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This list is not exhaustive; the president can take any number of unilateral steps to improve relations and increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. He can also expect significant pushback from a well-organized and vocal minority of elected officials who are increasingly out of step with their constituencies on this issue. (In the 2012 election, Obama’s share of the Cuban-American vote increased by 10 points in Miami-Dade county.) He can win the argument, however, by demonstrating that these measures are in the spirit of the congressional mandate to encourage a free and prosperous Cuba.
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Ted Piccone [Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy] March 18, 2013 Time to Bet on Cubahttp://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/03/18-cuba-piccone¶
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steps to improve relations and increase U.S. support to Cuba can expect significant pushback from vocal minority of elected officials who are increasingly out of step with their constituencies on this issue Obama can win the argument demonstrating that these measures are in the spirit of the congressional mandate to encourage a free and prosperous Cuba.
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The plan is popular, Obama can spin it as a win
| 620 | 48 | 355 | 99 | 11 | 56 | 0.111111 | 0.565657 |
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Even as defenders of the embargo warn against providing the Cuban government with “economic lifelines,” some Cubans and exiles are advocating a fresh approach. The Obama administration already showed an openness to engagement with Cuba in 2009 by removing restrictions on travel and remittances for Cuban Americans. But with Fidel Castro, 86, retired and President Raúl Castro, 81, leading a bureaucracy that is divided on the pace and scope of change, many have begun urging President Obama to go further and update American policy by putting a priority on assistance for Cubans seeking more economic independence from the government. “Maintaining this embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hard-liners,” said Carlos Saladrigas, a Cuban exile and co-chairman of the Cuba Study Group in Washington, which advocates engagement with Cuba. “What we should be doing is helping the reformers.”
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Cave 2012 (Damien Cave is a foreign correspondent for The New York Times, based in Mexico City. 11-19-12, “Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on US Embargo,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)
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Cubans and exiles are advocating a fresh approach The Obama administration already showed an openness to engagement with Cuba in 2009 by removing restrictions on travel and remittances many have begun urging President Obama to go further and update American policy by putting a priority on assistance for Cubans seeking more economic independence from the government. “Maintaining this embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hard-liners What we should be doing is helping the reformers.”
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Plan Popular – people encouraging Obama because of economic interests despite naysayers
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In the meantime, Jacobson said the detention of Gross "has clearly stimulated a review" of USAID's pro-democracy programs in Cuba. "For years, the United States has had programs in places that were difficult and dangerous. We have a commitment to continue helping democracy activists, working with incipient civil society, but we'll do that in a way that reduces as much as possible the dangers to people working there," she said. "Some of the guidelines are different than they were before. We want to make sure people remain safe while having an impact." Despite the lack of a political opening under President Raúl Castro since he took over the leadership of Cuba from his older brother Fidel four years ago, the regime has unveiled several dramatic economic reforms. These include the birth of a private real estate market, the dismantling of money-losing state companies, and the rise of small self-employment ventures known as cuentapropismo. Even the government predicts that by 2015, the nascent private sector could account for up to 40 percent of Cuba's GDP, compared to less than 5 percent today. "We're watching these changes very closely," said Jacobson. "We're as riveted to the possibility of change in Cuba as everybody else. As we watch these things, the possibility for economic opening and freedom is critically important to Cubans. "The problem we have is that they're halfway measures," she argues. "Change is possible and the United States will encourage, reward and respond to change. The way we responded to change in Burma is very instructive, I think. We are not absolutists in the sense that we're going to sit with our arms folded until everything is done." Region-wide, Jacobson said the Obama administration remains focused on the same four goals as when it came into office: improving citizen security, strengthening democracy, expanding economic opportunity, and reducing social inequality. "The fundamental goal that runs throughout all of those goals is partnership," she told The Diplomat. "As the president said in Cartagena, there's really no such thing as junior and senior partnerships. What's new about that is the capacity of our partner countries to act domestically, in the region and globally. Our partnerships include Brazil, Mexico, Canada, Colombia and Chile — countries with strong democratic institutions and the capacity to really bring something to the table that the United States can't." Some of the biggest international meetings in the last year, she noted, took place in Latin America, even though they weren't specific to Latin America. Jacobson also cited a "rare moment of bipartisanship" in the recent passage of U.S. free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama. "Even the opponents of free trade recognize that not having the agreements does not improve the labor or environmental situation," she said. "Sometimes, people have irrational exuberance about what FTAs can really achieve. They're not the entire answer on labor and environment, just as they're not the entire answer in growing trade and exports. They're critically important and they help enormously, but you must also have solid domestic legislation, enforcement and sanctions if people don't abide by the rules." The next logical step, said Jacobson, is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which seeks to eliminate trade barriers across the entire Pacific region. In addition to the United States, the TPP's original members include Chile and Peru, and now Mexico and Canada have been invited to join. In addition, Panama and Colombia are interested in becoming part of the TPP as soon as possible, while Costa Rica may sign up as well. "[If] you look at U.S. Latin America policy since Bush 41, there's been a lot of bipartisanship on this hemisphere. When I go up [to Congress] and brief them over the last four years on the Mérida Initiative and CARSI [Central America Regional Security Initiative], I do not get partisan pushback."
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Luxner 2012 (Larry Luxner is news editor of The Washington Diplomat. 10-1-12, “State Official Makes Her Mark on Rising Western Hemisphere”, http://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8560&Itemid=414)
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pro-democracy programs in Cuba. the United States has have a commitment to continue helping democracy activists the regime has unveiled several dramatic economic reforms. "We're as riveted to the possibility of change in Cuba as everybody else. As we watch these things, the possibility for economic opening and freedom is critically important to Cubans Change is possible and the United States will encourage, reward and respond to change. The way we responded to change in Burma is very instructive, said the Obama administration remains focused The fundamental goal that runs throughout all of those goals is partnership," Some of the biggest international meetings in the last year, she noted, took place in Latin America, even though they weren't specific to Latin America. Jacobson also cited a "rare moment of bipartisanship" in the recent passage of U.S. free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama. "Even the opponents of free trade recognize that not having the agreements does not improve the labor or environmental situation," she said. " If] you look at U.S. Latin America policy since Bush 41, there's been a lot of bipartisanship on this hemisphere. When I go up [to Congress] and brief them ], I do not get partisan pushback
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Economic engagement is bipartisan in Latin America
| 3,959 | 50 | 1,243 | 635 | 7 | 202 | 0.011024 | 0.31811 |
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Remember Jersey Sen. Bob Menendez's quixotic stand on behalf of regressive Cuba sanctions a few weeks ago? There he was, Senator Bob Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, holding forth from the well of the Senate making his Alamo stand against some very innocuous provisions to allow Cuban-American family members travel to Cuba and for American agricultural producers to carry out the business they already do with Cuba more efficiently during a time of economic recession. Most analysts I speak with say this was a picture of a man trying to put his finger in a dike, knowing it was about to burst. Senator Menendez is, you see, the highest ranking Cuban American in Congress and, with the Diaz-Balart brothers and Rep. Lehtinen in the minority, the last hope for defending the embargo against Cuba in the 111th Congress. The dike metaphor is apt. Obama ran on rethinking Cuba policy, and won Florida. The Cuban-American community is itself split between the geezers still clinging to a generations-long failed embargo policy, and the younger crowd eager for change. Respected foreign policy experts are eager for a more rational Cuba policy, including Republicans like Dick Lugar. And farm state legislators from both parties are eager to open up a new market for their farmers' goods. In other words, the embargo is not long for the world, with proponents dwindling in size and relegated mostly to the minority. Hence, Menendez's last stand, protesting a technical change in the definition of "cash-based sales" of medical and agricultural goods to Cuba that the Bush Administration had implemented to effectively block such sales to the island. Menendez dropped his efforts to hold up the Omnibus after he was promised that the Bush-era definition would remain. A bipartisan group of Senators, writing Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, is now demanding that Treasury tear up any such deal with Menendez and adhere to the letter of the law: The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) of 2000 authorized agricultural exports to Cuba by payment of cash in advance or third‐country bank letters of credit. For several years, until early 2005, such cash‐based sales were taking place and working well. After goods shipped from U.S. ports, the Cuban buyers initiated payments, routing them through third‐country banks, as required by the law. There were no reported instances in which a Cuban buyer took possession of U.S. goods prior to completing payment to the U.S. seller, a fact acknowledged by the Treasury Department during the confirmation hearing of Deputy Secretary Kimmitt in July 2005. Despite this fact, [the Office of Foreign Assets Control] issued a rule in February 2005 that defined "payment of cash in advance" as payment prior to shipment of goods. The change in definition has brought all cashbased sales to a halt, rendering the cash in advance provision useless and undermining Congress’s intent to facilitate agriculture sales to Cuba. Your March 5, 2009 letter stated that OFAC will continue to use this definition. This is contrary to the intention of the provisions included in the Omnibus legislation to halt this use.
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Daily Kos 2009 (3-18-09, “Bipartisan Senate group take aim at cuba embargo provisions,” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/03/18/710102/-Bipartisan-Senate-group-take-aim-at-Cuba-embargo-provisions#)
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Respected foreign policy experts are eager for a more rational Cuba policy, including Republicans like Dick Lugar. And farm state legislators from both parties are eager to open up a new market for their farmers' goods. In other words, the embargo is not long for the world, with proponents dwindling in size and relegated mostly to the minority. Hence, Menendez's last stand, protesting a technical change in the definition of "cash-based sales" of medical and agricultural goods to Cuba A bipartisan group of Senators, writing Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, is now demanding that Treasury tear up any such deal with Menendez and adhere to the letter of the law: The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) of 2000 authorized agricultural exports to Cuba by payment of cash in advance or third‐country bank letters of credit.
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Bipartisan support for ending embargo – agricultural and trade interests
| 3,161 | 72 | 849 | 513 | 10 | 137 | 0.019493 | 0.267057 |
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WASHINGTON, Mar. 31, 2009 (IPS/GIN) - A bipartisan group of U.S. senators and interest groups is backing a bill that would end the long economic embargo against Cuba, including travel restrictions to the island. The 'Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act' was introduced Tuesday by Senators Byron Dorgan, a North Dakota Democrat and Senate Democratic Policy Committee chair, and Michael Enzi, a Republican from Wyoming. They were joined by 20 cosponsors, including influential Senators Christopher Dodd and Richard Lugar, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Human Rights Watch (HRW). "The people of Cuba ought to be free," said Senator Dorgan, pointing to the U.S.'s failed Cuba policy in achieving this. The nearly 50-year-old embargo on Cuba is only "punishing American people," he said. If passed, the bill would prohibit the president from regulating or prohibiting travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal residents or any of the transactions ordinarily incident to such travel, except in time of war or armed hostilities between the United States and Cuba, or of imminent danger to the public health or the physical safety of U.S. travellers. The Cuban embargo, introduced in 1961 and subsequently tightened further, prohibits travel to and business dealings with Cuba for all U.S. citizens. Many have argued that this policy actually thwarts U.S. interests and further strengthens the government there. "The U.S. embargo on Cuba is a 50-year failure, and lifting the ban on travel is a good first step toward a more rational policy," said Myron Brilliant, senior vice president for International Affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. "The embargo was implemented to try to bring freedom to Cuba, but it made a martyr out of a tyrant and actually has helped prop up the regime." Sponsors of the bill include agricultural associations who believe the lifting of travel restrictions to Cuba will increase U.S. agricultural sales of such commodities as poultry, wheat and soybeans. Agricultural sales to Cuba have averaged 400 million dollars annually since 2000. "In the long term we need to do more to open up channels of trade (in Cuba), like we do in other countries," said Bob Stallman, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation. Proponents of the legislation point out that the 47-year-old embargo has done nothing to promote democracy or force the Cuban government to obey human rights standards. "Human Rights Watch has been monitoring human rights in Cuba for nearly two decades and the dismal state of human rights has not improved," said Jose Miguel Vivanco, executive director of the Americas Division at HRW
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Litvinsky 09 (Marina, reporter for The Global Information Network, “Penny Worthy Being Saved,” Global Information Network, April 1, 2009, Proquest)
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A bipartisan group of U.S. senators and interest groups is backing a bill that would end the long economic embargo against Cuba, . The 'Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act' was introduced Tuesday by Senators Byron Dorgan, a North Dakota Democrat and Senate Democratic Policy Committee chair, and Michael Enzi, a Republican from Wyoming. They were joined by 20 cosponsors, including influential Senators Christopher Dodd and Richard Lugar, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Human Rights Watch (HRW). "The people of Cuba ought to be free," said Senator Dorgan, pointing to the U.S.'s failed Cuba policy in achieving this. The nearly 50-year-old embargo on Cuba is only "punishing American people," he said. The U.S. embargo on Cuba is a 50-year failure, and lifting the ban on travel is a good first step toward a more rational policy Sponsors of the bill include agricultural associations In the long term we need to do more to open up channels of trade (in Cuba), the 47-year-old embargo has done nothing to promote democracy or force the Cuban government to obey human rights standards.
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Bipartisan support for repealing embargo – economic interests
| 2,667 | 61 | 1,117 | 432 | 8 | 185 | 0.018519 | 0.428241 |
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WASHINGTON, March 26 (Reuters) - President Barack Obama's domestic success on healthcare reform may pay dividends abroad as the strengthened U.S. leader taps his momentum to take on international issues with allies and adversaries. More than a dozen foreign leaders have congratulated Obama on the new healthcare law in letters and phone calls, a sign of how much attention the fight for his top domestic policy priority received in capitals around the world. Analysts and administration officials were cautious about the bump Obama could get from such a win: Iran is not going to rethink its nuclear program and North Korea is not going to return to the negotiating table simply because more Americans will get health insurance in the coming years, they said. But the perception of increased clout, after a rocky first year that produced few major domestic or foreign policy victories, could generate momentum for Obama's agenda at home and in his talks on a host of issues abroad. "It helps him domestically and I also think it helps him internationally that he was able to win and get through a major piece of legislation," said Stephen Hadley, former national security adviser to Republican President George W. Bush. "It shows political strength, and that counts when dealing with foreign leaders." Obama's deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes said the Democratic president's persistence in the long healthcare battle added credibility to his rhetoric on climate change, nuclear nonproliferation and other foreign policy goals. "It sends a very important message about President Obama as a leader," Rhodes told Reuters during an interview in his West Wing office. "The criticism has been: (He) sets big goals but doesn't close the deal. So, there's no more affirmative answer to that criticism than closing the biggest deal you have going."
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Mason 10 (Jeff, covers the White House for Reuters, covering Barack Obama 26 March, “Obama's health win could boost foreign policy”, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N26180856.htm)
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Obama's success on healthcare pay dividends as the leader taps his momentum leaders were cautious about the bump Obama could get from such a win the perception could generate momentum for Obama's agenda he was able to win and get through a major piece of legislation It shows strength, and that counts
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Winners win; true with Obama – healthcare proves
| 1,851 | 48 | 301 | 298 | 8 | 52 | 0.026846 | 0.174497 |
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Barack Obama's vow to quell "slash and burn" politics, which helped sweep him to the presidency, is facing a decisive test in the angry echo-chamber imperiling his health reform drive. "Do we participate in a politics of cynicism, or do we participate in a politics of hope?" Obama asked in the 2004 Democratic convention speech which rocketed him into the public eye. Fast-forward five years to the sound and fury of the health care debate, and that message is struggling to be heard above a cacophony of negative advertisements and fulminating voters at lawmakers' town hall meetings. "These struggles have always boiled down to a contest between hope and fear," President Obama said Saturday in Colorado, branding his critics as scaremongers. It seems inevitable that Obama will be a changed president when he emerges from the tumult over his plans to offer health care to 46 million uninsured, cut costs for those who have policies and rein in insurance giants. A famous victory on health care, which eluded previous Democratic presidents, would embolden Obama's change agenda and validate his core political creed and personal brand. But should his plan end up in the graveyard of failed big-ticket presidential initiatives, tough questions will be asked. Some will likely argue Obama's crusade for hope and change has been exposed as naive -- or "all hat and no cattle" as his foe-turned-ally Hillary Clinton said in their bitter primary campaign. Should Congress pass a messy compromise, second guessers will question Obama's strategy, and despite a string of early legislative wins, his political aura will dim. Obama makes no secret of his disdain for buzzsaw spin tactics, but the unflinching attack politics of his Republican critics do seem to be framing the debate. "The difficulty is, that style of politics, does not match up really well with the issue at stake," said Dante Scala, a political scientist at the University of New Hampshire.
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Collinson 9 Stephen Collinson 8-17-2009, Agence France Presse – English, Obama's new politics on line in health showdown
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Obama's vow to quell "slash and burn" politics is facing a decisive test Some will argue Obama's crusade for hope and change has been exposed as naive despite a string of legislative wins, his political aura will dim. Obama makes no secret of his disdain for buzzsaw spin tactics, but the unflinching attack politics of his Republican critics do seem to be framing the debate. that style of politics, does not match up really well with the issue at stake," said a political scientist at the University of New Hampshire.
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Winners win is a myth; opposition can always spin it away; true with Obama
| 1,954 | 74 | 519 | 319 | 14 | 90 | 0.043887 | 0.282132 |
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Obama believed that early success would be self-reinforcing, building a powerful momentum for bold government action. This belief was the essence of the White House’s theory of the “big bang” — that success in passing a big stimulus package would lead to success in passing health care, which in turn would clear the way for major cap-and-trade environmental legislation and “re-regulation” of the financial services sector — all in the first year. This proved to be a radical misreading of the dynamics of power. The massive cost of the stimulus package and industry bailouts — combined with the inconvenient fact that unemployment went up after their passage — meant that Obama spent the year bleeding momentum rather than steadily increasing public confidence in his larger governing vision. That vision was further obscured for many Americans by the smoke from the bitter and seemingly endless legislative battle on Capitol Hill over health care.
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Politico ‘10 01-20-10 (“Obama’s first year: what went wrong,”) http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31749.html
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Obama believed that early success would be self-reinforcing, building a powerful momentum the White House’s theory of the “big bang” — that success in passing a big stimulus package would lead to success in passing health care This proved to be a radical misreading of the dynamics of power. The massive cost of the stimulus package and industry bailouts meant that Obama spent the year bleeding momentum rather than steadily increasing public confidence in his larger governing vision.
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Winners lose – Obama pushing initiatives crushes his capital
| 951 | 60 | 486 | 152 | 9 | 78 | 0.059211 | 0.513158 |
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In 2010, CNPC signed a deal to help Venezuela develop a major Orinoco oil field known as Junin 4, which includes the construction of a facility to convert heavy oil to a lighter crude that could be shipped to a refinery in Guangdong, China. “Although the contract was signed in December 2010, not one barrel of oil has yet been produced, much less upgraded,” said Gustavo Coronel, a former PDVSA board member. “So far, nothing much seems to be happening, except for the arrival of a large group of Chinese staff to the CNPC’s Caracas office,” he added, referring to the Venezuelan capital, Caracas. “Apart from money, there seems to be little that China can offer Venezuela in the oil industry,” he said, adding that a “culture gap will make working with China very difficult for Venezuelan oil people, who were mostly trained in the U.S.” Erica Downs, a former energy analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency now with the Brookings Institution in Washington, said the Junin-4 project could be key to China’s future in Venezuela. “If all that happens, China will be in a position to take substantial volumes of Venezuelan oil,” she said. “The problem is that the project hasn’t gotten off the ground.” Ms. Downs said Venezuela is far from living up to Mr. Chavez’s export goals for Beijing and that PDVSA’s claims of sending 410,000 barrels a day do not match Chinese customs data, which show 322,000 barrels per day of crude and fuel oil imported from Venezuela last year. “Although Venezuela’s oil exports to China have grown along with the volume of oil-backed loans extended by China Development Bank to Caracas, the delivered volumes still fall short of Chavez’s goal of eventually shipping 1 million barrels per day to China,” she said. Critics of the loans say Mr. Chavez is using the so-called “China fund” as his personal piggy bank. The Chinese also seem to be increasingly wary. Internal PDVSA documents released by a Venezuelan congressman show that the Chinese balked at a $110 billion loan request by Mr. Chavez in 2010, after PDVSA officials failed to account fully for where the money would go. Problems with Orinoco The Chinese are now pressing PDVSA to let them list some of their investments in the Orinoco region on the Hong Kong exchange, a move analysts say would increase transparency and accountability in PDVSA’s spending. “Development of the Orinoco oil belt is only slowly taking place because most of the companies — excluding Chevron, Repsol and China National Offshore Oil Corp. — either do not have the cash or the technology,” said Oliver L. Campbell, a former finance coordinator at PDVSA. Unlike light and sweet crude from Saudi Arabia, oil from Orinoco is tarlike. It is laced with metals and sits beneath deep jungles. Getting to the oil field means building roads, electrical-power grids and other major infrastructure. Once the oil is extracted from the ground, it is technically difficult to process. “One of the major problems is that there are very few refineries outside the Gulf of Mexico that can handle Venezuelan crude,” said Jorge Pinon, a former president of Amoco Oil Latin America. Years ago, U.S. companies such as Shell and Exxon invested heavily in U.S. Gulf Coast refineries capable of processing heavy crude after they saw that the world’s supplies of sweet crude were diminishing, Mr. Pinon said. “The Chinese don’t have that kind of capacity,” he said.
