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The close relationship between Western epistemology—with its universalistic truth claims—modernity, and colonialism resulted in hegemonic control¶ of epistemologies that did not have universalist pretensions. According to¶ the Orientalist discourse, the Western worldview and epistemic foundations¶ were rational, dynamic, civilized, scientific, and progressive. Since the West’s¶ truth claims were indisputable, epistemologies with no universalistic truth¶ claims were easily colonized, Orientalized, and rubbished. As Arturo Esco-¶ bar states, “the seeming triumph of Eurocentered modernity can be seen as¶ the imposition of a global design by a particular local history, in such a way¶ that it has dislocated other local histories and designs (2004, p. 217). The¶ perception of non-European epistemologies and ontologies as inferior, less¶ evolved, and primitive suggested that they were obstacles to development¶ and modernity. Through epistemological colonization the West imposed¶ its authority to authenticate or invalidate knowledge systems other than its¶ own, which implied invalidation and resulted in epistemic genocide across¶ the globe. As Griffiths and Knezevic state, “Even societies that were widely¶ recognized for their social sophistication were deemed incapable of progress¶ without the European universalism of modernity..(2009, p. 67).¶ The presumed superiority of Western epistemology is not a phenomenon¶ of the past. It is mainstream thinking in the West today. Charles Taylor,¶ for one, argues that Western superiority in weapon technology “commands¶ attention in a quite nontheoretical way” ( 1982, p. 104). Employed against¶ both the Zulu and the Ashanti in the 19th century, the effective Gatling gun¶ helped the British to conquer these sub-Saharan territories with their weap-¶ ons designed for mass killings. The advanced weapon technology embodied¶ in the Gatling gun was based on what Taylor terms the superiority of Western epistemology. As stated by James Maffie: Taylor’s “might makes right”¶ argument “confounds military subjugation with philosophical refutation”¶ (2009, p. 1).¶ Writing in the same vein as Taylor, Ernest Gellner states: “The cognitive¶ and technological superiority of [the scientific-industrial] form of life is so¶ manifest, and so loaded with implications for the satisfaction of human wants¶ and needs ... that it simply cannot be questioned (Gellner, 1973, 71-72).¶ The arguments of epistemological superiority articulated by Taylor and¶ Gellner are unmistakably written within the tradition of the hegemonic knowledge monopoly tradition, which until recently has not been seriously interrogated. Taylor openly admits that the so-called epistemic superiority¶ belongs to the legacy of colonialism and imperialism. Other scholars, nota-¶ bly Zygmunt Bauman (1989), claim that the Holocaust should be seen as¶ deeply implicated with modernity, and its focus on rationality. Following a¶ similar line of argument, Aime Cesaire (2000) noted, in his Discourse on¶ Colonialism, that the Jewish Holocaust was not unique phenomenon in European history, but rather represented a continuation of the crimes committed by the colonial powers in the global South. With this legacy of human suffering and misery, there is an urgent¶ need to question the epistemological assumptions of Western science and¶ technology. The urgency of this query is also related to the contemporary ecological degradation of the planet, where Western science is the major accomplice and culprit. Clearly global warming, paradoxically evidenced¶ by the best Western scientists in the world, challenges the epistemological¶ and scientific superiority claim of Taylor, implying that the same scientists¶ who work within the Western scientific framework question some of its¶ major consequences. The price paid for the blessings of scientific “progress” has been high in terms of ecological devastation and destruction.¶ Nevertheless, the epistemic penetration of Western hegemony has been so¶ successful that it seems difficult to perceive alternatives or supplements to¶ Western epistemic domination. In the next subsection the universality and¶ truth claims of Western scientific research and epistemology are discussed.
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Breidlid 13 (Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 18)OG
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The close relationship between Western epistemology with its universalistic truth claims modernity and colonialism resulted in hegemonic control Since the West’s¶ truth claims were indisputable, epistemologies with no universalistic truth¶ claims were easily colonized the seeming triumph of Eurocentered modernity can be seen as¶ the imposition of a global design by a particular local history, in such a way¶ that it has dislocated other local histories and designs Through epistemological colonization the West imposed¶ its authority to authenticate or invalidate knowledge systems other than its¶ own, which implied invalidation and resulted in epistemic genocide across¶ the globe The presumed superiority of Western epistemology is not a phenomenon of the past. It is mainstream thinking in the West today. the Jewish Holocaust was not unique phenomenon in European history, but rather represented a continuation of the crimes committed by the colonial powers in the global South With this legacy of human suffering and misery, there is an urgent¶ need to question the epistemological assumptions of Western science and¶ technology. The urgency of this query is also related to the contemporary ecological degradation of the planet, where Western science is the major accomplice and culprit. global warming challenges the epistemological¶ and scientific superiority claim The price paid for the blessings of scientific “progress” has been high in terms of ecological devastation and destruction
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Western epistemology produces epistemic genocide and ecological devastation
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These mechanisms of epistemic racism perpetuate the inability of the South to name its cultural, political and economic practices and knowledges and, in the end, to name itself (Santos, 1998). Here, it is important to highlight that whereas the difficulties that the South has in naming itself are enormous, the epistemic racism practised by the westernized intellectuals has also negative effects inside the North: inasmuch the validity of Western knowl- edge is, in itself, uncriticisable, no effective critique can ever be launched at it from within. This means, by default, that the crit- icism that Sune Auken defends is, indeed, a criticism that does not challenge the system. The same people who defend the critical value of Western knowledge construction then neutralize criticism a priori, delinking criticism from the needs of transformation. And, if we follow the reasoning of Auken’s defence of the conser- vative university, global apartheid at the same time, does not warrant criticism because there is nothing structurally wrong with it. The idea of Western knowledge as an all-encompassing and universally valid system of knowledge is an imaginary. As I have suggested above, this is far from an obvious fact to the majority of the people in the Danish university. Hence, there is a need to bring the particularity and paro- chial nature of Western knowledge to atten- tion. This can be done in various ways: by forcing this Eurocentric imaginary into encounters with other knowledges, by systematically recording and addressing the instances of epistemic racism that are launched as arguments to invalidate these knowledges, and by taking advantage of the few cases in which openness towards these other knowledges is shown. This would imply that North-South collabora- tion is indeed an indispensable weapon in this endeavour, as long as it is framed by the recognition of global apartheid and of the need for working towards decoloniza- tion.
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Suarez 12 (Julia Suárez-Krabbe. Assistant professor at Roskilde University, The Department of Culture and Identity Interkulturelle studier Universitetsvej 1, 3.1.5 DK-4000, Roskilde Denmark “‘Epistemic Coyotismo’ and Transnational Collaboration: Decolonizing the Danish University” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self- Knowledge Volume 10 Issue 1 Decolonizing the University: Practicing Pluriversity 1-1-2012 Article 5)
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These mechanisms of epistemic racism perpetuate the inability of the South to name its cultural, political and economic practices and knowledges and, in the end, to name itself the epistemic racism has also negative effects inside the North: inasmuch the validity of Western knowl- edge is in itself, uncriticisable, no effective critique can ever be launched at it from within. This means, by default, that the crit- icism is, indeed, a criticism that does not challenge the system. , if we follow the reasoning global apartheid does not warrant criticism because there is nothing structurally wrong with it. The idea of Western knowledge as an all-encompassing and universally valid system of knowledge is an imaginary. there is a need to bring the particularity and paro- chial nature of Western knowledge to atten- tion This can be done by forcing this Eurocentric imaginary into encounters with other knowledges, by systematically recording and addressing the instances of epistemic racism that are launched as arguments to invalidate these knowledges, and by taking advantage of the few cases in which openness towards these other knowledges is shown.
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Western epistemology violently erases colonial populations and their epistemologies—only rejection solves.
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The fact is that from the very beginning of the colonization of¶ America, Europeans associated nonpaid or nonwaged labor with the dominated races because theywere “inferior” races. The vast genocide of the¶ Indians in the first decades of colonization was not caused principallyby¶ the violence of the conquest nor bythe plagues the conquistadors brought,¶ but took place because so many American Indians were used as disposable¶ manual labor and forced to work until death. The elimination of this colonial practice did not end untilthe defeat oftheencomenderosinthe middle of¶ the sixteenth century. The subsequent Iberian colonialism involved a new¶ politics of population reorganization, a reorganization of the Indians and¶ their relations with the colonizers. But this did not advance American Indians as free and waged laborers. From then on, they were assigned the status¶ of unpaid serfs. The serfdom of the American Indians could not, however,¶ be compared with feudal serfdom in Europe, since it included neither the¶ supposed protection of a feudal lord nor, necessarily, the possession of a¶ piece of land to cultivate instead of wages. Before independence, the Indian¶ labor force of serfs reproduced itself in the communities, but more than¶ one hundred years after independence, a large part of the Indian serfs was¶ still obliged to reproduce the labor force on its own.8¶ The other form of unwaged or, simplyput, unpaid labor, slavery, was assigned exclusively to¶ the “black” population brought from Africa.¶ The racial classification of the population and the early association of the new racial identities of the colonized with the forms of control¶ of unpaid, unwaged labor developed among the Europeans the singular¶ perception that paid labor was the whites’ privilege. The racial inferiority¶ of the colonized implied that they were not worthy of wages. They were¶ naturally obliged to work for the profit of their owners. It is not difficult¶ to find, to this very day, this attitude spread out among the white property¶ owners of anyplace in the world. Furthermore, the lower wages “inferior¶ races” receive in the present capitalist centers for the same work as done by¶ whites cannot be explained as detached from the racist social classification¶ of the world’s population—in other words, as detached from the global¶ capitalist coloniality of power.¶ The control of labor in the new model of global power was constituted thus, articulating all historical forms of labor control around the¶ capitalist wage-labor relation. This articulation was constitutively colonial,¶ based on first the assignment of all forms of unpaid labor to colonial races¶ (originallyAmerican Indians, blacks, and, in a more complex way, mestizos) in America and, later on, to the remaining colonized races in the rest¶ of the world, olives and yellows. Second, labor was controlled through the¶ assignment of salaried labor to the colonizing whites.¶ Coloniality of labor control determined the geographic distribution of each one of the integrated forms of labor control in global capitalism.¶ In other words, it determined the social geographyof capitalism: capital, as¶ a social formation for control of wage labor, was the axis around which all¶ remaining forms of labor control, resources, and products were articulated.¶ But, at the same time, capital’s specific social configuration was geographically and socially concentrated in Europe and, above all, among Europeans¶ in the whole world of capitalism. Through these measures, Europe and¶ the European constituted themselves as the center of the capitalist world¶ economy.
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Quijano 2k (Anibal, Professor of sociology at Binghamton University, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” http://www.unc.edu/~aescobar/wan/wanquijano.pdf, 2000)
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from the very beginning of the colonization of¶ America, Europeans associated nonpaid or nonwaged labor with the dominated races because theywere “inferior” races. The vast genocide of the¶ Indians place because so many were used as disposable¶ manual labor and forced to work until death. The elimination of this colonial practice did not end untilthe defeat oftheencomenderosinthe middle of¶ the sixteenth century. The subsequent Iberian colonialism involved a new¶ politics of of the Indians and¶ their relations with the colonizers they were assigned the status¶ of unpaid serfs. since it included neither the¶ supposed protection of a feudal lord nor the possession of a¶ piece of land to cultivate instead of wages slavery, was assigned exclusively to¶ the “black” population brought from Africa paid labor was the whites’ privilege. The racial inferiority¶ of the colonized implied that they were not worthy of wages. They were¶ naturally obliged to work for the profit of their owners. It is not difficult¶ to find, to this very day, this attitude spread out among the white property¶ owners of anyplace in the world. the lower wages “inferior¶ races” receive in the present cannot be explained as detached from global¶ capitalist coloniality of power . This articulation was constitutively colonial based on assignment of all forms of unpaid labor to colonial races .¶ Coloniality of labor control determined the geographic distribution of each one of the integrated forms of labor control in global capitalism it determined the social geographyof capitalism: capital as¶ a social formation for control of wage labor, was the axis around which all¶ remaining forms of labor control, resources, and products were articulated capital’s specific social configuration was geographically and socially concentrated among Europeans¶ in the whole world of capitalism
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The racialized wage-labor disparity between whites and degrees of non-whites today is a historical result of the coloniality of labor – the aff’s Eurocentrist capitalism will work non-whites to death
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Dispensable lives are instead the consequences of the racist foundation of economic capitalist practices: cost reductions,¶ financial gains, accumulation to re-invest to¶ further accumulation, are economic goals¶ that put human lives in second place. Racism is a necessary rhetoric in order to devaluate, and justify, dispensable lives that are¶ portrayed (by hegemonic discourses) as¶ less valuable. Once again, the bottom line¶ of racism is devaluation and not the color of¶ your skin. The color of your skin is just a¶ marker used to devaluate. Thus, human¶ lives as commodities and the fact that slavery¶ transforms human being into commodities,¶ means that they did not just lose their rights¶ but they lost their humanity. At the other¶ end, the concept of citizenship served a similar regulatory function for controlling population. Thus, it is not only the loss of polity¶ itself that expels him (Man) from humanity, as¶ Arendt has it. Enslaved Africans have been¶ not expelled but pulled out from their community. It is shortsighted, and self-serving,¶ for Arendt to say that “yet in the light of recent events it is possible to say that even¶ slaves still belonged to some sort of human¶ community” (pp. 297), and to place bare life¶ and the Holocaust above dispensable lives,¶ human lives transformed into commodities. ¶ Thus, both crimes against humanity—¶ dispensable and bare lives—are ingrained¶ in the very logic of coloniality. Certain lives¶ become dispensable in racist rhetoric to justify economic control, chiefly exploitation¶ of labor and appropriation of natural. Lives¶ are dispensable when expelled from humanity not because the loss of polity but because¶ they are pulled out of their community (enslaved Africans yesterday, young women¶ and children today) to become commodities. Lives become bare in racist rhetoric¶ that justifies national homogeneity and¶ ideal citizens. In the first case, commodity is¶ preferable to humanity; in the second citizenship is preferable to humanity. Thus, we¶ have here epistemic racism at its best,¶ working toward controlling economy and¶ authority—two pillars of the modern/colonial world which is also the world of imperial capitalism (i.e., the Ottomans could be¶ described as imperial but certainly not as¶ imperial capitalism) and Western Christian¶ monarchies and Western secular nationstates. ¶ This is the moment to remember Aimée¶ Césaire’s view of the Holocaust. What¶ counted for Césaire was “the application of¶ colonialist procedures” to the “white man.”¶ “Colonialist procedures” had been invented and implemented on people classi-¶ fied as inferior or out-cast—closer to¶ animals than to Man or unbelievers, pagans, derailed by the Devil on uncivilized.¶ Five centuries after the colonial matrix of¶ power has been put in place and implemented in relation to non-Europeans, it¶ went back to Europe like a boomerang. But¶ this time not so much in terms of economy¶ and the transformation of human lives into¶ commodities, but in terms of the state and¶ the law. ¶ Dispensable lives and bare lives are¶ subsumed—in the language of de-colonial¶ projects that I engage in here—as two dimensions of the coloniality of being. You¶ have to have the power of decision and action to be able to extract people from their¶ community and sell them as a piece of furniture and/or to expel them from your¶ community even if they were, like you,¶ German citizens but Jewish nationals instead of ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche).¶ Both have in common to be a consequence of epistemic imperial racism.¶ 8¶ In order to¶ carry on such projects, you have to be able¶ to make human beings to feel that they are¶ not quite human like you, either because¶ they are a commodity (or exploited like animals) or because they are made into illegal¶ or criminals that do not deserve to be in the¶ polity of citizens. Briefly, common to both¶ the economic legacy of slavery and the political/legal legacy of the Holocaust, is the¶ epistemic racism of the modern world: the¶ coloniality of knowledge. The coloniality of¶ being is a consequence of the coloniality of¶ knowledge (see above). Consequently, decolonial projects have to start from the decoloniality of knowledge and of being, in¶ order to de-colonize the economy and authority (e.g., political economy and political¶ theory).
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Mignolo 09(Walter D., Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University Dispensible and Bare Lives. Coloniality and the Hidden Political/Economic Agenda of Modernity. HUMAN ARCHITECTURE: JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, VII, 2, SPRING 2009, 69-88. Duke University. )
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Dispensable lives are the consequences of the racist foundation of economic capitalist practices: cost reductions, financial gains, accumulation to re-invest to further accumulation, are economic goals that put human lives in second place. Racism is a necessary rhetoric in order to devaluate, and justify, dispensable lives that are portrayed (by hegemonic discourses) as less valuable the bottom line of racism is devaluation and not the color of your skin. , human lives as commodities and the fact that slavery transforms human being into commodities, means that they did not just lose their rights but they lost their humanity. At the other end, the concept of citizenship served a similar regulatory function for controlling population. Thus, it is not only the loss of polity itself that expels him (Man) from humanity to place bare life and the Holocaust above dispensable lives, human lives transformed into commodities both crimes against humanity— dispensable and bare lives—are ingrained in the very logic of coloniality Certain lives become dispensable in racist rhetoric to justify economic control, chiefly exploitation of labor and appropriation of natural Lives become bare in racist rhetoric that justifies national homogeneity and ideal citizens. commodity is preferable to humanity; in the second citizenship is preferable to humanity. have here epistemic racism at its best, working toward controlling economy and authority—two pillars of the modern/colonial world which is also the world of imperial capitali the Holocaust was “the application of colonialist procedures” to the “white man.” “Colonialist procedures” had been invented and implemented on people classi- fied as inferior or out-cast—closer to animals than to Man or unbelievers, pagans, derailed by the Devil on uncivilized. Five centuries after the colonial matrix of power has been put in place and implemented in relation to non-Europeans, it went back to Europe like a boomeran Dispensable lives and bare lives are subsumed—in the language of de-colonial projects that I engage in here—as two dimensions of the coloniality of being. You have to have the power of decision and action to be able to extract people from their community and sell them as a piece of furniture and/or to expel them from your community even if they were, like you, German citizens but Jewish nationals instead of ethnic Germans Both have in common to be a consequence of epistemic imperial racism. In order to carry on such projects, you have to be able to make human beings to feel that they are not quite human like you, either because they are a commodity (or exploited like animals) or because they are made into illegal or criminals that do not deserve to be in the polity of citizens common to both the economic legacy of slavery and the political/legal legacy of the Holocaust, is the epistemic racism of the modern world: the coloniality of knowledge. The coloniality of being is a consequence of the coloniality of knowledge decolonial projects have to start from the decoloniality of knowledge and of being, in order to de-colonize the economy and authority
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Notions of human rights and citizenship lead to endless genocides – The Holocaust happened when Europe got the Hitlers it created– we must start by decolonizing knowledge in order to decolonize the economic and authoritative structures that make racism and genocide possible.
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Hellish existence in the colonial world carries with it both the racial and¶ the gendered aspects of the naturalization of the non-ethics of war. Indeed, coloniality of Being primarily refers to the normalization of the extraordinary events that take place in war. While in war there is murder and rape, in the hell of the¶ colonial world murder and rape become day to day occurrences and menaces.¶ ‘Killability’ and ‘rapeability’ are inscribed into the images of the colonial bodies. Lacking real authority, colonized men are permanently feminized. At¶ the same time, men of color represent a constant threat and any amount of¶ authority, any visible trace of the phallus is multiplied in a symbolic hysteria¶ that knows no limits.55 Mythical depiction of the black man’s penis is a case in¶ point. The Black man is depicted as an aggressive sexual beast who desires to¶ rape women, particularly White. The Black woman, in turn, is seeing as¶ always already sexually available to the raping gaze of the White and as¶ fundamentally promiscuous. The Black woman is seeing as a highly erotic being¶ whose primary function is fulfilling sexual desire and reproduction. To be¶ sure, any amount of ‘penis’ in both represents a threat. But in its most familiar¶ and typical forms the Black man represents the act of rape ‘raping’ while¶ the Black woman is seeing as the most legitimate victim of rape ‘being¶ raped’. Women deserve to be raped and to suffer the consequences in terms¶ of lack of protection from the legal system, further sexual abuse, and lack of¶ financial assistance to sustain herself and her family just as black man deserve¶ to be penalized for raping, even without committing such an act. Both ‘raping’¶ and ‘being raped’ are attached to Blackness as if they were part of the essence¶ of Black folk, which is seeing as a dispensable population. Black bodies are¶ seeing as excessively violent and erotic, as well as the legitimate recipients of¶ excessive violence, erotic and otherwise. ‘Killability’ and ‘rapeability’ are part¶ of their essence understood in a phenomenological way. The ‘essence’ of¶ Blackness in a colonial anti-black world is part of a larger context of meaning¶ in which the non-ethics of war gradually becomes a constitutive part of an¶ alleged normal world. In its racial and colonial connotations and uses,¶ Blackness is an invention and a projection of a social body oriented by the¶ non-ethics of war. The murderous and raping social body projects the features¶ that define it to sub-Others, in order to be able to legitimate the same behavior¶ that is allegedly descriptive of them. The same ideas that inspire perverted acts in war, particularly slavery, murder and rape, are legitimized in modernity¶ through the idea of race and gradually are seeing as normal to a great extent¶ thanks to the alleged obviousness and non-problematic character of Black¶ slavery and anti-Black racism. To be sure those who suffer the consequences of¶ such a system are primarily Blacks and indigenous peoples, as well as all of¶ those who appear as colored. In short, this system of symbolic representations,¶ the material conditions that in part produce it and continue to legitimate it,¶ and the existential dynamics that occur therein, which are also at the same time¶ derivative and constitutive of such a context, are part of a process that¶ naturalizes the non-ethics of war. The sub-ontological difference is the result of¶ such naturalization. It is legitimized through the idea of race. In such a world,¶ ontology collapses into a Manicheism, as Fanon suggested.56
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Maldonado-Torres 7 (Nelson, Professor Comparative Literature at Rutgers, "ON THE COLONIALITY OF BEING: Contributions to the development of a concept 1." Cultural Studies 21.2-3 (2007): 240-270)OG
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Hellish existence in the colonial world carries with it both the racial and¶ the gendered aspects of the naturalization of the non-ethics of war. coloniality of Being refers to the normalization of the extraordinary events that take place in war in the hell of the colonial world murder and rape become day to day occurrences ‘Killability’ and ‘rapeability’ are inscribed into the images of the colonial bodies colonized men are permanently feminized. At¶ the same time men of color represent a constant threat and any amount of¶ authority, any visible trace of the phallus is multiplied in a symbolic hysteria¶ that knows no limits. To be sure those who suffer the consequences of¶ such a system are primarily those who appear as colored. this system of symbolic representations,¶ the material conditions that in part produce it and continue to legitimate it,¶ and the existential dynamics that occur therein, which are also at the same time¶ derivative and constitutive of such a context, are part of a process that¶ naturalizes the non-ethics of war. The sub-ontological difference is the result of¶ such naturalization. It is legitimized through the idea of race. In such a world,¶ ontology collapses into a Manicheism
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Coloniality produces hell on earth – makes large-scale murder and rape normal
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In the association of various groups, there has been a gradual assimilation of cultural patterns. According to Reuter, this assimilation of a foreign culture comes when both individuals fully participate in the common life.65Backward peoples-so-called-after coming into contact with western civilization, tend to have a contempt for their native culture. Instead of emulating, the natives imitate. In order to be acceptable to the ruling group they become Euiropeanized. Since an advance in culture creates individualism and independence of thought, the natives have ultimately challenged the dogma of racial superiority."6With the progress of civilization in backward lands, there has been a steady contempt for manual training. They aim solely to be clerks, lawyers, preachers or physicians. Through the efforts of various organizations industrial and agricultural education are now being appreciated. In French Equatorial Africa, there¶ have been established medical schools and the government offers "fabulous" scholarships to encourage the students. On the contrary, the British seems to be afraid to educate its subjects for fear of self-determination."7¶ It is impossible to cover the whole range of the results of colonial imperialism in this treatise. But its chief features are its sociological aspects. With the advent of foreigners, there have been a diffusion of cultures and a gradual detribalization of the indigenous population. With this has come the urge to migrate to the coastal towns where one is confronted with the various aspects of social pathology, noticeably, crime, prostitution, liquor traffic and un- employment. Then there is the problem of judicial adjustment as a result of imperialism. In the 1924 Report of the British Mandate of Cameroons, paragraph 215, it is stated that it is an administrative impossibility to substitute Europeans for native chiefs. This has also caused the institution¶ of the "indirect rule" system and the Provincial Courts Ordinance in Nigeria. This ordinance and its adjunct, the Criminal Code, have been severely criticized by native jurists in that they deny trial by jury and also the right of a native criminal to be represented by a counsel, in certain specified localities.68
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Ibarra-Colado 7 (Eduardo, Professor of Management Studies at the Department of Economic Production, Metropolitan Autonomous University, “Organization Studies and Epistemic Coloniality in Latin America: Thinking Otherness from the Margins”)
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there has been a gradual assimilation of cultural patterns. 65Backward peoples-so-called-after coming into contact with western civilization, tend to have a contempt for their native culture In order to be acceptable to the ruling group they become Euiropeanized They aim solely to be clerks, lawyers, preachers or physicians , there have been a diffusion of cultures and a gradual detribalization of the indigenous population. With this has come the urge to migrate to the coastal towns where one is confronted with the various aspects of social pathology, noticeably, crime, prostitution, liquor traffic and un- employment
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Colonial assimilation breeds hatred for native culture—destroys identity
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The idea of race, in its modern meaning, does not have a known history¶ before the colonization of America. Perhaps it originated in reference to¶ the phenotypic differences between conquerors and conquered.4¶ However,¶ what matters is that soon it was constructed to refer to the supposed differential biological structures between those groups.¶ Social relations founded on the category of race produced new¶ historical social identities in America—Indians, blacks, and mestizos—¶ and redefined others. Terms such as Spanish and Portuguese, and much later¶ European, which until then indicated only geographic origin or country¶ of origin, acquired from then on a racial connotation in reference to the¶ new identities. Insofar as the social relations that were being configured¶ were relations of domination, such identities were considered constitutive¶ of the hierarchies, places, and corresponding social roles, and consequently¶ of the model of colonial domination that was being imposed. In other¶ words, race and racial identity were established as instruments of basic¶ social classification.¶ As time went by, the colonizers codified the phenotypic trait of¶ the colonized as color, and they assumed it as the emblematic characteristic¶ of racial category. That category was probably initially established in the¶ area of Anglo-America. There so-called blacks were not only the most¶ important exploited group, since the principal part of the economy rested¶ on their labor; they were, above all, the most important colonized race, since¶ Indians were not part of that colonial society. Why the dominant group calls¶ itself “white” is a story related to racial classification.5¶ In America, the idea of race was a way of granting legitimacy to the¶ relations of domination imposed by the conquest. After the colonization of¶ America and the expansion of European colonialism to the rest of the world,¶ the subsequent constitution of Europe as a new id-entity needed the elaboration of a Eurocentric perspective of knowledge, a theoretical perspective on¶ the idea of race as a naturalization of colonial relations between Europeans and non-Europeans. Historically, this meant a new way of legitimizing¶ the already old ideas and practices of relations of superiority/inferiority¶ between dominant and dominated. From the sixteenth century on, this¶ principle has proven to be the most effective and long-lasting instrument of¶ universal social domination, since the much older principle—gender or intersexual domination—was encroached upon by the inferior/superior racial¶ classifications. So the conquered and dominated peoples were situated in a¶ natural position of inferiority and, as a result, their phenotypic traits as well¶ as their cultural features were considered inferior.6¶ In this way, race became¶ the fundamental criterion for the distribution of the world population into¶ ranks, places, and roles in the new society’s structure of power.
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Quijano 2k (Anibal, Professor of sociology at Binghamton University, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” http://www.unc.edu/~aescobar/wan/wanquijano.pdf, 2000)
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The idea of race, , does not have a known history before the colonization of America. it was constructed to refer to the supposed differential biological structures .¶ Social relations founded on the category of race produced new¶ historical social identities in America—Indians, blacks, and mestizos—¶ and redefined others. Terms such as Spanish Portuguese, and European which until then indicated only geographic origin or country¶ of origin, acquired a racial connotation in reference to the¶ new identities. Insofar as the social relations that were being configured¶ were relations of domination, such identities were considered constitutive¶ of the hierarchies, places, and corresponding social roles, and consequently¶ of the model of colonial domination that was being imposed and racial identity were established as instruments of basic¶ social classification.¶ As time went by, the colonizers codified the phenotypic trait of¶ the colonized as color, and they assumed it as the emblematic characteristic¶ of racial category. the idea of race was a way of granting legitimacy to the relations of domination imposed by the conquest ,¶ the subsequent constitution of Europe as a new id-entity needed the elaboration of a Eurocentric perspective of knowledge, a theoretical perspective on¶ the idea of race as a naturalization of colonial relations between Europeans and non-Europeans. Historically, this meant a new way of legitimizing¶ the already old ideas and practices of relations of superiority/inferiority¶ between dominant and dominated. From the sixteenth century on, this¶ principle has proven to be the most effective and long-lasting instrument of¶ universal social domination So the conquered and dominated peoples were situated in a¶ natural position of inferiority and, as a result, their phenotypic traits as well¶ as their cultural features were considered inferior.6¶ In this way, race became¶ the fundamental criterion for the distribution of the world population into¶ ranks, places, and roles in the new society’s structure of power
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Colonial organization of inferiority/superiority is legitimized by conceptions of race, which then translated into phenotypical “color” classifications which produced new identities of domination and subjugation that still persist today
| 2,960 | 236 | 2,057 | 440 | 29 | 308 | 0.065909 | 0.7 |
Decoloniality Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Kritiks
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2013
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4,407 |
Without denying the importance of the endless accumulation of capital at a ¶ world scale and the existence of a particular class structure in global capitalism, I ¶ raise the following epistemic question: How would the world-system look like if we ¶ moved the locus of enunciation from the European man to an Indigenous women in ¶ the Americas, to, say, Rigoberta Menchú in Guatemala or Domitila Barrios de ¶ Chungara in Bolivia? I do not pretend to speak for or represent the perspective of ¶ these indigenous women. What I attempt to do is to shift the location from which ¶ these paradigms are thinking. The first implication of shifting our geopolitics of ¶ knowledge is that what arrived in the Americas in the late fifteenth century was not ¶ only an economic system of capital and labor for the production of commodities to be ¶ sold for a profit in the world market. This was a crucial part of, but was not the sole ¶ element in, the entangled “package.” What arrived in the Americas was a broader ¶ and wider entangled power structure that an economic reductionist perspective of ¶ the world-system is unable to account for. From the structural location of an ¶ indigenous woman in the Americas, what arrived was a more complex world-system ¶ than what political-economy paradigms and world-system analysis portrait. A uropean/capitalist/military/Christian/patriarchal/white/heterosexual/male arrived in ¶ the Americas and established simultaneously in time and space several entangled ¶ global hierarchies that for purposes of clarity in this exposition I will list below as if ¶ they were separate from each other:¶ 1) a particular global class formation where a diversity of forms of labor (slavery, ¶ semi-serfdom, wage labor, petty-commodity production, etc.) are going to coexist and be organized by capital as a source of production of surplus value ¶ through the selling of commodities for a profit in the world market;¶ 2) an international division of labor of core and periphery where capital organized ¶ labor in the periphery around coerced and authoritarian forms (Wallerstein ¶ 1974); ¶ 3) an inter-state system of politico-military organizations controlled by European ¶ males and institutionalized in colonial administrations (Wallerstein 1979); ¶ 4) a global racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileges European people over nonEuropean people (Quijano 1993; 2000); ¶ 5) a global gender hierarchy that privileges males over females and European ¶ Judeo-Christian patriarchy over other forms of gender relations (Spivak 1988; ¶ Enloe 1990); ¶ 6) a sexual hierarchy that privileges heterosexuals over homosexuals and lesbians ¶ (it is important to remember that most indigenous peoples in the Americas did ¶ not consider sexuality among males a pathological behavior and had no ¶ homophobic ideology); ¶ 7) a spiritual hierarchy that privileges Christians over non-Christian/non-Western ¶ spiritualities institutionalized in the globalization of the Christian (Catholic and ¶ later, Protestant) church; 8) an epistemic hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology over ¶ non-Western knowledge and cosmologies, and institutionalized in the global ¶ university system (Mignolo 1995, 2000; Quijano 1991);¶ 9) a linguistic hierarchy between European languages and non-European languages ¶ that privileges communication and knowledge/theoretical production in the ¶ former and subalternize the latter as sole producers of folklore or culture but not ¶ of knowledge/theory (Mignolo 2000);¶ 10) an aesthetic hierarchy of high art vs. naïve or primitive art where the West is ¶ considered superior high art and the non-West is considered as producers of ¶ inferior expressions of art institutionalized in Museums, Art Galleries and global ¶ art markets;¶ 11) a pedagogical hierarchy where the Cartesian western forms of pedagogy are ¶ considered superior over non-Westerm concepts and practices of pedagogy;¶ 12) a media/informational hierarchy where the West has the control over the means ¶ of global media production and information technology while the non-West do ¶ not have the means to make their points of view enter the global media ¶ networks;¶ 13) an age hierarchy where the Western conception of productive life (ages between ¶ 15 and 65 years old) making disposable people above 65 years old are ¶ considered superior over non-Western forms of age classification, where the ¶ older the person, the more authority and respect he/she receives from the ¶ community;¶ 14) an ecological hierarchy where the Western conceptions of “nature” (as an object ¶ that is a means towards an end) with its destruction of life (human and nonhuman) is privileged and considered superior over non-Western conceptions of ¶ the “ecology” such as Pachamama, Tawhid, or Tao (ecology or cosmos as subject ¶ that is an end in itself), which considers in its rationality the reproduction of life;15) a spatial hierarchy that privileges the urban over the rural with the consequent ¶ destruction of rural communities, peasants and agrarian production at the world scale.
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Grosfoguel 11 (Ramon, University of California, Berkeley, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity,¶ Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality”, [http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf]
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, I ¶ raise the following epistemic question: How would the world-system look like if we ¶ moved the locus of enunciation from the European man to an Indigenous women in ¶ the Americas What I attempt to do is to shift the location from which ¶ these paradigms are thinking. The first implication of shifting our geopolitics of ¶ knowledge is that what arrived in the Americas in the late fifteenth century was not ¶ only an economic system of capital and labor for the production of commodities to be ¶ sold for a profit in the world market. This was a crucial part of, the entangled “package From the structural location of an ¶ indigenous woman in the Americas, what arrived was a more complex world-system ¶ than what political-economy paradigms and world-system analysis portrait. A uropean/capitalist/military/Christian/patriarchal/white/heterosexual/male arrived in ¶ the Americas and established simultaneously in time and space several entangled ¶ global hierarchies that for purposes of clarity in this exposition I will list below as if ¶ they were separate from each other:¶ 1) a particular global class formation where a diversity of forms of labor are going to coexist and be organized by capital as a source of production of surplus value ;¶ 2) an international division of labor of core and periphery where capital organized ¶ labor in the periphery around coerced and authoritarian forms 3) an inter-state system of politico-military organizations controlled by European ¶ males and institutionalized in colonial administrations 4) a global racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileges European people over nonEuropean people 5) a global gender hierarchy that privileges males over females and European ¶ Judeo-Christian patriarchy over other forms of gender relations 6) a sexual hierarchy that privileges heterosexuals over homosexuals and lesbian ¶ 7) a spiritual hierarchy that privileges Christians over non-Christian/non-Western ¶ spiritualities institutionalized in the globalization of the Christian church; 8) an epistemic hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology over ¶ non-Western knowledge and cosmologies, and institutionalized in the global ¶ university system 9) a linguistic hierarchy between European languages and non-European languages ¶ that privileges communication and knowledge/theoretical production in the ¶ former and subalternize the latter as sole producers of folklore or culture but not ¶ of knowledge/theory 10) an aesthetic hierarchy of high art vs. naïve or primitive art where the West is ¶ considered superior high art and the non-West is considered as producers of ¶ inferior expressions of art 11) a pedagogical hierarchy where the Cartesian western forms of pedagogy are ¶ considered superior over non-Westerm concepts and practices of pedagogy;¶ 12) a media/informational hierarchy where the West has the control over the means ¶ of global media production and information technology while the non-West do ¶ not have the means to make their points of view enter the global media ¶ networks;¶ 13) an age hierarchy where the Western conception of productive life making disposable people above 65 years old are ¶ considered superior over non-Western forms of age classification, where the ¶ older the person, the more authority and respect he/she receives from the ¶ community;¶ 14) an ecological hierarchy where the Western conceptions of “nature” with its destruction of life is privileged and considered superior over non-Western conceptions of ¶ the “ecology” 15) a spatial hierarchy that privileges the urban over the rural with the consequent ¶ destruction of rural communities, peasants and agrarian production at the world scale.
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Colonial thought has a laundry list of impacts stemming from favoring Western thinking over subaltern thinking
| 5,081 | 110 | 3,702 | 797 | 16 | 570 | 0.020075 | 0.715182 |
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Kritiks
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2013
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The critical debate on the liberal peace is haunted by four particular avatars of Eurocentrism, which extend from the categories above: a methodological bypassing of target subjects in empirical research; the analytic bypassing of subjects in frameworks of governmentality; an ontology of cultural Otherness via the ‘liberal’/‘local’ divide; and critical nostalgia for the liberal social contract, a liberal subject and European social democracy. These collectively constitute a ‘paradox of liberalism’ in which Western liberalism is seen as a source of oppression but also implicitly understood as the only true source of emancipation. This section and the next elaborate these issues in more depth, while the final section of the article outlines paths for ‘decolonizing’ the analytic gaze in the critique of liberal peace developed from different traditions of critique. Methodological bypassing of target subjects in research While this cannot be said to be the trend in much of the more recent research on the liberal peace, in the earlier work that set the research agenda, as well as in later formulations, there was a tendency to exclude or marginalize consideration of the people targeted by its interventions from the analysis. This methodological exclusion manifested itself in different ways. In a seemingly banal sense, it was often manifested in work that sought to focus principally on the conceptualization of the liberal peace rather than its specific effects. Thus, some major works in the debate such as Richmond’s (2005) Transformation of Peace and Chandler’s (2010a) International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance did not represent or engage with the activities or behaviour of particular peoples targeted by interventions, since these were not considered relevant to the overall framing of this part of the research. Rather, such projects focused on making sense of the genealogies, contradictions and trajectories of intellectual traditions associated with the ‘West’ as the key object of intellectual concern. In the context of these deliberations, the peoples targeted by intervention were implicitly irrelevant to the conclusions that the research wanted to draw about the West’s relationship with post-conflict environments. While this is a methodological ‘exclusion’, then, it does not on the surface appear a problematic one – rather, it seems a natural artefact of a research design focused on Western ideology. Contributing to the theoretical framing, methodological exclusion of targeted peoples also characterized some of the empirical work on particular interventions. This often focused very largely on the policies, beliefs and practices of interveners. Exemplary of this were Chandler’s Faking Democracy After Dayton (2000) and Empire In Denial (2006), which almost exclusively looked at the international administrative structures and their illiberal and hypocritical exercise of power. Where Bosnians did appear, it was briefly and through a short explanation of their nationalist politics in the context of anti-corruption policies (see Chandler, 2006: 154–157). This same methodological exclusion is, however, also manifested in other influential writings. For example, in the cases covered in Richmond and Franks’ (2009) Liberal Peace Transitions, the focus is almost exclusively on the trajectory of the interventions. References to Kosovans, Cambodians and Timorese people are relatively brief, generally about recalcitrant politicians and offered in service of a critique that demonstrates the failure of the liberal peace to transform societies. Chesterman (2008) argues that the same applies to Zaum’s (2007) treatment of target societies. Even in Duffield’s work, which has included substantial efforts to ground the global theoretical critique in particular cases, the overarching tendency is to focus on the interveners and their practices in those environments rather than the peoples targeted by intervention. We see this particularly accentuated in the handling of the Zambezia Road Feeder Project in Mozambique (Duffield, 2007: 82–110) and continuities in Western attitudes towards Afghanistan (Duffield, 2007: 133–158). Again, there is a seemingly solid rationale for this – that this is the right methodological choice to make because these interventions are themselves the object of inquiry. Yet, it is a fundamental of most philosophies of social science that methodological choices reflect underlying ontological premises (Jackson, 2010). As noted, our ontological premises determine our basic understanding of what the political is (Walker, 1993). In these cases, to look only at interveners, and to imply by design that this is an adequate account of the politics of intervention, helps to reproduce, however unintentionally, the background assumption that that which is exterior to this does not matter for an appreciation of the politics of intervention. The fact that no explicit methodological rationale is usually offered for this absence suggests further that this is a matter of scholarly commonsense. Thus, defining and framing inquiry in this way supports habits of intellectual Eurocentrism by emphasizing ‘Western’ agency as the terrain of the political. What is under question, then, is not whether the methods used were adequate to the research question, but why research questions about the politics of the liberal peace have been continuously framed in this way. On our reading, this methodological habit precisely reproduces tenets of ‘old’ Eurocentrism here – the implied passivity, irrelevance or mysteriousness of the non-West – even as it tries to avoid them. It will be argued that, in combination with other avatars of Eurocentrism, it has played an important role in the construction of the ‘paradox of liberalism’ within the debate. Analytic bypassing of subjects through governmentality frameworks Allied to the methodological exclusion of peoples targeted by interventions is a deeper analytic bypassing of such peoples as substantive political subjects, via critical accounts of global governance. Specifically, the recent critical debate on the liberal peace has also been strongly influenced by the idea that it is a form of liberal governmentality (Dillon and Reid, 2000). This is the idea, derived from Foucault, that it is a productive technology of power that seeks to regulate life through its freedom – through the production of self-governing liberal subjects. This is understood to operate through a system of biopolitics (Duffield, 2005; Richmond, 2006), which articulates sovereign power as shifting from a management of territories to a management of bodies. This debate has been unfolding alongside the broader rise of Foucaultian analytics of the international, and particularly in analyses of war, peace and global governance (Jabri, 2007; Joseph, 2010). This analytic framework, particularly as developed by Duffield (2001, 2007) in the two books cited here, has been incredibly powerful as a critical imaginary for understanding the structure and practices of the development–security nexus and the liberal peace. While the first of the two books details the emerging strategic complex of actors – humanitarian, military, developmental – who intervene widely in the global South in new configurations, the second articulates these practices via a Foucaultian reading of liberal power and the expanding frontier of Western governance. Duffield (2001: 31–34) offers his reading of liberal peace, through Foucault, as a contrast to theses suggesting that interventions are a ‘new imperialism’. Rather, liberal power is ‘based on the regulation and management of economic, political and social processes’ (Duffield, 2001: 34). One of the most important themes emerging from the later work (Duffield, 2005, 2007) is the unevenness of life-chances and developmental expectations accorded to the liberal West and the rest of the world. For Duffield, this is a continuation of colonial strategies of rule (Duffield, 2005) and liberal racism (Duffield, 2007: 185–214) – we might also call it the production of ‘colonial difference’ in Mignolo’s terms. Duffield (2007: 10–11) roots this analysis in Harvey’s (2003) account of capitalism’s need to reproduce ‘surplus populations’ to avoid systemic crises. However, the central problem with Duffield’s analytic framework is its tendency to ignore the exteriority of power through the discounting of Southern subjecthood. This turns on the way in which political power and political subjecthood are implicitly understood to interact and produce consent: People in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected to do it willingly themselves. Compared to imperial peace, power in this form, while just as real and disruptive, is more nuanced, opaque and complex. Partnership and participation imply the mutual acceptance of shared normative standards and frameworks. Degrees of agreement, or apparent agreement, within such normative frameworks establish lines of inclusion and exclusion. (Duffield, 2001: 34) Here it is strongly implied that liberal governmentality operates in the international sphere in the same way as it does within ‘advanced liberal societies’ (Joseph, 2010) – that is specifically through the productive power of liberal discourse to produce self-regulating and self-governing subjects. If it is the case that the liberal peace consists of strategic complexes of governance consisting of different actors (Duffield, 2001: 12), then the implication is that they are governing the global South through the production of liberal subjectivity. Nonetheless, the way Duffield frames it here actually hedges the bet over Southern subjectivity while simultaneously endorsing the overall framework. That is, he does not want to say outright that Southern political subjecthood is produced by the liberal peace. Yet, this is the point of the ‘governmentality’ framework insofar as it has any analytic traction – that is, that it is a specific modality of power that works through the production of volition rather than coercion or loyalty. Throughout the work, then, we have a fairly strong narrative of the liberal peace and development–security network as a web or network of Western liberal power, the logic of which works through its attempted production of liberal subjects. There are longstanding debates as to whether a Foucaultian account of power is applicable at the global level (Joseph, 2010), adequate for understanding either the development of governmental structures themselves or the nature and character of ‘resistance’. As Jabri (2007: 74–75) notes, postcolonial critiques have argued that Foucault’s own focus on the European expression of power ignores the differentiated character of imperial power. In particular, they have problematized Foucault’s ignoring of the specific historical angle or positionality that informs his account of power (Jabri, 2007: 74), and subsequently his account of resistance that is itself ideologically somewhat empty, as noted by Spivak (Jabri, 2007: 75). These concerns can be applied to the use of his work in the liberal peace debate, and are specifically connected to the account of the subject that is implicit in the governmentality framework. Chandler has made similar claims, arguing that there is an emptiness to Duffield’s call for a ‘solidarity of the governed’ as a response to governmentality (Chandler, 2009: 67), because it lacks a political subject as the basis for critical theorizing (Chandler, 2010b: 153). Chandler is right to an extent: there is a lack of political subjecthood in Duffield’s account of intervention. However, what he does not clearly specify is that the principal lack is of the subjecthood of those targeted by intervention, not those seen to be enacting it. The latter actually have plenty of strategic agency, intentionality, ideology and purpose in this framework. In this sense, Duffield’s account of intervention is not dissimilar to Chandler’s, in that they both focus on the agency and subjecthood of interveners, even if under the analytic of governmentality this becomes more diffuse. Yet, they both exclude and avoid considerations of the exteriority of this power, and particularly the peoples targeted by interventions as political subjects. The habit of methodological exclusion noted in the previous section becomes then cognate with the analytic exclusions that underpin the framework of governmentality. Both exhibit avatars of Eurocentrism, which emphasize the distinctiveness and importance of Western behaviour while occluding the space outside it. Ontologies of Otherness: Liberal–local relations, ‘hybridity’, ‘resistance’ and the ‘everyday’ Sensitive to the problem of such occlusion, a major strand of recent literature has emphasized the need to rethink the relations between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’ in intervention settings (Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2009, 2010, 2011), in what has been labelled a ‘fourth generation’ approach (Richmond, 2011). This writing has taken a much more proactive approach to research with and about the peoples targeted by intervention, aiming to correct the impression of smooth liberal transformation and the ‘romanticization’ of the local (Mac Ginty, 2011: 2–4). Yet, the paths it has taken have, quite unwillingly, reinforced a Eurocentric understanding of intervention, through the use of an ontology of ‘Otherness’ to frame the issues. Prominent among these accounts is Richmond’s (2009, 2010, 2011) recent work on ‘post-liberal peace’, which frames the key problems of intervention through an ontological distinction between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’. In earlier writing, the liberal peace is elaborated as genealogically endogenous to Western traditions of thought, reflecting Enlightenment, modern and post-Christian values (Richmond, 2005). In post-conflict settings, however, it is critiqued for exercising forms of hegemony that suppress pluralism, depoliticize peace, undermine the liberal social contract and exercise a colonial gaze in its treatment of local ‘recipients’ of the liberal peace. In view of these various aspects of failure, the liberal peace is characterized as ‘ethically bankrupt’ (Richmond, 2009: 558) and requiring re-evaluation. The ‘local’, on the other hand, is a space characterized by ‘context, custom, tradition and difference in its everyday setting’ (Richmond, 2010: 669), which is suppressed by liberal peace interventions. The very conception of the ‘post-liberal peace’ is thus about the ways in which two ontologically distinct elements – the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’ – are ‘rescued and reunited’ via forms of hybridity and empathy, in which ‘everyday local agencies, rights, needs, custom and kinship are recognized as discursive “webs of meaning”’ (Richmond, 2010: 668). Mitchell (2011: 1628) has recently argued that Richmond’s conception of the ‘local’ is not ‘a reference to parochial, spatially, culturally or politically bounded places’ but ‘the potentialities of local agents to contest, reshape or resist within a local “space”’. Richmond (2011: 13–14) himself has also been concerned not to be understood as ‘essentializing’ the ‘local’, emphasizing that it contains a diversity of forms of political society. Indeed, in this more recent work, a more complex conception of the ‘everyday’ as a space of action, thought and potential resistance is elaborated. Despite these qualifications, however, there is much conflation, interchangeability and slippage between these conceptions of the ‘local’. Accordingly, the ontology of Otherness, understood as cultural distinctiveness and alterity, continuously surfaces throughout the narratives of liberal and post-liberal peace. Not only is the liberal peace closely linked to the intellectual trajectory of the ‘West’, but a conception of the ‘local’ as non-modern and non-Western often re-appears: This requires that local academies and policymakers beyond the already liberal international community are enabled to develop theoretical approaches to understanding their own predicaments and situations, without these being tainted by Western, liberal, and developed world orthodoxies and interests. In other words, to gain an understanding of the ‘indigenous’ and everyday factors for the overall project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a via media needs to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the orthodoxy of international prescriptions and assumptions about peace. (Richmond, 2009: 571, emphasis added) There is a clear emphasis here on the need to engage with the ‘indigenous’ or ‘authentic’ traditions of non-Western life, which seems to reflect an underlying assumption of cultural difference as the primary division between these two parties. This reproduces the division between the liberal, rational, modern West and a culturally distinct space of the ‘local’. Indeed, the call for a post-liberal peace is often a call for peacebuilding to reflect a more ‘culturally appropriate form of politics’ (Richmond, 2011: 102) that is more empathetic and emancipatory. This emphasis on tradition and cultural norms as constitutive of the ‘local’ is carried through in recent research on interventions in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands. These focus largely on the reinvigoration of ‘customary’ houses and institutions as a form of ‘critical agency’ in distinction to liberal institutions and the state (Richmond, 2011: 159–182). The point here is not simply that there is an account of alterity or cultural difference within the politics of intervention, but that the liberal/local distinction appears to be the central ontological fulcrum upon which the rest of the political and ethical problems sit (see also Chandler, 2010b: 153). Therefore, ‘local’ or ‘everyday’ ‘agency’ is seen to be best expressed to the extent that it reclaims ‘the customary’ and is not ‘co-opted’ by the internationals. It is understood as enhanced where codes of ‘customary law’ become part of the new constitutional settlement. A similar division can be seen in Mac Ginty’s (2011) framework, which sees the hybridities in peacebuilding as emerging at the intersection of the ‘international’ and ‘local’ agents and institutions. Again, this framework is built on an ontological distinction between the two that repeatedly splits the ‘Western’/‘international’ from the ‘non-Western’/‘local’. Even though this is well qualified, overall Mac Ginty (2011: 94) defends this distinction, arguing that if one were to abandon such potentially problematic labels then this would lead to an abandonment of research altogether. This can quite straightforwardly be read as a defence of the basic ontology of the project, which is an ontology of the distinction between the West and its Others, which meet through various forms of hybridization. While Mac Ginty does not pursue the ethics of the post-liberal peace in the same way as Richmond, the underlying intellectual framework also uses this distinction as the analytic pivot of the research. We earlier defined Eurocentrism as the belief in Western distinctiveness, and I have argued that this is philosophically fundamental to this strand of the critical literature that grapples with the relationship between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’. This strand has put substantial analytic weight on fundamental cultural differences between these two entities, even while disavowing any essentialism and making some substantive conceptual efforts to move away from this. Such difficulties are indicative of the deep hold that this particular avatar of Eurocentrism has on the critical imaginary. By contrast, the point made by a wide variety of other ‘postcolonial’ writers has precisely been against such an ontology of the international, pointing instead to the historically blurred, intertwined and mutually constituted character of global historical space and ‘culture’ (Bhabha, 2004; Bhambra, 2010).
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Sabaratnam ’13 (Meera, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, “Avatars of Eurocentrism in the critique of the liberal peace” http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/44/3/259.full)
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These collectively constitute a ‘paradox of liberalism’ in which Western liberalism is seen as a source of oppression but also implicitly understood as the only true source of emancipation. there was a tendency to exclude or marginalize consideration of the people targeted by its interventions from the analysis. The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance did not represent or engage with the activities or behaviour of particular peoples targeted by interventions, since these were not considered relevant to the overall framing of this part of the research the peoples targeted by intervention were implicitly irrelevant to the conclusions that the research wanted to draw about the West’s relationship with post-conflict environments , the overarching tendency is to focus on the interveners and their practices in those environments rather than the peoples targeted by intervention Thus, defining and framing inquiry in this way supports habits of intellectual Eurocentrism by emphasizing ‘Western’ agency as the terrain of the political liberal peace is a form of liberal governmentality a productive technology of power that seeks to regulate life through its freedom – through the production of self-governing liberal subjects This is understood to operate through a system of biopolitics which articulates sovereign power as shifting from a management of territories to a management of bodies interventions are a ‘new imperialism’ liberal power is ‘based on the regulation and management of economic, political and social processe this is a continuation of colonial strategies of rule and liberal racism the production of ‘colonial difference People in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected to do it willingly themselves Degrees of agreement establish lines of inclusion and exclusion liberal governmentality produce self-regulating and self-governing subjects. governmentality is a specific modality of power that works through the production of volition rather than coercion or loyalty a major strand of recent literature has emphasized the need to rethink the relations between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’ in intervention settings reinforced a Eurocentric understanding of intervention, through the use of an ontology of ‘Otherness’ to frame the issues the liberal peace exercis forms of hegemony that suppress pluralism, depoliticize peace, undermine the liberal social contract and exercise a colonial gaze in its treatment of local ‘recipients’ of the liberal peace. the ontology of Otherness continuously surfaces throughout the narratives of liberal and post-liberal peace a conception of the ‘local’ as non-modern and non-Western often re-appears: the need to engage with the ‘indigenous’ reflect an underlying assumption of cultural difference as the primary division between these two parties the relationship between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’ has put weight on fundamental cultural differences between these two entities
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Liberalism claims to both oppress and emancipate—this paradox promotes analytical exclusion, bio-political control, and the creation of the Other
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2013
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I see clearly what colonization has destroyed: the wonderful Indian civilizations - ¶ and neither Deterring nor Royal Dutch nor Standard Oil will ever console me for the ¶ Aztecs and the Incas. ¶ I see clearly the civilizations; condemned to perish at a future date, into which it has ¶ introduced a principle of ruin: the South Sea islands, Nigeria, Nyasaland. I see less clearly ¶ the contributions it has made. ¶ Security? Culture? The rule of law? In the meantime, I look around and wherever ¶ there are colonizers and colonized face to face, I see force, brutality, cruelty, sadism, ¶ conflict, and, in a parody of education, the hasty manufacture of a few thousand ¶ subordinate functionaries, "boys," artisans, office clerks, and interpreters necessary for the ¶ smooth operation of business. ¶ I spoke of contact. ¶ Between colonizer and colonized there is room only for forced labor, intimidation, ¶ pressure, the police, taxation, theft, rape, compulsory crops, contempt, mistrust, ¶ arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses. ¶ No human contact, but relations of domination and submission which turn the ¶ colonizing man into a class-room monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave ¶ driver, and the indigenous man into an instrument of production. ¶ My turn to state an equation: colonization = "thing-ification." ¶ I hear the storm. They talk to me about progress, about "achievements," diseases ¶ cured, improved standards of living. ¶ I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, ¶ institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic ¶ creations destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out. ¶ They throw facts at my head, statistics, mileages of roads, canals, and railroad ¶ tracks. ¶ I am talking about thousands of men sacrificed to the Congo-Ocean2¶ . I am talking ¶ about those who, as I write this, are digging the harbor of Abidjan by hand. I am talking ¶ about millions of men torn from their gods, their land, their habits, their life-from life, from ¶ the dance, from wisdom. ¶ 2¶ A railroad line connecting Brazzaville with the port of Pointe-Noire. (Trans.)¶ - 6 - I am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been cunningly instilled, who ¶ have been taught to have an inferiority complex, to tremble, kneel, despair, and behave ¶ like flunkeys. ¶ They dazzle me with the tonnage of cotton or cocoa that has been exported, the ¶ acreage that has been planted with olive trees or grapevines. ¶ I am talking about natural economies that have been disrupted - harmonious and ¶ viable economies adapted to the indigenous population - about food crops destroyed, ¶ malnutrition permanently introduced, agricultural development oriented solely toward the ¶ benefit of the metropolitan countries, about the looting of products, the looting of raw ¶ materials.
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Cesaire 55 (Aimé Césaire, politician from Martinique, 1955, Discourse on Colonialism, Discours sur le colonialism)
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colonization has destroyed: the wonderful Indian civilizations - ¶ and neither Deterring nor Royal Dutch nor Standard Oil will ever console me for the ¶ Aztecs and the Incas. ¶ I see clearly the civilizations; condemned to perish at a future date, into which it has ¶ introduced a principle of ruin: the South Sea islands, Nigeria, Nyasaland. I see less clearly ¶ the contributions it has made. ¶ Security? Culture? The rule of law? colonizers and colonized face to face, I see force, brutality, cruelty, sadism, ¶ conflict, and, in a parody of education, the hasty manufacture of a few thousand ¶ subordinate functionaries, "boys," artisans, office clerks, and interpreters necessary for the ¶ smooth operation of business. ¶ I spoke of contact. ¶ Between colonizer and colonized there is room only for forced labor, intimidation, ¶ pressure, the police, taxation, theft, rape, compulsory crops, contempt, mistrust, ¶ arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses. ¶ No human contact, but relations of domination and submission I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, ¶ institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic ¶ creations destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out I am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been cunningly instilled, who ¶ have been taught to have an inferiority complex, to tremble, kneel, despair, and behave ¶ like flunkeys. ¶ They dazzle me with the tonnage of cotton or cocoa that has been exported, the ¶ acreage that has been planted with olive trees or grapevines. ¶ I am talking about natural economies that have been disrupted - harmonious and ¶ viable economies adapted to the indigenous population - about food crops destroyed, ¶ malnutrition permanently introduced, agricultural development oriented solely toward the ¶ benefit of the metropolitan countries, about the looting of products, the looting of raw ¶ materials.
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Coloniality means a world of absolute domination and total violence. Economic engagement is just another tool of genocide unless we first address the brutality of colonial relationships
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Arising from the oppressive social conditions that colonialism creates (i.e., poverty, loss of identity, feelings of¶ inferiority, etc.), Indigenous peoples suffer from high rates of alcoholism, drug addiction, and suicide, in both rural and¶ urban communities. These are common methods oftemporarily escaping the oppressive routines of day-to-day life, of¶ suppressing trauma or tension, or ending feelings ofdespair and hopelessness (suicide).¶ High rates of violent death & imprisonment among Indigenous peoples are both attributed to alcohol and drug¶ abuse.. In Saskatchewan, a study found that alcohol was involved in 45 % ofsuicides among those 15-34 years ofage; 92 %¶ offatal motor vehicle accidents, over 38 % ofhomicides, and over halfthe deaths by fire and drowning ((First Nations in¶ Canada, p. 86).¶ Rates ofsuicide among Indigenous¶ peoples in Canada are estimated at 33 per¶ 100,000 population, compared to the¶ national average of 13 per 100,000. Among¶ Indigenous youth 15-24 years of age the¶ rate is 114 per 100,000, compared to 26 per¶ 100,000 among the general population¶ (First Nations in Canada, p. 83 & 85).¶ According to the Royal¶ Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, a¶ multi-million dollar investigation into the¶ conditions ofIndigenous peoples in Canada,¶ "We have concluded that suicide is¶ one of a group ofsymptoms ranging from¶ truancy & law breaking to alcohol and drug¶ part interchangeable as expressions of the¶ burden ofloss, grief, and anger experienced by Aboriginal people in Canadian society" (RCAP, 1995:90, quoted in First¶ Nations in Canada, p. 83).
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Warrior 11 (Zig-Zag, writer for Warrior Publications, Promoting Indigenous Warrior Culture, Fighting Spirit, & Resistance Movement, “Colonization and Decolonization: A Manual for Indigenous Liberation in the 21st Century” 2011)
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Arising from the oppressive social conditions that colonialism creates (i.e., poverty, loss of identity, feelings of¶ inferiority, etc.), Indigenous peoples suffer from high rates of alcoholism, drug addiction, and suicide These are common methods oftemporarily escaping the oppressive routines of day-to-day life, of¶ suppressing trauma or tension, or ending feelings ofdespair and hopelessness High rates of violent death & imprisonment among Indigenous peoples are both attributed to alcohol and drug¶ abuse According to a¶ multi-million dollar investigation into the¶ conditions ofIndigenous peoples in Canada suicide is¶ one symptom interchangeable as expressions of the¶ burden ofloss, grief, and anger
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Indigenous peoples suffer high rates of drug addiction, alcoholism, and suicide due to coloniality’s enforcement of poverty and destruction of identity, leading to violent death and imprisonment
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Texas (UTNIF)
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2013
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4,411 |
For those of us working in science and technology studies, the immediate media reaction to¶ September 11, 2001 provided countless distressing examples of those deterministic, ahistorical ideologies about technological development we have sought to challenge. In¶ commenting on the bitter irony of passenger airliners becoming weapons, for example.¶ pundits asserted that the appropriation of technologies for something other than their¶ intended purpose represented the new nature of violence in the 21st century. Most¶ descriptions of the technological dimensions of the attacks invoked polarities taken straight¶ from colonial-evolutionist discourse: "play the system right, and Neolithic technology can be¶ leveraged to bring on nuclear-like devastation," said one journalist in the New York Times,¶ presumably situating box-cutters in the Neolithic era He continued: "it was not just planes¶ that were hijacked but technology, to be used jujitsu style against its inventors."' As if the¶ very "founding fathers" of America (learning, it must be said, from the Indians they¶ displaced) hadn't used British guns in new ways in order to defeat the redcoats As if¶ "technology" had fixed meanings, stable uses. Meanwhile, US president George W, Bush¶ spluttered that the US would bomb Afghanistan "back into the Stone Age." The cry of protest¶ from the left? "But Afghanistan already is in the Stone Age!"¶ In subsequent weeks, the complexities of the technopolitical networks undergirding the¶ attacks became visible, and a few more sophisticated interpretations of the tragedy emerged.¶ The attacks exploited weaknesses inherent in at least two complex technological systems (air¶ travel and skyscrapers) that Americans themselves built. The attackers learned to fly in¶ American flight schools. They learned terrorism in camps that the US instituted during the¶ Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan. (A few even pointed out that Afghanistan was actually in¶ the Rubble Age.) Pulling back for a macro view, some left-wing commentators found the¶ roots of the crisis in the US "˜s insatiable thirst for oil and the techno-geopolitical compromises¶ made to quench it. Others suggested that the vast gulf between the promises and realities of¶ "globalization" might provide reasons for many around the world to resent the US and the¶ dominance of Western multinational corporations. A summary of these interpretations might¶ be: globalization meets Frankenstein and his monster, that venerable archetype of unintended¶ sociotechnical consequences.¶ Such observations were not popular in the American media, however, and they did not¶ supplant cruder perspectives on the role of modernity and technology's relation to society.¶ "The genius of the terrorists was to turn the artifacts of modernity into weapons against¶ modernity," said one writer just a few weeks before the US launched a new Afghan war. He¶ continued: "Odd and indeed disgusting as it is to find oneself writing that there is no¶ alternative to war I find myself nonetheless with nothing else to suggest. Modernity.¶ newly vulnerable, is, for all its faults, infinitely preferable to fascism." As if modernity hadn't¶ always been fragile; as if Hitler hadn't shown that modernity and fascism were eminently compatible.¶ As we know, these jumbled, false dichotomies (such as modernity vs fascism) and the¶ historical ruptures they invoke are nothing new in public discourse about technology. The¶ Cold War alone offers plenty of antecedents of what I call technopolitical rupture-talks*¶ namely, the rhetorical invocation of technological inventions to declare the arrival of a new¶ era or a new division in the world. Most notorious in the Cold War, of course, were repeated¶ political proclamations that nuclear weapons had produced a new world order. (More on this¶ shortly.) Indeed, the Cold War itself figures as a significant trope for our present fearless¶ leaders after September ll. In a fit of nostalgia for global Manichean struggle, Dick Cheney¶ explained that the war against terrorism would resemble the Cold War, hinting darkly that-¶ just as in those good old days-much of the current struggle would be invisible. And who¶ didn't flash to Reagan's "evil empire" speech after Bush's puzzling pronouncement¶ concerning the "axis of evil" allegedly formed by Iran, Iraq, and North Korea? Colin Powell¶ took another tack, proclaiming the start of a new era-the post-post-Cold War-thereby¶ suggesting the power of new alliances, and hinting at an ill-defined historical rupture. Clearly, whatever degree of post-ness we now find ourselves in with respect to the Cold War.¶ the era looms large in our fantasies.¶ What leaders and media pundits generally fail to note, however, are the implications of¶ Cold War infrastructure and discourse for our current crisis. Although such ahistoricism may¶ not be surprising, its consequences become ever more severe as the US simultaneously¶ reviews its own posture on the use of nuclear weapons and uses the potential nuclearity of¶ "rogue states" to justify military action. In the remainder of this paper, I will consider some¶ of the Cold War antecedents for the technopolitical rupture-talk of the early 21st century.¶ Since the onset of the Cold War, both the politics and the scholarship of the "nuclear age"¶ has been all about rupture and dichotomy. The nuclear world has been portrayed as a¶ polarized one, split into nuclear and non-nuclear states, nuclear and conventional¶ technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear dangers, pro- and anti-nuclear politics. What it means¶ to call something a "nuclear weapon" has seemed self-evident. Those weapons in tum have¶ served as the basis for "nuclear diplomacy," which has also appeared to constitute a clearly¶ defined set of practices. And so on. The dichotomies have appeared clear-cut, and they in tum¶ have appeared to signal a profound historical rupture -especially in the mouths of Western¶ political leaders, for whom "The Bomb" seemed to replace imperialism as the foundation for¶ global power. Here the alleged rupture of nuclearity met the fundamental dichotomy posited¶ by l9th and 20th century European imperialism: the opposition of "civilized" to "primitive"¶ Premised on a correspondence between industrialization and human evolution, this dichotomy legitimated colonial practices and states, For former imperial states (especially¶ France and Britain), the rupture of nuclearity could palliate the rupture threatened by the¶ prospect of docolonization.¶ Such assertions of rupture and the polarities they invoked masked a more complex¶ reality – an obvious point, perhaps, but nonetheless worth unpacking. The history of uranium¶ mining, for example, shows that colonial practices and structures were appropriated---not¶ overthrown – by the nuclear age, and proved central to its technopolitical success. Hiroshima¶ uranium came from the Belgian Congo. After the war, Britain's colonial ties to uranium-¶ supplying regions in Africa and Australia helped maintain nuclear relations with the US¶ South Africa`s eagerness to place its vast uranium reserves at the disposal of the West led the¶ US and Britain to gloss over the emerging apartheid regime." France could pursue an¶ independent nuclear program because it had access to uranium not just on metropolitan soil.¶ but also in its African colonies. Internal colonialism figured too: in the U.S. the richest¶ uranium regions proved to be on Native American lands on the Colorado Plateau, while¶ Australians found much of their uranium on Aboriginal lands in the Northern Territory. I¶ could continue to enumerate examples: the Soviet Union mined uranium in East Germany¶ and Czechoslovakia; South Africa mined uranium in (present-day) Namibia: Canada on¶ native lands, India on tribal lands. And on and on. And the same for nuclear testing, as the¶ US tested its weapons on the Marshall Islands. France in Algeria and Polynesia, and Britain¶ on Aboriginal lands.¶ Nuclear rupture-talk masked such local, regional, and national complexities while¶ repeatedly invoking colonialism, decolonization. or post-coloniality in order to produce a¶ vision of the world in which particular kinds of nuclear tcchnopolitics served as the limit¶ arbiter of global status and power. This process operated in several ways. Let me offer a few¶ rough sketches.¶ Perhaps most obviously, nuclearity appeared to provide imperial states with a geopolitical¶ solution to the loss of status threatened by decolonization. With growing challenges to the¶ legitimacy of colonial rule after World War II, Britain and France increasingly saw nuclear¶ weapons as a means of retaining some measure of geopolitical power and glory. But it wasn`t¶ just that atom bombs could replace colonial states as an instrument of global power. Atom¶ bombs would also prevent these imperial states from themselves becoming reduced to the¶ status of colonized subjects. Consider this remark by Churchill's chief scientific advisor.¶ Lord Cherwell, in l951: "lf we have to rely entirely on the United States army for this vital¶ weapon, we shall sink to the rank of a second-class nation, only permitted to supply auxiliary¶ troops, like the native levies who were allowed small arms but no artillery."" And listen to¶ Fiench parliamentary deputy (and future prime minister) Felix Gaillard, also in 1951: "those¶ nations which [do] not follow a clear path of atomic development [will] be, 25 years hence.¶ as backward relative to the nuclear nations of that time as the primitive peoples of Africa¶ [are] to the industrialized nations of today." ¶ These are but two examples of a rich discourse, which functioned by dialectically mapping¶ two sets of bimodal geopolitical subject positions onto each other. Nuclear = (former) colonizer. Non-nuclear = colonized. Over the course of the Cold War this bimodal¶ positioning shifted in complex ways, particularly as the language of colonialism mutated into¶ the language of "development" and the category of "Third World" became a staple of¶ international politics." Thus, for example, international discourse on non-proliferation made¶ it particularly inappropriate-morally, technologically, politically - for a "Third World"¶ nation to go nuclear.
