hands are tied."
|
Dallas Morning News 8/19/05 http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/texassouthwest/legislature/schoolfinance/stories/082005dntexsession.8bd31b4a.html
|
A court finding against the state would put the ball back in the hands of lawmakers, who have tended to put off dealing with problems until state or federal judges forced them to act "It's the classic political response to problems they don't want to deal with," said Dyson, a assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University There is no better political cover than to have a court rule that something must be done, which allows politicians to say their hands are tied."
|
(--) Courts provide political cover to politicians:
| 724 | 51 | 478 | 122 | 7 | 83 | 0.057377 | 0.680328 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,258 |
The outline of this revised research agenda, begins by looking at a 1993 article written by Mark Graber challenging the countermajoritarian difficulty paradigm. Graber's observations point to the importance of studying systemic transformations, such as the evolution of judicial supremacy. Using historical case studies on abortion, the Dred Scott controversy, and anti-trust issues to study perceived incidents of judicial independence, he contends that scholars who seek to justify independent judicial policymaking, even in the face of believed democratic deficiencies, misunderstand and inaccurately represent the relationships between justices and elected officials. By looking at the dialogues between these parties it becomes apparent that judicial independence, when it actually occurs, is often exercised at the invitation of elected officials, and in the absence of any expressed majoritarian choice, in order to resolve political controversies that elected officials cannot or do not want to resolve themselves. Hence the counter-majoritarian difficulty can be more appropriately characterized as the “non-majoritarian difficulty.” 33
|
Alison M. Martens, 2007 political science at University of Louisville, 2007 (Perspectives on Politics 5.3)
|
judicial independence, is often exercised at the invitation of elected officials, and in the absence of any expressed majoritarian choice, in order to resolve political controversies that elected officials cannot or do not want to resolve themselves. Hence the counter-majoritarian difficulty can be more appropriately characterized as the “non-majoritarian difficulty
|
(--) Politicians will use the counterplan to deflect blame
| 1,146 | 58 | 369 | 157 | 9 | 50 | 0.057325 | 0.318471 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,259 |
The purpose of this research is to examine theories of diffuse support and institutional legitimacy by testing hypotheses about the interrelationships among the salience of courts, satisfaction with court outputs, and diffuse support for national high courts. Like our predecessors, we are constrained by essentially cross-sectional data; unlike them, we analyze mass attitudes toward high courts in eighteen countries. Because our sample includes many countries with newly formed high courts, our cross-sectional data support several longitudinal inferences, using the age of the judicial institution as an independent variable. We discover that the U.S. Supreme Court is not unique in the esteem in which it is held and, like other courts, it profits from a tendency of people to credit it for pleasing decisions but not to penalize it for displeasing ones. Generally, older courts more successfully link specific and diffuse support, most likely due to satisfying successive, nonoverlapping constituencies.
|
Gregory Caldeira, 1998 Prof of Political Science at The Ohio State University, [Co-written by Vanessa A. Baird, James L. Gibson; “On the Legitimacy of National High Courts” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 2 (Jun., ), pp. 343-358; Jstor]
|
the U.S. Supreme Court is not unique in the esteem in which it is held and, like other courts, it profits from a tendency of people to credit it for pleasing decisions but not to penalize it for displeasing ones. Generally, older courts more successfully link specific and diffuse support, most likely due to satisfying successive, nonoverlapping constituencies.
|
(--) Extend our Caldeira evidence: individual decisions rarely make a splash—there’s no way a decision about the embargo will turn everyone away from the courts if decisions like abortion and gun control haven’t…
| 1,009 | 212 | 362 | 149 | 33 | 58 | 0.221477 | 0.389262 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,260 |
Internationalists also have powerful answers to the "judicial activism" charge of CIL lawmaking. They properly note that the process for the crystallization of CIL norms is an arduous one, which can justify only a fairly small number of CIL norms and even a smaller number of judicial opinions that apply them as binding law. n31 Furthermore, the sources to which decision makers may look is fairly well-set: state practice, precedents, international court cases, international legal materials, the views of experts. These do not always yield determinative results, any more than the "sources" of constitutional law mechanically produce answers. Judgment must be applied. But this fact has tended to argue for judicial modesty more than hubris. In any event, as internationalists point out, a democratic check on CIL lawmaking exists in Congress's power to reject or modify CIL rules by normal legislation.
|
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 2004 (Associate Dean for research @ Georgetown University Law Center, Jan, 98 A.J.I.L. 91, Lexis, Accessed, 7/23/2013, rwg)
|
Internationalists also have powerful answers to the "judicial activism" charge of CIL lawmaking. They properly note that the process for the crystallization of CIL norms is an arduous one, which can justify only a fairly small number of CIL norms and even a smaller number of judicial opinions that apply them as binding law. the sources to which decision makers may look is fairly well-set: state practice, precedents, international court cases But this fact has tended to argue for judicial modesty more than hubris.
|
(--) Use of customary international law doesn’t lead to judicial activism:
| 906 | 74 | 518 | 141 | 11 | 84 | 0.078014 | 0.595745 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,261 |
If the Constitution does not preclude the elevation of customary international law to the level of treaties or domestic enactments in theory, then practice has borne this out--the U.S. legal system has long accorded great respect, and deference, to the "law of nations." n95 As the Supreme Court noted in 1796, [w]hen the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement." n96 The Founders expected [*441] that the customary law of nations would find application in U.S. courts by virtue of the nation's membership in the international community; moreover, they unquestionably intended this outcome. n97 Early jurisprudence reflected this intent. n98 In the time since the nation's founding, the incorporation of international law into both federal and state law has continued unabated, with scholars, commentators, and jurists reiterating the propriety of such developments. n99 Cases arising under international law or international agreements to which the United States has acquiesced are within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. n100 These courts "are bound to give effect to international law." n101 Similarly, casesss arising under treaties to which the United States is a party, as well as cases arising under customary international law" are "within the Judicial Power of the United States under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution." n102
|
BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
|
As the Supreme Court noted in 1796, [w]hen the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, The Founders expected that the customary law of nations would find application in U.S. courts by virtue of the nation's membership in the international community; moreover, they unquestionably intended this outcome Early jurisprudence reflected this intent. the jurisdiction of U.S. courts These courts "are bound to give effect to international law."