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Hearn ‘12(Kelly Hearn, staff writer for the Washington Times, “Venezuelan oil a risky investment for China”, 3/12/2012, The Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/12/venezuelan-oil-a-risky-investment-for-china/?page=all)
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CNPC signed a deal to help Venezuela develop a major oil field Although the contract was signed in December 2010, not one barrel of oil has yet been produced there seems to be little that China can offer Venezuela in the oil industry a “culture gap will make working with China very difficult for Venezuelan oil people, who were mostly trained in the U.S.” Development is slowly taking place because most of the companies do not have the cash or the technology Years ago, U.S. companies invested heavily in U.S. Gulf Coast refineries capable of processing heavy crude The Chinese don’t have that kind of capacity
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Only US can solve- China fails- culture gap, lack of cash, lack of tech
| 3,412 | 71 | 612 | 574 | 14 | 106 | 0.02439 | 0.184669 |
Venezuela Oil Affirmative Updates - SDI 2013.html5
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Michigan State (SDI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,209 |
Venezuela President Hugo Chavez's government sold China oil for as little as US$5 a barrel and was upset that China apparently profited by selling fuel to other countries, according to a classified US document released by WikiLeaks. The report about Chinese companies diverting oil was one of several newly released documents that also describe falling crude output in Venezuela caused by a host of problems within the national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA, or PDVSA. The documents, posted online by the Spanish newspaper El Pais, also showed that American officials had managed to cultivate sources within the state oil company in spite of Mr Chavez's antagonism toward Washington. The confidential memo from the US Embassy in Caracas on February 26 said a PDVSA director revealed that the state company "had analysed its crude sales to China and determined that China had only paid $5/barrel of crude on a couple of deals" - a small fraction of the market price. The document said that according to the official, Mr Chavez's government was "extremely upset with Chinese companies due to the discrepancy between Chinese petroleum import statistics that suggest [China] is profiting from Venezuelan oil purchases by diverting the crude to third markets and earning a sizeable margin". The Venezuelan official, whose name was not released, "intimated that tankers had been diverted to the US, Africa, and elsewhere in Asia". Neither the Venezuelan government nor PDVSA reacted to the report. Calls to the Chinese Embassy in Caracas went unanswered on Tuesday. In China, there were no immediate responses to requests for comment from Sinopec, China's largest oil refiner; the China National Petroleum Corp; the Foreign Ministry and the National Development and Reform Commission, the country's top economic planning body. Mr Chavez relies on oil sales to his top client, the United States, to help fund his socialist-inspired programmes. But he has been building up oil sales to China, and in October he said that oil shipments to China had reached about 500,000 barrels a day, in spite of higher transport costs to reach Asia. Jorge Pinon, an energy expert and visiting research fellow at Florida International University in Miami, said he doubted that Venezuela's heavy crude would have been resold by China elsewhere because specialised refineries were needed to handle it. He said if there were any reselling by China, it would have been fuel oil and could have gone to Africa, Asia or the Caribbean "for blending and further re-export" to other markets. China, meanwhile, has also agreed to invest billions of dollars in a joint project to pump crude in Venezuela. Another embassy report on September 23, 2009, said a US diplomat had interviewed "PDVSA's senior executive director" when he was spotted in line at the embassy waiting for a US visa, and that the official revealed Venezuela had been manipulating its oil price index. It said the official confirmed that Venezuela "manipulates its Venezuelan Crude Oil basket index by including refined products in the mix". That method of calculating oil prices, which the official said "accurately reflected revenue from all of PDVSA's sales of crude petroleum and refined products", was responsible for narrowing the gap between prices for Venezuela's heavy sulphur-laden crude and benchmark light, sweet crude.
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AFP ’10 (Agence France-Presse, “China 'resold $5-a-barrel Venezuelan oil at a profit'”, 10/16/2010, The National, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/americas/china-resold-5-a-barrel-venezuelan-oil-at-a-profit)
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Venezuela sold China oil for as little as US$5 a barrel and was upset that China profited by selling fuel to other countries the government was "extremely upset with Chinese companies due to the discrepancy between Chinese petroleum import statistics that suggest [China] is profiting from Venezuelan oil purchases by diverting the crude to third markets and earning a sizeable margin". . Calls to the Chinese Embassy went unanswered In China, there were no immediate responses to requests for comment from China's largest oil refiner
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China can’t solve- Venezuela distrusts China due to reselling of oil
| 3,374 | 68 | 534 | 539 | 11 | 85 | 0.020408 | 0.157699 |
Venezuela Oil Affirmative Updates - SDI 2013.html5
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Michigan State (SDI)
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5,210 |
BUENOS AIRES — China has poured billions of dollars into Venezuela’s oil sector to expand its claim over the country’s massive oil reserves. But Beijing is getting relatively little for its investments, and Chinese officials are increasingly frustrated with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, according to energy analysts and former managers of the state oil company, Petroleum of Venezuela, or PDVSA as it’s known by its Spanish acronym. Mr. Chavez, who is battling a life-threatening recurrence of cancer, said his goal is to send 1 million barrels of oil a day to China, which has given Venezuela more than $30 billion in loans and promised billions of dollars more in energy investments by 2016. PDVSA claims to send 410,000 barrels a day to Chinese markets, the bulk of which is used to pay back the loans. Already this year, PDVSA has announced that Citic Group Corp., China’s largest state-owned investment company, will acquire a 10 percent stake in the Petropiar heavy-crude project held with PDVSA and U.S.-based Chevron Corp. It also said that the China Development Bank will spend $4 billion to help boost production in a joint venture with China National Petroleum Corp., or CNPC. The Chinese bank and the Venezuelan government also have agreed to renew a $6 billion bilateral investment fund, of which $2 billion will help boost PDVSA production. But Tom O’Donnell, an oil analyst who teaches at the New School University and writes an oil-industry blog, the Global Barrel, said the payoffs of China’s loans amount to a “consolation prize.” He said China’s goal is not to get oil for loans, but to have its own national oil companies contract for major oil-production projects in Venezuela’s Orinoco Tar Sands, the largest single known petroleum reserve in the world, with 513 billion barrels of heavy crude oil. Chinese displeased “The Chinese have not gotten the kind of preferential access they want [to the tar sands], and my sources tell me they are extremely unhappy,” said Mr. O’Donnell.
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Hearn ‘12(Kelly Hearn, staff writer for the Washington Times, “Venezuelan oil a risky investment for China”, 3/12/2012, The Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/12/venezuelan-oil-a-risky-investment-for-china/?page=all)
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Beijing is getting relatively little for its investments, and Chinese officials are increasingly frustrated with Venezuela an oil analyst said China’s goal is not to get oil for loans, but to have its own national oil companies contract for major oil-production projects in Venezuela The Chinese have not gotten the kind of preferential access they want and are extremely unhappy
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Venezuela says no to China
| 2,008 | 26 | 380 | 330 | 5 | 60 | 0.015152 | 0.181818 |
Venezuela Oil Affirmative Updates - SDI 2013.html5
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Michigan State (SDI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,211 |
The United States is Venezuela's most important trading partner. U.S. exports to Venezuela include machinery, organic chemicals, agricultural products, optical and medical instruments, autos and auto parts. Oil dominates U.S. imports from Venezuela, which is one of the top four suppliers of foreign oil to the United States. About 500 U.S. companies are represented in Venezuela. U.S. foreign direct investment in Venezuela is concentrated largely in the petroleum, manufacturing, and finance sectors.
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US Department of State 1/17/13 (It’s the freakin’ US DoS, cmon kid!, “U.S. Relations With Venezuela,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm //Bobby)
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The U S is Venezuela's most important trading partner. exports include machinery ag and auto parts Venezuela is one of the top four suppliers of foreign oil to the U S About 500 U.S. companies are represented in Venezuela
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Non-Unique- the US is Venezuela’s largest importer
| 502 | 50 | 221 | 72 | 7 | 39 | 0.097222 | 0.541667 |
Venezuela Oil Affirmative Updates - SDI 2013.html5
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Michigan State (SDI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,212 |
One response to this question is to suggest that, unlike other Western powers, the imperiality of US power emerged out of a postcolonial anchorage, or, in other words, a project of imperial power gradually emerged out of an initial anti-colonial struggle for independence from British rule. This fact of emergence has given the USA a contradictory identity of being a 'post-colonial imperial power', with the determining emphasis falling on the 'imperial' (Slater, 2004a). The postcolonial essentially refers to the specificity of origin, and does not preclude the possibility of a coloniality of power, as was exemplified in the case of the Philippines, or as is argued continues to apply to Puerto Rico (Pantojas-Garcia, 2005). Such a paradoxical identity has two significant implications. First, one finds juxtaposed an affirmation of the legitimacy of the self-determination of peoples with a belief in the geopolitical destiny of the USA. Such a belief dates at least from the time of 'Manifest Destiny' and notions of 'benevolent assimilation' to the present where, as the Mexican political scientist Orozco (2005: 54) expresses it, the USA sees itself as the 'first universal nation'. Historically, the contradiction between support for the rights of people to decide their own fate and a belief in the geopolitical destiny of 'America' (rather than Jose Marti's nuestra America see Santos de Souza, 2001) has necessitated a discursive 'bridge'. This bridge has been formed through the invocation of a democratic mission that combines the national and international spheres. In order to transcend the contradiction between an identity based on the self-determination of peoples and another rooted in Empire, a horizon is created for other peoples who are encouraged to choose freedom and democracy, thereby embedding their own struggles within an Americanising vision and practice. Second, the primacy of self-determination provides a key to explaining the dichotomy frequently present in the discourses of US geopolitical intervention, where a split is made between a concept of the people and a concept ofthe rulers. Given the historical differentiation of the New (American) World of freedom, progress and democracy from an Old (European) World of privilege and colonial power, support for anti-colonial struggles has been accompanied by a separation between oppressed people and tyrannical rulers. For example, in the case of US hostility towards the Cuban Revolution, the Helms- Burton Act of 1996 makes a clear separation between the Cuban people who need supporting in their vulnerability and the Castro government, which is seen as a tyrannical oppressor of its own people and a security threat to the international community (Slater, 2004b). Similar distinctions have been made in the contexts of interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989). Overall it can be suggested that geopolitical interventions have been couched in terms of a prominent concern for the rights of peoples who are being oppressed by unrepresentative and totalitarian regimes. The USA is thus represented as a benevolent guardian of the rights of a subordinated people. An imperial ethic of care is projected across frontiers to provide one form of legitimisation for interventions. This particular ethic of care needs to be kept in mind as a constitutive feature of the imperial and, although imperial power includes the capacity for force, equally it requires discourses of legitimisation wherein ideas of care and guidance continue to play a leading role. Geopolitical interventions have been a permanent feature of the landscape of North - South relations and can be viewed in terms of the interconnections between desire, will, capacity and legitimisation. The will to intervene can be represented as a crystallisation of a desire to expand, expressed for example in the notion of 'Manifest Destiny' (see Pratt, 1927). Such a will can only be made effective when the capacities-military, economic, political-to intervene are sufficiently developed. Will and capacity together provide a force, but their effectiveness is only secured as a hegemonic power through the deployment of a discourse of justification. A political will that focuses desire and is able to mobilise the levers of intervention seeks a hegemonic role through the ability to induce consent by providing leadership, while retaining the capacity to coerce. The desire to intervene, to penetrate another society and help to reorder, readjust, modernise, develop, civilise, democratise that other society is an essential part of any imperial project. The geopolitical will is provided by changing agents of power working in and through the apparatuses of the imperial state. The processes of legitimisation for that will to power are produced within the state but also within civil society (see Joseph et al, 1998; Salvatore, 2005). In the case of the USA and its relations with the societies of the global South and especially the Latin South the processes of discursive legitimisation have been particularly significant in supporting its power and hegemonic ambition. Specifically in this regard the aim of spreading or diffusing democracy, or a particular interpretation of democracy, has been and remains a crucial element in the process of justification of geopolitical power.
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Slater, Dept of Geography – Loughborough University, 2006(David, “Imperial powers and democratic imaginations,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 27, No. 8)
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one finds juxtaposed an affirmation of the legitimacy of the self-determination of peoples with a belief in the geopolitical destiny of the USA. Such a belief dates at least from the time of 'Manifest Destiny' and notions of 'benevolent assimilation' to the present the USA sees itself as the 'first universal nation'. the contradiction between support for the rights of people to decide their own fate and a belief in the geopolitical destiny of 'America ) has necessitated a discursive 'bridge'. This bridge has been formed through the invocation of a democratic mission that combines the national and international spheres. In order to transcend the contradiction between an identity based on the self-determination of peoples and another rooted in Empire, a horizon is created for other peoples who are encouraged to choose freedom and democracy, thereby embedding their own struggles within an Americanising vision and practice. geopolitical interventions have been couched in terms of a prominent concern for the rights of peoples who are being oppressed by unrepresentative and totalitarian regimes. The USA is thus represented as a benevolent guardian of the rights of a subordinated people. An imperial ethic of care is projected across frontiers to provide one form of legitimisation for interventions. This particular ethic of care needs to be kept in mind as a constitutive feature of the imperial and, although imperial power includes the capacity for force, equally it requires discourses of legitimisation wherein ideas of care and guidance continue to play a leading role. Geopolitical interventions have been a permanent feature of the landscape of North - South relations and can be viewed in terms of the interconnections between desire, will, capacity and legitimisation. The will to intervene can be represented as a crystallisation of a desire to expand, expressed for example in the notion of 'Manifest Destiny' (see Pratt, 1927). Such a will can only be made effective when the capacities-military, economic, political-to intervene are sufficiently developed. Will and capacity together provide a force, but their effectiveness is only secured as a hegemonic power through the deployment of a discourse of justification. A political will that focuses desire and is able to mobilise the levers of intervention seeks a hegemonic role through the ability to induce consent by providing leadership, while retaining the capacity to coerce. The desire to intervene, to penetrate another society and help to reorder, readjust, modernise, develop, civilise, democratise that other society is an essential part of any imperial project. The geopolitical will is provided by changing agents of power working in and through the apparatuses of the imperial state. The processes of legitimisation for that will to power are produced within the state but also within civil society In the case of the USA and its relations with the societies of the global South and especially the Latin South the processes of discursive legitimisation have been particularly significant in supporting its power and hegemonic ambition. in this regard the aim of spreading or diffusing democracy, or a particular interpretation of democracy, has been and remains a crucial element in the process of justification of geopolitical power.
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The economic intervention of the affirmative into Latin America is a form of imperialism which precludes self-determination and subjugates recipient countries
| 5,344 | 159 | 3,325 | 826 | 21 | 517 | 0.025424 | 0.625908 |
Imperialism Kritik - JDI 2013.html5
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Kansas (JDI)
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Kritiks
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2013
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5,213 |
In this context, it is important to note that we understand a social theory as a map or a guide to the social sphere. In a research context, it does not determine how we see the world but helps us devise questions and strategies for exploring it. A critical social theory is concerned in particular with issues of power and justice and the ways that the economy; matters of race, class, and gender; ideologies; discourses; education; religion and other social institutions; and cultural dynamics interact to construct a social system (Beck-Gernsheim, Butler, & Puigvert, 2003; Flccha, Gomez, & Puigvert, 2003). Thus, in this context we seek to provide a view of an evolving criticality or a reconceptualized critical theory. Critical theory is never static; it is always evolving, changing in light of both new theoretical insights and new problems and social circumstances. The list of concepts elucidating our articulation of critical theory indicates a criticality informed by a variety of discourses emerging after the work of the Frankfurt School Indeed, some of the theoretical discourses, while referring to themselves as critical, directly call into question some of the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. Thus, diverse theoretical traditions have informed our understanding of criticality and have demanded understanding of diverse forms of oppression including class, race, gender, sexual, cultural, religious, colonial, and ability-related concerns. The evolving notion of criticality we present is informed by, while critiquing, the post-discourses—for example, postmodernism, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism. In this context, critical theorists become detectives of new theoretical insights, perpetually searching for new and interconnected ways of understanding power and oppression and the ways they shape everyday life and human experience. In this context, criticality and the research it supports are always evolving, always encountering new ways to irritate dominant forms of power, to provide more evocative and compelling insights. Operating in this way, an evolving criticality is always vulnerable to exclusion from the domain of approved modes of research. The forms of social change it supports always position it in some places as an outsider, an awkward detective always interested in uncovering social structures, discourses, ideologies, and epistemologies that prop up both the status quo and a variety of forms of privilege. In the epistemological domain, white, male, class elitist, heterosexist, imperial, and colonial privilege often operates by asserting the power to claim objectivity and neutrality. Indeed, the owners of such privilege often own the "franchise" on reason and rationality. Proponents of an evolving criticality possess a variety of tools to expose such oppressive power politics. Such proponents assert that critical theory is well-served by drawing upon numerous liberatory discourses and including diverse groups of marginalized peoples and their allies in the nonhierarchical aggregation of critical analysts {Bello, 2003; Clark, 2002; Humphries, 1997). In the present era, emerging forms of neocolonialism and neo-imperialism in the United States move critical theorists to examine the wavs American power operates under the cover of establishing democracies all over the world. Advocates of an evolving criticality argue—as we do in more detail later in this chapter—that such neocolonial power must be exposed so it can be opposed in the United States and around the world. The American Empires justification in the name of freedom for undermining democratically elected governments from Iran (Kincheloe, 2004), Chile, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to Liberia (when its real purpose is to acquire geopolitical advantage for future military assaults, economic leverage in international markets, and access to natural resources) must be exposed by critical-ists for what it is—a rank imperialist sham (McLaren, 2003a, 2003b; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2002; McLaren & Martin, 2003). Critical researchers need to view their work in the context of living and working in a nation-state with the most powerful military-industrial complex in history that is shamefully using the terrorist attacks of September 11 to advance a ruthless imperialist agenda fueled by capitalist accumulation by means of the rule of force (McLaren & Farahmandpur,2003). Chomsky (2003), for instance, has accused the U.S. government of the "supreme crime" of preventive war (in the case of its invasion of Iraq, the use of military force to destroy an invented or imagined threat) of the type that was condemned at Kuremburg. Others, like historian Arthur Schlesinger (cited in Chomsky, 2003), have likened the invasion of Iraq to Japan's "day of infamy'' that is, to the policy that imperial Japan employed at the time of Pearl Harbor. David G. Smith (2003) argues that such imperial dynamics are supported by particular epistemological forms. The United States is an epistemological empire based on a notion of truth that undermines the knowledges produced by those outside the good graces and benevolent authority of the empire. Thus, in the 21 st century, critical theorists must develop sophisticated ways to address not only the brute material relations of class rule linked to the mode and relations of capitalist production and imperialist conquest (whether through direct military intervention or indirectly through the creation of client states) but also the epistemological violence that helps discipline the world Smith refers to this violence as a form of "information warfare" that spreads deliberate falsehoods about countries such as Iraq and Iran. U.S. corporate and governmental agents become more sophisticated in the use of such episto-weaponry with every day that passes. Obviously, an evolving criticality does not promiscuously choose theoretical discourses to add to the bricolage of critical theories. It is highly suspicious—as we detail later—of theories that fail to understand the malevolent workings of power, that fail to critique the blinders of Eurocentrism, that cultivate an elitism of insiders and outsiders, and that fail to discern a global system of inequity supported by diverse forms of ideology and violence. It is uninterested in any theory—no matter how fashionable—that does not directly address the needs of victims of oppression and the suffering they must endure. The following is an elastic, ever-evolving set of concepts included in our evolving notion of criticality. With theoretical innovations and shifting Zeitgeists, they evolve. The points that are deemed most important in one time period pale in relation to different points in a new era.