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Hecht 2003 [Gabrielle, Professor Department of History, University of Michigan, “Globalization Meets Frankenstein?¶ Reflections On Terrorism, Nuclearity, And¶ Global Technopolitical Discourse” History and Technology, 2003 Vol. 19(1) pp. 1-8, accessed via Ebsco]
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Most¶ descriptions of the technological dimensions of the attacks invoked polarities taken straight¶ from colonial-evolutionist discourse play the system right, and Neolithic technology can be¶ leveraged to bring on nuclear-like devastation, As if the¶ very "founding fathers" of America (learning, it must be said, from the Indians they¶ displaced) hadn't used British guns in new ways in order to defeat the redcoats As if¶ "technology" had fixed meanings, stable uses Meanwhile Bush¶ spluttered that the US would bomb Afghanistan "back into the Stone Age." But Afghanistan already is in the Stone Age!"¶ globalization meets Frankenstein and his monster, that venerable archetype of unintended¶ sociotechnical consequences false dichotomies (such as modernity vs fascism) and the¶ historical ruptures they invoke are nothing new in discourse rhetorical invocation of technological inventions to declare of a new¶ era were repeated political proclamations that nuclear weapons had produced a new world order Cold War figures as a significant trope for our present fearless¶ leaders who¶ didn't flash to Reagan's "evil empire" speech after Bush's puzzling pronouncement¶ concerning the "axis of evil" What leaders and media pundits generally fail to note are the implications of¶ Cold War discourse both the politics and the scholarship of the "nuclear age"¶ has been all about rupture and dichotom nuclear world has been portrayed as polarized split into nuclear and non-nuclear states, nuclear and conventional¶ technologies Those have¶ served as the basis for "nuclear diplomacy The dichotomies have appeared clear-cut, and appeared to signal a profound historical rupture for whom "The Bomb" seemed to replace imperialism as the foundation for¶ global power the rupture of nuclearity could palliate the rupture threatened by the¶ prospect of docolonization.¶ assertions of rupture and the polarities they invoked masked a more complex¶ reality history of uranium¶ shows that colonial practices and structures were appropriated by the nuclear age, Hiroshima¶ uranium came from the Belgian Congo. Britain's colonial ties to uranium-¶ supplying regio led the¶ US and Britain to gloss over the emerging apartheid regime." France could pursue an¶ independent nuclear program Internal colonialism figured in the U.S. the richest¶ uranium regions proved to be on Native American lands on the Colorado Plateau Nuclear rupture-talk masked such local, regional, and national complexities while¶ repeatedly invoking colonialism, decolonization. or post-coloniality in order to produce a¶ vision of the world in which particular kinds of nuclear tcchnopolitics served as the limit¶ arbiter of global status nuclearity appeared to provide imperial states with a geopolitical¶ solution to the loss of status threatened by decolonization But it wasn`t¶ just that atom bombs could replace colonial states as an instrument of global power. Atom¶ bombs would also prevent these imperial states from themselves becoming reduced to the¶ status of colonized subjects lf we have to rely entirely on the United States army for this vital¶ weapon, we shall sink to the rank of a second-class nation -nuclear = colonized. this bimodal¶ positioning shifted in complex ways, particularly as the language of colonialism mutated into¶ the language of "development Thus international discourse on non-proliferation made¶ it particularly inappropriate-morally, technologically, politically - for a "Third World"¶ nation to go nuclear.
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The constructed threat of nuclear destruction is embedded in coloniality—they polarize international systems along lines of peaceful colonizers and barbaric threats, reducing enemies to “2nd class nations” and justifying oppression
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Texas (UTNIF)
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2013
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4,412 |
That's very hard to predict. For one thing it may lead to nuclear war and there won't be anything else to talk about. If you set up an international confrontation, the world may blow up. American planners have repeatedly been willing to threaten that. For them it's considered a small danger. The idea that the world may blow up is a relatively insignificant consideration as compared with the importance of preventing a small country from using its resources for its own population. That's the way planning works. But it's highly unpredictable - they're playing with stakes that are just too high.
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Chomsky 99 (Noam, Professor (Emeritus) in the Department of Linguistics & Philosophy at MIT, and Heinz Dieterich. Latin America: from colonization to globalization. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1999)
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it may lead to nuclear war and there won't be anything else to talk about. the world may blow up. American planners have repeatedly been willing to threaten that. For them it's considered a small danger. The idea that the world may blow up is a relatively insignificant consideration as compared with the importance of preventing a small country from using its resources for its own population. That's the way planning works. they're playing with stakes that are just too high
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America’s obsession with constantly expropriating resources leads to nuclear war
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Kritiks
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“Colonialism not only deprives a society of its freedom and its wealth, but of its very character, leaving its people intellectually and morally disoriented” (Franz Fanon, 1966). Introduction This essay is going to assess colonialism and the class structure inherited as a main determinant of current development in Latin American countries. First of all, we must highlight statistics published by the World Bank: 1.4 billion people in developing countries are living under the extreme poverty. These countries are, in the majority, former colonies from different cycles of expansion of the major imperialist countries. Certainly, the processes driven by and the legacies of colonialism are multiple and cannot be understood if reduced to only the economic dimension. However, for the purpose of this paper, the effects of economic colonization will be stressed. The economic heritages of colonization are the consequences of the process of conquering, controlling and possessing the specified regions. I also avoid a discussion of the entire 20th century in order to focus on how the colonial occupation shaped various countries. This definition of colonialism is imprecise and broad. In an effort to be more precise, I understand it as an external/foreign exploitation assured through political control and dominance which led to a situation of dependency on the colonial power by the exploited economy. However, there are other extra-economic implications of colonialism: it is necessarily a violent conquest and violently maintained system for the over-exploration of the conquered people. It is an inhuman system in itself, destroying any attempt at real development of the colony. Economically, it confiscates and reserves productive lands for the use of the colonizer. At a psychological level, it de-humanizes the colonized, forcefully imposing a foreign culture. It is a system sustained by a racist ideology where cultural space is developed exclusively for relations of domination. This allows for suppression and subjugation of the colonized. Our main question is to analyze how the low level of economic performance in colonized countries is a reflex of social structures generated by colonialism. Thus, the first question which should be addressed is: Why do colonial powers established colonies? Secondly, how did they do it? Therefore, it will be possible to comprehend the current impacts and consequences of their practices. Historical context and genealogy of the colonialism The recent colonies (17th to 19th centuries) were established as part of the expansion of the European capitalistic production following the Industrial Revolution. European colonial powers aimed to incorporate territories which could provide raw materials and low-cost workforce, and in the process de-structuring and unmaking solid pre-capitalistic social formations. Hence, the main goal was not the transference of the metropolitan population to populate the colony, expanding their agriculture as practiced by the Roman (and earlier) Empire(s). The economies of the colonies were designed to serve as source of inexpensive labor and natural resources, and never planned to spark internal development. This situation led to monopolistic trade-relations in benefit of the economies of the colonial powers. To ensure these monopolistic privileges, the colonial powers forcibly shaped the social and economical dynamics of the colonies. In this sense, the colonized countries were forced to develop non-technologically intensive monocultures (ironically celebrated as “specialization”), selling unprofitably their entire production for the dominant countries. This same agro-export oriented dynamics outlined the land-owning structure, based in large properties under the (political and economical) control of non-modernizing oligarchies. The role of these oligarchies is of fundamental importance. The local elites were major actors on political-economical scenario. Their agency cannot be ignored and their internal activity defined, organized and settled the relations of exploitation which took place in the colonies. One of the most prominent Latin American economists, Celso Furtado, effectively explained the patterns of colonialism. According to him, the foreign country worked in interrelation with the ruling classes in the region, using authoritarian means to exclude large segments of the people from participating in political and economic control of their communities and countries with the intention of decreasing the cost of labor (when it not reduced drastically through the use of enslaved traditional populations). To sum up, Furtado states: 1. The existence of vast non-utilized areas permitted new extensive occupations of land instead of establishing a modern and intensive agriculture; 2. The profits accumulated by the local elites were wasted in the consumption of superfluous and luxurious goods for pure ostentation, rather than saving and investing in productive sectors of the national and nascent economy; 3. As consequence of the agrarian structure which extremely centralized power and wealth, a harsh situation of inequality, poverty and all sorts of privation for the majority of the society resulted. This excluded a major part of the population from the basic means of subsistence. All these points, maintained a vicious cycle of lower productivity in colonized regions and the flow of wealth to the dominant economies. The fate of the lest developed countries were determined in this dialectical relation where internal factors (the role of the dominant classes based in a semi-feudal order) interacted with external causes (the colonial power and its thirsty for resources and labor force). In this historic trap colonized regions were lately incorporated in the world-market as a result of the dissolution of the direct control of metropolitan capital over the colonies and had to be accommodated according to the needs of the previous. The (historical and contemporary) massive poverty in those specified regions saw its genealogy in the original privation of access to land and housing and currently also determines the economic performance of those countries where large majorities of the working classes are unable to consume the products made in a society scarred by inequality. Strict laws and other measures of social control were also established in the colonized countries. Even the manufacture of minimal technological products such as nails were forbidden, artificially increasing the dependence of the colonies. This is an important element of the colonial system, and it cannot be understood if its inherent contradictions are ignored: the development of the colonial country comes at the expense of the underdevelopment of the colonized. The markets and actual economies must be looked as historically constituted. In this sense, production in the colony was determined by the colonial power’s demands. The establishment of a monopolistic relation between the colonial power and the colony not only asphyxiated the nascent industrialization, but also strangled the benefits of competition. This historical process left the former colonies economically subordinated and disabled. Though it is important to bear in mind that the identity of the colonial power (and the type of the colonization) can be a different variable. For instance, the legacy in terms of cultural, institutional and legal heritage of the colonial power can create slight differences. In the table below, a list of the GDP of former colonies (in South America; data in American dollars) is contrasted with their Gini coefficients, or the statistical measure of inequality. [A low Gini number indicates a more equal distribution of wealth. By comparison, the US has a Gini coefficient of about .40, while many social democratic European countries are in the .20s. – Ed.] Historically, this sample was subjected to a similar kind of colonization. In other words, the pattern of colonization was to establish centers for supplying agricultural and non-industrialized products and minerals, such as gold and silver for the colonial powers. Generally speaking, Latin America has shown economic growth, although the social structure imposed colonialism has been perpetuated. The region is extremely unequal, with one of the worst income distributions of the world. The explanation for this is that the initial degree of inequality, initiated with the long process of fragmentation of local pre-capitalist and autonomous societies, followed by the enslavement of traditional indigenous populations, the transference of African slaves to the continent and, finally, the hyper-exploitation of the free (or recently liberated) working class is still affecting the actual development. The legacy of the colonial times - the concentration of power, wealth and land - led to a stratified society with an extreme inequality. The discrimination and oppression present in those hierarchical societies are the main inheritance of the former colonies and are a persistent tragedy, being part of the unsolved questions of the recent past.
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Miguel 9 (Vincius Valentin Raduan, holds a degree in Legal Sciences Faculty of Humanities and a professor at the Federal University of Rondônia, “Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Latin America” http://www.politicalaffairs.net/colonialism-and-underdevelopment-in-latin-america/)
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Colonialism leaving its people intellectually and morally disoriented 1.4 billion people in developing countries are living under the extreme poverty former colonies from different cycles of expansion the processes driven by and the legacies of colonialism are multiple and cannot be understood if reduced to only the economic dimension colonialism is an external/foreign exploitation assured through political control and dominance which led to a situation of dependency on the colonial power by the exploited economy it is necessarily a violent conquest and violently maintained system for the over-exploration of the conquered people. It is an inhuman system in itself, destroying any attempt at real development of the colony it confiscates and reserves productive lands for the use of the colonizer it de-humanizes the colonized, forcefully imposing a foreign culture. It is a system sustained by a racist ideology where cultural space is developed exclusively for relations of domination. This allows for suppression and subjugation of the colonized colonies were established as part of the expansion of the European capitalistic production following the Industrial Revolution The economies of the colonies were designed to serve as source of inexpensive labor and natural resources To ensure these monopolistic privilege the colonial powers forcibly shaped the social and economical dynamics of the colonies The existence of vast non-utilized areas permitted new extensive occupations of land As consequence of the agrarian structure which extremely centralized power and wealth, a harsh situation of inequality, poverty and all sorts of privation for the majority of the society resulted. This excluded a major part of the population from the basic means of subsistence massive poverty in those specified regions saw its genealogy in the original privation of access to land and housing and currently also determines the economic performance of those countries where large majorities of the working classes are unable to consume the products made in a society scarred by inequality Strict laws and other measures of social control were also established in the colonized countries the development of the colonial country comes at the expense of the underdevelopment of the colonized The markets and actual economies must be looked as historically constituted This historical process left the former colonies economically subordinated and disabled the pattern of colonization was to establish centers for supplying agricultural and non-industrialized products , Latin America is extremely unequal, with one of the worst income distributions of the world inequality, enslavement exploitation of the free (or recently liberated is still affecting the actual development colonial times led to extreme inequality. The discrimination and oppression present in those hierarchical societies are the main inheritance of the former colonies and are a persistent tragedy, being part of the unsolved questions of the recent past
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Colonialism establishes a framework of racism to justify cultural intervention exclusively for domination and subjugation
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Texas (UTNIF)
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2013
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What is termed globalization is the culmination of a process that began with the constitution of America and colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power. One of the fundamental axes of this model of power is the social classification of the world’s population around the idea of race, a mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including its specific rationality: Eurocentrism. The racial axis has a colonial origin and character, but it has proven to be more durable and stable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was established. Therefore, the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality. In what follows, my primary aim is too pen up some of the theoretically necessary questions about the implications of coloniality of power regarding the history of Latin America.1 America and the New Model of Global Power America was constituted as the first space/time of a new model of power of global vocation, and both in this way and by it became the first identity of modernity. Two historical processes associated in the production of that space/time converged and established the two fundamental axes of the new model of power. One was the codification of the differences between conquerors and conquered in the idea of “race,” a supposedly different biological structure that placed some in a natural situation of inferiority to the others. The conquistadors assumed this idea as the constitutive, founding element of the relations of domination that the conquest imposed. On this basis, the population of America, and later the world, was classified within the new model of power. The other process was the constitution of a new structure of control of labor and its resources and products. This new structure was an articulation of all historically known previous structures of control of labor, slavery, serfdom, small independent commodity production and reciprocity, together around and upon the basis of capital and the world market.3 Race: A Mental Category of Modernity The idea of race, in its modern meaning, does not have a known history before the colonization of America. Perhaps it originated in reference to the phenotypic differences between conquerors and conquered.4 However, what matters is that soon it was constructed to refer to the supposed differential biological structures between those groups. Social relations founded on the category of race produced new historical social identities in America—Indians, blacks, and mestizos— and redefined others. Terms such as Spanish and Portuguese, and much later European, which until then indicated only geographic origin or country of origin, acquired from then on a racial connotation in reference to the new identities. Insofar as the social relations that were being configured were relations of domination, such identities were considered constitutive of the hierarchies, places, and corresponding social roles, and consequently of the model of colonial domination that was being imposed. In other words, race and racial identity were established as instruments of basic social classification. As time went by, the colonizers codified the phenotypic trait of the colonized as color, and they assumed it as the emblematic characteristic of racial category. That category was probably initially established in the area of Anglo-America. There so-called blacks were not only the most important exploited group, since the principal part of the economy rested on their labor; they were, above all, the most important colonized race, since Indians were not part of that colonial society. Why the dominant group calls itself “white” is a story related to racial classification.5 In America, the idea of race was a way of granting legitimacy to the relations of domination imposed by the conquest. After the colonization of America and the expansion of European colonialism to the rest of the world, the subsequent constitution of Europe as a new identity needed the elaboration of a Eurocentric perspective of knowledge, a theoretical perspective on the idea of race as a naturalization of colonial relations between Europeans 535 Quijano . Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America and non-Europeans. Historically, this meant a new way of legitimizing the already old ideas and practices of relations of superiority/inferiority between dominant and dominated. From the sixteenth century on, this principle has proven to be the most effective and long-lasting instrument of universal social domination, since the much older principle—gender or intersexual domination—was encroached upon by the inferior/superior racial classifications. So the conquered and dominated peoples were situated in a natural position of inferiority and, as a result, their phenotypic traits as well as their cultural features were considered inferior.6 In this way, race became the fundamental criterion for the distribution of the world population into ranks, places, and roles in the new society’s structure of power.
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Quijano 2000 (Aníbal, professor of the Department of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America”)
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One of the fundamental axes of this model of power is the social classification of the world’s population around the idea of race, a mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including its specific rationality: Eurocentrism. , the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality America became the first identity of modernity One was the codification of the differences between conquerors and conquered in the idea of “race,” a supposedly different biological structure that placed some in a natural situation of inferiority to the others the world, was classified within the new model of power The idea of race, in its modern meaning, does not have a known history before the colonization of America soon it was constructed to refer to the supposed differential biological structures between those groups Social relations founded on the category of race produced new historical social identities in America—Indians, blacks, and mestizos— and redefined others. Terms such as Spanish and Portuguese which until then indicated only geographic origin acquired from then on a racial connotation the social relations that were being configured were relations of domination identities were considered constitutive of the hierarchies and the model of colonial domination that was being imposed , race and racial identity were established as instruments of basic social classification , the colonizers codified the phenotypic trait as color blacks were the most important colonized race the idea of race was a way of granting legitimacy to the relations of domination imposed by the conquest the idea of race as a naturalization of colonial relations Historically, this meant a new way of legitimizing relations of superiority/inferiority between dominant and dominated the conquered and dominated peoples were situated in a natural position of inferiority and, as a result, their phenotypic traits as well as their cultural features were considered inferior became the fundamental criterion for the distribution of the world population into ranks
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Racism is a construct of colonialism used to legitimize social conquest—relations of domination translate into phenotypic inferiority
| 5,121 | 133 | 2,174 | 787 | 17 | 331 | 0.021601 | 0.420584 |
Decoloniality Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Kritiks
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2013
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4,415 |
Since the abolition of slavery, this principle of colonial humanitarianism has been making an advance, but the imperial powers must now realize that Europeans (and American imperialists for that matter) are not the racial superiors of any other race, and unless this bugaboo of race superiority is renounced, there can be no sincere progress or inter-racial and international peace and good will.28 Dr. George Dorsey of the University of Chicago, recently criticized this idea of race superiority and inferiority, when in his famous treatise he said that too many abstract formulae about humanity and too little common sense for solving concrete social problems make human association and fellowship increasingly tense; "But," he states, "the 'racial purity' and 'racial inferiority' behind such books as McDougall's Is America Safe for Democracy? Chamberlain's Foundations of Nineteenth Century Civilization; Grant's The Passing of the Great Race; Wiggam's The New Decalogue of Science; Gould's America a Family Matter; and East's Mankind at the Crossroads, are pure bunk and simple. If the United States wish to restrict immigration to 'Nordics' or to this or that political group why not say so and be done with it? To bolster up racial prejudice or a Nordic or a Puritan complex by false and misleading inferences drawn from 'intelligence tests' or from pseudo-biology and ethnology is to throw away science and fall back on the mentality of primitive savagery. Evolution produced a human brain, our only remarkable inheritance. Nothing else counts. Body is simply brain's servant. Treat the body right, of course; no brain can function well without good service. But why worry more about the looks, color, and clothes of the servant than the service it performs? "2 Weyl holds that the social goal of democracy is advancement of the people through a democratization of advantages and opportunities of life.30 Even Edmund Burke, the fore-sighted statesman of England, warned the British regarding its policy under the complex of race superiority in the colonies thus: "Let the colonies always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your government; they will cling and grapple to you; and no force under heaven will be of power to tear them from their allegiance. But let it be once understood, that your government may be one thing, and your privileges another; that these two things may exist without any mutual relation; the cement is gone; the cohesion is loosened, and everything hastens to decay and dissolution ....” Deny them this participation of freedom, and you break that sole bond which originally made, and must still preserve the unity of the Empire."'" Thus the dual mandate principle entails more than trusteeship, it entails social progress and social progress entails a liberality of attitude and equal opportunities so that these adolescents will reap the benefit of a realistic and not a fictitious mandates principle. This is a challenge to international morality and particularly the League of Nations.
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Ibarra-Colado 7 (Eduardo, Professor of Management Studies at the Department of Economic Production, Metropolitan Autonomous University, “Organization Studies and Epistemic Coloniality in Latin America: Thinking Otherness from the Margins”)
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the imperial powers must now realize that Europeans (and American imperialists ) are not the racial superiors of any other race, and unless race superiority is renounced, there can be no sincere progress or inter-racial and international peace and good will ? To bolster up racial prejudice by false and misleading inferences drawn from 'intelligence tests' or from pseudo-biology and ethnology is to throw away science and fall back on the mentality of primitive savagery. Evolution produced a human brain, our only remarkable inheritance. Nothing else counts. Body is simply brain's servant why worry more about the looks, color, and clothes of the servant than the service it performs the social goal of democracy is advancement of the people through a democratization of advantages and opportunities of life social progress entails a liberality of attitude and equal opportunitie
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The ethic of coloniality makes serial policy failure and error replication inevitable –it biases research and skews claims of development
| 3,042 | 137 | 883 | 484 | 20 | 138 | 0.041322 | 0.285124 |
Decoloniality Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Kritiks
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2013
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4,416 |
There is an important question which students of colonial diplomacy have always evaded. The nature of the question is rather problematic. It is narrowed down to the fact that when once a principle is put into practice it becomes almost suicidal to follow a course that would be for the greatest good of the greatest number, without regard to selfish interests. If tutelage of these adolescents implies education till they are fledged and mature to take over the reins of government, then by all principles of justice and equity, there should be no unnecessary argument as to the right of a ward to claim his hard-earned fruits of victory. However, Lord Bryce views this question with avid pessimism when he concluded that the diffusion of education among backward races, such as the Filipinos or the African tribes will not necessarily qualify them for self-government.32 According to Foerster in Mes Combates, cited by Oldham, "It is just in hours of crisis, that strength of character, the sense of honor and the sincerity of our belief in moral forces have the opportunity of proving themselves."33 And when colonial powers are faced with such problems as independence, or a radical change in political status, force is resorted to, as the supreme ideal. This use of force, says Lord Bryce, makes a colonial power to reel like a drunkard; his authority intoxicates him insomuch that "the dazzling splendor of his aim blinds him in the wrongfulness of the means I whereby he flagrantly desecrates the sacred trust of civilization.34 In the preface to a publication on Africa, Lord Olivier charged that European governments of African dependencies were inherently "full of cruelty" because the white man will always draw a color line which causes resentment and ultimate inter-racial conflict.35¶ Sir G. C. Lewis in his book, suggests that every dominant power should not attempt by coercive means to repress political determinism the dependencies, but rather should grant them independence as soon as self-determination has been made.36The fallacy of this argument is the fact that "self-determination" has been loosely interpreted as to mean a vague ideal, so far as native races are concerned. The struggle for independence successively waged by Ireland, Egypt, India, the Philippine Islands, China, Korea, and Haiti, demonstrates that once a colony docilely accepts foreign domination, that becomes its eternal heritage, until it is able to muster arms and employ force to overthrow the dominating power. This is the only verdict of history.37In 1792, Premier William Pitt visualized the day when native Africans would become fledged to rule themselves.38But the noble lord fails to realize that responsibility of trusteeship is not fully discharged in securing justice to the natives; if the natives will eventually become a dominant factor in the administration of their own native-land, and if their colonial rulers are really honest and sincere, their material and moral advancement must be fostered by positive measures, constructive educational policies, promotion of health, and political tutelage, by actual appointment to the higher divisions of the various bureaus of the civil service of these colonies. So far, the little government of Gold Coast in West Africa has taken the initiative to establish a million dollar college for the training of natives and also the appointment of qualified Africans to the higher positions of the Gold Coast Civil Service. Nigeria, Gambia and other British colonies still believe that unless you restrict the education of the native, the white man will have to face another "Black Peril" in Africa.39According to John H. Harris, "trusteeship means that the government is to be in the interests of the governed; it means that when the ward has attained to manhood the trusteeship will be surrendered; it means that it is the prime duty of the trustee so to foster the growth of the ward that upon reaching the state of manhood the capacity to manage his own affairs will not be denied or questioned."40 Lord Durham followed the great orator Charles Fox, by adding that "the only method of retaining distant colonies with advantage was to enable them to govern them- selves.4'41 Buell, realizing the almost unsolvable difficulties of colonial administration has said that the habit of one¶ nation colonizing another nation that is weaker eventually forms a curse to the mother country.42
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Ibarra-Colado 7 (Eduardo, Professor of Management Studies at the Department of Economic Production, Metropolitan Autonomous University, “Organization Studies and Epistemic Coloniality in Latin America: Thinking Otherness from the Margins”)
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once a principle is put into practice it becomes almost suicidal to follow a course that would be for the greatest good of the greatest number, without regard to selfish interests. If tutelage of these adolescents implies education there should be no unnecessary argument as to the right of a ward to claim his hard-earned fruits of victory , Lord Bryce views this question with avid pessimism when he concluded that the diffusion of education among backward races, such as the Filipinos or the African tribes will not necessarily qualify them for self-government when colonial powers are faced with such problems as independence, or a radical change in political status, force is resorted to, as the supreme ideal European governments of African dependencies were inherently "full of cruelty" because the white man will always draw a color line which causes resentment and ultimate inter-racial conflict The struggle for independence successively waged by Ireland, Egypt, India, the Philippine Islands, China, Korea, and Haiti, demonstrates that once a colony docilely accepts foreign domination, that becomes its eternal heritage, until it is able to muster arms and employ force to overthrow the dominating power. This is the only verdict of history it is the prime duty of the trustee so to foster the growth of the ward that upon reaching the state of manhood the capacity to manage his own affairs will not be denied or questioned
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Regard the affirmative’s claims of growth and development with skepticism—the act of benign foreign intervention has been empirically denied
| 4,436 | 140 | 1,436 | 713 | 19 | 234 | 0.026648 | 0.328191 |
Decoloniality Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Kritiks
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2013
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4,417 |
Ideas of war, conquest, and genocide here bring up another fundamental¶ aspect of coloniality.28 The question about whether the indigenous peoples of¶ the Americas had soul or not was framed around the question of just war. In¶ the debates that took place in Valladolid in the sixteenth century Sepu´lveda¶ argued against Las Casas that the Spanish had the obligation to engage in a just¶ war against subjects who, in their inferiority, would not adopt by themselves¶ the superior Christian religion and culture.29 Once more, just like it happens¶ in respect to the question about the humanity of the so called Amerindians, the¶ outcome of the discussion is not as important as the question itself. The¶ ‘discovery’ and conquest of the Americas was no less than an ontological event¶ with many implications, the most dramatic of which were established by the¶ attitudes and questions that emerged in the context. By the time when the¶ question about engaging in a just war against the Amerindians was answered¶ the conquerors had already established a particular way of relating to the¶ peoples that they encountered. And the way in which they pursued such¶ relations did not correspond to the ethical standards that were followed in¶ their countries of origin. Indeed, as Sylvia Wynter argues, Columbus’s¶ redefinition of the purpose of land as being one for us, whereby for us meant for us who belong to the realm of Man vis-a`-vis those outside the human¶ oecumene, already introduces the exceptional character that ethics is going to¶ take in the New World.30 As we know, such exceptional situation gradually¶ lost its exceptionality and became normative in the modern world. But before¶ it gained such a widespread acceptance and became constitutive of a new¶ reigning episteme, the exceptionality was shown in the way in which¶ colonizers behaved in relation to the indigenous peoples and black slaves.¶ And this behavior coincided more with the kind of actions shown at war, than¶ with the ethics that regulated live with other European Christians.¶ When the conquerors came to the Americas they did not follow the code¶ of ethics that regulated behavior among subjects of the crown in their¶ kingdom.31 Their actions were regulated by the ethics or rather the non-ethics¶ of war. One cannot forget that while early Christians criticized slavery in the¶ Roman Empire, later Christians considered that vanquished enemies in war¶ could legitimately be enslaved.32 Indeed, in the Ancient world and the Middle¶ Ages it was for the most part legitimate to enslaved some people, particularly¶ prisoners of war and the vanquished. What happens in the Americas is a¶ transformation and naturalization of the non-ethics of war, which represented a¶ sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian¶ countries, to a more stable and long-standing reality ofdamnation. Damnation,¶ life in hell, refers here to modern forms of colonialism which constitute a¶ reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization¶ of slavery, now justified in relation to the very physical and ontological¶ constitution of people by virtue of ‘race’ and not to their faith or belief.33¶ That human beings become slaves when they are vanquished in a war translates¶ in the Americas to the suspicion that the conquered people, and then nonEuropean peoples in general, are constitutively inferior and that therefore they¶ should assume a position of slavery and serfdom. Sepu´lveda draws on Aristotle¶ to justify this position, but he was more than anything translating into¶ categories ideas that were already becoming common sense. Later the idea was¶ going to be solidified in respect to the slavery of people from Africa and¶ become stable until today under the tragic reality of different forms of racism.¶ Coloniality, I am suggesting here, can be understood as a radicalization and¶ naturalization of the non-ethics of war. This non-ethics included the practices¶ of eliminating and slaving certain subjects e.g., indigenous and black as¶ part of the enterprise of colonization. The hyperbolic expression of coloniality¶ includes genocide, which is the paroxysm of the ego cogito a world in which¶ the ego cogito exists alone. War, however, is not only about killing or¶ enslaving. War includes a particular treatment of sexuality and of feminity:¶ rape. Coloniality is an order of things that put people of color under the¶ murderous and rapist sight of a vigilant ego. And the primary targets of rape¶ are women. But men of color are also seeing through these lenses. Men of¶ color are feminized and become for the ego conquiro fundamentally penetrable subjects.34 I will expand more on the several dimensions of murder and rape¶ when I elaborate the existential aspect of the analytics of the coloniality of¶ Being. The point that I want to make here is that racialization works through¶ gender and sex and that the ego conquiro is constitutively a phallic ego as¶ well.35 Enrique Dussel, who submits the thesis of the phallic character of the¶ ego cogito, also makes links, albeit indirectly, with the reality of war.¶ And thus, in the beginning of modernity, before Descartes discovered...a terrifying anthropological dualism in Europe, the Spanish¶ conquistadors arrived in America. The phallic conception of the¶ European-medieval world is now added to the forms of submission of¶ the vanquished Indians. ‘Males’, Bartolome´ de las Casas writes, are¶ reduced through ‘the hardest, most horrible, and harshest serfdom’; but¶ this only occurs with those who have remained alive, because many of¶ them have died; however, ‘in war typically they only leave alive young¶ men (mozos) and women.¶ 36¶ Joshua Goldstein complements this account by depicting conquest as an¶ extension of the rape and exploitation of women in wartime.37 He argues that¶ to understand conquest one needs to examine: (1) male sexuality as a cause of¶ aggression; (2) the feminization of enemies as symbolic domination, and (3)¶ dependence on exploiting women’s labor. My argument is that these three¶ things come together in the idea of race that began to emerge in the conquest¶ and colonization of the Americas. Misanthropic skepticism posits its targets as¶ racialized and sexualized subjects. Once vanquished, they are said to be¶ inherently servants and their bodies come to form part of an economy of¶ sexual abuse, exploitation, and control. The ethics of the ego conquiro ceased to¶ be only a special code of behavior for periods of war and becomes in the¶ Americas and gradually the modern world by virtue of misanthropic¶ skepticism, the idea of race, and the coloniality of power, a standard of¶ conduct that reflects the way things are a way of things whose naturalization¶ reaches its climax with the use of natural science to validate racism in the¶ nineteenth century. The way things supposedly are emerge from the idea of¶ how a world is conceived to be in conditions of war and the code of behavior¶ that is part of it. What happens in modernity is that such a view of the world¶ and code of conduct is transformed through the idea of race and becomes¶ naturalized. Thus, the treatment of vanquished peoples in conditions of war is¶ perceived as legitimate long after war is over. Later on, it won’t be their¶ aggression or opposition, but their ‘race’ which justifies continued serfdom,¶ slavery, and rape. This represents a break with the European medieval¶ tradition and its ethical codes. With the initial exploitation of Africa and the¶ colonization of the Americas in the fifteenth century, the emerging modernity¶ comes to be shaped by a paradigm of war.38¶ Building on the work of Dussel, Gordon, Quijano, and Wynter I articulated¶ in this section what I see as three contributions to the understanding of¶ coloniality and race: (1) the understanding of race as misanthropic skepticism,¶ (2) the interrelation of race and gender, and (3) the understanding of race and¶ gender conceptions in modernity as the result of the naturalization of the ethics¶ of war. The lived experience of racialized people is deeply touched by the¶ encounter with misanthropic skepticism and by the constant encounter with¶ violence and death. The language that they use has also already being shaped by¶ understanding of the world as a battle field in which they are permanently¶ vanquished. Now that we have an idea about the basic conditions of life in the¶ colonial side of the modern world or in the dark side of the color-line we can try¶ to find a more precise philosophical articulation of these experiences and thus to¶ lay out the fundamentals for a discourse about the coloniality of being. But,¶ while we have explored to some extent the meaning of the idea of coloniality,¶ we haven’t done the same with the idea of ‘being’. We shall do that next.¶ What is being?¶ As I made clear at the outset, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology informs the¶ conception of Being that I want to elaborate here. His work, particularly his¶ 1927 magnus opus, Being and Time is not the point of departure to think about¶ the coloniality of Being but it is, at least when spelled out in the context of the¶ phenomenological tradition and its heretic expressions, an inescapable¶ reference point. I do not think that Heidegger’s conception of ontology and¶ the primacy that he gives to the question of being necessarily provide the best¶ basis for the understanding of coloniality or decolonization, but his analyses of¶ being-in-the-world serve as a starting point to understanding some key¶ elements of existential thought, a tradition that has made important insights¶ into the lived experience of colonized and racialized peoples.39 Returning to¶ Heidegger can provide new clues about how to articulate a discourse on the¶ colonial aspects of world making and lived experience.¶ Heidegger’s ontology is characterized by the idea that Being is not a being,¶ an entity, or a thing, but the Being of beings, that is, something like the general¶ horizon of understanding for all beings.40 He refers to the distinction between¶ Being and beings as the ontological difference.¶ 41 According to Heidegger,¶ Western philosophy, particularly Western metaphysics, is characterized by the¶ forgetfulness of Being and by a denial of the ontological difference. Western¶ metaphysics has equally betrayed the understanding of Being by conceiving¶ Being in terms of the godhead or divinity. He calls this tendency ontotheology, which is for him what fundamental ontology needs to overcome.42¶ In addition to arguing for the crucial importance of the ontological¶ difference, Heidegger makes the point that the answer to the question of the meaning of Being necessitates a new radical point of departure. God cannot¶ stand as the beginning of ontology anymore. Things as such are of not much¶ help either, since their meaning is partly independent of them, and surely they¶ do not grasp their own meaning. In fact there is only one being for whom the¶ question of Being is significant: the human being. Since Heidegger’s aim is to¶ begin philosophy anew, he does not want to use Man or any known concept¶ to refer to human beings. They all carry the trace of metaphysics and of¶ epistemologically-centered philosophy, which would vitiate his efforts to¶ escape from them. The concept that he uses to refer to human beings-quabeings for whom their own being is in question is Dasein. Dasein literally¶ means ‘being there’. Thus, Dasein is simply the being who is there. For¶ Heidegger, fundamental ontology needs to elucidate the meaning of ‘being¶ there’ and through that, articulate ideas about Being itself.¶ Heidegger’s first reflection about Dasein is that it ek-sist, which means that it¶ is projected to the future.43But Dasein is also ‘thrown there’. Dasein ek-sist in a¶ context which is defined by a history and where there are laws and established¶ conceptions about social interaction, subjectivity, the world, and so on. Now,¶ through the analysis of Dasein, Heidegger discovers that for the most time its¶ subjectivity takes the shape of a collective anonymous figure: the One or the¶ They. The They could be compared to what Nietzsche referred to as the herd or¶ the mass of people.44Once Heidegger has elaborated his view of the They the rest¶ of part I of Being and Time takes on the question of how can Dasein relate¶ authentically to itself by projecting its ownmost possibilities not those defined¶ by the They. Heidegger’s response is that authenticity can only be achieved by¶ resoluteness, and that resoluteness can only emerge in an encounter with the¶ possibility which is inescapably one’s own, that is, death. In death one is fully¶ irreplaceable: no one can die for one, or one for another. Death is a singular¶ individualizing factor. The anticipation of the death and the accompanying¶ anxiety allow the subject to detach herself from the They, to determine her¶ ownmost possibilities, and to resolutely define her own project of ek-sistence.45¶ While the anticipation of death provides the means for the achievement of¶ authenticity at an individual level, a Fuhrer or leader became for Heidegger the¶ means to achieve authenticity at a collective level. Resoluteness at a collective¶ level could only emerge by virtue of a leader. From here that Heidegger came¶ to praise Hitler’s role in Germany and became an enthusiastic participant in the¶ Nazi administration. War in some way provided a way to connect these two¶ ideas: the wars of the volk (people) in the name of their leader provide the¶ context for a confrontation with death, and thus, to individual authenticity.¶ The possibility of dying for the country in a war becomes a means for¶ individual and collective authenticity.46 This picture, to be sure, seems to¶ reflect more the point of view of the victor in war, than that of the vanquished.¶ But it could be said that the vanquished can also achieve authenticity through¶ the confrontation with death in war. Anybody can. Yet, the missing factor here is the following: if the previous account of coloniality in relation to the nonethics of war is plausible then it must be admitted that the encounter with¶ death is no extra-ordinary affair, but a constitutive feature of the reality of¶ colonized and racialized subjects. The colonized is thus not ordinary Dasein,¶ and the encounter with the possibility of death does not have the same impact¶ or results than for someone whose mode of alienation is that of¶ depersonalization by the One or They. Racialized subjects are constituted in¶ different ways than those that form selves, others, and peoples. Death is not so¶ much an individualizing factor as a constitituve feature of their reality. It is the¶ encounter with daily forms of death, not the They, which afflicts them. The¶ encounter with death always comes too late, as it were, since death is already¶ beside them. For this reason, decolonization, deracialization, and des-generaccio´n (in sum, decoloniality) emerge not through an encounter with one’s¶ own mortality, but from a desire to evade death, one’s own but even more¶ fundamentally that of others. In short, while a vanquished people in war could¶ achieve authenticity, for subjects who are not considered to be part of ‘the¶ people’ the situation is different. For some subjects modernity changed the¶ way of achieving authenticity: they already live with death and are not even¶ ‘people’. What Heidegger forgot is that in modernity Being has a colonial side,¶ and that this has far-reaching consequences. The colonial aspect of Being, that¶ is, its tendency to submit everything to the light of understanding and¶ signification, reaches an extreme pathological point in war and its naturalization through the idea of race in modernity. The colonial side of Being sustains¶ the color-line. Heidegger, however, looses from view the particular¶ predicament of subjects in the darker side of this line and the significance of¶ their lived experience for theorization of Being and the pathologies of¶ modernity. Ironically, Heidegger recognizes the existence of what he calls¶ ‘primitive Dasein’, but in no way he connected it with colonized Dasein.47¶ Instead, he took European Man as his model of Dasein, and thus the colonized¶ appeared as a ‘primitive’. He forgot that if the concept of Man is a problem, is¶ not only because it is metaphysical, but also because it does away with the idea¶ that, in modernity, what one finds is not a single model of human being, but¶ relations of power that create a world with masters and slaves. He needed to¶ break with the idea of Europe and the European as models, in order to uncover¶ the complex dynamics of Dasein in the modern period both of European and¶ colonized Dasein, to which we will refer here as the damne´. But we are already¶ in the territory of discourse on the coloniality of being.
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Maldonado-Torres 2007 [Nelson, Professor of Comparative Literature at Rutgers, PhD in Religious Studies “ON THE COLONIALITY OF BEING¶ Contributions to the development of a¶ Concept” 2007 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09502380601162548]
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Ideas of war, conquest, and genocide here bring up another fundamental¶ aspect of coloniality The question about whether the indigenous peoples of¶ the Americas had soul or not was framed around the question of just war just like it happens¶ in respect to the question about the humanity of the so called Amerindians, the¶ outcome of the discussion is not as important as the question itself. The¶ ‘discovery’ and conquest of the Americas was no less than an ontological event¶ with many implications Columbus’s¶ redefinition of the purpose of land as being one for us, whereby for us meant for us who belong to the realm of Man vis-a`-vis those outside the human¶ oecumene already introduces the exceptional character that ethics is going to¶ take in the New World such exceptional situation gradually¶ lost its exceptionality and became normative in the modern world. the exceptionality was shown in the way in which¶ colonizers behaved in relation to the indigenous peoples and black slaves And this behavior coincided more with the kind of actions shown at war, than¶ with the ethics that regulated live with other European Christians When the conquerors came to the Americas they did not follow the code of ethics that regulated behavior among subjects of the crown in their kingdom.31 Their actions were regulated by the ethics or rather the non-ethics of war. What happens in the Americas is a¶ transformation and naturalization of the non-ethics of war, which represented a¶ sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian¶ countries, to a more stable and long-standing reality ofdamnation Damnation, life in hell, refers here to modern forms of colonialism which constitute a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery, now justified in relation to the very physical and ontological constitution of people by virtue of ‘race’ and not to their faith or belief ¶ That human beings become slaves when they are vanquished in a war translates¶ in the Americas to the suspicion that the conquered people, and then nonEuropean peoples in general, are constitutively inferior and that therefore they¶ should assume a position of slavery and serfdom Coloniality can be understood as a radicalization and naturalization of the non-ethics of war This non-ethics included the practices¶ of eliminating and slaving certain subjects e.g., indigenous and black as¶ part of the enterprise of colonization The hyperbolic expression of coloniality¶ includes genocide, War, however, is not only about killing or¶ enslaving. War includes a particular treatment of sexuality and of feminity:¶ rape Coloniality is an order of things that put people of color under the¶ murderous and rapist sight of a vigilant ego And the primary targets of rape¶ are women. But men of color are also seeing through these lenses. Men of color are feminized and become for the ego conquiro fundamentally penetrable subjects.34 racialization works through¶ gender and sex and that the ego conquiro is constitutively a phallic ego as¶ well. The phallic conception of the¶ European-medieval world is now added to the forms of submission of¶ the vanquished Indians Males’ are¶ reduced through ‘the hardest, most horrible, and harshest serfdom’; but¶ this only occurs with those who have remained alive, in war typically they only leave alive young¶ men and women these three¶ things come together in the idea of race that began to emerge in the conquest¶ and colonization of the Americas Misanthropic skepticism posits its targets as¶ racialized and sexualized subjects Once vanquished, they are said to be¶ inherently servants and their bodies come to form part of an economy of¶ sexual abuse, exploitation, and control The ethics of the ego conquiro ceased to¶ be only a special code of behavior for periods of war and becomes in the¶ Americas and gradually the modern world by virtue of misanthropic¶ skepticism, the idea of race, and the coloniality of power whose naturalization¶ reaches its climax with the use of natural science to validate racism in the¶ nineteenth century such a view of the world¶ and code of conduct is transformed through the idea of race and becomes¶ naturalized Thus the treatment of vanquished peoples in conditions of war is¶ perceived as legitimate long after war is over their ‘race’ which justifies continued serfdom,¶ slavery, and rape the emerging modernity¶ comes to be shaped by a paradigm of war.38¶ The lived experience of racialized people is deeply touched by the¶ encounter with misanthropic skepticism by the constant encounter with¶ violence and death. The language that they use has also already being shaped by understanding of the world as a battle field in which they are permanently vanquished. while we have explored to some extent the meaning of the idea of coloniality,¶ we haven’t done the same with the idea of ‘being’ I do not think that Heidegger’s conception of ontology and¶ the primacy that he gives to the question of being necessarily provide the best¶ basis for the understanding of coloniality or decolonization, but his analyses of¶ being-in-the-world serve as a starting point to understanding some key¶ elements of existential thought, a tradition that has made important insights¶ into the lived experience of colonized and racialized peoples. Heidegger’s response is that authenticity can only be achieved by¶ resoluteness, and that resoluteness can only emerge in an encounter with the¶ possibility which is inescapably one’s own, that is, death. In death one is fully¶ irreplaceable: no one can die for one, or one for another. Death is a singular¶ individualizing factor. The anticipation of the death and the accompanying¶ anxiety allow the subject to detach herself from the They, to determine her¶ ownmost possibilities, and to resolutely define her own project of ek-sistence.45¶ The possibility of dying for the country in a war becomes a means for¶ individual and collective authenticity But the vanquished can also achieve authenticity through¶ the confrontation with death in war the encounter with¶ death is no extra-ordinary affair, but a constitutive feature of the reality of colonized and racialized subjects. The colonized is thus not ordinary Dasein,¶ and the encounter with the possibility of death does not have the same impact¶ or results than for someone whose mode of alienation is that of¶ depersonalization by the One or They Racialized subjects are constituted in¶ different ways than those that form selves, others, and peoples Death is not so¶ much an individualizing factor as a constitituve feature of their reality. It is the encounter with daily forms of death which afflicts them The¶ encounter with death always comes too late, as it were, since death is already¶ beside them. decoloniality emerge not through an encounter with one’s¶ own mortality, but from a desire to evade death For some subjects modernity changed the way of achieving authenticity: they already live with death and are not even ‘people’. in modernity Being has a colonial side,¶ and that this has far-reaching consequences. The colonial side of Being sustains¶ the color-line. Heidegger took European Man as his model of Dasein, and thus the colonized¶ appeared as a ‘primitive’ if the concept of Man is a problem, is not only because it is metaphysical, but also because it does away with the idea that, in modernity, what one finds is not a single model of human being, but relations of power that create a world with masters and slaves.
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Coloniality results in a permanent hell on earth where the colonized gains its identity through the non-stop confrontation with death. Rape, murder, and genocide characterize the lived experience of the racialized subject
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Individualism, Identity and¶ Inferiority Complex¶ With the breakdown of Indigenous¶ society, nations & families also become¶ broken & fragmented. European values of¶ individualism & self-interest (essentially¶ capitalist) increasingly replace traditional¶ Indigenous values of community &¶ collectivity. In fact, the entire fabric of¶ Indigenous culture & society is tom apart:¶ "Colonial domination, because it is¶ total and tends to over-simplify, very "soon¶ manages to disrupt in spectacular fashion the¶ cultural life of a conquered people. This¶ cultural obliteration is made possible by the¶ negation of national reality [loss of¶ sovereignty], by new legal relations¶ introduced by the occupying power [i.e., the Indian Act], by the banishment of the natives and their customs to outlying¶ districts by colonial society [reservations], by expropriation [theft], and by the systematic enslaving ofmen & women."¶ (Frantz Fanon, Wretched ofthe Earth, p. 236).¶ Alongside the breakdown of family & community is the loss of culture. When confronted with systematic¶ assimilation into European culture, the result is a loss of identity & feelings of inferiority:¶ "Every effort is made to bring the colonized person to admit the inferiority' of his culture which has been¶ transformed into instinctive patterns of"behavior, to recognize the unreality of his 'nation', and, in the last extreme, 'the¶ confused and imperfect character ofhis own biological structure."¶ (Frantz Fanon, Wretched ofthe Earth, p. 236).¶ Internalized Violence¶ As a result of the physical and psychological affects of colonialism, patterns of internalized violence and crime are¶ established. The colonized tend to attack and victimize their own. These attacks range from violent assaults and murder, to¶ petty theft and vandalism. These patterns are common among colonized peoples (i.e., a leading cause of death among¶ young black males in the US are you~g black males).¶ One reason the colonized prey on one another is that ofproximity; one's family & community are right there, while¶ the oppressor lives in another world. The physical realities of colonialism, the establishment of reserves and urban ghettos,¶ along with an apartheid system, separates the colonized and the settler communities.¶ More than the physical proximity of one's own people, however, is the psychological impact of colonization. Not¶ only is the settler community physically distant, it is also foreign and threatening. It is well guarded. The penalties for¶ violating the settler's person or property are more severe than for violating one's own. Many forms of internalized violence arise from European colonial society itself. Widespread sexual abuse among¶ Indigenous peoples in Canada and the US, for example, was first introduced through the Residential School system.¶ Children who experienced abuse by school staff (priests & nuns) returned to their communities and began abusing their¶ own family members, resulting in intergenerational patterns of abuse that continue to this day.
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Warrior 11 (Zig-Zag, writer for Warrior Publications, Promoting Indigenous Warrior Culture, Fighting Spirit, & Resistance Movement, “Colonization and Decolonization: A Manual for Indigenous Liberation in the 21st Century” 2011)
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nations & families also become¶ broken & fragmented. European values of¶ individualism & self-interest (essentially¶ capitalist) increasingly replace traditional¶ Indigenous values of community &¶ collectivity , the entire fabric of¶ Indigenous culture & society is tom apart . This¶ cultural obliteration is made possible by loss of¶ sovereignty and the systematic enslaving ofmen & women the result is a loss of identity & feelings of inferiority:¶ "Every effort is made to bring the colonized person to admit the inferiority' of his culture which has been¶ transformed into instinctive patterns of"behavior, to recognize the unreality of his 'nation', and, in the last extreme, 'the¶ confused and imperfect character ofhis own biological structure. As a result of the physical and psychological affects of colonialism, patterns of internalized violence and crime are¶ established. The colonized tend to attack and victimize their own . The physical realities of colonialism, the establishment of reserves and urban ghettos,¶ along with an apartheid system, separates the colonized and the settler communities ¶ only is the settler community physically distant, it is also foreign and threatening. It is well guarded. The penalties for¶ violating the settler's person or property are more severe than for violating one's own .¶ Children who experienced abuse by school staff (priests & nuns) returned to their communities and began abusing their¶ own family members, resulting in intergenerational patterns of abuse that continue to this day
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Colonialism obliterates indigenous culture and society, causing a loss of identity and feeding cycles of internalized violence
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The Economic and Wage Commission reported brutality to native laborers by white managers in the form of severe floggings in South Africa.59There have been discriminatory practices against natives in many instances. For example, natives cannot bear or secure arms in South Africa without¶ a special license, whereas the whites could do so, according to the Defense Act of 1912. In West Africa, inhabitants of the British, French and Portuguese colonies are not allowed to bear arms or to be found with any in their possession. It is a felonious crime over there, but the white man could possess as many pistols or rifles as his pocket will allow. Hertzog followed his policy of Repressionism by passing the historic Color Bar Legislation and the Pass Laws, which make it obligatory for natives to carry identification cards.60 In the French colonies, a special body of rules applicable to natives alone, exist, and it is called the indigenat. In Korea, Japanese colonists employed drastic flogging against Koreans and made the penal code especially severe toward these natives.6' In Nigeria, the British adopted a policy of segregation by not allowing natives to live within a specified radius in the Ikoyi and Apapa reservations where the white officials lived.62In South Africa, the native finds that after receiving an industrial education, his skill is worthless for he is prohibited by law from skilled labor and agriculture.63¶ These problems are yet to be solved. Force will not settle these issues. Sympathetic attitude alone will not alleviate these deplorable conditions. There is only one solution, and it is not a palliative at that, and that is the, realistic interpretation and the practice of the policy of trusteeship. Unless the natives are allowed to participate in the government of their own lands, on a sound basis of democracy, that is the application of the doctrine of natural, civil, political, social and economic rights and equalities, in the administration of their country, by a system which will not only educate them to use the ballot, but also make it possible for them to participate in the higher political offices which are now restricted to foreigners, the future forecasts an inter-racial war, which might be worse than Armaggedon."
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Ibarra-Colado 7 (Eduardo, Professor of Management Studies at the Department of Economic Production, Metropolitan Autonomous University, “Organization Studies and Epistemic Coloniality in Latin America: Thinking Otherness from the Margins”)
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The Economic and Wage Commission reported brutality to native laborers by white managers 59There have been discriminatory practices against natives in many instances , natives cannot bear or secure arms colonies are not allowed to bear arms or to be found with any in their possession but the white man could possess as many pistols or rifles Japanese colonists employed drastic flogging against Koreans and made the penal code especially severe toward these natives In Nigeria, the British adopted a policy of segregation by not allowing natives to live within a specified radius where the white officials lived the native finds that after receiving an industrial education, his skill is worthless for he is prohibited by law from skilled labor and agriculture Unless the natives are allowed to participate in the government of their own lands, on a sound basis of democracy, that is the application of the doctrine of natural, civil, political, social and economic rights and equalities, in the administration of their country, by a system which will educate them to use the ballot the future forecasts an inter-racial war, which might be worse than Armaggedon."
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Colonialism promotes structural inequality and oppression towards natives—the ballot is key to endorse participatory politics
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Most importantly, orienting theory around the temporal axis colonial/postcolonial makes it easier not to see, and therefore harder to theo- ¶ rize, the continuities in international imbalances in imperial power. Since ¶ the 1940's, the United State's imperialism-without-colonies has taken a ¶ number of distinct forms (military, political, economic and cultural), ¶ some concealed, some half-concealed. The power of US finance capital ¶ and huge multi-nationals to direct the flows of capital, commodities, ¶ armaments and media information around the world can have an impact ¶ as massive as any colonial regime. It is precisely the greater subtlety, ¶ innovation and variety of these forms of imperialism that makes the ¶ historical rupture implied by the term "post-colonial" especially unwar- ¶ ranted. ¶ "Post-colonial" Latin America has been invaded by the United States ¶ over a hundred times this century alone. Each time, the US has acted to ¶ install a dictatorship,rop up a puppet regime, or wreck a democracy. In ¶ the 1940's, when the climate for gunboat diplomacy chilled, United ¶ States' relations with Latin America were warmed by an economic impe- ¶ rial policy euphemistically dubbed "Good Neighborliness," primarily de- ¶ signed to make Latin America a safer backyard for the US' virile ¶ agribusiness. The giant cold-storage ships of the United Fruit Company ¶ circled the world, taking bananas from poor agrarian countries dominated ¶ by monocultures and the marines to the tables of affluent US house- ¶ wives.' And while Latin America hand-picked bananas for the United ¶ States, the United States hand-picked dictators for Latin America. In ¶ Chile, Allende's elected, socialist government was overthrown by a US- ¶ sponsored military coup. In Africa, more covert operations such as the ¶ CIA assassination of Patrice Lumumba in Zaire, had consequences as ¶ far-reaching. ¶ In the cold war climate of the 1980's, the US, still hampered by the ¶ Vietnam syndrome, fostered the more covert military policy of "low ¶ intensity" conflicts (in El Salvador and the Philippines), spawning death ¶ squads and proxy armies (Unita in Angola, and the Contras in Nicaragua) and training and aiding totalitarian military regimes in anti-democratic, ¶ "counter-insurgency" tactics (El Salvador, Honduras, South Africa, Is- ¶ rael, and so forth). In Nicaragua in February 1990 the "vote of fear" of ¶ continuing, covert war with the US brought down the Sandinistas. ¶ The recent fits of thuggery by the US in Libya, Grenada and Panama, ¶ and most calamitously in Iraq, have every characteristic of a renewed ¶ military imperialism, and a renewed determination to revamp military ¶ hegemony in a world in which it is rapidly losing economic hegemony. ¶ The attacks on Libya, Grenada and Panama (where victory was assured) ¶ were practice runs for the new imperialism, testing both the USSR's will ¶ to protest, and the US public's willingness to throw off the Vietnam ¶ syndrome, permitting thereby a more blatant era of intervening in Third ¶ World affairs. At the same time, having helped stoke the first Gulf War, ¶ the US had no intention of letting a new boy on the block assert colonial ¶ dominance in the region.
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McClintock 92 (Anne, Simone de Beauvoir Professor of English and Women's and Gender Studies at UW-Madison, The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term "Post-Colonialism", Duke University Press)
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Since ¶ the 1940's, the United State's imperialism-without-colonies has taken a ¶ number of distinct forms some concealed, some half-concealed. The power of US finance capital ¶ and huge multi-nationals to direct the flows of capital, commodities, ¶ armaments and media information around the world can have an impact ¶ as massive as any colonial regime. "Post-colonial" Latin America has been invaded by the United States ¶ over a hundred times this century alone. Each time, the US has acted to ¶ install a dictatorship,rop up a puppet regime, or wreck a democracy. In ¶ the 1940's, when the climate for gunboat diplomacy chilled, United ¶ States' relations with Latin America were warmed by an economic impe- ¶ rial policy euphemistically dubbed "Good Neighborliness," primarily de- ¶ signed to make Latin America a safer backyard for the US' virile ¶ agribusiness. The giant cold-storage ships of the United Fruit Company ¶ circled the world, taking bananas from poor agrarian countries dominated ¶ by monocultures and the marines to the tables of affluent US house- ¶ wives.' And while Latin America hand-picked bananas for the United ¶ States, the United States hand-picked dictators for Latin America. , the US, still hampered by the ¶ Vietnam syndrome, fostered the more covert military policy of "low ¶ intensity" spawning death ¶ squads and proxy armies The recent fits of thuggery by the US in Libya, Grenada and Panama, ¶ and most calamitously in Iraq, have every characteristic of a renewed ¶ military imperialism, and a renewed determination to revamp military ¶ hegemony in a world in which it is rapidly losing economic hegemony.