|
(--) Incorporation of international law in US courts is consistent with the Founders interpretation of the constitution:
| 1,438 | 120 | 488 | 222 | 17 | 74 | 0.076577 | 0.333333 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,262 |
Last, it can be pointed out--by way of anticipating objections to an Incompatibility Statute--that the legislation would not open the floodgates to litigation nor produce runaway judges imposing foreign-based rights willy-nilly. In contrast to the detailed rights established by the European Convention (and which British courts must now interpret and enforce), CIL-based rights are likely to play but a small role in U.S. civil rights litigation. This is so because of the wide-ranging constitutional and statutory rights already protecting Americans, and also because of the rather rigorous rules for identifying CIL that would control a conscientious federal judge. n78 And in any event, my proposal would equip Congress with a fast-track process for reversing the decisions of federal courts, if it seeks to adopt legislation in violation of CIL or disagrees with the judiciary's interpretation of CIL norms.
|
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 2004 (Associate Dean for research @ Georgetown University Law Center, Jan, 98 A.J.I.L. 91, Lexis, Accessed, 7/23/2013, rwg)
|
the legislation would not open the floodgates to litigation nor produce runaway judges imposing foreign-based rights willy-nilly CIL-based rights are likely to play but a small role in U.S. civil rights litigation. This is so because of the wide-ranging constitutional and statutory rights already protecting Americans, and also because of the rather rigorous rules for identifying CIL that would control a conscientious federal judge
|
(--) Applying CIL won’t produce runaway judges:
| 912 | 47 | 434 | 138 | 7 | 64 | 0.050725 | 0.463768 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,263 |
n97 See Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301, 301 (1999) ("The Founders clearly expected that the customary law of nations was binding, was supreme law, created (among others) private rights and duties, and would be applicable in United States federal courts.").
|
BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
|
The Founders clearly expected that the customary law of nations was binding, was supreme law, created (among others) private rights and duties, and would be applicable in United States federal courts.
|
(--) Customary international law is consistent with the Framers vision of the constitution:
| 351 | 91 | 200 | 57 | 13 | 31 | 0.22807 | 0.54386 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,264 |
n126 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). If international law is U.S. law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, and it is the "duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," then it is clearly within the Court's authority to rule on questions of international law. See id.; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 111(2), (3) (1987) (noting that cases arising under international law or international agreements to which the United States has acquiesced are within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts).
|
BENJAMIN MANCHAK, 2010 (staff writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal, “NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,” 30 B.C. Third World L.J. 417, Lexis, Accessed 2/24/2013, rwg)
|
If international law is U.S. law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, and it is the "duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," then it is clearly within the Court's authority to rule on questions of international law
|
(--) Clearly within the court’s authority to rule on questions of international law:
| 591 | 84 | 229 | 101 | 13 | 42 | 0.128713 | 0.415842 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,265 |
Why is the court's popularity suddenly in free fall? Andrew Dugan at Gallup says a key reason might be that its divisive, blockbuster decisions have disappointed conservatives and liberals alike. The justices angered the right when, in a 5-4 vote, they reaffirmed a lower court's overturning of the Defense of Marriage Act; they made the left just as mad when, in another 5-4 vote, they upheld state voter ID laws that Democrats say discourage left-leaning immigrant and minority blocs from casting ballots.¶ Unlike Congress or the presidency, one might expect the Supreme Court, as a nominally nonpartisan institution, to be sheltered from the public disaffection that has chipped away at the ratings of the other two branches. In reality, though, the court has often been a source of political polarization since 2000 and is hardly immune to the same political forces plaguing the other two branches. [Gallup]
|
Harold Maass, 7/22/2013 (staff writer, “How the Supreme Court got on the bad side of everybody,” http://theweek.com/article/index/247206/how-the-supreme-court-got-on-the-bad-side-of-everybody, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
Why is the court's popularity suddenly in free fall? a key reason might be that its divisive, blockbuster decisions have disappointed conservatives and liberals alike. The justices angered the right when, in a 5-4 vote, they reaffirmed a lower court's overturning of the Defense of Marriage Act; they made the left just as mad when, in another 5-4 vote, they upheld state voter ID laws
|
(--) Non-unique: The series of unpopular decisions last term should trigger the link:
| 911 | 85 | 385 | 147 | 13 | 65 | 0.088435 | 0.442177 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,266 |
Part IV of this Article discusses a counterintuitive implication of a coordination-based account of judicial power. Conventional wisdom suggests that courts secure compliance with their decisions by drawing upon their store of legitimacy, which is undermined by decisions that are unpopular, controversial, or lack intellectual integrity. n25 Part IV argues that precisely the opposite is true: an unpopular or unpersuasive decision can, in fact, enhance a court's power in future cases, as long as it is obeyed. Widespread compliance with a decision that is controversial, unpopular, or unpersuasive serves only to strengthen the widely held expectation that others comply with judicial decisions. This expectation, in turn, is self-fulfilling: those who expect others to comply with a court's decisions will find it strategically prudent to comply themselves, and the aggregate result will, in fact, be widespread compliance. Part IV illustrates these strategic insights--and the Supreme Court's apparent grasp of them--by contrasting [*734] Bush v. Gore n26 with Brown v. Board of Education n27 and Cooper v. Aaron. n28
|
David Law, 2009 (Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Georgetown Law Journal, March 2009, 97 Geo. L.J. 723; “A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review,” Lexis, rwg)
|
Conventional wisdom suggests that courts secure compliance with their decisions by drawing upon their store of legitimacy, which is undermined by decisions that are unpopular, controversial, or lack intellectual integrity. n25 Part IV argues that precisely the opposite is true: an unpopular or unpersuasive decision can, in fact, enhance a court's power in future cases, as long as it is obeyed. Widespread compliance with a decision that is controversial, serves only to strengthen the widely held expectation that others comply with judicial decisions. This expectation, in turn, is self-fulfilling
|
(--) Turn: Winners win for the Courts—controversial decisions enhance the court’s legitimacy:
| 1,122 | 93 | 601 | 167 | 12 | 89 | 0.071856 | 0.532934 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,267 |
After the Supreme Court struck dealt a blow to the Defense of Marriage Act and California’s Proposition 8 on Wednesday, reactions from the religious right were fervid and crazed, suggesting Christian conservatives feel their very livelihoods are imperiled. Indeed, one conservative tells us the dubious direction this is all heading:¶ The Supreme Court virtually declared an open season on those with whom the 5-4 majority disagree.¶ We are no longer relevant. What we think no longer counts. We are, after all, bigots who only want to demean homosexuals.¶ So when does the persecution begin?¶ When are we stripped of our citizen status, the right to vote, the right to bear arms and other constitutionally guaranteed liberties? Isn’t that next?