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McLaren and Kincheloe in 5 (Peter Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies @ UCLA and Joe, professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Eds Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln)
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we understand social theory as a guide to the social sphere it helps us devise strategies for exploring it A critical theory is concerned with issues of power and justice and the ways ideologies; discourses and other institutions interact to construct a social system Critical theory is never static theorists become detectives of new theoretical insights, perpetually searching for new and interconnected ways of understanding power and oppression and the ways they shape everyday life criticality and the research it supports are always encountering new ways to irritate dominant forms of power, to provide more evocative and compelling insights. The forms of social change it supports always position it in some places as an outsider, an awkward detective always interested in uncovering social structures, discourses, ideologies, and epistemologies that prop up both the status quo and a variety of forms of privilege. In the epistemological domain , imperial, and colonial privilege often operates by asserting the power to claim objectivity and neutrality. , the owners of such privilege often own the "franchise" on reason and rationality. Proponents of an evolving criticality possess a variety of tools to expose such oppressive power politics. In the present era, emerging forms of neocolonialism and neo-imperialism in the United States move critical theorists to examine the wavs American power operates under the cover of establishing democracies all over the world. Advocates of an evolving criticality argue that such neocolonial power must be exposed so it can be opposed in the United States and around the world. The American Empires justification in the name of freedom for undermining democratically elected governments when its real purpose is to acquire geopolitical advantage for future military assaults, economic leverage in international markets, and access to natural resources) must be exposed by critical-ists for what it is—a rank imperialist sham Critical researchers need to view their work in the context of living and working in a nation-state with the most powerful military-industrial complex in history that such imperial dynamics are supported by particular epistemological forms. The United States is an epistemological empire based on a notion of truth that undermines the knowledges produced by those outside the good graces and benevolent authority of the empire. critical theorists must develop sophisticated ways to address not only the brute material relations of class rule linked to the mode and relations of capitalist production and imperialist conquest (whether through direct military intervention or indirectly through the creation of client states) but also the epistemological violence that helps discipline the world Smith refers to this violence as a form of "information warfare" that spreads deliberate falsehoods U.S. corporate and governmental agents become more sophisticated in the use of such episto-weaponry with every day that passes. an evolving criticality is highly suspicious of theories that fail to understand the malevolent workings of power, that fail to critique the blinders of Eurocentrism, that cultivate an elitism of insiders and outsiders, and that fail to discern a global system of inequity supported by diverse forms of ideology and violence. It is uninterested in any theory that does not directly address the needs of victims of oppression and the suffering they must endure.
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Alternative: Vote negative to interrogate the epistemological framework of the 1AC. Breaking down boundaries of knowledge is key to counteract otherwise inevitable neo-imperialist violence
| 6,729 | 188 | 3,460 | 1,014 | 24 | 526 | 0.023669 | 0.518738 |
Imperialism Kritik - JDI 2013.html5
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Kansas (JDI)
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Kritiks
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2013
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5,214 |
Modern Western Civilization used war as well as peace to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war… It is true missionaries and traders had their share in the work of expanding world civilization, but always with the support, immediate or in the background, of armies and navies (pp. 251-252). The importance of dominance as a primary motive in civilized war in general was also emphasized for modern war in particular: '[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars' (p. 85). European empires were thrown up all over the world in this processof benefiting some at the expense of others, which was characterized by armed violence contributing to structural violence: 'World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force… Empires are primarily organizations of violence' (pp. 965, 969). 'The struggle for empire has greatly increased the disparity between states with respect to the political control of resources, since there can never be enough imperial territory to provide for all' (p. 1190). This 'disparity between states', not to mention the disparity within states, both of which take the form of racial differences in life expectancies, has killed 15-20 times as many people in the 20th century as have wars and revolutions (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c). When this structural violence of 'disparity between states' created by civilization is taken into account, then the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. Wright concluded that 'Probably at least 10 per cent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war… The trend of war has been toward greater cost, both absolutely and relative to population… The proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase' (pp. 246, 247). So far as structural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c), and so far as structural violence was a function of armed violence, past and present, then Wright's estimate was very conservative indeed. Assuming that war is some function of civilization, then civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency. The structural situation has been improving throughout the 20th century, however, so that structural violence caused 'only' 20% of all deaths in 1980 (Eckhardt, 1983c). There is obviously room for more improvement. To be sure, armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward the reduction of structural violence, even as armed violence in the form of imperialism has been directed toward its maintenance. But imperial violence came first, in the sense of creating structural violence, before revolutionary violence emerged to reduce it. It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one's benefit, but of putting an end to life itself! This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power beyond all human comprehension. It's too much, or superfluous, as the Existentialists might say. Why we should care is a mystery. But, if we do, then the need for civilized peoples to respond to the ethical challenge is very urgent indeed. Life itself may depend upon our choice.
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Eckhardt 90 (William, Lentz Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis, JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, February 1990, p. 15-16)
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Modern Western Civilization used war to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war… '[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars' European empires were thrown up all over the world in this process 'World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force… Empires are primarily organizations of violence' 'The struggle for empire has killed 15-20 times as many people in the 20th century as have wars and revolutions When this the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. structural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency. imperial violence came first It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one's benefit, but of putting an end to life itself! This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power Life itself may depend upon our choice.
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The K turns the case—imperialist domination is the root cause of all war and violence
| 3,757 | 85 | 1,440 | 604 | 15 | 235 | 0.024834 | 0.389073 |
Imperialism Kritik - JDI 2013.html5
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Kansas (JDI)
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Kritiks
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2013
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5,215 |
The oppressed and the exploited of the earth maintain their defiance: liberty from theft. But the biggest weapon wielded and actually daily unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the cultural bomb. The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from that wasteland. It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, with other peoples’ languages rather than their own. It makes them identify with that which is decadent and reactionary, all those forces which would stop their own springs of life. It even plants serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle. Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams. The intended results are despair, despondency and a collective death-wish. Amidst this wasteland which it has created, imperialism presents itself as the cure and demands that the dependant sing hymns of praise with the constant refrain: ‘Theft is holy’. Indeed, this refrain sums up the new creed of the neo-colonial bourgeoisie in many ‘independent’ African states.
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Thiong’o 86 (Ngugi wa Thiong’o – Distinguished Professor of University of California, Irvine. “Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature”. 1986.)
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the biggest weapon wielded and actually daily unleashed by imperialism is the cultural bomb The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people’s belief in their names in their languages in their environment, and in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from that wasteland. It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves It makes them identify with that which is decadent and reactionary, all those forces which would stop their own springs of life It even plants serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle The intended results are despair, despondency and a collective death-wish
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The K outweighs—imperialism destroys value to life by breaking down society psychologically and colonizing the mind
| 1,363 | 115 | 716 | 215 | 16 | 117 | 0.074419 | 0.544186 |
Imperialism Kritik - JDI 2013.html5
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Kansas (JDI)
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Kritiks
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2013
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5,216 |
The alternative is for the re-emergence and strengthening of a genuine political economy, inspired by the clashes between social theory and economics imperialism. By this, I mean an approach to economics that is systemic (understands the social as distinct from aggregation over individuals), is socially and historically specific (as opposed to universal and timeless, thus dealing with the nature of capital and of capitalism), and addresses issues of class, conflict, power, tendencies, structures, and so on. In part, this depends upon reclaiming the knowledge lost by social theory in its postmodernist turn and that lost by the discipline of economics through lack of interest in, and tolerance of, its own history and traditions. It also depends upon theoretical advance by taking account of the economic realities of contemporary capitalism, woefully overlooked in the rush to test ever more esoteric theories against empirical evidence. Whilst economics imperialism has delivered a terrible beating to political economy, the latter has the opportunity to prosper once more as its host discipline collapses under the weight of its own ambition and rotten core. The parallel with the rise and fall of the Roman Empire should not be taken too seriously. But political economy will only prosper if it seizes the initiative as opportunities open up to raise the economic content of the social sciences. Otherwise, scholarly barbarism is ready to divide up the analytical spoils, already apparent in case of globalization and social capital, ultimately relying upon methodological individualism albeit with a protective belt of eclecticism and empiricism.
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Fine, 00 (Ben, Department of Economics, the University of London, “Economics Imperialism and Intellectual Progress: The Present as History of Economic Thought?”, History of Economics Review, p. 25) BF
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an approach to economics that is systemic (understands the social as distinct from aggregation over individuals), is socially and historically specific (as opposed to universal and timeless, thus dealing with the nature of capital and of capitalism), and addresses issues of class, conflict, power, tendencies, structures, and so on. In part, this depends upon reclaiming the knowledge lost by social theory in its postmodernist turn and that lost by the discipline of economics through lack of interest in, and tolerance of, its own history and traditions. It also depends upon theoretical advance by taking account of the economic realities of contemporary capitalism, woefully overlooked in the rush to test ever more esoteric theories against empirical evidence. economics imperialism , already apparent in case of globalization and social capital, ultimately relying upon methodological individualism albeit with a protective belt of eclecticism and empiricism.
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US’s individualistically economic exploitation of other countries is a form of dangerous e economic imperialism
| 1,658 | 111 | 966 | 253 | 15 | 142 | 0.059289 | 0.561265 |
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Kansas (JDI)
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2013
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5,217 |
The Contras war closed one chapter in US imperialism in Latin America, while the installation of client collaborator regimes opened another-a chapter characterized not by armed force, the projection of military power, but rather by what we might term "economic imperialism"-engineering of free marker "structural reforms" in national policy, the penetration of foreign capital in the form of the multinationals, and a free trade regime. The agents of this imperialism included the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the host of neoconservative foreign policy advisors, neoliberal economists, and policy makers who serve the "global ruling class" as described by Pilger (2003). The new imperial order was made possible not only by a political turn toward neoconservatism but by a new reserve of ideological power: the idea of globalization, presented as the only road to "general prosperity," the necessary condition for reactivating a growth and capital accumulation process. The idea of globalization, used to justify the neoliberal "structural adjustment program" (SAP), complemented the call for a new world order. The World Bank's 1995 World Development Report, Workers in an Integrating World, can be seen as one of its most important programmatic statements-a capitalist manifesto on the need to adjust to the requirements of a new world order in which the forces of freedom (big business) would be liberated from the regulatory constraints of the welfare-development state and hold sway over the global economy. Regarding the need for political adjustments to the "new world order," the United States with its client electoral regimes firmly ensconced in power in most of Latin America declared its mission to spread democracy and free markets to make the world safe for freedom, and to support movement in diverse regions toward pro-US electoral regimes. The stabilization measures and "structural reforms" implemented in the 1990s were unpopular to say the least, with the core opposition coming from pockets of organized labor. A few governments put up some resistance but eventually succumbed, as in Jamaica and Mexico, which were reluctant to sign up for the structural reform agenda. In most cases structural adjustment programs were introduced by presidential decree or administrative fiat.
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Petras 11 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, “Social movements in Latin America: neoliberalism and popular resistance”, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 18-19)
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The Contras war closed one chapter in US imperialism in Latin America, while the installation of client collaborator regimes opened another-a chapter characterized not by armed force, the projection of military power, but rather by what we might term "economic imperialism"-engineering of free marker "structural reforms" in national policy, the penetration of foreign capital in the form of the multinationals, and a free trade regime. The new imperial order was made possible not only by a political turn toward neoconservatism but by a new reserve of ideological power: the idea of globalization, presented as the only road to "general prosperity," the necessary condition for reactivating a growth and capital accumulation process. The idea of globalization, used to justify the neoliberal "structural adjustment program" (SAP), complemented the call for a new world order. the forces of freedom (big business) would be liberated from the regulatory constraints of the welfare-development state and hold sway over the global economy. Regarding the need for political adjustments to the "new world order," the United States with its client electoral regimes firmly ensconced in power in most of Latin America declared its mission to spread democracy and free markets to make the world safe for freedom, and to support movement in diverse regions toward pro-US electoral regimes. The stabilization measures and "structural reforms" implemented in the 1990s were unpopular to say the least, with the core opposition coming from pockets of organized labor. A few governments put up some resistance but eventually succumbed, as in Jamaica and Mexico
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US economic intervention into Latin America only strengthens the imperialist grasp of the global ruling class
| 2,341 | 109 | 1,648 | 360 | 16 | 252 | 0.044444 | 0.7 |
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The Second World War ended with the United States as a dominant world economic power, commanding 40 percent of the world's industrial capacity and more than half of the financial resources. However, conditions were not favorable for the unilateral exercise of its dominant military power. For one thing, the Soviet Union had emerged from the war with a loss of over twenty million citizens but with its industrial production apparatus rebuilt and the potential of constituting a major economic power and as such a major threat to the imperial interests of the United States, forcing the government to opt for the creation of a multilateral system of military alliances modeled on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and regional economic treaties designed to facilitate US projections of power in Europe and the Third World. But Latin America was a different matter. It was historically within the US sphere of economic and political domination, and the state set about to ensure the compliance of governments in the hemisphere to US hegemony. First there was the overthrow of democratic socialist Cheddi lagan in Guyana (1953) and the successful intervention in Guatemala (1954) to topple democratically elected President Arbenz. But then came Cuba (1959) with a successful socialist revolution that abrogated the rules of empire, challenging US hegemony and directly threatening US imperial interests in the country and elsewhere, forcing the US government to open up another front in the war against social revolution and the lure of "communism." The first front was established in 1948 in the form of International Cooperation for Development, a system of bilateral and multilateral support for the economic advancement of the "economically backward" countries emerging from the yoke of European colonialism pursuing national more than 100 billion dollars in profit over a decade of neoliberal policies.
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Petras 11 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, “Social movements in Latin America: neoliberalism and popular resistance”, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 18-19)
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The Second World War ended with the United States as a dominant world economic power, commanding 40 percent of the world's industrial capacity and more than half of the financial resources. However, conditions were not favorable for the unilateral exercise of its dominant military power. But Latin America was a different matter. It was historically within the US sphere of economic and political domination, and the state set about to ensure the compliance of governments in the hemisphere to US hegemony. First there was the overthrow of democratic socialist Cheddi lagan in Guyana (1953) and the successful intervention in Guatemala (1954) to topple democratically elected President Arbenz. But then came Cuba (1959) with a successful socialist revolution that abrogated the rules of empire, challenging US hegemony and directly threatening US imperial interests in the country and elsewhere, forcing the US government to open up another front in the war against social revolution and the lure of "communism." The first front was established in 1948 in the form of International Cooperation for Development, a system of bilateral and multilateral support for the economic advancement of the "economically backward" countries emerging from the yoke of European colonialism pursuing national more than 100 billion dollars in profit over a decade of neoliberal policies.
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The U.S. has empirically treated Latin America as “economically backward” in hopes to bring these countries under the umbrella of neoliberalism and colonialism
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US imperialism has shaped the major conditions for capitalist development or underdevelopment in Latin America, through direct military intervention and through proxies. Between and against these imperial intrusions, popular movements based on labor, peasants, and unionized public employees have succeeded in electing leftist and center-left governments, and in the case of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada carrying out social revolutions. The outcomes of these epic struggles had enormous socioeconomic and political consequences in terms of the economic models that subsequently emerged. The great alterations in income and class inequalities, concentrations to wealth and property, popular participation and representation, individual freedoms and social rights have been profoundly affected by the strength and ascendancy of these two determinant forces in Latin America's equation of power.
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Petras 11 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, “Social movements in Latin America: neoliberalism and popular resistance”, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 18-19) JFP
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US imperialism has shaped the major conditions for underdevelopment in Latin America, through direct military intervention and through proxies. Between and against these imperial intrusions, popular movements based on labor, peasants, and unionized public employees have succeeded in electing leftist and center-left governments, and in the case of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada carrying out social revolutions.
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Imperialism in the past has helped the underdevelopment of Latin America
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Every once in a while in foreign policy, as well as in other policy and scholarly issues, it becomes necessary to go back to first principles, to reexamine assumptions that have long been taken for granted. It is now time to do that with regard to the assumptions underlying the so-called Washington consensus on U.S, policy toward Latin America, which holds that the United States should promote democracy, open markets, and free trade in the region. We also need to discuss U.S. counternarcotic policy in the area, the issue is complicated by the fact that few of us disagree with these policy goals per se. To be opposed to democracy, open markets, free trade, and counternarcotic efforts would be akin to being against God, motherhood, and apple pie-assuming we still believe in these latter items, The issues are thus mainly of shadings, nuance, meanings, as well as the ever present traps posed by the ingrained Wilsonian missionary, patronizing urge to bring the blessings of American civilization to "less fortunate" peoples, The issue relates also to the deeper difficulty the United States has in understanding and empathizing with other countries: the ethnocentrism issue.
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Wiarda 05 (Howard, Professor of International Relations at the University of Georgia, “Dilemmas of democracy in Latin America : crises and opportunity”, Rowman & Littlefield, p. 155) HJW
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Every once in a while in foreign policy, as well as in other policy and scholarly issues, it becomes necessary to go back to first principles, to reexamine assumptions that have long been taken for granted. It is now time to do that with regard to the assumptions underlying the so-called Washington consensus on U.S, policy toward Latin America, which holds that the United States should promote democracy, open markets, and free trade in the region. the issue is complicated by the fact that few of us disagree with these policy goals per se. To be opposed to democracy, open markets, free trade would be akin to being against God, motherhood, and apple pie The issues are thus mainly of the ever present traps posed by the ingrained Wilsonian missionary, patronizing urge to bring the blessings of American civilization to "less fortunate" peoples, The issue relates also to the deeper difficulty the United States has in understanding and empathizing with other countries: the ethnocentrism issue.
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We forced our free-market system on Latin America in the past, we don’t need to make the same mistake twice
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The Washington consensus was based on quite a number of very large assumptions about the economies, societies, and political systems of Latin America and the Third World that in the end proved not to be true-Or perhaps only partly true. Here we examine what those assumptions were and why in the developing world they did not work out as expected. First, there was a belief that freeing up these economies would give rise to a dynamic entrepreneurial class that could substitute for the state's role in the economy, seize the initiative, and stimulate economic growth. But dynamic entrepreneurial groups don't emerge out of thin air; they take a long time to develop and their emergence is related to other changing elements in society-for example, growth of the rule of law, honesty, and transparency in the administration of the public accounts, protected property rights, and so forth. In most developing countries, there is no dynamic entrepreneurial class or it is very small. What passes for entrepreneurs is usually the friends, relatives, and cronies of the regime in power; they often have special access to government contracts and monopolies. They are parasites whose goal is to rip off the system to line their own pockets, not to provide jobs and growth to the economy as a whole. The worst case is Russia, where some 90 percent of the former public patrimony-under socialism owned by the state-has been diverted in this way, with little or no benefit to the public at large. We may wish that a dynamic private sector would emerge to replace the state in the developing nations, but the fact is what passes for a private sector is usually in it mainly, even exclusively, for themselves and not to benefit society as a whole. A second assumption was that, as these economies were freed up, a host of financial institutions would emerge that would assist in the development process. But banks, lending agencies, financial service agencies, capital markets, stock exchanges, and the like in developing countries also tend to be weak and cannot be created quickly. Generations are required for these institutions to grow, not a few years. In addition, the few banks and financial institutions that exist in most developing countries tend not to be in business to give loans to small businessmen and dynamic start-up companies; rather, they are holding companies, often tied closely with the regimes or elites in power, that profit from insider connections and monopolistic government contracts. They are concerned not with changing the system but with protecting their stake in It. Third, the Washington consensus posited that the freeing up of the economies in the developing world would produce growth, Jobs, and benefits that would trickle down to the lower and middle classes. But this assumption ignored the class structure and class attitudes in Latin America and most developing countries. These tend to be very rigid, elitist, hierarchical, and inegalitarian. In fact, what has happened in too many cases under the new neoliberal economic order is that the elites, who already had the money and the political connections described above, have become enormously richer the small middle classes in the developing nations have been squeezed by salary freezes or job losses in the face of inflation; and the throbbing lower classes have received few benefits at all and have often become worse off.