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United States colonialism escalates to military violence
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Coloniality of power as the power matrix of the modern/colonial world¶ Globalization studies, political−economy paradigms and world−system analysis, with only a few exceptions, have not derived the epistemological and theoretical implications of the epistemic critique coming from subaltern locations in the colonial divide and expressed in academia through ethnic studies and women’s studies. They continue to produce knowledge from the perspective of western man’s "point zero" divine view. This has led to important problems in the way we conceptualize global capitalism and the "world−system". These concepts are in need of decolonization, which can only be achieved with a decolonial epistemology that overtly assumes a decolonial geopolitics and body−politics of knowledge as points of departure for a radical critique. The following examples can illustrate this point.¶ If we analyze European colonial expansion from a Eurocentric point of view, what we get is a picture in which the origins of the so−called capitalist world−system is primarily produced by inter−imperial competition among European empires. The primary motive for this expansion was to find shorter routes to the East, which led accidentally to the so−called discovery and, eventual, colonization of the Americas by Spain. From this point of view, the capitalist world−system would be primarily an economic system that determines the behaviour of the major social actors by the economic logic of making profits as manifested in the extraction of surplus value and the ceaseless accumulation of capital at a world−scale. Moreover, the concept of capitalism implied in this perspective privileges economic relations over other social relations. Accordingly, the transformation in the relations of production produces a new class structure typical of capitalism as opposed to other social systems and other forms of domination. Class analysis and economic structural transformations are privileged over other power relations. Without denying the importance of the endless accumulation of capital at a world scale and the existence of a particular class structure in global capitalism, I raise the following epistemic question : What would the world−system looks like if we moved the locus of enunciation from the European man to an Indigenous women in the Americas, to, say Rigoberta Menchu in Guatemala or to Domitila in Bolivia ? I do not pretend to speak for or represent the perspective of these indigenous women. What I attempt to do is to shift the location from which these paradigms are thinking. The first implication of shifting our geopolitics of knowledge is the recognition that what arrived in the Americas in the late 15th century was not only an economic system of capital and labour for the production of commodities to be sold for a profit in the world market. This was a crucial part of, but was not the sole element in, the entangled "package." What arrived in the Americas was a broader and wider entangled power structure that an economic reductionist perspective of the world−system is unable to account for. From the structural location of an indigenous woman in the Americas, what arrived was a more complex world−system than what political−economy paradigms and world−system analysis portray. A European/capitalist/military/christian/patriarchal/white/heterosexual/male arrived in the Americas and established simultaneously in time and space several entangled global hierarchies that for purposes of clarity in this exposition I will list below as if they were separate from each other :¶ 1) a particular global class formation where a diversity of forms of labour (slavery, semi− serfdom, wage labour, petty−commodity production, etc.) were to co−exist and be organized by capital as a source of production of surplus value through the selling of commodities for a profit in the world market ; 2) an international division of labour of core and periphery where capital organized labour at the periphery around coerced and authoritarian forms (Wallerstein 1974 ; 3) ; 3) an inter−state system of politico−military organizations controlled by European males and institutionalized in colonial administrations (Wallerstein 1979) ; 4) a global racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileged European people over non−European people (Quijano 1993 ; 2000) ; 5) a global gender hierarchy that privileged males over females and European patriarchy over other forms of gender relations (Spivak 1988 ; Enloe 1990) ; 6) a sexual hierarchy that privileged heterosexuals over homosexuals and lesbians (it is important to remember that most indigenous peoples in the Americas did not consider sexuality among males a pathological behaviour and had no homophobic ideology) ; 7) a spiritual hierarchy that privileged Christians over non−Christian/non−Western spiritualities institutionalized in the globalization of the Christian (Catholic and later Protestant) Church ; 8) an epistemic hierarchy that privileged western knowledge and cosmology over non− Western knowledge and cosmologies, and institutionalized in the global university system (Mignolo 1995, 2000 ; Quijano 1991). 9) a linguistic hierarchy between European languages and non−European languages that privileged communication and knowledge/theoretical production in the former and subalternized the latter as sole producers of folklore or culture but not of knowledge/theory (Mignolo 2000).¶ It not accidental that the conceptualization of the world−system, from decolonial perspectives of the South, will question its traditional conceptualizations produced by thinkers from the North. Following Peruvian Sociologist Aníbal Quijano (1991 ; 1998 ; 2000), we could conceptualize the present world−system as a historical− structural heterogeneous totality with a specific power matrix, which he calls a "colonial power matrix" ("patrón de poder colonial"). This matrix affects all dimensions of social existence such as sexuality, authority, subjectivity and labour (Quijano 2000). The 16th century initiated a new global colonial power matrix that by the late 19th century came to cover the whole planet. Taking a step further from Quijano, I conceptualize the coloniality of power as an entanglement or, to use US Third World feminist concept, intersectionality (Crenshaw 1989 ; Fregoso 2003) of multiple and heterogeneous global hierarchies ("heterarchies") of sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial forms of domination and exploitation. Here, the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the European/non−European divide transversally reconfigures all the other global power structures. What is new in the "coloniality of power" perspective is how the idea of race and racism becomes the organizing principle that structures all of the multiple hierarchies of the world−system (Quijano 1993). For example, the different forms of labour that are articulated to capitalist accumulation at a world−scale are assigned according to this racial hierarchy ; coercive (or cheap) labour is done by non−European people on the periphery and "free wage labour" at the core.¶
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Grosfoguel 8 (Ramón, Associate Professor at the University of California at Berkeley, Ethnic Studies Department, “DECOLONIZING POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES: Transmodernity, border thinking, and global coloniality”)
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Coloniality of power continue to produce knowledge from the perspective of western man’s "point zero" divine view. This has led to important problems in the way we conceptualize global capitalism and the "world−system". These concepts are in need of decolonization, which can only be achieved with a decolonial epistemology If we analyze European colonial expansion from a Eurocentric point of view, The primary motive for this expansion was to find shorter routes to the East, which led accidentally to the so−called discovery and, eventual, colonization of the Americas From this point of view, the capitalist world−system would be primarily an economic system that determines the behaviour of the major social actors by the economic logic of making profits the concept of capitalism implied in this perspective privileges economic relations over other social relations Class analysis and economic structural transformations are privileged over other power relations. What arrived in the Americas was a broader and wider entangled power structure that an economic reductionist perspective of the world−system is unable to account for what arrived was a more complex world−system than what political−economy paradigms and world−system analysis portray. A European simultaneously in time and space a particular global class formation where a diversity of forms of labour (slavery, semi− serfdom, wage labour, petty−commodity production, etc.) were to co−exist and be organized by capital a global racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileged European people over non−European people a global gender hierarchy that privileged males over females and European patriarchy over other forms of gender relations a sexual hierarchy that privileged heterosexuals over homosexuals and lesbians (it is important to remember that most indigenous peoples in the Americas did not consider sexuality a spiritual hierarchy that privileged Christians over non−Christian/non−Western spiritualities institutionalized in the globalization of the Christian an epistemic hierarchy that privileged western knowledge and cosmology over non− Western knowledge and cosmologies, and institutionalized in the global university system a linguistic hierarchy between European languages and non−European languages that privileged communication and knowledge/theoretical production in the former and subalternized the latter as sole producers of folklore or culture but not of knowledge/theory we could conceptualize a "colonial power matrix" This matrix affects all dimensions of social existence such as sexuality, authority, subjectivity and labour ( the hierarchy of the European/non−European divide reconfigures all the other global power structures
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Coloniality promotes the European/non-European dichotomy—root causes all other binaries
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First, the theoryof historyas a linear sequence of universallyvalid events¶ needs to be reopened in relation to America as a major question in the¶ social-scientific debate. More so when such a concept of historyis applied¶ to labor and the control of labor conceptualized as modes of production in¶ the sequence precapitalism-capitalism. From the Eurocentric point of view,¶ reciprocity, slavery, serfdom, and independent commodity production are¶ all perceived as a historical sequence prior to commodification of the labor¶ force. They are pre capital. And they are considered not only different, but¶ radicallyin compatible with capital. The fact is, however, that in America¶ they did not emerge in a linear historical sequence; none of them was a¶ mere extension of the old precapitalist form, nor were they incompatible¶ with capital.¶ Slavery, in America, was deliberately established and organized¶ as a commodity in order to produce goods for the world market and to¶ serve the purposes and needs of capitalism. Likewise, the serfdom imposed¶ on Indians, including the redefinition of the institutions of reciprocity, was¶ organized in order to serve the same ends: to produce merchandise for the¶ global market. Independent commodity production was established and¶ expanded for the same purposes. This means that all the forms of labor¶ and control of labor were not only simultaneously performed in America,¶ but they were also articulated around the axis of capital and the global¶ market. Consequently, all of these forms of labor were part of a new model¶ of organization and labor control. Together these forms of labor configured¶ a new economic system: capitalism.¶ Capital, as a social relation based on the commodification of the¶ labor force, was probablyb orn in some moment around the eleventh or¶ twelfth centuryin some place in the southern regions of the Iberian and/or¶ Italian peninsulas and, for known reasons, in the Islamic world.20 Capital is¶ thus much older than America. But before the emergence of America, it was¶ nowhere structurally articulated with all the other forms of organization¶ and control of the labor force and labor, nor was it predominant over any¶ of them. Only with America could capital consolidate and obtain global¶ predominance, becoming precisely the axis around which all forms of labor were articulated to satisfy the ends of the world market, configuring a¶ new pattern of global control on labor, its resources, and products: world¶ capitalism. Therefore, capitalism as a system of relations of production,¶ that is, as the heterogeneous linking of all forms of control on labor and its¶ products under the dominance of capital, was constituted in history only¶ with the emergence of America. Beginning with that historical moment,¶ capital has always existed, and continues to exist to this day, as the central¶ axis of capitalism. Never has capitalism been predominant in some other¶ way, on a global and worldwide scale, and in all probability it would not¶ have been able to develop otherwise.
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Quijano 2000 (Anibal, Professor of sociology at Binghamton University, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” http://www.unc.edu/~aescobar/wan/wanquijano.pdf, 2000)
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reciprocity, slavery, serfdom, and independent commodity production not emerge in a linear historical sequence; none of them was a¶ mere extension of the old precapitalist form Slavery, in America, was deliberately established and organized¶ as a commodity in order to produce goods for the world market and to¶ serve the purposes and needs of capitalism. Likewise, the serfdom imposed¶ on Indians, including the redefinition of the institutions of reciprocity, was¶ organized in order to serve the same ends: to produce merchandise for the¶ global market. Independent commodity production was established and¶ expanded for the same purposes. This means that all the forms of labor and control of labor were not only simultaneously performed in America, but they were also articulated around the axis of capital and the global market. all of these forms of labor were part of a new model¶ of organization and labor control. Together these forms of labor configured¶ a new economic system: capitalism. Capital is older than America. But before the emergence of America, it was¶ nowhere structurally articulated with all the other forms of organization¶ and control of the labor force and labor, nor was it predominant over any¶ of them. Only with America could capital consolidate and obtain global predominance, becoming precisely the axis around which all forms of labor were articulated to satisfy the ends of the world market, configuring a¶ new pattern of global control on labor, its resources, and products: world¶ capitalism. Therefore, capitalism as a system of relations of production,¶ that is, as the heterogeneous linking of all forms of control on labor and its¶ products under the dominance of capital, was constituted in history only¶ with the emergence of America. Beginning with that historical moment,¶ capital has always existed, and continues to exist to this day, as the central¶ axis of capitalism. Never has capitalism been predominant in some other¶ way, on a global and worldwide scale, and in all probability it would not¶ have been able to develop otherwise.
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Capitalism and the commodification of the labor force emerged and gained global domination as a result of racial colonialism, and they mutually reinforce each other
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In the historical process of the constitution of America, all forms of control¶ and exploitation of labor and production, as well as the control of appropriation and distribution of products, revolved around the capital-salary¶ relation and the world market. These forms of labor control included slavery, serfdom, petty-commodity production, reciprocity, and wages. In such¶ an assemblage, each form of labor control was no mere extension of its¶ historical antecedents. All of these forms of labor were historically and¶ sociologically new: in the first place, because they were deliberately established and organized to produce commodities for the world market; in¶ the second place, because they did not merely exist simultaneously in the¶ same space/time, but each one of them was also articulated to capital and its¶ market. Thus they configured a new global model of labor control, and in¶ turn a fundamental element of a new model of power to which they were¶ historically structurally dependent. That is to say, the place and function,¶ and therefore the historical movement, of all forms of labor as subordinated¶ points of a totality belonged to the new model of power, in spite of their¶ heterogeneous specific traits and their discontinuous relations with that totality. In the third place, and as a consequence, each form of labor developed¶ into new traits and historical-structural configurations.¶ Insofar as that structure of control of labor, resources, and products¶ consisted of the joint articulation of all the respective historicallyknown¶ forms, a global model of control of work was established for the first time¶ in known history. And while it was constituted around and in the service¶ of capital, its configuration as a whole was established with a capitalist¶ character as well. Thus emerged a new, original, and singular structure of relations of production in the historical experience of the world: world¶ capitalism.¶ Coloniality of Power and Global Capitalism¶ The new historical identities produced around the foundation of the idea of¶ race in the new global structure of the control of labor were associated with¶ social roles and geohistorical places. In this way, both race and the division¶ of labor remained structurally linked and mutually reinforcing, in spite of¶ the fact that neither of them were necessarily dependent on the other in¶ order to exist or change.¶ In this way, a systematic racial division of labor was imposed. In¶ the Hispanic region, the Crown of Castilla decided earlyon to end the enslavement of the Indians in order to prevent their total extermination. They¶ were instead confined to serfdom. For those that lived in communities, the¶ ancient practice of reciprocity—the exchange of labor force and labor without a market—was allowed as a wayof reproducing its labor force as serfs.¶ In some cases, the Indian nobility, a reduced minority, was exempted from¶ serfdom and received special treatment owing to their roles as intermediaries with the dominant race. They were also permitted to participate¶ in some of the activities of the non noble Spanish. However, blacks were¶ reduced to slavery. As the dominant race, Spanish and Portuguese whites¶ could receive wages, be independent merchants, independent artisans, or¶ independent farmers—in short, independent producers of commodities.¶ Nevertheless, only nobles could participate in the high-to-midrange positions in the military and civil colonial administration. Beginning in the eighteenth century, in Hispanic America an extensive and important social stratum of mestizos (born of Spanish men and¶ Indian women) began to participate in the same offices and activities as¶ non noble Iberians. To a lesser extent, and above all in activities of service¶ or those that required a specialized talent (music, for example), the more¶ “whitened” among the mestizos of black women and Spanish or Portuguese¶ had an opportunity to work. But theywere late in legitimizing their new¶ roles, since their mothers were slaves. This racist distribution of labor in¶ the interior of colonial/modern capitalism was maintained throughout the¶ colonial period.¶ In the course of the worldwide expansion of colonial domination¶ on the part of the same dominant race (or, from the eighteenth century¶ onward, Europeans), the same criteria of social classification were imposed on all of the world population. As a result, new historical and social identities were produced: yellows and olives were added to whites, Indians,¶ blacks, and mestizos. The racist distribution of new social identities was¶ combined, as had been done so successfullyin Anglo-America, with a racist¶ distribution of labor and the forms of exploitation of colonial capitalism.¶ This was, above all, through a quasi-exclusive association of whiteness with¶ wages and, of course, with the high-order positions in the colonial administration. Thus each form of labor control was associated with a particular¶ race. Consequently, the control of a specific form of labor could be, at the¶ same time, the control of a specific group of dominated people. A new technology of domination/exploitation, in this case race/labor, was articulated¶ in such a way that the two elements appeared naturally associated. Until¶ now, this strategy has been exceptionally successful.
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Quijano 2k (Anibal, Professor of sociology at Binghamton University, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” http://www.unc.edu/~aescobar/wan/wanquijano.pdf, 2000)
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In the historical process of the constitution of America, all forms of control¶ and exploitation of labor and production, as well as the control of appropriation and distribution of products, revolved around the capital-salary¶ relation and the world market. These forms of labor control included slavery, serfdom, petty-commodity production, reciprocity, and wages. All of these forms of labor were historically and¶ sociologically new: in the first place, because they were deliberately established and organized to produce commodities for the world market; in¶ the second place, because they did not merely exist simultaneously in the same space/time, but each one of them was also articulated to capital and its market Thus they configured a new global model of labor control, and in¶ turn a fundamental element of a new model of power to which they were¶ historically structurally dependent , the place and function,¶ and therefore the historical movement, of all forms of labor as subordinated¶ points of a totality belonged to the new model of power, in spite of their¶ heterogeneous specific traits and their discontinuous relations with that totality each form of labor developed¶ into new traits and historical-structural configurations a global model of control of work was established for the first time¶ in known history. its configuration as a whole was established with a capitalist¶ character as well. Thus emerged a new, original, and singular structure of relations of production in the historical experience of the world: world¶ capitalism. new historical identities produced around ¶ race in the new global structure of the control of labor were associated with¶ social roles and geohistorical places race and the division of labor remained structurally linked and mutually reinforcing a systematic racial division of labor was imposed. Indians were confined to serfdom exchange of labor force and labor without a market—was allowed as a wayof reproducing its labor force as serfs However, blacks were¶ reduced to slavery. , Spanish and Portuguese whites¶ could be independent producers of commodities in Hispanic America mestizos (born of Spanish men and¶ Indian women) began to participate in the same offices and activities as¶ non noble Iberians. in activities of service¶ or those that required a specialized talent more¶ “whitened” among the mestizos of black women and Spanish or Portuguese¶ had an opportunity to work. But theywere late in legitimizing their new¶ roles, since their mothers were slaves In the course of the worldwide expansion of colonial domination¶ on the part of the same dominant race the same criteria of social classification were imposed on all of the world population new historical and social identities were produced The racist distribution of new social identities was¶ combined with a racist¶ distribution of labor and the forms of exploitation of colonial capitalism.¶ the control of a specific form of labor could be, at the¶ same time, the control of a specific group of dominated people. new technology of domination/exploitation, in this case race/labor, was articulated¶ in such a way that the two elements appeared naturally associated.
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In Latin America, capitalism has historically been both used to justify and justified by colonial conceptions of race that legitimize slavery and colonial domination – prefer our historical analysis
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Many are the subtle and varied forms in which the need to achieve selfrecognition in a context without God has found expression. God may be dead, but it is clear that imperial Man and the imperiality of power are still rising by virtue of new and varied acts of projection.60 Imperial Man found new ways to sustain his position as lord and to achieve what only God seemed able to offer, recognition as master. I already mentioned abstract notions of humanity or man as projections of Imperial Man in his effort to erase the significance and constitutive power of relations of lordship and bondage. Along with the concept of Man, ideas of nation, race, and the system or market have also come to fill the space left by God.61 It is not incidental that general skepticism of God, along with ideas about the “death of God,” emerged precisely when Europe came to be more consistently formed by nation-states in the nineteenth century.62 As biologically defined ideas of race and secular conceptions of the nation provided new coordinates for self-identification, God became more and more dispensable in the process of recognition. And, in fact, once nation-states are formed imperialism finds more effective ways to legitimize itself than religion. The nation and the race become central for the identity of Imperial Man as Man, and for the idea of superiority. Then eugenics, phrenology, and the social sciences take the place of religious ideals and creeds in the legitimization of empire.63 The divinization of the system and the theological dimensions of the market also help to sustain relations of slavery in a world without God.64 Ideologies such as conservatism and neoliberalism, with their respective beliefs in the preservation of the system or the sustained increase of the market, offer justification to sacrificial modes of relations that assure the position of the master as the one and only lord.65 To the “egolatrous” projection of Imperial Man to abstract man, the idolatrous relation with the system or market is added as another form of sustaining power and recognition after the “death of God.” In the contemporary world, economy becomes the new theology. The logic of the market likewise becomes a new form of theodicy.66 It is from here that the life and hunger of millions sustain an inhuman system unconditionally defended by imperial humanity.
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Maldonado-Torres 2008 [Nelson. “Against War : Views from the Underside of Modernity”¶ Durham, NC, USA: Duke University Press, 2008. p 215-217¶ http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utexas/Doc?id=10217191&ppg=52]
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Imperial Man found new ways to sustain his position as lord and to achieve recognition as master. Along with the concept of Man, ideas of nation, race, and the system or market have also come to fill the space left by God As biologically defined ideas of race and secular conceptions of the nation provided new coordinates for self-identification God became more and more dispensable in the process of recognition Ideologies such as conservatism and neoliberalism, with their respective beliefs in the preservation of the system or the sustained increase of the market, offer justification to sacrificial modes of relations that assure the position of the master as the one and only lord. the idolatrous relation with the system or market is added as another form of sustaining power and recognition after the “death of God.” economy becomes the new theology The logic of the market likewise becomes a new form of theodicy It is from here that the life and hunger of millions sustain an inhuman system unconditionally defended by imperial humanity.
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Faith in neoliberalism occurs as the concept of Man becomes the ideal form of the human
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A central consequence of what I called here the coloniality of gender and which elsewhere I have proposed as the modern/ colonial gender system" is that gender is a modern colonial imposition. The modern/ colonial gender system is not only hierarchical but also racially differentiated, and the racial differentiation denies humanity and thus gender to the colonized. I have clarified that gender has been thought of and treated as a civilized human trait, not extended to all. Irene Silverblatt," Carolyn Dean,” Maria Esther Pozo,” Pamela Calla,” Sylvia Marcos," Paula Gunn Allen,” Filipe Guaman Poma de Ayala," Filomena Mi- randa,” and Oyeronke Oyewumi, among others, enable me to affirm that gender is a colonial imposition, not just as it imposes itself on life in relation that was lived in tune with cosmologies incompatible with the modern logic of dichotomies but also that such inhabitations animated the self among-others in resistance from and at the extreme tension of the colonial difference. The long process of subjectification of the colonized toward adoption/ internalization of the men/ women dichotomy as a normative construction of the social, a mark of civilization, citizenship, membership in civil society was and is constantly renewed. It is met in the flesh over and over by oppositional responses grounded in a long history of in-the-flesh oppositional responses in a constant resistant movement. It is lived in alternative, resistant socialities at the colonial difference. It is movement toward coalition that impels us to know each other as selves that are thick, in relation, in alternative socialities, and grounded in tense, creative inhabitations of the colonial difference.
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Lugones 10 (Maria, Argentine scholar, philosopher, feminist, and an Associate Professor of Comparative Literature and Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture and of Philosophy and of Women's Studies at Binghamton University, "Toward a decolonial feminism." Hypatia 25.4, 742-759)
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consequence of coloniality of gender is that gender is a modern colonial imposition. The modern/ colonial gender system is not only hierarchical but also racially differentiated, and the racial differentiation denies humanity and thus gender to the colonized. I have clarified that gender has been thought of and treated as a civilized human trait, not extended to all. gender is a colonial imposition not just as it imposes itself on life in relation that was lived in tune with cosmologies incompatible with the modern logic of dichotomies but also that such inhabitations animated the self among-others in resistance from and at the extreme tension of the colonial difference The long process of subjectification of the colonized toward adoption/ internalization of the men/ women dichotomy as a normative construction of the social, a mark of civilization, citizenship, membership in civil society was and is constantly renewed. It is met in the flesh over and over by oppositional responses grounded in a long history of in-the-flesh oppositional responses in a constant resistant movement lived in alternative resistant socialities at the colonial difference movement toward coalition that impels us to know each other as selves that are thick, in relation, in alternative socialities grounded in tense, creative inhabitations of the colonial difference
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Gender is a construction of colonization—
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Does Anzaldúa’s Chicana paradigm of the U.S.-Mexican borderlands share in expressing diaspora culture’s dystopic– utopian tensions? Are both bad news and good news built into the text? Can Anzaldúa’s re-codification of the utopian otherwise as nepantilism help us better ground or grapple with the tensions and ambivalences that Clifford theorizes in his reading of Gilroy’s work? What are we to make of Anzaldúa’s deportation stories, of her invocation of the U.S.Mexican War of 1846– 48, of the post– Jim Crow ethno-racial hierarchies in South Texas, of the international division of labor with undocumented women at the center of the maquiladoras, and of her dramatic swerve to nepantilism and new mestiza consciousness in Borderlands/La Frontera? Border thinking, for Anzaldúa, is a site of crisscrossed experience, language, and identity. Mignolo’s de-colonial reading of Anzaldúa is especially helpful in this context. She draws, Mignolo (2000b, 237) insists, ‘‘a different map: that of reverse migration, the migration from colonial territories relabeled the Third World (after 1945), toward the First.’’ This reverse U.S. Latino/a migratoriness, in Mignolo’s view, helps explain Anzaldúa’s powerful ‘‘languaging practices,’’ which ‘‘fracture the colonial language’’ (Mignolo 2000b, 237). If Borderlands/La Frontera thematizes not the hegemonic Hegelian– Emersonian universalism of Turner’s Frontier Thesis but the epistemic diversal reason of the multiple broken tongues of Greater Mexico’s local nepantilism, ‘‘such fractures,’’ Mignolo (2000b, 237) argues, ‘‘occur due to the languaging practices of two displaced linguistic communities’’ in Anzaldúa’s work: ‘‘Nahuatl, displaced by the Spanish expansion and Spanish displaced by the increasing hegemony of the colonial languages of the modern period (English, German, and French).’’ This fracturing and braiding of colonial and postcolonial languages explain why Borderlands/La Frontera has the power to elicit such critical emphasis from Mignolo, one of the most innovative critics of de-colonial literatures of the Américas. Reading Anzaldúa as a Chicana feminist philosopher of fractured and braided languages is precisely what I address later as one of the major issues in Borderlands/ La Frontera and, indeed, for U.S. Latino/a studies in particular and for the future of minority studies in general. Rather than a unified subject representing a folk border culture in any holistic sense, we meet in Anzaldúa’s Chicana neologism autohistoriateoría, ∞∞ a braided, mestiza consciousness, and a feminist writer fundamentally caught between various hegemonic colonial and postcolonial languages and subaltern dialects and vernacular expressions. Her lament that ‘‘wild tongues’’ such as her own ‘‘can not be tamed’’ for ‘‘they can only be cut out’’ (Anzaldúa 1987, 76) might as well be addressed to her complex postcolonial audience of radical women and (feminist) men of color. Throughout Borderlands/La Frontera, Anzaldúa expresses regret that even her bilingual mother in Hargill has been partially complicit in valuing the English language of the hegemonic: ‘‘I want you to speak English. Pa’ hallar buen trabajo tienes que saber hablar el inglés bien. Que vale toda tu educación si todavía hablas inglés con un ‘accent,’ my mother would say, mortified that I spoke English like a Mexican. At Pan American University, I, and all Chicano students were required to take two speech classes. Their purpose: to get rid of our accents’’ (Anzaldúa 1987, 54– 55).
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Saldivar 12, Jose, Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley and Chicano Scholar of the Year from the Modern Language Association, Trans-Americanity: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico, Duke University Press Durham and London, 2012)
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Does Anzaldúa’s Chicana paradigm of the U.S.-Mexican borderlands share in expressing diaspora culture’s dystopic– utopian tensions? Are both bad news and good news built into the text? C What are we to make of Anzaldúa’s deportation stories, of her invocation of the U.S.Mexican War of 1846– 48, of the post– Jim Crow ethno-racial hierarchies in South Texas, of the international division of labor with undocumented women at the center of the maquiladoras, Border thinking is a site of crisscrossed experience, language, and identity. reverse U.S. Latino/a migratoriness helps explain powerful ‘‘languaging practices,’’ which ‘‘fracture the colonial language’’ La Frontera thematizes not the hegemonic Hegelian– Emersonian universalism but the epistemic diversal reason of the multiple broken tongues of Greater Mexico’s local nepantilism, ‘‘such fractures occur due to the languaging practices of two displaced linguistic communities’ This fracturing of colonial and postcolonial languages explain why Borderlands has the power to elicit such critical emphasis from Mignolo Rather than a unified subject representing a folk border culture we meet in Anzaldúa’s Chicana neologism a braided, mestiza consciousness fundamentally caught between various hegemonic colonial and postcolonial languages and subaltern dialects and vernacular expressions Throughout Borderlands Anzaldúa expresses regret that even her bilingual mother in Hargill has been partially complicit in valuing the English language of the hegemonic
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The fractured, nepantilistic languages produced by the border are necessary—borderlands thinking represents the interweaving of minority voices into colonial thought
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If our identities are real and affective, they do come from somewhere. Any post-contemporary account of subjectification (e.g., Butˇ ler, Laclau, and Ziˇ zek 2000) and any post-postivist realist account of identity (Mohanty, Moya, and Hames-García), I believe, would have to grapple with the ‘‘colonial difference’’ that Quijano and Wallerstein, among others, outline for us. Perhaps to get back to Alcoff ’s concluding riffs on the realist view of identity, that is why it might not be so dizzying for some to view identities as something we might be better off without. Michel Foucault (1982, 212), for instance, noted that the point is ‘‘not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are.’’ But here, too, I would stress that Foucault, especially in The History of Sexuality, tends to erase the crafty details of the colonial difference in his analysis of biopower. On the whole, however, I am largely in strong agreement with Alcoff ’s point about the political power of our identities. In our informational culture and society, our identities, Manuel Castells (2003, 361) insists, are crucial and important because ‘‘they build interests, values, and projects, around experience, and refuse to dissolve by establishing a specific connection between nature, history, geography, and culture.’’ Identities, Castells concludes (in Marxist realist fashion), ‘‘anchor power in some areas of the social structure, and build their resistance or their offensives in the informational struggle about the cultural codes constructing behavior and, thus, new institutions.’’ It is this new subject or identity project of the informational mode of production, I believe, that many ‘‘straight’’ Marxists have refused to grapple with in their engagement with the power of identity politics.¶ This issue of global ‘‘coloniality,’’ then, leads to another hesitation I have with the rich Reclaiming Identity project of Mohanty, Moya, and Hames-Garcia, and Alcoff. In his Local Histories/Global Designs (2000), Walter Mignolo draws on the social-science work of Quijano and Wallerstein to criticize various recent desires for universalist theories among both neoliberals and neo-Marxists. Mignolo (2000b) argues that, parallel to the ethno-racialized classification of the Américas and the world (the embalming of identities), the colonial project in the Américas also classified languages and knowledge. The epistemology of the European Renaissance therefore was assumed to be the natural perspective from which knowledge could be described and suppressed. This same process, Mignolo suggests, was resituated after the Enlightenment, when the concept of reason opened up a new description, and reason became associated with northern Europe and indirectly with whiteness (Hegel and Kant). What are we to make of Mohanty’s and Moya’s use of an apparently idealist Kantian ‘‘universalism’’ in their post-positivist realist project? Should a realist view of identity not severely criticize the abstract hegemonic universalisms in Kant and the Enlightenment? Is it possible to imagine an ‘‘epistemic diversality or pluriversality,’’ as Mignolo (drawing on the work of Édouard Glissant), suggests in his work on Zapatismo? For Mignolo (2002c, 264– 65), diversality is not ‘‘the rejection of universal claims, but the rejection of universality understood as an abstract universal grounded in a monologic.’’ Further, he writes, a ‘‘universal principle grounded on the idea of the di-versal is not a contradiction in terms but rather a displacement of conceptual structures.’’ As an alternative to the Kantian universalism in Moya’s and HamesGarcía’s post-positivist realist project, I propose that Gloria Anzaldúa’s, Victor Martínez’s, and Arundhati Roy’s imaginative works belong to a ‘‘diversalist’’ cross-genealogical field that I term (after Quijano) the coloniality of border and diaspora power: ‘‘coloniality’’ because of the many structural and ethno-racial similarities about identity formations binding them to a colonizing past, but ‘‘border and diaspora power’’ because there are certainly many discontinuities —the outernational dimension of represented space— to dictate the cognitive metaphor of the ‘‘world-system’’ text, which, as I have been suggesting, recalls the world political economy of Wallerstein and Quijano.
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Saldivar 12 (Jose, Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley and Chicano Scholar of the Year from the Modern Language Association, Trans-Americanity: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico, Duke University Press Durham and London, 2012)
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Any post-contemporary account of subjectification Perhaps to get back to Alcoff ’s concluding riffs on the realist view of identity, that is why it might not be so dizzying for some to view identities as something we might be better off without On the whole I am largely in strong agreement with Alcoff ’s point about the political power of our identities. In our informational culture identities are crucial and important because ‘‘they build interests, values, and projects and refuse to dissolve by establishing a specific connection between nature, history, geography, and culture.’’ Identities, anchor power in some areas of the social structure and build their resistance or their offensives in the informational struggle about the cultural codes constructing behavior and, thus, new institutions Mignolo parallel to the ethno-racialized classification of the Américas the colonial project also classified languages and knowledge epistemology was assumed to be the natural perspective from which knowledge could be described and suppressed What are we to make of Mohanty’s and Moya’s use of an apparently idealist Kantian ‘‘universalism’’ Should a realist view of identity not severely criticize the abstract hegemonic universalisms in Kant Is it possible to imagine an ‘‘epistemic diversality or pluriversality,’’ diversality is not ‘‘the rejection of universal claims, but the rejection of universality understood as an abstract universal grounded in a monologic a ‘‘universal principle grounded on the idea of the di-versal is not a contradiction but rather a displacement of conceptual structures As an alternative to the Kantian universalism in Moya’s post-positivist realist project, I propose that Gloria Anzaldúa’s works belong to a ‘‘diversalist’’ cross-genealogical field that I term the coloniality of border and diaspora power to dictate the cognitive metaphor which recalls the world political economy of Wallerstein and Quijano.
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Acknowledging identity politics promotes epistemic diversality—the alt rejects modernity in order to open up new structures
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Based on the previous considerations, I submit that in order to respond to the current crisis the humanities have to insist not only on how important they are for a robust democracy and for the formation of an educated citizenry, but also to: a) take stock of how they have been complicit with neoliberalism (in terms of over-professionalization, etc.) as well as with different forms of dehumanization, segregation, and apartheid; b) enter in a closer relationship with interdisciplinary formations that focus on the critical examination of race, gender and other markers of dehumanization and consider the possibility that a formation like “ethnic studies” could actually be- come a matrix for the transforma- tion of the humanities through engagement with questions and is- sues that have typically remained excluded from it, as Johnella Butler (2001) aptly describes. I conceive of “ethnic studies” as a name for a particular expression of a project that precedes the formation of “ethnic studies” in the academy and that has gone with different names in different places and spaces. These different projects can be seen as part of an unfinished project of decolonization after the end of formal desegregation in the academy. What we find today, though, are multiple attempts to intensify the colonization of knowledge and the segregation of peoples in society. One only has to compare census projections on the one hand, which anticipate that people of color, and possibly Lati- na/os alone, will become majority in the country sometime in the 21st century, and the dismal reports of, for instance, Latina/os having “the lowest rate of high-school comple- tion and the lowest level of educa- tional attainment of any minority group” or Black students having “the lowest college-persistence rate of any racial group” (see Schmidt 2010). In face of this, one could argue that neither the hu- manities nor the social sciences should aim to remain “neutral.” But this only means that they have to take sides with the emancipa- tory and decolonial forms of knowledge production today, and being willing to change in the pro- cess; c) consider entering into a different relation with social movements, and develop methods that simulta- neously legitimize those move- ments and provide new lenses for work in the humanities, the social sciences, and the university at large (e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ theorization of the World Social Fo- rum and his proposal for changes in existing research universities and the creation of a Popular Uni- versity for Social Movements— Santos 2003 and 2010); d) seek to empower the population that is expected to become the ma- jority in the US by engaging the problems that they face and that are common to other long-standing populations in the country who have always been considered to be outside the norm. The humanities have more chance of saving what is most important about them by showing their relevance in critical anal- ysis and by pursuing the most constructive lines of inquiry that I have indicated above, than by rehearsing the typical arguments about its constructive role in educating the citizen-subject, etc.—lines of argument that do not take sufficiently into consideration the extent to which the problem that we face is neoapartheid, and not just economic neoliberalism.
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Maldonado-Torres ’12 (Nelson Maldonado-Torres. PhD, Religious Studies with a Certificate for Outstanding Work in Africana Studies, Brown University BA, Philosophy, University of Puerto Rico. Rutgers University “The Crisis of the University in the Context of Neoapartheid: A View from Ethnic Studies” Winter 2012. HUMAN ARCHITECTURE: JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE)
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the humanities have to insist on how important they are for democracy and for the formation of an educated citizenry take stock of how they have been complicit with neoliberalism as well as with dehumanization segregation, and apartheid; enter in a closer relationship with interdisciplinary formations that focus on the examination of race, gender and dehumanization and consider that a formation like “ethnic studies” could actually be- come a matrix for the transforma- tion of the humanities develop methods that simulta- neously legitimize move- ments for work in the humanities, the social sciences, and the university at large seek to empower the population by engaging the problems that they face and by pursuing constructive lines of inquiry
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The alternative is to prove the humanities are key to make democracy and education effective by forming closer relationships with groups that focus on dehumanization and actively seeking to make the public aware
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It is instructive that the first piece in Horowitz’s “Indoctrination” series is dedi- cated to the University of Colorado at Boul- der and that it begins by making reference to its Ethnic Studies Department’s former chairperson Ward Churchill (Horowitz 2006b). Ethnic Studies, to be sure, is typi- cally first in line when it comes to conserva- tive attacks, even as it has sometimes been forced to survive only in the form of prima- rily social scientific studies about race and ethnicity, or as a companion to area studies, which are arguably reductionist concep- tions of the field. I would argue, instead, that what we have come to call Ethnic Stud- ies is one of the most important interven- tions in academic settings and that it challenges the division of knowledge based on the primacy of explanation and under- standing and the European and U.S. Amer- ican oriented humanities and sciences. That is, Ethnic Studies is yet another example of an intellectual and scholarly space that challenges the humanities and aims to make humanities’ work simultaneously more rigorous and relevant. To be sure, those committed with the liberal arts curriculum and division of knowledge tend to see Ethnic Studies as: either an undesirable field whose relation to social movements make it suspect; as an unso- phisticated scholarly space that is haunted and fundamentally limited by feelings of nostalgia, cultural nationalism, or ethnic essentialism; or, at best, as a temporary space to be either maintained at a mini- mum, phased out, or folded into discipline- based departments and the standard divi- sions between the humanities, the social sciences, and other areas. The difference between the two reali- ties is to some extent captured in a piece by Stanley Fish entitled “The Crisis of the Humanities Officially Arrives” (2010), when compared with Roberto Rodríguez’s column “Arizona: This is What Apartheid Looks Like” (2010). The first article addresses the proposed elimination of French, Italian, Classics, Russian, and theatre programs from the State University of New York at Albany and calls for politi- cal action in defense of the liberal arts. The second focuses on laws SB 1070 and HB 2281, and calls attention to a social reality of apartheid that affects bodies as well as knowledges and cultures. The issues are quite different: the crisis of the liberal arts vis-à-vis the near-criminalization of certain forms of knowledge with HB 2281. And, yet, one must reflect on how these two real- ities relate to each other. While Ethnic Stud- ies disturb and challenge the existing division of knowledge and conceptions of the humanities in the university, they appear even more as a threat to other forms of hegemony out of the university. There is no better evidence of this today than the passing of state law HB 2281 in Arizona, which bans Raza Studies from Arizona’s public schools classrooms. This law is a companion to another piece of legislation, SB 1070, which allows police to interrogate suspects about their citizen status on the basis of “reasonsable suspicion.” While humanists complain about the lack of recognition of the value of their fields, and their evaluation according to metrics that belong to the corporate sector and that seek efficiency rather than understanding, Raza and Ethnic Studies scholars face not only the menace of neoliberalism, but also perse- cution and illegality. That is, while the humanities are facing the pressure of neo- liberalism, Ethnic Studies is facing the pres- sure of both neo-liberalism and neoapart- heid in a context where the people and their memories, knowledges, questions, and perspectives are rendered illegal. From the perspective of a number of humanists, the relation is clear and priori- tizes the crisis of the humanities even as it shows concerns for apartheid: one must demonstrate how the humanities are important for the education of ethno-racial- ized populations, particularly those that are growing demographically. The argu- ment claims that these populations deserve the humanities, and that the humanities deserve support from the state in compen- sation for their function of enlightening the population. The implicit view here is that it is better for the state and for ethno-racial- ized populations to value and support the humanities, since they can pay a role in better prepare people for life in the nation and, doing this, they help reduce the appar- ent need for apartheid. This argument, though, is not much different from liberal views that propose unidirectional assimila- tion in response to the more conservative ones that tend to justify apartheid. But unidirectional assimilation and its demor- alizing and marginalizing effects are precisely what Raza Studies classes in Arizona high schools are combating. If youth of color and other sectors who have been crucial to the creation of Ethnic Studies and related units in the university thought that investment in the humanities was what would have best responded to their needs, they would have sought direct support for them. Rather, they found a situ- ation where “Arts and Sciences” have been understood for the most part as “White Arts and Sciences,” and where the divi- sions of knowledge within the university, and between knowledge and praxis, are not up to the task of responding to their ques- tions and their concerns. Prioritizing the defense of the humanities in a context of rising apartheid and the near-criminaliza- tion of academic spaces focused on reflect- ing on people of color’s ideas, questions, and concerns is another form of erasure and sub-alternization. A better response to the challenges of the time would be for the humanities to take more seriously the ques- tions and critical insights from decolonial and emancipatory epistemological forma- tions, such as Ethnic Studies, Raza Studies and other projects, and thereby seek to respond to the questions of value and rele- vance that they face today, even if this means fundamental changes in the human- ities themselves. But crises often strengthen the urge for self-preservation, which can lead to ignoring other realities even if those realities are far more dangerous. If responding to the challenge posed by neoliberalism is difficult, it is even more difficult for the humanities to increase their scope and challenge that very limited understanding of the crisis that we face, while seeking to strengthen their ties with the multi- and transdisciplinary epistemo- logical projects that are most closely related to those who are the objects of neoapart- heid.
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Maldonado-Torres ’12 (Nelson Maldonado-Torres. PhD, Religious Studies with a Certificate for Outstanding Work in Africana Studies, Brown University BA, Philosophy, University of Puerto Rico. Rutgers University “The Crisis of the University in the Context of Neoapartheid: A View from Ethnic Studies” Winter 2012. HUMAN ARCHITECTURE: JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE)
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it challenges the division of knowledge based on the primacy of explanation and under- standing and the European and U.S. Amer- ican oriented humanities and sciences. , Ethnic Studies is yet another example of an intellectual and scholarly space that challenges the humanities and aims to make humanities’ work simultaneously more rigorous and relevant. While Ethnic Stud- ies disturb and challenge the existing division of knowledge and conceptions of the humanities in the university, they appear even more as a threat to other forms of hegemony out of the university. Ethnic Studies scholars face not only the menace of neoliberalism, but also perse- cution and illegality. Ethnic Studies is facing the pres- sure of both neo-liberalism and neoapart- heid in a context where the people and their memories, knowledges, questions, and perspectives are rendered illegal. : one must demonstrate how the humanities are important for the education of ethno-racial- ized populations, particularly those that are growing demographically. The argu- ment claims that these populations deserve the humanities, and that the humanities deserve support from the state in compen- sation for their function of enlightening the population liberal views that propose unidirectional assimila- tion But its demor- alizing and marginalizing effects are precisely what Raza Studies classes are combating. Prioritizing the defense of the humanities in a context of rising apartheid and the near-criminaliza- tion of academic spaces focused on reflect- ing on people of color’s ideas, questions, and concerns is another form of erasure and sub-alternization. A better response to the challenges of the time would be for the humanities to take more seriously the ques- tions and critical insights from decolonial and emancipatory epistemological forma- tions, such as Ethnic Studies
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Challenging currently questionable epistemology is the only way to solve—gives subaltern a voice
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This section is a study of the interplay between the performative, border epistemologies of two Chicano/a imaginative writers and the changing discourses of American vernacular literatures and cultures. Gloria Anzaldúa’s and Victor Martínez’s writings about U.S. Latino/a life explore, among other things, the linguistic intermixture of ethnic and mainstream languages (English, Spanish, and Spanglish) to illustrate the changing languages of America. What vernacular varieties of English or Spanish will dominate in twenty-first-century America? Which lingua rustica will the some 30 million U.S. Latinos/as (with more than 10 million in California) hegemonize in their testimonios, novels, essays, and poetry? What new literary genres, produced by Chicanos/as, will emerge in American literature? If the ‘‘dialect novel’’ was all the rage in late-nineteenth-century vernacular America (Mark Twain, George W. Cable, Abraham Cahan, W. E. B. Du Bois), Ω is there a borderlands English or Spanglish already under way in U.S. Latino/a-dominant California, Arizona, Florida, Texas, Illinois, and New York? On another level, I want to investigate the enabling condition of some recent Chicano/a narrative and poetry and the various ways in which they seek to create an epistemological ground on which versions of the world may be produced. As many U.S. Latino/a writers themselves suggest, to read is to question and to understand the (bilingual) texture and the rhetorical resources of language. If Anzaldúa sees the aesthetic structure of knowledge as a form of nepantilism, Martínez sees minority writing as a form of the California borderlands of subaltern studies informing mass youth U.S. Latino/a culture. ∞≠ To begin, I juxtapose Anzaldúa’s key concept of U.S.-Mexican border nepantilism against the U.S. historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s well-known nineteenth-century idea of the frontier. I do so to emphasize that while Turner and Anzaldúa may share some affinities of narrative and subaltern conventions and self-locations in the United States— each writer locates stories in a tradition of border historiography— their contrasts, I think, run far deeper, for Turner’s paradigms of the ‘‘frontier’’ and Anzaldúa’s frontera are not equivalent.
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Saldivar 12 (Jose, Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley and Chicano Scholar of the Year from the Modern Language Association, Trans-Americanity: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico, Duke University Press Durham and London, 2012)
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This section is a study of the interplay between the performative, border epistemologies of two Chicano/a imaginative writers and the changing discourses of American vernacular literatures Anzaldúa’s writings about U.S. Latino/a life explore the linguistic intermixture of ethnic and mainstream languages illustrate the changing languages of America Which lingua rustica will the some 30 million U.S. Latinos hegemonize in their testimonios What new literary genres will emerge in American literature? is there a borderlands English or Spanglish already under way in U.S. Latino/a-dominant California, Arizona, Florida I want to investigate the enabling condition of some recent Chicano/a narrative in which they seek to create an epistemological gro As many U.S. Latino/a writers themselves suggest, to read is to question and to understand the (bilingual) texture and the rhetorical resources of language If Anzaldúa sees the aesthetic structure of knowledge as a form of nepantilism each writer locates stories in a tradition of border historiography
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Our polyphonic interpretation of art at the border is key—they create an epistemological grounding as a counter-hegemony to colonial thought
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Not only the concern with identity has produced problematic expressions in Ethnic Studies; the same occurs with the imperative of liberation. The problem emerges when liberation is translated as a claim for immediate political action, a kind of political immediatism that becomes antipathetic to theoretical reflection. When the two combine, that is, the worst aspects of the claim for identity and those of the search for liberation, then we have a form of what Lewis Gordon calls epistemological closure.13 When this happens, the particular contribution of Ethnic Studies scholarship to the project of decolonization tends to be neglected, not only by the academy itself, but by Ethnic Studies programs. Beyond the dialectic between identity and liberation, and the expressions of its most problematic features, Ethnic and Women's Studies posit the imperative of epistemic decolonization and the construction of new categories, critical discourses, and sciences. What I am suggesting, and what intellectuals seeking to advance the discourse of decolonization make clear, is that beyond the dialectics of identity and liberation, recognition and distribution, we have to add the imperative of epistemic decolonization, and in fact, of a consistent decolonization of human reality.14 For that one must build new concepts and being willing to revise critically all received theories and ideas. This is part of the “stuff” of the decolonial turn, and here resides the fundamental contribution of Ethnic Studies: Ethnic Studies is not merely a province in the Enlightened or Corporate University; it is, rather, a decolonial force in philosophy, theory, and critique that asks for and anticipates an-other kind of intellectual space. This special issue reaffirms the true vocation of Ethnic Studies (which has remained alive in the work of many), and which finds expression in the decolonial turn.
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Maldonado-Torres 11 (Nelson, Professor in Latino and Hispanic Caribbean Studies at Rutgers, Thinking through the Decolonial Turn: Post-continental Interventions in Theory, Philosophy, and Critique—An Introduction, TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 1(2), 2011)
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. The problem emerges when liberation is translated as a claim for immediate political action, a kind of political immediatism that becomes antipathetic to theoretical reflection. When the two combine, that is, the worst aspects of the claim for identity and those of the search for liberation, then we have a form of what Lewis Gordon calls epistemological closure.13 When this happens, the project of decolonization tends to be neglected . What I am suggesting, and what intellectuals seeking to advance the discourse of decolonization make clear, is that beyond the dialectics of identity and liberation, recognition and distribution, we have to add the imperative of epistemic decolonization, and in fact, of a consistent decolonization of human reality For that one must build new concepts and being willing to revise critically all received theories and ideas. This is part of the “stuff” of the decolonial turn, and here resides the fundamental contribution of Ethnic Studies: Ethnic Studies is not merely a province in the Enlightened or Corporate University; it is, rather, a decolonial force in philosophy, theory, and critique that asks for and anticipates an-other kind of intellectual space
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The alternative is to decolonize this educational space – immediate political action is irrelevant and destructive
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This book summarizes the main aspects of the “Research Project on Modernity/ Coloniality” and the central theorical proposals of the famous Argentine decolonization theorist, Walter Mignolo. The main thrust of this work is explained thus: “if knowledge is an instrument of imperial colonization, one of the urgent tasks ahead is the decolonization of knowledge.”¶ First, the book attempts to broaden the definition of colonialism. This concept refers to a complex matrix in which various spheres intertwine (economy, authority, nature, gender and sexuality, subjectivity and knowledge) and is based on three main foundations: knowledge (epistemology), understanding or comprehention (hermeneutics) and the ability to feel (aesthesis). On the other hand, there also exists a relationship between colonialism and modern rationality, where the latter is undestood as a construction of a Totality that overrides any difference or possibility of constructing other totalities. Although there is a critique of these notions from postmodern writers (postcolonialism being the wellspring in this field of study), it is circumscribed to European history and the history of European ideas. Thus, this critique is incapable of reaching deep into the colonial paradigm and imagination. This is why a decolonial project is ultimately necessary in order to make possible a programmatic analysis of delinking categories (Aníbal Quijano) of colonial knowledge.¶ The book also takes some of the contributions from the philosopher Erique Dussel as a proposal of decolonization of knowledge, as exemplified by the differentiation he makes between emancipation (as liberal framework that serves to the pretensions of the bourgeoisie) and liberation (as a broader category that seeks ways of leaving the european emancipatory project). But decolonization, for Mignolo, goes further than liberation: it involves both the colonizers and the colonized (using the ideas of Franz Fanon), by including emancipation/liberation on a same level within its framework. But because emancipation is a modern project linked to European liberal bourgeoisie, it is better to think in terms of liberation/decolonization, which includes in itself the rational concept of emancipation.¶ Mignolo proposes a delinking strategy, which involves denaturalizing the concepts and fields of knowledge within coloniality. This does not mean “ignoring or denying what cannot be denied”, but rather using imperial strategies for decolonial purposes. Delinking also implies disbelieving that imperial reasoning can itself create a liberating reason (i.e. proposals of decolonization from a marxist enterprise, which do not involve a radical delinking but rather a radical emancipation; the reason being marxism offers a different “content” but not a different “logic”). Postmodern thought attempts to be a liberating discourse, but still maintains a European framework that is far from creating a delinked colonial logic. In this sense, Mignolo argues that while modernity is not strictly a European phenomenon, its rhetoric -as Dussel argues- is formed by European philosophers, academics and politicians. Hence, modernity involves colonization of time and space, defining a border in realtion to a self-determining Other and it’s own European identity.¶ The project of decolonization proposes a displacement of the theo- and ego- hegemonic logic of empire into a geo-political and a body-logic of knowledge. This project arises from a de-clasification and de-identification of imperially denied subjects, as a de-colonial policy and epistemology that affects both the political and economic control of neoliberalism and capitalism, each frameworks of the imperialist project. The decolonization process begins when these same agents or subjects, who inhabit the denied languages and identities of the Empire, become aware of the effects of coloniality on being, body and knowledge. This process does not imply a call to an external element/actor/project but a movement towards an exteriority which make visible the difference in the space of experience and the horizon of expectations registered in the colonial space. Is this a proposal of cultural relativism? No. What Mignolo suggests is a questioning of the posture taken from divisive borders. In other words, the borders that both unite and separate modernity/coloniality.¶ Henceis the main proposal of the book: border thinking. This epistemology evokes the pluri-versity and di-versity of the dynamics between the spaces of experience and horizons of expectations found within the larger arena of coloniality/modernity. Border thinking implies that decolonization will not come from the conflicts over the imperial difference but from the spaces of experience and horizons of expectations generated by the colonial difference. Decolonial critical thinking connects the pluri-versity of experiences enclosed within the colonial framework with the delinking uni-versal project that is in constant tension within imperial horizons. It builds a proposal that goes beyond the implementation of a model constructed within modern categories (right, center, left) and onto reflecting on the subversive spaces inscribed among the actions of colonized agents through the fissures and cracks of the imperial system.¶ The concept of decolonization offered in Mignolo’s work is a major contribution towards creating a theoretical framework outside the standards of modern Western philosophy. What must also be recognized, however, is that this theoretical proposal and its development is still influenced by those same theories and epistemologies that it intends to criticize. It could be said that the book itself is a decolonization proposal in how it subversively re-orients traditional theoretical frameworks into a deep questioning of themselves.
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Panotto 11 , Nicolas Panotto, theologian and currently serves as Group Managing Director for Multidisciplinary Studies on Religion and Public Advocac, “Walter Mignolo: Epistemic disobedience. Rhetoric of modernity, logic of coloniality and decolonial grammar (Buenos Aires 2010), July 27, 2011 [http://postcolonialnetworks.com/2011/07/27/walter-mignolo-epistemic-disobedience-rhetoric-of-modernity-logic-of-coloniality-and-decolonial-grammar/]
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This book summarizes the “Research Project on Modernity/ Coloniality” and the central theorical proposals of the famous Argentine decolonization theorist, Walter Mignolo. The main thrust of this work is explained thus: “if knowledge is an instrument of imperial colonization, one of the urgent tasks ahead is the decolonization of knowledge.” the book attempts to broaden the definition of colonialism. This concept refers to a complex matrix in which various spheres intertwine (economy, authority, nature, gender and sexuality, subjectivity and knowledge) and is based on knowledge (epistemology there is a critique of these notions from postmodern writers it is circumscribed to European history and the history of European ideas. this critique is incapable of reaching deep into the colonial paradigm and imagination. This is why a decolonial project is ultimately necessary in order to make possible a programmatic analysis of delinking categories of colonial knowledge But decolonization goes further than liberation: it involves both the colonizers and the colonized by including emancipation/liberation on a same level within its framework. But because emancipation is a modern project linked to European liberal bourgeoisie, it is better to think in terms of liberation/decolonization, which includes in itself the rational concept of emancipation Mignolo proposes a delinking strategy, which involves denaturalizing the concepts and fields of knowledge within coloniality. This does not mean “ignoring or denying what cannot be denied”, but rather using imperial strategies for decolonial purposes. Delinking also implies disbelieving that imperial reasoning can itself create a liberating reason Postmodern thought attempts to be a liberating discourse, but still maintains a European framework that is far from creating a delinked colonial logic Mignolo argues that while modernity is not strictly a European phenomenon, its rhetoric - is formed by European philosophers, academics and politicians modernity involves colonization of time and space, defining a border in realtion to a self-determining Other and it’s own European identity.¶ The project of decolonization proposes a displacement of the theo- and ego- hegemonic logic of empire into a geo-political and a body-logic of knowledge. a de-colonial policy and epistemology that affects both the political and economic control of neoliberalism and capitalism, each frameworks of the imperialist project. The decolonization process begins when these same agents or subjects, who inhabit the denied languages and identities of the Empire, become aware of the effects of coloniality on being, body and knowledge. What Mignolo suggests is a questioning of the posture taken from divisive borders. the borders that both unite and separate modernity/coloniality This epistemology evokes the pluri-versity and di-versity of the dynamics between the spaces of experience and horizons of expectations found within the larger arena of coloniality/modernity Border thinking implies that decolonization will not come from the conflicts over the imperial difference but from the spaces of experience and horizons of expectations generated by the colonial difference. Decolonial critical thinking connects the pluri-versity of experiences enclosed within the colonial framework with the delinking uni-versal project that is in constant tension within imperial horizons ¶ The concept of decolonization offered in Mignolo’s work is a major contribution towards creating a theoretical framework outside the standards of modern Western philosophy.
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We must engage in a process of delinking ourselves from Eurocentric epistemology through a combination of critical border thinking and challenging the epistemology of the West through denaturalizing the concepts and fields of knowledge grounded in and surrounding the epistemology of coloniality
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These perspectives do not fully explore the immense potentialities¶ of the recognition of the crisis of modernity. Radically different ways of¶ thinking about the world are possible if we assume this historical period to be the crisis of the hegemonic pretensions of Western civilization. Different¶ consequences would arise from an interpretation that recognizes that this is¶ not the end of history,but the end of the phantasmagorical universal history¶ imagined by Hegel. The implications for non-Western societies and for¶ subaltern and excluded subjects around the world would be quite different¶ if colonialism,imperialism,racism,and sexism were thought of not as¶ regretful by-products of modern Europe,but as part of the conditions that¶ made the modernWest possible. We could assume a different perspective¶ on the so-called crisis of the subject if we were to conclude that the extermination¶ of natives,transatlantic slavery,and the subordination and exclusion¶ of the other were nothing more than the other face,the necessary mirror¶ of the self,the indispensable contrasting condition for the construction of¶ modern identities. This is the way modern history is read today,from different parts¶ of the world,in very heterogeneous ways by subaltern studies,postcolonial¶ theories (Guha and Spivak 1988; Chatterjee 1993; Prakash 1995),and diverse¶ African contributions (Mudimbe 1988; Eze 1997). These perspectives¶ go beyond Eurocentric interpretations of the crisis of modernity. Other¶ spaces are explored,other voices are heard,as well as other histories and¶ subjects that had no room in the universalizing Western project. These¶ theoretical tendencies share with postmodern theories some preoccupations¶ and methodological emphasis,such as the critique of determinism¶ and economism. They partake in the centrality assigned to the study of¶ cultural and symbolic processes as well as the analysis of discourses and representations.¶ In the same fashion,some authors considered to be founders of¶ postmodernism—particularly Foucault—have had a significant theoretical¶ influence on these perspectives,which could be generally called “postcolonial.”¶ This is the case,for example,of one of the seminal works of this¶ approach,Edward Said’s Orientalism (1979). These debates create possibilities for new intellectual strategies to¶ address the challenges posed by the crisis of modernity for Latin American¶ critical theory. In view of the fact that “we are at a point in our work¶ where we can no longer ignore empires and the imperial context of our¶ studies” (Said 1993,6),it is absolutely necessary to question whether postmodern¶ theories offer an adequate perspective from which to transgress¶ the colonial limits of modern social thought. Some of the main issues of¶ postcolonial perspectives have been formulated and taken anew at different¶ times in the history of Latin American social thought of the late-nineteenth¶ and twentieth centuries (Martí 1987; Mariátegui 1979; Fals-Borda 1970; Fernández Retamar 1976). There have been extraordinary developments¶ associated with the revitalization of the struggles of indigenous peoples¶ in recent decades.5 Nonetheless,these issues paradoxically have been of¶ relatively marginal concern in the academic world,outside anthropology¶ and some areas of the humanities.Western social sciences,“which must be¶ applied creatively to the study of the realities of Latin America,” are still¶ assumed to be “the best of universal thought.” Due to both institutional and¶ communicational difficulties,as well as to the prevailing universalist orientations¶ (intellectual colonialism? subordinate cosmopolitanism?),6 today¶ the Latin American academy has only limited communication with the vigorous¶ intellectual production to be found in Southeast Asia,some regions¶ of Africa,and in the work of academics of these regions working in Europe¶ or the United States. The most effective bridges between these intellectual¶ traditions are being offered today by Latin Americans who work in North¶ American universities (Escobar 1995; Mignolo 1996a,1996b; Coronil 1996,¶ 1997).¶ However,at the margins of mainstream Latin American social¶ science,there is a vigorous and original intellectual debate that has been¶ able to articulate and enrich previous Latin American indictments of the¶ universalistic claims of occidental knowledge with contemporary insights in the critique of Eurocentrism and colonialism. This production deals¶ with such basic issues as the critique of the universalist claims of European¶ local history (Dussel 1994,2000; Quijano 2000); the origins and basic features¶ of modernity (Dussel 1994,2000; Quijano 1990,2000; Coronil 2000;¶ Escobar 2000); the colonial nature of the modern world-system (Coronil¶ 2000; Quijano 1997,1999,2000; Dussel 2000); the historical conditions of¶ the emergence of colonial-Eurocentric conceptions of history and society¶ in the metropolitan centers of the modern world-system (Mignolo 1995,¶ 2000; Lander 1997b,2000a); the schism between abstract,formal scientific¶ knowledge and local forms of knowledge (Escobar 2000; Mignolo 2000);¶ the possibilities and potentials of alternative,subaltern forms of knowledge¶ (Escobar 2000; Mignolo 2000); and the critique of universal reason in an age¶ of globalization (Dussel 1998; Castro-Gómez 1997,1998).
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Lander 00, Edgardo, Professor of Social Sciences at the Universidad Central de Venezuela in Caracas, Eurocentrism and Colonialism in Latin American Social Thought, Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 1, Issue 3, 2000 by Duke University Press, 2000)
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Radically different ways of thinking about the world are possible if we assume this historical period to be the crisis of the hegemonic pretensions of Western civilization. Different consequences would arise from an interpretation that recognizes that this is not the end of history,but the end of the phantasmagorical universal history implications for non-Western societies and for subaltern subjects would be quite different if colonialism were thought of not as regretful by-products of modern Europe, This is the way modern history is read today,from different parts of the world,in very heterogeneous ways by subaltern studies,postcolonial theories These go beyond Eurocentric interpretations of the crisis of modernity Other¶ spaces are explored,other voices are heard,as well as other histories and¶ subjects that had no room in the universalizing Western project. These¶ theoretical tendencies share with postmodern theories some preoccupations¶ and methodological emphasis such as the critique of determinism and economism. These create possibilities for new intellectual strategies to¶ address the challenges posed by the crisis of modernity for Latin American critical theory it is absolutely necessary to question whether postmodern theories offer an adequate perspective from which to transgress the colonial limits of modern social thought these issues paradoxically have been of¶ relatively marginal concern in the academic world,outside anthropology .” Due to both institutional and¶ communicational difficulties,as well as to the prevailing universalist orientations ¶ the Latin American academy has only limited communication with the vigorous¶ intellectual production to be found in Southeast Asia,some regions¶ of Africa,and in the work of academics of these regions working in Europe¶ or the United States The most effective bridges between these intellectual¶ traditions are being offered today by Latin Americans who work in North¶ American universities there is a vigorous and original intellectual debate that has been¶ able to articulate and enrich previous Latin American indictments of the¶ universalistic claims of occidental knowledge This production deals¶ with such basic issues as the critique of the universalist claims of European¶ local history the schism between abstract,formal scientific¶ knowledge and local forms of knowledge the possibilities and potentials of alternative,subaltern forms of knowledge and the critique of universal reason
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Opening up new historical readings of coloniality is key—new localized readings of modern history allow more cohesive interpretations of world-systems
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Decolonial aesthetics, in particular, and decoloniality in general have joined the liberation of sensing and sensibilities trapped by modernity and its darker side: coloniality. Decoloniality endorses interculturality, (which has been conceptualized by organized communities) and delinks from multiculturalism (which has been conceptualized and implemented by the State). Muticulturalism promotes identity politics, while interculturality promotes transnational identities-in-politics. Multiculturalism is managed by the State and some affiliated NGO’s, whereas interculturality is enacted by the communities in the process of delinking from the imaginary of the State and of multiculturalism. Interculturality promotes the re-creation of identities that were either denied or acknowledged first but in the end were silenced by the discourse of modernity, postmodernity and now altermodernity. Interculturality is the celebration by border dwellers of being together in and beyond the border. Decolonial transmodern aesthetics is intercultural, inter-epistemic, inter-political, inter-aesthetical and inter-spiritual but always from perspectives of the global south and the former-Eastern Europe.¶ Massive migration from the former Eastern Europe and the global south to former-Western Europe (today European Union) and to the United States have transformed the subjects of coloniality into active agents of decolonial delinking. “We are here because you were there” is the reversal of the rhetoric of modernity; transnational identities-in-politics are a consequence of this reversal, it challenges the self-proclaimed imperial right to name and create (constructed and artificial) identities by means either of silencing or trivialization.¶ The embodied daily life experience in decolonial processes within the matrix of modernity defeats the solitude and the search for order that permeates the fears of postmodern and altermodern industrial societies. Decoloniality and decolonial aesthetics are instrumental in confronting a world overflowed with commodities and ‘information’ that invade the living space of ‘consumers’ and confine their creative and imaginative potential.¶ Within different genealogies of re-existence ‘artists’ have been questioning the role and the name that have been assigned to them. They are aware of the confinement that Euro-centered concepts of arts and aesthetics have imposed on them. They have engaged in transnational identities-in-politics, revamping identities that have been discredited in modern systems of classification and their invention of racial, sexual, national, linguistic, religious and economic hierarchies. They have removed the veil from the hidden histories of colonialism and have rearticulated these narratives in some spaces of modernity such as the white cube and its affiliated branches. They are dwelling in the borders, sensing in the borders, doing in the borders, they have been the propellers of decolonial transmodern thinking and aesthetics. Decolonial transmodernities and aesthetics have been delinking from all talks and beliefs of universalism, new or old, and in doing so have been promoting a pluriversalism that rejects all claims to a truth without quotation marks. In this regard, decolonial transmodernity has endorsed identities-in-politics and challenged identity politics and the self-proclaimed universality of altermodernity.¶ Creative practitioners, activist and thinkers continue to nourish the global flow of decoloniality towards a transmodern and pluriversal world. They confront and traverse the divide of the colonial and imperial difference invented and controlled by modernity, dismantling it, and working towards “living in harmony and in plenitude” in a variety of languages and decolonial histories. The worlds emerging with decolonial and transmodern political societies have art and aesthetics as a fundamental source.
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Maldonado-Torres et al 11 (Nelson, Professor Comparative Literature at Rutgers, “THE ARGUMENT (AS MANIFESTO FOR DECOLONIAL AESTHETICS”, https://globalstudies.trinity.duke.edu/the-argument-as-manifesto-for-decolonial-aesthetics)OG
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Decolonial aesthetics and decoloniality in general have joined the liberation of sensing and sensibilities trapped by modernity and its darker side Decoloniality endorses interculturality, (which has been conceptualized by organized communities) and delinks from multiculturalism (which has been conceptualized and implemented by the State). Interculturality is the celebration by border dwellers of being together in and beyond the border. Decolonial transmodern aesthetics is i always from perspectives of the global south decolonial aesthetics are instrumental in confronting a world overflowed with commodities and ‘information’ that invade the living space of ‘consumers’ and confine their creative and imaginative potential.¶ artists’ have removed the veil from the hidden histories of colonialism and have rearticulated these narratives in some spaces of modernity such as the white cube and its affiliated branches. dwelling in the borders they have been the propellers of decolonial transmodern thinking and aesthetics. Decolonial aesthetics delink from universalism Creative practitioners, activist and thinkers continue to nourish the global flow of decoloniality towards a transmodern and pluriversal world. They confront and traverse the divide of the colonial and imperial difference invented and controlled by modernity, dismantling it The worlds emerging with decolonial and transmodern political societies have art and aesthetics as a fundamental source.