|
Michael Luciano, 6/25/2013 (staff writer, “After Gay Marriage Rulings, Christian Conservatives Unconvincingly Portray Themselves As the Victims,” http://www.policymic.com/articles/51897/marriage-equality-christian-conservatives-absurdly-claim-they-re-the-real-victims, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
After the Supreme Court struck dealt a blow to the Defense of Marriage Act on Wednesday, reactions from the religious right were fervid and crazed, suggesting Christian conservatives feel their very livelihoods are imperiled
|
(--) Non-unique: conservatives enraged about the DOMA decision:
| 745 | 63 | 224 | 119 | 8 | 34 | 0.067227 | 0.285714 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,268 |
Opinion about the Supreme Court may influence opinion about the Court's decisions, but is the opposite true? Viewed from the perspective of the Court's justices, it would be preferable if public reaction to rulings did not shape subsequent levels of support for the Court. If opinion about the Court were fully determined by early political socialization and deeply rooted attachments to democratic values, then justices would be free to intervene in controversial policy questions without risk that doing so would expend political capital. Consistent with this perspective, a long tradition of scholarship argues that the Supreme Court is esteemed partly because it commands a bedrock of public support, or a reservoir of goodwill, which helps it to remain legitimate despite occasional critical reaction to unpopular rulings (Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968; Easton 1965, 1975; Caldeira 1986; Caldeira and Gibson 1992). The sources of this diffuse support are usually seen as rather stable and immune from short-term influences, implying that evaluations of specific decisions are of little or no broad importance. For instance, Caldeira and Gibson (1992) find that basic democratic values, not reactions to decisions, act as the strongest determinants of institutional support.
|
Grosskopf and Mondak, 1998 (Anke Grosskopf, Assistant Prof of Political Science @ Long Island University, & Jeffrey Mondak, Professor of Political Science @ U of Illinois, 1998, “Do attitudes toward specific supreme court decisions matter? The impact of Webster and Texas v Johnson on Public Confidence in the Supreme Court” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 51 no 3 633-54 September1998)
|
it would be preferable if public reaction to rulings did not shape subsequent levels of support for the Court
|
(--) Judicial capital is resilient – one controversial decision won’t destroy it.
| 1,274 | 81 | 109 | 192 | 12 | 19 | 0.0625 | 0.098958 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,269 |
In its decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, justices voted 7-1 that the University of Texas's race-based admissions policy must be reviewed at the highest level judicial review - "strict scrutiny."¶ It sent the case back to the lower federal court to apply that standard to UT Austin - which apparently thought the days of "race conscious" policies had an open road based on a 2003 Supreme Court ruling, which in fact was quite a narrow decision.¶ Ms. Fisher, who is white and who applied to UT-Austin in 2008, sought redress because she said she was passed over in favor of a lesser-qualified minority candidate. Since she already enrolled at another school and graduated, she now wants the $100 she spent on what she feels was a discriminatory process.¶ Today's ruling is quite significant. A 7-1 ruling requiring lower courts to apply "strict scrutiny" to university admissions policies even when done in the name of "diversity" will place significant limits on affirmative action. The strict scrutiny standard is a high burden for any state or federal policy to meet and invariably results in the policies being struck down by federal courts.
|
Horace Cooper, 6/24/2013 (former law professor at the George Mason University School of Law, Christian Science Monitor, Lexis, Accessed 7/28/2013, rwg)
|
In its decision in Fisher Today's ruling is quite significant requiring lower courts to apply "strict scrutiny in the name of "diversity" will place significant limits on affirmative action. The strict scrutiny standard is a high burden and invariably results in the policies being struck down by federal courts.
|
(--) Fisher ruling already substantially curtails AFF action:
| 1,162 | 61 | 312 | 194 | 8 | 49 | 0.041237 | 0.252577 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,270 |
WASHINGTON -- Sequestration will quietly chip away at the military's readiness capabilities, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel argued on Monday, urging members of Congress to work together to come up with a solution.¶ "To implement the steep and abrupt reductions that have been required under sequestration, we've had to make very difficult decisions to reduce, stop and defer many activities and programs that keep our military prepared to fight -- including training, maintenance, and modernization investments," Hagel said.¶ "Readiness cuts aren't always visible, but these cuts are having and will continue to have very damaging effects," he added.
|
Amanda Terkel, 7/22/2013 (staff writer, “Sequestration Damaging To Military Readiness, Chuck Hagel Says,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/sequestration-military-readiness_n_3635686.html?utm_hp_ref=politics, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
Sequestration will quietly chip away at the military's readiness capabilities To implement the steep and abrupt reductions that have been required under sequestration, we've had to make very difficult decisions to reduce that keep our military prepared to fight -- including training, maintenance, and modernization investments these cuts are having and will continue to have very damaging effects,"
|
(--) Non-unique: Sequestration undermines readiness now:
| 649 | 56 | 399 | 97 | 6 | 58 | 0.061856 | 0.597938 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,271 |
"Each of the services have curtailed activities -- flying hours have been reduced, ships are not sailing, and Army training has been halted," said Hagel on Monday. "These kinds of gaps and shortages could lead to a force that is inadequately trained, ill-equipped, and unable to fulfill required missions.
|
Amanda Terkel, 7/22/2013 (staff writer, “Sequestration Damaging To Military Readiness, Chuck Hagel Says,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/sequestration-military-readiness_n_3635686.html?utm_hp_ref=politics, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
Each of the services have curtailed activities -- flying hours have been reduced, ships are not sailing These kinds of gaps and shortages could lead to a force that is inadequately trained, ill-equipped, and unable to fulfill required missions.
|
(--) Sequestration is underming military readiness:
| 305 | 51 | 244 | 49 | 6 | 39 | 0.122449 | 0.795918 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,272 |
Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also recently said that unless Congress addresses sequestration, there will be "a dramatic impact in our readiness."¶ On Tuesday, the Senate Budget Committee, chaired by Sen. Patty Murray (D-Wash.), will be holding a hearing examining the impact of sequestration and national security. One of the witnesses will be Jennifer-Cari Green, a Madigan Army Medical Center employee and single mother who is being furloughed.
|
Amanda Terkel, 7/22/2013 (staff writer, “Sequestration Damaging To Military Readiness, Chuck Hagel Says,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/sequestration-military-readiness_n_3635686.html?utm_hp_ref=politics, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
unless Congress addresses sequestration, there will be "a dramatic impact in our readiness. will be holding a hearing examining the impact of sequestration and national security.