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Wiarda 05 (Howard, Professor of International Relations at the University of Georgia, “Dilemmas of democracy in Latin America: crises and opportunity”, Rowman & Littlefield, p. 155) HJW
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The Washington consensus was based on quite a number of very large assumptions about the economies, societies, and political systems of Latin America and the Third World that in the end proved not to be true-Or perhaps only partly true. Here we examine what those assumptions were and why in the developing world they did not work out as expected. First, there was a belief that freeing up these economies would give rise to a dynamic entrepreneurial class that could substitute for the state's role in the economy, seize the initiative, and stimulate economic growth. But dynamic entrepreneurial groups don't emerge out of thin air; they take a long time to develop and their emergence is related to other changing elements in society What passes for entrepreneurs is usually the friends, relatives, and cronies of the regime in power; they often have special access to government contracts and monopolies. A second assumption was that, as these economies were freed up, a host of financial institutions would emerge that would assist in the development process. But banks, lending agencies, financial service agencies, capital markets, stock exchanges, and the like in developing countries also tend to be weak and cannot be created quickly. Generations are required for these institutions to grow, not a few years. Third, the Washington consensus posited that the freeing up of the economies in the developing world would produce growth, Jobs, and benefits that would trickle down to the lower and middle classes. But this assumption ignored the class structure and class attitudes in Latin America and most developing countries. These tend to be very rigid, elitist, hierarchical, and inegalitarian. In fact, what has happened in too many cases under the new neoliberal economic order is that the elites, who already had the money and the political connections described above, have become enormously richer the small middle classes in the developing nations have been squeezed by salary freezes or job losses in the face of inflation; and the throbbing lower classes have received few benefits at all and have often become worse off.
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When the US tries to exploit Latin American countries, success is limited and imperialism and collapse are the result
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While Cuba was forced out of globalization, many countries in the South that were "invited in" have¶ fared poorly, and the poor of those countries have fared miserably. Case by case, country by country,¶ the story of globalization from the point of view of the destitute has seen intentional de-investment in¶ public services in order to repay foreign debts. Restructuring economies and restructuring lives so the¶ South exports soybeans, flowers, and peanuts but imports milk, medicine, tourists, and TV shows at¶ extortionist prices. Although the United States is the world's most indebted country no one seems¶ rushed to demand payments from Washington. Yet, at the turn of the millennium the Global South¶ was repaying its foreign debt at the rate of US $250,000 per minute (Galeano 2000). In India the¶ economy sees children stitch soccer balls rather than go to school. In Ecuador, Honduras, and¶ Nicaragua the export-oriented economy sees many of tomorrow's scholars go as far as grade six¶ before setting out on a long-life of banana picking, because from the point of view of financial¶ directors bananas are more important than public schools. In places like Haiti medical clinics are few¶ and trained doctors fewer, loan repayments limit the imagination of financial directors to seldom¶ invest in clinics and rarely train doctors. Within this economic climate, the 800 million souls suffering¶ from chronic hunger are doomed to the fate of the empty plate until the free market decides to lower¶ food prices.
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Huish ‘08 [ Robert, Assistant Professor, International Development Studies, Dalhousie University, “Cuba vs. Globalization: Chronicle of Anti-imperialism, solidarity and Co-operation”, Centre for Research Ethics, University of Montreal, Online, 7/6/13 http://globalautonomy.ca/global1/dialogueItem.jsp?index=SN08_Huish.xml ]
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While Cuba was forced out of globalization, many countries in the South that were "invited in" have¶ fared poorly, and the poor of those countries have fared miserably the story of globalization from the point of view of the destitute has seen intentional de-investment in¶ public services in order to repay foreign debts. Restructuring economies and restructuring lives so the¶ South exports soybeans, flowers, and peanuts but imports milk, medicine, tourists, and TV shows at¶ extortionist prices In Ecuador, Honduras, and¶ Nicaragua the export-oriented economy sees many of tomorrow's scholars go as far as grade six¶ before setting out on a long-life of banana picking, because from the point of view of financial¶ directors bananas are more important than public schools. In places like Haiti medical clinics are few¶ and trained doctors fewer, loan repayments limit the imagination of financial directors to seldom¶ invest in clinics and rarely train doctors.
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Cuban embargo shields from globalization, prevents exploitation
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“Democracy" is the globalizational credo of the new Western imperialism. It resounds with the incessant chant of freedom. It talks of liberating the world. This is its totalitarian thrust. It is about global control. This means reducing the entire world into a Western capitalist monopoly and the destruction of other and more humanizing forms of the organization of political and economic livelihood. But this seems lost to those who are caught the clamor for democracy. We have a situation where capitalist White supremacist Western liberal democracies are invading and destroyirlg people and countries to increase their exploitative control while the chant for democracy goes on in other places. This is an ideologized chant. It is where "democracy" is erroneously seen as a panacea for the resolution of the forms and practices of oppressive rule everywhere. The spread of "democracy" is the restructuring of target societies, the re-organization of political and economic formation in the world to accommodate the interests of the White supremacist West, united under capital. Democracy is used as the medium for the brutal globalization of capitalism, and its insertion is enforced by the most undemocratic of measures - authoritarian, command-obedience violent totalitarian military control. The use of the concept "democracy" both romanticizes and violates its Greek originary, demos which idealizes the notion of people's rule - which has never happened in the history of Greek imperial state culture. We should note that in its political inception in Greece women were not included in the state· craft of "Democracy." Democracy was the purview of the male order of state power. It was the phallocentric elitist politics of the state rule of people through select male representatives who constituted the echelon of political power. Far from being people's rule, it was rather the ruling of people by giving them the illusion that they had a significant say in the rule of the state over them. And its contemporary Western deployment is. about the regulation of the lives of peoples to ensure their exploitation. But there is a great deal of dissembling going on. Eurocentric master race culture has attempted to sanitize itself of the odiousness of racism and the smear of racial mastery in its development of the discourse of "democracy" which it thinks is the best way to organize the politics of representationality in state power for the good of all peoples everywhere on earth. This is presented as being sensible, practical, and "civilized," in fact as the only way to organize political life. This is the reification of imperialism. It is where the ordinary Western citizen resolutely believes this and sees it as commonsense and does not understand what all the fuss is about. We have here the leveling absorption of the imperial patriot-subject who is now passionately committed and ready to defend and spread Western political control in the enforcement of "democracy" every where. And if you go along with it, you are likely to conclude that there is no racism here and that it is simply the best culture on earth, doing the right thing. Armored to the point of having the capacity to kill everyone in the world several times over, the West has wrapped itself in discourses of democratizing imperializing "peace"- while it manufactures and exports arms and other weapons of mass destruction, much of which it has used against many of the racialized peoples of the world. It organizes, supports and wages war to construct the peace required to facilitate its repressive order. It talks of freedom when it has been the historical destroyer of the freedoms of the millions it has used, abused, deprived of their independence, tortured, worked to death, robbed and killed to acquire wealth. It upholds liberty and fraternity - but only among its own kind - and even here this civic ideal is differentially implemented. Liberty and fraternity are not meant for the inferiorized Other. It is for the privileged in the order of White solidarity. And this order of things is disturbed when its designated inferior tries to change the terms and parameters of the discourse of the West's claim superiority.
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Itwaru 09 ( Arnold, psychotherapist, educator, and editorial consultant on the project named Researching Caribbean Teaching and Learning at the University of the West Indies, Jamaica “Master Race, Murder and Gory Globalization” in The White Supremacist State: Eurocentrism, Imperialism, Colonialism, Racism Arnold H. Itwaru, ed. 2009 p. 25-79 deven)
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“Democracy" is the globalizational credo of the new Western imperialism It talks of liberating the world. This is totalitarian This means reducing the entire world into a Western capitalist monopoly and the destruction of more humanizing forms of the organization We have a situation where capitalist White supremacist Western liberal democracies are invading and destroyirlg people and countries to increase their exploitative control while the chant for democracy goes on in other places The spread of "democracy" is the restructuring of target societies to accommodate the interests of the White supremacist West Democracy is used as the medium for brutal globalization and its insertion is enforced by authoritarian violent totalitarian military control Democracy was the purview of the male order of state power Far from being people's rule, it was rather the ruling of people by giving them the illusion that they had a significant say in the rule of the state over them And its contemporary Western deployment is. about the regulation of the lives of peoples to ensure their exploitation Eurocentric master race culture has attempted to sanitize itself of the odiousness of racism in its development of the discourse of "democracy" which it thinks is the best way to organize politics This is presented as being sensible, practical, and "civilized This is the reification of imperialism. It is where the ordinary Western citizen resolutely believes this and sees it as commonsense and does not understand what all the fuss is about Armored to the point of having the capacity to kill everyone in the world several times over, the West has wrapped itself in discourses of democratizing imperializing "peace"- while it manufactures and exports arms and other weapons of mass destruction . It organizes, supports and wages war to construct the peace required to facilitate its repressive order. It talks of freedom when it has been the historical destroyer of the freedoms Liberty and fraternity are not meant for the inferiorized Other. It is for the privileged in the order of White solidarity. And this order of things is disturbed when its designated inferior tries to change the terms and parameters of the discourse
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Democracy perpetuates imperialism—creates cycles of endless violence and oppression
| 4,217 | 83 | 2,225 | 685 | 9 | 357 | 0.013139 | 0.521168 |
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However, donor support during this period faced a number of criticisms. Firstly, critics argued that donors tended to reduce the concept of civil society to a depoliticised technical tool (Jenkins, 2001; Robinson and Friedman, 2005). Secondly, during this first phase of support donors relied on a rather limited definition of civil society, equating it with Western-style advocacy groups or NGOs and leading them to concentrate their assistance on a narrow set of organisations. In particular, organisations that form an important part of civil society in most advanced democracies, such as sports clubs, cultural associations and religious associations, have been absent from most programmes (Carothers and Ottaway, 2000). Thirdly, in many instances, the views of NGOs that have emerged as a response to democracy promotion programmes reflect donors’ views of democracy, both in their immediate goals and in the means they use to pursue them. Fourthly, many of the NGOs favoured by democracy assistance programmes have a small membership and therefore lack a mandate from a wider constituency, putting both their sustainability and representativeness in doubt. Finally, there is evidence that donor assistance can actually militate against grassroots participation because the NGOs it helps to bring about are perceived as depoliticised, too closely aligned with donor service delivery agendas, too dependent on external funding, and out of touch with the grassroots (Howell and Pearce, 2001). Taken together, these factors meant that donors often focused on particular types of social organisation (urban-based and poorly rooted in society, top-down rather than grassroots, trustee rather than representative organisations and heavily reliant on external funding for their continued existence) and, as a result, bypassed other significant agents of social and political change.
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Rachner et al. 2007 (Lise – Chr. Michelson Inst., http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2761=democratisations-third-wave-and-the-challenges-of)
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donors relied on a limited definition of civil society, equating it with Western-style advocacy groups or NGOs leading them to concentrate assistance on narrow organisations organisations that form an important part of civil society such as sports cultural and religious associations, have been absent the views of NGOs reflect donors’ views many of the NGOs favoured have a small membership and lack a mandate putting their sustainability and representativeness in doubt donors focused on particular types of social organisation urban top-down rather than grassroots, trustee rather than representative organisations and heavily reliant on external funding for their continued existence) and bypassed significant agents of social and political change.
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The process of US democratization focuses on top down civil society groups and away from grassroots organizations, furthering imperialist control
| 1,882 | 145 | 754 | 277 | 20 | 108 | 0.072202 | 0.389892 |
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But how do these varied points relate to the question of imperial democracy? In the context of global politics the attempt to export and promote one vision of democracy as a unifying project across frontiers clashes with the logic of differences, but in a way that is deeply rooted in nationalist discourses. In the formulations developed by Laclau, Lefort and Mouffe there is an assumption that one is dealing with a territorially intact polity, that the conceptual terrain can be developed in accordance with a guiding assumption of territorial sovereignty. However, in the context of imperial powers one needs to remember that the autonomy of other democratic experiments has been terminated by interventions organised by Washington (eg Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973, Nicaragua during the 1980s—see Slater, 2002). In this sense the internal tension between the logic of unity and the logic of difference has been overshadowed by an imperial logic of incursion, followed by the imposition of a different set of political rules. In the example of the USA it can be suggested that there is a logic of democracy for export and a logic of terminating intervention for other democratic processes that have offered a different political pathway. Furthermore, interventions which have led to the overthrow of dictatorial regimes, as in Iraq in 2003, ought not to lead us into forgetting the realities of Western support for military dictatorships in the global South throughout the 20th century.12 Nor, as Callinicos (2003: 24) reminds us, should we turn a blind eye to the fact that there are contemporary examples of support for non-democratic regimes, as shown in the case of the Bush administration’s backing for the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan, despite its numerous violations of human rights, and for Musharraf’s regime in Pakistan, which receives US support yet is scarcely to be considered a fully fledged democracy. The imperative to ‘democratise’, just as the injunction to ‘globalise’, creates, as Dallmayr (2005) suggests, an asymmetry between those announcing the imperative and those subjected to it, between those who ‘democratise’ and those who are ‘democratised’. Such an asymmetry has a long history. Jeffersonian notions of both an ‘empire of liberty’ and an ‘empire for liberty’ represented an initial framing of the conflicting juxtaposition of emerging American imperial power—expressed for instance in the phrase that the USA has a ‘hemisphere to itself’—with a benevolent belief in America’s mission to spread democracy and liberty to the rest of the world. This juxtaposition, which is also closely tied to the founding importance of the self-determination of peoples, is characterised by an inherent tension between strong anti-colonial sentiment and the projection of power over peoples of the Third World. Discourses of democracy are deployed in ways that are intended to transcend such dissonances and to justify the imperial relation, even though such a relation is frequently denied (for a critical review, see Cox, 2005). What is also significant in this context is the idea that democracy US-style is being called for, being invited by peoples yearning for freedom, so that more generally imperial power is being invited to spread its wings (see Maier, 2005). Rather than democracy being imposed, it is suggested that the USA is responding to calls from other societies to be democratised, so that through a kind of cellular multiplication a US model can be gradually introduced; the owners will be the peoples of other cultures who will find ways of adapting the US template to their own circumstances. As it is expressed in the National Security Strategy for 2006, ‘it is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture’ (White House, 2006: 1). What is on offer here is a kind of ‘viral democracy’, whereby the politics of guidance is merged into a politics of benign adaptation.13 Nevertheless, at the same time, a specific form of democratic rule is being projected and alternative models that include a critique of US power and attempts to introduce connections with popular sovereignty and new forms of socialism are singled out for opprobrium. This is reflected in the commentary on Hugo Chavez—‘in Venezuela, a demagogue awash in oil money is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region’ (White House, 2006: 15). This is despite the fact that the Venezuelan leader has won more elections in the past seven years than any other Latin American leader.
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Slater, Dept of Geography – Loughborough University, 2006(David, “Imperial powers and democratic imaginations,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 27, No. 8)
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the attempt to export and promote democracy across frontiers clashes with the logic of differences in a way deeply rooted in nationalist discourses. the internal tension between the logic of unity and the logic of difference has been overshadowed by an imperial logic of incursion followed by the imposition of political rules. The imperative to ‘democratise’ creates an asymmetry between those announcing the imperative and those subjected to it, between those who ‘democratise’ and those who are ‘democratised’. Jeffersonian notions of an ‘empire of liberty’ and ‘empire for liberty’ represented an initial framing of American imperial power with a benevolent belief in America’s mission to spread democracy This is characterised by tension between strong anti-colonial sentiment and the projection of power over peoples of the Third World. Discourses of democracy are deployed in ways that are intended to transcend dissonances and justify the imperial relation imperial power is being invited to spread its wings Rather than democracy being imposed the USA is responding to calls to be democratised, so that through cellular multiplication a US model can be introduced; the owners will find ways of adapting the template to their own circumstances. it is expressed in the N S S it is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements What is on offer here is a kind of ‘viral democracy’, whereby guidance is merged into benign adaptation. a specific form of democratic rule is being projected and alternative models and attempts to introduce connections with sovereignty and forms of socialism are singled out This is reflected in the commentary on Hugo Chavez—‘in Venezuela, a demagogue awash in oil money is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region’ despite the fact that the Venezuelan leader has won elections
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Democratization creates a violent, disingenuous imperial relation to the countries it claims to help
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The murderous mode of reasoning is situated in and informs the glorification of mass murder institutionalized in the West as "war." It has been instrumental in history of the White supremacist European colonizational practice of murdering people whose land they were occupying and exploiting wherever they imposed themselves in the world. The gruesome pyres of hundreds of millions of racialized bodies upon which the empyres of Western supremacy proudly and imperiously stand, grimly attest to this. The current "War on Terrorism" which has so far killed and maimed more than a million people in Iraq and Afghanistan alone in this century of Western aggression, is the blatant demonstration of the murderous means through which the White supremacist American-led West is expanding its conquest project of global domination. This is the fundamental objective of globalization, despite the nice ties in which it continues to be dressed and promoted. These self-professed Christian states have joined forces in what amounts to their unstated but nevertheless holy war against an imputed terrorism which so far has been aimed at Islamic peoples and cultures for the strategic implementation of additional Western control and economic gain. New technologies and techniques of terror, torture and killing have been implemented in the murderous mode of scientific reasoning and used to continue the same heinous historical killing of racialized peoples. This has been a central feature in the history of Western imperial culture. It has procured the blood money upon which much of its pompous wealth is based, and has informed much of the social and political psyche in these racist orders. There is strong support for these atrocities from the majority of patriotic Western citizens who ironically believe they are bright, informed, free and peace-loving good people. These constitute the moral cultural force which legitimates the force of their armies of death in the military industrial complex of ever expanding Western capitalist exploitation. Proud of their toughness which they uphold as a cruel virtue, they are unmoved by the slaughter of defenseless men, women, children, the elderly and the ill in the current invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, or anywhere else for that matter in the racialized world outside of the White supremacist West. In the murderous mode of reasoning these racialized Others are not considered human. They are reduced into the dangerous threatening Enemy-Other who must be killed. The murder of the caricatured terrorist is believed to ensure the safety of all Western citizens. Hence it has become a matter of patriotic duty for such citizens to believe they are defending their country when they support the preemptive attacks of the invading American led White West who have been directing their assaults against the peoples and cultures thousands of miles and continents away from the domesticities of the imperial Western fortress homeland. The culture informed by this mode of reasoning is where the murderous patriot-subject is produced and highly exalted. In the supra-militarized, settler-occupier, armed, aggressive and dangerous, United States of America and its fawning settler-occupier northern neighbor and reliable ally, the Dominion of Canada, waning troops are tearfully loved and admired by sections of the patriotic populace as they are deployed to attack the racialized evil Enemy-Other. This emotional display is in effect the militarization of affection and patriotism in the culture of murderous aggression. These troops are the state trained military killers who are patriotically loved as "our troops" as they go out in "harm's way" - to do what they are trained to do - to kill, to maim, to destroy people. These are not the "nice guys" and "nice gals" we are repeatedly told they are. "Nice guys" and "nice gals" do not undergo military training to go out and kill people. And we should seriously rethink the repeated claims being made that when these "nice guys" and "nice gals" slaughter innocent and helpless people in distant regions across the world that they are ensuring safety "at home," given that there is no verifiably credible danger "at home" in the first place. The murderous mode of reasoning celebrates military killers and deifies them as heroes. This mode of reasoning has historically framed the imposition of the racial mastery of euro-supremacism in its colonial conquests which for hundreds of years have debased, enslaved, exploited and murdered, willfully and knowingly killed large numbers of people, to assert its domineering control.