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Decolonial aesthetics utilizes art and ecpression to dismantle modernity, epistemic coloniality, and state multiculturalism
| 3,914 | 123 | 1,471 | 537 | 14 | 203 | 0.026071 | 0.378026 |
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Differential consciousness is linked to whatever is not expressible through words. It is¶ accessed through poetic modes of expression: gestures, music, images, sounds, words¶ that plummet or rise through signification to find some void — some no-place — to¶ claim their due. This mode of consciousness both inspires and depends on differential social movement and the methodology of the oppressed and its differential technologies, yet it functions outside speech, outside academic criticism, in spite of all¶ attempts to pursue and identify its place and origin. In seeking to describe it, Barthes¶ wrote toward the end of his life that this mode of differential consciousness “can¶ only be reached” by human thought through an unconformable and “intractable”¶ passage — not through any “synthesizing term” — but rather through another kind¶ of “eccentric,” and “extraordinary term.”¶ 1¶ This book has demonstrated that this¶ “eccentric” passage toward “differential consciousness” is designed in a multiplicity¶ of forms, from revolt to religious experience, from rasquache¶ 2¶ to punk, from technical¶ achievements like the methodology of the oppressed, to Saussure’s sign reading alone;¶ it is a conduit brought about by any system of signification capable of evoking and¶ puncturing through to another site, to that of differential consciousness.¶ According to the Barthes of Incidents, The Pleasure of the Text, or¶ A Lover’s Discourse,¶ 3¶ that term, puncture, passage, or conduit can be provided by the¶ process of “falling in love.” Third world writers such as Guevara, Fanon, Anzaldúa,¶ Emma Pérez, Trinh Minh-ha, or Cherríe Moraga, to name only a few, similarly¶ understand love as a “breaking” through whatever controls in order to find “understanding and community”: it is described as “hope” and “faith” in the potential¶ goodness of some promised land; it is defined as Anzaldúa’s coatlicue state, which is a¶ “rupturing” in one’s everyday world that permits crossing over to another; or as a¶ specific moment of shock, what Emma Pérez envisions as the trauma of desire, of¶ erotic despair.¶ 4¶ These writers who theorize social change understand “love” as a¶ hermeneutic, as a set of practices and procedures that can transit all citizen-subjects,¶ regardless of social class, toward a differential mode of consciousness and its accompanying technologies of method and social movement.¶ Toward the end of his life, Barthes was able to provide written¶ descriptions of the passionate, artful, and even unspoken elements of this mode of¶ consciousness, using the example of love. Centering his discussion on language itself,¶ Barthes points out that what we often detect in the shadow of our lover’s speech is¶ that which is “unreal,” which is to say, meaning when it is unruly, willful, anarchic¶ (90). The language of lovers can puncture through the everyday narratives that tie¶ us to social time and space, to the descriptions, recitals, and plots that dull and order our senses insofar as such social narratives are tied to the law. The act of¶ falling in love can thus function as a “punctum,” that which breaks through social¶ narratives to permit a bleeding, meanings unanchored and moving away from their¶ traditional moorings — in what, Barthes writes, brings about a “gentle hemorrhage”¶ of being (12). That is why, for Barthes, this form of romantic love, combined with¶ risk and courage, can make anything possible. In A Lover’s Discourse Barthes extends¶ his definitions of the “third,”¶ 5¶ “zero” (19), and “obtuse” (222) meanings — all terms¶ that reach toward the same differential place of possibility without which no other¶ meaning can find its own life. It is love that can access and guide our theoretical and¶ political “movidas” — revolutionary maneuvers toward decolonized being. Indeed,¶ Barthes thinks that access to the spectrum from which consciousness-in-resistance¶ emanates might best materialize in a moment of “hypnosis,” like that which occurs¶ when one is first overwhelmed or engulfed by love (11).
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Sandoval and Davis 10 [Chela Sandoval, associate professor of Chicana studies, and Angela Davis, political activist, Methodology of the Oppressed Theory Out of Bounds vol. 18]
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Differential consciousness is linked to whatever is not expressible through words poetic modes of expression: gestures, music, images, sounds, words¶ that plummet or rise through signification to find some void — some no-place — to¶ claim their due. This inspires and depends on differential social movement and the methodology of the oppressed yet it functions outside speech, outside academic criticism writers understand love as a “breaking” through whatever controls in order to find “understanding and community”: it is described as “hope” and “faith it is defined as is a¶ “rupturing” in one’s everyday world that permits crossing over to another love” can transit all citizen-subjects,¶ regardless of social class, toward a differential mode of consciousness and its accompanying technologies of method and social movement. The language of lovers can puncture through the everyday narratives that tie¶ us to social time and space, to the descriptions, recitals, and plots that dull and order our senses insofar as such social narratives are tied to the law love can break through social¶ narratives to permit a bleeding love can access and guide our theoretical and¶ political “movidas” — revolutionary maneuvers toward decolonized being access to the spectrum from which consciousness-in-resistance¶ emanates might best materialize in a moment of “hypnosis, when one is first overwhelmed or engulfed by love
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Alt: The alternative is a decolonial love that functions as a poetic mode of expression which ruptures our world to create another. This world is inaccessible to speech or academic criticism, and creates endless possibilities for revolution.
| 4,049 | 242 | 1,415 | 633 | 37 | 215 | 0.058452 | 0.339652 |
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¶ Recognition of ‘otherness’ brings us to understanding that global¶ ¶ inclusion should not eliminate the particularities of every local reality¶ ¶ (Clegg et al., 1999; Radhakishnan, 1994). Even if globalization seems to¶ ¶ mean the elimination of differences, there is evidence everywhere that¶ ¶ indicates that these differences remain and multiply (e.g. Appadurai,¶ ¶ 1990). Therefore, it is necessary to analyse organizational problems in¶ ¶ Latin America from its exteriority; that is, to see ourselves as colonized¶ ¶ nations searching for our own identity by means of re-cognition of our¶ ¶ local forms of organization and management, and by recovering cognitive¶ ¶ forms so deeply rooted in our countries.¶ ¶ Third, no matter how difficult it might be, Latin America, as well as¶ ¶ other regions of the world that have endured colonization, must provincialize Europe (and consequently the United States). This must be done¶ ¶ in order to come to terms with the fact that the world is both Anglo-EuroCentric Modernity and Otherness (Dussel and Ibarra-Colado, 2006),¶ ¶ which recognizes the importance of geopolitical space in the construction of our identities and our different forms of being. This concerns not¶ ¶ only economic and social differences; it is related above all to epistemic¶ ¶ differences. Hence, what is under dispute is our capacity for intellectual¶ ¶ autonomy and our capacity for seeing with our own eyes and thinking in¶ ¶ our own languages (Spanish, Portuguese, Nahuatl, Aimara, Zapotec,¶ ¶ Quechua or Mapuche), even though sometimes we must write in English.¶ ¶ As Dussel points out: ‘To be born in the North Pole or in Chiapas is not¶ ¶ the same thing as to be born in New York City’ (Dussel, 2003: 2).¶ ¶ When we consider the problems of our countries through the eyes of¶ ¶ the Centre, what we are doing is accepting unreflectively the problems¶ ¶ of the Centre in its effort to submit and dominate the region. Thus, we see¶ ¶ the Centre’s constant effort to impose on us its idea of modernization as¶ ¶ the only available option, but just as with any sort of loan, the interest¶ ¶ rates have always been enormous. This useless dependency on the¶ ¶ knowledge of the Centre (useless because the problems modernization set¶ ¶ out to resolve are still with us, and aggravated) emphasizes the urgency of¶ ¶ moving from translation and imitation to original creation as emancipated creation. Only then will we be able to break our silence and start a¶ ¶ real transformation.¶ ¶ A different organizational knowledge is needed, constructed from the¶ ¶ perspective of ‘otherness’. It must be original insofar as it relates to its¶ ¶ origins and is not the result of translation, imitation or falsification. It¶ ¶ must analyse the organizational realities of Latin America from the¶ ¶ standpoint of the specific history of its economic and political formation¶ ¶ and from its vast cultural heritage. These realities function under modes¶ ¶ of rationality that differ significantly from the instrumental mode of the¶ ¶ Centre. These are, in short, the orienting ideas of this meditation, which¶ ¶ I develop in following three sections: The first one establishes the main¶ ¶ characteristic of the development of Organization Studies in Latin¶ ¶ America as its tendency towards falsification and imitation of the knowledge generated in the Centre. The second section recognizes the role played by the term ‘organization’ as an artifice that facilitates the comparison of different realities through their structural variables, but also¶ ¶ the inability of this term to recognize any reality that escapes instrumental rationality and the logic of the market. It also articulates the¶ ¶ increasing importance of such concepts in the context of neo-liberalism.¶ ¶ The third section concludes by renewing the urgency of appreciating the¶ ¶ organizational problems of Latin America from the outside by proposing¶ ¶ a preliminary research agenda built from original approaches that¶ ¶ recognize otherness.
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Ibarra-Colado 06 (Eduardo. Head of the Department of Institutional Studies at the¶ Autonomous Metropolitan University, Campus Cuajimalpa and professor of Management¶ and Organization Studies. He obtained his PhD in Sociology with Honors at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. June 20. Organization Studies and¶ Epistemic Coloniality in Latin¶ America: Thinking Otherness from¶ the Margins. Universidad Aut´onoma Metropolitana-Cuajimalpa, Mexico)
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Recognition of ‘otherness’ brings us to understanding that global inclusion should not eliminate the particularities of every local reality is necessary to analyse organizational problems in Latin America from its exteriority; that is, to see ourselves as colonized nations searching for our own identity by means of re-cognition of our local forms of organization and management, and by recovering cognitive forms so deeply rooted in our countries. matter how difficult it might be, Latin America, as well as other regions of the world that have endured colonization, must provincialize Europe (and consequently the United States). This must be done in order to come to terms with the fact that the world is both Anglo-EuroCentric Modernity and Otherness which recognizes the importance of geopolitical space in the construction of our identities and our different forms of being. This concerns not only economic and social differences; it is related above all to epistemic differences. Hence, what is under dispute is our capacity for intellectual autonomy and our capacity for seeing with our own eyes and thinking in our own languages even though sometimes we must write in English. As Dussel points out: ‘To be born in the North Pole or in Chiapas is not the same thing as to be born in New York City’ When we consider the problems of our countries through the eyes of the Centre, what we are doing is accepting unreflectively the problems of the Centre in its effort to submit and dominate the region Thus, we see the Centre’s constant effort to impose on us its idea of modernization as the only available option, but just as with any sort of loan, the interest rates have always been enormous This useless dependency on the knowledge of the Centre emphasizes the urgency of moving from translation and imitation to original creation as emancipated creation. Only then will we be able to break our silence and start a real transformation. A different organizational knowledge is needed, constructed from the perspective of ‘otherness’. It must be original insofar as it relates to its origins and is not the result of translation, imitation or falsification. It must analyse the organizational realities of Latin America from the standpoint of the specific history of its economic and political formation and from its vast cultural heritage. These realities function under modes of rationality that differ significantly from the instrumental mode of the Centre. The first one establishes the main characteristic of the development of Organization Studies in Latin America as its tendency towards falsification and imitation of the knowledge generated in the Centre. The second section recognizes the role played by the term ‘organization’ as an artifice that facilitates the comparison of different realities through their structural variables, but also the inability of this term to recognize any reality that escapes instrumental rationality and the logic of the market It also articulates the increasing importance of such concepts in the context of neo-liberalism third section concludes by renewing the urgency of appreciating the organizational problems of Latin America from the outside by proposing a preliminary research agenda built from original approaches that recognize otherness.
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Current modes of knowledge production – economic, historic, and philosophical – are flawed reflections of the desires of the Eurocentric center. We must decolonize knowledge by starting from the historical truths and perspectives of the region.
| 4,124 | 245 | 3,405 | 652 | 36 | 521 | 0.055215 | 0.79908 |
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Kritiks
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2013
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4,437 |
Inspired by these Fanonian insights l have articulated elsewhere the idea of a weak utopian project as bringing about the Death of European Man.67 I think that the peculiar intricacies between "estadounidense" patriotism, Eurocentrism, the propensity to war, and the continued subordination of the theoretical contributions of peoples from the south call for a reformulation of this idea.68 Today, after the post- 1989 and post-September 11 patriotism we shall call more directly simply for the Death of American Man.6 By American Man I mean a concept or figure, a particular way of being-in-the-world, the very subject of an episteme that gives continuity to an imperial order of things under the rubrics of liberty and the idea of a Manifest Destiny that needs to be accomplished. American Man and its predecessor and still companion European Man are unified under an even more abstract concept, Imperial Man. Imperial gestures and types of behavior are certainly not unique to Europe or "America." A radical critique and denunciation of Latin American Man, and of ethno-class continental Man in general, is what 1 aim at in my critique. "Man," here, refers to an ideal of humanity, and not to concrete human beings. It is that ideal which must die in order for the human to be born. ¶ It should be clear that what I call for and defend here is epistemological and semiotic struggle, which takes the form of critical analysis and the invention and sharing of ideas that allow humans to preserve their humanity. A subversive act is that which helps us to deflate imperial and continental concepts of Man, such as referring to "Americans" in a way that designates their own particular provinciality rather than by a concept through which they appropriate the whole extent of the so-called "New World." Popular culture in the u_s. has picked up on many Spanish words and phrases (such as "Ay Caramba,.. "Hasta Ia vista, baby," and several others), but "" has failed to adopt the central one (perhaps because Latin@s have not insisted on it enough): "estadounidense." "Estadounidense" is one of the most important words that U.S. Americans learn from Spanish. It could be considered one of the most precious gifts (not an imperial but a decolonial one) from Spanish and Hispanic culture to the Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture that Huntington reifies and s e e k s to protect. As I have argued elsewhere, unfortunately, reception of gifts and hospitality are two fundamental modes of humanity that those who occupy and assume the position of Master most resist. Indeed, the reception or resistance of decolonizing gifts provides a measure of the presence of coloniality.¶ Before being a challenge, Latin@s in this country have been colonized and ra cialized subjects as well as collaborators in different forms of racialization. Many Latin@s, especially conservative ones, desire the American and Americano Dream most often they desire it until they realize that it turns into a nightmare, both for oth ers and for themselves. While the culturalist-nationalist response to the Americana Dream consists in taking away the possibility of dreaming this dream in Spanish, a decolonial response rather abandons the very idea of the American or Americana Dream and offers as a gift the possibility for the Anglo-Saxon U . S . American to dream the "estadounidense" dream-a dream that does not have anything to do about speaking one language or another, but about learning from others basic ideas about how to conceive of oneself, in this case, to see oneself as a nation-in-relation rather than as a continental being.71
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Maldonado Torres 2005 [Nelson, professor at Rutgers, “Decolonization and the New Identitarian Logics after September 11,” Radical Philosophy Review 8, n. 1 (2005): 35-67]
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Today we shall call more directly simply for the Death of American Man By American Man I mean a concept or figure, a particular way of being-in-the-world, the very subject of an episteme that gives continuity to an imperial order of things under the rubrics of liberty and the idea of a Manifest Destiny that needs to be accomplished. A radical critique and denunciation of Latin American Man, and of ethno-class continental Man in general, is what 1 aim at in my critique Man," here, refers to an ideal of humanity, and not to concrete human beings. It is that ideal which must die in order for the human to be born what I call for and defend here is epistemological and semiotic struggle . A subversive act is that which helps us to deflate imperial and continental concepts of Man, Estadounidense" is one of the most important words that U.S. Americans learn from Spanish. It could be considered one of the most precious gifts (not an imperial but a decolonial one the reception or resistance of decolonizing gifts provides a measure of the presence of coloniality. Latin@s in this country have been colonized and ra cialized subjects as well as collaborators in different forms of racialization Many Latin@s, desire the American and Americano Dream most often they desire it until they realize that it turns into a nightmare a decolonial response rather abandons the very idea of the American or Americana Dream and offers as a gift the possibility for the Anglo-Saxon U . S . American to dream the "estadounidense" dream-a dream that does not have anything to do about speaking one language or another, but about learning from others basic ideas about how to conceive of oneself, in this case, to see oneself as a nation-in-relation rather than as a continental being.71
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The alternative is the DEATH OF THE AMERICAN MAN – this is an epistemological and semiotic struggle which deflates the enthno-class of Man
| 3,615 | 138 | 1,778 | 591 | 23 | 305 | 0.038917 | 0.516074 |
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Quijano’s analysis brings forth the dark or underside of modernity through a historical materialist analysis that at the same time leaves no another possibility for thought than the construction of another intersubjectivity and reality founded on an analogous rational, historical moment of progress. As I said above, there does not seem to be possible an outside for a thought liberated from Western Modern instrumental rationalism. However, this point goes beyond Quijano’s own intentions in his analysis. This is because in recognizing the coloniality of power and knowledge as that which is a constitutive element of Western modernity, Quijano exposes neither an outside nor an inside but modernity in its movement. In light of the racist and temporal prejudice that characterizes Western modernity, the question is not how and whether the other will speak or be heard. The crucial point is not even that oppression, exclusion, and violence are definitive elements of modernity. These are aspects that without doubt situate it in its distinct occurrences. The issue is that Quijano’s analysis puts into question the very elements that sustain his critique: historical materialism, critique, and rationalism in its ever unfolding dialectic of theories about how and when the other is excluded, and how the negative may be recovered in a positive sense. In short, the exposure of the prejudice that organizes existence in terms of the coloniality of power and knowledge exposes Western modernity to its self-deconstructing movement by showing the undoing of the dialectical promise of an unfolding of reason and its ever-servile negativity. The very existence of the excluded and oppressed is not just that, negativity, but those lives, lineages, practices, languages, and expression discarded by modernity expose ways of being not created by Western rationalism and not available for systematic calculation, manipulation, transformation, or even rationalist critical “salvation.” Latin America is the difference that cannot be subsumed, and that at the same time, marks the impossibility of the project of modernity. To say it in other words, Latin America as well as the very history of colonialism, as they become apparent through Quijano’s analysis, are the explicit configurations of the inoperative aspect of the Western Modern project. Neither outside nor inside modernity, in a movement that will slip from reason, progress, and history, the Americas will continue to undo modernity. These inoperative movements will play out modernity’s hopes and unreason since the inception of the land and peoples of the new world into history, and this even before the movement becomes a narrative of Modern belated and failed progress under the impossibly ambiguous name “America.”38 Thus, Western modernity does not determine the Americas, but the Americas mark the impossibility of the accomplishment of rationalism and modernity as articulations of humanity and freedom. This occurs with the ever-failing attempts of modernity to give rational and theoretical form to human freedom, a failure that becomes explicit once one takes seriously the inseparability of the coloniality of power and knowledge and the project of the enlightenment. The Americas mark the failure by slipping, mixing, reinscribing, undoing the time, space, and narrative of Modern dialectical thought. Latin America, as the name indicates, is neither outside nor inside, it is never on par in time or geographically coherent; it is impossible in terms of pure lineages, ordered traceable progress, or the historical line of Western development . . . and yet this series of discontinuities marks the concrete movement of modernity from below. One may reconsider at this point the critical dichotomy between deconstruction and critique, in which historical dialectical critique appears as the practical socio-political call of philosophical thought to its real context and responds with the positive configuration of theories, institutions, and ultimately the recognition of the other; while deconstruction appears as a weak internal Western critique that in its exposure and undoing of the power dynamics and neuroses behind Western narrative and the rational subject, ends up failing to produce a positive account of the other and his/her/their reality and agency. Such division is not sufficient here if one engages the underside of modernity. On the one hand, as we have seen from looking at Quijano’s analysis, critique without deconstruction remains always under the attraction of the affirmation of the positivist project of progress and of the temporal prejudice of modernity. On the other hand, deconstruction, if limited to a strategy that plays out the undoing of Western onto-theology and the history of metaphysics and the rational subject, remains a blind attempt to undo what remains untouched, since it is the racial temporal prejudice of the coloniality of power and knowledge that sustains Western thought, including deconstruction within and from a Western perspective. As we will see now, instead of remaining within this theoretical Western divide, Latin America appears from radical exteriority as a severe interruption: as the trace that decenters and plays out Western thought, that exposes rationalist critique, while facing modernity with five hundred years of narratives and concrete lives that articulate distinct ways and senses of beings. When one looks closer at Quijano’s genealogy, at crucial moments one finds elements at play that do not fit into the rationalist, materialist, historical analysis. If one engages them, if one enters the discussion again with their sound in mind, the analysis shifts towards unexpected spaces, not subsumed by instrumental rationalism, by the enlightenment’s rationalist project in its guises of subjectivity, history, and humanism. Quijano’s genealogy recognizes the origin of the egocentrism that situates European thought at the apogee and center of all existence in the ego conquero. It is by virtue of the irrational repetition of practices that a form of rationality takes its place as the ego cogito. To say it in terms of Walter Benjamin’s analysis of Western culture, history acquires its direction and Westernized meaning by virtue of the pilling up of bodies, of massacres, death, exclusion, and a fundamental violence against modalities and configurations of senses of life.39 It is by discarding life that history takes its course and price. While Quijano’s analysis makes it possible to see the mechanism of power and knowledge behind history, the life of the oppressed remains the differend, the life that is not history and yet under historical dialectic rationalism.40 With the coloniality of power and knowledge, one uncovers that there is another side of modernity; there is life, bodies, and distinct vital existences. This is the realm of human experience, that is, living experience, the flesh and breath of the excluded, the source that is a life calling for its own distinct articulation from outside the Western engine of rationalist historical progress. This life is not some inarticulate noise or a muddled formless nature that awaits rational determination. For more than five hundred years in Latin America, thought has been occurring that is distinct from Western rationalism. Not irrational mysticism but thoughtful articulations of existence. This is the thought that awaits beyond and towards philosophy today. These lives do not fit Quijano’s analysis, and therefore he must assign them ambiguous places: first, in the “mythical” realm of Garcia Márquez; second, in the utopian project of an intersubjectivity that appears as the result of a dialectic that once again leaves nothing outside of the system of production and progress under a new but still historical materialist project. The fate of critique is critique, rationalism, and under this way of thinking, the fate of life is the system, i.e., a system under which life by necessity unfolds according to the requirements of instrumental rationalism, produced, ordered, and at the next stage of progress. But how would one engage in thought if not through critique? I close with just one indication: Neither the ego conquero nor the indigenous belong to or fit within the historical rationalism that sustains Quijano’s analysis. Is one really to believe that the existence of the mapuche (literally people of the earth) with their lineages, practices, traditions, are the product of Western Modern instrumental rationalism today? Which normative critique would begin from the concept of pachamama,41 and what would occur to that sense of existence when turned towards a historical materialist project? One could follow this unsettling impossibility of making sense of the advent of modernity with a question concerning the construction of the body over against the rational, a body which must be forged in light of the destruction of lives, that is, as a way of adjudicating a place to violence within the domain of the rational. But this would answer to a need itself obsessive, a need to clean up and conceal what cannot be subsumed, saved, said, in the name of a progress that by now in our discussion is already undone by its exposed secret underside. As in the case of the mapuche and pachamama, in these limits one finds a margin not of Western philosophy. As we just have seen, within the discourse of Western Modern thought as well as within the discourses that will be generated by a critical thought like Quijano’s, one finds a radical un-inscribable alterity and one’s thought exposed to alterity: that is, exposed to the incompleteness internal to the critique, exposed to that which may perhaps best be engaged in silence and listening, in finding oneself as one is put into question by proximity to another that may refute critique as useless. This occurs in being set back, in having the progress of history stopped by what remains vital, adrift, and tacitly challenging as a being in radical exteriority, an unbridled reality that may liberate/transfigure “us,” rather than being the occasion for further covering over or leaving to oblivion through critical discourses and new theories towards liberating and including the other with its working negativity. We are speaking of an unbridled reality, una realidad desmesurada (to use Gabriel Garcia Márquez’s fitting term to introduce Latin American reality in his Nobel Prize speech of 1982), which figures an unbridled anachronism. In the poetry and thought of the Nahuas or Aztecs, one of the gifts of the one who has knowledge of what is, the tlamantini, is a scepter with a mirror that faces us but has a perforation at the center through which, from behind the mirror, the tlamantini sees us. Perhaps, it is the gaze of the tlamantini that situates Western thought in light of coloniality and at the beginning of thinking.42 To which race does Western philosophy and its underside belong if not to that of a humanity condemned to its blind progresses under the coloniality of knowledge and power, which spreads underneath the history of Western thought and its dialectic perpetuation? With this question we have moved from the affirmation of a racial divide and its social and political origins and implications, and from the affirmation of the other that misses missing the other to engaging the very question of the limit and possibility of philosophy and the senses of human knowledge and discourses of freedom.
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Vallega 12 [Alejandro A., Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon | “Remaining with the Crossing: Social-Political Historical Critique at the Limit in Latin”, Research in Phenomenology 42 (2012) 229–250 | DOI: 10.1163/156916412X651210]
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in recognizing the coloniality of power and knowledge as that which is a constitutive element of Western modernity, Quijano exposes neither an outside nor an inside but modernity in its movement. In light of the racist and temporal prejudice that characterizes Western modernity, the question is not how and whether the other will speak or be heard. The crucial point is not even that oppression, exclusion, and violence are definitive elements of modernity. The very existence of the excluded and oppressed is not just that, negativity, but those lives, lineages, practices, languages, and expression discarded by modernity expose ways of being not created by Western rationalism and not available for systematic calculation, manipulation, transformation, or even rationalist critical “salvation.” Latin America is the difference that cannot be subsumed, and that at the same time, marks the impossibility of the project of modernity. Latin America as well as the history of colonialism are the explicit configurations of the inoperative aspect of the Western Modern project. Neither outside nor inside modernity, in a movement that will slip from reason, progress, and history, the Americas will continue to undo modernity. Western modernity does not determine the Americas, but the Americas mark the impossibility of the accomplishment of modernity as articulations of humanity and freedom The Americas mark the failure by slipping, mixing, reinscribing, undoing the time, space, and narrative of Modern dialectical thought. Latin America is neither outside nor inside never on par in time or geographically coherent; it is impossible in terms of pure lineages, ordered traceable progress, or the historical line of Western development and yet this series of discontinuities marks the concrete movement of modernity from below instead of remaining within this theoretical Western divide, Latin America appears from radical exteriority as a severe interruption: as the trace that decenters and plays out Western thought, that exposes rationalist critique, while facing modernity with five hundred years of narratives and concrete lives that articulate distinct ways and senses of beings. When one looks closer at crucial moments one finds elements at play that do not fit into rationalist historical analysis. If one engages them the analysis shifts towards unexpected spaces, not subsumed by by the enlightenment’s rationalist project in its guises of subjectivity, history, and humanism. history acquires its direction and Westernized meaning by virtue of the pilling up of bodies, of massacres, death, exclusion, and a fundamental violence against modalities and configurations of senses of life the life of the oppressed remains the differend, the life that is not history and yet under historical dialectic rationalism. With the coloniality of power and knowledge, one uncovers that there is another side of modernity; there is life, bodies, and distinct vital existences. This is the realm of experience, that is, living experience, the flesh and breath of the excluded, the source that is a life calling for its own distinct articulation from outside the engine of progress. This life is not some inarticulate noise or a muddled formless nature that awaits rational determination. For more than five hundred years in Latin America, thought has been occurring that is distinct from Western rationalism. Not irrational mysticism but thoughtful articulations of existence. how would one engage in thought if not through critique? One could follow this unsettling impossibility of making sense of the advent of modernity with a question concerning the construction of the body over against the rational, a body which must be forged in light of the destruction of lives, that is, as a way of adjudicating a place to violence within the domain of the rational. But this would answer to a need itself obsessive, a need to clean up and conceal what cannot be subsumed, saved, said, in the name of a progress that by now in our discussion is already undone by its exposed secret underside. one finds a radical un-inscribable alterity and one’s thought exposed to alterity exposed to the incompleteness internal to the critique, exposed to that which may perhaps best be engaged in silence and listening, in finding oneself as one is put into question by proximity to another that may refute critique as useless. This occurs in being set back, in having the progress of history stopped by what remains vital, adrift, and tacitly challenging as a being in radical exteriority, an unbridled reality that may liberate/transfigure “us,” rather than being the occasion for further covering over or leaving to oblivion through critical discourses and new theories towards liberating and including the other with its working negativity.
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The alternative is to affirm Latin America as a differend –an impossibility in terms of lineages, ordered progress, or a historical line of development. To affirm the series of discontinuities, the life, bodies, and vital existences which cannot be subsumed within rationalism
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Texas (UTNIF)
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2013
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One of the most effective ways to work against epistemic racism is through what Nelson Maldonado-Torres has called ‘epistemic coyotismo.’ Epistemic coyotismo consists of introducing “theories and ideas that are banned or excluded from the halls of academia into the universities and formal centers of learning” (2006:16). In my experience, the introduction of theories and ideas otherwise banned is especially fruit- ful for students who, at the same time, often take those theories beyond the specific class or project in which they have learned about them. This means that the theories and ideas can to some extent infiltrate academia from below: the students will for example present an essay on another issue, which brings to the fore some of these otherwise excluded theories. In this manner other faculty will start recognizing, if not neces- sarily acknowledging, them. When introduc- ing such theories to students, I have found it useful to add to the introduction a word of warning: they must know what kind of invalidating strategies they will encounter when using these other theories, such as the strategies of epistemic racism that I listed previously. This helps to prepare the students for countering these strategies by addressing them in advance. In my experi- ence, the fact that the list of strategies of “invisibilization,” or epistemic racism, presented in the previous section, is not an expression of the teacher’s paranoia, but a realistic description of some of the mecha- nisms at work today in their own univer- sity, often surprises them. However, epistemic coyotismo pursued only at this level does not suffice. There is a need to promote destabilising spaces of debate that move beyond the classroom level and are aimed at unsettling the mech- anisms of epistemic racism. At the same time, there is a strong need to address the ways in which the coloniality of knowledge manifests itself. By mapping and address- ing the global articulations of power, the dismantling of the same becomes a realistic possibility. We know that there is a strong resistance towards these hegemonic articu- lations of power—most powerfully among social and ethnic movements in the South. To some extent, this resistance is also at play within the university sector in the South. In the North, it is still very weak.10 As mentioned, the university in the North is strongly attached to the triangle of colo- niality and, indeed, works as a powerful weapon of global apartheid. As such, that is, as a weapon, it needs to be dismantled. Therefore, epistemic coyotismo in the North must necessarily be articulated with the epistemic resistance (and coyotismo) in the South. To start dissolving the power of the transnational elites, they need to be countered transnationally. Indeed, whether we like it or not, epistemic coyotes are, leaving aside our very different geo-body- politics, very often members of the transna- tional elites. We might find ourselves in precarious conditions and marginal posi- tions within the university, and probably most of us embody that ‘incorporated dissent’ that is tolerated as long as it does not constitute a serious threat. Neverthe- less, we are (peripherally) part of the global elites. This means that however negative the picture of coloniality is, and however persistent global apartheid remains, we have some margin for maneuvre that must be exploited to the greatest extent. As Castro-Gómez (2007:80) has argued, ... even within the University new paradigms of thought and organi- zation are being incorporated, [paradigms] that could help break the trap of [the] modern/colonial triangle, though still very precari- ously. I refer specifically to trans- disciplinarity and complex thought as emerging models from which we could begin to build bridges towards a transcultural di- alogue of knowledges (my transla- tion). In this respect, strategic alliances between ‘epistemic coyotes’ and critical members of the transnational elites (poten- tial epistemic coyotes) must not be discarded insofar as they provide impor- tant fields of action and improve the possi- bilities of achieving access to funding. In any case, efforts at decolonizing the univer- sity in Denmark must necessarily aim to foster ‘encounters’ between different epis- temologies. Furthermore, as we know, decolonization requires a change in the subject (Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Gordon, 2004). My bet is that, at this initial point, in Denmark this change must be fomented through these encounters—hopefully direct ones, as in seminars, courses, and other such forums.
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Suarez 12 (Julia Suárez-Krabbe. Assistant professor at Roskilde University, The Department of Culture and Identity Interkulturelle studier Universitetsvej 1, 3.1.5 DK-4000, Roskilde Denmark “‘Epistemic Coyotismo’ and Transnational Collaboration: Decolonizing the Danish University” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self- Knowledge Volume 10 Issue 1 Decolonizing the University: Practicing Pluriversity 1-1-2012 Article 5)
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One of the most effective ways to work against epistemic racism is introducing “theories and ideas that are banned or excluded from the halls of academia into the universities and formal centers of learning” the theories and ideas can infiltrate academia from below: the students will for example present an essay on another issue, which brings to the fore some of these otherwise excluded theories. In this manner other faculty will start recognizing, them the fact that the list of strategies of “invisibilization is a realistic description of some of the mecha- nisms at work today often surprises them. However There is a need to promote destabilising spaces of debate that move beyond the classroom there is a strong need to address the ways in which the coloniality of knowledge manifests itself. By mapping and address- ing the global articulations of power, the dismantling of the same becomes a realistic possibility. specifically trans- disciplinarity and complex thought as emerging models could begin to build bridges towards a transcultural di- alogue of knowledges , decolonization requires a change in the subject this change must be fomented through these encounters—hopefully direct ones, as in seminars, courses, and other such forums.
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The alt is Epistemic Coyotismo – to introduce radical thought in spaces like debate
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The remarkable breakthrough, then, comes when a Maori becomes an anthropologist and practices anthropology as a Maori, rather than studying the Maori as an anthropologist. Epistemic disobedience and delinking are, in this case, two sides of the same coin. Let me explain this idea further by starting with a quotation from Linda T. Smith's Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (1999). One section of the first chapter is subtitled "On Being Human."¶ One of the supposed characteristics of primitive peoples was that we could not use our minds or intellects. We could not invent things, we could not create institutions or history, we could not imagine, we could not produce anything of value, we did not know how to use land and other resources from the natural world, we did not practice the "arts" of civilization. By lacking such values we disqualified ourselves, not just from civilization but also from humanity itself. In other words, we were not "fully human"; some of us were not even considered partially human. Ideas about what counted as human in association with the power to define people as human or not human were already encoded in imperial and colonial discourses prior to the period of imperialism covered here."¶ No, Smith is not still practicing Western anthropology: she is precisely shifting the geography of reasoning and subsuming anthropological tools into Maori (instead of Western) cosmology and ideology. China is a capi- talist country, but one couldn't say that China is "practicing Western, neo- liberal capitalism, unless we accept the principle that the type of economy that liberals and Marxists describe as capitalism can only be run under neo- liberal premises. I suspect it would be a narrow Eurocentered perspective,¶ and an insult for Chinese leaders, that would describe the Chinese economy as neo-liberal. Certainly, there is a self-serving interest in Smith's move, as¶ much as there is a self-serving interest among European anthropologists observing the Maori. The only difference is that the self-interests do not always coincide, and Maoris are no longer amenable to being the objects observed by European anthropologists. Well, you get the idea of the inter- relations between the politics of identity and epistemology, which becomes identity in politics, including academic and disciplinary politics. You could certainly be a Maori and an anthropologist, and, by being an anthropolo- gist, suppress the fact that you are Maori or black Caribbean or Aymara. Or, you can choose the decolonial option: engage in knowledge-making to "advance" the Maori cause, rather than to "advance" the discipline (e.g., anthropology). Why would someone be interested in merely advancing the discipline if not for either alienation or self-interest?¶ If you engage in decolonial thinking, and therefore engage the decolo- nial options, and put anthropology "at your service," like Smith does, then you engage in shifting the geography of reason, by unveiling and enacting geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge. You can also say that there are non-Maori anthropologists of Euro-American descent who truly support and are concerned with the mistreatment of Maoris, and that they are really working to remedy the situation. In that case, the anthropologists could fol- low two different paths. One path will be in line with that of Father Barto- lome de las Casas and with Marxism (Marxism being a European invention responding to European problems). When Marxism encounters "people of color; men or women, the situation becomes parallel to anthropology: be- ing Maori (or Aymara, or Afro-Caribbean like Aime Cesaire and Frantz Fanon) is not necessarily in smooth relation with Marxism, because of the privileged class relations over racial hierarchies and patriarchal and hetero-¶ sexual normativity. The other path will be to "submit" to the guidance of Maori or Aymara anthropologists and engage, with them, in the decolonial option. Politics of identity is different from identity politics—the former is open to whoever wants to join, while the second tends to be enclosed by the definition of a given identity.¶ I am not saying that a Maori anthropologist has epistemic privileges over a New Zealand anthropologist of Anglo descent (or a British or U.S. anthro- pologist). I am saying that a New Zealand anthropologist of Anglo descent has no right to guide the "locals" in what is good or bad for the Maori popu- lation. The decolonial and the anthropological are two distinct options. The 138¶ Chapter Three¶ It Is "Our" Modernity 139¶ former puts disciplinary tools at the service of the problem being addressed. The latter tends to put the problem at the service of the discipline. That is precisely the naturalization of modernity that is taken for granted, and that appears as the concept of knowledge in the report of the Harvard Inter- national Review, wherein a group of U.S. experts expressed the belief that they can really decide what is good and what is bad for "developing coun- tries:' Granted, there are many locals in developing countries who, because of imperial and capitalist cosmology, were led to believe (or pretended they believed, or found it convenient to endorse) that what is good for developed countries is good for underdeveloped countries as well, because the former know "how to get there" and can lead the way for underdeveloped countries trying to reach the same level. I am just saying, following Wiredu's dictum¶ ("African, know thyself"), that there is a good chance that Maoris would know better what is good or bad for themselves than would an expert from Harvard or a white anthropologist from New Zealand. And there is also a good chance that an expert from Harvard may "know" what is good for himself or herself and his or her people, even when he or she thinks that he or she is stating what is good for "thern:' that is, the underdeveloped countries and people. If you are getting the idea of what shifting the geography of reason and enacting the geopolitics of knowledge means, you will also begin under- standing what decolonial option (in general) or decolonial options (in each particular and local history) means. It means, in the first place, to engage in epistemic disobedience, as it is clear in the three examples I offered. Epistemic disobedience is necessary to take on civil disobedience (Gandhi, Martin Luther King) to its point of no return. Civil disobedience, within modern Western epistemology (and remember: Greek and Latin, and six vernacular European modern and imperial languages), could only lead to reforms, not to transformations. For this simple reason, the task of decolonial think- ing and the enactment of the decolonial option in the twenty-first century starts from epistemic delinking: from acts of epistemic disobedience
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Mignolo 2011, (Walter, Prof at Duke University, “THE DARKER SIDE OF WESTERN MODERNITY: Global Futures, Decolonial Options”, 2011, 6/28/13|Ashwin)
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The remarkable breakthrough comes when a Maori practices anthropology as a Maori, rather than studying the Maori as an anthropologist. Epistemic disobedience and delinking are, in this case, two sides of the same coin One of the supposed characteristics of primitive peoples was that we could not use our minds or intellects we could not create institutions or history By lacking such values we disqualified ourselves, not just from civilization but also from humanity itself. we were not "fully human"; some of us were not even considered partially human. Ideas about what counted as human in association with the power to define people as human or not human were already encoded in imperial and colonial discourse precisely shifting the geography of reasoning and subsuming anthropological tools into Maori ideology China is a capi- talist country, but one couldn't say that China is "practicing Western, neo- liberal capitalism the self-interests do not always coincide, and Maoris are no longer amenable to being the objects observed by European anthropologists the inter- relations between the politics of identity and epistemology, which becomes identity in politics, including academic and disciplinary politics engage in knowledge-making to "advance" the Maori cause, rather than to "advance" the discipline If you engage in decolonial thinking, and therefore engage the decolo- nial options, and put anthropology "at your service," like Smith does, then you engage in shifting the geography of reason Politics of identity is different from identity politics—the former is open to whoever wants to join, while the second tends to be enclosed by the definition of a given identity there are many locals in developing countries who, because of imperial and capitalist cosmology, were led to believe that what is good for developed countries is good for underdeveloped countries as well getting the idea of what shifting the geography of reason and enacting the geopolitics of knowledge means, you will also begin under- standing what decolonial option engage in epistemic disobedience, necessary to take on civil disobedience to its point of no return disobedience, within modern Western epistemology could only lead to reforms, not to transformations
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The alternative is epistemic disobedience - shifting geographic reasoning and engaging within knowledge production creates a politics of identity—lack of epistemic identity retrenches dominant structures that view the “other” as an exploitable object separate from the subject of humanity
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To this point indigenism has been described mainly as a critique of the dominant modes of¶ sociopolitical organization inherent to the modern world. Although both Marxist and Liberal¶ paradigms also originated as critiques of the hegemonic political orders of their respective eras,¶ they inevitably put forth their own plans for radical social transformation. The normative¶ societal blueprints described by both Liberals and Marxists were similar in that they contained inclusive universalizing assumptions about the future of humanity. Future Marxist and liberal¶ polities will purportedly incorporate all of humanity into their respective normative regimes.¶ Each predicts an increasing degree of homogenization as their assumptions and ideologies are¶ disseminated across the non-Western world. Both paradigms are considered¶ universalizing/inclusive because each sought to subsume the entirety of humanity under its¶ respective ideological umbrella.¶ North American indigenism, too, offers its own vision of a radically-redefined sociopolitical¶ world order. However, whereas Liberalism and Marxism promote a universalizing/inclusive¶ normative regime, indigenism advocates one which is universalizing/exclusive. The implication¶ is that, although indigenism promotes a set of values and assumptions which would reconfigure¶ the global system, the resulting normative regime would not impose itself onto non-Indians. Put¶ differently, once the system of colonial relations has been deconstructed and indigenous peoples¶ have secured land and autonomy, they would not seek to impose their own values or political¶ order upon the non-indigenous peoples of the world. This distinction is the most critical¶ between Western paradigms and the indigenist paradigm. Differing assumptions and attitudes¶ about nature and citizenship are much less problematic if they are formed in a context of mutual¶ respect and cultural heterogeneity.¶ The remainder of this section will detail the North American indigenist plan for a postcolonial¶ indigenous polity. The indigenist system is predicated on four distinct socio-technical¶ concepts: soft-path technology, deep ecology, green anarchism, and global balkanization. Each¶ of these conceptual categories plays a specific role in the overall function and organization of the¶ indigenist polity. Taken Furthermore, each concept reflects the underlying assumptions which support the indigenist paradigm. Taken together, these four components constitute an old form¶ of indigenous socialism which Marx referred to as “primitive communism” (Churchill 2003c,¶ 279). Following my description of this indigenist polity I will summarize these assumptions in¶ the same format as those of Marxism and Liberalism in Chapter II…The North American indigenist literature provides a compelling conceptual platform from¶ which to frame a new paradigm. Not only does it incorporate the underlying themes of Latin¶ American “indigenisms,” it establishes an entire theoretical/normative worldview which¶ carefully balances critique with praxis. The assumptions inherent to an indigenist paradigm¶ would provide a valuable interpretive tool for Western social scientists. This qualifier does not¶ mean that one must accept these assumptions as fact, only that they must be fully considered¶ when analyzing indigenous resistance to globalization. Earlier I demonstrated the fundamental¶ incompatibility between Western paradigmatic assumptions and those of the indigenous world.¶ The following section will detail the assumptions of an emergent indigenist paradigm in the same¶ format Chapter II.¶ Before moving forward I must make one final comment about indigenist assumptions. The¶ assumptions inherent to the indigenist paradigm are not merely the product of a theoretical¶ “brainstorming exercise.” They are wholly derived from indigenous contexts and thus cannot be¶ considered “imperial impositions” in the vein of Marxist or liberal assumptions about humanity¶ and political life (Churchill 2003c). Furthermore:¶ [Indigenism means that] I am one who not only takes the rights of indigenous peoples as¶ the highest priority of my political life, but who draws upon the traditions- the bodies of¶ knowledge and corresponding codes of values- evolved over many thousands of years by¶ native peoples the world over (emphasis added). This is the basis upon which I not only¶ advance critiques of, but conceptualize alternatives to (emphasis original) the present¶ social, economic, and philosophical status quo. (Churchill 2003c, 275)¶ This distinction is important because it fulfills the normative requirement that a paradigm for¶ indigenous studies be the product of native, not external, thought. Examining the genealogical¶ purity of North American indigenism would be a considerable undertaking, and there is at¶ present no reason to question its epistemological credibility. Therefore it can be assumed that the indigenist paradigm is not a “colonial imposition.”
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Wallace 12 (Robert A., M.A. from Marshall University, “DECOLONIZING THE MIND:¶ A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO INDIGENOUS¶ MOVEMENTS AND GLOBALIZATION”, December, http://mds.marshall.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1416&context=etd)
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indigenism has been described mainly as a critique of the dominant modes of¶ sociopolitical organization inherent to the modern world. Although both Marxist and Liberal¶ paradigms also originated as critiques of the hegemonic political orders of their respective eras,¶ they inevitably put forth their own plans for radical social transformation. normative¶ societal blueprints described by both Liberals and Marxists were similar in that they contained inclusive universalizing assumptions about the future of humanity. Each predicts an increasing degree of homogenization as their assumptions and ideologies are¶ disseminated across the non-Western world Both paradigms are considered¶ universalizing/inclusive because each sought to subsume the entirety of humanity under its¶ respective ideological umbrella indigenism offers its own vision of a radically-redefined sociopolitical¶ world orde However whereas Liberalism and Marxism promote a universalizing/inclusive¶ normative regime, indigenism advocates one which is universalizing/exclusive system of colonial relations has been deconstructed and indigenous peoples¶ have secured land and autonomy, they would not seek to impose their own values or political¶ order upon the non-indigenous peoples of the world Differing assumptions and attitudes¶ about nature and citizenship are much less problematic if they are formed in a context of mutual¶ respect and cultural heterogeneity.¶ The remainder of this section will detail the North American indigenist plan for a postcolonial¶ indigenous polity. The indigenist system is predicated on four distinct socio-technical¶ concepts: soft-path technology, deep ecology, green anarchism, and global balkanization. Each¶ of these conceptual categories plays a specific role in the overall function and organization of the¶ indigenist polity. Taken Furthermore, each concept reflects the underlying assumptions which support the indigenist paradigm. Taken together, these four components constitute an old form¶ of indigenous socialism which Marx referred to as “primitive communism The North American indigenist literature provides a compelling conceptual platform from¶ which to frame a new paradigm. Not only does it incorporate the underlying themes of Latin¶ American “indigenisms,” it establishes an entire theoretical/normative worldview which¶ carefully balances critique with praxis. The assumptions inherent to an indigenist paradigm¶ would provide a valuable interpretive tool for Western social scientists. This qualifier does not¶ mean that one must accept these assumptions as fact, only that they must be fully considered¶ when analyzing indigenous resistance to globalization. assumptions inherent to the indigenist paradigm are wholly derived from indigenous contexts and thus cannot be¶ considered “imperial impositions” in the vein of Marxist or liberal assumptions about humanity¶ and political life
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Indigenism criticizes hegemonic political structures WITHOUT collapsing the world under the norms of an “ideological umbrella”--for this reason, indigenism should be considered the only paradigm in which to deconstruct coloniality – as opposed to things like Marxism and Liberalism which make inclusive, universalizing assumptions about the future
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The structure of European society is, by its very nature, a system of¶ oppression & control. It is organized in a pyramid structure, with a small elite at¶ the top and the masses of people at the bottom. Indigenous peoples comprise¶ the bottom layer of this pyramid, and it can be said that it is literally built on top¶ of them (i.e., in Mexico City, the Presidential 'Palace is built on top of an Aztec¶ temple). The pyramid structure is one that reappears throughout civilization, reflecting the oppressive relationships &¶ patterns upon which such society's are based. The patriarchal family unit, the government, the church, the army, the¶ corporation; all share similar organizations of hierarchy, central authority, and control.¶ In society, one's position in this pyramid is determined by gender, race, and economic class; the global elite are¶ overwhelmingly rich white males. They are the descendents of the European nobility and aristocracy established after the¶ collapse ofthe Roman Empire.. Their rise to global power as a class began with the 1492 invasion ofthe Americas. This¶ class system is maintained in the interests of the rulers and is protected by national police and military forces (including¶ courts & prisons).¶ Globally, the pyramid of power exists in the relations between nations; the predominantly Euro-American Group of¶ Seven (the G7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States. With Russia it is the 08)¶ control the international political and economic system. They are the top ofthe pyramid. Most ofthe world's countries are¶ poor and impoverished, forming the bottom layers ofthe pyramid. Following the period of military invasion, and once¶ an occupation has been established, surviving Indigenous¶ populations are then subjected to policies of assimilation. This¶ is only possible after their military defeat.¶ In many colonial situations, a first step in assimilation¶ is to contain the surviving Indigenous populations in a¶ reservation system (Le., the South African Bantustan, or¶ reserves in North America). This is necessary to 'open up¶ territory for settlement & exploitation, while providing a basis¶ for systematic indoctrination into European society.¶ In many colonial situations, it is the Church and¶ missionaries who begin the process of indoctrination. A¶ common tactic is the forcible removal of children from their¶ families and communities, and their placement in Church-run¶ schools (i.e., missions, Residential or Industrial Schools, etc.).¶ A primary target for indoctrination are chiefs or high¶ ranking families; once converted, they serve as useful¶ collaborators, able to influence their communities and to¶ mobilize resources.¶ Along with education, all aspects of the colonial¶ society are utilized in a process of assimilation, i.e., political,¶ economic, ideological, cultural, etc. The goal is to eradicate¶ as much of the Indigenous culture & philosophy as possible,¶ .and to replace these with those of European civilization.¶ Assimilation is a final phase in colonization. What distinguishes it from the previous stages of recon, invasion &¶ occupation is its primarily psychological aspects. It is not a military attack against a village, but a psychological attack against the mind & belief system of a people.¶ As a result of assimilation polices in Canada& the US, generations of Indigenous people have become increasingly¶ integrated into European society. Since the 1970s, more Indigenous people have become professionals (lawyers, doctors,¶ businessmen, etc.), and more have passed through universities or ·colleges. As a result of this increased training, band¶ councils now self-administer government policies and are more involved in business & resource exploitation that at any time¶ in the past.¶ While this is promoted as progress (and even 'decolonizaton'), it is actually greater assimilation into the colonial¶ society. Overall, today's generations ofIndigenous people show a greater degree ofassimilation than previous ones. Some¶ factors that account for this are the effects ofresidential schools, decline of culture, reduced reliance on traditional ways of¶ life, greater dependence on the colonial system, increased urbanization, and ongoing exposure to Western culture through¶ modem communications (TV, movies, music, printed material, etc.).
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Warrior 11 (Zig-Zag, writer for Warrior Publications, Promoting Indigenous Warrior Culture, Fighting Spirit, & Resistance Movement, “Colonization and Decolonization: A Manual for Indigenous Liberation in the 21st Century” 2011)
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The structure of European society is, by its very nature, a system of¶ oppression & control It is organized in a pyramid structure, with a small elite at¶ the top and the masses of people at the bottom. Indigenous peoples comprise¶ the bottom layer of this pyramid, and it can be said that it is literally built on top¶ of them pyramid structure is reflecting the oppressive relationships &¶ patterns upon which such society's are based The patriarchal family unit, the government, the church, the army, the¶ corporation; all share similar organizations of hierarchy, central authority, and control. one's position in this pyramid is determined by gender, race, and economic class; the global elite are¶ overwhelmingly rich white males. They are the descendents of the European nobility and aristocracy established after the¶ collapse ofthe Roman Empire Globally, the pyramid of power exists in the relations between nations; Following the period of military invasion, and once¶ an occupation has been established, surviving Indigenous¶ populations are then subjected to policies of assimilation. Along with education, all aspects of the colonial¶ society are utilized in a process of assimilation The goal is to eradicate¶ as much of the Indigenous culture & philosophy as possible,¶ .and to replace these with those of European civilization. . It is not a military attack against a village, but a psychological attack against the mind & belief system of a people
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Eurocentric society is built on the oppression of indigenous people— fighting coloniality must happen at the level of mind and subjectivity
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For these reasons, if one aims at overcoming modernity, it becomes¶ necessary to deny the denial of the myth of modernity from an ethics of¶ responsibility.18 Thus, the other denied and victimized side of modernity¶ must first be unveiled as “innocent”: it is the “innocent victims” of ritual¶ sacrifice that in the self-realization of their innocence cast modernity as¶ guilty of a sacrificial and conquering violence—that is, of a constitutive,¶ originary, essential violence. By way of denying the innocence of modernity¶ and of affirming the alterity of the other (which was previously denied),¶ it is possible to “discover” for the first time the hidden “other side” of¶ modernity: the peripheral colonial world, the sacrificed indigenous peoples,¶ the enslaved black, the oppressedwoman,the alienated infant, the estranged¶ popular culture: the victims of modernity, all of them victims of an irrational¶ act that contradicts modernity’s ideal of rationality.¶ Only when the civilizing and exculpating myths of modern violence¶ are denied and the injustice inherent to sacrificial praxis both inside¶ and outside of Europe is recognized is it possible to overcome the essential¶ limitation of “emancipatory reason.” This overcoming of emancipatory¶ reason as a liberating reason is possible only when both enlightened reason’s¶ Eurocentrism and the developmentalist fallacy of the hegemonic process of¶ modernization are unmasked. It ismycontention here that these operations¶ can still be performed from enlightened reason when one ethically discovers¶ the dignity of the other (of the other culture, sex, or gender), when one¶ pronounces innocent the victims of modernity by affirming their alterity¶ as identity in the exteriority. In this manner, modern reason is transcended¶ not as denial of reason as such, but rather as denial of the violent, Eurocentric,¶ developmentalist, hegemonic reason. What is at stake here is what¶ I have called “transmodernity,” a worldwide ethical liberation project in¶ which alterity, which was part and parcel of modernity, would be able to¶ fulfill itself.19 The fulfillment of modernity has nothing to do with a shift¶ from the potentialities of modernity to the actuality of European modernity.¶ Indeed, the fulfillment of modernity would be a transcendental shift¶ where modernity and its denied alterity, its victims, would mutually fulfill each other in a creative process. The transmodern project is the mutual¶ fulfillment of the “analectic” solidarity of center/periphery, woman/man,¶ mankind/earth, western culture/peripheral postcolonial cultures, different¶ races, different ethnicities, different classes. It should be noted here that¶ this mutual fulfillment of solidarity does not take place by pure denial but¶ rather by subsumption from alterity.20All of this implies that what is at stake here is not a premodern¶ project that would consist of a folkloric affirmation of the past, nor is¶ it an antimodern project of the kind put forward by conservative, rightwing,¶ populist or fascist groups. Finally, it is not only a postmodern project¶ that would deny modernity and would critique all reason, thus falling¶ into a nihilist irrationalism or a pure affirmation of difference without¶ conmensurability. This is a transmodern project that would emerge by real¶ subsumption of the rational emancipatory character of modernity and its¶ denied alterity (the other of modernity) by way of the denial of modernity’s¶ sacrificial-mythical character (which justifies modernity’s innocence over its¶ victims and, by this token, becomes irrational in a contradictory manner).¶ It is true that the culture that will subsequently produce modernity¶ formally developed in certain medieval European cities, especially in¶ those of the Renaissance quattrocento. However, modernity only truly began¶ when the historical conditions of its real origin were met: in 1492, when¶ a real worldwide expansion took place, when the colonial world became¶ organized and the usufruct of its victims’ lives began. Modernity really¶ began in 1492: that is my thesis. The real overcoming of modernity (as subsumption¶ and not merely as Hegelian Aufhebung) is then the subsumption¶ of its emancipatory, rational, European character transcended as a worldwide¶ liberation project from its denied alterity. Transmodernity is a new¶ liberation project with multiple dimensions: political, economic, ecological,¶ erotic, pedagogic, religious.¶
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Dussel 2k (Enrique D, professor in the Departament of Philosophy in the Metropolitan Autonomous University (UAM), Campus Iztapalapa in Mexico City, doctorate in philosophy in the Complutense University of Madrid and a doctorate in history from the Sorbonne of Paris. He also has a license in theology from Paris and Münster. He has been awarded doctorates honoris causa from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and the Higher University of San Andrés in Bolivia; “Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism” Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 1, Issue 3, 2000, pp. 465-478)
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it becomes¶ necessary to deny the denial of the myth of modernity from an ethics of responsibility the denied and victimized side of modernity¶ must first be unveiled as “innocent”: it is the “innocent victims” of ritual¶ sacrifice that in the self-realization of their innocence cast modernity as¶ guilty of a sacrificial and conquering violence—that is, of a constitutive,¶ originary, essential violence By denying the innocence of modernity and of affirming the alterity of the other ),¶ it is possible to “discover” for the first time the hidden “other side” of¶ modernity: the peripheral colonial world, the sacrificed indigenous peoples,¶ the enslaved black, the oppressedwoman,the alienated infant, the estranged¶ popular culture: the victims of modernity, all of them victims of an irrational act that contradicts modernity’s ideal of rationality Only when the civilizing and exculpating myths of modern violence¶ are denied and the injustice inherent to sacrificial praxis both inside¶ and outside of Europe is recognized is it possible to overcome the essential¶ limitation of “emancipatory reason.” This is possible only when both enlightened reason’s¶ Eurocentrism and the developmentalist fallacy of the hegemonic process of¶ modernization are unmasked one ethically discovers the dignity of the other one pronounces innocent the victims of modernity by affirming their alterity as identity in the exteriority. modern reason is transcended¶ not as denial of reason as such, but rather as denial of the violent, Eurocentric, developmentalist, hegemonic reason What is at stake is a worldwide ethical liberation project in¶ which alterity be able to¶ fulfill itself. the fulfillment of modernity would be a transcendental shift¶ where modernity and its denied alterity, its victims, would mutually fulfill each other in a creative process. this mutual fulfillment of solidarity does not take place by pure denial but¶ rather by subsumption from alterity what is at stake is not a premodern¶ project nor is¶ it an antimodern project This is a transmodern project that would emerge by real¶ subsumption of the rational emancipatory character of modernity and its¶ denied alterity by way of the denial of modernity’s sacrificial-mythical character (which justifies modernity’s innocence over its¶ victims and, by this token, becomes irrational in a contradictory manner real overcoming of modernity is the subsumption¶ of its emancipatory, rational, European character transcended as a worldwide¶ liberation project from its denied alterity. Transmodernity is a new¶ liberation project with multiple dimensions: political, economic, ecological,¶ erotic, pedagogic, religious
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The alt is to deny the innocence of modernity and affirm the alterity and dignity of the other. Vote negative to unmask the true violence of the aff and adopt an ethics of responsibility
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In October 1998, there was a conference/dialogue at Duke University ¶ between the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group and the Latin American Subaltern ¶ Studies Group. The dialogue initiated at this conference eventually resulted in the ¶ publication of several issues of the journal NEPANTLA. However, this conference was ¶ the last time the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group met before their split. ¶ Among the many reasons and debates that produced this split, there are two that I ¶ would like to stress. The members of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group ¶ were primarily Latinamericanist scholars in the USA. Despite their attempt at producing a radical and alternative knowledge, they reproduced the epistemic schema of Area Studies in the United States. With a few exceptions, they produced ¶ studies about the subaltern rather than studies with and from a subaltern ¶ perspective. Like the imperial epistemology of Area Studies, theory was still located ¶ in the North while the subjects to be studied are located in the South. This colonial ¶ epistemology was crucial to my dissatisfaction with the project. As a Latino in the ¶ United States, I was dissatisfied with the epistemic consequences of the knowledge ¶ produced by this Latinamericanist group. They underestimated in their work ¶ ethnic/racial perspectives coming from the region, while giving privilege ¶ predominantly to Western thinkers. This is related to my second point: they gave ¶ epistemic privilege to what they called the “four horses of the apocalypse” (Mallon ¶ 1994; Rodríguez 2001), that is, Foucault, Derrida, Gramsci and Guha. Among the ¶ four main thinkers they privilege, three are Eurocentric thinkers while two of them ¶ (Derrida and Foucault) form part of the poststructuralist/postmodern Western canon. ¶ Only one, Rinajit Guha, is a thinker thinking from the South. By privileging Western ¶ thinkers as their central theoretical apparatus, they betrayed their goal to produce ¶ subaltern studies. ¶ Among the many reasons for the split of the Latin American Subaltern Studies ¶ Group, one of them was between those who read subalternity as a postmodern ¶ critique (which represents a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism) and those who ¶ read subalternity as a decolonial critique (which represents a critique of Eurocentrism ¶ from subalternized and silenced knowledges) [Mignolo 2000: 183-186; 213-214]. ¶ For those of us that took side with the decolonial critique, the dialogue with the Latin ¶ American Subaltern Studies Group made evident the need to epistemologically ¶ transcend, that is, decolonize the Western canon and epistemology. The South ¶ Asian Subaltern Studies Group’s main project is a critique to Western European ¶ colonial historiography about India and to Indian nationalist Eurocentric ¶ historiography of India. But by using a Western epistemology and privileging Gramsci ¶ and Foucault, constrained and limited the radicalism of their critique to Eurocentrism. ¶ Although they represent different epistemic projects, the South Asian Subaltern ¶ School privilege of Western epistemic canon overlapped with the sector of the Latin ¶ American Subaltern Studies Group that sided with postmodernism. However, with all ¶ its limits, South Asian Subaltern Studies Group represents an important contribution ¶ to the critique of Eurocentrism. It forms part of an intellectual movement known as ¶ postcolonial critique (a critique of modernity from the Global South) as opposed to the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group postmodern critique (a critique of ¶ modernity from the Global North) [Mignolo 2000]. These debates made clear to us ¶ (those who took side with the decolonial critique described above), the need to ¶ decolonize not only Subaltern Studies but also Postcolonial Studies (Grosfoguel ¶ 2006a; 2006b).
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Grosfoguel 11 (Ramon, University of California, Berkeley, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity,¶ Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality”, [http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf]
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The dialogue initiated at this conference eventually resulted in the ¶ publication of several issues of the journal NEPANTLA. However, this conference was ¶ the last time the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group met before their split. ¶ Among the many reasons and debates that produced this split, there are two that I ¶ would like to stress. The members of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group ¶ were primarily Latinamericanist scholars in the USA. Despite their attempt at producing a radical and alternative knowledge, they reproduced the epistemic schema of Area Studies in the United States. they produced ¶ studies about the subaltern rather than studies with and from a subaltern ¶ perspective This colonial ¶ epistemology was crucial to my dissatisfaction with the project. As a Latino in the ¶ United States, I was dissatisfied with the epistemic consequences of the knowledge ¶ produced by this Latinamericanist group. They underestimated in their work ¶ ethnic/racial perspectives coming from the region, while giving privilege ¶ predominantly to Western thinkers. This is related to my second point: they gave ¶ epistemic privilege to what they called the “four horses of the apocalypse” that is, Foucault, Derrida, Gramsci and Guha. Among the ¶ four main thinkers they privilege, three are Eurocentric thinkers while two of them ¶ (Derrida and Foucault) form part of the poststructuralist/postmodern Western canon Only one is a thinker thinking from the South. By privileging Western ¶ thinkers as their central theoretical apparatus, they betrayed their goal to produce ¶ subaltern studies Among the many reasons one of them was between those who read subalternity as a postmodern ¶ critique (which represents a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism) and those who ¶ read subalternity as a decolonial critique (which represents a critique of Eurocentrism ¶ from subalternized and silenced knowledges) For those of us that took side with the decolonial critique, the dialogue with the Latin ¶ American Subaltern Studies Group made evident the need to epistemologically ¶ transcend, decolonize the Western canon and epistemology. The South ¶ Asian Subaltern Studies Group’s main project is a critique to Western European ¶ colonial historiography by using a Western epistemology and privileging Gramsci ¶ and Foucault, constrained and limited the radicalism of their critique to Eurocentrism. South Asian Subaltern Studies Group represents an important contribution ¶ to the critique of Eurocentrism It forms part of an intellectual movement known as ¶ postcolonial critique (a critique of modernity from the Global South) as opposed to the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group postmodern critique (a critique of ¶ modernity from the Global North) These debates made clear to us the need to ¶ decolonize not only Subaltern Studies but also Postcolonial Studies
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Reorienting ourselves towards a different form of thinking which is outside hegemonic power structures is key- without a reorientation to this subaltern thought we reinforce the epistemology of coloniality
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Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) was an African intellectual and psychologist, involved in Algeria's war for¶ independence in the 1950s. His analysis of colonialism and its effects on colonized peoples have had a profound impact on¶ anti-colonial resistance movements around the world. For Fanon, culture was a vital part of this resistance.¶ As noted, Indigenous culture is a primary means of decolonization. It is both a link to our ancestral past and to¶ another way of thinking, of seeing the world. It is the essence of our identity as Indigenous peoples and a vital part of¶ challenging colonial ideology. Yet, as Fanon and others have observed, this culture, when not totally erased, is warped &¶ distorted by the colonial society:¶ "The colonial situation calls a halt¶ to national culture in almost every field...¶ By the time a century or two has passed¶ there comes about a veritable emaciation¶ [starvation, or thinning out] of the stock of¶ national culture. It becomes a set of¶ automatic habits, some traditions of dress¶ and a few broken-down institutions. Little¶ movement can be discerned in such¶ remnants of culture; there is no real¶ creativity and no overflowing life.· The¶ poverty ofthe people, national oppression¶ and the inhibition of culture are one and¶ the same thing. After a century ofcolonial¶ domination we fmd a culture, which is¶ rigid in the extreme, or rather, what we¶ findare the dregs [left-overs] ofculture, its¶ mineral strata, The withering away of the¶ reality of the nation and the death-pangs of¶ the national culture are linked to each other¶ in mutual dependences."¶ (Frantz Fanon, Wretched of the¶ Earth, p. 237-38).¶ Here, Fanon describes the effects¶ of colonization on culture. Its natural¶ development, the incorporation of new¶ experiences, etc., are more or less stopped¶ at the point of contact. In many ways, it is¶ the colonial power (or anthropologists,¶ etc.) that comes to : define what is¶ traditional and what is not. The colonized,¶ in an effort to retain traditional culture, at the same time also stop its development and impose strict limits on interpretation¶ in an effort to retain an imagined 'purity'. While superficial aspects of culture remain, the essence & vitality o fthe culture¶ itself are lost or minimized (think pow-wow, or consider the influences of Christianity & New Age 'spiritualism' on¶ Indigenous culture).¶ ous culture).¶ An important point Fanon makes is that a people's culture is directly linked to the physical world: the colonial¶ occupation of a nation's territory is total, affecting everything & everyone. According to Fanon, it is the anti-colonial¶ resistance that revitalizes the culture of the colonized:¶ "It is the fight for national existence which sets culture moving and opens to it the doors of creation... We believe¶ that the organized undertaking by a colonized people to re-establish the sovereignty of that nation constitutes the most¶ complete and obvious cultural manifestation that exists. It is not alone the success of the struggle, which afterwards gives¶ validity and vigor to culture; culture is not put into cold storage during the conflict. The struggle itself in its development¶ and in its internal progression sends culture along different paths and traces out entirely new ones for it. The struggle for¶ freedom does not give back to the national culture its former value and shapes; this struggle which aims at a fundamentally different set of relations between [people] cannot leave intact either the form or the content ofthe people's culture. After the conflict, there is not only the disappearance of colonialism but also the disappearance of the colonized..."