|
(--) Sequestration undermines readiness:
| 486 | 40 | 178 | 75 | 4 | 26 | 0.053333 | 0.346667 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,273 |
But even though it represents a clear victory for the Obama administration, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion wasn't only a tactical move. It may also further conservative jurisprudence in the long run by setting new limits on congressional power. The ruling articulated limits on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, a bedrock of the modern state, and also placed new boundaries on how the federal government could use its spending power. "Roberts showed he's more than just a member of a conservative bloc. It really is the Roberts Court," said Erwin Chemerinsky, dean of the University of California, Irvine, law school. Some Republicans were livid. "Just because a couple of people on the Supreme Court declare something to be 'constitutional,' does not make it so," said Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky.
|
ASHBY JONES And BRENT KENDALL, 6/28/2012 (staff writers, “Roberts Straddles Ideological Divide,” Accessed 7/25/2012 at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240 52702303561504577494723149538572.html, rwg)
|
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion wasn't only a tactical move. Some Republicans were livid. "Just because a couple of people on the Supreme Court declare something to be 'constitutional,' does not make it so," said Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky
|
(--) Extend our Maass & Luciano evidence—conservatives are angry about the DOMA decision and the Prop 8 decision—they feel their very livelihoods are imperiled—massively swamping the link provided by the plan.
| 814 | 209 | 239 | 130 | 31 | 39 | 0.238462 | 0.3 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,274 |
"Wars come and go, and the economy goes up and down, but a Supreme Court justice serves, on average, 20 years," she said. "And once the court has made a decision, getting it reversed is practically impossible."
(--) Justices will modify their behavior to avoid backlash from other branches:
|
Baxter, 2005 7/12/2005 (Tom, staff writer, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Lexis)
|
Wars come and go, and the economy goes up and down, but a Supreme Court justice serves, on average, 20 years," And once the court has made a decision, getting it reversed is practically impossible.
|
(--) Supreme Court decisions are almost impossible to reverse:
| 290 | 62 | 197 | 49 | 9 | 35 | 0.183673 | 0.714286 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,275 |
In a press release, Cuomo said: “The Supreme Court’s decision to strike down DOMA was a groundbreaking civil rights victory that brought the LGBT community closer to the true meaning of equal rights under the law. As a result of that decision, New York State is now able to issue refund checks to qualified same-sex spouses who were required to pay taxes for no reason other than their sexual orientation.”
|
Dan Orlando, 7/24/2013 (staff writer, “Same-Sex couples to receive estate tax refund in NY,” http://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2013/07/24/same-sex-couples-to-receive-estate-tax.html, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
The Supreme Court’s decision to strike down DOMA was a groundbreaking civil rights victory that brought the LGBT community closer to the true meaning of equal rights under the law.
|
(--) Non-unique: DOMA ruling was a huge civil rights victory:
| 406 | 61 | 180 | 70 | 10 | 30 | 0.142857 | 0.428571 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,276 |
Equally as important as Brown's moral victory was its impact on the Civil Rights Movement and race relations in the United States. Indeed, two camps of scholars have explored and articulated the importance of the decision on effecting social change. For some, such as Professor Mark Tushnet, Brown had a direct and forceful impact on the success of the Civil Rights Movement and landmark civil rights legislation enacted during the 1960s. n116 According to these scholars, Brown gave Blacks hope that racial equality would be achieved and that the rights of Blacks would be recognized, thereby shaping and helping to forge a more aggressive Civil Rights Movement, a movement that would result in strong anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. n117
|
Onwuachi-Willig, 2005 Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Michigan Law Review, May, 2005, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1507, Lexis, rwg
|
Equally as important as Brown's moral victory was its impact on the Civil Rights Movement and race relations in the United States Brown had a direct and forceful impact on the success of the Civil Rights Movement and landmark civil rights legislation enacted during the 1960s Brown gave Blacks hope that racial equality would be achieved and that the rights of Blacks would be recognized, thereby shaping and helping to forge a more aggressive Civil Rights Movement, a movement that would result in strong anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965
|
(--) Brown proves: the law boslters social change:
| 813 | 50 | 610 | 133 | 8 | 102 | 0.06015 | 0.766917 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,277 |
n199. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1027, 1030 (1992) (book review) (asserting that Rosenberg's book "deserves harsh criticism because ... it endorses inconsistent measures of effective judicial action, focuses on the Court in isolation rather than as part of a larger political culture, uses presumptions hostile to the recognition of a broad judicial role, and employs inadequate data and questionable portrayals of existing research"); Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 Yale L.J. 1763, 1771-72 (1993) (book review) (criticizing Rosenberg's theory for being "radically indeterminate," for neglecting certain "dynamic effects unleashed by many Court decisions," and for failing "to differentiate between constitutional and statutory interpretation decisions").
|
Fallon, 2005 prof. of Constitutional Law @ Harvard, Harvard Law Review, April 2005, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787; Lexis, rwg
|
Devins, asserting that Rosenberg's book "deserves harsh criticism because ... it endorses inconsistent measures of effective judicial action, focuses on the Court in isolation rather than as part of a larger political culture, uses presumptions hostile to the recognition of a broad judicial role, and employs inadequate data and questionable portrayals of existing research Schuck criticizing Rosenberg's theory for being "radically indeterminate," for neglecting certain "dynamic effects unleashed by many Court decisions," and for failing "to differentiate between constitutional and statutory interpretation decisions").
|
(--) Rosenberg is wrong: multiple reasons:
| 817 | 42 | 624 | 114 | 6 | 83 | 0.052632 | 0.72807 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,278 |
Litigation as a visible, public, and "newsworthy" phenomenon can serve an educative function, by teaching the general public about international norms of behavior, calling attention to injustices, persuading changes of opinion, provoking a public outcry, and mobilizing grassroots campaigns. n163 Within the U.S., press accounts of [*2339] the extent of repression elsewhere, and even direct participation in the judicial process by individual jurors, can generate a societal empathy for human rights victims, n164 thus contributing to a domestic human rights consciousness and the development of a political constituency supportive of an ethical foreign policy. n165 Greater domestic attention to rights abuses occurring overseas will increase pressure on the U.S. government to condemn abuses and bring its influence to bear on repressive governments. n166
|
Van Schaack, 2004 Assistant Prof. of Law @ Santa Clara University School of Law, Vanderbilt Law Review, November, Beth, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2305; Lexis, rwg)
|
Litigation as a visible, public, and "newsworthy" phenomenon can serve an educative function, by teaching the general public about international norms of behavior, calling attention to injustices, persuading changes of opinion, provoking a public outcry, and mobilizing grassroots campaigns. direct participation in the judicial process by individual jurors, can generate a societal empathy for human rights victims, n164 thus contributing to a domestic human rights consciousness and the development of a political constituency supportive of an ethical foreign policy Greater domestic attention to rights abuses occurring overseas will increase pressure on the U.S. government to condemn abuses and bring its influence to bear on repressive governments
|
(--) Litigation on human rights mobilizes grassroots campaigns and educates the public about human rights abuses:
| 858 | 113 | 753 | 123 | 16 | 106 | 0.130081 | 0.861789 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,279 |
I like to keep my posts squarely in the Pagan sphere, but there are times my inner snark just becomes too much to bear. Today has been a huge step forward for equality and civil rights. Politics in the United States are often round after round of disappointment, but today there was mostly joy. Sure, we have many more battles ahead of us to realize full marriage equality on a nationwide level, but we took major strides today.