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Itwaru 09 ( Arnold, psychotherapist, educator, and editorial consultant on the project named Researching Caribbean Teaching and Learning at the University of the West Indies, Jamaica “Master Race, Murder and Gory Globalization” in The White Supremacist State: Eurocentrism, Imperialism, Colonialism, Racism Arnold H. Itwaru, ed. 2009 p. 25-79 deven)
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The murderous mode of reasoning is situated in and informs the glorification of mass murder institutionalized in the West as "war." It has been instrumental in history of the White supremacist European colonizational practice of murdering people whose land they were occupying and exploiting wherever they imposed themselves in the world. . The current "War on Terrorism" is the blatant demonstration of the murderous means through which American-led West is expanding its conquest project of global domination. This is the fundamental objective of globalization, despite the nice ties in which it continues to be dressed and promoted. These self-professed Christian states have joined forces in what amounts to their unstated but nevertheless holy war against an imputed terrorism . New technologies and techniques of terror, torture and killing have been implemented in the murderous mode of scientific reasoning and used to continue the same heinous historical killing of racialized peoples. This has been a central feature in the history of Western imperial culture. It has procured the blood money upon which much of its pompous wealth is based, and has informed much of the social and political psyche in these racist orders. There is strong support for these atrocities from the majority of patriotic Western citizens constitute the moral cultural force which legitimates the force of their armies of death in the military industrial complex of ever expanding Western capitalist exploitation. Proud of their toughness which they uphold as a cruel virtue, they are unmoved by the slaughter of defenseless men, women, children, the elderly and the ill in the current invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, or anywhere else for that matter in the racialized world outside of the White supremacist West. In the murderous mode of reasoning these racialized Others are not considered human. They are reduced into the dangerous threatening Enemy-Other who must be killed. The murder of the caricatured terrorist is believed to ensure the safety of all Western citizens. Hence it has become a matter of patriotic duty for such citizens to believe they are defending their country when they support the preemptive attacks of the invading American led White West who have been directing their assaults against the peoples and cultures thousands of miles and continents away from the domesticities of the imperial Western fortress homeland. The culture informed by this mode of reasoning is where the murderous patriot-subject is produced and highly exalted. This mode of reasoning has historically framed the imposition of the racial mastery of euro-supremacism in its colonial conquests which for hundreds of years have debased, enslaved, exploited and murdered, willfully and knowingly killed large numbers of people, to assert its domineering control
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The War on Terror is a guise for imperial euro-supremacism—ensures continual violence
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Considered from a historical perspective, globalization is the present stage of economic imperialism. In accordance with the definition formulated by Hilferding and Lenin at the beginning of the twentieth century, imperialism is a set of basic characteristics: the development of monopoly capital, the emergence of finance capital through the fusion of industrial capital and the banks, the export of investments from the center to the periphery, and interimperialist competition for the control of foreign markets. In the present circumstances, these features are exacerbated. Recent technological innovations with regard to the flow of information and immense international liquidity have favored the increased growth of finance capital and huge transnational monopoly corporations. The magnitude and rate of international investment flows have also multiplied, and the implosion of the Soviet bloc has opened new spaces for investment in underdeveloped areas. Capitalist control of the world is greater today than it has ever been, leading to the intensification of the stratification of international power in which the United¶ States appears to have unquestionable hegemony.
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Vilas 2002 (Vilas, Professor of Sociology and Political science, UNAM, “Globalization as Imperialism”, University of Toronto, 70-71)
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, globalization is the present stage of economic imperialism development of monopoly capital, the emergence of finance capital through the fusion of industrial capital and the banks, the export of investments from the center to the periphery, and interimperialist competition for the control of foreign markets. technological innovations with regard to the flow of information and immense international liquidity have favored the increased growth of finance capital and huge transnational monopoly corporations. been, leading to the intensification of the stratification of international power in which the United¶ States appears to have unquestionable hegemony.
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Globalization is a form of imperialism
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Fulbright educational and cultural exchanges, and pointed toward the development of new activities. (We use the term “state-private network” to refer to the extensive, unprecedented collaboration between “official” U.S. agencies and “private” groups and individuals in the development and implementation of political, economic, and cultural programs in support of U.S. foreign policy from the early cold war period to today.)13 Legislative backing was obtained in 1948 with the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, popularly known as the Smith-Mundt Act, for “the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the U.S., its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad . . . to provide a better understanding of the U.S. in other countries and to increase mutual understanding.”14 With these mandates, public diplomacy could carry forth the rhetorical command of the Truman Doctrine “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” In an expansion supporting, but also constructed as distinct from, the extension of U.S. political and economic influence, U.S. projects by early 1951 covered ninety-three countries, broadcasting in forty-five languages and disseminating millions of booklets, leaflets, magazines, and posters. Touring exhibitions, already established by the late 1940s, received more coherent if often contested support and were common throughout the 1950s.15 In 1953 the organization of public diplomacy moved beyond the State Department with the formation of the autonomous United States Information Agency (USIA) “to tell America’s story to the world.”16 The modern history of U.S. public diplomacy is often focused on the USIA, telling the story of its contributions to the winning of the cold war and of its “decline” as the agency was downsized in the 1990s. This story tends to separate public diplomacy from the system of political warfare that emerged in the late 1940s, limiting understanding of the intersections between overt and covert practices. The overt measures of sponsored media production and cultural exhibitions, though central to the formation of cold war public diplomacy, need, however, to be understood as part of a broader restructuring of the national security state and of a strategic framework designed to promote an “America” that would win a total campaign for “hearts and minds.” The authority granted to the State Department by NSC 4, forged in the immediacy of a crisis in which the NSC feared communists might legitimately take power in France and Italy through elections, was complementary and potentially secondary to another mandate, NSC 4-A, which directed the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “to initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities.”17 With the threat of French and Italian communism always at the forefront in the wider American objective of securing Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, NSC 4-A, like its more mundane counterpart, was the cornerstone of a regional and indeed global strategy. A special clause in the Marshall Plan, when it was passed in April 1948, set aside 5 percent of “counterpart funds” for undefined operations under NSC 4-A. This translated into hundreds of millions of dollars for propaganda and covert action.18 Thus public diplomacy, beyond providing the informational overlay for “containment,” was already part of a broader operational conception for a more ambitious objective. In May 1948, George Kennan, the head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, drafted a proposal for “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare” against the Soviet Union. The national security state would support “liberation committees” and “underground activities behind the Iron Curtain” as well as “indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the Free World.”19 Victory over the Soviets, achieved with the “liberation” of captive peoples, which went beyond “containment,” would come not only through the reality of American economic and diplomatic superiority but also through the projection of that superiority as inherent to the American system and way of life. The sanction of NSC 4-A and the testing grounds of France and Italy were only the first stages of this campaign. The NSC endorsed Kennan’s plan in November 1948, and within months the Policy Planning Staff, CIA, and Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a new agency created to carry out covert operations, converted the proposal for “a public American organization which will sponsor selected political refugee committees” into the National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE). The NCFE’s guidelines came from the State Department and 75 percent of its funding from the CIA; its chief executive officers were psychological warfare veterans from the army and the CIA’s forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Its best-known operation, Radio Free Europe, was on air in 1951, but even before that, the NCFE was already promoting the idea of liberation from communism through pamphlets, magazines, books, and a Free European University in Strasbourg, France.20
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Kennedy and Lucas in 5 (Liam, Prof at Univ of Birmingham, Scott, Prof at Univ of Birmingham, American Quarterly, “Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy”, 57(2)) MAT
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We use the term “state-private network” to refer to the extensive, unprecedented collaboration between “official” U.S. agencies and “private” groups and individuals in the development and implementation of political, economic, and cultural programs in support of U.S. foreign policy from the early cold war period to today. public diplomacy could carry forth the rhetorical command of the Truman Doctrine “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” In an expansion supporting, but also constructed as distinct from, the extension of U.S. political and economic influence, U.S. projects by early 1951 covered ninety-three countries, broadcasting in forty-five languages and disseminating millions of booklets, leaflets, magazines, and posters. In 1953 the organization of public diplomacy moved beyond the State Department with the formation of the autonomous United States Information Agency to tell America’s story to the world. The modern history of U.S. public diplomacy is often focused on the USIA, telling the story of its contributions to the winning of the cold war and of its “decline” as the agency was downsized in the 1990s. This story tends to separate public diplomacy from the system of political warfare that emerged in the late 1940s, limiting understanding of the intersections between overt and covert practices. The overt measures of sponsored media production and cultural exhibitions, though central to the formation of cold war public diplomacy, need, however, to be understood as part of a broader restructuring of the national security state and of a strategic framework designed to promote an “America” that would win a total campaign for “hearts and minds.” Thus public diplomacy, beyond providing the informational overlay for “containment,” was already part of a broader operational conception for a more ambitious objective. The national security state would support “liberation committees” and “underground activities behind the Iron Curtain” as well as “indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the Free World. Victory over the Soviets, achieved with the “liberation” of captive peoples, which went beyond “containment,” would come not only through the reality of American economic and diplomatic superiority but also through the projection of that superiority as inherent to the American system and way of life.
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Economic principles and diplomacy build upon the image of American soft power. This is used to expand US imperial goals
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It is within this context of spreading liberal humanism as the divine imperative of humankind, that the act of giving becomes the perfect exercise of power over another. In Foucault's understanding, the most emblematic feature of power is that it cannot be readily recognized; it is made inconspicuous- innocuous - and power is truly elegant when those subject to it stubbornly deny its existence because they are, in fact, deluded by the idea of freedom (Foucault, 1975 ). As such, colonialism's aggressive strategy of 'taking' has prudently metamorphasized into liberal humanism's strategy of giving. The Good global citizens do not "rule" as the children of colonialism did. They "help." And such help is the result of the conscious motivation of one's own advantage. The need may be to please parents, find meaning, appease guilt, build a resume, or acquire cultural capital with self-serving benefits into the future. In liberal humanist societies, aid activities orchestrated and staged by corporations and learning institutions as "causes for kids" aren't about helping those in need ... they are about helping one's self. Helping the other is about the conquest of neoliberalism over other ways of doing and other ways of knowing. This perception is not held so much by the recipients as by the helpers. Recipients of help are not equal collaborators, rather, their needs are diagnosed from outside the culture, by foreigners whose social, economic, and political power permits them to judge other cultures by their external standards of normality. Whoever desires help is agreeing to be made subject to the watchful gaze of the helper and is made beholden to the helpers assessment and conditions and the kind of help the helpers are prepared to give. The very act of identifying the need for amelioration in the living standards of another echoes the universalizing projects of modernization, which predate the neo-liberalism of this age. The conclusion of these projects is always that the needs of the less fortunate must not only be sated by foreign goods, money, visits, and leadership, but must also be determined by the moral values of the white middle classes of the western world. Survivors of earthquakes in India need to be less vulnerable in times of natural disaster, instead they are 'helped' with shipments of rice in areas where there is no water to cook it. The children of Afghanistan need Western invaders to leave their country, instead they are 'helped' with air drops of peanut butter and crackers less than kilometers from where the bombs are dropped. The African girl requires the security that comes with her traditional community being left in tact, instead she is ‘helped' with birth-control pills. The impoverished and working poor in Ontario need higher incomes, job security and healthcare instead they are 'helped' with toys and turkeys through the Christmas Cheer Board. The good citizen thinks, "what possible fate would these less fortunate have had we not acted as their saviors?" And why not? The good citizen is giving freedom, for It Is their compassion; their visit to the soup kitchen; their UNICEF collection which offers the possibility for the less fortunate to break out from the shackles of their culture of poverty and join the ordered, organized abundance of the global culture. The act of helping, In Its quest for equality and justification, has adopted the ideological tactics of neoliberalism. In the end, caring for another, turns Into the act of saving oneself, because help is extended not for the sake of the other, but for the sake of the achievements of one's own western civilization, raised to the level of a worldwide validity. The ghost of universality returns. What makes domination through helping more insidious than through taking is that it eliminates any thought of resistance from either side.
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Vardalos 09 (Marianne, Professor of sociology and cultural studies at Laurentian University, “Raising Good global citizens: Liberal Humanism as a Philanthropic Rationale for Imperialism” in The White Supremacist State: Eurocentrism, Imperialism, Colonialism, Racism Arnold H. Itwaru, ed. 2009 p. 243-260 deven)
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spreading liberal humanism as divine imperative of humankind, the act of giving becomes the perfect exercise of power over another the most emblematic feature of power is it cannot be readily recognized made inconspicuous and power is truly elegant when those subject to it stubbornly deny its existence because they are deluded by the idea of freedom colonialism's aggressive strategy of 'taking' prudently metamorphasized into liberal humanism's strategy of giving. Good global citizens do not "rule" as the children of colonialism did. They "help." such help is result of the conscious motivation of one's own advantage. The need may be to find meaning, appease guilt, or acquire cultural capital with self-serving benefits into the future aid activities orchestrated and staged by corporations and institutions aren't about helping those in need ... they are about helping one's self. Helping the other is about conquest of neoliberalism over other ways of doing and other ways of knowing. This perception held by the helpers. Recipients of help are not equal collaborators, , their needs are diagnosed from outside the culture, by foreigners whose social, economic, and political power permits them to judge other cultures by their external standards of normality. The act of identifying need for amelioration in living standards of another echoes the universalizing projects of modernization, which predate neo-liberalism The conclusion of these projects is always that the needs of the less fortunate must not only be sated by foreign goods, money, visits, and leadership, but must also be determined by the moral values of the white middle classes of the western world children of Afghanistan need Western invaders to leave their country, instead they are 'helped' with air drops of peanut butter and crackers less than kilometers from where the bombs are dropped. The good citizen thinks, "what possible fate would these less fortunate have had we not acted as their saviors?" And why not? The good citizen is giving freedom, for their compassion which offers the possibility for the less fortunate to break out from the shackles of their culture of poverty and join the ordered, organized abundance of the global culture. The act of helping, Its quest for equality and justification, adopted the ideological tactics of neoliberalism. help is extended not for the sake of the other, but for the sake of the achievements of one's own western civilization, raised to the level of a worldwide validity. What makes domination through helping more insidious than through taking is that it eliminates any thought of resistance from either side.
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The “help” the affirmative attempts to give only serves to foster a “savior-victim” relationship. This is a new-age form of imperialism, and only serves neoliberalist, corporate goals
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Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the “reluctant imperialist.”10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes—not reluctantly at all—in “Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World”: “The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society.”11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image.
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Kaplan in 4 (Amy, President of the American Studies Association, American Quarterly, Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, 56(1), p. 4-5)pl
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Another dominant narrative about empire today is that of the “reluctant imperialist.” United States never sought an empire but it had the burden thrust upon it The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy Those characteristics include basic political stability ; economic freedom; and representative government it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle fo liberal civil society.
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The benevolence of the United States is another form of imperialism.
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In terms of the first, the present system of economic globalisation is often compared to the open international economy of the late-nineteenth century: as Krugman puts it, 'it is a late twentieth-century conceit that we invented the global economy yesterday'.43 This has been primarily discussed in terms of the level of international trade, the mobility of capital and the overall high interdependence of the era of the Gold Standard. As Hirst and Thompson summarise, 'the level of autonomy under the Gold Standard up to the First World War was much less for the advanced economies than it is today. This is not to minimise the level of that integration now ... but merely to register a certain scepticism over whether we have entered a radically new phase in the internationalisation of economic activity' .4 However, narrowly focusing on the economic openness misses the connection between economic power and globalisation. Ferguson has described the period as 'Anglobalisation', pointing specifically to the connection between empire and an open international economy.45 While similar arguments have been made within international relations regarding the development of hegemonic power, these arguments tend to avoid the questions concerning the imperial nature of Britain's hegemony in comparison to today.46 While it is certainly not the case that all historical empires were 'empires of trade', the comparison between the present system and the nineteenth century is useful for the parallels with the global economy and the ideology surrounding the pursuit of an open economy. The guiding role of British informal rule in the nineteenthc entury was to 'open up' states to British commerce47 A nd the role of this facet of globalisation is no different, according to both proponents and critics. Along these lines as well, the force of American 'soft power', as Nye has described it, should not be seen as detrimental to empire, but conducive of it.48 Soft power, in essence, also forms one part of a drive to gain a legitimate basis for imperial rule.
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Mabee in 4 (Bryan, Sr. lecturer at Oxford Brookes Institute, Third World Quarterly, Discourses of Empire: The US 'Empire', Globalisation and International Relations, 25(8), p. 1365-1366)pl
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narrowly focusing on the economic openness misses the connection between economic power and globalisation. Ferguson has described the period as 'Anglobalisation', pointing specifically to the connection between empire and an open international economy. the force of American 'soft power' should not be seen as detrimental to empire, but conducive of it.48 Soft power, in essence, also forms one part of a drive to gain a legitimate basis for imperial rule.
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Usage of soft power is the basis of imperialism.
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“Public diplomacy—which consists of systematic efforts to communicate not with foreign governments but with the people themselves—has a central role to play in the task of making the world safer for the just interests of the United States, its citizens, and its allies.”5 In the last few years, U.S. public diplomacy has undergone intensive reorganization and retooling as it takes on a more prominent propaganda role in the efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of foreign publics. This is not a new role, for the emergent ideas and activities of public diplomacy as the “soft power” wing of American foreign policy have notable historical prefigurations in U.S. international relations. In this essay we situate the history of the cold war paradigm of U.S. public diplomacy within the broader framework of “political warfare” that combines overt and covert forms of information management.6 However, there are distinctive features to the “new public diplomacy” within both domestic and international contexts of the contemporary American imperium. It operates in a conflicted space of power and value that is a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order. We consider the relation of this new diplomacy to the broader pursuit of political warfare by the state in its efforts to transform material preponderance (in terms of financial, military, and information capital) into effective political outcomes across the globe. In a post-9/11 context, we argue, public diplomacy functions not simply as a tool of national security, but also as a component of U.S. efforts to manage the emerging formation of a neoliberal empire. The term “public diplomacy” was coined by academics at Tufts University in the mid-1960s to “describe the whole range of communications, information, and propaganda” under control of the U.S. government.7 As the term came into vogue, it effectively glossed (through the implication of both “public” and diplomatic intent) the political valence of both its invention and object of study through emphasis on its role as “an applied transnational science of human behaviour.”8 The origin of the term is a valuable reminder that academic knowledge production has itself been caught up in the historical foundations and contemporary conduct of U.S. public diplomacy, with the American university a long-established laboratory for the study of public opinion and of cross-cultural knowledge in service of the state.9 American studies, of course, has had a particularly dramatic entanglement with public diplomacy and the cold war contest for “hearts and minds,” and legacies of that entanglement still haunt the field imaginary today.10 We do not intend to directly revisit that history here, but we do contend that the current regeneration of public diplomacy by the U.S. government is an important topic for critical study by American studies scholars, in particular as they negotiate the “internationalization” of their field in the context of post- and transnational impulses, now conditioned by the new configurations of U.S. imperialism. In this essay we posit a need to retheorize the modes and meanings of public diplomacy in order to reconsider the ways in which the power of the American state is manifested in its operations beyond its national borders, and to examine the conditions of knowledge-formation and critical thinking shaped by the operations of this power. At issue is not so much the way in which American studies has been shaped internationally through diplomatic patronage (though this remains an important and underexamined issue) but rather the articulation of field identities in the expanding networks of international and transnational political cultures.
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Kennedy and Lucas in 5 (Liam and Scott, Dir. of the Clinton Institute for American Studies and dir. Of Center for US foreign policy, American Quarterly, Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy, 57(2), p. 310-311)pl
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U.S. public diplomacy has undergone intensive reorganization to win the “hearts and minds” of foreign publics. activities of public diplomacy as the “soft power” wing of American foreign policy have notable historical prefigurations , there are distinctive features to the “new public diplomacy” within both domestic and international contexts of the contemporary American imperium. It operates in a conflicted space of power and value that is a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order. public diplomacy functions not simply as a tool of national security, but also as a component of U.S. efforts to manage the emerging formation of a neoliberal empire. current regeneration of public diplomacy by the U.S. government is an important topic as they negotiate the “internationalization” of their field in the context of post- and transnational impulses, now conditioned by the new configurations of U.S. imperialism.
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Diplomatic measures of the US disguise neo-imperialism.