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Warrior 11 (Zig-Zag, writer for Warrior Publications, Promoting Indigenous Warrior Culture, Fighting Spirit, & Resistance Movement, “Colonization and Decolonization: A Manual for Indigenous Liberation in the 21st Century” 2011)
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culture was a vital part of this resistance. Indigenous culture is a primary means of decolonization. It is both a link to our ancestral past and to¶ another way of thinking, of seeing the world this culture, when not totally erased, is warped &¶ distorted by the colonial society The colonial situation calls a halt¶ to national culture in almost every field...¶ By the time a century or two has passed¶ there comes about a veritable emaciation of the stock of¶ national culture The withering away of the¶ reality of the nation and the death-pangs of¶ the national culture are linked to each other¶ in mutual dependences colonization natural¶ development, the incorporation of new¶ experiences, etc., are more or less stopped¶ at the point of contact it is¶ the colonial power that comes to : define what is¶ traditional and what is not The colonized,¶ in an effort to retain traditional culture, at the same time also stop its development and impose strict limits on interpretation¶ in an effort to retain an imagined 'purity' While superficial aspects of culture remain, the essence & vitality o fthe culture¶ itself are lost or minimized a people's culture is directly linked to the physical world: the colonial¶ occupation of a nation's territory is total, affecting everything & everyone. , it is the anti-colonial¶ resistance that revitalizes the culture of the colonized:¶ "It is the fight for national existence which sets culture moving and opens to it the doors of creation. organized undertaking by a colonized people to re-establish the sovereignty of that nation constitutes the most complete and obvious cultural manifestation that exists. It is not alone the success of the struggle, which afterwards gives¶ validity and vigor to culture; culture is not put into cold storage during the conflict. The struggle itself in its development and in its internal progression sends culture along different paths and traces out entirely new ones for it. The struggle for¶ freedom does not give back to the national culture its former value and shapes; this struggle which aims at a fundamentally different set of relations between [people] cannot leave intact either the form or the content ofthe people's culture. After the conflict, there is not only the disappearance of colonialism but also the disappearance of the colonized
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The struggle for decolonization means destroying the very category of the colonized—only absolute rejection can lead to the recreation of indigenous culture and the possibility of diverse modernities.
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Decolonization is the ending of colonialism and¶ the liberation of the colonized. This requires the¶ dismantling of the colonial government and its entire¶ social system upon which control & exploitation are¶ based. Decolonization, then, is a revolutionary struggle¶ aimed at transforming the entire social system and reestablishing the sovereignty of tribal peoples, In political¶ terms, this means a radical de-centralization of national¶ power (i.e., the dismantling of the nation-state) and the¶ establishment of local autonomy (community & region,¶ traditionally the village and tribal nation).¶ Any discussion of decolonization that does not¶ take into consideration the destruction of the colonial¶ system & the liberation ofland & people can only lead to¶ greater assimilation & control. The demand for greater¶ political & economic power by chiefs & councils,¶ although presented as a form of decolonization (i.e.,¶ "self-government"), only serves to assimilate Indigenous¶ peoples further into the colonial system.¶ Just as colonialism enters and passes through¶ various phases, beginning first with recon missions and¶ then the application of military force, so too does¶ decolonization. It would be a mistake to conceive of¶ decolonization as a single event. Instead, it is a process¶ that begins with individuals & small groups. The primary¶ focus in the first phase of decolonization is on¶ .disengaging from the colonial system" and re-learning¶ one's history, culture, etc. This phase places a heavy¶ emphasis on rejecting European society & embracing all¶ that isIndigenous as good & positive.¶ Some common steps in this phase include¶ returning to one's community, re-establishing family¶ relations, re-Ieaming culture (inc. art, language, songs,¶ ceremonies, hunting, fishing, etc.). This not only¶ counters the destructive effects of colonialism, but also¶ instills in the Indigenous person a greater respect &¶ appreciation for their own culture and way oflife. In many ways it is a struggle for identity & purpose. While this is a¶ crucial first step in any decolonization process, without the infusion ofradical & revolutionary analysis, however, the focus¶ on cultural identity in and of itself does not necessarily lead to anti-colonial consciousness. In fact, this focus on 'culture'¶ alone can easily lead to conservative and even pro-colonial sentiments.
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Warrior 11 (Zig-Zag, writer for Warrior Publications, Promoting Indigenous Warrior Culture, Fighting Spirit, & Resistance Movement, “Colonization and Decolonization: A Manual for Indigenous Liberation in the 21st Century” 2011)
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Decolonization is the ending of colonialism and¶ the liberation of the colonized. This requires the¶ dismantling of the colonial government and its entire¶ social system upon which control & exploitation are¶ based Decolonization is a revolutionary struggle¶ aimed at transforming the entire social system and reestablishing the sovereignty of tribal peoples In political¶ terms, this means a radical de-centralization of national¶ power ) and the¶ establishment of local autonomy ).¶ Any discussion of decolonization that does not¶ take into consideration the destruction of the colonial¶ system & the liberation ofland & people can only lead to¶ greater assimilation & control. It would be a mistake to conceive of¶ decolonization as a single event Instead, it is a process¶ that begins with individuals & small groups. The primary¶ focus in the first phase of decolonization is on¶ .disengaging from the colonial system" and re-learning¶ one's history, culture, etc. Some common steps in this phase include¶ returning to one's community, re-establishing family¶ relations, re-Ieaming culture This not only¶ counters the destructive effects of colonialism, but also¶ instills in the Indigenous person a greater respect &¶ appreciation for their own culture and way oflife. In many ways it is a struggle for identity & purpose. however, the focus¶ on cultural identity in and of itself does not necessarily lead to anti-colonial consciousness.
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Decolonization is a total and ongoing process—we must begin from the total annihilation of the colonial system. Only then do ethics, culture and agency become meaningful or possible
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If it is true that European–North American modernity has had¶ economic and military hegemony over other cultures (Chinese, Southeast¶ Asian, Hindustani, Islamic, Bantu, Latin American [mestizo, Aymara,¶ Quechua, Maya], etc.) for only the last two hundred years—and over Africa¶ for only a little more than one hundred years, since 1885—then this is not enough time to penetrate the “ethico-mythical nucleus” (to borrow Paul Ricoeur’s¶ term) of the intentional cultural millenary structures. It is therefore¶ no miracle that the consciousness of these ignored and excluded cultures¶ is on the rise, along with the discovery of their disparaged identities. The¶ same thing is happening with the regional cultures dominated and silenced¶ by European modernity, such as the Galician, Catalan, Basque, and Andalusian¶ cultures in Spain; the diverse regions and cultural nations in Italy¶ (especially the Mezzogiorno), Germany (especially Bavaria and the five¶ Länder of the East), France, and even the United Kingdom (where the¶ Scottish, Irish, and other groups, like the Québécois in Canada, struggle¶ for the recognition of their identities); and the minorities in the United¶ States (especially Afro-Americans and Hispanics). All of this outlines a¶ multipolar twenty-first century world, where cultural difference is increasingly¶ affirmed, beyond the homogenizing pretensions of the present capitalist¶ globalization and its supposedly universal culture, and even beyond¶ the postmodern affirmation of difference that finds it difficult to imagine¶ cultural universalities from a millenary tradition outside of Europe and¶ the United States. This “trans”-modernity should adopt the best that the¶ modern technological revolution has to offer—discarding antiecological¶ and exclusivelyWestern aspects—and put it at the service of differentiated¶ valorized worlds, ancient and actualized, with their own traditions and¶ ignored creativity. This will allow the emergence of the enormous cultural¶ and human richness that the transnational capitalist market now attempts¶ to suppress under the empire of “universal” commodities that materially¶ subsume food (one of the most difficult things to universalize) into capital.¶ The future “trans”-modernity will be multicultural, versatile, hybrid,¶ postcolonial, pluralist, tolerant, and democratic (but beyond the modern¶ liberal democracy of the European state). It will have splendid millenary¶ traditions25 and be respectful of exteriority and heterogeneous identities.¶ The majority of humanity retains, reorganizes (renovating and including¶ elements of globality),26 and creatively develops cultures in its everyday,¶ enlightened horizon. The cultures of this majority deepen the valorative¶ “common sense” of their participants’ real and particular existences, countering¶ the exclusionary process of globalization, which precisely because¶ of this process inadvertently “pushes” toward a “trans”-modernity. It is a¶ return to the consciousness of the great majorities of humanity, of their¶ excluded historical unconscious!
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Dussel 2 (Enrique D, professor in the Departament of Philosophy in the Metropolitan Autonomous University (UAM), Campus Iztapalapa in Mexico City, doctorate in philosophy in the Complutense University of Madrid and a doctorate in history from the Sorbonne of Paris. He also has a license in theology from Paris and Münster. He has been awarded doctorates honoris causa from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and the Higher University of San Andrés in Bolivia; “World-System and "Trans"-Modernity” Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2002, pp. 221-244)
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the consciousness of these ignored and excluded cultures¶ is on the rise, along with the discovery of their disparaged identities. of this outlines a¶ multipolar twenty-first century world, where cultural difference is increasingly¶ affirmed, beyond the homogenizing pretensions of the present capitalist¶ globalization and its supposedly universal culture, and even beyond¶ the postmodern affirmation of difference that finds it difficult to imagine¶ cultural universalities from a millenary tradition outside of Europe and¶ the United States This “trans”-modernity should adopt the best that the¶ modern technological revolution has to offer—discarding antiecological¶ and exclusivelyWestern aspects—and put it at the service of differentiated¶ valorized worlds, ancient and actualized, with their own traditions and¶ ignored creativity This will allow the emergence of the enormous cultural and human richness that the transnational capitalist market now attempts to suppress under the empire of “universal” commodities that materially¶ subsume food into capital The future “trans”-modernity will be multicultural, versatile, hybrid, postcolonial, pluralist, tolerant, and democratic but beyond the modern¶ liberal democracy of the European state). It will have splendid millenary traditions25 and be respectful of exteriority and heterogeneous identities. The majority of humanity retains, reorganizes creatively develops cultures in its everyday,¶ enlightened horizon. The cultures of this majority deepen the valorative¶ “common sense” of their participants’ real and particular existences, countering¶ the exclusionary process of globalization, which precisely because¶ of this process inadvertently “pushes” toward a “trans”-modernity. It is a¶ return to the consciousness of the great majorities of humanity, of their¶ excluded historical unconscious
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We advocate a multicultural transmodern world that affirms human richness and respect
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To be sure, there are many Latina/o scholars and allies who take the¶ challenges outhned above seriously and already have a strong record of research¶ and institufion-building in much needed areas." At the same time, it¶ is not strange for many of these scholars and others to confront exclusion,¶ misunderstanding, and marginahzation, not only in society at large, but also¶ in the academy itself. They find that normative university culture tends to¶ demand as much assimilation from scholars who belong to non-normadve¶ groups or who specialize in the study of problems or issues that are particularly¶ relevant to non-normative groups, as normative society demands assimilation¶ from its multiple minoritized populations.^"* Just like in society, in the¶ university there is a system of penalties and rewards supported by skewed¶ forms of democracy, appeals to equality, and shared governance." It is not strange for these scholars to have to jusdfy their objects of¶ study and research quesdons repeatedly and be pressured to comply with¶ what is considered the established norm.^^ This is a major problem for Latina/¶ o scholars as the serious consideradon of the history, memories, cultural¶ acdvism, knowledge, polidcal dynamics, and social and economic condidons¶ of minoridzed populadons often results in the introducdon of quesdons¶ and methods that challenge the boundaries of established disciplines, fields,¶ and the division of knowledge in the academy." While Latina/os are under¶ siege in society, the situadon in the academy is not dissimilar—at least not¶ for those who are most interested in addressing issues that particularly affect¶ Ladna/os and other minoridzed populadons or groups, or who raise quesdons¶ from muldple minoritized perspecdves. The connecdon among the status of Ladna/os in society, the consideradon¶ of their history, memory, and knowledge in the academy, and the condidons¶ within which progressive scholars who focus on quesdons relevant to¶ Latina/os have most recendy been made obvious by the attack on Raza Studies¶ by the passing of Proposidon H.B. 2281 in Arizona,^* H.B, 2281 was¶ passed shortly after S,B, 1070,^9 While the latter targets "illegal immigrants"¶ in the state of Arizona, H.B. 2281 focuses on Raza and Mexican¶ American Studies in public schools.^" Combined, the two proposidons¶ demonstrate the perspecdve that neither certain migrants (and by extension¶ people who look like them), nor the memories, historical perspecdves, and¶ knowledge of that populadon, are fit to be included in the public or the¶ public realm. In the face of actual demographic shifts in the inhabitants of¶ the state, the response is to further delimit the sphere of the public by excluding¶ people and their histories, memories, cultures, and understandings of¶ it. The only routes left in this context would seem to be voluntary departure,¶ forced removal, condnued persecudon, exclusion and minoritizadon, unidirecdonal¶ assimiladon, and resistance in response to the nadvist menaces.¶ The social and pohdcal climate in Arizona is particularly significant¶ because it dramadzes a reality that has already existed and that is growing in¶ other states in the nation.^' It is a response to rapid demographic change,where traditionally undesirable communities are growing in number and¶ where a variety of groups respond, not only by Hmiting the possibilities for¶ citizenship but also by limifing the scope of what is considered public."¶ This situation leads to a more numerous population being considered out of¶ the boundaries of the "people" and closer to that of the "damned."" The¶ banning from belonging to the pubhc focuses on bodies as much as it also¶ targets minds, or consciousness and knowledge, thereby reducing the possibilities¶ for diversity even among those who can claim to be an authentic¶ part of the public. While privatization and the expectation of unilateral assimilation erode¶ the strength of the public, Latina/os are increasingly relegated to the space of¶ the "under-public" or "damned;" and if Latina/os make it to the sphere of¶ the public, or rise to the position of managerial private compensation (or any¶ other position in society), the idea is that only their bodies make it there, but¶ not their minds.^"* It is in this context that it is particularly important to assert¶ the presence of Lafina/os in bodies and in mind in society and public institutions,¶ including the academy. It is important to challenge problematic tendencies¶ in society and in each of those institutions, while also formulating¶ goals and ideals that can help to create a larger and healthier sense of the full¶ extent of the pubhc in all its richness and diversity. Although Latina/os and¶ their allies have been working on this for a long time," and their productive¶ efforts should be valued and supported, there is a need to continue conceiving¶ and creating projects and institutions that can complement the work that¶ is already being done and contribute to make more powerful and visible the¶ collective strength of those who wish to evade new forms of social and epistemological apartheid and their consequences. The idea for creating a Latina/¶ o Academy of Arts and Sciences was bom out of this wish and need.
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Maldonado-Torres 11 (Nelson, PhD, Religious Studies with a Certificate for Outstanding Work in Africana Studies, Brown University¶ BA, Philosophy, University of Puerto Rico: ”THE LATINA/O ACADEMY OF ARTS¶ AND SCIENCES: DECOLONIZING¶ KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY IN THE¶ CONTEXT OF NEO-APARTHEID” Harvard Latino Law Review, Vol 14, 2011)
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many Latina/o scholars exclusion,¶ misunderstanding, and marginahzation, not only in society at large, but also¶ in the academy itself. normative university culture tends to¶ demand as much assimilation from scholars who belong to non-normadve¶ groups or who specialize in the study of problems or issues that are particularly¶ relevant to non-normative groups, as normative society demands assimilation¶ from its multiple minoritized populations , in the¶ university there is a system of penalties and rewards supported by skewed¶ forms of democracy, appeals to equality, and shared governance." scholars have to jusdfy their objects of¶ study and research quesdons repeatedly and be pressured to comply with¶ what is considered the established norm. Latina/os are under¶ siege in society, the situadon in the academy is not dissimilar Latina/os are increasingly relegated to the space of¶ the "under-public" or "damned;" and if Latina/os make it to the sphere of¶ the public the idea is that only their bodies make it there, but¶ not their minds It is in this context that it is particularly important to assert¶ the presence of Lafina/os in bodies and in mind in society and public institutions,¶ including the academy. It is important to challenge problematic tendencies in society and in each of those institutions, while also formulating goals and ideals that can help to create a larger and healthier sense of the full extent of the pubhc in all its richness and diversity there is a need to continue conceiving and creating projects and institutions that can complement the work that is already being done and contribute to make more powerful and visible the collective strength of those who wish to evade new forms of social and epistemological apartheid and their consequences.
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The alt is key to affirm Latin@ scholarship here, in an academic space in which it is regularly excluded or assimilated
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Whatever we understand by knowing or knowledge (or, by extension, by true or truth), we almost invariably know amid unstable, asymmetric power relations, interests, and dynamics. The old dictum that knowledge is power probably contains more (and more problematic) wisdom than what we usually would want to grant it. To know is always, at least implicitly, a claim to know, thus an attempt to either reaflirm “what everybody knows” (and thus gain recognition as a normal, acceptable member of the community), or to sway others toward a more or less novel way of understanding (and thus gain recognition as a legitimate challenger of accepted verities). Claiming to know something, to have knowledge, is thus always a kind of claim to power, a political move.¶ Knowledge might simply be, to begin with, a claim to share and accept what all or most (or those with the weightiest say) in a community accept and share as “true,” “obvious,” “mandatory,” “expected,” or the like (as in “we all know that undocumented, illegal, and criminal go together”). That is, it might be a way of claiming that the present, pre- vailing state of affairs is OK, is as it should be, and needs not be chal- lenged. (Claiming) knowledge, therefore, might entail a surreptitious threat to whoever dares to even think of challenging the prevailing power arrangements in the community (be such community a family, a network of specialized scientific experts, a nation, a political constituency, a hospital, a religious congregation, etc.): a subtle summons to acquiesce to the establishment.¶ Knowing, however, may involve a claim to know something that oth- ers do not know: a claim to a “new” or “hidden” knowledge, one that does not fully mesh either with the prevailing power arrangements in the community or with the established epistemological order therein (i.e., the limits of what is socially accepted to be known and knowable). Think of the claim that “first generation immigrants have a significantly lower rate of involvement in criminal activities than U.S.-born, third gen- eration or higher, 'white' citizens.”¶ An utterance is then, more often than not (and regardless of the aware- ness of the “speaker”), simultaneously an epistemological and a political act(ion): awakening, activating, mobilizing not only knowledge/ s (within a wide range of possibilities going from confirmation of the prevailing state of affairs to its questioning, interruption, and/ or subversion), including in the “speaker” herself/ himself as well as in her/ his web of relations-but also awakening, activating, mobilizing power claims, rela- tions, struggles, conflicts, fears, and other types of conflictual dynamics.¶ In fact, most utterances could be seen as being in themselves, at least to a certain degree, claims to power, to authority: appeals to assent, respect, and recognition-i.e., political moves. This is particularly the case when/ if such an utterance commands (or tries to bring forth) at- tention-an attempt that is more likely to succeed if/ when the person uttering something is capable of mobilizing significant forces (social, economic, military, political, legal, emotional, etc.) behind her/ his utter- ances, or at least of giving the appearance and stirring the fear of having such capability.¶ Conversely, the “same” utterance (as seen abstractly by an “outsider”), even in the “same” community, but uttered by a different or differently located “speaker” (or by the “same” one but in a different juncture in¶ the dynamics of the “same” community) might be entirely “inaudible,” overlooked, meaningless-or worse: It might elicit rejoinders, attacks, violent silencing, or even physical suppression.¶ Or, to put it in yet other terms: No utterance (written, sung, spoken, iconic, gestured, or otherwise) can have only one meaning in or of itself; because meaning is not something residing in the utterance, or even in the utterer, but, rather, it is produced and can be “present” only ln the relation (itself unstable and perishable) between utterance (and, if some- how present, its utterer, too) and a community of interpretation-the latter equally unstable, mobile, perishable.¶ Meaning is located always in an unstable relation-a relation, among others, of course, of knowledge, inexorably located amid a dynamic larger constellation of relations, which indeed complicate the production, circulation, perception, and transformation of meaning (i.e., of knowl- edge): relations of identity, competition, exchange, power, domination, resistance, alliance, and so on, which include (but are by no means lim- ited to) gender, sexual, economic, political, cultural, linguistic, military ) and other types of relations, many of which (but not necessarily all, nor all necessarily reinforcing each other) involve lopsided, asymmetric, con- flictual power dynamics.¶ Thus, the meaning of an utterance, if any, is (re)produced in relation (both specific and variable) to the history, culture, and dynamics (includ- ing power dynamics) of a specific community-be these personified in one single individual member of a community having access to that ut- terance, or embodied in a group.¶ This suggests that, in all probability, any utterance can mean any- thing-including what would seem from certain perspectives as absolute opposite meanings-depending on the interest/ knack of the “hearer(s)” (reader/s, dancer/s, singer/s, preacher/s, professor/s, etc.) to (re)pro-¶ duce a particular meaning, as well as on her/ his/ their ability to mobilize certain forces (social, political, legal, emotional, etc.) both in favor ofsuch meaning, and over against those different or opposite understandings of the “same” utterance (and against the bearers of those other differing senses).¶ What is needed to transform a certain, accepted meaning, of a “stable” discourse (text, icon, song, etc.) in a particular community into what would have been typically grasped in that same community as its exact opposite meaning is at least, probably, time (which helps forget and¶ transform meanings), people (i.e., increased numbers of individuals and groups invested in the “new” meaning), and power (of any and/or all sorts) to both boost the “new” meaning and counter the lingering or reemerging remembrance, allegiances, and diffusion of former meanings of the “same” discourse or utterance. Is not this what happens in many of our churches with the ancient Hebrew injunction regarding hospitality to the stranger?
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Maduro 11, Otto, Latino philosopher and sociologist of religion at Drew University,, “Decolonizing Epistemologies” Chapter “An(Other) Invitation to Epistemological Humility” Fordham University Press, November 2011
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Whatever we understand by knowing or we almost invariably know amid unstable, asymmetric power relations, interests, and dynamics. The old dictum that knowledge is power probably contains more wisdom than what we usually would want to grant it. To know is always, at least implicitly, a claim to know, thus an attempt to either reaflirm “what everybody knows” (and thus gain recognition as a normal, acceptable member of the community), or to sway others toward a more or less novel way of understanding Claiming to know something, to have knowledge, is thus always a kind of claim to power, a political move.¶ (Claiming) knowledge, therefore, might entail a surreptitious threat to whoever dares to even think of challenging the prevailing power arrangements in the community An utterance is then simultaneously an epistemological and a political act awakening, activating, mobilizing knowledge utterances could be seen as claims to power, to authority: appeals to assent, respect, and recognition No utterance can have only one meaning in or of itself; because meaning is not something residing in the utterance, or even in the utterer, but, rather, it is produced and can be “present” only ln the relation (itself unstable and perishable) between utterance ) and a community of interpretation-the latter equally unstable, mobile, perishable.¶ Meaning is located always in an unstable relation of knowledge relations of identity, competition, exchange, power, domination, resistance, alliance, and so on, which include gender, sexual, economic, political, cultural, linguistic, military ) and other types of relations, many of which involve lopsided, asymmetric, con- flictual power dynamics. Thus, the meaning of an utterance, if any, is (re)produced in relation (both specific and variable) to the history, culture, and dynamics ) of a specific community-be these personified in one single individual member of a community having access to that ut- terance, or embodied in a group.¶ What is needed to transform a certain, accepted meaning, of a “stable” discourse in a particular community into what would have been typically grasped in that same community as its exact opposite meaning is at least, probably, time people and power to both boost the “new” meaning and counter the lingering or reemerging remembrance, allegiances, and diffusion of former meanings of the “same” discourse or utterance.
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ALL knowledge is produced out of history, power relations and dynamics – every utterance is an epistemological and political action
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Finally, my interest here lies in the continuities between the colonial past and current global colonial/ racial hierarchies. All too often, the social sciences and the humanities’ focus on intricacies, nuances or indeterminacies of the historical process, contribute to the invisibility of coloniality. It is not accidental that the insistence on pointing at the continuities of colonial mechanisms of exclusion and oppression most often comes from the subaltern groups, and not from established scholars in the academic world. It is enough to participate in the World Social Forum and in general to come close to social movements in Latin America and elsewhere, to corroborate that the ideas which I present here are, indeed, up to date and pertinent to the vast majority of the world’s population1. These conceptualizations are, however, often classified as “outdated” within the academic realm. This conceptualization only confirms my point – that far from having overcome the linear evolutionist and paternalistic model of Europe being the developed and the rest being underdeveloped, academics continue labeling the conceptualizations of subaltern subjects as ideas that belong to the past, which, unsurprisingly, Europe has long-gone overcome. This not only brings about questions on the legitimacy of knowledge and knowledge production; it also shows that subalternized subjects are regarded as incapable of conceptualizing their own realities.
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Grosfoguel 9 (Ramon, Associate Professor. Ethnic Studies Department,, UC Berkeley, A Decolonial Approach to Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality, Kult 6, http://postkolonial.dk/artikler/GROSFOGUEL.pdf
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the social sciences and the humanities’ focus on intricacies, nuances or indeterminacies of the historical process, contribute to the invisibility of coloniality. the insistence on pointing at the continuities of colonial mechanisms of exclusion and oppression most often comes from the subaltern groups and not from established scholars in the academic world. far from having overcome the linear evolutionist and paternalistic model of Europe being the developed and the rest being underdeveloped, academics continue labeling the conceptualizations of subaltern subjects as ideas that belong to the past, which, unsurprisingly, Europe has long-gone overcome. This not only brings about questions on the legitimacy of knowledge and knowledge production; it also shows that subalternized subjects are regarded as incapable of conceptualizing their own realities.
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Foregrounding coloniality is key to scholarship
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The conceptualisation of modernity/coloniality is grounded in a series of¶ operations that distinguish it from established theories. These include: 1)¶ locating the origins of modernity with the conquest of America and the control¶ of the Atlantic after 1492, rather than in the most commonly accepted landmarks¶ such as the Enlightenment or the end of the 18th century; 2) attention to¶ colonialism, postcolonialism and imperialism as constitutive of modernity; 3) the¶ adoption of a world perspective in the explanation of modernity, in lieu of a¶ view of modernity as an intra-European phenomenon; 4) the identification of the¶ domination of others outside the European core as a necessary dimension of¶ modernity; 5) a conception of eurocentrism as the knowledge form of modernity/¶ coloniality—a hegemonic representation and mode of knowing that claims¶ universality for itself, ‘derived from Europe’s position as center’.31 In sum, there¶ is a re-reading of the ‘myth of modernity’ in terms of modernity’s ‘underside’¶ and a new denunciation of the assumption that Europe’s development must be¶ followed unilaterally by every other culture, by force if necessary—what Dussel¶ terms ‘the developmentalist fallacy’.32 The main conclusions are, first, that the¶ proper analytical unit of analysis is modernity/coloniality—in sum, there is no¶ modernity without coloniality, with the latter being constitutive of the former.¶ Second, the fact that ‘the colonial difference’ is a privileged epistemological and¶ political space. In other words, what emerges from this alternative framework is¶ the need to take seriously the epistemic force of local histories and to think¶ theory through the political praxis of subaltern groups.
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Escobar 8 (Arturo, Kenan Distinguished Professor at UNC Chapel Hill, Ph.D, University of Calfornia, Berkeley, May 27. Third World Quarterly. Beyond the Third World: imperial¶ globality, global coloniality and antiglobalisation social movements. Third World Quarterly, Vol 25, No 1, pp 207–230)
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The conceptualisation of modernity/coloniality is grounded in a series of operations that distinguish it from established theories These include: 1) locating the origins of modernity with the conquest of America and the control of the Atlantic after 1492, rather than in the most commonly accepted landmarks such as the Enlightenment or the end of the 18th century; 2) attention to colonialism, postcolonialism and imperialism as constitutive of modernity; 3) the adoption of a world perspective in the explanation of modernity, in lieu of a view of modernity as an intra-European phenomenon ) the identification of the domination of others outside the European core as a necessary dimension of modernity; 5) a conception of eurocentrism as the knowledge form of modernity/ coloniality—a hegemonic representation and mode of knowing that claims universality for itself, ‘derived from Europe’s position as center’.31 In sum, there is a re-reading of the ‘myth of modernity’ in terms of modernity’s ‘underside’ and a new denunciation of the assumption that Europe’s development must be followed unilaterally by every other culture, by force if necessary—what Dussel terms ‘the developmentalist fallac the¶ proper analytical unit of analysis is modernity/coloniality—in sum, there is no modernity without coloniality, with the latter being constitutive of the former. Second, the fact that ‘the colonial difference’ is a privileged epistemological and political space. In other words, what emerges from this alternative framework is¶ the need to take seriously the epistemic force of local histories and to think¶ theory through the political praxis of subaltern groups.
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Your epistemology bad arguments don’t apply– ours is grounded and backed with empirical data
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Evidence-based education projects a monoculture in different education systems,¶ promotes technical skills and conceptualizes learning as a package that is transmitted¶ from teacher to students, from government to the public (Hodkinson 2005). Furthermore,¶ it also pushes minoritized bodies ‘out’ of schooling along the lines of race,¶ class, and language, while at the same time reinforcing colonial discourses of the¶ ‘other.’ Fanon (1967), in summary, aptly describes the colonizing nature of standardized¶ testing on the bodies of teachers and students, whereby their identity is reconfigured¶ into a subjectivity informed by high-stakes testing. He states:¶ Overnight the Negro [educational leaders, teachers and students] has been given …¶ frames of references within which he has had to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less¶ pretentiously, his customs and the sources on which they were based, were wiped out¶ because they were in conflict with a civilization [accountability and high-stakes testing]¶ that he did not know and that imposed itself on him. (Fanon 1967, 110) Similar to earlier colonial discourses, by espousing one standard, the evidence-based¶ education movement maintains control, as there is one goal to work towards and therefore,¶ everything is broken down into fitting that goal (i.e. improving students’ scores¶ in standardized tests). In summary, such regulations of knowledge production in terms¶ of evidence and curriculum are increasingly fixed by evidence-based education that¶ perpetuates a monoculture of the mind, where alternative ways of knowing are¶ displaced or subjugated, ‘very much like the introduction of monocultures destroying¶ the very conditions for diverse species to exist’ (Shiva 1995, 12). Similar to colonial¶ discourse, the ideas and meanings attached to evidence and the outcome of education¶ are being ‘fixed’ (Hall 1997) in evidence-based education which perpetuates a monoculture¶ of the mind in education that serves the global economy. Using such a colonial¶ discourse, proponents of evidence-based education are ‘fixing, bounding, and settling’¶ (Cohn 1996, 8) education and those within schooling.
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Shahjahan 2011 [Riyad Ahmed, Assistant Professor of Higher, Adult, and Lifelong Education (HALE) at Michigan State University. Ph.D. at the OISE/University of Toronto in Higher Education. “Decolonizing the evidence-based education and policy movement:¶ revealing the colonial vestiges in educational policy, research, and¶ neoliberal reform” Online publication date: 22 March 201, Journal of Education Policy, 26: 2,¶ 181 — 206 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2010.508176]
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Evidence-based education projects a monoculture in different education systems,¶ promotes technical skills and conceptualizes learning as a package it also pushes minoritized bodies ‘out’ of schooling along the lines of race,¶ class, and language, while at the same time reinforcing colonial discourses of the¶ ‘other. Fanon states Overnight the Negro [educational leaders, teachers and students] has been given …¶ frames of references within which he has had to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less¶ pretentiously, his customs and the sources on which they were based, were wiped out¶ because they were in conflict with a civilization [accountability and high-stakes testing]¶ that he did not know and that imposed itself on him the evidence-based¶ education movement maintains control, as there is one goal to work towards and therefore,¶ everything is broken down into fitting that goal ( In summary, such regulations of knowledge production in terms¶ of evidence and curriculum are increasingly fixed by evidence-based education that¶ perpetuates a monoculture of the mind, where alternative ways of knowing are¶ displaced or subjugated Similar to colonial¶ discourse, the ideas and meanings attached to evidence and the outcome of education¶ are being ‘fixed’ in evidence-based education which perpetuates a monoculture¶ of the mind in education that serves the global economy
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Their evidence-based education creates a monocultural approach to knowledge production which serves to exclude minoritized bodies
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In a sense, Freire’s (1970) theorizing of the dialogic nature of knowledge¶ production is important here, but it requires that both parties in the dialogue acknowledge that there is wisdom and important knowledges to be¶ gathered from the other dialogue partner. There is a need to acknowledge the significance of contextual, localized, and spiritual knowledges, in educational institutions, in the world of aid, and in societies in the South at large simply because the current epistemic hegemony is not able, as has¶ been repeatedly noted, to address these issues in a sustainable way alone. It is with this perspective that White suggests the importance of an alterna-¶ tive Western knowledge system derived from the teachings of St. Francis,¶ which I propose to call the Francisization of Western knowledge produc-¶ tion.7 There is a sense that the negotiation of a third space in relation to¶ CHAT, which encompasses different knowledge systems may be facilitated¶ with the inclusion of, or the appropriation of, aspects of this alternative¶ Western knowledge into the hegemonic one. There are, however, difficul-¶ ties with such an appropriation /inclusion due to the hegemonic power/¶ knowledge syndrome and also because of a heavy historical legacy.
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Breidlid 13 (Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 52-53)OG
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the dialogic nature of knowledge¶ production requires that both parties in the dialogue acknowledge that there is wisdom and important knowledges to be¶ gathered from the other dialogue partner. There is a need to acknowledge the significance of contextual, localized, and spiritual knowledges, in educational institutions, in the world of aid, and in societies in the South at large simply because the current epistemic hegemony is not able, as has¶ been repeatedly noted, to address these issues in a sustainable way alone. negotiation of a third space may be facilitated with appropriation of, alternative knowledge into the hegemonic one
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Perm fails – non-Western knowledge will be appropriated to strengthen colonial hegemony
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Without contradicting this perspective, although implying a completely¶ different intellectual commitment, the concept of “post”-modernity¶ (the A moment I will show in figure 2) indicates that there is a process that¶ emerges “from within” modernity and reveals a state of crisis within globalization.¶ “Trans”-modernity, in contrast, demands a whole new interpretation¶ of modernity in order to include moments that were never incorporated¶ into the European version. Subsuming the best of globalized European and¶ North American modernity, “trans”-modernity affirms “from without” the¶ essential components of modernity’s own excluded cultures in order to develop¶ a new civilization for the twenty-first century. Accepting this massive¶ exteriority to European modernity allows one to comprehend that there¶ are cultural moments situated “outside” of modernity. To achieve this, an¶ interpretation that supposes a “second” and very subtle Eurocentrism must¶ be overcome.6 One can then shift to a non-Eurocentric interpretation of¶ the history of the world-system, a system only hegemonized by Europe¶ for the last two hundred years (not five hundred). The emergence of other¶ cultures, until now depreciated and unvalued, from beyond the horizon of¶ European modernity is thus not a miracle arising from nothingness, but¶ rather a return by these cultures to their status as actors in the history of¶ the world-system. Although Western culture is globalizing—on a certain¶ technical, economic, political, and military level—this does not efface other¶ moments of enormous creativity on these same levels, moments that affirm¶ from their “exteriority” other cultures that are alive, resistant, and growing.
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Dussel 2 (Enrique D, professor in the Departament of Philosophy in the Metropolitan Autonomous University (UAM), Campus Iztapalapa in Mexico City, doctorate in philosophy in the Complutense University of Madrid and a doctorate in history from the Sorbonne of Paris. He also has a license in theology from Paris and Münster. He has been awarded doctorates honoris causa from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and the Higher University of San Andrés in Bolivia; “World-System and "Trans"-Modernity” Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2002, pp. 221-244)
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Trans”-modernity , demands a whole new interpretation¶ of modernity in order to include moments that were never incorporated¶ into the European version Subsuming the best of globalized European and¶ North American modernity, “trans”-modernity affirms “from without” the¶ essential components of modernity’s own excluded cultures in order to develop a new civilization for the twenty-first century. Accepting this massive¶ exteriority to European modernity allows one to comprehend that there¶ are cultural moments situated “outside” of modernity To achieve this, an interpretation that supposes a “second” and very subtle Eurocentrism must be overcome The emergence of other¶ cultures, until now depreciated and unvalued, from beyond the horizon of¶ European modernity is thus not a miracle arising from nothingness, but¶ rather a return by these cultures to their status as actors in the history of¶ the world-system. Although Western culture is globalizing—on a certain¶ technical, economic, political, and military level—this does not efface other¶ moments of enormous creativity on these same levels, moments that affirm¶ from their “exteriority” other cultures that are alive, resistant, and growing.
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No perm: ANY residual modernity mitigates any solvency – a COMPLETE break is necessary (also postmodernism doesn’t solve)
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Breny Mendoza raises several key questions about the turn to the left and/or the decolonial turn in Latin America, particularly as this transformation is playing out in Honduras. As she points out, in Honduras social movements are at the forefront of resistance not only to the coup but also to various forms of modern/colonial power. Like in Honduras, in countries that have shifted to the left at the state level (e.g., Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela), many activists and critical scholars have pointed out the multiple processes taking place simultaneously, and as part of this, the ongoing contradictions among the goals of social movements and those of socialist states. The move by indigenous movements and other activists, as well as that of cultural studies scholars, to rethink the dualisms that so pervade colonial/modern logic, including that of (neo)developmentalism, capital and citizenship, is perhaps at the center of the many ongoing struggles we see concerning how to imagine and institutionalize “another world.” This “another world” has been addressed in various ways, from theorizing another form of production to producing alternative form(s) of knowledge – questions that have great ontological, epistemological and political significance, at least when posed by those interested in a truly decolonial turn. As Breny alludes to, the Honduran resistance movement’s emphasis on constitutional reform exemplifies the strategy used by other left-turning governments to remake the nation. Much of the emphasis, at least originally and on the surface, has been on Latin American states’ shift away from the global neoliberal agenda; that is, on the anti-neoliberal or post-neoliberal turn. As Arturo Escobar points out (2010), Latin America was the first region to undergo structural adjustment measures – of the most extreme kind, inspired by Harvard University’s Jeffrey Sachs – and also the first where states so widely adopted (often forcibly) a World Bank/IMF inspired neoliberal restructuring agenda. Yet more recently it was also the first to resist the inequalities emerging from that process and from modern/colonial capitalism more generally, including perhaps most notably in the turn to the left, which we have now seen in up to twelve countries, or about two-thirds of the region, to varying degrees.¶ I want to respond to Breny’s commentary by focusing on an example of constitutional reform that has already occurred: namely, that of the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution and the broader revolución ciudadana that President Rafael Correa (2007-present) has promoted. I’ll also bring in some examples from the 2008 Bolivian constitution and Evo Morales’ MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) administration (2006-present). As I have followed the debates within social movements and in the constitutional assembly process, a few key disjunctures stand out, including the following: (1) the well-known disjuncture between the turn to the left and the decolonial turn; (2) a lack of analysis of the governance of intimacy (Lind 2010a) and biopolitics in both leftist and decolonial accounts of “another world”; and (3) decolonial vs. liberal challenges posed by activists in the remaking of Latin American nations.¶ First, for the most part I would argue that the Ecuadorian state is not participating in a decolonial turn but rather in a turn to a leftist form of alternative modernization, akin to Chavez’s production regime in Venezuela, Morales’ in Bolivia, and Bachelet’s center-leftist concertación in Chile (among possible others). I state this with the caveat that of course one can find many examples of decolonial strategies in Ecuador, including in the constitution itself, yet mostly the Ecuadorian state is focused on alternative modernization. As in Bolivia, Venezuela and Chile, the Ecuadorian state has continued to rely on the extraction of hydrocarbons and other resources; this is so despite the fact that the 2008 Constitution grants nature equal rights to human beings and generally advocates “well-being” over economic growth (“well being” being the translation of sumaq kawsay in Quichua or el buen vivir in Spanish). And to make matters worse – what analysts could not have predicted when the Correa administration was first inaugurated – when indigenous communities have resisted the state’s developmentalist presence, including its ongoing exploitation of nature and endorsement of the nature/culture dualism despite the new constitutional language, they have been repressed. Most sectors of the organized indigenous movement have been alienated by the Correa administration; currently there is little dialogue between the two. And although Bolivian President Morales himself identifies as indígena, he too has alienated indigenous and peasant communities in Eastern lowland Bolivia concerning his administration’s plans to build a highway on their land – a direct blow to local communities and also a denial of his own constitution’s declaration of nature as having constitutional rights. In Chile, indigenous protestors of Bachelet’s policies were arrested and labeled as terrorists (Richards in press). What these leaders are discovering (or perhaps what they are having confirmed) is that while they can create an anti-neoliberal agenda, they cannot necessarily create a post-capitalist economy based on non-capitalist forms of social and economic life, nor a post-liberal order that transcends liberal classifications of identity. There are glimpses of this, within the state and outside. For example Ecuador’s National Plan of Living Well attempts to institutionalize the “solidarity economy” alongside the capitalist economy, and the 2008 Constitution provided for an Inequality Council which would, in theory, address five axes of inequality based on race, ethnicity, ability and gender in an intersectional and transversal way. This has yet to be institutionalized, however. Moreover, we can see clear attempts within social movements to create a post-capitalist economy that challenges the modern/colonial versions of governmentality found in these states. But regardless one must distinguish between the political ideals of 21st century socialism envisioned by social movements, on one hand, and on the other, the kinds of governmentalities created by these socialist states.
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Lind 12 [Amy Lind, Mary Ellen Heintz Endowed Chair and Associate Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, University of Cincinnati “Intimate Governmentalities, the Latin American Left, and the Decolonial Turn.” feminists@law, Vol 2, No 1 (2012) https://journals.kent.ac.uk/kent/index.php/feministsatlaw/article/view/43/115]
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Mendoza raises several key questions about the decolonial turn in Latin America in Honduras social movements are at the forefront of resistance not only to the coup but also to various forms of modern/colonial powe in countries that have shifted to the left many activists have pointed out the multiple processes taking place simultaneously, the ongoing contradictions among states. The move by indigenous movements to rethink the dualisms including that of (neo)developmentalism is at the center of the many ongoing struggles we see concerning how to imagine another world.” This has been addressed in various ways, from theorizing another form of production to producing alternative form(s) of knowledge – questions that have great ontological, epistemological and political significance, Latin America was the first region to undergo structural adjustment measures – of the most extreme kind and where states so widely adopted one can find many examples of decolonial strategies in Ecuador yet mostly the state is focused on alternative modernization. state has continued to rely on the extraction of hydrocarbons despite the fact that the 2008 Constitution grants nature equal rights to human beings and generally advocates “well-being” over economic growth when indigenous communities have resisted the state’s developmentalist presence , they have been repressed Bolivian President Morales has alienated indigenous and peasant communities in Eastern lowland Bolivia indigenous protestors of Bachelet’s policies were arrested and labeled as terrorists What these leaders are discovering that while they can create an anti-neoliberal agenda, they cannot necessarily create a post-capitalist economy based on non-capitalist forms of social and economic life This has yet to be institutionalized we can see clear attempts within social movements to create a post-capitalist economy that challenges the modern/colonial versions of governmentality found in these states. But regardless one must distinguish between the political ideals of 21st century socialism and governmentalities created by these socialist states.
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Movements operating within the state are necessarily co-opted and repressed—empirics prove
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The new nomos of the earth comes with a new observer and a new epistemic foundation. This sense of "newness" will become one of the anchors of all¶ rhetoric of modernity, from the sixteenth century to the twenty-first. The Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez described it the hubris of the zero point. This second consequence sets the stage for imperial control and colonization of knowledge. ¶ Basically, zero point epistemology is the ultimate grounding of knowl- edge, which paradoxically is ungrounded, or grounded neither in geo- historical location nor in bio-graphical configurations of the bodies. The geopolitical and bio-graphic politics (e.g., body-politics, not bio-politics) of knowledge is hidden in the transparency and the universality of the zero point. It is grounding without grounding; it is in the mind and not in the brain and in the heart. Every way of knowing and sensing (feeling) that do not conform to the epistemology and aesthesis of the zero point are cast be-¶ hind in time and/or in the order of myth, legend, folklore, local knowledge, and the like. Since the zero point is always in the present of time and the center of space, it hides its own local knowledge universally projected. Its imperiality consists precisely in hiding its locality, its geo-historical body location, and in assuming to be universal and thus managing the universal- ity to which everyone has to submit. The zero point is the site of observation from which the epistemic colonial differences and the epistemic imperial differences are mapped out. Latin absorbed and recast knowledges that were either translated from Greek to Arabic or that were cast in the Arabo-Islamic tradition. While of course Arabic remained crucial locally, it lost its global influence once that modern/European language—derived from Greek and Latin—became the language of sustainable knowledge, disavowing the epistemic insights of non-European languages. Being where one thinks has become since then a fundamental concern of those who have been mapped out by the colo- nial and imperial differences and, therefore, relegated to a second or third¶ place in the global epistemic order. "I am where I think" sets the stage for epistemic affirmations that have been disavowed. At the same time, it creates a shift in the geography of reason for the affirmation "I am where I think." From the perspective of the epistemically disavowed colonial subjects (now¶ migrants in Western Europe and the United States), the affirmation implies And you too:' addressed to believers in the epistemology of the zero point. In other words, "we all are where we think:' but only the European system of knowledge was built on the basic premise "I think, therefore I am:' which was a translation of the theological foundation of knowledge, in which the privilege of the soul over the body was translated into the secular mind over the body and on the premise that love should be global currency, and that every one in the world should believe (after Descartes) that they think and therefore exist.¶ "By way of this strategy," Castro-Gomez observes, "scientific thought po- sitions itself as the only valid form of producing knowledge, and Europe ac- quires an epistemological hegemony over all the other cultures of the world."5 From the fact that Western epistemology—that is, the epistemology of the zero point—became hegemonic, it doesn't follow that whoever was and is not thinking in those terms is not thinking. There is ample evidence to the contrary, evidence that is kept silenced both in the academic world and in mainstream media. The democratization of epistemology is under way (my argument intends to contribute to it), and "I am where I think" is one basic epistemic principle that legitimizes all ways of thinking and de-legitimizes the pretense of a singular and particular epistemology, geo-historical and¶ bio-graphically located, to be universal. Decolonizing Western epistemology means to strip it out of the pretense that it is the point of arrival and the guiding light of all kinds of knowledges. In other words, decolonizing knowledge is not rejecting Western epistemic contributions to the world. On the contrary, it implies appropriating its contributions in order to then de-chain from their imperial designs. "Hu- manitas" and "modernity" are concepts that do not emerge from an ontol- ogy wherein entities carry with them the essential being of humans and modernity; instead, they are concepts allowing those who manage catego- ries of thought and knowledge production to use that managerial authority to assert themselves by disqualifying those who ("anthropos" who at once¶ are barbarians and traditional) are classified as deficient, rationally and on- tologically. Once you realize that true values and objectivity without paren- thesis are only true values and objectivity for those who believe in them (as in the case of religion or any other ideology that holds to truth and objectiv- ity without parenthesis), you are ready to delink, to free yourself from the imperial magic of "modernity" sustained by the epistemology of the zero point. Humanitas and modernity, then, are two companion concepts and central concepts of Western civilization. Such an epistemic style of think- ing hides coloniality and prevents pluriversal, dialogic, and epistemically democratic systems of thought from unfolding. Two choices are given to the anthropos: to assimilate or to be cast out. In other words, universal op- tions are options based on truth without parenthesis and cannot admit the difference. As a matter of fact, differences are created in order to eliminate other options.¶ This argument is being structured from anthropos's perspectives. That means that it builds and is built on an enunciation grounded on geo- and body-politics of knowledge, while humantitas's arguments build and are built on theo- and ego-politics of knowledge,' that is, on zero point epistemology
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Mignolo 11 (Walter, Prof at Duke University, “THE DARKER SIDE OF WESTERN MODERNITY: Global Futures, Decolonial Options”, 2011, 6/28/13|Ashwin)
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new nomos of the earth comes with a new observer and a new epistemic foundation. the hubris of the zero point. This second consequence sets the stage for imperial control and colonization of knowledge. ¶ Basically, zero point epistemology is the ultimate grounding of knowl- edge, which paradoxically is ungrounded, or grounded neither in geo- historical location nor in bio-graphical configurations of the bodies. The geopolitical and bio-graphic politics of knowledge is hidden in the transparency and the universality of the zero point Every way of knowing that do not conform to the epistemology of the zero point are cast be hind in time and/or in the order of myth, legend, folklore, local knowledge, and the like it hides its own local knowledge universally projected. Its imperiality consists precisely in hiding its locality, its geo-historical body location, and in assuming to be universal and thus managing the universal- ity to which everyone has to submit The zero point is the site of observation from which the epistemic colonial differences and the epistemic imperial differences are mapped out. From the perspective of the epistemically disavowed colonial subjects we all are where we think:' but only the European system of knowledge was built on the basic premise "I think, therefore I am scientific thought po- sitions itself as the only valid form of producing knowledge, and Europe ac- quires an epistemological hegemony over all the other cultures of the world the epistemology of the zero point—became hegemonic I am where I think" is one basic epistemic principle that legitimizes all ways of thinking and de-legitimizes the pretense of a singular and particular epistemology Decolonizing Western epistemology means to strip it out of the pretense that it is the point of arrival and the guiding light of all kinds of knowledges it implies appropriating its contributions in order to then de-chain from their imperial designs "modernity do not emerge from an ontol- ogy wherein entities carry with them the essential being of humans and modernity they are concepts allowing those who manage catego- ries of thought and knowledge production to use that managerial authority to assert themselves by disqualifying those who ) are classified as deficient true values and objectivity without paren- thesis are only true values and objectivity for those who believe in them modernity, hides coloniality and prevents pluriversal, dialogic, and epistemically democratic systems of thought from unfolding universal op- tions are options based on truth without parenthesis differences are created in order to eliminate other option and are built on theo- and ego-politics of knowledg
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Zero-Point Epistemology is a DA to the Permutation—Only a shift to a democratic form of epistemology-grounded in geo/body politics RATHER THAN EUROCENTRICISM allows for a transition to a decolonial society—the permutation precludes the ability to detach from colonial matrices
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Bhabha’s third space is a contested terrain and has been critiqued for¶ its presumed lack of historical and political embeddedness. While Bhab-¶ ha’s third space is conceptually and theoretically interesting, one should¶ be wary of being too optimistic given the long history of economic and¶ epistemic subjugation. The epistemological dimension of colonialism¶ should not be underrated and should not be thought of in the past tense.¶ The inherent danger of such a space is the perpetuation of imbalance and¶ asymmetry between the knowledge systems—between the dichotomized¶ space of Self and Other within the third space. When exploring the third¶ space one has to acknowledge that all indigenous knowledges are subju-¶ gated knowledges, and that the issue of power is central in discussing and¶ analyzing the power relationships between indigenous knowledges and¶ so-called Western science and epistemology. There is a question of nego-¶ tiation here, but the question is how much can be negotiated when the¶ power relationship between the knowledge systems is so skewed and when¶ there is an issue of domination and subjugation. There is a concern that¶ indigenous knowledges are appropriated by the North to serve North’s¶ own purposes or interests, and that they are made to fit the paradigms¶ of Western epistemology. As Agrawal (2005) states: “those who possess¶ indigenous knowledge have not possessed much power to influence what¶ is done with their knowledge” (p. 380).
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Breidlid 13 (Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 48)OG
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third space is a contested terrain and has been critiqued for¶ its presumed lack of historical and political embeddedness one should¶ be wary given the long history of economic and¶ epistemic subjugation. The epistemological dimension of colonialism¶ should not be underrated and should not be thought of in the past tense.¶ The inherent danger of such a space is the perpetuation of imbalance and¶ asymmetry between the knowledge systems—between the dichotomized¶ space of Self and Other within the third space. one has to acknowledge that all indigenous knowledges are subju-¶ gated knowledges, and that the issue of power is central in discussing and¶ analyzing the power relationships between indigenous knowledges and¶ so-called Western science and epistemology the question is how much can be negotiated when the¶ power relationship between the knowledge systems is so skewed and when¶ there is an issue of domination and subjugation indigenous knowledges are appropriated by the North to serve North’s¶ own purposes or interests, and that they are made to fit the paradigms¶ of Western epistemology. those who possess¶ indigenous knowledge have not possessed much power to influence what¶ is done with their knowledge
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Perm is net worse – fusing epistemologies strengthens Western power by appropriating indigenous knowledge
| 1,480 | 105 | 1,224 | 229 | 14 | 189 | 0.061135 | 0.825328 |
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The semantic consequence of the coloniality of gender is that “colonized woman” is an empty category. No women are colonized. No colonized females are women. Thus, the colonial answer to Sojoumer Truth is clearly-No. That gives to her defiant question a depth and complexity that' is otherwise lost. Unlike colonization, the coloniality of gender is still with us; It is what lies at the intersection of gender and class and race as central constructs of the capitalist world system of power. Thinking about the coloniality of gender enables us to think of historical beings, only one-sidedly understood as oppressed. As there are no such beings as colonized women, I suggest that we focus on the beings that resist and respond critically and praxically the coloniality of gender from the colonial difference. Such beings are, as I have suggested, only partially under- stood as oppressed, as constructed through the coloniality of gender. The suggestion is not that we search from another side of the eurocentric construction of gender in indigenous organizations of the social world. Resistance to the coloniality of gender is historically complex. When I think of myself as a theorist of resistance, of defiant response from an other logic, that is not because I think of resistance as the end or goal of political struggle, but rather its beginning, its possibility. I am interested in the relational subjective/ intersubjective spring of liberation, as both adaptive and creatively oppositional. Resistance is the tension between subjectification (the forming/informing ofthe subject) and active subjectivity, that minimal sense of agency required for the oppress- ing -) (_ resisting relation to be an active one, without appeal to the maximal sense of agency of the modern subject.”¶ Resistant subjectivity often expresses itself infrapolitically. Infrapolitics marks the tum inward in a politics of resistance toward liberation. It shows the power of groups, enclaves, and communities of the oppressed constituting both resistant meaning and each other against the constitu- tion of meaning and social organization by power. As colonized and racially gendered, we are also other than what the hegemony makes us be. That is an infrapolitical achievement. If we are exhausted, fully made through and by micro and macro mechanisms and circulations of power, “liberation” loses much of its meaning or ceases to be an intersubjective affair. The very possibility of an identity based on politics’ and the project of decoloniality loses its peopled ground.
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Lugones 10 (Maria, Argentine scholar, philosopher, feminist, and an Associate Professor of Comparative Literature and Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture and of Philosophy and of Women's Studies at Binghamton University, "Toward a decolonial feminism." Hypatia 25.4, 742-759)
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consequence of the coloniality of gender is that “colonized woman” is an empty category. Unlike colonization, the coloniality of gender is still with us; It is what lies at the intersection of gender and class and race as central constructs of the capitalist world system of power. Thinking about the coloniality of gender enables us to think of historical beings, only one-sidedly understood as oppressed. As there are no such beings as colonized women, I suggest that we focus on the beings that resist and respond critically and praxically the coloniality of gender from the colonial difference When I think of myself as a theorist of resistance, of defiant response from an other logic, that is not because I think of resistance as the end or goal of political struggle, but rather its beginning, its possibility. I am interested in the relational subjective/ intersubjective spring of liberation, as both adaptive and creatively oppositional. Resistance is the tension between subjectification and active subjectivity Resistant subjectivity often expresses itself infrapolitically. Infrapolitics marks the tum inward in a politics of resistance toward liberation. It shows the power of groups, enclaves, and communities of the oppressed constituting both resistant meaning and each other against the constitu- tion of meaning and social organization by power. As colonized and racially gendered, we are also other than what the hegemony makes us be. If we are , fully made through and by micro and macro mechanisms and circulations of power, “liberation” loses much of its meaning or ceases to be an intersubjective affair. The very possibility of an identity based on politics’ and the project of decoloniality loses its peopled ground.
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Perm fails – any resistance to the coloniality of gender MUST turn inward – the perm’s use of any macro OR micro mechanisms of power destroy the possibility of decoloniality
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In the book’s conclusion, ‘‘Who’s Afraid of Identity Politics?,’’ Alcoff carefully defends the new post-postivist accounts of identity by discussing how approaches to the self developed by Hegel, Freud, Foucault, and Althusser have influenced the most important postcontemporary conceptions of identity and subjectification. The answer to the problems of essentialism and anti-essentialism, Alcoff argues, is not Wendy Brown’s theory of ‘‘wounded attachments’’ (Brown 1995), where the cycle of blame is never transcended, but new, better formulations of identity produced by the essayists in Reclaiming Identity. Near her essay’s ending, Alcoff (2000, 335) writes, ‘‘To say that we have an identity is just to say that we have a location in social space, a hermeneutic horizon that is both grounded in a location and an opening or site from which we attempt to know the world. Understood in this way, it is incoherent to view identities as something we would be better off without.’’ Given this précis of what I take to be one of the central aims of the Reclaiming Identity project, I end this section by raising two issues for further interrogation. The first concerns the issue of identity in relationship to what Quijano and Wallerstein call ‘‘Americanity’’ and what Quijano, Mignolo, Agustín Laó-Montes, Ramón Grosfoguel, and others are theorizing as ‘‘the coloniality of power.’’ ∏ As I noted in the preface, Quijano and Wallerstein (1992) argue that the Américas were fundamental to the formation of the modern (colonial) world-system and that Americanity is a fundamental element of modernity. For our purposes, Quijano and Wallerstein identify four new categories that originated in the so-called discovery of the Americas. They are coloniality, ethnicity, racism, and the concept of newness itself. My first hesitation with the Reclaiming Identity project thus has to do with the way most of the contributors are generally silent about our identities in relationship to what Quijano and Wallerstein grapple with in their work— namely, coloniality. In other words, if Mohanty, Moya, Hames-García, and Alcoff are right that to have an identity means that we have to understand that ‘‘we have a location in social space’’ (Moya and Hames-García 2000, 335), would it not be useful for us to ground these identities and locations in the history of the modern (colonial) world-system? Quijano and Wallerstein remind us that, after all, coloniality created a structure of hierarchy and drew new boundaries around and within the Américas. Moreover, coloniality was essential to the formation of states, and in his more recent work, such as ‘‘Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America’’ (2002), Quijano makes the additional claim that, even in decolonization, the ‘‘stateness’’ of decolonized states re-centered the colonial structure of power. In ‘‘What is termed globalization,’’ Quijano (2000b, 533) writes, is the cultural process that began with the constitution of America and colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power. One of the fundamental axes of power is the social classification of the world’s population around the idea of race, a mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including its rationality. The racial axis has a colonial origin and character, but it has proven to be more durable and stable than colonialism in whose matrix it was established. Therefore the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality. For Quijano and Wallerstein (1992, 550; emphasis added), ethnic identity fundamentally is the set of communal boundaries into which in part we are put by others [through coloniality], in part which we impose upon ourselves, serving to locate our identity and our rank within the state. . . . [Ethnic identities] are always contemporary constructs, and thus always changing. All the major categories, however, into which we ethnically divide today in the Américas and the world (Native Americans or Indians, Blacks or Negroes, Whites or Creoles/Europeans, Mestizos or other names given to a so-called mixed-category)—all these categories did not exist prior to the modern world-system. They are part of what makes up Americanity. They have become the cultural staple of the entire world-system.
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Saldivar 12 (Jose, Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley and Chicano Scholar of the Year from the Modern Language Association, Trans-Americanity: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico, Duke University Press Durham and London, 2012)
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Alcoff carefully defends the new post-postivist accounts of identity by discussing how approaches to the self developed have influenced the most important postcontemporary conceptions of identity and subjectification. To say that we have an identity is just to say that we have a location in social space, a hermeneutic horizon that is both grounded in a location and an opening from which we attempt to know the world The first concerns the issue of identity in relationship to what Quijano and Wallerstein call ‘‘Americanity’’ the Américas were fundamental to the formation of the modern (colonial) world-system and that Americanity is a fundamental element of modernity. They are coloniality, ethnicity, racism, and the concept of newness itself coloniality created a structure of hierarchy and drew new boundaries around the Américas coloniality was essential to the formation of states, and in his more recent work, such as ‘‘Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America’’ even in decolonization, the ‘‘stateness’’ of decolonized states re-centered the colonial structure of power globalization is the cultural process that began with the constitution of America and colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global powe the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality ethnic identity fundamentally is the set of communal boundaries into which in part we are put by others Ethnic identities] are always contemporary constructs All the major categories, however, into which we ethnically divide today in the Américas and the all these categories did not exist prior to the modern world-system. They are part of what makes up Americanity
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Perm fails—the structure of America is built upon coloniality, coopting state-led “decolonization” and ignoring micropolitical identities
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The application of Western paradigms to indigenous peoples is problematic for two reasons:¶ one conceptual and the other normative. Conceptually, (as demonstrated in Chapter II) Western¶ paradigms are often ill-suited to the task of conducting research in non-Western contexts.¶ Normatively, the application of Western paradigms to indigenous societies extends colonial¶ relations onto the intellectual plane, a figurative colonization of the mind. If colonialism¶ historically deprived indigenous peoples of land, livelihood, and autonomy, the inappropriate use¶ of paradigm threatens to deprive them of perspective. How, then, can political science¶ understand and explain the political processes, attitudes, and assumptions of indigenous peoples¶ in a manner which is both conceptually valid and normatively acceptable?¶ 34¶ I propose that the search for a new paradigm is the only way to address these conceptual and¶ normative problems. Paradigm shifts historically occurred when a new paradigm emerged to¶ challenge and critique the existing dominant paradigm (IE Liberalism to feudalism/monarchy¶ and Marxism to Liberalism). What paradigm thus has the potential to challenge the dominant¶ status of both Marxism and Liberalism in modern social theory? The emergent philosophy¶ known as “indigenism” is perhaps the best answer to the paradigmatic challenges for indigenous¶ peoples in the age of globalization. Indigenism originated as a resistance philosophy among¶ North and Central American Indians during the mid-to-late 20th Century, thus ensuring its¶ normative credibility. As I will demonstrate in the following sections, indigenism also contains¶ the intellectual rigor and explanatory power to achieve paradigmatic legitimacy on par with that¶ of Marxism and liberalism.