|
Jason Mankey, 6/26/2013 (staff writer, “Deconstructing Stupid: Dumb Responses to the End of DOMA, “http://www.patheos.com/blogs/panmankey/2013/06/deconstructing-stupid-dumb-responses-to-the-end-of-doma/, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
Today has been a huge step forward for equality and civil rights today there was mostly joy. Sure, we have many more battles ahead of us to realize full marriage equality on a nationwide level, but we took major strides today.
|
(--) Extend our Orlando evidence, the strike down of the Defense of Marriage Act totally swamps the plan—it’s a much bigger symbol that the Court is interested in protecting civil rights than a strike down of the Cuban embargo. At a minimum, it is perceived as a huge civil rights victory—non-uniquing the Disad and swamping our link.
| 428 | 334 | 226 | 78 | 57 | 41 | 0.730769 | 0.525641 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,280 |
Regardless of which camp one falls in, the direct or indirect Brown effect camp, the undeniable truth is that Brown certainly helped to transform race relations in this country. n120 Whether it ignited racial change because of a stronger belief that Blacks' rights and interests would be acknowledged and protected or whether it effected change in a more perverse manner by creating southern resistance that [*1533] invoked the sympathies of northern Whites and politicians, Brown helped to change a nation. In sum, the Brown decision was and is more than a symbol of racial equality. It was the impetus of a movement that worked to change how Americans viewed and thought about race and resulted in important legislation that helped to protect the civil liberties of Blacks and other minorities, even though, as Bell points out, with dwindling force today.
|
Onwuachi-Willig, 2005 Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Michigan Law Review, May, 2005, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1507, Lexis, rwg
|
the undeniable truth is that Brown certainly helped to transform race relations in this country Whether it ignited racial change because of a stronger belief that Blacks' rights and interests would be acknowledged and protected or whether it effected change in a more perverse manner by creating southern resistance that [*1533] invoked the sympathies of northern Whites and politicians, Brown helped to change a nation. In sum, the Brown decision was and is more than a symbol of racial equality. It was the impetus of a movement that worked to change how Americans viewed and thought about race and resulted in important legislation that helped to protect the civil liberties of Blacks and other minorities,
|
(--) Brown fundamentally altered race relations in the country:
| 857 | 63 | 709 | 140 | 9 | 115 | 0.064286 | 0.821429 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,281 |
As Zelma Henderson, one of the Topeka parents, proclaimed about the moral victory of Brown, "When you get right down to it, the message of the Brown decision ... is really that all human beings of all races are created equal... . We went to the Supreme Court of the United States to affirm that fact, and we won." n128 Regardless of the status of minorities today, that moral victory was significant. As Professor Dennis Hutchinson recently asserted, "[Brown] de-legitimized Jim Crow. It said that the social attitude ... . this insulting, [*1535] demeaning, humiliating attitude that ... white people have about black people - does not have the official imprimatur of the law." n129
|
Onwuachi-Willig, 2005 Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Michigan Law Review, May, 2005, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1507, Lexis, rwg
|
When you get right down to it, the message of the Brown decision ... is really that all human beings of all races are created equal... . We went to the Supreme Court of the United States to affirm that fact, and we won As Professor Dennis Hutchinson recently asserted, "[Brown] de-legitimized Jim Crow. It said that the social attitude ... . this insulting, [*1535] demeaning, humiliating attitude that ... white people have about black people - does not have the official imprimatur of the law."
|
(--) Brown fundamentally altered social attitudes toward social change:
| 683 | 71 | 496 | 115 | 9 | 86 | 0.078261 | 0.747826 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,282 |
Furthermore, there was a practical effect to Brown that was equally significant. As I suggested earlier, had there not been Brown, would segregation have tumbled so easily in other areas, such as with busing and other public accommodations? n130 Moreover, what would have happened if Whites, in their efforts to equalize schools under Bell's "separate but equal" plan, had simply decided that their social interests in preventing race-mixing were much higher than their economic interests in funding only one school? n131 Is this not what Bell astutely points out that many poor and working-class Whites have consistently done throughout history? The fact is that Brown gave society a goal to strive for and set the stage for a movement that created racial change. Brown was more than a legal decision; it was "a statement about the fundamental moral basis of democracy." n132 In other words, what is important here is not whether "separate but equal" could have been achieved (which I do not believe was possible), but rather, as Ted Shaw proclaimed, whether we would have been "satisfied with that as a nation." n133 The answer for many of us is a clear, resounding "No." Our ability to interact across racial lines allows us to learn about the differences in each other's culture and history, and more importantly, about what we have in common, what are our shared experiences, and what are our shared interests. It is only through this form of integration that true racial equality can be achieved. n134 Indeed, the most recent debates regarding the Ten Percent Plan in the state of Texas reveal the ways in which integration and the discovery of once concealed, common interests can lead to the unearthing of race and class inequality.
|
Onwuachi-Willig, 2005 Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Michigan Law Review, May, 2005, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1507, Lexis, rwg
|
there was a practical effect to Brown that was equally significant. As I suggested earlier, had there not been Brown, would segregation have tumbled so easily in other areas, such as with busing and other public accommodations? The fact is that Brown gave society a goal to strive for and set the stage for a movement that created racial change. Brown was more than a legal decision; it was "a statement about the fundamental moral basis of democracy."
|
(--) Brown fundamentally mobilized racial change in the United States:
| 1,740 | 70 | 452 | 290 | 10 | 78 | 0.034483 | 0.268966 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,283 |
The Supreme Court's approval rating plunged this month to its lowest level in eight years, according to a new poll from Gallup. After an important term with landmark decisions on voting rights, gay rights, and affirmative action, just 43 percent of Americans now approve of the court — near an all-time low and down 6 percentage points from last September. Forty-six percent of respondents disapproved of the justices, marking the first time their poll numbers have been underwater since June 2005.¶ Why is the court's popularity suddenly in free fall? Andrew Dugan at Gallup says a key reason might be that its divisive, blockbuster decisions have disappointed conservatives and liberals alike. The justices angered the right when, in a 5-4 vote, they reaffirmed a lower court's overturning of the Defense of Marriage Act; they made the left just as mad when, in another 5-4 vote, they upheld state voter ID laws that Democrats say discourage left-leaning immigrant and minority blocs from casting ballots.