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A Reconcept utilized Critical Theory of Power; Hegemony. Our conception of a reconceptualized critical theory is intensely concerned with the need to understand the various and complex ways that power operates to dominate and shape consciousness. Power, critical theorists have learned, is an extremely ambiguous topic that demands detailed study and analysis. A consensus seems to be emerging among criticalists that power is a basic constituent of human existence that works to shape the oppressive and productive nature of the human tradition. Indeed, we are all empowered and we are all unempowered, in that we all possess abilities and we are all limited in the attempt to use our abilities. Because of limited space, we will focus here on critical theory's traditional concern with the oppressive aspects of power, although we understand that an important aspect of critical research focuses on the productive aspects of power—its ability to empower, to establish a critical democracy, to engage marginalized people in the rethinking of their sociopolitical role (Apple, 19%; Fiske, 1993; A.M.A. Freire. 2000; Giroux, 1997; Macedo, 1994; Nicholson & Seidman, 1995). In the context of oppressive power and its ability to produce inequalities and human suffering, Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony is central to critical research. Gramsci understood that dominant power in the 20th century was not always exercised simply by physical force but also was expressed through social psychological attempts to win people's consent to domination through cultural institutions such as the media, the schools, the family, and the church. Gramscian hegemony recognizes that the winning of popular consent is a very complex process and must be researched carefully on a case-by-case basis. Students and researchers of power, educators, sociologists, all of us are hegemonized as our field of knowledge and understanding is structured by a limited exposure to competing definitions of the sociopolitical world. The hegemonic field, with its bounded sociopsychological horizons, garners consent to an inequitable power matrix—a set of social relations that are legitimated by their depiction as natural and inevitable. In this context, critical researchers note that hegemonic consent is never completely established, as it is always contested by various groups with different agendas (Grossberg, 1997; Lull, 1995; McLaren. 1995a, 1995b; McLaren, Hammer, Reilly, & Shollc, 1995; West, 1993). We note here that Gramsci famously understood Marx's concept of laws of tendency as implying a new immanence and a new conception of necessity and freedom that cannot be grasped within a mechanistic model of determination (Bensaid.2002). A Reconceptualized Critical Theory of Power: Ideology. Critical theorists understand that the formation of hegemony cannot be separated from the production of ideology. If hegemony is the larger effort of the powerful to win the consent of their "subordinates," then ideological hegemony involves the cultural forms, the meanings, the rituals, and the representations that produce consent to the status quo and individuals' particular places within it. Ideology vis-a-vis hegemony moves critical inquirers beyond explanations of domination that have used terms such as "propaganda" to describe the ways media, political, educational, and other sociocultural productions coercively manipulate citizens to adopt oppressive meanings. A reconceptualized critical research endorses a much more subtle, ambiguous, and situationally specific form of domination that refuses the propaganda model's assumption that people are passive, easily manipulated victims. Researchers operating with an awareness of this hegemonic ideology understand that dominant ideological practices and discourses shape our vision of reality (Lemke, 1995,1998). Thus, our notion of hegemonic ideology is a critical form of epistemological constructivism buoyed by a nuanced understanding of powers complicity in the constructions people make of the world and their role in it (Kincheloc, 1998). Such an awareness corrects earlier delineations of ideology as a monolithic unidirectional entity that was imposed on individuals by a secret cohort of ruling-class czars. Understanding domination in the context of concurrent struggles among different classes, racial and gender groups, and sectors of capital, critical researchers of ideology explore the ways such competition engages different visions, interesls, and agendas in a variety of social locales—venues previously thought to be outside the domain of ideological struggle (Brosio, 1994; Steinberg, 2001). <309-310>
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McLaren and Kincheloe in 2k5 (Peter Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies @ UCLA and Joe, professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Eds Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln)
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Our conception of a reconceptualized critical theory is intensely concerned with the need to understand the various and complex ways that power operates to dominate and shape consciousness. Power , is an extremely ambiguous topic that demands detailed study and analysis that power is a basic constituent of human existence that works to shape the oppressive and productive nature of the human tradition ). In the context of oppressive power and its ability to produce inequalities and human suffering Gramsci's notion of hegemony is central to critical research. Gramsci understood that dominant power in the 20th century was not always exercised simply by physical force but also was expressed through social psychological attempts to win people's consent to domination through cultural institutions such as the media, the schools, the family, and the church Gramscian hegemony recognizes that the winning of popular consent is a very complex process and must be researched carefully on a case-by-case basis The hegemonic field, with its bounded sociopsychological horizons, garners consent to an inequitable power matrix—a set of social relations that are legitimated by their depiction as natural and inevitable the formation of hegemony cannot be separated from the production of ideology. If hegemony is the larger effort of the powerful to win the consent of their "subordinates," then ideological hegemony involves the representations that produce consent to the status quo and individuals' particular places within it. Ideology vis-a-vis hegemony moves critical inquirers beyond explanations of domination that have used terms such as "propaganda" to describe the ways media, political, educational, and other sociocultural productions coercively manipulate citizens to adopt oppressive meanings . Researchers operating with an awareness of this hegemonic ideology understand that dominant ideological practices and discourses shape our vision of reality Thus, our notion of hegemonic ideology is a critical form of epistemological constructivism buoyed by a nuanced understanding of powers complicity in the constructions people make of the world and their role in it Such an awareness corrects earlier delineations of ideology as a monolithic unidirectional entity . Understanding domination in the context of concurrent struggles critical researchers of ideology explore the ways such competition engages different visions, interesls, and agendas in a variety of social locales
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Softpower is not benign-the expansion of influence through seemingly harmless institutions is still intertwined with an oppressive form of power. It limits the scope of what constitutes legitimate knowledge and allows oppression to seem natural and inevitable.
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Second, Nye describes soft power as the noncoercive means through which the U.S. state struggles to organize the consent of non-American states, organizations, and populations to the values associated with American national identity (soft power in the first instance). Soft power “is the ability [of the American state] to get what it want[s] through attraction rather than coercion or payments,”29 “co-opts people rather than coerces,”30 and has “the ability to attract.”31 The U.S. state’s central instruments of soft power are government communication and cultural agencies and corporate media industries. Government soft power apparatuses include: the State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy, the radio station Voice of America, the universities, the military (including psychological warfare operations), and the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.). Corporate industries of American soft power include: Hollywood and television, news media, nongovernmental organizations (N.G.O.’s), U.S. corporations and their commodities, and the art market. In Nye’s third description, soft power refers to something akin to U.S. ideological dominance or global hegemony. Soft power describes the extent to which America is perceived as a morally legitimate global leader by non-American states, organizations, and populations: “The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its domestic and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”32 Here, soft power (as consent to America’s morally legitimate global leadership) appears as the desired effect or outcome of soft power in the second sense: the U.S. state’s strategies and means of ideological suasion, its struggle on the terrain of communication and media culture to manufacture and organize international consent to the values of America’s national identity. Nye rationalizes American soft power by investing it with two moral functions. American soft power’s first moral obligation is to rid the world of the evils of terrorist networks,33 and thus is aligned with the Bush administration’s national and global security imperatives. Soft power’s second moral duty is to help the Middle East to modernize more efficiently,34 and thus bestows America with a new white man’s burden, a civilizing mission. Nye’s political solution to the apparent problem of Middle Eastern anti-modernity is soft power, which must educate people there about the just and benevolent intentions of America. Nye recommends that the public diplomacy missionaries of American soft power work with Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya to respond to what he feels is distorted coverage of U.S. intervention, explain U.S. foreign policies more effectively, and “develop a long term strategy of cultural and educational exchanges that develop a richer and more open civil society in Middle Eastern countries.”35 Like the colonialist intelligentsia of the British Empire that rationalized cultural imperialism as part of a civilizing mission to bring a backward Other into modernity, Nye imagines America and American soft power as bringing enlightenment to the Middle East. The process and effect to which Nye’s soft power discourse refers resembles the process and effect once described by the critical discourse of U.S. cultural imperialism. Government communication apparatuses and corporate media globally export and legitimize American values to international audiences. The ideal effect of this process is the organization of international consent to American values, the establishment of America’s moral legitimacy as a global superpower, and the realization of U.S. foreign policy objectives (which entails the remaking of different social formations in America’s image).However, by denying the existence of an American empire and universalizing American multiculturalism as reflective of an emergent global culture, Nye attempts to differentiate his soft power discourse from the discourse of U.S. cultural imperialism.
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Mirrlees in 6 (Tanner, member of York and Ryerson Uni.’s Joint Program of Communication and Culture, Oneworld, The New Imperialists, p. 208-209)pl
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Soft power “is the ability to get what it want[s] through attraction rather than coercion or payments co-opts people rather than coerces,”30 and has “the ability to attract. soft power apparatuses include: the State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy the military and the Central Intelligence Agency soft power refers to something akin to U.S. ideological dominance or global hegemony. Here, soft power appears as the desired effect or outcome Soft power’s second moral duty is to help the East to modernize more efficiently,34 and thus bestows America with a new white man’s burden, a civilizing mission. Like the colonialist intelligentsia of the British Empire that rationalized cultural imperialism as part of a civilizing mission to bring a backward Other into modernity, Nye imagines America and American soft power as bringing enlightenment The process and effect to which Nye’s soft power discourse refers resembles the process and effect once described by the critical discourse of U.S. cultural imperialism. Government communication apparatuses and corporate media globally export and legitimize American values to international audiences
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Soft power disguises the US' cultural imperialism.
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Trade relations between the United States and Latin America at the beginning of the new millennium were centered on the plan to build a Free Trade Area of the Americas. Given the difficulties and ensuing stalling of negotiations, the United States, often with the consent of Latin American countries, has favored switching to a case-by-case approach. One of the main traits of continuity in the US Latin American policy is the attempt to propose, if not impose, its approved rules and economic models on the rest of the continent. The United States, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, has historically been in favor of free markets and deregulation of international trade, but only as long as this is beneficial to the United States. The FTAA would provide ample opportunities to expand US industrial production and services sectors. However, there are still doubts over whether or not Latin American countries also have relevant interests in and potential benefits to gain from the conclusion of such an agreement, or a series of bilateral agreements with the same purpose. Critics of the FTAA claim that it is simply an instrument for the US to perpetuate its economic hegemony over the Americas in the era of globalization. They claim that it is a tool which uses asymmetric and conditional openness in markets and Customs barriers to promote the US economy, providing only negligible benefits for Latin economies. In addition, they state that this openness would result in an intensification of the imbalanced exchange system between the raw materials and agricultural produce of the South and the high-added-value manufactured products of the North, thus exacerbating rather than lessening the disparity in exchange flows, As at the end of the 1800s, Latin American countries, or at least the leading lights among them, hesitate today when faced with a possible Pan-American agreement.
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Gardini 12 (Gian Luca, University of Bath, “Latin America in the 21st Century”, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 99-100)
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Trade relations between the United States and Latin America at the beginning of the new millennium were centered on the attempt to propose, if not impose, its approved rules and economic models on the rest of the continent. The United States, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, has historically been in favor of free markets and deregulation of international trade, but only as long as this is beneficial to the United States. Critics of the FTAA claim that it is simply an instrument for the US to perpetuate its economic hegemony over the Americas in the era of globalization. They claim that it is a tool which uses asymmetric and conditional openness in markets and Customs barriers to promote the US economy, providing only negligible benefits for Latin economies. In addition, they state that this openness would result in an intensification of the imbalanced exchange system between the raw materials and agricultural produce of the South and the high-added-value manufactured products of the North, thus exacerbating rather than lessening the disparity in exchange flows, As at the end of the 1800s, Latin American countries, or at least the leading lights among them, hesitate today when faced with a possible Pan-American agreement.
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United States trade policies with Latin America only serve to benefit the United States and put other countries at a disadvantage
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Yet, even on Ignatieff ’s narrow definition, in which human rights are about stopping unmerited cruelty and suffering, the crucial question is how we are to do so. What if some means to this ostensible end – say, a military invasion – can reasonably be expected to produce tens of thousands of civilian casualties and an almost certain breakdown in social order? Ignatieff ’s doctrine of human rights provides absolutely no ethico-philosophical criteria in that regard. Instead, he offers a pragmatic judgement – and a highly dubious one – that only U.S. military power can be expected to advance human rights in the zones where “barbarians” rule. But note: this is an utterly ad hoc addition to his theory. In no respect can it be said to flow from any of his reflections on human rights per se. Moreover, others proceeding from the same principle of limiting cruelty and suffering have arrived at entirely opposite conclusions with respect to imperial war. Ignatieff ’s myriad proclamations for human rights thus lack any demonstrable tie to his support of empire and imperial war. This is convenient, of course, since the chasm between moralizing rhetoric and imperial advocacy allows Ignatieff to pump out empty platitudes as if these contained real ethical guidance. Concrete moral choices, involving historical study and calibrations of real human risk, never enter the equation. So, Ignatieff can drone on about the world being a better place without Saddam, never so much as acknowledging the cost of this result: some 25,000 Iraqis killed as a result of armed conflict since the start of the U.S. invasion, and probably more than 100,000 dead as a result of all the consequences of the U.S. war.24 Nowhere does he offer any kind of calculus for determining if these tens of thousands of deaths are ethically justified. Instead, banalities about being rid of Saddam are offered up without even countenancing the scale of human suffering that Ignatieff ’s preferred course of action – war and occupation – has entailed. But then, Ignatieff shows little regard for ordinary people in the zones of military conflict. His concern is for the security of the West and of the U.S.A. in particular. Ruminating about America’s new “vulnerability” in the world, for instance, he writes, When American naval planners looked south from the Suez Canal, they had only bad options. All the potential refuelling stops – Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Yemen – are dangerous places for American warships. As the attack on the U.S.S. Cole made clear, none of the governments in these strategically vital refuelling stops can actually guarantee the safety of their imperial visitors.25
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McNally 6 (David, Professor of political science at York University “The new imperialists – Ideologies of Empire” Ch 5 Pg 92) JL
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only U.S. military power can be expected to advance human rights in the zones where “barbarians” rule. others proceeding from the same principle of limiting cruelty and suffering have arrived at entirely opposite conclusions with respect to imperial war. Ignatieff ’s myriad proclamations for human rights thus lack any demonstrable tie to his support of empire and imperial war. the chasm between moralizing rhetoric and imperial advocacy allows Ignatieff to pump out empty platitudes as if these contained real ethical guidance. Concrete moral choices, involving historical study and calibrations of real human risk, never enter the equation. So, Ignatieff can drone on about the world being a better place without Saddam, never acknowledging the 25,000 Iraqis killed as a result Nowhere does he offer any kind of calculus for determining if these tens of thousands of deaths are ethically justified.
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Imperialism destroys ethics by valuing security risks over collateral damage
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Parmesan and most other scientists hadn't expected to see species extinctions from global warming until 2020. But populations of frogs, butterflies, ocean corals, and polar birds have already gone extinct because of climate change, Parmesan said. Scientists were right about which species would suffer first—plants and animals that live only in narrow temperature ranges and those living in cold climates such as Earth's Poles or mountaintops. "The species dependent on sea ice—polar bear, ring seal, emperor penguin, Adélie penguin—and the cloud forest frogs are showing massive extinctions," Parmesan said. Her review compiles 866 scientific studies on the effects of climate change on terrestrial, marine, and freshwater species. The study appears in the December issue of the Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics. Global Phenomenon Bill Fraser is a wildlife ecologist with the Polar Oceans Research Group in Sheridan, Montana. "There is no longer a question of whether one species or ecosystem is experiencing climate change. [Parmesan's] paper makes it evident that it is almost global," he said. "The scale now is so vast that you cannot continue to ignore climate change," added Fraser, who began studying penguins in the Antarctic more than 30 years ago. "It is going to have some severe consequences." Many species, for example, have shifted their ranges in response to rising temperatures.
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Hoah 2006 [Hannah, Published Author, “Global Warming Already Causes Extinction”, National Geographics News, July 5th, 2013 http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/11/061128-global-warming.html]
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most scientists hadn't expected to see species extinctions from global warming until 2020. But populations of frogs, butterflies, ocean corals, and polar birds have already gone extinct because of climate change, Parmesan said. Scientists were right about which species would suffer first—plants and animals that live only in narrow temperature ranges and those living in cold climates such as Earth's Poles or mountaintops. "The species dependent on sea ice— , ring seal, , —and the cloud forest frogs are showing massive extinctions," The scale now is so vast that you cannot continue to ignore climate change
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Environmental consequences lead to extinction
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One of the main causes of the First World War was imperialism: an unequal relationship, often in the form of an empire, forced on other countries and peoples, resulting in domination and subordination of economics, culture, and territory. Historians disagree on whether the primary impetus for imperialism was cultural or economic, but whatever the reason, Europeans in the late 19th century increasingly chose to safeguard their access to markets, raw materials, and returns on their investments by seizing outright political and military control of the undeveloped world. Between the 1850s and 1911, all of Africa was colonized except for Liberia and Ethiopia. The British, who had imposed direct rule on India in 1858, occupied Egypt in 1882, probably a strategic necessity to protect their Indian interests. The French, who had begun missionary work in Indochina in the 17th century, finished their conquests of the region in 1887, and in 1893 they added to it neighboring Laos and a small sliver of China.
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TAHC 2012 [The Authentic History Center, “The Origins of WWI” Primary Source for American Pop Culture, July 6th, 2013, http://www.authentichistory.com/1914-1920/1-overview/1-origins/index.html]
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One of the main causes of the First World War was imperialism: an unequal relationship, often in the form of an empire, forced on other countries and peoples, resulting in domination and subordination of economics, culture, and territory. Europeans in the late 19th century increasingly chose to safeguard their access to markets, raw materials, and returns on their investments by seizing outright political and military control of the undeveloped world
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Imperialism leads to war—WWI proves
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First, the United States is seeking to shift final authority for authorizing internal interventions away from the UN and toward itself, relegating the UN to a position of secondary importance, to be called upon when convenient as a marginal contributor to essentially American undertakings. Second, by arguing that the United States has the right to intervene not only to eliminate threats to itself and international peace, but also to put in place new regimes, the doctrine of preemptive intervention poses a new threat to the principle of state sovereignty. Not surprisingly, the debate on imperialism has intensified—unilateral American interventionism constitutes a far greater threat to the foundations of the international system than even the most aggressive multilateral missions of the 1990s. In [End Page 86] Namibia, Haiti, and Sierra Leone multilateral interventions supported regime change, but these cases have been justified as the return of legally recognized powers in place of an illegal de facto regime. The unilateralist American project appears to go much further. It justifies regime change not simply as a means of restoring a legitimate government, but as a means of removing threats to U.S. security interests as defined by the U.S. administration. Though all states have the right to defend their security interests, U.S. unilateral interventions, based on preemption of vaguely defined threats and undertaken without an international process of legitimization, would provoke widespread international resentment against the United States, as the war in Iraq already has. U.S. unilateralism may also furnish a license for unilateral interventions by other states, and thus become a source of instability. In addition to the threat unilateral interventions pose to the international system and U.S. moral credibility, the experience of multilateral post-conflict reconstruction during the 1990s should be a major check on such a project. That experience demonstrates that interventions, even those with imperial characteristics and significant resources, often result in very little change to internal power dynamics. Even the tremendous military power and financial resources of the United States cannot necessarily keep its attempts to rebuild states and support stable, benign, and democratic regimes from being thwarted by local political realities. Rapidly transforming rogue and failed states will prove a daunting task, and unilateral intervention, shackled by international resentment and charges of imperialism, is especially unlikely to prove an effective tool.
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Ottaway and Lacina 2003 [Marina and Bethany, Social Sciences Authors, “International Interventions and Imperialism”, Muse, July 6th, 2013 http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/sais_review/v023/23.2ottaway.html]
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by arguing that the United States has the right to intervene not only to eliminate threats to itself and international peace, but also to put in place new regimes, the doctrine of preemptive intervention poses a new threat to the principle of state sovereignty. the debate on imperialism has intensified—unilateral American interventionism constitutes a far greater threat to the foundations of the international system than even the most aggressive multilateral missions The unilateralist American project appears to go much further. It justifies regime change not simply as a means of restoring a legitimate government, but as a means of removing threats to U.S. security interests U.S. unilateral interventions, based on preemption of vaguely defined threats and undertaken without an international process of legitimization, would provoke widespread international resentment against the United States and thus become a source of instability. Even the tremendous military power and financial resources of the United States cannot necessarily keep its attempts to rebuild states and support stable, benign, and democratic regimes from being thwarted by local political realities. Rapidly transforming rogue and failed states will prove a daunting task, and unilateral intervention, shackled by international resentment and charges of imperialism, is especially unlikely to prove an effective tool.