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Wallace 12 (Robert A., “DECOLONIZING THE MIND:¶ A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO INDIGENOUS¶ MOVEMENTS AND GLOBALIZATION”, A thesis submitted to¶ the Graduate College of¶ Marshall University, In partial fulfillment of the requirements for degree of¶ Master of Arts in¶ Political Science, December 2012)
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application of Western paradigms to indigenous peoples is problematic for two reasons:¶ one conceptual and the other normative. Conceptually, Western¶ paradigms are often ill-suited to the task of conducting research in non-Western contexts plication of Western paradigms to indigenous societies extends colonial¶ relations onto the intellectual plane, a figurative colonization of the mind. If colonialism¶ historically deprived indigenous peoples of land, livelihood, and autonomy, the inappropriate use¶ of paradigm threatens to deprive them of perspective the search for a new paradigm is the only way to address these conceptual and¶ normative problems. Paradigm shifts historically occurred when a new paradigm emerged to¶ challenge and critique the existing dominant paradigm
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The permutation is a recolonization of the mind—the struggle for new paradigms is key
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Colonial hierarchies of knowledge and monocultures of the mind¶ Colonial discourse is also evident among proponents of evidence-based education as¶ diverse ways of knowing are not tolerated and a distortion of other ways of knowing¶ is continued. Colonial discourse promoted a monoculture of the mind to maintain¶ control over knowledge production. For instance, Chilisa (2005) argues that colonizers¶ used research methods to fashion the whole world into sameness in order to dominate¶ and suppress the colonized. Similar to the debate on what constitutes evidence¶ and what should be included as evidence as part of systematic reviews in evidencebased¶ education (see Thomas 2004), colonial-era investigations into indigenous¶ science and technology separated ‘accurate’ and ‘rational’ knowledge from ‘mythology’¶ (Baber 1996, 159). Such a hierarchy of knowledge was then used to systematize¶ and rank groups of people around the world in terms of ‘intelligence’ in order to¶ legitimize domination (Pratt 1992; Grosfoguel 2007).¶ Throughout proponents’ discourses of evidence-based education, there is a notion¶ of evidence and ‘scientific based research’ that is constantly fixed to mean a certain¶ thing. This features an emphasis on empirical randomized control experimental¶ research studies, surveys, longitudinal studies, and statistical data. For instance, Slavin¶ associates ‘rigorous research’ with studies that use ‘rigorous experimental methods’¶ (2005, 7). Similarly, the American Educational Research Association Council in July¶ 2008 refers to scientific-based research as ‘the use of rigorous, systematic, and objective¶ methodologies to obtain reliable and valid knowledge.’ The AERA council also¶ outlined what kind of research it prefers for policy-making:¶ The examination of causal questions requires experimental designs using random assignment¶ or quasi-experimental or other designs that substantially reduce plausible competing¶ explanations for the obtained results. These include, but are not limited to,¶ longitudinal designs, case control methods, statistical matching, or time series analyses.¶ This standard applies especially to studies evaluating the impacts of policies and¶ programs on educational outcomes. (http://www.aera.net/opportunities/?id=6790) While Slavin explicates what he means by evidence, other authors are not as forthright.¶ Proponents of evidence-based education use the rhetoric of ‘evidence-based’¶ practice and policy. This rhetoric leaves out a definition of ‘evidence’ and therefore¶ assumes that there is a standardized notion of ‘evidence.’ Similarly, colonial discourse¶ constructed and produced standardized subjects for rule in order to consolidate¶ colonial power despite the heterogeneity among the colonized in terms of their identity¶ and knowledge systems (Rafael 1993; Cohn 1996).¶ While multiple methods are proposed in the evidence-based education movement,¶ there is still a standard of evidence that is espoused, which leads to prediction¶ and control (Lather 2004). This standard also falls in line with a colonial discourse,¶ which does not tolerate diverse ways of knowing. Instead, the rhetoric of bias is¶ used in the evidence-based education movement to negate other ways of knowing¶ so that control is maintained. For instance, Blunkett (2000) posits that statistically¶ based, experimental research is the preferred method that should be used by¶ evidence-based practitioners since it is less biased by the interests of the researcher.¶ Similarly, a Canadian federal response to an Organization for Economic Cooperation¶ and Development (OECD) conference on evidence-based education describes¶ similar types of evidence that were used for generating evidence for learning¶ policy: The research program consists of analyses of data from national surveys and longitudinal¶ surveys, community based case studies, laboratory simulations, randomized controlled¶ experiments and program evaluation. All of them involve systematic procedures, tests of¶ statistical significance and peer review. Though there may be limitations to each method¶ in the tool kit, multiple lines of evidence are used to build the case for policy … Canada¶ relies on a system of national surveys covering learning from birth to late adulthood.¶ These surveys provide the data for the bulk of the research supporting policy. (Brink¶ 2004, 2) What is significant to point out in this Canadian example is that while the rhetoric of¶ ‘multiple lines of evidence’ is used, the examples cited in this quote are all associated¶ with the empirical realm and are exclusively based on positivistic, quantitative methods.¶ Furthermore, it is quite clear that ‘survey data’ are the most valued means of¶ generating evidence as they provide the ‘bulk’ of evidence supporting federal policy.¶ Similarly in Britain, three types of evidence are employed in policy decision-making¶ (Sebba 2004). These include: (1) statistical quantitative data from national surveys¶ that monitor, evaluate, and provide forecast analyses; (2) inspection data generated¶ through Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) inspections; and (3) research¶ evidence derived from externally commissioned projects or programs funded by the¶ government or external bodies, including research councils. ¶ The types of data collection tools and data, used across these three countries, are¶ very similar to the techniques used during the colonial era to establish governmentality.¶ Throughout the colonial world, statistical knowledge and surveys were part of¶ colonial governmentality. As Cohn states ‘A number was, for the British, a particular¶ form of certainty to be held on to in a strange world’ (1996, 8). Kalpagam (2000)¶ argues that the practices of governance by the colonial state in India, and elsewhere,¶ ushered in a new ‘quantificatory episteme’ which promoted the modern statistical¶ worldview. The administrative measures in these colonial states required an immense¶ effort to record information. From the latter half of the nineteenth century, in the colonial¶ state, populations were ‘enumerated, classified, and territorially delineated’ so¶ that people could become targets of colonial interventions (Kalpagam 2000, 49). As¶ statistical techniques developed, it became possible to identify and codify aggregates¶ of population for specific kinds of description and intervention. Similarly, in later¶ centuries, quantitative research played a key role in naming, taming, and controlling¶ the colonized subjects. Within the Philippines, in the twentieth century, census data¶ were an important component of the American imperial project. As Rafael notes, the¶ power and persuasiveness of a census lie in its amazing capacity to picture in simple,¶ quantitative terms ‘the totality of the world’s multiplicity’ and at the same time appear¶ to be ‘an objective representation of the world’ (1993, 188). In short, systemic knowledge¶ production was a tool of colonial administration that allowed the colonizers to¶ name, classify, and control the ‘other’ as well as provide legitimacy to the colonial¶ administration. However, one could pose the question: Does the use of such research methods¶ have colonizing effects in the contemporary educational arena as it did in the past? I¶ would argue, ‘mostly yes.’ In the British context, Stronach (2005) highlighted the fact¶ that 70 complaints about the activities of the Ofsted are made annually. With respect¶ to Ofsted inspections, Stronach reports that:¶ It privileges an imperative to standardize … It transfers the notion of fairness from the¶ individual situation (the child, the school) to a systemic location where it marks the place of the child or the school within national comparisons. In this way individual ‘aims and¶ characteristics’ are subordinated to measures of average national attainment. And¶ ‘fairness’ becomes a technical rather than a moral requirement. (2005, 19)¶ Gillborn points out that British schools need to always demonstrate ‘a good performance¶ in the official statistics’ and ‘continual ‘under-performance’ can trigger a range¶ of sanctions including, ultimately, school closure’ (2005, 19). Ball argues that such¶ British technologies of governance, ‘require individual practitioners to organize themselves¶ as a response to targets, indicators, and evaluations,’ and require them ‘to set¶ aside personal beliefs and commitments and live an existence of calculation’ (2003,¶ 215). Ball further notes that the burden of performativity felt by teachers in this British¶ school, whereby ‘[t]he activities of the new technical intelligentsia, of management,¶ drive performativity into the day-to-day practices of teachers’ (2003, 223). Furthermore,¶ in a study on school leaders in Britain and Canada and the usage of statistical¶ data in decision-making, Earl and Fullan found ‘expressed unhappiness among these¶ school leaders about what they termed the ‘surveillance’ orientation of central government’¶ (2003, 390). They continue:¶ Although leaders were experiencing the value of using data and had many examples of¶ occasions when data provided them with insights and motivation to address a problem,¶ they were plagued by worries, because of the climate of surveillance, that the data would¶ come back to ‘bite’ them at some point. This tension was particularly evident in contexts¶ of large-scale centralised reform. (Earl and Fullan 2003, 391) This top-down mechanism of research used in policy decision-making takes agency¶ away from school leaders to interpret and make their own decisions based on data. As¶ Earl and Fullan state, ‘When the data are locally developed, leaders still are able to¶ decide how to use it and who should see it. When the data are public, there is no escaping¶ the release of data and needing to respond to questions and concerns that come¶ from various constituents’ (2003, 392). Hence, through these colonial discourses, not¶ only is the concept of evidence being ‘fixed,’ but also the research techniques used are¶ being standardized for policy decision-making. This ‘fixing’ has colonizing ramifications¶ on schools, educational leaders, and teachers, in that they are all objectified.¶ I need to be clear that my argument here is not suggesting that quantitative research¶ techniques, surveys, or Ofsted inspection are in themselves colonizing in nature. The¶ point here is that they have been the predominant tool used for technologies of governance¶ in colonial rule, and continue to have similar functions and effects in the¶ evidence-based movement. These technologies of accountability are also racialized¶ and gendered in their impacts on students and teachers (see Ball 2003; Lipman 2003;¶ Gillborn 2005; Kerr 2006). They serve the function of standardizing the subjects of¶ knowledge and function as tools of governmentality. Beyond the question of ‘evidence,’ evidence-based education also espouses a¶ certain conception of educational practice and policy which does not tolerate diversity¶ (i.e. diverse bodies and knowledge forms) and thus promotes a monoculture of the¶ mind. It perpetuates a standardized curriculum (i.e. a standardized form of knowledge),¶ student, and teacher subjectivity, through the culture of high-stakes testing and¶ accountability. As scholars have noted, there has been a growing emphasis on highstakes¶ testing and accountability culture in the current neoliberal climate in Canada,¶ Britain, and the USA which leads to the standardization of education and learning (Hill¶ 2004; Lipman 2004; Hursh 2007; Majhanovich 2008). For instance, in the USA, recent studies have argued that the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) policy’s focus on highstakes¶ testing has drastic effects, including: limiting teachers’ flexibility and becoming¶ more lecture-based, leaving little time to explore different learning styles, narrowing¶ curricula content to the tests, pushing minoritzed students (along the lines of race, class,¶ and language) out of schooling in order to increase test scores, and bolstering the¶ achievement gap between majoritized/minoritized students (McNeil 2000; Lipman¶ 2002, 2004; Valenzuela 2005; Au 2007; Hursh 2007; Biramiah 2008). In a recent study¶ examining third and fourth grade standardized tests of 11 states, Viruru (2009) discovered¶ a qualitative difference in the representations of European-Americans and people¶ of color. These tests, according to Viruru, depicted European-Americans as normal,¶ while ‘colonialists images of people of color’ (2009, 101) were perpetuated by which¶ people of color were ‘deemed … exotic, less resourceful, passive and waiting for¶ change to come’ (2009, 115). In short, a high-stakes performativity and accountability¶ culture is fixing and consolidating monocultural ways of knowing and being in US¶ schooling, while simultaneously colonizing diverse ways of knowing and being.
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Shahjahan 11 [Riyad Ahmed, Assistant Professor of Higher, Adult, and Lifelong Education (HALE) at Michigan State University. Ph.D. at the OISE/University of Toronto in Higher Education. “Decolonizing the evidence-based education and policy movement:¶ revealing the colonial vestiges in educational policy, research, and¶ neoliberal reform” Online publication date: 22 March 201, Journal of Education Policy, 26: 2,¶ 181 — 206 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2010.508176]
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Colonial discourse is also evident among proponents of evidence-based education as¶ diverse ways of knowing are not tolerated and a distortion of other ways of knowing¶ is continued Colonial discourse promoted a monoculture of the mind to maintain control over knowledge production colonizers¶ used research methods to fashion the whole world into sameness in order to dominate¶ and suppress the colonized colonial-era investigations into indigenous¶ science and technology separated ‘accurate’ and ‘rational’ knowledge from ‘mythology’ Such a hierarchy of knowledge was then used to systematize¶ and rank groups of people around the world in terms of ‘intelligence’ in order to¶ legitimize domination there is a notion¶ of evidence and ‘scientific based research’ that is constantly fixed to mean a certain¶ thing This features an emphasis on empirical randomized control experimental¶ research studies, surveys, longitudinal studies, and statistical data Proponents of evidence-based education use the rhetoric of ‘evidence-based’¶ practice and policy. This rhetoric leaves out a definition of ‘evidence’ and therefore¶ assumes that there is a standardized notion of ‘evidence Similarly, colonial discourse¶ constructed and produced standardized subjects for rule in order to consolidate¶ colonial power despite the heterogeneity among the colonized in terms of their identity¶ and knowledge systems This standard also falls in line with a colonial discourse,¶ which does not tolerate diverse ways of knowing Instead, the rhetoric of bias is¶ used in the evidence-based education movement to negate other ways of knowing¶ so that control is maintained. in Britain, three types of evidence are employed in policy decision-making¶ The types of data collection tools and data, used across these three countries, are¶ very similar to the techniques used during the colonial era to establish governmentality. Throughout the colonial world, statistical knowledge and surveys were part of colonial governmentality. A number was, for the British, a particular¶ form of certainty to be held on to in a strange world’ the practices of governance by the colonial state in India, and elsewhere,¶ ushered in a new ‘quantificatory episteme’ which promoted the modern statistical¶ worldview. in the colonial¶ state, populations were ‘enumerated, classified, and territorially delineated’ so¶ that people could become targets of colonial interventions quantitative research played a key role in naming, taming, and controlling¶ the colonized subjects In short, systemic knowledge¶ production was a tool of colonial administration that allowed the colonizers to¶ name, classify, and control the ‘other’ as well as provide legitimacy to the colonial¶ administration. Does the use of such research methods¶ have colonizing effects in the contemporary educational arena as it did in the past? yes It privileges an imperative to standardize … It transfers the notion of fairness from the¶ individual situation (the child, the school) to a systemic location where it marks the place of the child or the school within national comparisons. fairness’ becomes a technical rather than a moral requirement top-down mechanism of research used in policy decision-making takes agency away from school leaders to interpret and make their own decisions based on data. through these colonial discourses, not¶ only is the concept of evidence being ‘fixed,’ but also the research techniques used are¶ being standardized for policy decision-making This ‘fixing’ has colonizing ramifications¶ on schools, educational leaders, and teachers, in that they are all objectified.¶ quantitative research¶ techniques have been the predominant tool used for technologies of governance¶ in colonial rule, and continue to have similar functions and effects in the¶ evidence-based movement These technologies of accountability are also racialized and gendered in their impacts on students and teachers They serve the function of standardizing the subjects of¶ knowledge and function as tools of governmentality. evidence-based education also espouses a¶ certain conception of educational practice and policy which does not tolerate diversity¶ and thus promotes a monoculture of the mind. It perpetuates a standardized curriculum student, and teacher subjectivity,
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Their colonial discourse promotes a monoculture of the mind and normalizes bodies to be controlled
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In fact, a whole scholarly literature in Latin America has precisely analyzed how the popular demands of indigenous, afro-descendant and minority groups were channeled into the traditional framework of liberal democracies and constitutions in the 1990s (Ochoa 2003, Hale 2005, Gros 2000). Not coincidentally, these same transformations were taking place with the subtle arrival and sedimentation of neo-liberal policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the scripts of ‘participation’, ‘descentralization’, ‘flexibilization’ and ‘good governance’. For these commentators, in this ‘perverse confluence’ (Dagnino) between constitutional transformations and the popular demands, the ‘radical difference’ was cancelled and tamed under the guise of the multicultural state (Alvarez 2008). In fact, one could argue that the reconfigured ‘state-form’ was able to reterritorialize these vectors into new consensuses while losing their radical drive. But one could again ask: is this all the story? Thus the state apparatus of capture completely tamed difference? Or does the capture completely control and regulate the speeds and intensities of these vectors? And for those of us in the academy, how should one think and write about these processes and transformations?¶ For sure, Arturo Escobar's 2010 groundbreaking article on the recent transformations taking place ‘at the State level’ in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia raises these same crucial interrogations with even more acuteness As he argues right in the beginning, posing a formidable challenge to academics working in these areas, ‘how one thinks about these processes is itself an object of struggle and debate’ (Escobar 2010, p. 3). And he adds: ‘Is it possible to suggest ways of thinking about the ongoing transformations that neither shortcut their potential by interpreting them through worn out categories, not that aggrandize their scope by imputing them utopias that might be far from the desires and actions of the main actors involved?’ With these warnings, the author continues to narrate the possibilities and limits of these transformations taking place in these three countries to eradicate and transform the traditional liberal and modern framework of these state-forms. He recognizes two major current socio-economic, political and cultural transformations taking place in the country. The first one is the one of alternative modernizations that ‘stems from the end of the hegemony of the neo-liberal project but does not engage significantly with the second aspect of the conjuncture … , the hegemony of Euro-modernity; (b) [the second one], decolonial projects, based on a different set of practices (e.g. communal, indigenous, hybrid, and above all, pluriversal and intercultural), leading to a post-liberal society (an alternative to Euro-modernity). This second project stems from the second aspect of the conjuncture and seeks to transform neoliberalism and development from this perspective’ (Escobar 2010, p. 11). With these arguments that seem to reproduce the essential contradiction pointed above around Laclau's work, this is, between the fundamental tension between the ‘power bloc’ and the popular, or between ‘democracy’ and radical difference, and I might add, in their ontological and epistemological dimensions, Escobar's argument seems to move between the classic Gramscian move of the ‘pessimistic of the intellect’ and ‘the optimism of the will’. He even argues that his argument at this stage deals more about potentiality (about the field of the virtual) than about ‘how things really are’. But nevertheless, he still maintains the warning that even those vectors of potentiality or about the field the virtual are never free from any contradictions or tensions.
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Aparicio 2011 [Juan Ricardo, Associate Professor Department of Languages and Sociocultural Studies University of the Andes, “Reply To Arturo Escobar's ‘Latin America at a Crossroads: Alternative Modernizations, Post-Liberalism, or Post-Development?” Cultural Studies¶ Volume 25, Issue 3, 2011 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09502386.2010.527156#.UfbYqI21Fsl]
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a whole scholarly literature in Latin America has precisely analyzed how the popular demands of indigenous, afro-descendant and minority groups were channeled into the traditional framework of liberal democracies these same transformations were taking place with the subtle arrival and sedimentation of neo-liberal policies of the World Bank one could argue that the reconfigured ‘state-form’ was able to reterritorialize these vectors into new consensuses how one thinks about these processes is itself an object of struggle and debate’ Is it possible to suggest ways of thinking about the ongoing transformations that neither shortcut their potential not that aggrandize their scope the author continues to narrate the possibilities of these transformations taking place in these three countries to eradicate the traditional liberal and modern framework of these state-forms the hegemony of Euro-modernity; based on a different set of practices This second project stems from the second aspect of the conjuncture and seeks to transform neoliberalism and development from this perspective’ Escobar's argument seems to move between the classic Gramscian move of the ‘pessimistic of the intellect’ and ‘the optimism of the will’. He even argues that his argument at this stage deals more about potentiality
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The state can’t solve the alt—the stances of indigenous and minorities groups are channeled into un-enforced writing—only a rethinking of Western political processes solves
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Let’s move closer to ongoing processes of decolonization of knowledge and building decolonial epistemologies. The following argument is in time and in conversation with Maria Lugones’s and Nelson Maldonado Torres’s contributions to this volume, and with the work of Emma¶ Perez.” You will see decolonial thinking at work grounded in particular,¶ although similar, genealogies of thoughts and experiences of embedded¶ in colonial epistemic and ontological differences. In my view, this¶ guishes us (in the project modernity/ coloniality or at least myself) from¶ the genealogy of thought, experiences, and issues that generated the¶ great work of thinkers such as Max I-lorkheimer, Simone de Beauvoir,¶ and Michel Foucault, to give a few examples. If all of us are concerned¶ and working toward a just and nonimperial world order (Ecuadorian¶ quichua “sumak kawsay,” to live in plenitude, living in harmony; Manda-¶ rin’s “Ho” peace, harmony, union; or Western languages’ “democracy”)¶ we do it in different ways because-due to the modern/ colonial world¶ order we are all living in-we share the same goals but have different¶ ways to march toward them: Some are imperial, religious, or secular;¶ others, national; others, decolonial. And that is the simple “fact” that¶ requires geopolitics and body-politics of knowing, understanding, and¶ being, to avoid modernity/rationality, as Quijano said, in its variegated¶ forms: the imperial Right, the modern liberating secular Left (Marxism),¶ and the modern theology of liberation. To extricate oneself (to de-link¶ from modernity/ rationality means to de-link from the the Right, the Left,¶ and liberation theology. It means simply that the decolonial options need to be asserted in order to “extricate oneself” not only from the imperial / dominating option but also from liberating options such as Marxism and theology of liberation. Decolonizing epistemology means, in the long run, liberating thinking from sacralized texts, whether religious or secular.)
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Mignolo 11, Walter, Argentine semiotician and professor at Duke University, “Decolonizing Epistemologies” Chapter “Decolonizing Western Epistemology” Fordham University Press, November 2011
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You will see decolonial thinking at work grounded in particular,¶ although similar, genealogies of thoughts and experiences of embedded¶ in colonial epistemic and ontological differences If all of us are concerned¶ and working toward a just and nonimperial world order we do it in different ways because-due to the modern/ colonial world¶ order we are all living in-we share the same goals but have different¶ ways to march toward them: Some are imperial, religious, or secular;¶ others, national; others, decolonial. And that is the simple “fact” that¶ requires geopolitics and body-politics of knowing, understanding, and¶ being, to avoid modernity/rationality in its variegated¶ forms: the imperial Right, the modern liberating secular Left (Marxism),¶ and the modern theology of liberation. To extricate oneself (to de-link¶ from modernity/ rationality means to de-link from the the Right, the Left,¶ and liberation theology. It means simply that the decolonial options need to be asserted in order to “extricate oneself” not only from the imperial / dominating option but also from liberating options such as Marxism and theology of liberation.
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Decolonial approaches come first – delinking from modernity and geopolitical shifts in epistemology are a crucial prerequisite to any movement towards a just world
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One of the main goals of mujerista discourse has been to provide a plat- form for the voices of Latinas living in the United States. Mujerista dis- course, particularly focused on Christian ethics and theology, has as its goal the liberation/flourishing of Latinas. It uses as its source the understandings and practices of Latinas, in particular the religious understandings and prac- tices of grassroots Latinas who struggle against oppression in their every- day lives. Mujerista discourse, originally a liberationist one, highlights the voices of Latinas, which as a group are ignored by U.S. society! Often considered intellectually inferior, Latinas’ understandings are indeed one of the many subjugated knowledges that are ignored to the detriment not only of our own community but also of the whole of society.”
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Isasi-Diaz 11, Ada Maria, professor of ethics and theology at Drew University, “Decolonizing Epistemologies” Chapter “Mujerista discourse: A Platform for Latinas’ Subjugated Knowledge” Fordham University Press, November 2011
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Mujerista discourse highlights the voices of Latinas, which as a group are ignored by U.S. society! Often considered intellectually inferior, Latinas’ understandings are indeed one of the many subjugated knowledges that are ignored to the detriment not only of our own community but also of the whole of society.”
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Decolonial Latin@ discourse must be placed at the forefront – liberation is impossible if the basis of knowledge production is founded on European forms of thought
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We use a critical anti-colonial discursive framework (Dei & As-ghazadesh, 2001) to situate our discussion on spirituality and teaching in higher education. It is our belief that no anti-colonial work would be complete without attending to the spirit, the broken spirit, the spirit that the colonizers managed to convince the colonized subject was poor and in need of salvaging (see Pearce, 1998; Mazama, 2002). Wane (2006)argues that when missionaries met Indigenous people of the world,the first thing they claimed to notice was the spiritual poverty of thepeople. The missionaries embarked upon a project of decolonization bycontinually eroding and destroying all vestiges of the indigenous people’sspirituality (see Battiste & Henderson, 2000; Some, 1994). Adopting an anti-colonial discursive theory, it is critical to place issues of spiritual-ity of the colonized people at the center of our discussion (Shahjahan,2005a). This framework provides the basis from which to challenge the foundations of institutionalized power and privilege and the power congrautions embedded in ideas, cultures, and histories of knowledge production (see Dei, 2000).By embracing anti-colonial thought, we acknowledge spiritual practices which have survived the colonial and neo-colonial powers. We view these acts of survival as forms of resistance that need to be acknowledged and legitimated in the academy. Anti-colonial theorizing rises out of alternative, oppositional paradigms, which are in turn based on indigenous concepts and analytical systems and cultural frames of reference (Dei, 2000). It recognizes the displacement of spirituality and other non-dominant ways of knowing the world by Western knowledge systems as significant (Graveline, 1998; Smith, 2001). Hence, as Zine(2004) has written about using an anti-colonial framework to understand issues of spirituality: “addressing the erasures of spiritual knowledge in academic and discursive contexts is part of an anti-colonial politics of knowledge construction, reclamation, and inclusion” (p. 5). Furthermore, the anti-colonial discursive framework provides a political ontology which serves to decolonize academic knowledge and pedagogical practices, by valuing and employing spiritual ways of knowing (Magnusson, 2004).Indigenous knowledges are central in the process of de colonization and an important entry point for theorizing issues of spirituality (seeGraveline, 1998). Within indigenous cultures, narrative and storytell-ing are primarily pedagogical tools. In considering how such practices may contribute to the project of decolonizing the academy, Iseke-Barnes(2003) contends that: Through story telling we can highlight how knowledge production in the academy reinforces colonial and neo-colonial relations and the considerable implications of these struggles over knowledge for claims of Indigenousness, agency, and resistance in community activities and academic pursuits focused on cultural vitalization and self-determina-tion. (p. 218)¶ Building on this understanding, we offer the following narrative, atapestry of dialogical insights into our theorizing of how spirituality may be incorporated into teaching in higher education. This narrative developed as a result of an interactive presentation entitled “EvokingSpirituality in the Academy: A Tool for Decolonization and Transforma-tion for Global Citizens”¶ ¶ presented at an International Transformative Learning Conference, May 2003.
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Wane, et. al 9 (Njoki Nathani Wane is the Special Adviser on Status of Women at University of Toronto as Co-Director of Centre for Integrative Anti-Racist Research Studies. ¶ Anne Wagner (featured left) is a professor of Modern and Contemporary ¶ Art at UC-Berkeley. Riyad Shahjahan is an educational administrator at ¶ Michigan State University. “Rekindling the Sacred: Toward a ¶ Decolonizing Pedagogy in Higher Education” Journal of Thought, ¶ Spring-Summer 2009
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We use a critical anti-colonial discursive to situate our discussion on spirituality and teaching in education. no anti-colonial work would be complete without attending to the spirit, the broken spirit, the spirit that the colonizers managed to convince the colonized subject was poor and in need of salvaging Adopting an anti-colonial discursive theory, it is critical to place issues of spiritual-ity of the colonized people at the center of our discussion This framework provides the basis from which to challenge the foundations of institutionalized power and privilege and the power congrautions embedded in ideas, cultures, and histories of knowledge production these acts of survival as forms of resistance that need to be acknowledged and legitimated in the academy. Anti-colonial theorizing rises out of alternative, oppositional paradigms, which are in turn based on indigenous concepts and analytical systems and cultural frames of reference It recognizes the displacement of spirituality and other non-dominant ways of knowing the world by Western knowledge systems as significant addressing the erasures of spiritual knowledge in academic and discursive contexts is part of an anti-colonial politics of knowledge construction, reclamation, and inclusion the anti-colonial discursive framework provides a political ontology which serves to decolonize academic knowledge and pedagogical practices, by valuing and employing spiritual ways of knowing Indigenous knowledges are central in the process of de colonization and an important entry point for theorizing issues of spirituality Within indigenous cultures, narrative and storytell-ing are primarily pedagogical tools. such practices may contribute to the project of decolonizing the academy, Through story telling we can highlight how knowledge production in the academy reinforces colonial and neo-colonial relations and the considerable implications of these struggles over knowledge for claims of Indigenousness, agency, and resistance in community activities and academic pursuits focused on cultural vitalization and self-determina-tion.
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An anti-colonial discursive framework is key to decolonizing debate and challenging institutionalized power
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The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in¶ processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g.¶ de-colonization) of the original formal apparatus of enunciation.2 I have¶ been supporting in the past those who maintain that it is not enough to¶ change the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change¶ the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation¶ implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the¶ conflict of interpretations. As far as controversies and interpretations remain¶ within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control¶ of knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question¶ the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary¶ to focus on the knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very¶ assumptions that sustain locus enunciations.¶ In what follows I revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the¶ perspective of geo- and bio-graphic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is¶ epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation is¶ unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the¶ conversation. The basic assumption is that the knower is always implicated,¶ geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology (e.g.¶ the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure¶ of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at¶ the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts himself or herself in¶ a privileged position to evaluate and dictate.¶ The argument is structured as follows. Sections I and II lay out the¶ ground for the politics of knowledge geo-historically and bio-graphically,¶ contesting the hegemony of zero point epistemology. In Section III, I explore¶ three cases in which geo- and body-politics of knowledge comes forcefully¶ to the fore: one from Africa, one from India and the third from New Zealand.¶ These three cases are complemented by a fourth from Latin America: my¶ argument is here. It is not the report of a detached observer but the intervention¶ of a de-colonial project that ‘comes’ from South America, the Caribbean and Latinidad in the US. Understanding the argument implies that the¶ reader will shift its geography of reasoning and of evaluating arguments. In¶ Section IV, I come back to geo- and body-politics of knowledge and their¶ epistemic, ethical and political consequences. In Section V, I attempt to pull¶ the strings together and weave my argument with the three cases explored,¶ hoping that what I say will not be taken as the report of a detached observed¶ but as the intervention of a de-colonial thinker.¶
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Mignolo 9 (Walter, Professor of literature-Duke University, Ph.D. from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, academic director of Duke in the Andes, an interdisciplinary program in Latin American and Andean Studies in Quito, Ecuador at Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador and the Universidad Politécnica Salesiana, “Epistemic Disobedience,¶ Independent Thought and¶ De-Colonial Freedom” ,Theory, Culture & Society 2009)
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The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in¶ processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing of the original formal apparatus of enunciation that it is of the essence to change¶ the terms of the conversation Changing the terms of the conversation¶ implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the¶ conflict of interpretations. in order to call into question¶ the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary¶ to focus on the knower rather than on the known means to go to the very¶ assumptions that sustain locus enunciations revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the¶ perspective of geo- and bio-graphic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is¶ epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation is¶ unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the¶ conversation basic assumption is that the knower is always implicated,¶ geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology hubris of the zero point managed to conceal both and created the figure¶ of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at¶ the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts himself or herself in¶ a privileged position to evaluate and dictate Understanding the argument implies that the¶ reader will shift its geography of reasoning and of evaluating arguments
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Debate should be a question of shifting the geography of reason, not just resolving competing interpretations from the position of neutral observation. Their framework arguments are part and parcel of coloniality’s epistemological structure.
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Globalization accelerates, multiplies, and elicits the constant criss- crossing, encounters, conflicts, clashes, and mutual influences and transformations of a multiplicity of knowledges, knowers, and ways of knowing-often unevenly able to deal openly and creatively with each other. Dialogue and syncretisms are only a few of the dynamics emerging from these encounters, sadly often overshadowed (or worse) by destruc- tive dynamics of invisibility, denial, exclusion, persecution, (in)civil wars, and other forms of conflict generated in the encounter among diverse ways of knowing through migrations, seasonal labor, maquilas, electronic communications, and other dimensions of the contemporary processes of globalization.¶ The paradox of a way of knowing that aims to undermine an authoritarian, hierarchical, exploitive social system is that, in order not to mimic, legitimate, and serve as an instrument of that very system, it needs to shape itself as an open, humble, dialogical, consistently self-examining way of understanding and producing knowledge-which inevitably turns it into a more fragile, vulnerable way of understanding and producing knowledge, even more liable to be destroyed by the very social system it emerges against.
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Maduro 11, Otto, Latino philosopher and sociologist of religion at Drew University, “Decolonizing Epistemologies” Chapter “An(other) Invitation to Epistemological Humility: Notes toward a Self-Critical Approach to Counter-Knowledges” Fordham University Press, November 2011
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Globalization accelerates, multiplies, and elicits the constant criss- crossing, encounters, conflicts, clashes, and mutual influences and transformations of a multiplicity of knowledges, knowers, and ways of knowing-often unevenly able to deal openly and creatively with each other. Dialogue and syncretisms are only a few of the dynamics emerging from these encounters, sadly often overshadowed by destruc- tive dynamics of invisibility, denial, exclusion, persecution, ( , and other forms of conflict generated in the encounter among diverse ways of knowing through migrations, seasonal labor, maquilas, electronic communications, and other dimensions of the contemporary processes of globalization.¶ The paradox of a way of knowing that aims to undermine an authoritarian, hierarchical, exploitive social system is that, in order not to mimic, legitimate, and serve as an instrument of that very system, it needs to shape itself as an open, humble, dialogical, consistently self-examining way of understanding and producing knowledge-which inevitably turns it into a more fragile, vulnerable way of understanding and producing knowledge, even more liable to be destroyed by the very social system it emerges against.
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Universal or “true” epistemologies homogenize the human – our knowledge production cannot mimic the exploitative structures we seek to undermine. Shifts to new forms of knowing are necessary
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What is almost completely under-communicated in the South is how¶ the hegemonic educational discourse—across the curriculum of school and¶ university systems and across nations—has helped to promote the capitalist¶ world-system and globalization and defend positions of power. The sig-¶ nificance of privileging Western epistemology, beyond its alienating effect,¶ is how the hegemonic epistemology and educational discourse effectively¶ prevents a critique of the present neo-colonial epistemological legacy—the¶ hegemonic world system and its oppressive features.¶ This is made possible because the hegemonic epistemology and its trans-¶ lation into educational discourse is unrivalled in schools. Such an educa-¶ tional discourse reinforces the epistemic dominance in countries in the¶ semi-periphery or periphery, which already experience the negative aspects¶ of the present world order. To challenge this hegemonic knowledge neces-¶ sitates a deconstruction of the triad of Western epistemology-(neo)coloni-¶ zation-hegcmonic power and implies a decolonizing of the curricula and¶ the educational discourses globally.
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Breidlid 13 (Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 57)OG
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hegemonic educational discourse—across the curriculum of school and¶ university systems and across nations—has helped to promote the capitalist¶ world-system and globalization and defend positions of powe The sig-¶ nificance of privileging Western epistemology, beyond its alienating effect,¶ is how the hegemonic epistemology and educational discourse effectively¶ prevents a critique of the present neo-colonial epistemological legacy—the¶ hegemonic world system and its oppressive features. This is made possible because the hegemonic epistemology and its trans-¶ lation into educational discourse is unrivalled in schools. Such an educa-¶ tional discourse reinforces the epistemic dominance To challenge this neces-¶ sitates a deconstruction of the triad of Western epistemology-(neo)coloni-¶ zation-hegcmonic power and implies a decolonizing of the curricula and¶ the educational discourses globally.
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We must decolonize the curriculum – it upholds the larger hegemonic epistemic system
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Countering hierarchical social and educational relations in contexts of racialization is¶ outlined by Margonis (1999, 2000, 2011a, b) as an ontological project and philosophers of¶ education invested in a critical analysis of the intersections of race, class and colonialism¶ are indebted to his thinking. I think it is important to read Margonis as fostering a¶ de-colonial position in philosophy of education and his call for a dialogical pedagogical¶ practice is crucially important for shifting the location of philosophical knowledge generation and the languages of education. Indeed, Margonis’ dialogical (2007, 2011a, b)¶ project for anti-assimilatory education would suggests multilingualism to assist in moving¶ from the hegemonic languages of philosophy (German, French and English) to Indigenous¶ languages, African-American Vernacular English, creole and Chicano Spanish. Accordingly, his call for dialogue is in direct conversation with Mignolo (2000) and MaldonadoTorres (2004, 2009). For each of these thinkers, coming into and becoming through a¶ dialogical relation re-situates being by exposing and disrupting the colonialist claims that¶ Indigenous and African and African diaspora peoples were or are primitive. Likewise,¶ dialogue resituates being by placing minoritized knowledge systems and forms of being at¶ the center of relationships of learning.¶ Dialogue and multilingualism in the service of more expansive discussions of being¶ cannot then be grounded in a pre-formulated or normalized (continental) existentialist¶ language of philosophy. Rather, dialogue can be outlined according to a de-colonial¶ attitude (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 262) which takes as its primary effort the assertion of¶ the languages which relate those knowledge systems and forms of being that have been¶ conceived as outside or below the domain of Being. Dialogue conceived with a decolonial¶ attitude would necessitate bi- or multilingualism to undermine the ways in which the term¶ ‘‘enigma’’ is used to dismiss and denigrate minoritized knowledges and forms of life. As I¶ will elaborate below, multilingualism should be rethought according to languaging¶ (Mignolo 2000). Following the work of Khatibi (1999) and Anzaldua (1987) Mignolo has¶ used the terms languaging and bilanguaging to signal a shift away from a strictly technical¶ project for linguistic communication or translation (see also Sandoval 2000). For each of¶ these thinkers, bilanguaging operates to re-position being according to the ways of life of¶ the minoritized. In this way, African Americans, Latina/os and Native Americans are not¶ enigmas for philosophers of education but opportunities and invitations for a formulation¶ of being that is non-assimilationist to the privileged and hegemonic languages of¶ philosophy.¶ Dialogue and the Decolonial Attitude¶ Maldonado-Torres (2007) speaks of a Du Bois (1999) inspired de-colonial attitude that¶ ‘‘demands responsibility and the willingness to take many perspectives and [the] points of¶ view of those whose very existence is questioned and produced as insignificant’’ (262).¶ While dialogue is not explicitly named here, it is an assumed element in developing the¶ decolonial attitude. Indeed, elsewhere Maldonado-Torres (2004) elaborates how ‘‘radical¶ critique should take dialogical form’’ whereby philosophers ‘‘make space for the¶ enunciation of non-Western cosmologies and for the expression of different cultural,¶ political and social memories’’ (51). Du Bois (1999) is for Maldonado-Torres (2007) one¶ who made spaces for the memories of African and African diaspora peoples through a¶ radical form of dialogue. From this dialogue a different direction for the articulation and¶ formulation of African American forms of being was charted.¶ Moreover, as Maldonado-Torres (2007) goes on to note, Du Bois’ dialogue enabled ‘‘the¶ creation of black institutions in the United States as well as furthering Pan-African visions¶ and struggles’’ (262). Du Bois fostered and called forth spaces for Pan-African visions,¶ providing a ‘‘fundamental shift in perspective that leads one to see the world anew in a way¶ that targets its evil in a new way and gives us a better sense of what to do next’’¶ (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 262). On Maldonado-Torres’ (2004, 2007) reading, the institution building Du Bois achieved was a realization of a radicalized form of dialogue where¶ the knowledges, terms and forms of being expressed by African and African diaspora¶ peoples provide the intellectual, philosophical and ontological force for these projects.¶ There is in Maldonado-Torres’s description here an important complementarity to¶ Margonis’ (2011a, b) notion of being in dialogue with the sentiments and existential¶ situations of racialized/colonized peoples. Indeed, Margonis (2011a, b) echoes some of this¶ Du Boisian de-colonial attitude when he writes ‘‘educators would do well to invite broad¶ and cacophonous forms of interaction in the classroom; a mix of conservative, artistic,¶ comedic, and narrative patterns in the classroom gives a broader range of points of contact¶ with students’’ (3). Margonis arrives at this call for a cacophonous classroom in large part¶ through his careful reading and reworking of Freire’s (1993) notion of dialogue. ‘‘Freire’s¶ description of egalitarian, de-colonizing dialogue,’’ he writes, provide ‘‘means for setting¶ in motion social spaces of focused, passionate intellectual intensity’’ (Margonis 2011a, b,¶ 3). Like Maldonado-Torres (2004, 2007) the insistence here on dialogue as crucial to¶ providing the space for engagements with multiple intellectual traditions is crucial for¶ Margonis. As I have suggested above however, this space for dialogue has not prompted a¶ stance which works to expose the coloniality of being operating in Rousseau (1984) or¶ Heidegger (1962). Again, Margonis (2007, 2011a, b) seems to limit a more radical¶ understanding of dialogue provokes an anti-assimilationist stance toward Rousseau’s¶ (1984) and Heidegger’s (1962) philosophies of being. In this way, Margonis (1999, 2009)¶ inadvertently de-couples a particular existentialist philosophical discourse from its relationship to colonialism.¶ In stating this, I am not suggesting that Margonis, I or Maldonado-Torres (2007, 2009)¶ could easily ‘‘fix’’ the discourse of primitive in Heidegger for example (1962) as a way to¶ deploy him otherwise. As Bernasconi (2005) has warned, we cannot simply enact a¶ ‘‘surgical [philosophical] operation’’ (243) to smooth over these tensions for a more¶ ‘‘inclusive’’ Heideggerian existentialism. A de-colonial dialogue can be more attentive to¶ shifts toward bilanguaging in the enunciations and learning of Indigenous, African and¶ African diaspora and Latino/a traditions of being.¶ Bilanguaging and/as Border Thinking for Trans-Ontologies¶ Finally, Mignolo (2000) identifies the space of dialogue as a site of ‘‘border thinking’’ and¶ ‘‘bilanguaging.’’ Anticipating Maldonado-Torres’ (2004) idea of a more radical form of¶ dialogue, bilanguaging is ‘‘a form of life possible in the fractures of a hegemonic (national¶ or imperial) language’’ that ‘‘draw[s] in something that is beyond sound, syntax and¶ lexicon’’ (Mignolo 2000, 264). Margonis (2011a, b) pedagogy of cacophony solicits a form¶ of border thinking and hints at this idea of bilanguanging, but his philosophical framework¶ has not been fractured in ways that would shift us away from the Rousseauean (1994) and¶ Heideggerian (1962) coloniality of being. Dialogical practice as focused intellectual¶ intensity would seem to entail the kind of bilanguaging Mignolo (2000) speaks of here to¶ achieve a decolonial dialogue. This would more fully attend to the way trans-ontologies¶ undermine the coloniality of being enacted through professional philosophy. Taken¶ together, a decolonial trans-ontology is an emergent form of being stemming from a border¶ thinking and bilanguaging.¶ In the context of the United States and the Americas more broadly, it is not only an¶ intellectual and pedagogical project that would provide the opportunity for trans-ontologies¶ to emerge. An anti-assimilatory pedagogy seeking cacophony would entail a shift in¶ location to those physical borders where the complex forms and languages of being¶ continuously emerge. That is, philosophers and teachers would situate themselves where¶ African American youth are not conceived as enigmas. In this sense, Margonis’ (2007,¶ 2011a, b) teachers would not only seek a cacophonous classroom, but the cacophonous,¶ creative, driven and constructive locations of African American, Indigenous and Latono/a¶ being. Through radical dialogues in these shifted locations we learn the pre-situations of¶ such youth. Learning with minoritized youth in this way entails forms of bilanguaging¶ wherein European ontologies lose something of their habitability. In those, perhaps fleeting¶ moments, decolonial trans-ontologies are more clearly recognized as the future which¶ denies the coloniality of being.¶ The processes of radical dialogue (Maldonado-Torres 2004) and bilanguaging (Mignolo¶ 2000) for trans-ontologies underscores the potentialities of a de-colonial turn in philosophy¶ of education. ‘‘The de-colonial turn,’’ writes Maldonado-Torres (2007), ‘‘marks the¶ definitive entry of enslaved and colonized subjectivities into the realm of thought at before¶ unknown institutional levels’’ (262). Margonis’ (1999, 2007, 2011a, b) efforts for antioppressive pedagogical practices and philosophical frameworks serves as an important¶ moment in a de-colonial turn in philosophy of education. Continuing with him toward a¶ critique of the coloniality of being provide a way to move past the terms of enigma and¶ primitive to decolonial trans-ontologies in philosophy of education.
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Richardson 12 (Troy A, Associate Professor, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences (CALS), Cornell University, "Disrupting the Coloniality of Being: Toward De-colonial Ontologies in Philosophy of Education." Studies in Philosophy and Education 31.6 (2012): 539-551)OG
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fostering a¶ de-colonial position in education and a dialogical pedagogical¶ practice is crucially important for shifting the location of philosophical knowledge generation and the languages of education. dialogue resituates being by placing minoritized knowledge systems and forms of being at the center of relationships of learning.¶ dialogue can be outlined according to a de-colonial¶ attitude which takes as its primary effort the assertion of knowledge systems and forms of being that have been¶ conceived as outside or below the domain of Being. ‘‘radical¶ critique should take dialogical form’’ whereby philosophers ‘‘make space for the¶ enunciation of non-Western cosmologies and for the expression of different cultural,¶ political and social memories’ In the context of the United States and the Americas , it is not only an¶ intellectual and pedagogical project that would provide the opportunity for trans-ontologies¶ to emerge. An anti-assimilatory pedagogy seeking cacophony would entail a shift in¶ location to those physical borders where the complex forms and languages of being¶ continuously emerge. teachers would not only seek a cacophonous classroom, but the cacophonous,¶ creative, driven and constructive locations of Indigenous and Latono/a¶ being. The processes of radical dialogue and bilanguaging for trans-ontologies underscores the potentialities of a de-colonial turn in philosophy¶ of education. ‘‘The de-colonial turn,’’ ‘‘marks the definitive entry of enslaved and colonized subjectivities into the realm of thought at before unknown institutional levels’’ efforts for antioppressive pedagogical practices and philosophical frameworks serves as an important¶ moment in a de-colonial turn in philosophy of education. Continuing with toward a¶ critique of the coloniality of being provide a way to move past the terms of enigma and¶ primitive to decolonial trans-ontologies in philosophy of education.
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We must decolonize education by centering minority epistemologies
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The argument that colonialism as an external imposition is the only determinant for the actual socioeconomic situation in former colonies is certainly not convincing: we have to take in account the role of local elites who have benefited from those exploitative relations. Colonialism is part of the historical process and formation of these countries. The contemporary economies are debilitated for the following main reasons: a) The agro-export oriented economies gave the general contours to the colonized production, forestalling attempts at industrialization and import substitution; b) The agrarian structure excluded a majority from the access to the land and privileged a non-intensive production; c) Concentration of income, poverty and inequality impeded the creation of internal consumption; d) the internal dynamics of the ruling classes haven't facilitated savings, (re)investments and innovation in the national economy. Finally, the geography (or how it was appropriated by the colonial powers) gave an incentive for easy exploitation of natural resources (a necessary input to production), shaping the patterns of occupation and de-population of the colony. The actual development policy of Latin American countries has focused on the exportation of agricultural products, repeating old economic patterns. The monoculture is mystified under the label of diversification of products. The impacts are more environmental destruction and (re)concentration of land in favor of big and old landowners. Low cost labor is once more a comparative advantage in international trade, now called "competitive" costs in the globalized world. Years of development studies demonstrated that there is not a model or "recipe" for progress and modernization. A diversity of development policies are needed in order to face these structural problems. The developmentalists in Latin America are ignoring a very basic premise: any real attempt of development must focus on the rupture of the old colonial legacy. Otherwise, social change will purely constitute a perpetuation of actual unequal conditions.
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Miguel 9 (Vincius Valentin Raduan, holds a degree in Legal Sciences Faculty of Humanities and a professor at the Federal University of Rondônia, “Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Latin America” http://www.politicalaffairs.net/colonialism-and-underdevelopment-in-latin-america/)
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we have to take in account the role of local elites who have benefited from those exploitative relations Colonialism is part of the historical process and formation of these countries. The contemporary economies are debilitated for the following main reasons The agrarian structure excluded a majority from the access to the land and privileged a non-intensive production Concentration of income, poverty and inequality impeded the creation of internal consumption the geography gave an incentive for easy exploitation of natural resources The actual development policy of Latin American countries has focused on exportation The impacts are more environmental destruction Years of development studies demonstrated that there is not a model or "recipe" for progress and modernization any real attempt of development must focus on the rupture of the old colonial legacy. Otherwise, social change will purely constitute a perpetuation of actual unequal conditions.
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Deconstructing colonialist knowledge production is a prerequisite to development—Latin America has a history of inequality perpetuated by epistemologically flawed policies
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Like the god Vishnu, Eurocentrism has many avatars (Wallerstein, 1997). These allow it to come into being age after age, to meet different adversaries and set its followers back on its own path. For those who recognize Eurocentrism as a problem within the study of world politics and wish to overcome it, it is necessary to be perpetually reflexive about its recurrent and evolving manifestations. This has been a major preoccupation of postcolonial security studies and international relations (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Jones, 2006; Shilliam, 2010; Hobson, 2012). This issue has also been in the sights of many critical accounts of the liberal peace,1 which interrogate the security–development nexus and its prescriptions for intervention (e.g. Duffield, 2001, 2007; Chandler, 2006; Richmond, 2005; Pugh, 2004, 2005; Mac Ginty, 2011).2 Overall, the liberal peace can be understood as a set of particular ideas and practices intended to reform and regulate polities in the global South so as to avoid both poverty and conflict. In contrast to the reassuring tenor of ‘policy-relevant’ conflict management and state-building strategies, the critical literature has fundamentally called into question the political significance and legitimacy of the liberal peace as a form of imperial global order. In Duffield’s (2001: 10–11) words: liberal peace embodies a new or political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy. In many respects, while contested and far from assured, liberal peace reflects a radical developmental agenda of social transformation. In this case however, this is an international responsibility and not that of an independent or single juridical state. These critiques have been suspicious of policies that project liberal peacebuilding strategies as merely effective technical solutions to violent conflict, underdevelopment and state weakness (Götze and Guzina, 2008; Chandler, 2010a). Rather, the critiques elaborate insightful accounts of the politics of international interventions in ‘post-conflict’ or ‘fragile’ environments. These critiques are ‘anti-imperial’ in orientation and ethic; that is to say, they derive much of their intellectual significance from exposing the tensions between norms and ethics of self-determination, democracy and sovereignty, on the one hand, and the neo-imperial interventionist discourses and practices that constitute the liberal peace, on the other (Chandler, 2006; Zaum, 2007). They respond to a much larger ‘mainstream’ literature on peacebuilding that has broadly sought to defend the latter’s core practices (e.g. Paris, 2010; Ignatieff, 2003; Caplan, 2005; see also the discussion by Cunliffe, 2012). The common charge within the critiques of ‘neocolonialism’ or ‘imperialism’ is thus understood as being serious as it implies association with an illegitimate relation of rule. However, despite growing interest in the ‘everyday’, ‘local’ or ‘subaltern’ actors in post-conflict societies and their modes of ‘resistance’ or ‘hybridity’ (Richmond, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011), the critiques have failed to address systematically the deeper problems of ‘Eurocentrism’ in how we think and research the politics of the international. As Walker (1993) has argued, international relations theory is itself political theory; that is to say, it circumscribes our understanding of the ‘possible’ in world politics through its ontologies and epistemologies. This insight, however, must also be applied to our traditions of critical theory. The core contribution of this article is an interrogation of the Eurocentric limits of thought in the critical liberal peace literature, which close down rather than open up counter-hegemonic modes of thinking the international (see also Krishna, 1993; Hobson, 2007, 2012). Thus, although the critical literature’s ethics are often ‘postcolonial’, the analytics can be further ‘decolonized’. In this sense, the push in this article to ‘decolonize’ critiques of the liberal peace can be seen as sympathetic to the anti-imperial ethos of the existing literature, if critical of its limits. Getting beyond those limits requires a deep appraisal of the particular forms of Eurocentrism in social theory. Such an appraisal leads towards a repoliticization of assumptions of ‘difference’. This article begins by identifying three major variants of Eurocentrism at work in social theory. It then unpacks key features of critical accounts of the liberal peace and discusses the ways in which they are inhabited by avatars of Eurocentrism. These culminate in what we might call a ‘paradox of liberalism’. Finally, the article offers three strategies for ‘decolonizing’ research on the development–security nexus through a repositioning of the analytic gaze.
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Sabaratnam 13 (Meera, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, “Avatars of Eurocentrism in the critique of the liberal peace” http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/44/3/259.full)
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it is necessary to be perpetually reflexive about its recurrent and evolving manifestations critical accounts of the liberal peace, interrogate the prescriptions for intervention the liberal peace can be understood as a set of particular ideas and practices intended to reform and regulate polities in the global South so as to avoid both poverty and conflict liberal peace embodies a new or political humanitarianism that reflects a radical developmental agenda of social transformation this is an international responsibility and not that of an independent or single juridical state. These critiques have been suspicious of policies that project liberal peacebuilding strategies as merely effective technical solutions to violent conflict, underdevelopment and state weakness These critiques are ‘anti-imperial’ in orientation and ethic; the neo-imperial interventionist discourses and practices that constitute the liberal peace common charge within the critiques of ‘neocolonialism’ or ‘imperialism’ is thus understood as being serious as it implies association with an illegitimate relation of rule the critiques have failed to address systematically the deeper problems of ‘Eurocentrism’ in how we think and research the politics of the internationa , it circumscribes our understanding of the ‘possible’ in world politics through its ontologies and epistemologies. This insight must also be applied to our traditions of critical theory an interrogation of the Eurocentric limits of thought in the critical liberal peace literature, which close down rather than open up counter-hegemonic modes of thinking , the analytics can be further ‘decolonized’
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Calls for liberal peace and development are grounded in Eurocentric thought that justifies illegitimate rule—deconstructing decolonial epistemology is key
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During the 1550s, while Spain debated the origins and behaviors of Native Americans,¶ Dominican Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas stated:¶ And the savage peoples of the earth may be compared to uncultivated soil that readily¶ brings forth weeds and useless thorns, but has within itself such natural virtue that by¶ labour and cultivation it maybe to yield sound and beneficial fruits. (cited in Sardar and¶ Davies 2002, 154)¶ How different are Las Casas’ words compared to the rhetoric used by proponents of¶ evidence-based education and their thoughts on educational research and practices¶ today? In this paper, using evidence-based education as a working example, I demonstrate¶ how colonial remnants continue with us in the discourses of educational policy¶ and neoliberalism.¶ In the past several years we have witnessed a growing interest and debate on¶ evidence-based education, practice, policy, and decision-making.1 Many journal¶ special issues, articles, and books have been dedicated to the topic, both in Britain and the USA (see Constable and Coe 2000; Erickson and Gutierrez 2002; Feuer, Towne,¶ and Shavelson 2002; Slavin 2002; Thomas and Pring 2004). Some authors attribute¶ the growing evidence-based movement to the worldwide trend in Western countries¶ towards greater ‘accountability’ (see Levin 2003; Rogers 2003; Hojgaard 2005).¶ Other authors trace the evidence-based movement in education to the formation of the¶ Cochrane Collaboration (evidence-based medicine initiative) in 1993 and the Centre¶ for Evidence-Based Medicine in Oxford in 1995 (Simons 2003). Pirrie (2001),¶ however, argues that the rise of the evidence-based movement in education stems¶ from the ‘crisis of legitimization in educational research’ (124) perpetuated by several¶ of the ‘most prominent champions of … “evidence-based” policy and practice in¶ education and proponents of evidence-based education’ (126). To counteract this¶ delegitimization of educational research and the practice of education in general, a¶ growing body of literature from a critical perspective has also emerged in response to¶ this movement (see Atkinson 2000; Elliott 2001; Hammersley 2001; Davies 2003;¶ Bloch 2004; Lather 2004; Olson 2004; Ryan and Hood 2004). So far these discussions have rarely connected the current evidence-based education¶ movement with colonial histories. For example, evidence-based policies and¶ practices have been used to marginalize indigenous bodies around the world, particularly¶ through forced cultural assimilation, theft, and the plundering of indigenous land¶ (Shiva 1995; Smith 1999). My intention in this article is to foreground how evidencebased¶ education proponents are unknowingly perpetuating a colonial discourse. In¶ other words, I join with those who have already critiqued evidence-based education,¶ and extend their critique by offering an anticolonial perspective. To this end, I will¶ first provide a brief description of the anticolonial theoretical framework. I will next¶ provide an overview of the literature that problematizes evidence-based education¶ from different critical perspectives. Drawing on the literature and policy documents¶ related to evidence-based education, particularly works written by proponents and¶ critics in the USA, Britain, and Canada, the following section analyzes this policy¶ discourse from an anticolonial perspective. I argue that proponents of evidence-based¶ education promote a colonial discourse and material relations of power that continue¶ from the European-American colonial era. I posit that this colonial discourse is present¶ in the evidence-based education movement in at least three ways: (1) the discourse of¶ civilizing the profession of education, (2) the promotion of hierarchies of knowledge¶ and monocultures of the mind, and (3) the interconnection between neoliberal educational¶ policies and global colonialism. I conclude with the implications of unpacking¶ these colonial vestiges in educational policy and suggest that we, as educators, need¶ to ‘slow down’ in the process of educational policy and practice.
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Shahjahan 2011 [Riyad Ahmed, Assistant Professor of Higher, Adult, and Lifelong Education at Michigan State University. Ph.D. at the OISE/University of Toronto in Higher Education. “Decolonizing the evidence-based education and policy movement:¶ revealing the colonial vestiges in educational policy, research, and¶ neoliberal reform” Online publication date: 22 March 201, Journal of Education Policy, 26: 2,¶ 181 — 206 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2010.508176]
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During the 1550s, while Spain debated the origins and behaviors of Native Americans,¶ Dominican Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas stated:¶ And the savage peoples of the earth may be compared to uncultivated soil that readily¶ brings forth weeds and useless thorns, but has within itself such natural virtue that by¶ labour and cultivation it maybe to yield sound and beneficial fruits. How different are Las Casas’ words compared to the rhetoric used by proponents of evidence-based education colonial remnants continue with us in the discourses of educational policy¶ and neoliberalism the rise of the evidence-based movement in education stems¶ from the ‘crisis of legitimization in educational research perpetuated by several¶ of the ‘most prominent champions of … “evidence-based” policy and practice in¶ education and proponents of evidence-based education’ evidence-based policies and¶ practices have been used to marginalize indigenous bodies around the world, particularly¶ through forced cultural assimilation, theft, and the plundering of indigenous land evidencebased education proponents are unknowingly perpetuating a colonial discourse proponents of evidence-based¶ education promote a colonial discourse and material relations of power that continue¶ from the European-American colonial era. I posit that this colonial discourse is present¶ in the evidence-based education movement in at least three ways: (1) the discourse of¶ civilizing the profession of education, (2) the promotion of hierarchies of knowledge¶ and monocultures of the mind, and (3) the interconnection between neoliberal educational¶ policies and global colonialism. we, as educators, need¶ to ‘slow down’ in the process of educational policy and practice.
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The reliance on evidence based education perpetuates a colonial discourse
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Shifting the geography of reason is part and parcel of the decolonial turn; it is indeed part of what the decolonial turn first achieved: the idea that we do not produce rigorous knowledge by adhering to the questions, concepts, and standards on the basis of the views or needs of only one region of the world, and even less of a region that has been characterized by either colonizing or ignoring other regions. This view of knowledge production as bounded by particular geographical horizons, or by disciplines or methods, is precisely what Gordon argues leads to disciplinary decadence. In that sense, decolonizing knowledge necessitates shifting the geography of reason, which means opening reason beyond Eurocentric and provincial horizons, as well as producing knowledge beyond strict disciplinary impositions. This includes the suspension of method, and the attention to problems and questions that emerge in the very effort to liberate oneself from the view of certain areas or bodies as epistemologically irrelevant. That is, “shifting the geography of reason” is a way to decolonize knowledge.
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Maldonado-Torres 11 (Nelson, Professor in Latino and Hispanic Caribbean Studies at Rutgers, Thinking through the Decolonial Turn: Post-continental Interventions in Theory, Philosophy, and Critique—An Introduction, TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 1(2), 2011)
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Shifting the geography of reason is part and parcel of the decolonial turn the idea that we do not produce rigorous knowledge by adhering to the questions, concepts, and standards on the basis of the views or needs of only one region of the world, and even less of a region that has been characterized by either colonizing or ignoring other regions. This view of knowledge production as bounded by particular geographical horizons, or by disciplines or methods, is precisely what Gordon argues leads to disciplinary decadence , decolonizing knowledge necessitates shifting the geography of reason, which means opening reason beyond Eurocentric and provincial horizons, as well as producing knowledge beyond strict disciplinary impositions. This includes the suspension of method, and the attention to problems and questions that emerge in the very effort to liberate oneself from the view of certain areas or bodies as epistemologically irrelevant. That is, “shifting the geography of reason” is a way to decolonize knowledge.
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Limits are bad – precludes questioning colonialism
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Departing from the intersection of the main theoretical currents present in these two special issues, one can also see the twentieth century as the moment when the decolonial skepticism, and the creative thought of figures such as the Caribbean-Algerian Frantz Fanon and the Chicana Gloria Anzaldúa—skepticism towards dehumanizing forms of thinking that present themselves as natural or divine—, animate new forms of theorizing based on the scandal in face of the continuity of dehumanizing practices and ideas. These dehumanizing forces, logics, and discourses hardly seem to find an end in the current neoconservative and neoliberal moment, or in the liberal and Eurocentric radical responses that it sometimes generate. Continued Manichean polarities between sectors considered more human than others, the accelerated rhythm of capitalist exploitation of land and human labor—sometimes facilitated, as Fanon well put it, by neocolonial elites among the groups of the oppressed themselves—, as well as anxieties created by migration and rights claims by populations considered pathological, undesirable, or abnormal—to name only a few of the most common issues found today—, make clear that decolonization will remain unfinished for some time.9 Likewise, decolonial movements of racialized populations in as varied places as the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, to name only a few, make clear that decolonization is relevant in the present and will continue to be doing so in the considerable future.
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Maldonado-Torres 11 (Nelson, Professor in Latino and Hispanic Caribbean Studies at Rutgers, Thinking through the Decolonial Turn: Post-continental Interventions in Theory, Philosophy, and Critique—An Introduction, TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 1(2), 2011)
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the twentieth century as the moment when the decolonial skepticism towards dehumanizing forms of thinking that present themselves as natural or divine—, animate new forms of theorizing based on the scandal in face of the continuity of dehumanizing practices and ideas. These dehumanizing forces, logics, and discourses hardly seem to find an end in the current neoconservative and neoliberal moment, or in the liberal and Eurocentric radical responses that it sometimes generate. Manichean polarities between sectors considered more human than others, the accelerated rhythm of capitalist exploitation of land and human labor— facilitated by neocolonial elites among the groups of the oppressed themselves—, as well as anxieties created by migration and rights claims by populations considered pathological, undesirable, or abnormal make clear that decolonization will remain unfinished for some time decolonial movements of racialized populations in as varied places make clear that decolonization is relevant in the present and will continue to be doing so in the considerable future
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Our skepticism strengthens current decolonial movements
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Hence Awaikta’s narrative resonates with what Anne remarked aboutepistemological dissonance. The objectivist paradigm and over-empha-sis on rationality continues to be a major obstacle to the inclusion of aspiritual ontology (Palmer, 2000). The misconception which equates anydiscourse of spirituality with religious dogmatism is yet another barrier(Scott, 1998). Finally, institutional culture and peer pressure function tosilence any discussion of spirituality within the halls of academe (hooks,2003; Dillard et al, 2000). The institutional culture presents an ongoing challenge, especially in the context of research universities, where thereis a pervasive and exclusive emphasis on “meritocracy” and productivity(Rendon, 2005; Shahjahan, 2005a). Hence, we feel that we do not have ime to talk about the “why” issues of life (Why am I here? What is the purpose of life?), instead, focusing on the “how’ issues of life, (How amI going to publish more articles? How am I going to fund my researchprojects?) (Shahjahan, 2005a). Such pragmatism is a reflection of theway in which different forms of knowledge production are valued in the academy. Similarly students are assimilated into a meritocratic environment of marks and competition where they “are pitted against each other” (Rendon, 2005, p. 88). Hence, we continue to live a life of fragmentation, rather than connectedness. As a result, we become as-similated into the meritocratic, or what I call the neo-colonial academy,where institutional goals and ideologies become internalized as ourown, both for faculty and students. Yet how might we counteract these entrenched challenges? I believe it is critical to address inclusiveness interms of factors such as curricula, bodies, language, pedagogical stylesand other considerations
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Wane, et. al 9 (Njoki Nathani Wane is the Special Adviser on Status of Women at University of Toronto as Co-Director of Centre for Integrative Anti-Racist Research Studies. ¶ Anne Wagner (featured left) is a professor of Modern and Contemporary ¶ Art at UC-Berkeley. Riyad Shahjahan is an educational administrator at ¶ Michigan State University. “Rekindling the Sacred: Toward a ¶ Decolonizing Pedagogy in Higher Education” Journal of Thought, ¶ Spring-Summer 2009
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The objectivist paradigm and over-empha-sis on rationality continues to be a major obstacle to the inclusion of aspiritual ontology The institutional culture presents an ongoing challenge, especially in the context of research universities, where thereis a pervasive and exclusive emphasis on “meritocracy” and productivity Hence, we feel that we do not have ime to talk about the “why” issues of life (Why am I here? What is the purpose of life?), instead, focusing on the “how’ issues of life Such pragmatism is a reflection of theway in which different forms of knowledge production are valued in the academy. Similarly students are assimilated into a meritocratic environment of marks and competition where they “are pitted against each other we continue to live a life of fragmentation, rather than connectedness. we become as-similated into the meritocratic, or what I call the neo-colonial academy,where institutional goals and ideologies become internalized as ourown,
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Objectivity and pragmatism are all tools to promote fragmentation and coloniality in the classroom
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First, there is a questioning of the place of the individual in society,¶ whereby on the one hand there is the assertion of the right to be different¶ while on the other there is strong opposition to anything which separates¶ the individual or splits up community life. Second, the privileges of¶ official knowledge, its secrecy and disinformation, are strongly challenged, calling into question the established relation of knowledge to¶ power. Third, there is a rejection of state violence and a refusal of a¶ ‘scientific or administrative inquisition’ which attempts to determine¶ who one is. These innovative features, which are relevant to the 1980s¶ debate on the new social movements, and also to the contemporary¶ discussion of protest and change, revolve around the dynamic intersections among the individual, society and political power. In this context,¶ the crucial political and ethical problem of the day was to try and liberate¶ oneself from both the state and the type of individualization that is linked¶ to the state – what is then needed are new forms of subjectivity. These¶ new forms of subjectivity will vary in content, and such variation will¶ clearly be deeply affected by the historical and societal context. To¶ illustrate this idea and to take the argument forward, I want to take an¶ example from Latin America and specifically from Brazil.¶ At the beginning of the 1990s, it was noted that in Latin America, in¶ addition to the rooted problems of social polarization, marginalization,¶ underemployment and unemployment, poverty and social deterioration,¶ the continent was facing new problems from emigration and drugs. This¶ seemingly intractable situation led one Brazilian social theorist, namely¶ Weffort (1991), to stress the deleterious effects of social decay, of the¶ dangerous prospects of a generalized anomie, of a loss of a future and of¶ a sense of societal disintegration.7¶ Pitted against this dystopian scenario,¶ Weffort (1991: 93) affirmed the force of democracy as the ‘force of¶ hope’. And this democracy referred not only to the nature of political power but equally significantly to the extraordinary increase in the¶ organizational capacity of civil society. How then would such an organizational capacity connect to new forms of subjectivity and the¶ proliferation of resistances?
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Slater 04(David. 2004. Geopolitics and¶ the Post-colonial¶ Rethinking North–South Relations. Blackwell Publishing. )
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there is a questioning of the place of the individual in society, the privileges of official knowledge, its secrecy and disinformation, are strongly challenged, calling into question the established relation of knowledge to power there is a rejection of state violence and a refusal of a ‘scientific or administrative inquisition’ which attempts to determine who one is These features relevant to the debate on the new social movements and contemporary discussion , revolve around the dynamic intersections among the individual, society and political the crucial political and ethical problem of the day was to try and liberate oneself from both the state and the type of individualization that is linked to the state – what is then needed are new forms of subjectivity subjectivity will be deeply affected by the historical and societal context At the beginning of the 1990s, it was noted that in Latin America, in addition to the rooted problems of social polarization, marginalization, underemployment and unemployment, poverty and social deterioration, the continent was facing new problems from emigration and drugs. This seemingly intractable situation led one Brazilian social theorist, namely Weffort (1991), to stress the deleterious effects of social decay, of the dangerous prospects of a generalized anomie, of a loss of a future and of a sense of societal disintegration Pitted against this dystopian scenario, Weffort (1991: 93) affirmed the force of democracy as the ‘force of hope’. And this democracy referred not only to the nature of political power but equally significantly to the extraordinary increase in the organizational capacity of civil society. How then would such an organizational capacity connect to new forms of subjectivity and the proliferation of resistances?