|
Harold Maass, 7/22/2013 (staff writer, “How the Supreme Court got on the bad side of everybody,”http://theweek.com/article/index/247206/how-the-supreme-court-got-on-the-bad-side-of-everybody, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
The Supreme Court's approval rating plunged this month to its lowest level in eight years After an important term with landmark decisions on voting rights, gay rights, and affirmative action, just 43 percent of Americans now approve of the court — near an all-time low Why is the court's popularity suddenly in free fall? a key reason might be that its divisive, blockbuster decisions have disappointed conservatives and liberals alike
|
(--) No link: we don’t overrule any prior precedent—we just apply international law in a new area.
| 1,007 | 98 | 435 | 163 | 17 | 70 | 0.104294 | 0.429448 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,284 |
The real cause for the loss of public confidence in what remains the least political branch of the federal government has less to do with specific decisions and more to do with a general decline in trust for public institutions...¶ The broader point that a poll like this stands for becomes apparent when you take into account other polling that shows that Congress, the Presidency and, indeed, almost any other public institution outside of the military and police seem to have lost the trust of the public. In the long term, that's simply not healthy. [Outside the Beltway]¶ Furthermore, the Supreme Court is in the unique position of having the last word on so many issues that divide us. It's hardly a surprise that the justices take some of the blame when they take sides on issues the public is still fiercely debating.
|
Harold Maass, 7/22/2013 (staff writer, “How the Supreme Court got on the bad side of everybody,”http://theweek.com/article/index/247206/how-the-supreme-court-got-on-the-bad-side-of-everybody, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
The real cause for the loss of public confidence in what remains the least political branch of the federal government has less to do with specific decisions and more to do with a general decline in trust for public institutions. almost any other public institution outside of the military and police seem to have lost the trust of the public
|
(--) Decisions don’t affect legitimacy:
| 825 | 39 | 341 | 143 | 5 | 60 | 0.034965 | 0.41958 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,285 |
Historically, the Supreme Court as a body has enjoyed consistently positive approval ratings. With no political party officially designated as in control, the court is able to command a sense of legitimacy that often eludes members of other branches of government in such a polarized national dynamic.¶ Yet over the past year, the court's approval rating has fallen from its previously dependable loft. Gallup reports that today only 43% of Americans hold a favorable view of the Supreme Court, the court's lowest rate since 2005, and six points lower than September of last year. Furthermore, 46% of Americans currently hold an unfavorable view of the Supreme Court, marking only the second time since Gallup began running this poll that the disapproval rating is higher than the approval rating.
|
Maggie O'Neill, 7/21/2013 (staff writer, “Supreme Court Approval Ratings Plummet, But It's Not Their Job to Please People,” http://www.policymic.com/articles/55823/supreme-court-approval-ratings-plummet-but-it-s-not-their-job-to-please-people, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
Historically the court is able to command a sense of legitimacy that often eludes members of other branches of government Yet over the past year, the court's approval rating has fallen from its previously dependable loft. Gallup reports that today only 43% of Americans hold a favorable view of the Supreme Court, the court's lowest rate since 2005, Furthermore, 46% of Americans currently hold an unfavorable view of the Supreme Court, marking only the second time since Gallup began running this poll that the disapproval rating is higher than the approval rating
|
(--) Non-unique: Supreme Court legitimacy declining now:
| 797 | 56 | 565 | 128 | 7 | 92 | 0.054688 | 0.71875 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,286 |
The Roberts Court has decided more cases by a 5-to-4 ruling (about 21.5 percent) than any Court before it, though only by a narrow margin. The previous Court, led by William Rehnquist, decided 20.5 percent of its cases by this minimum coalition. That rate, however, represents roughly twice the share of 5-to-4 rulings in the Stone Court, during World War II. And the Stone Court had more than three times the rate of 5-to-4 decisions of any Court prior. Roberts noticed the trend early in his term. "I do think the rule of law is threatened by a steady term after term after term focus on 5-4 decisions," Roberts told The New Republic's Jeffrey Rosen in 2006. "I think the Court is ripe for a similar refocus on functioning as an institution, because if it doesn't, it's going to lose its credibility and legitimacy as an institution."
|
David Paul Kuhn, 2012 staff writer, “The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court,” http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/, rwg)
|
The Roberts Court has decided more cases by a 5-to-4 ruling than any Court before it I do think the rule of law is threatened by a steady term after term after term focus on 5-4 decisions I think the Court it's going to lose its credibility and legitimacy as an institution."
|
(--) Non-unique: Series of 5-4 decisions are undermining the legitimacy of the Court:
| 836 | 85 | 275 | 147 | 13 | 52 | 0.088435 | 0.353741 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,287 |
The Relationship Between Institutional Legitimacy and the Substantive Sociological Legitimacy of Judicial Decisions. - Recent scholarship supports two interesting conclusions about the relationship between the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court and the substantive sociological legitimacy of particular decisions. First, although the Court's institutional legitimacy varies with public responses to particular rulings, it does so less sharply than earlier, less sophisticated studies had indicated. n183 For example, recent surveys show that Bush v. Gore has had almost no impact on "diffuse support" for the Court, notwithstanding critics' predictions. n184 The Court apparently possesses a reservoir of trust that is not easily dissipated. n185
|
Fallon, 2005 prof. of Constitutional Law @ Harvard, Harvard Law Review, April 2005, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787; Lexis, rwg
|
although the Court's institutional legitimacy varies with public responses to particular rulings, it does so less sharply than earlier, less sophisticated studies had indicated , recent surveys show that Bush v. Gore has had almost no impact on "diffuse support" for the Court, notwithstanding critics' predictions The Court apparently possesses a reservoir of trust that is not easily dissipated
|
(---) NO LINK: Court legitimacy is resilient: individual decisions are largely irrelevant:
| 757 | 90 | 396 | 103 | 12 | 59 | 0.116505 | 0.572816 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,288 |
Perhaps even more significant than what the recent studies establish, however, is something that poll-based measures of diffuse support cannot capture. As I have suggested already, the public's relative lack of attentiveness makes it impossible to gauge the substantive sociological legitimacy - in the strong sense of active endorsement - of controversial methods of constitutional interpretation. If we focus on this concern, we will remain chronically uncertain about judicial legitimacy in the sociological sense - even though other measures, including that of institutional legitimacy (or diffuse support), would often support more affirmative judgments about the Court's sociological legitimacy.