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U.S. Imperialism creates world-wide tensions and fails by every measure
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The concept “imperial formation,” recently distilled by Ann Laura Stoler, captures the mobile terrain on which these battles for an anti-racist historical legibility have been waged. Imperial formation suggests the shifting degrees of rights, scale, rule, and violence through which the state projects sovereignty both within and outside internationally agreed upon borders. They are “macropolities whose technologies of rule thrive on the production of exceptions and their uneven and changing proliferation.” They “thrive on turbid taxonomies that produce shadow populations and ever-improved coercive measures to protect the common good against those deemed threats to it. Finally, imperial formations give rise both to new zones of exclusion and new sites of—and social groups with—privileged exemption” (2006, 128). This theory of the shifting cartography of empire as one built on differential forms of exclusion and exemption that operate through racist social structures begins to help us see how SNCC and, increasingly, many others involved in the black freedom movement began to see in Palestine “facts . . . that pertain to our struggle here.” A critique of the widespread discourse of U.S. support for Palestine’s occupation could challenge the staid exceptionalist arguments that the United States and Israel were somehow unique in achieving their philosophical commitments and political practices of freedom and democracy. Indeed, U.S. exceptionalist discourse, as Stoler and David Bond cogently note—and the black freedom movement’s post-1967 engagement with Palestine gives depth, complexity, and specificity to—“has historically constructed places exempt from scrutiny and peoples partially excluded from rights” (2006, 95), what Etienne Balibar calls “a fluctuating combination of continued exteriorization and ‘internal exclusion’”
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Feldman 2008 [Keith, Professor of University of Washington, “Black Power’s Palestine and the End(s) of Civil Rights”, Muse, July 6th, 2013 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v008/8.2.feldman.html]
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“imperial formation,” recently distilled by Ann Laura Stoler, captures the mobile terrain on which these battles for an anti-racist historical legibility have been waged. Imperial formation suggests the shifting degrees of rights, scale, rule, and violence through which the state projects sovereignty are “macropolities whose technologies of rule thrive on the production of exceptions and their uneven and changing proliferation.” imperial formations give rise both to new zones of exclusion and new sites of—and social groups with—privileged exemption” the shifting cartography of empire as one built on differential forms of exclusion and exemption operate through racist social structures U.S. exceptionalist discourse, as Stoler and David Bond cogently note “has historically constructed places exempt from scrutiny and peoples partially excluded from rights” what Balibar calls “a fluctuating combination of continued exteriorization and ‘internal exclusion’”
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The only thing an imperialist country does is bring violence
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The existing world order was constructed under the leadership of the United States following World War II. The United Nations, the representative of this order, is certainly not an entirely democratic organization. Since its inception, the United Nations has been controlled by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. These two superpowers used the United Nations as a stage on which to vie for power. But it is important to note that [End Page 159] neither the United States nor the Soviet Union doubted the significance or efficacy of the United Nations—and the United States, in particular, used the United Nations to export its values to the rest of the world. Both their confrontations and their mutual hold on power gave the second half of the twentieth century a long peace. However, after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the surviving hegemon, the United States, no longer had the patience to use the United Nations to put forward its own values, but rather pursued what might be referred to as peace under imperial domination (diguo tongzhi xia de heping). America's invasion of Iraq has damaged the authority of the United Nations and the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty. Before the war broke out, Bush repeatedly sent out warnings in which he stated that if the Security Council refused to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force, the United Nations would become irrelevant. Some hawks in the administration and conservative newspapers even threatened that the United States could withdraw from the United Nations, bringing it to an ignominious end. The strategy of preemption as espoused by American neoconservatism, along with new interpretations of sovereignty, will bring about a revolution in the twenty-first century, and the war in Iraq will serve as a model. The United States will use its neo-imperialist imagination in an attempt to recreate the so-called rogue states and restore world order. The strategy of preemption is a sign of America's abandonment of both traditional Western international regulatory systems and the principle of rule by law as established under the U.N. charter. Instead, America is bringing about the return to an era where naked power takes preeminence. At a press conference held June 27, 2003, after talks with the French minister of foreign affairs, Dominique de Villepin, Nelson Mandela commented on this shift: "Since the establishment of the U.N., there have been no world wars; therefore, anybody, and particularly the leaders of the superpowers, who takes unilateral action outside the frame of the U.N. must receive the condemnation of all who love peace." On a visit to Ireland on June 20, 2003, he went on to say, "Any organization, any country, any movement that now decides to sideline the United Nations, that country and its leader are a danger to the world. We cannot allow the world to again degenerate into a place where the will of the powerful dominates over all other considerations."4 [End Page 160] The strategy of preemption is not simply a military strategy, but is, in fact, a kind of barbaric politics, a serious attack against civilized humanity. It is ultimately tied to the question of whether the world is seeking civilization and order, or whether it is entering into a period of violence and chaos. The United States' adoption of this strategy provoked the intense opposition of Europe and, indeed, the entire world because many believe that a strategy of preemption would take the world in the latter direction. As a result of the Iraq War, a deep rift was opened up between America and its western European allies, to which the media now frequently affix the label "Old Europe." Modern history, beginning in 1492, has been a Eurocentric history of colonialism, imperialism, and expansion. However, the United States has replaced Europe as imperialist colonizer. The imagination of American neoconservative politics has inspired the United States to become a tyrannical and self-appointed hegemon, willfully changing global boundaries, and a particularly intense force for the destruction of world order. Europe, on the other hand, has become a force for rationality and civilization. The dispute that arose between Europe and America during the Iraq War was both a conflict of potential profit and a sign of civilizational disparity.
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Kuang et al 5 (Xinnian, teaches modern Chinese literature at Tsinghua University, “Preemptive War and a World Out of Control” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/positions/v013/13.1kuang.html) JL
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after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the surviving hegemon, the United States, no longer had the patience to use the United Nations to put forward its own values, but rather pursued what might be referred to as peace under imperial domination America's invasion of Iraq has damaged the authority of the United Nations The strategy of preemption as espoused by American neoconservatism will bring about a revolution in the twenty-first century The United States will use its neo-imperialist imagination in an attempt to recreate the so-called rogue states and restore world order. The strategy of preemption is a sign of America's abandonment of traditional Western international regulatory America is bringing about the return to an era where naked power takes preeminence. any movement that now decides to sideline the United Nations, that country and its leader are a danger to the world. We cannot allow the world to again degenerate into a place where the will of the powerful dominates over all other considerations. The strategy of preemption is not simply a military strategy, but is, in fact, a kind of barbaric politics, a serious attack against civilized humanity. The United States' adoption of this strategy provoked the intense opposition of Europe and the entire world the United States has replaced Europe as imperialist colonizer. The imagination of American neoconservative politics has inspired the United States to become a tyrannical and self-appointed hegemon, willfully changing global boundaries, and a particularly intense force for the destruction of world order.
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US imperialism threatens to spur major world conflict
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In light of this assessment, counter-insurgency wars, in Iraq or elsewhere, would clearly lead to attacks on the local population insofar as it constitutes a support network for insurgents. This review of changing tactics in Iraq is important because it sets the stage for future wars. Overwhelming force and counter-insurgency doctrine are strategies for occupation. But all imperialist occupations face the same political problem. They are opposed by local people who yearn for self-determination. This fundamental truth is something no Washington think tank or Pentagon general can admit, not even to themselves. They always believe in the rightness of their cause, be it the ‘white man’s burden’ or the war against terror. Such hubris blinds military/industrial intellectuals time and time again. Their understanding of conditions is framed by the bias and dogmas formed in the imperial centre, leaving them ignorant of the complexities of Third World societies. National chauvinism that originates in power and wealth never accepts that less powerful, less wealthy and less technologically endowed societies can run their affairs better than the imperialist centre; consequently, defeat seems unimaginable. Just listen to the eloquent arrogance of neoconservative Richard Perle shortly before the war: ‘Those who think Iraq should not be next may want to think about Syria or Iran or Sudan or Yemen or Somalia or North Korea or Lebanon or the Palestinian Authority … if we do it right with respect to one or two … we could deliver a short message, a two-word message, “You’re next.”’
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Harris, 08 (Jerry, “US Imperialism after Iraq”, Race & Class, 50(1), p. 41) JH
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Overwhelming force and counter-insurgency doctrine are strategies for occupation. But all imperialist occupations face the same political problem. They are opposed by local people who yearn for self-determination. This fundamental truth is something no Washington think tank or Pentagon general can admit, not even to themselves. They always believe in the rightness of their cause, be it the ‘white man’s burden’ or the war against terror. Such hubris blinds military/industrial intellectuals time and time again. Their understanding of conditions is framed by the bias and dogmas formed in the imperial centre, leaving them ignorant of the complexities of Third World societies. National chauvinism that originates in power and wealth never accepts that less powerful, less wealthy and less technologically endowed societies can run their affairs better than the imperialist centre; consequently, defeat seems unimaginable. Just listen to the eloquent arrogance of neoconservative Richard Perle shortly before the war: ‘Those who think Iraq should not be next may want to think about Syria or Iran or Sudan or Yemen or Somalia or North Korea or Lebanon or the Palestinian Authority … if we do it right with respect to one or two … we could deliver a short message, a two-word message, “You’re next.”’
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Imperialist ideals cause us to rush ignorantly into unnecessary violence and wars
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The threat to the survival of humankind posed by nuclear weapons has been a frightening and essential focus of public debate for the last four decades and must continue to be so if we are to avoid destroying ourselves and the natural world around us. One unfortunate result of preoccupation with the nuclear threat, however, has been a new kind of "respectability" accorded to conventional war. In this radical and cogent argument for pacifism, Robert Holmes asserts that all war--not just nuclear war--has become morally impermissible in the modern world. Addressing a wide audience of informed and concerned readers, he raises dramatic questions about the concepts of "political realism" and nuclear deterrence, makes a number of persuasive suggestions for nonviolent alternatives to war, and presents a rich panorama of thinking about war from St. Augustine to Reinhold Niebuhr and Herman Kahn.
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Holmes 89 (Robert, Professor at Princeton University, “On war and morality”, Princeton University Press, p. 1)
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The threat to the survival of humankind posed by nuclear weapons has been a frightening and essential focus of public debate for the last four decades and must continue to be so if we are to avoid destroying ourselves and the natural world around us. One unfortunate result of preoccupation with the nuclear threat, however, has been a new kind of "respectability" accorded to conventional war Holmes asserts that all war--not just nuclear war--has become morally impermissible in the modern world.
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The continuance of violence causes extinction
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This current bout of U.S. imperialism is what Hans Morgenthau denominated “unlimited imperialism” in his seminal work Politics Among Nations (4th ed. 1968, at 52-53): ¶ “The outstanding historic examples of unlimited imperialism are the expansionist policies of Alexander the Great, Rome, the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuries, Napoleon I, and Hitler. They all have in common an urge toward expansion which knows no rational limits, feeds on its own successes and, if not stopped by a superior force, will go on to the confines of the political world. This urge will not be satisfied so long as there remains anywhere a possible object of domination–a politically organized group of men which by its very independence challenges the conqueror’s lust for power. It is, as we shall see, exactly the lack of moderation, the aspiration to conquer all that lends itself to conquest, characteristic of unlimited imperialism, which in the past has been the undoing of the imperialistic policies of this kind… “¶ It is the Unlimited Imperialists along the lines of Alexander, Rome, Napoleon and Hitler who are now in charge of conducting American foreign policy. The factual circumstances surrounding the outbreaks of both the First World War and the Second World War currently hover like twin Swords of Damocles over the heads of all humanity.¶
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Boyle ‘12 [ Francis, Professor of international Law, University of Illinois, “Unlimited Imperialism and the Threat of World War III. U.S. Militarism at the Start of the 21st Century”, Global Research, Online, 7/6/13, http://www.globalresearch.ca/unlimited-imperialism-and-the-threat-of-world-war-iii-u-s-militarism-at-the-start-of-the-21st-century/5316852]
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This current bout of U.S. imperialism is what Hans Morgenthau denominated “unlimited imperialism” The outstanding historic examples of unlimited imperialism are the expansionist policies of Alexander the Great, Rome, the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuries, Napoleon I, and Hitler. They all have in common an urge toward expansion which knows no rational limits, feeds on its own successes and, if not stopped by a superior force, will go on to the confines of the political world It is the Unlimited Imperialists along the lines of Alexander, Rome, Napoleon and Hitler who are now in charge of conducting American foreign policy. The factual circumstances surrounding the outbreaks of both the First World War and the Second World War currently hover like twin Swords of Damocles over the heads of all humanity.¶
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Imperialism leads to world war
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In his 1976 work Communication and Cultural Domination, Herbert Chiller defines cultural imperialism as: the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system, and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even to promote, the values and structures of the dominant center of the system. Thus, cultural imperialism involves much more than simple consumer goods; it involves the dissemination of ostensibly American principles, such as freedom and democracy. Though this process might sound appealing on the surface, it masks a frightening truth: many cultures around the world are gradually disappearing due to the overwhelming influence of corporate and cultural America. The motivations behind American cultural imperialism parallel the justifications for U.S. imperialism throughout history: the desire for access to foreign markets and the belief in the superiority of American culture. Though the United States does boast the world’s largest, most powerful economy, no business is completely satisfied with controlling only the American market; American corporations want to control the other 95 percent of the world’s consumers as well. However, one must question whether this projected society is truly beneficial for all involved. Is it worth sacrificing countless indigenous cultures for the unlikely promise of a world without conflict? Around the world, the answer is an overwhelming “No!” Disregarding the fact that a world of homogenized culture would not necessarily guarantee a world without conflict, the complex fabric of diverse cultures around the world is a fundamental and indispensable basis of humanity. Throughout the course of human existence, millions have died to preserve their indigenous culture. It is a fundamental right of humanity to be allowed to preserve the mental, physical, intellectual, and creative aspects of one’s society. A single “global culture” would be nothing more than a shallow, artificial “culture” of materialism reliant on technology. Thankfully, it would be nearly impossible to create one bland culture in a world of over six billion people. And nor should we want to. Contrary to Rothkopf ’s (and George W. Bush’s) belief that, “Good and evil, better and worse coexist in this world,” there are no such absolutes in this world. The United States should not be able to relentlessly force other nations to accept its definition of what is “good” and “just” or even “modern.” Fortunately, many victims of American cultural imperialism aren’t blind to the subversion of their cultures.
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Galeota 2004 [Julia, The Humanist, Article “Cultural Imperialism: An American Tradition” http://www.thehumanist.org/humanist/articles/essay3mayjune04.pdf]
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Herbert Chiller defines cultural imperialism as: the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system, and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even to promote, the values and structures of the dominant center of the system. cultural imperialism involves much more than simple consumer goods; it involves the dissemination of ostensibly American principles, such as freedom and democracy. Though this process might sound appealing on the surface, it masks a frightening truth: many cultures around the world are gradually disappearing due to the overwhelming influence of corporate and cultural America. The motivations behind American cultural imperialism parallel the justifications for U.S. imperialism throughout history: the desire for access to foreign markets and the belief in the superiority of American culture. Though the United States does boast the world’s largest, most powerful economy, no business is completely satisfied with controlling only the American market; American corporations want to control the other 95 percent of the world’s consumers as well. Is it worth sacrificing countless indigenous cultures ? the answer is an overwhelming “No!” Disregarding the fact that a world of homogenized culture would not necessarily guarantee a world without conflict, the complex fabric of diverse cultures around the world is a fundamental and indispensable basis of humanity. Throughout the course of human existence, millions have died to preserve their indigenous culture. It is a fundamental right of humanity to be allowed to preserve the mental, physical, intellectual, and creative aspects of one’s society.
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Imperialism deteriorates the culture of indigenous people
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OTHER THREATS this hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offer important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
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Diamond December 1995 [Larry- Senior fellow at the hoover institution, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s:Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives” July 5, 2013 http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/Promoting%20Democracy%20in%20the%201990s%20Actors%20and%20Instruments,%20Issues%20and%20Imperatives.pdf]
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Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness The experience of this century offer important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
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Lack of democracy leads to extinction
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Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for mono, It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular invaluable and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism'. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.” Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, unit, of amount are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without deaf either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted. the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds whatever exceeds measure. But how do that necessity present itself? Another Justice answer: as the surplus of the duty to answer to One claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality. What also means is that the human is not decided. lt is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in position of having so decide without having already been fully determined end without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision.
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Dillon 99 (Michael, Professor of International Relations at the University of Lancaster, “Another Justices” Political Theory, Vol 27, No. 2, 164-5)
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The subject was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism' They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability Once rendered calculable unit, of amount are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value may claim to be they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted. the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life the human is not decided. lt is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in position of having so decide without having already been fully determined end without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision.
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Calculating life allows it to be devalued-this justifies the worst atrocities in history and has real effects on populations
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In the post-9/11 period the 'war on terror', with its attendant corrosion of civil liberties, denigration of human rights and overall insinuation of a politics of fear, has tended to undermine the effectiveness of a positive vision on the diffusion of US democracy. Both at home and abroad, market-based democracy as the universal model for the rest of the world has come to be associated more with a bellicose unilateralism than with a seductive system for political emulation and potential hegemony. Moreover, other democratic imaginations emanating from Latin America have been offering vibrant alternatives to the US model. Most notably, at the national level Hugo Ch'avez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia have put on to the agenda critiques of US power in the Americas and are offering different visions of developing democratic polities more related to policies of redistribution, social justice, indigenous rights and national autonomy. Transnationally the Hemispheric Social Alliance, which is a large coalition of civil society groups located throughout the Americas, has argued that the entire process of negotiating trade agreements should be democratised, just as the World Social Forums, originating in Porto Alegre, have similarly argued for a democratisation of global organisations such as the World Trade Organiza- tion, World Bank and IMF (Doucet, 2005).14 While imperial powers are being challenged, there is an amplification of democratic politics. In the context of US-Latin American relations the mission to universalise a US model of democracy is being contested by a wide gamut of political forces and social movements. The promotion of democracy from above may be sustained by imperial sentiment at home but it is actively called into question in a continent increasingly impatient with being framed as the passive recipient. For democracy to flourish, it has to be home-grown and autonomously sustained, not exported as part of a legitimisation of subordinating power. When the imperial and the democratic are conjoined, a number of unresolveable contradictions emerges. As was noted above, the imperial relation entails processes of penetration, violation, imposition and ethno- centric universalism. Equally, such a relation requires legitimisation to enhance its effectiveness and, in this context, notions of promoting and sustaining a form of democratic politics assume their central relevance. While imperial power requires a discourse of justification, the effectiveness of a democratic mantle is continually undermined by the subordinating practices of the actual deployment of such power. As a consequence, the interface between the imperial and the democratic is forever characterised by a dynamic series of tensions which can only be resolved through a democratic geopolitics that challenges and transcends the imperial.
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Slater, Dept of Geography – Loughborough University, 2006(David, “Imperial powers and democratic imaginations,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 27, No. 8)
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n the post-9/11 period the 'war on terror', with its attendant corrosion of civil liberties, denigration of human rights and overall insinuation of a politics of fear, has tended to undermine the effectiveness of a positive vision on the diffusion of US democracy. Both at home and abroad, market-based democracy as the universal model for the rest of the world has come to be associated more with a bellicose unilateralism than with a seductive system for political emulation and potential hegemony. other democratic imaginations emanating from Latin America have been offering vibrant alternatives to the US model. Ch'avez and Morales have put on to the agenda critiques of US power in the Americas and are offering different visions of developing democratic polities more related to policies of redistribution, social justice, indigenous rights and national autonomy. While imperial powers are being challenged, there is an amplification of democratic politics. In the context of US-Latin American relations the mission to universalise a US model of democracy is being contested by a wide gamut of political forces and social movements. The promotion of democracy from above may be sustained by imperial sentiment at home but it is actively called into question in a continent increasingly impatient with being framed as the passive recipient. For democracy to flourish, it has to be home-grown and autonomously sustained, not exported as part of a legitimisation of subordinating power. When the imperial and the democratic are conjoined, a number of unresolveable contradictions emerges. the imperial relation entails processes of penetration, violation, imposition and ethno- centric universalism. While imperial power requires a discourse of justification, the effectiveness of a democratic mantle is continually undermined by the subordinating practices of the actual deployment of such power. As a consequence, the interface between the imperial and the democratic is forever characterised by a dynamic series of tensions which can only be resolved through a democratic geopolitics that challenges and transcends the imperial.