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Radical democratic deliberation over Latin America should include the imagination of new subjectivities beyond the state
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It has been argued that it is urgent to start new conversations about the¶ world and man in terms of the present economic and ecological crisis, but¶ also in terms of the global architecture of education.¶ A natural starting point for these new conversations is the school, with¶ its large catchment area. The following section interrogates the state of¶ affairs of educational discourse production globally and queries how nation¶ states in the South, often with a non-hegemonic, indigenous epistemologi-¶ cal orientation, prepare the new generation in the South for a sustainable¶ future. Clearly schools and education institutions are important sites where¶ knowledge production takes place.¶ While education cannot be seen as the miracle cure that can change the¶ situation in these countries for the better, there is little doubt that education¶ and relevant knowledges are important factors in fostering societies that¶ have the potential to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development¶ within the constraints of the global system discussed earlier. By undertak-¶ ing a survey of educational discourses across the globe, one finds evidence¶ of the global architecture of education (Jones, 2007).¶ The global architecture of education or the global educational discourse¶ has had, and still has, enormous consequences for how the school systems¶ function in various parts of the world. This homogenous global educational¶ discourse exists in countries with heterogeneous socio-economic and politi-¶ cal systems, both in the core and the periphery, and is distributed in substan-¶ tial part through the World Bank, IMF, UN organizations, INGOs such as¶ USAID, Save the Children, etc., and through state-to-state cooperation on¶ education.9 With such a perspective, education plays a homogenizing epis-¶ temological and a modernizing role. The epistemological transfer, besides¶ its ramifications nationally and internationally, impacts school quality as¶ it contributes, I argue, to alienating students in the South cognitively from¶ their home environment by introducing them to an alien culture and episte-¶ mology in school.
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Breidlid 13 (Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 54-55)OG
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it is urgent to start new conversations A natural starting point is the school, with¶ its large catchment area. schools and education institutions are important sites where¶ knowledge production takes place.¶ education¶ and relevant knowledges are important factors in fostering societies that¶ have the potential to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development¶ within the constraints of the global system The global architecture of education or the global educational discourse¶ has had, and still has, enormous consequences for how the school systems¶ function in various parts of the world education plays a homogenizing epis- temological and a modernizing role The epistemological transfer, besides¶ its ramifications nationally and internationally, impacts school quality
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Schools are the key starting point for epistemological transformation
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Whatever we understand by knowledge, we always and only know in community, in a culture and a language shared by a community; a shared culture and language allow us to communicate what is understood, chal- lenged, or probed as being-or not being-knowledge. In another cul- ture or language we could easily be at a total loss, at least at first, to claim having, achieving, or conveying anything as knowledge.¶ This is markedly important for Latin American immigrants, their U.S. l-lispanic/ Latin@ descendants, and their relatives gradually turned into aliens-by either xenophobia, racism, and/ or the ever-moving westem and southern frontiers (“we didn’t cross the broder, the broder crossed us” is a piece of grassroots counter-knowledge shared by many Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans, among others).¶ Part of the social paradox of knowing is that knowledge is not yet quite knowledge unless and until it is recognized as such by a group of people-both in the sense of being “understood” by them and in the¶ sense of being “accepted” by the group. If nobody understands or (what is almost the same, but not quite) if nobody accepts what somebody "knows,” for all intents and purposes that knower knows nothing (for the time being), that is, her/ his/ their knowledge is at least provisionally incapable of making a difference in the community where the knower/ s is/are located.¶ “Individual” knowledge is never merely individual: It is always a knowledge claimed by an individual within a community, but not quite yet knowledge until it is understood and validated by a community (or another). Cr, otherwise stated, knowledge is always in process, in an unpredictable process for that matter, and knowledge is always in strug- gle: the process and the struggle of trying to (re)formulate (received or “new”) knowledge in such a way as to gain understanding and accep- tance (recognition), indeed, but also the process and the struggle of react- ing and responding to the obstacles to such knowledge’s being received and acknowledged as knowledge.¶ Even in the extreme, hypothetical case of a hermit separated from any human contact for decades, and suffering from what could be deemed (from the outside) as dementia, whatever s/ he knows, cannot be so but in response to, and with the elements o£ what s/he acquired in the community of her/ his years before being estranged from human con- tact-and it is on such a basis that her/ his creativity might build. What- ever s/he knows, it will not be understood and recognized as knowledge, again, unless and until a group of people concurs with it.¶ Changes, conflicts, and power dynamics in any community- unavoidable traits of any group of people, especially when time, innovations, and social differentiation intervene-have consequences in the ways in which knowledge is (differentially) understood and “used within human interaction. For starters, those alterations, struggles, forces at work tend to induce analogous changes, conflicts, and power struggles around what people want (or desperately need) to make sense o£ to know, what we recognize (or overlook, or disqualify) as knowl- edge, and those whom we recognize (or dismiss) as producers or carriers of legitimate knowledge, as authorities.
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Maduro 11, Otto, Latino philosopher and sociologist of religion at Drew University,, “Decolonizing Epistemologies” Chapter “An(Other) Invitation to Epistemological Humility” Fordham University Press, November 2011
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Part of the social paradox of knowing is that knowledge is not yet quite knowledge unless and until it is recognized as such by a group of people-both in the sense of being “understood” by them and in the¶ sense of being “accepted” by the group. If nobody understands or if nobody accepts what somebody "knows,” for all intents and purposes that knower knows nothing that is their knowledge is at least provisionally incapable of making a difference in the community where the knower/ is/ located.¶ “Individual” knowledge is never merely individual: It is always a knowledge claimed by an individual within a community, but not quite yet knowledge until it is understood and validated by a community Even in the hypothetical case of a hermit separated from any human contact for decades, , whatever s/ he knows, cannot be so but in response to, and with the elements o£ what s/he acquired in the community of her/ his years before being estranged from human con- tact-and it is on such a basis that her/ his creativity might build. What- ever s/he knows, it will not be understood and recognized as knowledge, again, unless and until a group of people concurs with it.¶ Changes, conflicts, and power dynamics in any community- unavoidable traits of any group of people, especially when time, innovations, and social differentiation intervene-have consequences in the ways in which knowledge is (differentially) understood and “used within human interaction. For starters, those alterations, struggles, forces at work tend to induce analogous changes, conflicts, and power struggles around what people want (or desperately need) to make sense o£ to know, what we recognize (or overlook, or disqualify) as knowl- edge, and those whom we recognize (or dismiss) as producers or carriers of legitimate knowledge, as authorities.
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Knowledge is inherently tied to social location and human experiences – a community must understand and validate a thought for it to become considered knowledge
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The essays in this book are at the intersection of two axes: liberation epistemology and decolonizing epistemology. Liberation epistemology, born from the struggles of oppressed peoples all over the world, emerged originally in Latin America, the roots of Latinas/os living in the United States. The centrality of comunidades de base -base communities-in this movement and the insistence on the richness of popular religion that is fed by Amerindian, African, and European beliefs clearly indicate that the experiences and understandings of grassroots people are the source and locus ofliberating Latina/ o subjugated knowledge. The decolonizing axis, a more recently developed one, emerged as a response/reaction to the way that over the last half a century most theories have synergistically conspired to exclude the non-West, the non-Male, the non-White, and the non-European, which means the rivile · of European Anglo-¶ decolonizing axis points to how a group of Latina/o scholars has challenged the way Latinas / os have been written off the epistemic geopolitical maps produced by the West-Europe and now the United States.¶ Latinas/os are not postcolonial subjects the way that Indians or South¶ Africans are postcolonial subjects. Nor are we imperial subjects, in the¶ way one can say that the Spaniards, the French, and the British are impe-¶ r:ial subject;§. Latina/ o political and cultural identities have been forged in¶ the cauldron of struggles to resist postimperialism (after Spain, Portugal,¶ England, France) and neoimperialism (U.S.). Latinas/os are not national¶ subjects of one given nation, for we occupy at the same time different¶ national imaginaries and have plural allegiances; nor are we postnation-¶ als, for most ofus are U.S. citizens, and our Latina/o identities are forged..¶ in and are part of the United States. All of these forces, political vectors,¶ spaces of belonging, sites of dispossession, claimed interstices, erased¶ memories, and hushed stories have been theorized under a group of¶ terms that aim to reorient the way we approach knowledge production.¶ At the center of this new epistemic matrix is an understanding of our "coloniality/neocoloniality," which we live in the street~ of New York, Miami, Chicago, an:d San Francisco and in the agricultural fields of Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and California. We are the children of a West, a Europe, and a United States, whose lies about themselves refuse and negate our histores. To survive and flourish we have to decolonize our- selves. Our confrontation with the "coloniality of power," to use Anibal Quijano's generative expression, requires a relentless and ceaseless strug- gle to value our past as our peoples experienced it and not as the West has written it. Our past is part of our present, as it continues to frame what becomes actuality from a horizon of possibilities. Our decolonizing enterprise to free subjugated knowledges is a creative process that works at uncovering how to determine, from our own Latina/o perspectives, horizons of possibility and knowability. Both axes - liberation and decolonization – focus their knowing gaze on the ignored histories of Latinas/os;¶ they also embody archaeologies and genealogies that deliberately explore "sites of exception, fracture, dehumanization, and liminality" (Nelson Maldonado-Torres).
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Isasi-Diaz & Mendieta 11 (Ada Maria, Eduardo, professor of ethics and theology at Drew University, associate professor of Philosophy at Stony Brook University, “Decolonizing Epistemologies” Chapter “Freeing Subjugated Knowledge” Fordham University Press, November)
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The decolonizing axis, a more recently developed one, emerged as a response/reaction to the way that over the last half a century most theories have synergistically conspired to exclude the non-West, the non-Male, the non-White, and the non-European, which means the rivile · of European Anglo-¶ decolonizing axis points to how a group of Latina/o scholars has challenged the way Latinas / os have been written off the epistemic geopolitical maps produced by the West-Europe and now the United States.¶ Latinas/os are not postcolonial subjects the way that Indians or South¶ Africans are postcolonial subjects All of these forces, political vectors,¶ spaces of belonging, sites of dispossession, claimed interstices, erased¶ memories, and hushed stories have been theorized under a group of¶ terms that aim to reorient the way we approach knowledge production.¶ At the center of this new epistemic matrix is an understanding of our "coloniality/neocoloniality To survive and flourish we have to decolonize our- selves. Our confrontation with the "coloniality of power," requires a relentless and ceaseless strug- gle to value our past as our peoples experienced it and not as the West has written it. Our past is part of our present, as it continues to frame what becomes actuality from a horizon of possibilities. Our decolonizing enterprise to free subjugated knowledges is a creative process that works at uncovering how to determine, from Latina/o perspectives, horizons of possibility and knowability. Both axes - liberation and decolonization – focus their knowing gaze on the ignored histories of Latinas/os;¶ they also embody archaeologies and genealogies that deliberately explore "sites of exception, fracture, dehumanization, and liminality"
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Subjugated knowledge must be freed in the struggle against coloniality. Viewing history from the position of the ignored is necessary to engage in decolonial discourse
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The crisis that American and European universities suffer today are not only the result of pressures created by neoliberalism, the financial crisis and global capitalism (such as the "Bologna Process" in Europe, budget cuts in American universities, state abandonment of its historical policies of strong support to public education, etc.). This crisis also originates in the exhaustion of the present academic model with its origins in the universalism of the Enlightenment. The participants in the conference were in broad agreement that this type of universalism has been complicit with processes of not only class exploitation but also processes of racial, gender, and sexual dehumanization.¶ In fact, internal criticisms of Western forms of knowledge are not new. But in the last decade, the Kantian-Humboldtian model of university (including "science by and for science" detached from theology, the encyclopedic character of research, the figure of the teacher-researcher and of the researcher-student) has been widely questioned and criticized by Asian, Latin-American, North American and European postcolonial thinkers who call for decolonial social sciences and humanities. In particular, the Latin American and US Latino critical intellectuals, who prefer to refer to themselves as decolonial rather than postcolonial, are questioning the epistemic Eurocentrism and even the epistemic racism and sexism that guide academic practices and knowledge production in Westernized universities. They use these terms in critical reference to theories that are (1) based on European traditions and produced nearly always by European or Euro-American men who are the only ones accepted as capable of reaching universality, and (2) truly foundational to the canon of the disciplines in the Westernized university's institutions of social sciences and the humanities. Moreover, they question the intention of total encyclopedic knowledge, in particular anthropological knowledge, which is a process of knowing about "Others" that never fully acknowledges these "Others" as thinking and knowledge-producing subjects.¶ Such criticism does not necessarily lead to a narrow relativism and/or to the rejection of all research-making claims of universality. On the contrary, the most interesting dimension of Latin American and US Latino thinkers' latest reflections is that they underline the necessity of a process of universal thinking, built on dialogue between researchers from diverse epistemic horizons. This is what some Latin American decolonial intellectuals, following the Latin American philosopher of liberation, Enrique Dussel, has characterized as transmodernity. The latter refers to pluri-versalism as opposed to uni-versalism.¶ It is striking to note that the reforms proposed by the Bologna Process and the budget cuts to universities in the Americas do not address the internal and external critiques of the university outlined above. On the contrary, they reinforce the academic world's disenchantment with traditional forms of knowledge production in the social sciences and humanities.¶ Yet the potential for the renewal of American and European universities is considerable. One important path to renewal would involve opening the university resolutely to inter-epistemic dialogues with a view to building a new university, following what Boaventura de Sousa Santos has called an "ecology of knowledges." Far from limiting itself to a weak relativism by default, or to "micro-narratives," the decolonial proposal would be to search for universal knowledge as pluriversal knowledge, but through horizontal dialogues among different traditions of thought, or in Dussel's terms transmodernity as pluriversalism. The construction of "pluriverses" of meaning by taking seriously the knowledge production of "non- Western" critical traditions and genealogies of thought would imply a refounding of the Western university. There are social scientists and humanists in many parts of the world who, because of epistemic racism/sexism, are silenced or ignored or inferiorized by the canon of Western male tradition of thought, that is, the foundational authors of all the major disciplines in Westernized universities. Reforming the university with the aim of creating a less provincial and more open critical cosmopolitan pluriversalism would involve a radical re-founding of our ways of thinking and a transcendence of our disciplinary divisions.¶ The conference began a dialogue with other traditions of thought, particularly among Latin American, North American and European thinkers. It also included experiences such as those of the indigenous universities in the Americas. As was observed by several speakers, one of the main effects of neoliberalism has been the market-oriented university where research priorities and funding are based on market needs. As a result, the US model of the corporate university has been elevated to the status of a model since the 1970s. Latin America rapidly adopted this model and caused it to multiply into hundreds of private institutions during the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s. In other words, analyzing and discussing the academic changes that have occurred in the Americas and in Europe for the last decades should enable us to get a more profound understanding of the situation we find ourselves in today and to better rethink the university of tomorrow. The Bologna-inspired reforms of universities in the European Community are in many ways attempts at imitating the corporate neoliberal university model of the United States and, increasingly, Great Britain.¶ In one way or another the conference papers published in this volume discuss critiques of Eurocentric knowledge and of the universities (or other, related institutions such as museums) that have generated it, and explore initiatives to fight epistemic coloniality in several countries in Europe (the Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany Denmark) as well as in the Americas (Bolivia and the U.S.).¶ Regarding the Bologna university agenda in Europe, the intervention of Boaventura de Sousa Santos in this volume is fundamental for understanding the contemporary structures of the university. De Sousa formulates a series of what he calls "strong questions" about the contemporary European university in the context of the Bologna Process. These are questions that, in his words, "go to the roots of the historical identity and vocation of the university in order to question ... whether the university, as we know it, indeed has a future" (p. 8). The aim is to determine, for example, whether the European university can successfully reinvent itself as a center of knowledge in a globalizing society in which there will be many other centers as well; whether there will be room for "critical, heterodox, non-marketable knowledge," respectful of cultural diversity, in the university of the future; whether the scenario of a growing gap between "central" and "peripheral" universities can be avoided; whether market imperatives can be relativized as a criterion for successful research and whether the needs of society- in particular those not reducible to market needs-can be taken sufficiently into account; and, whether the university can become the site of the refounding of "a new idea of universalism on a new, intercultural basis." A decade after the beginning of the Bologna Process, De Souza observes that these strong questions have received only weak answers to date but he imagines a future scenario in which stronger answers can be provided and the university can "rebuild its humanistic ideal in a new internationalist, solidary and intercultural way" (p. 13).¶ In the context of the Bologna Process of neoliberal European university reform, Manuela Boatcã argues that the German authorities have recently promoted an "Excellence Initiative" which has defined as one key objective the promotion of area studies. To the extent that such initiatives constitute a more modestly funded imitation of existing US programs and share their affinity with evolutionist modernization theories and their instrumental function in orienting elite strategy, they operate as a vector of "re-Westernization" of the German university. However, these initiatives may also in some particular cases open up new spaces for the development of critical approaches to migration studies and ethnic and racial studies, from a more subaltern perspective, with openings to critical gender studies and attention to minority politics.¶ In the Danish university, outlooks on the countries of the South and issues of development are strongly conditioned by hegemonic perspectives marked by coloniality. Although, in an era of neoliberal university reform, decolonial critique of dominant forms and institutions of knowledge is a marginal pursuit, Julia Suárez- Krabbe draws on the experience of the collective Andar Descolonizando, based at Roskilde University, to suggest some ways in which decolonizing critique can be trained on the university institution itself and its "position within global articulations of power." Such critical work, aiming in particular at epistemic racism, can be accomplished through what she calls, with philosopher Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "epistemic coyotismo"-that is, introducing into the discussion theories and perspectives that are generally excluded from academia and causing them to be recognized at least, if not openly accepted and seeking decolonizing forms of collaboration with social movements in the South.¶ On the basis of direct experience in the Dutch university system, Kwame Nimako analyses the ways in which knowledge about ethnic minorities-so-called "minority research"-has been hegemonized by dominant elites who view minorities as problem populations and seek to manage minority problems in such a way as to minimize them and never question their own domination nor the historical heritage of colonialism and slavery. This forced Dutch minority groups to search for critical thinking and knowledge production outside the university structures. Nimako describes several initiatives undertaken- mainly outside the university-by minority groups to re-examine race and ethnic relations and the history of slavery and abolition, including the National Platform on the Legacy of Slavery, the National Institute for the study of Dutch Slavery and its Legacy (NiNsee), the Black Europe Summer School, etc.¶ The domination of Eurocentric social sciences in the Dutch university is reflected in the reproduction of ideological myths in its knowledge production. Sandew Hira examines certain dominant historical narratives regarding slavery and abolition produced and disseminated in the Dutch university and Dutch governmental institutions by colonial social scientists and historians. He denounces their ideological and non-scientific approaches and in particular their strong tendency to understate or deny the oppressive character of slavery and the responsibility of Dutch ruling classes in its promotion, while also mystifying the historical factors that explain why abolition took place.¶ Drawing inspiration from Patricia Hill Collins' critique of the "Eurocentric, masculinist knowledge-validation process," Stephen Small examines various ways in which universities, both in Britain and the United States, have long suppressed critical inquiry into the history of empire, slavery and the slave trade. Parallel to this critique, he examines museums and other memorial sites devoted to slavery in Britain and the U.S., including a small number of initiatives that challenge hegemonic accounts and draw attention to the agency and the resistance of slaves. He further draws attention to initiatives within academic institutions in the U.S., Britain and other parts of Europe to challenge dominant accounts of slavery and its legacy.¶ Contrary to Western European universities, ethnic studies and gender studies in the United States emerged from social pressures from below as part of the legacy of the civil rights struggles. This is why they are centres of critical thinking inside the United States' Westernized university. Ramón Grosfoguel examines the formation of ethnic and racial studies programs in the United States as a form of epistemic insurgency against epistemic racism/sexism. He develops an epistemic and institutional critique to the Westernized university as well as a critical view of the dilemmas ethnic studies confront today.¶ Taking ethnic studies as a decolonial project in the sense of "a southern epistemological space within a northern setting," Nelson Maldonado-Torres develops a radical critique of the humanities-and its crisis-today. He uses the decolonial epistemic revolt of ethnic studies as a point of departure for thinking about ways to decolonize the humanities. He calls for serious consideration of the experiences and epistemic perspectives of racialized colonial subjects traditionally ignored by the humanities in order to address its present crisis centred in Eurocentric knowledge production irrelevant to the present demographic shifts in the United States. He shows the parallels of the racial logic that have excluded colonial subjects and the neoliberal logic that today justifies huge budget cuts in the humanities. He argues that: "The temptation for the humanities would be to show that they are the depositories of a better form of whiteness (without ever calling it that, or recognizing it as such) than the one that is putting the humanities at the level of 'unproductive' people of color" (p. 98).¶ Drawing on his anthropological field work in Bolivia in the midst of profound social and political change, Anders Burman examines various interlocutors' attitudes towards knowledge, and in particular the important differences between "hegemonic theories of knowledge and indigenous epistemologies, between propositional and non-propositional knowledge, between knowledge of the world and knowledge from within the world, or between representationalist and relational ways of knowing" (p. 111). He stresses that there is "no absolute dividing line," no "clear-cut dichotomies after almost 500 years of asymmetric and colonial intermingling of epistemologies and knowledge systems from different traditions" (Ibid.). Yet he notes: "Relational ways of knowing and indigenous traditions of thought continue to be systematically treated as inferior but they are still present and are currently making themselves felt at the university" (Ibid.).¶ Maria Paula Meneses, speaking as a Mozambican researcher living and working in Portugal, examines the different types of knowledge about the history of the colonial relationship and the independence movement produced in the two countries. She observes that (at least) two separate narratives coexist and render difficult any possibility of mutual recognition. Colonialism involved much forgetting and silencing; the dominant Eurocentric perspective on colonial history needs to be questioned and problematized. This does not contradict a critical questioning of the official post-colonial narrative of the independent Mozambican state, whose state- and nation-building function has caused it to silence the diversity of memories generated by the interaction between colonizers and colonized and to justify the repression of those who questioned the official version of history. Public narratives, official or otherwise, that construct or reconstruct memories are inevitably in competition with each other and reflect power relations. But the full plurality of memory does not receive public attention; it must be dug out by activist researchers who are able to distinguish among different subjective viewpoints and produce knowledge with a full understanding of the complex relations among conflicting historical legacies.
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Boidin 12 (Capucine Boidin,Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, “Introduction: From University to Pluriversity: A Decolonial Approach to the Present Crisis of Western Universities”, [http://www.readperiodicals.com/201201/2582466231.html#b]
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The crisis that American and European universities suffer today are not only the result of pressures created by neoliberalism, the financial crisis and global capitalism This crisis also originates in the exhaustion of the present academic model with its origins in the universalism of the Enlightenment. The participants in the conference were in broad agreement that this type of universalism has been complicit with processes of not only class exploitation but also processes of racial, gender, and sexual dehumanization criticisms of Western forms of knowledge are not new. the Kantian-Humboldtian model of university has been widely questioned and criticized by Asian, Latin-American, North American and European postcolonial thinkers who call for decolonial social sciences and humanities. the Latin American and US Latino critical intellectuals, who prefer to refer to themselves as decolonial rather than postcolonial, are questioning the epistemic Eurocentrism and even the epistemic racism and sexism that guide academic practices and knowledge production in Westernized universities. They use these terms in critical reference to theories that are (1) based on European traditions and produced nearly always by European or Euro-American men who are the only ones accepted as capable of reaching universality, and (2) truly foundational to the canon of the disciplines in the Westernized university's institutions of social sciences and the humanities Such criticism does not necessarily lead to a narrow relativism and/or to the rejection of all research-making claims of universality. the most interesting dimension of Latin American and US Latino thinkers' latest reflections is that they underline the necessity of a process of universal thinking, built on dialogue between researchers from diverse epistemic horizons. This is what some Latin American decolonial intellectuals, following the Latin American philosopher of liberation, Enrique Dussel, has characterized as transmodernity. the potential for the renewal of American and European universities is considerable. One important path to renewal would involve opening the university resolutely to inter-epistemic dialogues with a view to building a new university Far from limiting itself to a weak relativism by default, or to "micro-narratives," the decolonial proposal would be to search for universal knowledge as pluriversal knowledge, but through horizontal dialogues among different traditions of thought The construction of "pluriverses" of meaning by taking seriously the knowledge production of "non- Western" critical traditions and genealogies There are social scientists and humanists in many parts of the world who, because of epistemic racism/sexism, are silenced or ignored or inferiorized by the canon of Western male tradition of thought the foundational authors of all the major disciplines in Westernized universities. Reforming the university with the aim of creating a less provincial and more open critical cosmopolitan pluriversalism would involve a radical re-founding of our ways of thinking analyzing and discussing the academic changes that have occurred in the Americas and in Europe for the last decades should enable us to get a more profound understanding of the situation we find ourselves in today and to better rethink the university of tomorrow. the conference papers published in this volume discuss critiques of Eurocentric knowledge and of the universities that have generated it, and explore initiatives to fight epistemic coloniality The aim is to determine whether the European university can successfully reinvent itself as a center of knowledge in a globalizing society whether there will be room for "critical, heterodox, non-marketable knowledge," respectful of cultural diversity, in the university of the future; whether the scenario of a growing gap between "central" and "peripheral" universities can be avoided the university can become the site of the refounding of "a new idea initiatives may open up new spaces for the development of critical approaches to migration studies and ethnic and racial studies, from a more subaltern perspective, with openings to critical gender studies and attention to minority politics decolonial critique of dominant forms and institutions of knowledge is a marginal pursuit some ways in which decolonizing critique can be trained on the university institution itself and its "position within global articulations of power Such critical work, aiming in particular at epistemic racism, can be accomplished through what she calls, with philosopher Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "epistemic coyotismo"-that is, introducing into the discussion theories and perspectives that are generally excluded from academia and causing them to be recognized at least, if not openly accepted and seeking decolonizing forms of collaboration with social movements in the South the ways in which knowledge about ethnic minorities-so-called "minority research"-has been hegemonized by dominant elites who view minorities as problem populations This forced Dutch minority groups to search for critical thinking and knowledge production outside the university structures. The domination of Eurocentric social sciences in the Dutch university is reflected in the reproduction of ideological myths in its knowledge production. Stephen Small examines various ways in which universities, both in Britain and the United States, have long suppressed critical inquiry into the history of empire, slavery and the slave trade he examines museums and other memorial sites devoted to slavery in Britain and the U.S., including a small number of initiatives that challenge hegemonic accounts and draw attention to the agency and the resistance of slaves ethnic studies and gender studies in the United States emerged from social pressures from below as part of the legacy of the civil rights struggles. This is why they are centres of critical thinking inside the United States' Westernized university. Grosfoguel examines the formation of ethnic and racial studies programs in the United States as a form of epistemic insurgency against epistemic racism/sexism. He develops an epistemic and institutional critique to the Westernized university as well as a critical view of the dilemmas ethnic studies confront today.¶ Taking ethnic studies as a decolonial project in the sense of "a southern epistemological space within a northern setting," Nelson Maldonado-Torres develops a radical critique of the humanities-and its crisis-today. He uses the decolonial epistemic revolt of ethnic studies as a point of departure for thinking about ways to decolonize the humanities. He calls for serious consideration of the experiences and epistemic perspectives of racialized colonial subjects traditionally ignored by the humanities in order to address its present crisis centred in Eurocentric knowledge production irrelevant to the present demographic shifts in the United States. the parallels of the racial logic that have excluded colonial subjects and the neoliberal logic that today justifies huge budget cuts in the humanities Anders Burman examines various interlocutors' attitudes towards knowledge, and in particular the important differences between "hegemonic theories of knowledge and indigenous epistemologies, between propositional and non-propositional knowledge, between knowledge of the world and knowledge from within the world, or between representationalist and relational ways of knowing" there is "no absolute dividing line," no "clear-cut dichotomies after almost 500 years of asymmetric and colonial intermingling of epistemologies and knowledge systems from different traditions" "Relational ways of knowing and indigenous traditions of thought continue to be systematically treated as inferior but they are still present and are currently making themselves felt at the university" She observes that (at least) two separate narratives coexist and render difficult any possibility of mutual recognition. Colonialism involved much forgetting and silencing; the dominant Eurocentric perspective on colonial history needs to be questioned and problematized.
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The University can provide the catalyst for changing our knowledge production and including subalternate thinking to break down the hegemonic power structures of the West
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In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, President Bush urged the nations of the world to work together "to free people from tyranny and violence, hunger and disease, illiteracy and ignorance, and poverty and despair."[1] That message echoes the enduring confidence that Americans have in freedom as a moral and liberating force for all peoples. It is the foundation of true democracy and human rights. Freedom is the engine that drives sustainable economic growth and provides increased access to prosperity for all people everywhere. Economic freedom is essentially about ensuring human rights. Strengthening and expanding it guarantees an individual's natural right to achieve his or her goals and then own the value of what they create. Amartya Sen, a Nobel laureate economist who has made considerable contributions to development economics, once noted that "Development consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity for exercising their reasoned legacy."[2] People crave liberation from poverty, and they hunger for the dignity of free will. By reducing barriers to these fundamental human rights, forces of economic freedom create a framework in which people fulfill their dreams of success. In other words, the greater the economic freedom in a nation, the easier for its people to work, save, consume, and ultimately live their lives in dignity and peace.
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Kim 7 [Anthony B. Kim, Policy Analyst in the Center for International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation, “The Link between Economic Freedom and Human Rights,” September 28, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/wm1650.cfm]
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That message echoes the enduring confidence that Americans have in freedom as a moral and liberating force It is the foundation of true democracy Freedom is the engine that drives sustainable economic growth and provides increased access to prosperity for all people everywhere. Economic freedom is essentially about ensuring human rights Strengthening and expanding it guarantees an individual's natural right to achieve his or her goals People crave liberation from poverty, and they hunger for the dignity of free will. By reducing barriers to these fundamental human rights, forces of economic freedom create a framework in which people fulfill their dreams of success
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Economic freedom solves poverty, human rights, war, and democracy worldwide
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With these developments human consciousness becomes enmeshed in a sense of time and history that belongs to the project of progress constructed in the sixteenth century. Therefore, by the time Descartes states his “Ego cogito sum,” his words mark the delimitation of thought under the Western racial economic project of development of a world-system of economic power and its fitting or working knowledge. In looking at the development of the racial difference, as traced by Quijano, one finds then two points of possible critical engagement with Western Modern philosophy. On the one hand, the need for a critique of Western consciousness as situated by the temporality of a rationalist instrumental project and delimitation of thought. This I take to be a critique that begins from Heidegger and works through deconstruction in Western philosophy. The other position would be exterior to this Western project, namely, a thinking from those lives, cultures, and histories discarded for the last five hundred years. My concern here is always with the latter, as the path to a decolonial thinking. But here appears a profound difficulty, how would one think in light of discarded consciousness if not out of a consciousness determined by the time line and sense of history that sustain the Western Modern rationalist instrumental project? In order to understand this question and its problematic implications better, I turn now back to Quijano’s analysis. In doing so I will be playing out some of the delimiting moments in Quijano’s analysis in order to see the extent to which the very opening accomplished by his analysis is framed by the coloniality of time that I have been discussing. However clear and historically and socio-politically accurate the analysis, Quijano’s discussion does not have a philosophical effect yet. Both his negative and positive critiques are grounded on ideas that belong to the very project he wants to challenge and undo. His discussion is based on a rationalist historical materialism (not a utopian humanism), and the expectation that leads it is that of a progress that occurs out of history. We are speaking of a change without a fundamental transformation, since the new configurations occur by constructing a new rationalism, modernity, and history. This is a new modernity that still corresponds to ideas of progress and history in the form of a dialectic movement of material historical progress. In his analysis the excluded and exploited in their very being are always the product of the ego conquero, and therefore are ultimately situated by the Western tradition as its other. Where this may be fitting in the sense of power and knowledge, the being of those distinct lives and cultures is not the product of (genitive) Western modernity tout court. As a result of this adjudication of difference to the system of power and knowledge that sustains the development of Western European and later North American modernity, the only path beyond racism is through finding a transformation by recognizing a movement of history and production. The progress that excludes must become a progress that liberates, a utopic progress as the engine of dialectic history goes on. What is not put into question is the concept of progress, and the historical materialism that is but an ever selfproducing manifestation of Western instrumental rationalism. Quijano’s critique recognizes Western history as the origin of alterity and thereby situates all questions of alterity under that historical development. The indigenous, the Afro-Caribbean, the Islamic, the Chinese are but creations of the Western historical development and therefore may only be critiqued through Western history. Every change and every possible unfolding must arise from, and therefore pass by, necessity through the filter or engine of rationalist historical progress and dialectic production. The problem is that such an analysis does not leave room for other possible configurations of identities, for transformations, for dialogue beyond the constraints of the Western Modern project of progress and the epistemic and existential requirements and limitations such a project imposes on all senses of beings. If one thinks of the traditional North-South dependency, in following Quijano’s analysis any liberating thought will have to repeat the journey north and thus will have to pass through a transformation of the northern epistemic apparatus operative in the coloniality of power and knowledge. This would mean that for Quijano any South-South dialogue between those excluded, oppressed, and violently fragmented cultures is simply a myth, that is, since in every case the agents involved would be mere creations of the Modern engine of progress. Inversely, this is why only through history, rationality, and progress would change occur. One may contrast this position with that of philosophers of liberation like Enrique Dussel, for whom philosophy today requires a south-south dialogue in which the excluded and discarded thought of the oppressed may engage in its own transmodern dialogue.35 We are speaking, here, of philosophical dialogues that do not depend or refer to Western modernity for their occurrence and development. Such transmodernity, such thinking in radical exteriority is an impossibility for Quijano.36 When Quijano does reach for a thinking that is Latin American he turns towards the recognition of Latin America’s participation in the development of modernity: the utopian thought of Western Modern philosophy comes from indigenous experiences that reach the other side of the Atlantic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and during the period of the development of modernity in the West, during the enlightenment, the Americas are on par when not ahead of Europe (particularly with respect to political revolution).37 Here the indigenous appears only through its inscription into the history of Western modernity, or in the form of the excluded, as one appeals to the American participation in Modern political revolutions that ultimately used and excluded the indigenous by virtue of the criollo revolutions of the nineteenth century. Obviously neither of these are in Quijano’s intentions, but they do show how the other is always a function of and reinscribed into a project of modernity, i.e. of its history, rationalism, materialism, and production. This issue becomes also evident when one considers that when Quijano does reach beyond Western history/time, he does so by appealing to Garcia Márquez’s writing as a “mythical” writing that articulates a sense of historical time diverse from Western historical temporality. What is curious is that one must move from the real to the mythic in order to engage Latin American reality. This is because Quijano remains with a rationalist historical origination that, in being recognized also delimits his critique, to the point that the only outside of the Western coloniality of time is itself a version of the product (and thus within the parameters) of rationalist materialist dialectic concepts and expectations inseparable from the coloniality of power and knowledge.
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Vallega 12 [Alejandro A., Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon | “Remaining with the Crossing: Social-Political Historical Critique at the Limit in Latin”, Research in Phenomenology 42 (2012) 229–250 | DOI: 10.1163/156916412X651210]
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With these developments human consciousness becomes enmeshed in a sense of time and history that belongs to the project of progress constructed in the sixteenth century. Descartes words mark the delimitation of thought under the Western racial economic project of development of a world-system of economic power and its fitting or working knowledge. The other position would be exterior to this Western project a thinking from those lives, cultures, and histories discarded for the last five hundred years how would one think in light of discarded consciousness if not out of a consciousness determined by the time line and sense of history that sustain the Western Modern rationalist instrumental project? negative and positive critiques are grounded on ideas that belong to the very project he wants to challenge and undo. discussion is based on a rationalist historical materialism and the expectation that leads it is that of a progress that occurs out of history a change without a fundamental transformation, since the new configurations occur by constructing a new rationalism, modernity, and history that still corresponds to ideas of progress and history in the form of a dialectic movement the excluded and exploited in their very being are always the product of the ego conquero, and therefore are ultimately situated by the Western tradition as its other As a result the only path beyond racism is through finding a transformation by recognizing a movement of history and production. The progress that excludes must become a progress that liberates What is not put into question is the concept of progress, and the historical materialism that is but an ever selfproducing manifestation of Western instrumental rationalism. Quijano’s critique recognizes Western history as the origin of alterity and thereby situates all questions of alterity under that historical development. The indigenous, the Afro-Caribbean, the Islamic, the Chinese are but creations of the Western historical development and therefore may only be critiqued through Western history. Every change and possible unfolding must arise from the engine of rationalist historical progress and dialectic production. such an analysis does not leave room for other possible configurations of identities, for transformations, for dialogue beyond the constraints of the Western Modern project of progress and the epistemic and existential requirements and limitations such a project imposes on all senses of beings. If one thinks of the traditional North-South dependency, in Quijano’s analysis any liberating thought will have to repeat the journey north and will have to pass through a transformation of the northern epistemic apparatus operative in the coloniality of power and knowledge. any South-South dialogue between those excluded, oppressed, and violently fragmented cultures is a myth the indigenous appears only through its inscription into the history of Western modernity in the form of the excluded one must move from the real to the mythic in order to engage Latin American reality. This is because Quijano remains with a rationalist historical origination that, in being recognized also delimits his critique, to the point that the only outside of the Western coloniality of time is itself a version of the product of rationalist materialist dialectic concepts and expectations inseparable from the coloniality of power and knowledge.
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Coloniality’s routing of all history through Western narratives reifies the eurocentrism it claims to critique and makes alternatives impossible
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In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should¶ be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform¶ in education creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments¶ in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice¶ (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.
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Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG
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in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and resources rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced they should¶ be enhanced and expanded a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy establishes certain parameters to ensure that the outcomes do not lead to “unjust” policy Reform takes time, sometimes decades Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ Every reform¶ creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. This is a valid critique worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and skilled facilitation experiments¶ in deliberative democracy reform in Brazil have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication, problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners and developing communities of practice¶ democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments a more deliberative and democratic model of international cooperation would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming. a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity
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Limited deliberative forums like debate which discuss Latin American specific policies prevent elite domination, develops agency, and promotes epistemological equality
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Globalization from above can be thought of as another name for¶ neo-liberal globalization, a process that is founded on privatization,¶ competitiveness, deregulation, standardization and more profoundly¶ the commodification of social life. For Falk (1999) this kind of globalization is predatory and homogenizing, whereas globalization from¶ below is associated with heterogeneity, diversity and bottom-up participatory politics. This distinction can be helpful and avoids the problems¶ associated with a full-blown denunciation of globalization in its entirety,¶ from which the alternative tends towards a somewhat uncritical notion¶ of localization. It can be suggested that while a neo-liberal globalization¶ from above promotes competitiveness, hierarchy, conformity and the¶ primacy of the cash nexus, globalization from below can help expand the ethic of participatory democracy to a variety of spatial levels, not just¶ the global but the supra-national, national, regional, local and community levels. It is not that more power at one level of governance will¶ necessarily disempower people at other levels, but that the empowerment¶ of local and national communities requires the extension of democratic¶ principles at the global and supra-national levels. As Brecher et al. (2000)¶ constructively suggest, globalization from below requires a framework¶ that recognizes this interdependence of spatial spheres or levels. It can¶ also be suggested here that when globalization from above intersects¶ with globalization from below, the point of maximum tension will tend¶ to locate itself at the national level – what I previously referred to as the¶ geopolitical pivot, where the pressures from above and below interact¶ with the most impact.
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Slater 04 (David. David Slater is Professor of Social and Political Geography at Loughborough University. 2004. Geopolitics and¶ the Post-colonial¶ Rethinking North–South Relations. Blackwell Publishing. )
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globalization from below is associated with heterogeneity, diversity and bottom-up participatory politics. This distinction can be helpful and avoids the problems associated with a full-blown denunciation of globalization in its entirety, from which the alternative tends towards a somewhat uncritical notion of localization. globalization from below can help expand the ethic of participatory democracy to a variety of spatial levels, not just the global but the supra-national, national, regional, local and community levels It is not that more power at one level of governance will necessarily disempower people at other levels, but that the empowerment of local and national communities requires the extension of democratic principles at the global and supra-national levels globalization from below requires a framework that recognizes this interdependence of spatial spheres or levels. when globalization from above intersects with globalization from below, the point of maximum tension will tend to locate itself at the national level – what I previously referred to as the geopolitical pivot, where the pressures from above and below interact with the most impact.
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Globalization from below– beginning from local and community level– solves broader political change
| 1,765 | 99 | 1,188 | 251 | 13 | 172 | 0.051793 | 0.685259 |
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The Zapatista discourse emerging from this interchange overtly showed its capacities to overcome ethnocentrisms, exhibited in its programmatic call for “a world where many worlds fit”. However, the notion of a persistent coloniality promotes a view on this “revolutionary” encounter that tends on the one side to focus on centuries-old traditions of indigenous modes to produce meaning of the social world and on the other side to deal with Marx- ism as an ideology contained in a Eurocentric orthodoxy and therefore not considerable as a source of “decolonising” concepts for the indigenous population. To formulate it trenchantly against the backdrop of postcolonial studies’ general claim to represent an intellectual “movement beyond a relatively binaristic, fixed and stable mapping of power relations between ‘colonizer / colonized’ and ‘center / periphery’” – quoted by Mignolo 9 – and their declaration to “fight against essentialism”: the idea of coloniality orientates in Mignolo’s analysis of zapatismo a perspective that privileges precisely the binary logic of an original mutual translation between a homogenous and self-contained “Occidental” ideological system and Amerindian ways of knowing and representing, preserved in traditions over the centuries, instead of a thorough examination of the complex historical conditions that actually led to this liaison and were the result of long-term permanent interactions between indigenous and non-indigenous social and cultural spheres. As a consequence, Mignolo completely glosses over the “modern”, post-colonial (hyphen- ated) elements in the culture and the thinking of the Mayan communities that joined the EZLN. Among these decisive prerequisites for the emergence of zapatismo, orthodox Marxism played an influential role. Zapatismo was a hybrid political formation with multiple levels of meaning. It was in the 1990s a movement that intertwined in the representation of its emancipatory project closely indigenous imaginaries with Marxist ideology, liberation theology and nationalist narratives of modern Mexican history. At a certain point in his essay, Mignolo remarks critically against a statement made by Yvon LeBot that a definition of democracy by Subcomandante Marcos – quoted in the text – has to remain basically meaningless for the interpreter who does not know the previous discourse of the EZLN and of its Tojolabal Major Ana María. The same is true for the Zapatista discourse as well: without a comprehension of the historicity of its elements, the understanding of zapatismo is severely limited. And such a comprehension implies above all the arduous task to scrutinise historical interactions of the concerned entities and their transformations. Mignolo applies his concept of “border thinking” to the Zapatistas’ theoretical revolution: “border thinking emerges from the double translation across the colonial difference”. Apparently, he underestimates the permeability of these borders.
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Epple & Lindner 11, Angelika and Ulrike, both professors in the department of History, Philosophy and Theology at the University of Bielefeld, “Foucault Hardly Came to Africa: Some notes on colonial and postcolonial governmentality” Comparativ - Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 21 (2011) Heft 1, S. 7–13.
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The Zapatista discourse showed its capacities to overcome ethnocentrisms However, the notion of a persistent coloniality promotes a view on this “revolutionary” encounter that tends on the one side to focus on centuries-old traditions of indigenous modes to produce meaning of the social world and on the other side to deal with Marx- ism as an ideology contained in a Eurocentric orthodoxy and therefore not considerable as a source of “decolonising” concepts for the indigenous population. the idea of coloniality orientates in analysis of zapatismo a perspective that privileges precisely the binary logic of an original mutual translation between a homogenous and self-contained “Occidental” ideological system and Amerindian ways of knowing and representing, preserved in traditions over the centuries, instead of a thorough examination of the complex historical conditions that actually led to this liaison and were the result of long-term permanent interactions between indigenous and non-indigenous social and cultural spheres. Mignolo completely glosses over the “modern”, post-colonial elements in the culture and the thinking of the Mayan communities that joined the EZLN. Among these decisive prerequisites for the emergence of zapatismo, orthodox Marxism played an influential role Zapatismo was a movement that intertwined in the representation of its emancipatory project closely indigenous imaginaries with Marxist ideology, liberation theology and nationalist narratives of modern Mexican history. that a definition of democracy by Subcomandante Marcos – quoted in the text – has to remain basically meaningless for the interpreter who does not know the previous discourse of the EZLN and of its Tojolabal Major Ana María. The same is true for the Zapatista discourse as well: without a comprehension of the historicity of its elements, the understanding of zapatismo is severely limited. And such a comprehension implies above all the arduous task to scrutinise historical interactions of the concerned entities and their transformations.
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Mignolo’s coloniality framework is too blunt to understand the Zapatistas and their hybrid political movement
| 2,976 | 109 | 2,056 | 436 | 15 | 302 | 0.034404 | 0.692661 |
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We also observe, finally, that Mignolo’s dream of an absolutely unmediated democracy could exist at all only if the two seemingly opposed actions ¶ of ruling and obeying could somehow take place, as the dictum itself suggests, “at the same time.”33 We would thus have to imagine beings who both¶ obey and rule; and not merely in turn, sometimes doing one and sometimes the other, but both at once. The beings capable of this extraordinary ¶ simultaneity of ruling and obeying would thus somehow have extricated ¶ themselves from the problem of time itself, both philosophically and practically. By the same token, the democracy constituted by the gathering of ¶ such beings would exist as if in a continuous present, capable of neither ¶ improvement nor decline, and in fact closed off to new events in its own ¶ infinite and absolute completion. Such a political vision is all the more ¶ unexpected in that, after all, Mignolo’s project is otherwise an essentially ¶ historical one. Mignolo analyzes and celebrates, above all, a border thinking ¶ that emerges only after a historical confrontation and interaction of two ¶ radically different ways of thinking and being; and as such, border thinking ¶ is something that must have been, at some particular time and place, new. ¶ And yet the democracy that emerges from such border thinking apparently no longer exists in time or history at all. In other words, Mignolo ¶ seems to envision a history that leads via a particular necessary sequence ¶ of events to a particular telos—and then stops. This teleological vision ¶ simply reinstalls in the future Mignolo’s arcadian vision of a “originally ¶ good” Amerindian voice. For us, as for Derrida, on the contrary, democracy is always “to come,” something that can never be made absolutely present ¶ once and for all—precisely because, as democracy, it must question and ¶ interrogate every border, remaining infinitely incomplete and open: to the ¶ unforeseeable, to the future, and to the unexpected arrival of the other. And ¶ this, indeed, will take time.
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Michaelsen and Shershow 7 (Scott Michaelsen and Scott Cutler Shershow, Professor of English at Michigan State and Professor of English at UC Davis “Rethinking Border Thinking”, [http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/106/1/39.full.pdf+html]
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Mignolo’s dream of an absolutely unmediated democracy could exist at all only if the two seemingly opposed actions ¶ of ruling and obeying could somehow take place, at the same time.”33 We would thus have to imagine beings who both¶ obey and rule; and not merely in turn, sometimes doing one and sometimes the other, but both at once. The beings capable of this extraordinary ¶ simultaneity of ruling and obeying would thus somehow have extricated ¶ themselves from the problem of time itself the democracy constituted by the gathering of ¶ such beings would exist as if in a continuous present, capable of neither ¶ improvement nor decline, and in fact closed off to new events in its own ¶ infinite and absolute completion. Such a vision is all the more ¶ unexpected in that Mignolo’s project is otherwise an essentially ¶ historical one. Mignolo analyzes and celebrates a border thinking ¶ that emerges only after a historical confrontation and interaction of two ¶ radically different ways of thinking and being; border thinking ¶ is something that must have been, at some particular time and place, new yet the democracy that emerges from such border thinking apparently no longer exists in time or history at all. Mignolo ¶ seems to envision a history that leads to a particular telos—and then stops. This teleological vision ¶ simply reinstalls in the future Mignolo’s arcadian vision of a “originally ¶ good” Amerindian voice. For us democracy is always “to come,” something that can never be made absolutely present ¶ once and for all as democracy, it must question and ¶ interrogate every border, to the ¶ unforeseeable, to the future, and to the unexpected arrival of the other. And ¶ this, indeed, will take time.
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Mignolo’s border theory will not lead to a better democratic world where everyone is equal- it leads to a world without change- an impossibility beyond history and time itself
| 2,059 | 175 | 1,725 | 344 | 29 | 293 | 0.084302 | 0.851744 |
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As we have observed, this whole elaborate theoretical machinery depends on a single fundamental claim: that Amerindian systems of signification were so distinctively different as to escape the problems Derrida ¶ described under the term logocentrism. Even on the surface of it, such a ¶ claim is founded in a contradiction so simple and obvious as to have eluded ¶ Mignolo himself. On the one hand, Mignolo argues above all that these ¶ colonial subjects, who were declared to be a people “without writing” by ¶ their colonial conquerors (because they appeared to lack systems of phonetic or alphabetic inscription) in fact do possess a variety of practices that ¶ can meaningfully be called “writing.” In this sense, the Amerindians were ¶ culturally the same as their conquerors: their signifying systems were in no ¶ sense “primitive” and should not be understood as merely the earlier stages ¶ of some alleged progression toward alphabetic writing. On the other hand, ¶ Mignolo also argues that Amerindian signifying practices were in fact distinctively different from European ones, for their “writing” was neither a ¶ phonetic representation of speech nor understood as a privileged realm of ¶ memory and authority in the Western manner. Mignolo is thus trying, as ¶ it were, to have his difference and deny it too. He insists that Amerindians did have writing, yet imagines the writing they had as one that escapes all ¶ of writing’s problems and that exists in the form of an untamed “voice” not ¶ yet contaminated by the letter.The first half of this self-contradictory argument also merely echoes a ¶ traditional anthropological critique of “evolutionary” Eurocentric conceptions of culture. True enough, both the Renaissance colonialists and ¶ humanists whom Mignolo discusses, and later thinkers such as Rousseau ¶ and Hegel, always assume that alphabetic writing is the inevitable telos of ¶ human cultural progress. The other contributors to Writing without Words¶ frequently join Mignolo (and Derrida) in rightly critiquing such assumptions. For example, Elizabeth Hill Boone, the coeditor of the volume, ¶ deplores how “the denial of pictographic writing systems as ‘real writing’ ¶ has generally been accompanied by an insidious pejorative tone.”8 Boone, ¶ however, enlists Derrida’s critique of logocentrism as an ally in reclaiming ¶ the pictographic systems of pre-Columbian as legitimate forms of “writing.” What Boone calls the “semasiographic” writing systems of Mesoamerica do not primarily rely on a phonetic representation of speech and ¶ are “characterized by a high proportion of visual description,” but nevertheless, “like other iconic systems they also use some arbitrary conventions,” and “phonetic elements may be present—especially in personal ¶ names and place names” (18). As Derrida himself always argues, no system ¶ of writing is either purely phonetic or purely pictographic; and “‘phonetic’ and ‘nonphonetic’ are . . . never pure qualities of certain systems of ¶ writing, they are the abstract characteristics of typical elements, more or ¶ less numerous and dominant within all systems of signification in general” ¶ (Grammatology, 89). No departure from Derrida is therefore necessary to ¶ join Mignolo and his collaborators in this volume in simply concluding ¶ that, during the period of colonization, “the materiality and the ideology ¶ of Amerindian semiotic interactions were intermingled with or replaced ¶ by the materiality and ideology of Western reading and writing cultures” ¶ (Darker, 76) and that, in other words, European colonialists misinterpreted ¶ Amerindian practices in the light of their own cultural presuppositions, ¶ and imposed Western conceptions of writing on colonial subjects as part ¶ of a broader process of cultural and political subjugation.¶ But the second half of Mignolo’s self-contradictory double claim—that ¶ Amerindian systems of signification escape the problems of logocentrism—by no means follows from this conclusion. Consider, for example, ¶ how Boone suggests that one advantage of semasiographic systems is that ¶ “Aztec (Nahuatl-speaking) scribes from Central Mexico could . . . read the Mixtec histories of southern Oaxaca, giving them voice in their own language” (19). And she concludes:¶ One thing shared by all these indigenous New World systems is that ¶ they give accountability. Because they are permanent, or relatively so, ¶ they functioned for their societies to document and to establish ideas. ¶ As records, they are memory that can be inspected by others. The ¶ hieroglyphic text and the pictorial-iconic presentation could be read ¶ or interpreted by many people other than their creator. (22, emphases ¶ original)¶ One must join Boone here in highlighting, as definitive characteristics of ¶ any of these New World systems of inscription, the functions of accountability, memory, and interpretability. Such characteristics would pertain in ¶ even the relatively extreme case of the Peruvian quipus, insofar as their patterns of knots and cords functioned, in any sense, to record or document ¶ information (and even if, as some have claimed, these were no more than ¶ personal mnemonic devices). Similarly, Peter L. van der Loo, discussing in ¶ the same volume a pre-Columbian pictorial manuscript known as the Borgia Group, explains that “these manuscripts can be read as text. Because the message is put down in a pictorial mode, the actual spoken text may differ ¶ from reader to reader, but the main content of the message will remain the ¶ same to all.”9 As described here, this nonphonetic “writing” nevertheless ¶ is said to be linked to some semiotic “message” or “content” that both ¶ precedes and survives its inscription, that is reproducible as “voice” or ¶ “reading” in its wake, and that thus anchors or limits the varied readings or ¶ voicing of the inscribed signs. Is this, too, merely a Eurocentric misreading ¶ of pre-Columbian practices? Or is there, rather, no other way to “read” or ¶ to “write” except as a perpetually unfinished process of deferred presence? ¶ What else could this “content” or “voice” be than what Derrida calls the ¶ “trace,” the “arche-writing” that is “before the letter” not in some historical ¶ or evolutionary sense but, rather, as the mark of a consciousness and an ¶ “experience” lived only in signs and in time, and therefore in an interminable process of self-differing and self-deferring? As soon as there is, in any ¶ sense, record, account, or document, as soon as inscription of any kind offers ¶ itself as at once a supplement and a substitute for a memory that already ¶ supplements and substitutes for the trace, one is already, as these ethnographic descriptions themselves clearly attest, within the strange economy ¶ of what Derrida famously calls difference. But Mignolo himself, as we have already observed, wants both to re-claim these New World practices as “writing” and to free them from all ¶ such economies. In The Darker Side, Mignolo observes repeatedly that it ¶ is possible to have “writing without books,” pointing to, for example, the ¶ graphic inscriptions on the walls of temples in ancient Egypt and ancient ¶ Mesoamerica. He fails to acknowledge that such observations have always accompanied the very discourses whose ethnocentric biases he wants to ¶ expose. For example, Hegel, whose Aesthetics is perhaps the supreme European statement of an “evolutionary” approach to language, observes in ¶ this same text that Egyptian temples “can be regarded like the pages of a ¶ book.”10 Mignolo’s specific observations also remain suspended between ¶ the two rather different arguments that we have already summarized. He ¶ suggests that Amerindians possessed sophisticated writing practices that ¶ were misunderstood by their conquerors, but then goes on to claim—or ¶ at least to hint— that the Amerindians grasped the very relation between ¶ presence and representation in a manner somehow radically different from ¶ Europeans
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Michaelsen and Shershow 7 (Scott Michaelsen and Scott Cutler Shershow, Professor of English at Michigan State and Professor of English at UC Davis “Rethinking Border Thinking”, [http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/106/1/39.full.pdf+html]
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this whole elaborate theoretical machinery depends on a single fundamental claim: that Amerindian systems of signification were so distinctively different as to escape the problems Derrida ¶ described under the term logocentrism. Even on the surface of it, such a ¶ claim is founded in a contradiction so simple and obvious as to have eluded ¶ Mignolo himself. Mignolo argues above all that these ¶ colonial subjects, in fact do possess a variety of practices that ¶ can meaningfully be called “writing.” the Amerindians were ¶ culturally the same as their conquerors: their signifying systems were in no ¶ sense “primitive” and should not be understood as merely the earlier stages ¶ of some alleged progression toward alphabetic writing. Mignolo also argues that Amerindian signifying practices were in fact distinctively different from European ones Mignolo is thus trying, as ¶ it were, to have his difference and deny it too. He insists that Amerindians did have writing, yet imagines the writing they had as one that escapes all ¶ of writing’s problems and that exists in the form of an untamed “voice” not ¶ yet contaminated by the letter.The first half of this self-contradictory argument echoes a ¶ traditional anthropological critique of “evolutionary” Eurocentric conceptions of culture. both the Renaissance colonialists and ¶ humanists whom Mignolo discusses always assume that alphabetic writing is the inevitable telos of ¶ human cultural progress no system ¶ of writing is either purely phonetic or purely pictographic; and “‘phonetic’ and ‘nonphonetic’ are . . . never pure qualities of certain systems of ¶ writing, they are the abstract characteristics of typical elements, more or ¶ less numerous and dominant within all systems of signification in general” No departure from Derrida is therefore necessary to ¶ join Mignolo and his collaborators in this volume in simply concluding ¶ that, during the period of colonization, “the materiality and the ideology ¶ of Amerindian semiotic interactions were intermingled with or replaced ¶ by the materiality and ideology of Western reading and writing cultures” and that, in other words, European colonialists misinterpreted ¶ Amerindian practices in the light of their own cultural presuppositions, ¶ and imposed Western conceptions of writing on colonial subjects as part ¶ of a broader process of cultural and political subjugation.¶ But the second half of Mignolo’s self-contradictory double claim—that ¶ Amerindian systems of signification escape the problems of logocentrism—by no means follows from this conclusion. One thing shared by all these indigenous New World systems is that ¶ they give accountability. Because they are permanent, or relatively so, ¶ they functioned for their societies to document and to establish ideas. ¶ A they are memory that can be inspected by others. The ¶ hieroglyphic text and the pictorial-iconic presentation could be read ¶ or interpreted by many people other than their creator. One must join Boone here in highlighting, the functions of accountability, memory, and interpretability. Because the message is put down in a pictorial mode, the actual spoken text may differ ¶ from reader to reader, but the main content of the message will remain the ¶ same to all.”9 As described here, this nonphonetic “writing” nevertheless ¶ is said to be linked to some semiotic “message” or “content” that both ¶ precedes and survives its inscription, that is reproducible as “voice” or ¶ “reading” in its wake, and that thus anchors or limits the varied readings or ¶ voicing of the inscribed signs Is this merely a Eurocentric misreading ¶ of pre-Columbian practices? Or is there, rather, no other way to “read” or ¶ to “write” except as a perpetually unfinished process of deferred presence? therefore in an interminable process of self-differing and self-deferring? As soon as there is, in any ¶ sense, record, account, or document, as soon as inscription of any kind offers ¶ itself as at once a supplement and a substitute for a memory that already ¶ supplements and substitutes for the trace, as these ethnographic descriptions themselves clearly attest, within the strange economy ¶ of what Derrida famously calls difference. Mignolo himself, as we have already observed, wants both to re-claim these New World practices as “writing” and to free them from all ¶ such economies Mignolo observes repeatedly that it ¶ is possible to have “writing without books,” pointing to, He fails to acknowledge that such observations have always accompanied the very discourses whose ethnocentric biases he wants to ¶ expose. Hegel, whose Aesthetics is perhaps the supreme European statement of an “evolutionary” approach to language, observes in ¶ this same text that Egyptian temples “can be regarded like the pages of a ¶ book.” Mignolo’s specific observations also remain suspended between ¶ the two rather different arguments that we have already summarized. He ¶ suggests that Amerindians possessed sophisticated writing practices that ¶ were misunderstood by their conquerors, but then goes on to claim—or ¶ at least to hint— that the Amerindians grasped the very relation between ¶ presence and representation in a manner somehow radically different from ¶ Europeans
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Mignolo contradicts himself- he claims that Native Americans are distinct and yet the same as those who came across the sea and oppressed them
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Notwithstanding this apparently obvious problem, Mignolo follows ¶ Quijano closely here. Though he never says so with much emphasis, ¶ Mignolo comprehends Amerindian “gnosis” as fundamentally different ¶ from a Western or European one, precisely because it is grounded in a ¶ logic of complementarity rather than dualism or binarity: “The Sun and the ¶ Moon, in Amerindian categories of thought are not opposite, contrary or ¶ contradictory; they are complementary. To extend deconstruction beyond ¶ Western metaphysics or to assume that there is nothing else than Western ¶ metaphysics will be a move similar to colonizing global designs” (Local, ¶ 326).19 We first note that the division of the world into binarity (Europe) and ¶ complementarity (its others, including Amerindia) runs uncomfortably ¶ close to the long history of the romanticization of the other.20 In particular, ¶ it seems a mere variation on the anthropological distinction between societies premised on individuality and difference, and those grounded in ¶ community or cooperation.21 The introduction of such an old, essentialist ¶ binary into Mignolo’s text should give any reader pause.¶ If Mignolo were correct, however, this would mean that Amerindian ¶ logic is fundamentally nonhierarchical and nonexclusive and that Amerindian gnosis involves no structural oppositions at all. Such gnosis would ¶ have, then, no inflections, no hierarchies, and no values of any kind. No ¶ term or concept could ever be privileged; each would be deemed necessary ¶ to its other—supplying its lack, and “completing” the other, rather than ¶ opposing it.22 But this completion would necessarily imply a higher order ¶ of synthesis: if “man” is not privileged over “woman,” for instance, and ¶ such terms are instead complementary, then they would necessarily find ¶ their completion in some higher, perhaps neo-Platonic, “third sex” concept, ¶ or, perhaps, “life” or “human being.” But then, by the same logic, even the ¶ “human being” would necessarily be judged as complementary with regard ¶ to that which is “animal” or “inanimate,” and so forth, endlessly foreclosing ¶ inflection and hierarchy. In every possible register (race, culture, class, ¶ caste, gender, sex, age, or the like), difference would undergo no valuation. ¶ There would be differences, perhaps, but they would exist in “peaceful ¶ coexistence” rather than “violent hierarchy.”23 At the limit of this thought, ¶ the “citizen” and the “stranger” would necessarily be thought in complementary fashion, disenabling the very possibility of the state and sovereignty, all basic structures of governance, and indeed, all modes of thinking ¶ and decision making that begin from systematic discrimination. We must ¶ conclude, therefore, that the positing of radical complementarity implies a ¶ withdrawal from the political decision in general, into an alternative, arcadian ¶ space in which nothing ever need be decided. But as Derrida writes: “We ¶ know what always have been the practical (particularly political) effects of ¶ immediately jumping beyond oppositions, and of protests in the simple ¶ form of neither this nor that” (Positions, 41). In other words, complementarity, rather than fundamentally opposing binarity, leaves every available ¶ term for discrimination in place, “preventing any means of intervening in ¶ the field effectively” (Derrida, Positions, 41).