|
Fallon, 2005 prof. of Constitutional Law @ Harvard, Harvard Law Review, April 2005, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787; Lexis, rwg
|
the public's relative lack of attentiveness makes it impossible to gauge the substantive sociological legitimacy - in the strong sense of active endorsement - of controversial methods of constitutional interpretation
|
(---) NO LINK: Public doesn’t pay enough attention to constitutional interpretations to influence Court legitimacy:
| 701 | 115 | 216 | 98 | 15 | 30 | 0.153061 | 0.306122 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,289 |
The Supreme Court's popularity among the American public — particularly among blacks — has dipped to an historic low, according to new findings released Wednesday by Pew Research Center.¶ Pew found that, for the first time in almost three decades of polling, the Supreme Court's favorability rating has fallen below 50 percent. Forty-eight percent said they have a favorable opinion of the high court, down from 52 percent in March. The latest survey showed that 38 percent have an unfavorable opinion, a 7-point increase since March.
|
Tom Kludt, 7/24/2013 (staff writer, “Pew: SCOTUS Popularity Plummets Among Blacks Following VRA Decision,” http://livewire.talkingpointsmemo.com/entry/pew-scotus-popularity-plummets-among-blacks-following-vra, Accessed 7/28/2013, rwg)
|
The Supreme Court's popularity among the American public — particularly among blacks — has dipped to an historic low for the first time in almost three decades of polling, the Supreme Court's favorability rating has fallen below 50 percent
|
Supreme Court legitimacy at a historic low now:
| 534 | 47 | 239 | 86 | 8 | 39 | 0.093023 | 0.453488 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,290 |
This means that the lower court governing the northern district of California stands. Thus, only the decision striking down Prop 8 by the lower district court remains in effect. The remaining parts of California are unaffected. No doubt litigation will ensue in the southern and middle districts of California.¶ “Today, the United States Supreme Court has lost its legitimacy as an arbiter of the Constitution and the rule of law,” notes Mat Staver, founder and chairman of Liberty Counsel. “Today is the death of the court’s legacy, because the decision in the federal Defense of Marriage Act case defies logic and is a pure invention of a handful of justices.”
|
Nicole Lange, 6/26/2013 (staff writer, “The Supreme Court Crossed the Line With DOMA Ruling,” http://www.charismanews.com/us/40035-the-supreme-court-crossed-the-line-with-doma-ruling, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
Today, the United States Supreme Court has lost its legitimacy as an arbiter of the Constitution and the rule of law, Today is the death of the court’s legacy, because the decision in the federal Defense of Marriage Act case defies logic and is a pure invention of a handful of justices.”
|
(--) Non-unique: DOMA ruling has shattered the court’s legitimacy:
| 662 | 66 | 288 | 110 | 9 | 52 | 0.081818 | 0.472727 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,291 |
During the George W. Bush years, Republicans liked the Supremes better than Democrats in general did. The court's ruling upholding Obamacare was a blow to that pattern and in one of Pew's polls right after the Obamacare ruling, a huge partisan gap opened up between high (64 percent) approval of the court by Dems and low (38 percent) approval by Repubs. The most recent batch of rulings included some that liberals disliked (the gutting of the Voting Rights Act) and some that conservatives disliked (striking down key portions of the Defense of Marriage Act), and the latest poll finds the court in bipartisan trouble with Democrats approving the court's work by just over 50 percent, Republicans at 48 and independents casting the deciding vote with just 47 percent approval.
|
Eric Black, 7/2013 (“Public doesn't much like any branch of federal government,” http://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2013/07/public-doesnt-much-any-branch-federal-government, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)
|
The most recent batch of rulings included some that liberals disliked (the gutting of the Voting Rights Act) and some that conservatives disliked (striking down key portions of the Defense of Marriage Act), and the latest poll finds the court in bipartisan trouble with Democrats approving the court's work by just over 50 percent, Republicans at 48 and independents casting the deciding vote with just 47 percent approval
|
(--) Neither conservatives nor liberals are happy with the court now:
| 778 | 69 | 422 | 129 | 11 | 68 | 0.085271 | 0.527132 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,292 |
Yet concerns about the Court's apolitical credibility are hardly alleviated. At least two-thirds of the 5-4 rulings during the Roberts Court have split along ideological lines. Roberts has agreed with the three most conservative justices -- Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia -- in at least eight in 10 non-unanimous rulings, according to calculations by SCOTUSblog. The health-care ruling will likely temper, for now, charges that the Court has become a predictably political institution. Yet concerns about its apolitical credibility are hardly alleviated.
|
David Paul Kuhn, 6/29/2012 (staff writer, “The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court,” http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/, rwg)
|
concerns about the Court's apolitical credibility are hardly alleviated. At least two-thirds of the 5-4 rulings during the Roberts Court have split along ideological lines The health-care ruling will likely temper charges that the Court has become a predictably political institution. Yet concerns about its apolitical credibility are hardly alleviated.
|
(--) Health care ruling won’t save the legitimacy of the Court:
| 573 | 63 | 354 | 84 | 11 | 50 | 0.130952 | 0.595238 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,293 |
Today, the court has done Mr. Dooley one better: It doesn’t follow the election returns; it tries to lead them. No wonder, then, that a recent poll suggests that public confidence in the court has never been lower in the modern era, with just 44 percent of respondents approving of its performance.
|
Noah Feldman, 6/17/2012 (staff writer, “Supreme Court’s Super Mondays Don’t Serve Justice,” Accessed 7/28/2012 at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-17/supreme-court-s-super-mondays-don-t-serve-justice.html, rwg)
|
a recent poll suggests that public confidence in the court has never been lower in the modern era, with just 44 percent of respondents approving of its performance.
|
(--) Court legitimacy low now:
| 298 | 30 | 164 | 52 | 5 | 28 | 0.096154 | 0.538462 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,294 |
In the Roberts Court, 5-to-4 majorities have allowed unlimited corporate and union campaign spending, upheld an individual's right to gun ownership, limited an employee's ability to file a pay discrimination, decided states cannot impose mandatory life sentences on juvenile murderers without the possibility of parole, and limited class-action suits as well as decided the constitutionality of the health-care law. This polarization has not gone unnoticed. The judiciary remains the most trusted branch of government. Sixty-three percent of Americans said in autumn 2011 that they have a "great deal" or a "fair amount" of faith in it. Yet that is the lowest share to express trust in the judicial branch since 1976, when Gallup first asked the question.