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Michaelsen and Shershow 7 (Scott Michaelsen and Scott Cutler Shershow, Professor of English at Michigan State and Professor of English at UC Davis “Rethinking Border Thinking”, [http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/106/1/39.full.pdf+html]
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Mignolo follows ¶ Quijano closely here. Mignolo comprehends Amerindian “gnosis” as fundamentally different ¶ from a Western or European one, precisely because it is grounded in a ¶ logic of complementarity rather than dualism or binarity The Sun and the ¶ Moon, in Amerindian categories of thought are not opposite, contrary or ¶ contradictory; they are complementary. To extend deconstruction beyond ¶ Western metaphysics or to assume that there is nothing else than Western ¶ metaphysics will be a move similar to colonizing global designs complementarity runs uncomfortably ¶ close to the long history of the romanticization of the other it seems a mere variation on the anthropological distinction between societies premised on individuality and difference The introduction of such an old, essentialist ¶ binary into Mignolo’s text should give any reader pause.¶ If Mignolo were correct this would mean that Amerindian ¶ logic is fundamentally nonhierarchical and nonexclusive and that Amerindian gnosis involves no structural oppositions at all. Such gnosis would ¶ have, then, no inflections, no hierarchies, and no values of any kind. No ¶ term or concept could ever be privileged; But this completion would necessarily imply a higher order ¶ of synthesis: if “man” is not privileged over “woman,” for instance, and ¶ such terms are instead complementary, then they would necessarily find ¶ their completion in some higher, perhaps neo-Platonic, “third sex” concept, ¶ or, perhaps, “life” or “human being.” by the same logic, even the ¶ “human being” would necessarily be judged as complementary with regard ¶ to that which is “animal” or “inanimate,” endlessly foreclosing ¶ inflection and hierarchy. In every possible register (race, culture, class, ¶ caste, gender, sex, age, or the like), difference would undergo no valuation. There would be differences, perhaps, but they would exist in “peaceful ¶ coexistence” rather than “violent hierarchy.” the limit of this thought, ¶ the “citizen” and the “stranger” would necessarily be thought in complementary fashion, disenabling the very possibility of the state and sovereignty, all basic structures of governance, and all modes of thinking ¶ and decision making that begin from systematic discrimination. We must ¶ conclude, therefore, that the positing of radical complementarity implies a ¶ withdrawal from the political decision in general, into an alternative, arcadian ¶ space in which nothing ever need be decided. We ¶ know what always have been the practical effects of ¶ immediately jumping beyond oppositions, and of protests in the simple ¶ form of neither this nor that” complementarity, rather than fundamentally opposing binarity, leaves every available ¶ term for discrimination in place, “preventing any means of intervening in ¶ the field effectively”
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The binaries which Mignolo bases his theories on are false- if they were true Native American communities would have no hierarchies, no oppositions at all and nothing can ever be privileged
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From this welter of definition, we observe, first, that for Mignolo border ¶ thinking emerges out of an assumed dichotomy. That is, Mignolo postulates the existence of at least two languages, ways of reasoning, ways of ¶ interpreting the world and, in short, at least two radically different modes of ¶ being and knowing. One has been suppressed or subordinated by the work ¶ of “the colonial difference.” Then, with the emergence of border thinking, ¶ the subordinated term of the dichotomy comes forward and, alternately or ¶ simultaneously, absorbs, displaces, battles, or incorporates the master term in ¶ order to fashion something unprecedented and new.¶ The problems with such formulations, at once figural and conceptual, ¶ begin with their initial premise. That which is “dichotomous” has been cut ¶ and divided, split in two, or forked and branched, and implies an original ¶ point of origin—an original wholeness—rather than two separate origins ¶ (see OED, s.vv. “dichotomous,” “dicho-”). In the context of the colonial ¶ situation, the idea of dichotomy would thus imply an original relatedness, ¶ even though such relational identities were forged within a context of deeply ¶ asymmetrical power relations. By using this term, Mignolo thus comes ¶ dangerously close to suggesting a counterthesis to his own, and to aligning himself with something like Anne Norton’s analysis of the “incompleteness” of any particular identity: “Hegel’s account of the dependence of ¶ the identity of the master on the servant draws attention to another sense in ¶ which each identity is partial. Each identity is dependent on those against ¶ which it defines itself.”12 Mignolo himself, however, claims that his project ¶ “is no longer conceivable in Hegel’s dialectics” (Darker, 67), and he might ¶ well be pleased to be thus understood as radically “outside” the Western ¶ philosophic tradition. But to imagine something fundamentally “notHegelian” is to imagine differences that are not in relation, and a world constituted by monad-like cultures whose status is simply to be different ¶ as such. This would be, in Rodolphe Gasché’s words, an attempt to think ¶ the “absolutely singular,” which “from the standpoint of thinking is a thoroughly idiosyncratic notion that resists the universalizing bent of thought” ¶ and which “does not fit any of the classical definitions of philosophy.”13 Thus ¶ Mignolo posits a so-called “dichotomy” in which, however, two entities at ¶ once confront one another historically and yet lack any original relation. This ¶ sheer assertion of radical difference not only positions his project outside ¶ philosophy but also disenables the very possibility of critical thought. Mignolo’s other conceptual metaphors share a similar incongruity. ¶ Mignolo claims that “subaltern reason” absorbs or incorporates hegemonic ¶ forms of knowledge, formulations that imply a certain fusion or combination. He also claims, however, that those hegemonic forms have been ¶ displaced by the subaltern term in order to make room for it. The two terms ¶ also engage in battle, something that implies struggle and conflict without ¶ any necessary implication of their final combination (a “battle” might ¶ logically result, for instance, in one or the other term’s obliteration or ¶ destruction). As we will eventually show, this unstable fibrillation among ¶ this set of metaphors exposes Mignolo’s project to one or more readings ¶ that directly contradict his avowed intentions. Now, just as Mignolo claims, in The Darker Side of the Renaissance, that ¶ Amerindian signifying practices are radically distinct from European ones, ¶ so in Global Histories/Local Designs he suggests, more broadly, that a “modern¶ (Western) epistemology” is absolutely closed off to its other, and unable ¶ to recognize Amerindian “alternatives” (Local, 9, emphasis original). A ¶ brief detour here through the thought of sociologist Anibal Quijano will ¶ be helpful in further assessing this claim.14 Mignolo often acknowledges ¶ his debt to Quijano, whose problematic opening moves are reproduced and ¶ amplified in Mignolo’s text. Quijano’s notion of the “coloniality of power” ¶ describes “social relations within the last five hundred years of historical ¶ capitalism” (27)15 and includes a set of four institutions: “the capitalist ¶ enterprise” proper, “the bourgeois family,” “the nation-state,” and “Eurocentrism” (545).16 The last of these institutions, Eurocentrism, is defined by ¶ Quijano in terms of two of its “nuclear elements,” “evolution and dualism,” ¶ which produce “race” as a basic category for purposes of classification and ¶ domination (542). As Delgado de Torres tellingly explains, the coloniality ¶ of power defines “a set of social relations between colonizer and colonized ¶ that are internal to Europe itself” (“Reformulating,” 27; emphasis added). Or, as Quijano puts it, a “binary, dualist perspective” is “particular to Eurocentrism” (“Coloniality,” 542; emphasis added).17
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Michaelsen and Shershow 7 (Scott Michaelsen and Scott Cutler Shershow, Professor of English at Michigan State and Professor of English at UC Davis “Rethinking Border Thinking”, [http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/106/1/39.full.pdf+html]
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we observe that for Mignolo border ¶ thinking emerges out of an assumed dichotomy. Mignolo postulates the existence of at least two languages, ways of reasoning, ways of ¶ interpreting the world and, in short, at least two radically different modes of ¶ being and knowing. One has been suppressed or subordinated by the work ¶ of “the colonial difference.” with the emergence of border thinking, ¶ the subordinated term of the dichotomy comes forward and, alternately or ¶ simultaneously, absorbs, displaces, battles, or incorporates the master term in ¶ order to fashion something unprecedented and new.¶ The problems with such formulations, at once figural and conceptual, ¶ begin with their initial premise. That which is “dichotomous” has been cut ¶ and divided, split in two, or forked and branched, and implies an original ¶ point of origin—an original wholeness—rather than two separate origins the context of the colonial ¶ situation, the idea of dichotomy would thus imply an original relatedness Mignolo thus comes ¶ dangerously close to suggesting a counterthesis to his own, and to aligning himself with something like Anne Norton’s analysis of the “incompleteness” of any particular identity: “Hegel’s account of the dependence of ¶ the identity of the master on the servant draws attention to another sense in ¶ which each identity is partial. Each identity is dependent on those against ¶ which it defines itself.” Mignolo himself claims that his project ¶ “is no longer conceivable in Hegel’s dialectics” to imagine something fundamentally “notHegelian” is to imagine differences that are not in relation, and a world constituted by monad-like cultures whose status is simply to be different ¶ as such This would be attempt to think ¶ the “absolutely singular,” which “from the standpoint of thinking is a thoroughly idiosyncratic notion that resists the universalizing bent of thought” ¶ and which “does not fit any of the classical definitions of philosophy.” Mignolo posits a so-called “dichotomy” in which, however, two entities at ¶ once confront one another historically and yet lack any original relation. This ¶ sheer assertion of radical difference not only positions his project outside ¶ philosophy but also disenables the very possibility of critical thought. Mignolo’s other conceptual metaphors share a similar incongruity. ¶ Mignolo claims that “subaltern reason” absorbs or incorporates hegemonic ¶ forms of knowledge, formulations that imply a certain fusion or combination. He also claims that those hegemonic forms have been ¶ displaced by the subaltern term in order to make room for it. The two terms ¶ also engage in battle, something that implies struggle and conflict without ¶ any necessary implication of their final combination this unstable fibrillation among ¶ this set of metaphors exposes Mignolo’s project to one or more readings ¶ that directly contradict his avowed intentions Mignolo claims that ¶ Amerindian signifying practices are radically distinct from European ones, ¶ so in Global Histories/Local Designs he suggests, more broadly, that a “modern¶ (Western) epistemology” is absolutely closed off to its other, and unable ¶ to recognize Amerindian “alternatives A ¶ brief detour through the thought of Anibal Quijano will ¶ be helpful in further assessing this claim. Quijano’s notion of the “coloniality of power” ¶ describes “social relations within the last five hundred years of historical ¶ capitalism” and includes a set of four institutions: “the capitalist ¶ enterprise” proper, “the bourgeois family,” “the nation-state,” and “Eurocentrism”
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Mignolo assumes preexisting binaries and dichotomies which don’t exist- this guts solvency
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With this book, Jonathan Israel continues the exploration of the philosophical origins of modernity he began with Radical Enlightenment (2001). In that work, he argued that despite recent efforts to pluralize and variegate the European Enlightenment, or to view it solely in sociological or social-historical terms and categories, we should instead view the European Enlightenment "as a single highly integrated intellectual and cultural movement" (p. vi). Moreover, the intellectual core or backbone of what is for Israel the "true" Enlightenment, the Radical Enlightenment, was Baruch Spinoza and Spinozism. While the classical literature in the field--one thinks of Paul Hazard, Ernst Cassirer, and Peter Gay--had acknowledged Spinoza's strong eighteenth-century presence, Israel made a convincing case that it was actually Spinoza and the academics, writers, and critics who followed him who were the real challengers of ecclesiastical authority, pre-ordained social hierarchies, religious intolerance, and the restriction of expression. Spinoza and Spinozists were the unabashed proponents of the core values of Enlightenment, such as democracy, human freedom, equality, and justice. Spinoza, in other words, not Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Voltaire, Isaac Newton, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Moses Mendelssohn, or Immanuel Kant, is for Israel the true source of our "modernity."¶ In the preface, Israel asks: "Was the Enlightenment in essence a social or an intellectual phenomenon?" He answers that "it was both, and ... physical reality and the life of the mind must be seen to be genuinely interacting in a kind of dialectic" (p. v). Precious little of this dialectic is included in the book, however, and the argument suggests the Enlightenment was primarily a philosophical phenomenon: "it was philosophers who were chiefly responsible for propagating the concepts of toleration, equality, democratic republicanism, individual freedom, and liberty of expression and the press, the batch of ideas identified as the principal cause of the near overthrow of authority, tradition, monarchy, faith, and privilege. Hence, philosophers specifically had caused the revolution" (p. vii).¶ In order to give the argument adequate profile, I must jump to the end of the book, to the postscript where Israel enumerates what he views as the enduring, core values of the Enlightenment: 1) philosophical reason as the criterion of what is true; 2) rejection of supernatural agency (divine providence); 3) equality of all mankind (racial and sexual equality); 4) secular universalism in ethics anchored in equality and stressing equity, justice, and charity; 5) comprehensive toleration and freedom of thought; 6) personal liberty of lifestyle between consenting adults, safeguarding the dignity and freedom of the unmarried and homosexuals; 7) freedom of expression, political criticism, and the press in the public sphere; and 8) democratic republicanism. In Israel's account roughly seventy French, Dutch, German, Italian, and British academics, writers, philosophers, scholars, and critics active between 1660 and 1750 espoused these views and constituted what he calls the Radical Enlightenment. The vast diversity of these figures and their sources notwithstanding, Israel urges that "the only kind of philosophy that could coherently integrate and hold together such a far-reaching value-condominium in the social, moral and political spheres, as well as in 'philosophy,' was the monist, hylozoic systems of the Radical Enlightenment labelled 'Spinozist' in the 'long' eighteenth century" (p. 867). Much of the book is concerned with showing how Spinoza and Spinozism informed these thinkers of the Radical Enlightenment, and, in turn, how these core values both sprang from and reflected Spinoza's basic philosophy. The most important figures in Israel's story, besides Spinoza himself, of course, are Pierre Bayle, Jean Baptiste de Boyer, Marquis d'Argens, Henri Boulainvilliers (although his aristocratic republicanism place him slightly outside of the Radical Enlightenment), Denis Diderot, Paolo Doria, Johann Christian Edelmann, Jean Meslier, César Chesneau du Marsais, Franciscus van den Enden, Adriaen Koerbagh, Johann Georg Wachter, Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d'Holbach, Julien Offray de la Mettrie, Johann Lorenz Schmidt, Bernard de Mandeville, Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch, Simon Tyssot de Patot, John Toland, Giambattista Vico, Jean le Rond d'Alembert, and Radicati di Passerano.¶ Instead of proceeding through each phase of the argument, interrogating individual interpretations, and examining Israel's demanding and minute documentation at each turn, which would explode the boundaries of a review in terms of sheer volume, I would rather like to ask some questions regarding the overall trajectory of the book, what I see to be the underlying research interest and point of the book, and finally what I believe to be truly at stake, methodologically and theoretically, in the writing of this book. In addition to the incredible erudition and skill of presenting a coherent thesis over eight hundred pages, Israel does not conceal his hermeneutical concerns. I believe there are three distinct, yet related, claims that Israel is making with this book beyond the fundamental argument stated above.¶ First, as already mentioned with reference to Radical Enlightenment, Enlightenment Contested is an attempt to shore up the idea that there are essentially two Enlightenments, a "moderate mainstream" Enlightenment, which was morally, socially, and politically conservative, and apologetic if not outright supportive of absolutistic monarchy, and, on the other hand, the Radical Enlightenment. The Radical Enlightenment was responsible for, first and foremost, the emergence of liberal modernity in the eighteenth century and its rejection of ecclesiastical authority, its strict differentiation between truth and belief, philosophy and religion, its insistence on human equality regardless of race, gender, and class, and its demand for the absolute freedom of expression in the public sphere. Secondly, Enlightenment Contested is a not-so-implicit critique of modern trends in cultural history, cultural studies, "new social history," and sociology of knowledge. Focused not on the institutions, settings, milieux, written media, cultural contexts, or socioeconomic and political structures of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Israel is unapologetic about doing "high" intellectual history, a history of ideas, or Ideengeschichte. His argumentation seeks at every turn to show how Spinozism and spinozistic ideas, diffused and disseminated, repeatedly surface in the texts of Radical Enlightenment thinkers and threaten the existing sociopolitical and sociocultural order and how Spinoza and Spinozism represent the single most significant rupture with tradition and pave the way for the revolutions of the second half of the eighteenth century, not to mention our own democratic values, ideals, and aspirations even today.¶ Around 1969, historical thinkers such as Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock, and John Dunn took the linguistic turn, asking how political languages worked in an effort to understand not the ideas themselves but how discourse functioned, making the discussion of ideas richer and more grounded in the political and social transformations of the time.[1] With the work of the 1970s and 1980s, the importance of the textual and linguistic context of ideas had been firmly established. In Germany, Reinhard Koselleck had insisted on and developed a highly useful history of the semantics of terms and concepts, historical-critical Begriffsgeschichte as opposed to traditional Geistesgeschichte.[2] The central idea was that key ideas were crafted and propagated amid the "cut and thrust" of political, social, and economic history. The Cambridge School and the work in historical semantics taking place in Germany had a great deal in common. Increasingly, however, a new sociocultural history emerged that questioned even these more progressive and newly established forms of intellectual history, the history of political "languages," and Begriffsgeschichte. Israel cites in particular the work of Roger Chartier, who argued that the most profound changes in the ways of being "were not the result of clear and distinct thoughts" (p. 21), but instead a basic, determining set of "real" social structures lay at the root of these new, bold ideas.[3] Robert Darnton's "new social history" is equally criticized as a "diffusionist" method that unwittingly ends up supporting "the Postmodern campaign to discredit traditional methods of historical criticism and marginalize, and cast a negative light on, the Enlightenment itself" (p. 22).[4] Contrary to this tendency, Israel argues that "to integrate intellectual history effectively with social, cultural, and political history ... it seems likely that what is really needed is nothing like a 'cultural sociology,' but rather a new reformed intellectual history presiding over a two-way traffic, or dialectic of ideas and social reality" (p. 23). Israel proposes that we look carefully at "contemporary controversies" to see, on the ground, what mattered to whom and why. "Contemporary controversies" are the pivot, the means to grasp the real relationship between the social sphere and ideas (p. 25).¶ For Israel, therefore, public intellectual controversies are the key. Israel's "controversialist technique" is focused on the broad mass of Enlightenment controversies to see "how structures of belief and sensibility in society interact dialectically with the evolution of philosophical ideas" (p. 26). I am taking aim at a crucial distinction between "new reformed intellectual history presiding over a two-way traffic, or dialectic of ideas and social reality," and the "controversialist technique," which examines the intricacies of intellectual debate and exchange and never truly examines how such controversies are situated, informed by, and responding to social, economic, and political structures. Indeed, for Israel, intellectual history does "preside" over a "two-way traffic, or dialectic of ideas and social reality." The problem is either that Israel assumes we already have the other piece of this traffic or dialectic (which would obviously be fully undialectical), or he fails, in many instances, to mediate effectively between the diffusion and dissemination of Spinoza and Radical Enlightenment, on the one hand, and the social and cultural institutions as well as the political forces at work in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, on the other. To be fair, Israel's account of the eclipse of the reign of Louis XIV and the liberalization aperture that occurred in the period of 1715-40 (pp. 699-709) does provide some of this mediation, but this is the only instance where I genuinely felt he succeeded in bridging the two parts of his proposed "dialectic" between ideas and social reality. The radical writings that circulated clandestinely in the period before 1715 at that point became diffused widely in French society.¶ The most interesting and intellectually satisfying chapters are those in part 4 of the book, "The Party of Humanity" (pp. 545-692). In five chapters, Israel adroitly traces the concept of equality from Book 3 of Spinoza's Ethics (1677) to the eighteenth-century transformation of conceptions of gender and sexuality, race and ethnicity, colonialism and empire, Islam, and Orientalism. These sections are in my view exemplary for their nuanced and balanced approach, their sensitivity to the context of the texts, and their engagement with issues relevant to us today. The Radical Enlightenment is shown to have rejected the entire system of social pressures and theological pretexts and became truly emancipatory in the sphere of gender and relations between the sexes. The "erotic revolution, entailing a whole new culture of desire, voluptuousness, and pleasure" (p. 585) becomes manifest in such writers as Adriaen Beverland, Jean-Frederic Bernard, André-François Boureau-Deslandes, d'Argens, La Mettrie, Diderot, and Étienne Gabriel Morelly. Without original sin, sexual relations are simply part of nature and integral to it. Although Israel acknowledges that sexual life must then be "ordered," and "classified" in an entirely new fashion, and that research into sexuality then becomes "a new kind of investigation" (p. 587), the investigations of Michel Foucault, Lynn Hunt, and others who have explored the regimens of sexual knowledge and relations in this arena are strangely absent.¶ Next, empire became integral to national identity in the period 1680-1720. The Radical Enlightenment launched a powerful critique not merely of empire and its colonial aspirations. Bayle and other "spinozists" consistently professed and deployed the principle of universal moral respect for different cultures and different civilizations. Different human societies might stand at strikingly different levels of civilization and technology, but this variety does not entail, for the radical writers, a moral or legal hierarchy of races, cultures, or civilizations (p. 603). Many of these writers in fact condemned slavery in all of its guises and advanced a nascent form of powerful anti-imperial and anti-colonialist thinking.¶ Finally, chapters 24 and 25 look at the ways the Radical Enlightenment rethought Islam and the Orient. While it clearly did not condone the fanatical side of Islam, the Radical Enlightenment praised the intellectual coherence, consistency, and conformity to justice in Muhammad's teachings. Finally, with respect to the Orient, Chinese culture, and civilization in particular, Israel successfully documents the Radical Enlightenment's enthusiasm for classical Chinese philosophy in the writings of Isaac Vossius (1618-89), who extolled the virtues of Chinese civilization, science, and technology, Charles de Marguetel de Saint-Denis de Saint-Evremond (1613-1703), and Sir William Temple (1628-99), both of whom were acquainted with Spinoza. They represent an instance of "Spinozism before Spinoza." But it was again Bayle who made the most specific connection between Chinese thinking and philosophy and the work of Spinoza. According to Bayle, Spinozism pervades the thought of Cabbalists, Sufis, and the Chinese.¶ Also interesting to many readers will be Israel's critique of the postmodernist attack on the Enlightenment, and his critical remarks against Alasdair McIntyre and Charles Taylor in particular.[5] This attack states that the Enlightenment was unsuccessful in being able to construct or to establish "a viable secular morality independent of theology and traditional metaphysics" (p. 808). According to Israel, however, this result stems from a failure to distinguish moderate mainstream and Radical Enlightenment (p. 808). Thinkers and writers such as Spinoza, Bayle, Du Marsais, Diderot, d'Argens, Claude Adrien Helvetius, d'Holbach, and Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet, who followed Spinoza and Bayle "in adopting a fully secular and universalist ethic based exclusively on the 'common good,' equity, and equality" (p. 808) essentially make the postmodernist critique beside the point. In Israel's view, postmodernism and postcolonialism have targeted an obsolete and truncated view of Enlightenment and have not responded adequately to the claims and arguments of Radical Enlightenment. There might be many sources of such a universalist secular ethic and such sources might not have originated in the West, but the Radical Enlightenment of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the "instance," according to Israel, in western civilization where this radical model of full equality and absolute freedom of expression, in which the unrelenting critique of existing church and political authority, sexual roles, gender differences, empire, and colonialism was first fully articulated. As such, it represents the cornerstone of modernity. But it is not simply that postmodernism and postcolonialism attack a fundamentally outmoded and truncated Enlightenment. Israel claims that they actually share in the responsibility for the failure of Enlightenment; that through their confusion and negligence in understanding the true origins of the Radical Enlightenment they actually contribute to its demise. He sees this as a failure of philosophy and the humanities in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to teach about the specific origins and nature of modern ideas concerning democracy, equality, individual freedom, full toleration, liberty of expression, and anti-colonialism.¶
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Leventhal 2007 (Robert, German Studies (Department of Modern Languages and Literatures), College of William and Mary, Review of Enlightenment Contested, http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=13250)
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he intellectual core of true" Enlightenment, the Radical Enlightenment, was challengers of ecclesiastical authority, pre-ordained social hierarchies, religious intolerance, and the restriction of expression Israel enumerates what he views as the enduring, core values of the Enlightenment: philosophical reason as the criterion of what is true rejection of divine providence racial and sexual equality secular universalism in ethics anchored in equality and stressing equity, justice, and charity freedom of expression and the the public sphere Enlightenment Contested is an attempt to shore up the idea that there are essentially two Enlightenments The Radical Enlightenment was responsible for, first and foremost, the emergence of liberal modernity in the eighteenth century and its rejection of ecclesiastical authority, its strict differentiation between truth and belief, philosophy and religion, its insistence on human equality regardless of race, gender, and class, and its demand for the absolute freedom of expression in the public sphere. Enlightenment Contested is a critique of modern trends in cultural studies sociocultural history emerged that questioned more progressive and newly established forms of intellectual history, the history of political "languages public intellectual controversies are the key to see "how structures of belief and sensibility in society interact dialectically with the evolution of philosophical ideas" The most intellectually satisfying chapters traces the concept of equality to the eighteenth-century transformation of conceptions of gender and sexuality, race and ethnicity, colonialism and empire, Islam, and Orientalism. The Radical Enlightenment launched a powerful critique of empire and its colonial aspirations. these writers in fact condemned slavery in all of its guises and advanced a nascent form of powerful anti-imperial and anti-colonialist thinking. While it clearly did not condone the fanatical side of Islam, the Radical Enlightenment praised the intellectual coherence attack on the Enlightenment states that the Enlightenment was unsuccessful however, this result stems from a failure to distinguish moderate mainstream and Radical Enlightenment postcolonialism have targeted an obsolete and truncated view of Enlightenment and have not responded adequately to the claims and arguments of Radical Enlightenment. the Radical Enlightenment was the "instance in western civilization where this radical model of full equality and absolute freedom of expression, in which the unrelenting critique of existing church and political authority, sexual roles, gender differences, empire, and colonialism was first fully articulated As such, it represents the cornerstone of modernity postcolonialism actually share in the responsibility for the failure of Enlightenment; that through their confusion and negligence in understanding the true origins of the Radical Enlightenment they actually contribute to its demise. He sees this as a failure of philosophy and the humanities to teach about the specific origins and nature of modern ideas concerning democracy, equality, individual freedom, full toleration, liberty of expression, and anti-colonialism
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Modernity provides resources for emancipation and a radical critique of colonialism—their homogenizing view of the enlightenment undermines its liberatory potential
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The communal is not grounded on the idea of the ‘common’, nor that of the ‘commune’, although the latter has been taken up in Bolivia of late – notably, not by Aymara and Quechua intellectuals, but by members of the criolla or mestiza population. The communal is something else. It derives from forms of social organisation that existed prior to the Incas and Aztecs, and also from the Incas’ and Aztecs’ experiences of their 500-year relative survival, first under Spanish colonial rule and later under independent nation states. To be done justice, it must be understood not as a leftwing project (in the European sense), but as a de-colonial one.¶ De-coloniality is akin to de-Westernisation, which was a strong element of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and remains an active ideological element in East and Southeast Asia. De-Westernisation is neither left nor right: it questions Occidentalism, racism, a totalitarian and unilateral globality and an imperialist epistemology. The difference is that de-coloniality frontally questions the capitalist economy, whereas de-Westernisation only questions who controls capitalism – the West or ‘emerging’ economies. Félix Patzi Paco is a controversial figure in Bolivia, but an important voice in the current process of thinking and working toward a pluri-national state. Many criollo and mestizo intellectuals suspect that he works towards the hegemony of the Aymara people. They argue that his project is not pluri-national: first, its aim is to reverse the white (mestiza/criolla) hegemony; and second, it ignores the many nations that currently exist in the state of Bolivia, including other indigenous nations, as well as organised peasant communities. The objection cannot easily be dismissed, for it comes not from the right-wing of the low lands, but from many leftist voices (generally whites, by South American standards) who are seriously engaged in the construction of a pluri-national state. This suggests a serious tension between the left, with its ingrained European traditions, and de-colonial indigenous voices, which have a long history of confrontation with European traditions. This tension has everything to do with the differing genealogies of thought and practice from which concepts like ‘the commons’ and ‘the communal’ originate.¶ Patzi Paco’s proposal, published in 2004, aims at a re-conceptualisation of a ‘communal system’ as an alternative to the liberal system. For Patzi Paco, sistema liberal refers to what subsists from the advent of the modern/colonial state in Bolivia (and other regions of the non-Western world), through the republics resulting from independence from Spain (controlled by an elite of criollos and mestizos), up until the election of Morales in December of 2005.¶ One of his motivations was to redress the image of indigenous nations prevailing among social scientists, in Bolivia as elsewhere. He sought instead to provide a vision of indigenous societies and nations that comes from the history, knowledges and memories of indigenous people themselves. As a sociologist, he is not rejecting the social scientific disciplines, and particularly not sociology, but rather inverting his role in their discourse. Instead of listening to the dictates of sociology, he uses sociology to communicate and organise his argument. The result is a clear case of border epistemology: the ability to speak from more than one system of knowledge. This is important because the social sciences have been instrumental in producing the marginalised conception of the indigenous. Being able to speak in and from both systems of knowledge and language is not a rejection of one in favour of the other, but an act of pluralising epistemologies.¶ Patzi Paco’s main objection to disciplinary studies of indigenous nations is that they limit their investigations to the common culture, the language and the territorial space. What is usually bypassed or ignored, then, is what for him is the ‘core’ of communal organisation – in the case of the Andes, the ayllu, which we will examine later. In other words, most of what we know about the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia concerns their ‘context’ or ‘environment’ (entorno), rather than the ‘core’ of their socio-economic organisation. This is a critical distinction that Patzi Paco extends to the uses of identity made by indigenistas (pro-indigenous non-indigenous) and indianistas (indigenous engaged in a form of identity politics, identifying with indigeneity through clothes, long hair and rituals). Both indigenistas and indianistas operate at the level of the entorno, rather than that of the two basic, core nodes of the communal system: economic and political organisation. When they refer to the ayllu, it is as ‘territorial geographic organisation’ (which is a state conception), rather than to the communal systems of economic and political management.
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Mignolo 10 (Walter, Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University, The communal and the decolonial, Turbulence, 4/16/2010)
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The communal derives from forms of social organisation that existed prior to the Incas and Aztecs, and also from the Incas’ and Aztecs’ experiences of their 500-year relative survival it must be understood not as a leftwing project but as a de-colonial one.¶ De-coloniality is akin to de-Westernisation, which was a strong element of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, De-Westernisation questions Occidentalism, racism, a totalitarian and unilateral globality and an imperialist epistemology difference is that de-coloniality frontally questions the capitalist economy his project is not pluri-national: first, its aim is to reverse the white (mestiza/criolla) hegemony it ignores the many nations that currently exist in the state of Bolivia, including other indigenous nations, as well as organised peasant communities tension has everything to do with differing genealogies of thought and practice from which concepts like ‘the commons’ originate One of his motivations was to redress the image of indigenous nations prevailing among social scientists he is not rejecting the social scientific disciplines, and particularly not sociology, but rather inverting his role in their discourse he uses sociology to communicate and organise his argument. The result is a clear case of border epistemology: the ability to speak from more than one system of knowledge. the social sciences have been instrumental in producing the marginalised conception of the indigenous. Being able to speak in and from both systems of knowledge and language is not a rejection of one in favour of the other, but an act of pluralising epistemologies. Patzi Paco’s main objection to disciplinary studies nations is that they limit their investigations to the common culture, What is usually bypassed is the ‘core’ of communal organisation Both indigenistas operate at the level of the entorno economic and political organisation
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Rejection alone is bad—we must create border epistemologies and promote multiple standpoints
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It is, in today’s world, necessary for indigenous and Western knowledge¶ systems to co-exist. By co-existence I mean, in particular, a situation where¶ the hegemonic knowledge system talks to the dominated one and acknowl-¶ edges the urgency of addressing issues that the dominant epistemology¶ seems unable or unwilling to tackle. Its superiority complex must be dis-¶ banded in the quest for a sustainable future. Concomitantly, indigenous¶ knowledges should be given space, or rather they must create and demand¶ space, to query hegemonic epistemology.¶ All societies are hybrid, in one sense or the other, in line with Homi¶ K. Bhabha’s cultural hybridity thesis (Bhabha, 1994, 1996) where dif-¶ ferent cultures and knowledge systems operate in the same space. There¶ is some sort of dialectic here where the one feeds into the other, but¶ there is also a tension and an asymmetry that needs to be addressed. In¶ Bhabha’s thinking, the idea of a third space is something that is gener-¶ ated, but not necessarily, caused by what preceded it. The third space is,¶ in my understanding, a space which generates new possibilities by ques-¶ tioning entrenched categorizations of knowledge systems and cultures¶ and opens up new avenues with, and this is important to underline, a¶ counter-hegemonic strategy. In a post-colonial situation where the colo-¶ nizer “presents a normalising, hegemonic practice, the hybrid strategy¶ opens up a third space of/for rearticulation of negotiation and meaning”¶ (Meredith 1998, p. 3).¶ Bhabha’s third space is a contested terrain and has been critiqued for¶ its presumed lack of historical and political embeddedness. While Bhab-¶ ha’s third space is conceptually and theoretically interesting, one should¶ be wary of being too optimistic given the long history of economic and¶ epistemic subjugation. The epistemological dimension of colonialism¶ should not be underrated and should not be thought of in the past tense.¶ The inherent danger of such a space is the perpetuation of imbalance and¶ asymmetry between the knowledge systems—between the dichotomized¶ space of Self and Other within the third space. When exploring the third¶ space one has to acknowledge that all indigenous knowledges are subju-¶ gated knowledges, and that the issue of power is central in discussing and¶ analyzing the power relationships between indigenous knowledges and¶ so-called Western science and epistemology. There is a question of nego-¶ tiation here, but the question is how much can be negotiated when the¶ power relationship between the knowledge systems is so skewed and when¶ there is an issue of domination and subjugation. There is a concern that¶ indigenous knowledges are appropriated by the North to serve North’s¶ own purposes or interests, and that they are made to fit the paradigms¶ of Western epistemology. As Agrawal (2005) states: “those who possess¶ indigenous knowledge have not possessed much power to influence what¶ is done with their knowledge” (p. 380).¶ In many ways, the third space is reminiscent of Freire’s (1970) concept¶ of dialogue where conscientization is the ultimate goal. Freire’s concept¶ of dialogue potentially provides the foundation for a re-imagining of the¶ teacher-student relationship in this new space. A third space that transcends¶ the teacher-student relationship onto a more trans-personal level indicates¶ some sort of undogmatic, non-entrenched space where both potential nos-¶ talgic claims of indigenous authenticity, Western pretensions of superiority,¶ and the inherent contradictions (referred to earlier) in both knowledge sys-¶ tems can be interrogated for new negotiations.¶ Louis R. Botha (2011), who tries to articulate a way of knowing beyond¶ “the grasp of my Western consciousness,” (p. 43) employs:¶ Cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) as a conceptual frame-¶ work within which mixed methods can be employed to negotiate more¶ appropriate knowledge-making relations and practices between the¶ epistemologically divergent ways of knowing of indigenous and West-¶ ern knowledge communities (p. 2).¶ Third generation cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) (Engestrom,¶ 1987, 2001) is relevant when analyzing contradictions within and between¶ the two activity systems of indigenous knowledges and Western knowl-¶ edge. In CHAT, contradictions are viewed as central sources of change and¶ development. According to Yrjo Engestrom (2001), “contradictions gener-¶ ate disturbances and conflicts, but also innovative attempts to change the¶ activity” (p. 137). CHAT is an object-oriented change methodology, so it¶ is therefore essential to analyze contradictions in relation to the object of¶ activity. A crucial object of activity in which Western knowledge systems¶ and indigenous knowledge systems interact is, for example, to combat HIV/¶ AIDS. Relevant questions to ask in order to focus on contradictions within¶ and between these two interacting activity systems working to combat¶ HIV/AIDS arc, for example: How has the activity system’s relation with¶ the object been developed over time? What are the theoretical ideas and¶ tools that have shaped the activity?¶ Making use of the cultural-historical activity theory may be seen as a¶ way of operationalizing Bhabha’s third space in which indigenous peoples¶ can name and practice their knowledge-making processes and state where¶ and how they would relate to Western knowledge. It is a space to undermine¶ “the position of power that dominant Western knowledge traditions have¶ assumed vis-a-vis indigenous knowledge making” and to expose “how the¶ local and spiritual nature of indigenous knowledges differentiate them from¶ modern, Western knowledges” (Botha 2011, p. 2).¶ This space then becomes a potentially shared object of activity as shown¶ in Figure 3.3. Potentially shared objectives are objects of activity or problems¶ that motivate collaboration between activity systems. As Anne Edwards,¶ Harry Daniels, Tony Gallagher, Jane Leadbettcr, and Paul Warmington¶ (2009) explain:¶ CHAT alerts us to the impact of sharing problems or tasks between¶ systems. It was developed to recognize that participants from different¶ systems bring different attributes to work on a common object or prob-¶ lem, which, in turn, is likely to lead to an expansion of the object and¶ systemic learning within the collaborating systems (p. 91).¶ The model is in line with Scmali and Kinchcloe’s (1999) notion that¶ indigenous knowledges are subjugated knowledges that “can be employed¶ as a constellation of concepts that challenge the invisible cultural assump-¶ tions embedded in all aspects of schooling and knowledge production”¶ (p. 32).¶ CHAT is used as a framework for decolonizing knowledge-making by¶ challenging some of the dominating knowledge traditions that hegemon-¶ ize Western epistemology by claiming universality. Botha (2011) asks¶ “how we can consciously and deliberately integrate the diverse ontologi-¶ cal, epistemological and axiological positions implicit in the project of¶ bringing together indigenous and Western knowledges” (p. 6). CHAT¶ is a tool to mobilize differences between knowledge systems “for the¶ ultimate purpose of bringing the divergent ways of knowing together¶ in a conscious and critical manner” (p. 2). CHAT represents a space, a¶ potentially shared object of activity, where indigenous peoples can name¶ and practice their knowledge-making processes, and relate them to West-¶ ern knowledge. Concomitantly, CHAT is a way of “demonstrating how¶ Western research can redefine its relationship to people from indigenous/¶ marginalised contexts” (p. 2). ¶ On a micro level it implies creating dia-¶ logues across traditional barriers and knowledge systems by breaking¶ down the skewed power relationships and redistributing power. More-¶ over, such dialogues imply participation (within the redistributive power¶ framework) and open up spaces for sustainable change.¶ According to Engestrom (2001) two interacting activity systems consti-¶ tute the minimal model for activity theory. CHAT can trace the complex¶ interactions between indigenous knowledges and Western knowledge¶ without losing sight of the many ways in which these knowledges are¶ construed, or of the possibility for new and diverse understandings¶ to emerge.¶ The upper part of the triangle shows how a group of people uses tools to¶ pursue an objective. The use of tools and signs demonstrate the intentional-¶ ity of human actions, while at the same time tracing a cultural trajectory of¶ the tool users. This means that the nature of a system’s activity influences,¶ and is influenced by, the tools it has developed in response to its object¶ orientation. The lower part of the triangle shows the division of labor, and¶ that the activity of this community is regulated by rules.¶ The starting point in a collaborative activity is the partnership between¶ actors and institutions working towards a shared objective. In our con-¶ text, a dialogue working towards a shared objective rakes place between¶ proponents of the hegemonic Western knowledge system and proponents of¶ indigenous knowledges, for example, to combat HIV/AIDS. The dialogue¶ or negotiations may take the “solution” of the challenge a step further and¶ lead to proposals for a new strategy/new solutions that are based on other¶ contested, contradictory, and alternative proposals. Often such dialogue may¶ create contradictions, and it is therefore urgent to situate the dialogue in¶ a context where both parties, particularly Western hegemonic knowledge,¶ have to yield to create power equity. By identifying contradictions, in our¶ case within and between Western and indigenous knowledge systems in the¶ activity systems, the participants are aided in focusing on the root causes of¶ the problem and thereby aided in creating solutions based on these contra-¶ dictions. As noted, contradictions are crucial for the development of activity¶ systems (Engestrom) and involve what he terms expansive learning (Fig. 3.4¶ below). It means questioning and reflecting on the current situation, which¶ may lead to new learning and the development of new forms of knowledge.¶ As mentioned above the expansive learning cycle starts with individuals¶ questioning the present situation or context and is expanded to collective¶ movements or new solutions. An initially simple idea is transformed into a¶ more complex one and is being implemented, but is again being contested¶ or interrogated, and new practices are being consolidated and revised. It¶ creates a third space, which intends to undermine “the position of power¶ that dominant Western knowledge traditions have assumed vis-a-vis indig-¶ enous knowledge making, and how the local and spiritual nature of indig-¶ enous knowledges differentiate them from modern, Western knowledges”¶ (Botha 2011, p. 2).¶ The model is in line with Scmali and Kinchcloc’s (1999) notion of indig-¶ enous knowledges as subjugated knowledge that “can be employed as a¶ constellation of concepts that challenge the invisible cultural assumptions¶ embedded in all aspects of schooling and knowledge production” (p. 32).¶ CHAT is used as a framework for decolonizing knowledge-making by¶ challenging some of the dominating knowledge traditions that hegemonize¶ Western epistemology by claiming universality.¶ Such a space means the unraveling of myths of fixed indigenous knowl-¶ edges and identities and underlining the dynamism of these knowledges.¶ At the same time there are commonalities between the various indigenous¶ knowledges in terms of the relationship between the Self and the world,¶ which “provides us with fascinating new ways of making sense of reali-¶ ties and compelling topics for intercultural conversations” (Kincheloe and¶ Steinberg, 2008, p. 14).
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Breidlid 13 (Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 47-51)OG
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It is, in today’s world, necessary for indigenous and Western knowledge¶ systems to co-exist. By co-existence the hegemonic knowledge system talks to the dominated one and acknowl-¶ edges the urgency of addressing issues that the dominant epistemology¶ seems unable or unwilling to tackle All societies are hybrid The third space generates new possibilities by ques-¶ tioning entrenched categorizations of knowledge systems and cultures¶ and opens up new avenues with, and this is important to underline, a¶ counter-hegemonic strategy. cultural-historical activity theory is relevant when analyzing contradictions within and between¶ the two activity systems of indigenous knowledges and Western knowl-¶ edge. contradictions are central sources of change and development. “contradictions gener-¶ ate disturbances and conflicts, but also innovative attempts to change the¶ activity” Potentially shared objectives motivate collaboration between activity systems. CHAT alerts us to the impact of sharing problems or tasks between¶ systems. participants from different¶ systems bring different attributes to work on a common object or prob-¶ lem, which, in turn, is likely to lead to an expansion of the object and¶ systemic learning within the collaborating systems CHAT is a framework for decolonizing knowledge-making CHAT is a way of “demonstrating how¶ Western research can redefine its relationship to people from indigenous/¶ marginalised contexts” for example, to combat HIV/AIDS negotiations may take the “solution” of the challenge a step further and¶ lead to proposals for a new strategy/new solutions that are based on other¶ contested, contradictory, and alternative proposals the expansive learning cycle starts with individuals¶ questioning the present situation or context and is expanded new solutions there are commonalities between the various indigenous¶ knowledges in terms of the relationship between the Self and the world,¶ which “provides us with fascinating new ways of making sense of reali-¶ ties and compelling topics for intercultural conversations”
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Perm solves best—EACH contradictions spurs better solutions and new epistemologies
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The conquistador’s mind is a permanent feature of how we think about ourselves and others, Díaz says. It explains why folks of color often see their own group as human, but are not so sure about other folks of color. It explains why so many people in the U.S. are suspicious that Obama isn’t really American. I’m reminded of john powell’s argument in Racing to Justice that the “problematic and isolated white self” is the lens through which we see and is preventing us from living into a truly inclusive America. This is NOT to say that white people themselves are the problem, but that this conquistador’s mind is the frame operating within each of us (and in our institutions and structures). I think Díaz and powell would agree that we must see that colonial idea of self and others, name it, and find another way, all of us, to become more dynamically interconnected. Díaz says that cultivating decolonial love will get us there.¶ How can we cultivate decolonial love? Díaz says that there is no telling which practices will prove liberatory for the future, so we must proliferate strategies to see what works. Here are a few Díaz calls out:¶ Cultivate the Martí Mind, named for José Martí. As progressives we judge each other’s authenticity all the time. This is so not helpful. We must stop seeing each other through the conquistador’s mind and instead, have as much love for other groups as we have for our own.¶ Practice “racial anarchist calisthenics.” Drawing on James Scott’s concept of “anarchist calisthenics,” we must practice breaking the little rules of society and exercise the muscles of resistance – because we are practicing society’s rules all the time without thinking about it.¶ Say white. White supremacy is the great silence of our world, and in it is embedded much of what ails us as a planet. White supremacy’s greatest trick is that it has convinced people that, if it exists at all, it exists always in other people, never in us. We must practice saying white.¶ Study and emulate the 3rd world feminist writers of the 1980s, including Cherríe Moraga, Audre Lorde and Octavia Butler. They write/wrote brilliantly about how power and oppression work and there are threads of hope in their work we should look to. Without knowing it, each of us nurses a head of the many-headed hydra of power. Even if we chop all the heads off and raze the structures of oppression, the hydra lives within us. We must realize that we are fundamentally comprised of the oppressions we resist, understand how that has shaped us and how we love.¶ BAM! Díaz drove the point home that we progressives are too often too quick to act from our conquistador’s mind. I could not agree more. We should take to heart Díaz’s advice that we learn to tolerate other people’s contradictionsand our own, and that we embrace simultaneity as a value. Because practicing decolonial love calls us all to a higher and harder place – loving ourselves, loving those we love to judge, and cultivating a way of being and loving that is not rooted in colonialism, but freedom.
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Willsea 12 [JEN WILLSEA, Member, Board of Advisors at Resource GenerationSenior Associate at Interaction Institute for Social Change, Member, Board of Directors at RESIST, Inc., Individual Giving Officer at Facing History and Ourselves, Grassroots Fundraiser at Peace Action West, Searching for DeColonial Love, http://interactioninstitute.org/blog/2012/12/07/searching-for-decolonial-love/,]
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this conquistador’s mind is the frame operating within each of us we must see that colonial idea of self and others, name it, and find another way to become more interconnected cultivating decolonial love will get us there stop seeing each other through the conquistador’s mind and instead, have as much love for other groups as we have for our own practice breaking the little rules of society and exercise the muscles of resistance – because we are practicing society’s rules all the time without thinking about it Say white. White supremacy is the great silence of our world, each of us nurses a head of the many-headed hydra of power. Even if we chop all the heads off and raze the structures of oppression, the hydra lives within us. We must realize that we are fundamentally comprised of the oppressions we resist, understand how that has shaped us and how we love decolonial love calls us all to a higher and harder place – loving ourselves, loving those we love to judge, and cultivating a way of being and loving that is not rooted in colonialism, but freedom
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Perm do both: A love for all people, revolutionaries, and reformists, is the only way to deconstruct colonialism. Decolonial love calls us to a higher place, outside the guise of colonialism.
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CHELA SANDOVAL'S METHODOLOGY OF THE OPPRESSED IS, TO USE BALDWIN'S ¶ analogy, the outsider who has entered the gates of some of the most ¶ apparently incongruous methodological and theoretical positions, ¶ defamiliarizing their tenets in order to illuminate their dialogic origins, ¶ their possibilities for co-articulation, and the potential for their "occu- ¶ pants" to discard the robes muffling radical cultural critique, suffocat- ¶ Ruby C. Tapia is a doctoral candidate in the department of ethnic studies at the ¶ University of California, San Diego. She is currently completing a dissertation on the ¶ racialized construction of maternity in popular visual culture. ¶ American Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2001) © 2001 American Studies Association ¶ 733 ¶ This content downloaded from 206.76.84.110 on Sun, 28 Jul 2013 14:39:49 PM¶ All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions734 AMERICAN QUARTERLY ¶ ing social transformation. In this brilliantly innovative work, Sandoval ¶ demands that (all) intellectuals interested in democratizing power trust ¶ their nakedness enough to venture into new political, theoretical ¶ territories, to explode (inter)disciplinary and identificatory boundaries, ¶ to listen to and participate in conversations heretofore largely inaudible ¶ across borders of subjectivity. If this characterization of Sandoval's ¶ work seems abstract, if its imagery discomforts, then it has been ¶ effectively inspired by the word and spirit of a most rigorous, practical ¶ and practice-able political science: Sandoval's science of love. ¶ Molded with material from such apparently "different" knowledges ¶ as those put forth by Frederic Jameson, Gloria Anzaldia, and Roland ¶ Barthes, Methodology of the Oppressed feels through and across ¶ material and theoretical histories of first world powers and third world ¶ struggles, carving a path toward what Sandoval outlines in part four as ¶ "a hermeneutics of love in the postmodern world." Stirred in part by ¶ Roland Barthes' meditations on love in Incidents, The Pleasure of the ¶ Text, and A Lover's Discourse, Sandoval re-members these texts' ¶ connections to the decolonial theory of Frantz Fanon, Jacques Derrida, ¶ and Emma Perez, among others, as well as their applicability to ¶ contemporary predicaments of culture, subjectivity, and politics. She ¶ weaves together the theoretical narratives presented by each of the ¶ thinkers that she engages to construct not another narrative but a ¶ manner of story-telling and theory-making that attempts to take ¶ seriously and move always beyond the repertoire of intellectual and ¶ political possibility articulated in individual bodies of critical theory, ¶ whether they be post-structuralist, post-modern, post-colonial or strict ¶ identity-based bodies. Even as Sandoval calls attention to the weak- ¶ nesses and would-be despairing moments inherent in the theoretical ¶ formulations that she engages, her analyses are immanently productive ¶ because they challenge the racialized "apartheid of theoretical domains" (chapter 3), (per)forming new terms, new possibilities, new ¶ alliances in intellectual being and importantly, social movement. ¶ Without a doubt, the love in Sandoval's Methodology has everything to ¶ do with social movement. It is love as social movement that is, ¶ ultimately, her object of study. It is love as social movement that ¶ inspires the dialogue she transcribes and furthers between intellectuals ¶ (such as Frederic Jameson and Gloria Anzaldtia) whose interests and ¶ formulations are widely perceived to be divergent, at best, and incom- ¶ patible at worst. ¶ What Sandoval's location at the nexus of ethnic studies, women's ¶ studies, cultural studies, and American studies compels her to demon- ¶ strate is that intellectual-activists in these fields have never not spoken ¶ of one another, even though their alliances with or divergence from ¶ certain ideological positions mean that, as individuals, they (may) have ¶ never been perceived to be speaking to or with one another. They have ¶ never not been implicated in or effected by one another's theorizations, ¶ just as they have never not, any of them, performed their knowledges ¶ from embodied locations or with bodily effects. Thus, Sandoval's ¶ Methodology importantly incorporates Cherrie Moraga's notion of ¶ theory in the flesh, "reclaim[ing] that theory from the halls of the ¶ academy where it has been intercepted and domesticated" (7), and re- ¶ membering its origins in the intellectual and political insurrections of ¶ oppressed peoples. Beyond pointing out that "the new modes of critical ¶ theory and philosophy, the new modes of reading and analysis that have ¶ emerged during the U.S. post-World War II period are fundamentally ¶ linked to the voices of subordinated peoples" (8). Sandoval draws out ¶ these links, holding together-through moments of tension and har- ¶ mony-the decolonizing possibilities of critical theory as practiced by ¶ both dominant "Western" and traditionally liminal intellectuals. ¶
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Tapia 2K11 [Ruby C. Tapia, doctoral candidate in the department of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego and is currently completing a dissertation on the racialized construction of maternity in popular visual culture, What's Love Got to Do with It?: Consciousness, Politics and Knowledge Production in Chela, Sandoval's Methodology of the Oppressed, Methodology of the Oppressed by Chela Sandoval, American Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), pp. 733-743]
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Sandoval's science of love. Molded with material from different" knowledges feels through and across material and theoretical histories of first world powers and third world ¶ struggles, carving a path toward a hermeneutics of love in the postmodern world. She ¶ weaves together theoretical narratives presented by each of the ¶ thinkers that she engages to construct a ¶ manner of story-telling and theory-making that attempts to take ¶ seriously and move always beyond the repertoire of intellectual and ¶ political possibility articulated in individual bodies of critical theory her analyses challenge the racialized "apartheid of theoretical domains the love has everything to ¶ do with social movement "the new modes of critical ¶ theory and philosophy, the new modes of reading and analysis that have ¶ emerged during the U.S. post-World War II period are fundamentally ¶ linked to the voices of subordinated peoples"
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Perm do both: To move beyond individual struggles and embrace the fight against colonialism as whole is to create a world of political possibility.
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Gender has been paramount to the process of Decolonization. In Latin America, indigenous intellectuals such as Fausto Reinaga have held forth the idea of gender complementarity as an illustration of the colonial difference, that is, as an element that distinguishes Aymara gender relations from western patriarchy. While for Reinaga gender complementarity is a reality, for Marı´a Eugenia Choque Quispe gender complementarity is an ideal that the colonial experience itself has compromised (1998, p. 12). For many indigenous women, questioning gender paradigms in the process of decolonization has helped to constitute indigenous cultures as dynamic practices that are in need of re-invention rather than offering a return to an idealized past (Cervone 1998, Mujeres Indı´genas de la CONAIE 1994). Documentary and fiction videos, directed and produced by members of indigenous communities frequently cast women as the guardians of tradition; they enact the transmission of social memory and perform gender complementarity on screen. At the same time, videomakers foster debates over the links between gender and the colonial subalternization of knowledge. For some indigenous videomakers gender complementarity itself has become a metaphor for thinking decolonized relations between indigenous communities and national society (Schiwy 2002). Social memory and subalternized knowledge is embodied and transmitted in gendered ways but the enactment and representation of such links between knowledge and the female body in the discourse of decolonization has been a central point of debate not only for indigenous movements in Latin America. In postcolonial discussions focused on India and Northern Africa, scholars such as Partha Chatterjee asked whether decolonization mustn’t ‘include within it a struggle against the false essentialism of home/world, spiritual/material, feminine/masculine propagated by nationalist ideology.While¶ gender concepts are clearly crucial to decolonization, the heterosexual model¶ through which complementarity is thought affirms Andean duality and hides¶ those subjectivities and forms of desire that would challenge binary thinking¶ itself. Indeed, as, the literary critic Michael Horswell argues, the Andean¶ gender binary is itself a modern/colonial construct.
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Freya Schiwy, Ph.D. 2002, Duke University, DECOLONIZATION AND THE QUESTION OF SUBJECTIVITY Gender, race, and binary thinking. Cultural Studies Volume 21, Issue 2-3, 2007 Special Issue: Globalization and the De-Colonial Option
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Gender has been paramount to the process of Decolonization In Latin America, indigenous intellectuals such as Fausto Reinaga have held forth the idea of gender complementarity as an illustration of the colonial difference, Reinaga gender complementarity is a reality for Quispe is an ideal that the colonial experience itself has compromised questioning gender paradigms in the process of decolonization has helped to constitute indigenous cultures as dynamic practices that are in need of re-invention rather than offering a return to an idealized past Documentary and fiction videos, directed and produced by members of indigenous communities frequently cast women as the guardians of tradition; they enact the transmission of social memory and perform gender complementarity on screen. videomakers foster debates over the links between gender and the colonial subalternization of knowledge Social memory and subalternized knowledge is embodied and transmitted in gendered ways but the enactment and representation of such links between knowledge and the female body in the discourse of decolonization has been a central point of debate not only for indigenous movements in Latin America. In postcolonial discussions focused on India and Northern Africa, scholars asked whether decolonization mustn’t ‘include within it a struggle against the false essentialism of home/world, spiritual/material, feminine/masculine propagated by nationalist ideology.
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The permutation solves – processes of decolonization and gendered analysis intersect
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But this also means that there is a dire need for what Santos has called a¶ theory of translation—one that propitiates mutual understanding and intelligibility among movements brought together into networks but with worldviews, life¶ worlds and conceptions that are often different and at odds with each other, if¶ not plainly incommensurable.54 How can mutual learning and transformation¶ among subaltern practices be promoted? This is increasingly recognised as an¶ important element for advancing counter-hegemonic globalisation (for instance,¶ by the world network of social movements that emerged from the World Social¶ Forum process). If it is true that many of the subaltern movements of today are¶ movements of knowledges that have been marginalised and excluded, does this¶ not amount in some fashion to a situation of ‘transnational third worlds of¶ peoples and knowledges’,55 whose articulation might usher in new types of¶ counter-hegemonic agency? No longer conceived as a classificatory feature¶ within the modern epistemic order, these ‘third worlds of peoples and knowledges’ could function as the basis for a theory of translation that, while¶ respecting the diversity and multiplicity of movements (albeit questioning their¶ particular identities), would enable increasing intelligibility of experiences¶ among existing worlds and knowleges, thus making possible a higher level of¶ articulation of ‘worlds and knowledges otherwise’. As Santos put it:¶ such a process includes articulating struggles and resistances, as well as promoting¶ ever more comprehensive and consistent alternatives … an enormous effort of¶ mutual recognition, dialogue, and debate will be required to carry out the¶ task … Such a task entails a wide exercise in translation to enlarge reciprocal¶ intelligibility without destroying the identity of what is translated. The point is to¶ create, in every movement or NGO, in every practice or strategy, in every discourse¶ or knowledge, a contact zone that may render it porous and hence permeable to¶ other NGOs, practices, strategies, discourses and knowledges. The exercise of¶ translation aims to identify and potentiate what is common in the diversity of the¶ counter-hegemonic drive.56¶
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Escobar 8 (Arturo, Kenan Distinguished Professor at UNC Chapel Hill, Ph.D, University of Calfornia, Berkeley, May 27. Third World Quarterly. Beyond the Third World: imperial¶ globality, global coloniality and antiglobalisation social movements. Third World Quarterly, Vol 25, No 1, pp 207–230)
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there is a dire need for what Santos has called a theory of translation—one that propitiates mutual understanding and intelligibility among movements brought together into networks but with worldviews, life worlds and conceptions that are often different and at odds with each other, if not plainly incommensurable If it is true that many of the subaltern movements of today are movements of knowledges that have been marginalised and excluded, does this not amount in some fashion to a situation of ‘transnational third worlds of peoples and knowledges’,55 whose articulation might usher in new types of counter-hegemonic agency? No longer conceived as a classificatory feature within the modern epistemic order, these ‘third worlds of peoples and knowledges’ could function as the basis for a theory of translation that, while respecting the diversity and multiplicity of movements would enable increasing intelligibility of experiences among existing worlds and knowleges, thus making possible a higher level of articulation of ‘worlds and knowledges otherwise’ such a process includes articulating struggles and resistances, as well as promoting¶ ever more comprehensive and consistent alternatives … an enormous effort of¶ mutual recognition, dialogue, and debate will be required to carry out the¶ task … Such a task entails a wide exercise in translation to enlarge reciprocal intelligibility without destroying the identity of what is translated every movement or NGO, in every practice or strategy, in every discourse or knowledge, a contact zone may render it porous and hence permeable to other NGOs, practices, strategies, discourses and knowledges The exercise of¶ translation aims to identify and potentiate what is common in the diversity of the¶ counter-hegemonic drive.56
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The affirmative engages in cultural translation—the permutation is a necessary vehicle to widen movements to a global scale and connect across geographical and ideological divides
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The opening of identities and the very emergence of ethnic movements,¶ which the state can no longer prevent, is part and parcel of the third¶ phase of modernity, as much as it is the result of a couple of decades of¶ ethnic militancy. Formerly a peasant identity and working-class movements,¶ along with a leftist as well as middle-class nationalism within the developmental¶ framework, were the nodal points of identity formation. This does¶ not mean that ethnic identities were not important: they just tended to be¶ neither rationalized nor politicized as they often (though not always) are¶ today. Social movements, in this regard, are now quite plural and depend¶ on network mechanisms to organize themselves internally as well as to¶ weave alliances (Domingues, 2007: ch. 5, 2008: ch. 3). Modernity is, moreover, a two-pronged phenomenon; this is why we¶ must maintain an ambivalent relation towards it. It has at its core some¶ entrenched systems of domination: capitalism, the bureaucratic state and¶ patriarchy, as well as racism. While the two former are intrinsic to¶ modernity, the latter may entertain a more contingent relation to it, regardless¶ of how close-knit they have been since its inception. But modernity also¶ has some key imaginary elements – emancipatory – which have furnished¶ its horizon of expectations across the planet: freedom, equality and solidarity,¶ with responsibility playing a more discreet though rather important¶ part (Domingues, 2006). It is quite likely, as Marx argued in his immanent¶ critique, that they cannot be realized in modernity, and therefore need a¶ different type of society in which they would be sublated, including of course¶ ‘coloniality’, a historical feature of the birth and expansion of modernity,¶ however that is conceptualized. It may be also that perspectives that bring¶ into contemporary modern discussions elements from other civilizational¶ sources can provide new elements of criticism – for instance by insisting¶ on the community moment of democracy, such as is the case in Bolivia today.¶ In any case, an opening of citizenship and to some extent its transformation¶ as well as a re-structuration of the nation stands at the core of all these¶ movements and their ‘epistemic’ proposals. New principles of thinking and systematic theorizing can be proposed¶ by ‘border thinking’ constructions rooted in indigenous peoples’ movements,¶ reaching maturation in various forms of (hopefully not dichotomous) ‘another¶ thinking’. But other movements and their own brand of ‘border thinking’ –¶ race-oriented movements, workers’, women’s and environmental movements¶ or whatever – stand on an equal footing with ethnically based social movements,¶ especially in countries in which those are by far the minority. We¶ are far beyond the days when working-class movements could demand an¶ absolutely central position in social change. It is not reasonable that we¶ should expect other partial movements to take their place. This is certainly¶ not the Zapatistas’ perspective. Such movements become really threatening¶ when they weave broad alliances and when more encompassing issues –¶ such as the traditional left banner of nationalization or the more recent one,¶ taken up again, though transformed and democratically radicalized, of¶ citizenship – are pursued to their completion. Such modernizing moves,¶ from which take different directions, will inevitably develop through modernity,¶ albeit not necessarily within it should radical social change come about.¶ While neoliberalism reiterates modern systems of domination (especially¶ capitalism and bureaucratic state power, with low-intensity democracy),¶ those democratic moves may remain within modernity (although widening¶ its democratic horizons, at the imaginary level and institutionally) or point¶ beyond it, in any case being informed by and having to engage with it –¶ even if their constitution as collective subjectivities centrally includes other¶ civilizational elements. This is in some part happening right now, when some¶ of those movements take the telos contained in the horizon of expectations¶ of modernity and lend new specificities to older traditions stemming from¶ liberal and socialist thought, creatively transforming them to a large extent,¶ while the same is happening to indigenous traditions, which have by now¶ been radically modernized themselves.
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Domingues 9 (Jose, Rio de Janeiro University Research Institute, Global Modernization, `Coloniality' and a Critical Sociology for Contemporary Latin America, Theory Culture Society 2009 26: 112, 2009)
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opening of identities and the very emergence of ethnic movement is part and parcel of the third phase of modernity Formerly a peasant identity along with a leftist nationalism were the nodal points of identity formation Modernity is a two-pronged phenomenon; this is why we must maintain an ambivalent relation It has at its core some entrenched systems of dominatio the latter may entertain a more contingent relation to it, regardless of how close-knit they have been since its inception modernity also has some key imaginary elements – emancipatory – which have furnished its horizon of expectations across the planet: freedom, equality and solidarity, with responsibility playing a more discreet though rather important perspectives that bring into contemporary modern discussions elements from other civilizational sources opening of citizenship and its transformation stands at the core of epistemic’ proposals New principles of thinking and systematic theorizing can be proposed by ‘border thinking’ constructions race-oriented movements, workers’, women’s and environmental movements stand on an equal footing with ethnically based social movements It is not reasonable that we should expect other partial movements to take their place. This is certainly not the Zapatistas’ perspective. Such movements become really threatening when they weave broad alliances and when more encompassing issues – such as the traditional left banner of nationalization are pursued to their completion democratic moves may remain within modernity or point beyond it, in any case being informed by and having to engage with it This is happening right now, when some of those movements take the telos contained in the horizon of expectations of modernity
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Their monolithic view of modernity is bad—it ignores the emancipatory nature it has for new social movements
| 4,422 | 108 | 1,758 | 659 | 17 | 263 | 0.025797 | 0.39909 |
Decoloniality Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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4,498 |
Decolonization and ‘des-gener-accio´n’, different from authenticity, are not¶ based on the anticipation of death, but on the aperture of one’s self to the¶ racialized other to the point of substitution.¶ 67¶ Substitution occurs when one’s¶ identity is teleologically suspended and when one offers one’s life to the task of¶ achieving decolonial justice: that is, a justice oriented by the trans-ontological¶ dimension of the human. Decolonial justice opposes the preferential option for¶ imperial Man by the preferential option for the damne´ or condemned of the¶ earth. Such justice is inspired by a form of love which is also decolonial.¶ ‘Decolonial love’ ! a concept coined and developed by the Chicana theorist¶ Chela Sandoval ! gives priority to the trans-ontological over the claims of¶ ontology.¶ 68¶ Decolonization and ‘des-gener-accio´n’ are the active products of¶ decolonial love and justice. They aim to restore the logics of the gift through a¶ decolonial politics of receptive generosity.¶ 69¶ In order to be consistent, the discourse of decolonization and ‘des-generaccio´n’ would have to be understood according to the very logics that they open. They cannot take the form of a new imperial universal. Decolonization¶ itself, the whole discourse around it, is a gift itself, an invitation to engage in¶ dialogue. For decolonization, concepts need to be conceived as invitations to¶ dialogue and not as impositions. They are expressions of the availability of the¶ subject to engage in dialogue and the desire for exchange. Decolonization in¶ this respect aspires to break with monologic modernity. It aims to foment¶ transmodernity, a concept which also becomes an invitation that has to be¶ understood in relation to the decolonial paradox of giving and receiving.¶ 70¶ Transmodernity is an invitation to think modernity/coloniality critically from¶ different epistemic positions and according to the manifold experiences of¶ subjects who suffer different dimensions of the coloniality of Being.¶ Transmodernity involves radical dialogical ethics ! to initiate a dialogue¶ between humans and those considered subhumans ! and the formulation of a¶ decolonial and critical cosmopolitanism.¶ 71¶
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Maldonado-Torres 2K7 [Nelson, Professor in Latino and Hispanic Caribbean Studies at Rutgers, 'ON THE COLONIALITY OF BEING', Cultural Studies, 21:2, 240]
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decolonial love would have to be understood according to the very logics that they open They cannot take the form of a new imperial universal. Decolonization is a gift itself, an invitation concepts need to be conceived as invitations to¶ dialogue and not as impositions. to break with monologic modernity transmodernity, has to be¶ understood in relation to the decolonial paradox of giving and receiving an invitation
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Turn – Forcing the affirmative to accept decoloniality is the monolithic ideology of the West
| 2,210 | 93 | 419 | 331 | 15 | 67 | 0.045317 | 0.202417 |
Decoloniality Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Kritiks
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2013
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4,499 |
The reason for interrogating the truth claims of Western science is not to¶ undermine its importance and merits, but to put its self-proclaimed supe-¶ rior position globally in perspective. Scientific discoveries and technological¶ change have in many ways been a blessing in the sense that these discover-¶ ies have made life more manageable and easier for millions of people, viz.¶ discoveries in medicine, agriculture, transport, and information technology, to mention just a few. There is no reason to reject or de-emphasize¶ the merits of modern science and technology. Science and technology are very important aspects of modern society and societies in the South. They permeate, in one way or another, almost every society on earth and are in¶ many ways indispensable.
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Breidlid 13 (Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 21)OG
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Scientific discoveries and technological¶ change have in many ways been a blessing in the sense that these discover-¶ ies have made life more manageable and easier for millions of people discoveries in medicine, agriculture, transport, and information technology, to mention just a few. There is no reason to reject or de-emphasize¶ the merits of modern science and technology. Science and technology are very important aspects of modern society and societies in the South. They permeate, in one way or another, almost every society on earth and are in¶ many ways indispensable
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Science and technology are good – they benefit all societies
| 775 | 60 | 577 | 121 | 10 | 91 | 0.082645 | 0.752066 |
Decoloniality Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Kritiks
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2013
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