|
David Paul Kuhn, 6/29/2012 (staff writer, “The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court,” http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/, rwg)
|
The judiciary remains the most trusted branch of government. Sixty-three percent of Americans said in autumn 2011 that they have a "great deal" or a "fair amount" of faith in it. Yet that is the lowest share to express trust in the judicial branch since 1976, when Gallup first asked the question
|
(--) Court legitimacy is at its lowest level ever:
| 755 | 50 | 296 | 117 | 9 | 52 | 0.076923 | 0.444444 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,295 |
And the Supreme Court is especially sullied. Prior to Thursday's decision, about three in four Americans agreed that "personal or political views influence" current Court decisions, according to a recent New York Times/CBS News Poll. Yet the public has not seen the Court as apolitical since, at least, it became more politically ordered. In 1946, a narrow plurality, four in 10 Americans, told Gallup that they "agree" that "the Supreme Court decides many questions largely on the basis of politics."
|
David Paul Kuhn, 6/29/2012 (staff writer, “The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court,” http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/, rwg)
|
the Supreme Court is especially sullied. Prior to Thursday's decision, about three in four Americans agreed that "personal or political views influence" current Court decisions
|
(--) Supreme Court reputation is sullied now:
| 501 | 45 | 176 | 80 | 7 | 25 | 0.0875 | 0.3125 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,296 |
Indeed, the reflexive avoidance of politically divisive or controversial cases--via the political question doctrine, the acte de government doctrine, and the like n233 --might actually prove a counterproductive choice of strategy for a court keen to consolidate its power. This Article has argued that, contrary to conventional wisdom, controversial decisions have a tendency to enhance, rather than diminish, a court's power, as long as they are obeyed. n234 Accordingly, a court that already commands obedience and expects more of the same, such as the United States Supreme Court or the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, has little to fear and perhaps even something to gain from embracing controversy. By contrast, a court that lacks a similarly developed track record, such as a newly established constitutional court in an emerging democracy, faces greater risk that its decisions will be disobeyed and its reputation for obedience stillborn. Should it succeed in deciding such a case, however, it will engender expectations of future obedience that boost its power in subsequent cases. If those gains seem more than commensurate with the risks involved, adjudication becomes a prudent gamble. A truly strategic court, as opposed to a merely timid one, will recognize that its political environment is characterized not merely by risks, but also by rewards: nothing ventured, nothing gained.
|
David Law, 2009 (Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Georgetown Law Journal, March 2009, 97 Geo. L.J. 723; “A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review,” Lexis, rwg)
|
contrary to conventional wisdom, controversial decisions have a tendency to enhance, rather than diminish, a court's power, as long as they are obeyed a court that already commands obedience and expects more of the same, such as the U S Supreme Court has little to fear and perhaps even something to gain from embracing controversy.
|
(--) Controversial decisions enhance the court’s power:
| 1,396 | 55 | 332 | 212 | 7 | 55 | 0.033019 | 0.259434 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,297 |
One way, then, to judge whether Bush v Gore has undermined the Court's institutional legitimacy in American society would be to examine public attitudes toward the Court. Studies have shown that public support for the Court and its role in society run high, even though many have little knowledge about the Court's day-to-day activities.14 While this is not the place to conduct a detailed study,15 we may perhaps draw some initial conclusions from recent Gallup polling data. Over the last decade, poll respondents have usually held more confidence in the Supreme Court than in the other two branches of government.16 In June 2000, 47 percent of those polled said that they held either a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Supreme Court, versus 42 percent for the presidency and 24 percent for Congress.17 Even in light of the usual caveats surrounding the use of polling data, the resiliency in the Court's public support has been relatively deep and wide,18 even as it has rendered a series of controversial decisions ranging from affirmative action to abortion to civil rights to religion.
|
John C. Yoo, 2001 Professor of law at the University of California, 2001, [The University of Chicago Law Review, “In defense of the court’s legitimacy,” rwg]
|
Studies have shown that public support for the Court and its role in society run high, even though many have little knowledge about the Court's day-to-day activities. Even in light of the usual caveats surrounding the use of polling data, the resiliency in the Court's public support has been relatively deep and wide,18 even as it has rendered a series of controversial decisions ranging from affirmative action to abortion to civil rights to religion.
|
(--) Court’s legitimacy is resilient: Unpopular decisions don’t undermine Court legitimacy:
| 1,109 | 91 | 453 | 184 | 11 | 74 | 0.059783 | 0.402174 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,298 |
A second way to approach the question of legitimacy would be to compare Bush v Gore to other historical periods in which the Court's authority has come into question. If the Court's actions today were similar in significant ways to earlier moments of challenge to judicial legitimacy, then we might predict that the changes in the immediate polling data may augur a more sustained attack on the Court. Evaluating Bush v Gore in light of earlier historical periods, however, suggests that any sustained assault on the Court's legitimacy is unlikely to arise.
|
John C. Yoo, 2001 Professor of law at the University of California, 2001, [The University of Chicago Law Review, “In defense of the court’s legitimacy,” p. 75, rwg]
|
A second way to approach the question of legitimacy would be to compare Bush v Gore to other historical periods in which the Court's authority has come into question Evaluating Bush v Gore in light of earlier historical periods, however, suggests that any sustained assault on the Court's legitimacy is unlikely to arise.
|
(--) Even after controversial decisions, public opinion will always swing back in favor of the Court.
| 557 | 101 | 321 | 92 | 16 | 53 | 0.173913 | 0.576087 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,299 |
The Court has acquired substantial power over our political culture. The public, which knows little about the technical details or philosophical implications of constitutional doctrine, knows that much. And so do the Justices. The remarkable thing about Roe v. Wade is not only the substance of the rule it announced, but the fact that the Court felt so little compunction about imposing a new and radical rule upon the entire nation. But for all the controversy generated by the abortion decisions, the public is generally not disposed to chasten the Court for its excesses on that or any other subject. The modern Court has tutored the public well on how it ought to think about judicial power and the Constitution. And its central teaching, as I say, is not about the permanent principles that justify representative government but about the inevitability of, indeed the duty to, change.
|
Uhlmann, 2003 professor of government at Claremont Graduate University, October ( Michael M., “The Supreme Court Rules ww.orthodoxytoday.org/ articles2/UhlmannSupremeCourt.shtm)
|
The Court has acquired substantial power over our political culture. The public, which knows little about the technical details or philosophical implications of constitutional doctrine, knows that much But for all the controversy generated by the abortion decisions, the public is generally not disposed to chasten the Court for its excesses on that or any other subject.
|
(--) Individual decisions won’t undermine Court legitimacy:
| 890 | 60 | 371 | 147 | 7 | 57 | 0.047619 | 0.387755 |
Cuba Embargo Courts Affirmative - SDI 2013.html5
|
Michigan State (SDI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
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