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The alternative is key to break down epistemological boundaries currently perpetuating violent power dynamics between the US and Latin America
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Ever since the end of the Cold War, experts of various stripes have been grappling with the nature of American power. Clearly, with the demise of its only major rival, the United States became really, really powerful. So powerful that the old term “superpower” doesn’t seem to cut it anymore. A French foreign minister suggested that “hyperpower” was more appropriate, but that hasn’t caught on. Other analysts have called the United States a hegemon, a global policeman, even an empire. I’ve been known to use the latter label myself, even though the United States is no longer a territorial empire of the Roman type (as it was in the days of Manifest Destiny). Michael Mandelbaum, professor of American foreign policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, doesn’t think much of those who want to cloak the old Republic in imperial ermine. “American influence in the world is certainly considerable,” he writes, “but the United States does not control, directly or indirectly, the politics and economics of other societies, as empires have always done, save for a few special cases that turn out to be the exceptions that prove the rule.” He prefers to label the United States the “world’s government,” though it’s hard to see why that’s much of an improvement. As Mandelbaum himself admits, “There are…many governments in the world and the global role of the United States, expansive though it is, does not look much like any of them.” His case for labeling the United States a global government, rather than a global empire, rests on a rickety foundation. “Traditionally,” he notes, “the imperial power has been seen as a predator, drawing economic profit and political gain from its control of the imperial possession, while the members of the society it controls suffer.” The United States, he correctly notes, does not exploit any states in this way. Instead, it provides the whole world with valuable “public goods”—principally protection from predators—that are welcomed by most of the world’s states. But that hardly makes it that different from the British Empire, which also performed all sorts of public services, such as stamping out the slave trade and piracy. Mandelbaum may see the United States as a particularly benign great power, and he is not wrong to do so; but most empires of the past also saw themselves as advancing a mission civilisatrice. His assurance that the United States means it—honestly!—is not likely to mollify America’s critics. Nor is his choice of terminology particularly reassuring. I can’t see some mandarin at the Quai d’Orsay (the French foreign ministry) slapping himself on the forehead and exclaiming, “So they are not an empire after all. They’re only the world’s government. What a relief. Vive les Etats-Unis!” The value of The Case for Goliath does not lie in its central conceit—the United States as the world’s government—but in the arguments Mandelbaum advances for why American power serves the interests of other countries. The case he makes is not particularly novel (William Odom and Robert Dujarric made similar points in their 2004 book, America’s Inadvertent Empire), but it bears repeating at a time when the publishing industry is churning out reams of paranoid tomes with titles like Rogue Nation, The Sorrows of Empire, and The New American Militarism. Mandelbaum begins by listing five security benefits the United States offers the world. First, the continuing deployment of American troops in Europe is a reassurance that “no sudden shifts in Europe’s security arrangements would occur.” Second, the United States has “reduced the demand for nuclear weapons, and the number of nuclear-armed countries, to levels considerably below what they otherwise have reached,” both by attempting to stop rogue states from acquiring nukes and by providing nuclear protection to countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that would otherwise go nuclear. Third, the United States has fought terrorists across the world and waged preventive war in Iraq to remove the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Fourth, the United States has undertaken humanitarian interventions in such places as Bosnia and Kosovo, which Mandelbaum likens to the “practice, increasingly common in Western countries, of removing children from the custody of parents who are abusing them.” Fifth, the United States has attempted to create “the apparatus of a working, effective, decent government” in such dysfunctional places as Haiti and Afghanistan. Mandelbaum also points to five economic benefits of American power. First, the United States provides the security essential for international commerce by, for instance, policing Atlantic and Pacific shipping lanes. Second, the United States safeguards the extraction and export of Middle Eastern oil, the lifeblood of the global economy. Third, in the monetary realm, the United States has made the dollar “the world’s ’reserve’ currency” and supplied loans to “governments in the throes of currency crises.” Fourth, the United States has pushed for the expansion of international trade by midwifing the World Trade Organization, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and other instruments of liberalization. And fifth, by providing a ready market for goods exported by such countries as China and Japan, the United States “became the indispensable supplier of demand to the world.” Naturally, the United States gets scant thanks for all these services provided gratis. But Mandelbaum points out that, for all their griping, other countries have not pooled “their resources to confront the enormous power of the United States because, unlike the supremely powerful countries of the past, the United States [does] not threaten them.” Instead, the United States actually helps other nations achieve shared goals such as democracy, peace, and prosperity.
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Bil 2006 (Max, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Power for Good", The Weekly Standard. 10 April. Vol. 11, Issue 28, Factiva)
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the United States is no longer a territorial empire of the Roman type (as it was in the days of Manifest Destiny) Traditionally,” he notes, “the imperial power has been seen as a predator, drawing economic profit and political gain from its control of the imperial possession, while the members of the society it controls suffer.” The United States, he correctly notes, does not exploit any states in this way. Instead, it provides the whole world with valuable “public goods”—principally protection from predators—that are welcomed by most of the world’s states deployment in Europe is a reassurance that “no sudden shifts in Europe’s security arrangements would occur.” United States has “reduced the demand for nuclear weapons, and the number of nuclear-armed countries, to levels considerably below what they otherwise have reached attempting to stop rogue states from acquiring nukes and by providing nuclear protection to countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that would otherwise go nuclear. Third, the United States has fought terrorists across the world and waged preventive war in Iraq to remove the threat posed by Saddam Hussein United States has attempted to create “the apparatus of a working, effective, decent government” in such dysfunctional places as Haiti and Afghanistan. Mandelbaum also points to five economic benefits of American power. First, the United States provides the security essential for international commerce by, for instance, policing Atlantic and Pacific shipping lanes. Second, the United States safeguards the extraction and export of Middle Eastern oil, the lifeblood of the global economy. Third, in the monetary realm, the United States has made the dollar “the world’s ’reserve’ currency” and supplied loans to “governments in the throes of currency crises.” Fourth, the United States has pushed for the expansion of international trade , for all their griping, other countries have not pooled “their resources to confront the enormous power of the United States because, unlike the supremely powerful countries of the past, the United States [does] not threaten them.” Instead, the United States actually helps other nations achieve shared goals such as democracy, peace, and prosperity.
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US imperialism is benevolent—not the same type of imperialism your authors are talking about
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Humans have long caused irreparable harm to ecosystems, driven species to extinction, and have in turn endured major shifts in biogeochemical cycling. We agree that such incidents are avoidable and unacceptable and that the magnitude of current trends must not be dismissed. Humans have also developed ingenious and novel ways of making resource use far more efficient or exploiting new types of resources. Obvious developments here include the invention of agriculture and the domestication of wild plant and animal species, of course, but humans have also been innovative in energy development (wood, wind, coal, petroleum, hydropower, biofuels, geothermal, biogen, nuclear, solar, and wave power), the development of synthetic chemical fertilizers in the 19th century, and the discovery of modern antibiotics in the 20th century. Other innovations have been organizational, such as the development of cities in the Levant and east and south Asia, the birth of modern experimental science, and the transition from family-tribal-moeity structures to multiple scales of governance (including corporate, national, international, and global government structures and institutions).
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John H. Matthews 12, and Frederick Boltz, Center for Conservation and Government, Conservation International, June 2012, “The Shifting Boundaries of Sustainability Science: Are We Doomed Yet?,” PLOS Biology, http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001344
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Humans have long caused irreparable harm to ecosystems driven species to extinction Humans have also developed ingenious and novel ways of making resource use far more efficient or exploiting new types of resources humans have been innovative in energy development the development of synthetic chemical fertilizers and the discovery of modern antibiotics Other innovations have been organizational
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Growth’s sustainable---tech innovation continually changes the game and outpaces their predictions---global shift towards sustainability’s happening now, it’s effective and permanent
| 1,179 | 183 | 397 | 170 | 20 | 57 | 0.117647 | 0.335294 |
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In this issue of PLoS Biology, Burger and colleagues make several important contributions to the discourse of sustainability science, recalling limits of human economic and population growth derived from macroecology and physical principles [1]. We agree with many of the points offered in their paper in this issue and with those in the paper by Brown and colleagues [2]. However, we also believe there is danger in a vision of sustainability that is overly deterministic and does not reflect the dynamic nature of the biosphere, its ecosystems, and economies. We are also concerned about the implications of framing sustainability in the language of physics rather than ecology.
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John H. Matthews 12, and Frederick Boltz, Center for Conservation and Government, Conservation International, June 2012, “The Shifting Boundaries of Sustainability Science: Are We Doomed Yet?,” PLOS Biology, http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001344
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there is danger in a vision of sustainability that is overly deterministic and does not reflect the dynamic nature of the biosphere
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Collapse and extinction are not inevitable---their authors underestimate societal resilience, flexibility, and innovation---the existential imperative will drive growth toward ecological sustainability
| 680 | 202 | 131 | 107 | 21 | 22 | 0.196262 | 0.205607 |
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Perhaps the most significant shifts in resource management consciousness have emerged through climate change adaptation and the recognition that institutions, infrastructure, and ecosystems have been managed on the basis of climate “stationarity,” which is the assumption that the past is an effective guide to the future [30],[39].
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John H. Matthews 12, and Frederick Boltz, Center for Conservation and Government, Conservation International, June 2012, “The Shifting Boundaries of Sustainability Science: Are We Doomed Yet?,” PLOS Biology, http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001344
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the most significant shifts in resource management consciousness have emerged through climate change adaptation
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Growth’s key to successful global-scale climate solutions
| 332 | 58 | 111 | 47 | 7 | 14 | 0.148936 | 0.297872 |
Tournament Updates - Politics%2C Neolib K Answers - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniros.html5
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President Barack Obama's approval rating on three key issues is distinctly underwater, according to a new poll from Quinnipiac University released Wednesday. The poll found that at least 10 percent more respondents disapproved than approved of Obama's handling of the economy, gun policy, and immigration issues: On the economy, 53 percent disapprove of Obama's job performance, while only 41 percent approve. Two weeks after the Senate failed to pass a measure that would have expanded background checks, Obama's approval rating on "gun policy" is also 41 percent. Meanwhile, 52 percent disapprove. And as the immigration debate continues to flare on Capitol Hill, only 40 percent approve of Obama's handling of the issue. Fifty percent disapprove. Together, the three issues are perhaps the ones that will dominate Washington on a domestic scale for the foreseeable future. The poll also found that on two of the issues — the economy and guns — respondents said they trusted Congressional Republicans to handle the issue more than Congressional Democrats. On immigration, Democrats narrowly hold a 39-38 edge. In a press conference Tuesday, Obama tried to downplay any notion that he had lost any "juice" in getting his legislative agenda through Congress
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LoGiurato, 2013 (Brett, “Any Political Capital That Obama Had Is Now Gone”, Business Insider, 5/1/2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/poll-obama-approval-rating-guns-economy-immigration-2013-5)
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President Barack Obama's approval rating on three key issues is distinctly underwater, according to a The poll found that at least 10 percent more respondents disapproved than approved of Obama's handling of the economy, gun policy, and immigration issues Two weeks after the Senate failed to pass a measure that would have expanded background checks, Obama's approval rating on "gun policy" is also 41 percent as the immigration debate continues to flare on Capitol Hill, only 40 percent approve of Obama's handling of the issue Together, the three issues are perhaps the ones that will dominate Washington on a domestic scale for the foreseeable future Obama lost juice" in getting his legislative agenda through Congress
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No PC now-gun control and past immigration debate
| 1,257 | 49 | 723 | 197 | 8 | 115 | 0.040609 | 0.583756 |
Tournament Updates - Politics%2C Neolib K Answers - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniros.html5
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The situation in the South American nation remains dire amid skyrocketing inflation, largely due to Chavez's efforts to nationalize private industry and increase social benefits. Maduro's immediate attention after claiming victory was drawn to remedying widespread blackouts and food shortages. One expert on the region says the new leader may need to tap into a shadow world of transnational crime to maintain the stability his countrymen [SIC] expect. "Venezuela is a really nice bar, and anybody can go in there and pick up anybody else," says Doug Farah, an expert on narco-terrorism and Latin American crime. He compares the country to the kind of establishment where nefarious actors can find solutions to a problem. Anti-American groups can find freelance cyber terrorists, for example, or potential drug runners can make connections with the FARC, the Colombian guerilla organization, he says. "Sometimes it creates a long-term relationship, and sometimes it creates a one-night stand," says Farah, a former Washington Post investigative reporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. Under Chavez, Venezuela also created strong ties with Cuba, which for decades has navigated treacherous financial waters and desperate economic straits, all while dodging U.S. influence. But the help Venezuela receives is not limited to its own hemisphere. Farah produced a research paper for the U.S. Army War College in August 2012 about the "growing alliance" between state-sponsored Iranian agents and other anti-American groups in Latin America, including the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. This alliance with Iran uses established drug trade routes from countries in South and Central America to penetrate North American borders, all under a banner of mutual malevolence toward the U.S.
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Shinkman 4-24-13. Paul D. Shinkman is a national security reporter for U.S. News & World Report. “Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond?” [http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond?page=2] ***Gender modified [MG]
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The situation in the nation remains dire amid skyrocketing inflation, largely due to Chavez's efforts to nationalize private industry and increase social benefits. Maduro's immediate attention after claiming victory was drawn to remedying widespread blackouts and food shortages the new leader may need to tap into a shadow world of transnational crime to maintain the stability his countrymen [SIC] expect Farah, an expert on narco-terrorism and Latin American crime compares the country to the kind of establishment where nefarious actors can find solutions to a problem. Anti-American groups can find freelance cyber terrorists potential drug runners can make connections with the FARC Venezuela also created strong ties with Cuba, which for decades has navigated treacherous financial waters and desperate economic straits while dodging U.S. influence the help Venezuela receives is not limited to its own hemisphere the "growing alliance" between state-sponsored Iranian agents and other anti-American groups in Latin America, including the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. This alliance with Iran uses established drug trade routes from countries in South and Central America to penetrate North American borders, all under a banner of mutual malevolence toward the U.S.
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Collapse of the economy will quickly turn the country into a hub for organized crime—
| 1,846 | 85 | 1,277 | 279 | 15 | 188 | 0.053763 | 0.673835 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,255 |
The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) transnational criminal and terrorist franchises in Latin America poses a tier-one security threat for the United States. These organizations operate under broad state protection and undermine democratic governance, sovereignty, growth, trade, and stability. Similar hybrid franchise models are developing in other parts of the world, which makes understanding their new dynamics essential, as they are an important element in the broader global security context. This threat goes well beyond the traditional nonstate transnational organized crime (TOC) activity, which includes drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking. It also encompasses trafficking in and the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by designated terrorist organizations and their sponsors. These activities are carried out with the support of regional and extra-regional state actors whose leadership is deeply enmeshed in criminal activity, yielding billions of dollars in illicit revenues every year in the region, and trillions globally. Leaders of these organizations share a publicly articulated doctrine to employ asymmetric warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses the use of WMD as a legitimate tactic. The threat centers around an improbable alliance of groups that often seem to have irreconcilable world views and ideologies; e.g., Iran, a conservative Islamist theocracy and primary state sponsor of Hezbollah and the Bolivarian alliance espousing 21st-century socialism, led by Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. Such alliances, in turn, offer material and political support to the Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC]). This group, designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, produces more than two-thirds of the world’s cocaine and is rapidly strengthening its ties to Mexican cartels. Such illicit forces in Latin America within criminalized states have begun using tactical operations centers as a means of pursuing their view of statecraft. That brings new elements to the “dangerous spaces” where nonstate actors intersect with regions characterized by weak sovereignty and alternative governance systems. This new dynamic fundamentally alters the structure underpinning global order. Being capable of understanding and mitigating this threat requires a whole-of-government approach, including collection, analysis, law enforcement, policy, and programming. The traditional state/nonstate dichotomy is no longer useful for an adequate illumination of these problems. Similarly, the historical divide between transnational organized crime and terrorism is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
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Farah ‘12. Douglas Farah, International Assessment and Strategy Center’s (IASC) Senior Fellow, Financial Investigations and Transparency. He specializes in research, writing, and training on transnational criminal organizations and armed groups, and their effects on states and corruption; terrorism, terror finance, and proliferation; and, illicit financial flows, with a particular focus on the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and globalized networks. “Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority” PDF Available Online @ [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117][MG]
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The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) transnational criminal and terrorist franchises in Latin America poses a tier-one security threat for the United States. These organizations operate under broad state protection and undermine democratic governance, sovereignty, growth, trade, and stability This threat goes well beyond the traditional nonstate activity, which includes drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking. It also encompasses trafficking in and the use of (WMD) by designated terrorist organizations and their sponsors Leaders of these organizations share a publicly articulated doctrine to employ asymmetric warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses the use of WMD as a legitimate tactic Iran, a conservative Islamist theocracy and primary state sponsor of Hezbollah and the Bolivarian alliance espousing 21st-century socialism Such alliances, in turn, offer material and political support to [FARC]). This group, designated as a terrorist organization produces more than two-thirds of the world’s cocaine and is rapidly strengthening its ties to Mexican cartels. Such illicit forces in Latin America within criminalized states have begun using tactical operations centers as a means of pursuing their view of statecraft. That brings new elements to the “dangerous spaces” where nonstate actors intersect with regions characterized by weak sovereignty and alternative governance systems. This new dynamic alters the structure underpinning global order The traditional state/nonstate dichotomy is no longer useful for an adequate illumination of these problems. the historical divide between transnational organized crime and terrorism is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
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That threatens all aspects of security globally, significantly increasing the chance of terrorism and nuclear exchanges—
| 2,770 | 120 | 1,742 | 386 | 16 | 243 | 0.041451 | 0.629534 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,256 |
President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65
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Manwaring ‘5. Max G. Manwaring. Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College, “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare.” October 2005.
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the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows means of coercion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, diseas trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide and criminal anarchy these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65
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Disregard their impact defense. Organized crime represents the most probable impact for spillover and drawn out conflict—
| 3,423 | 121 | 1,633 | 491 | 17 | 229 | 0.034623 | 0.466395 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,257 |
More than a month after Venezuela’s contested presidential election, President Nicolás Maduro’s narrow victory has yet to be recognized by the United States. Refusing to legitimize the new premier while a partial recount of the vote is underway, the US position has led to further political tensions in a relationship historically stressed under the leadership of former President Hugo Chávez. A handful of countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over the democratic standards of the election, which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vote. Venezuela’s opposition party is calling for the results to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavista-strongholds to polling booth intimidation. “Obviously, if there are huge irregularities we are going to have serious questions about the viability of that government,” said Secretary of State John Kerry during a hearing of the US Foreign Affairs Committee following the announcement of President Maduro’s victory in April. While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics, the refusal to recognize Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is trying to send, and how – if at all – it will impact Venezuela post-Chávez. “[The US isn’t] recognizing or failing to recognize,” says David Smilde, professor of sociology at the University of Georgia. “They’re just waiting. But here in Venezuela that’s seen as an act of belligerence.”
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Baverstock 5-17-13. Alasdair, CS Monitor. Foreign Correspondent and Guidebook Author. “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition][MG]
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Maduro’s narrow victory has yet to be recognized by the U S the position has led to further political tensions historically stressed under Chávez. Venezuela’s opposition party is calling for the results to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavista-strongholds to polling booth intimidation. if there are huge irregularities we are going to have serious questions about the viability of that government,” said Kerry While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics, the refusal to recognize Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is trying to send, and how if at all it will impact Venezuela post-Chávez. “[The US isn’t] recognizing or failing to recognize But here in Venezuela that’s seen as an act of belligerence.”
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Relations between the United States and Venezuela are plummeting—
| 1,524 | 65 | 829 | 239 | 9 | 131 | 0.037657 | 0.548117 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,258 |
Over half of Venezuela’s federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for 95 percent of the country’s exports. Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world. Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United States, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela. Venezuela’s oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s, and, as president, Chavez further tightened government control over its production. His government took a greater chunk of revenues and imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentage would always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies. While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, critics argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company. The same critics also point to increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty infrastructure. In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with Venezuelans to develop new extraction sites. “The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – production is down and the economic situation is deteriorating,” explained Shifter. “They know they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out.” If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United States, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in the world. Kerry’s recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting with open arms. “Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time,” Diana Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, “and we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests.” Indeed, Negroponte said she was “optimistic” about the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries within the next six months. She notes a “troika” of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels.
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Metzker 6-17-13. Jared Metzker, Inter Press Service “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations” [http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuela-relations/][MG]
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Over half of Venezuela’s federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for 95 percent of the country’s exports ts proven reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world its principal customer is the United States, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela. Venezuela’s oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s critics argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company. The same critics also point to increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty infrastructure PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from Chevron, The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – production is down and the economic situation is deteriorating They know they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United States, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in the world. Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same tim we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests , Negroponte notes a “troika” of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels.
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Oil cooperation is key to reset the relationship—
| 2,506 | 49 | 1,524 | 390 | 8 | 245 | 0.020513 | 0.628205 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,259 |
"Each of the Bolivarian states has lifted visa requirements for Iranian citizens, thereby erasing any public record of the Iranian citizens that come and go to these countries," wrote Farah of countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama. He also cited Venezuelan Foreign Minister David Velasquez who said, while speaking at a press conference in Tehran in 2010, "We are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to the threats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism." These relationships are controlled by a group of military elites within Venezuela, Farah tells U.S. News. He wonders whether the 50.8 percent of the vote Maduro won in the April 14 election gives him enough support to keep the country – and its shadow commerce – stable enough to continue its usual business. "[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez never took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money." "Most criminalized elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't be as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez. U.S. officials might try to engage the new Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties between the two countries. But Maduro has never been close with the senior military class in his home country, and will likely adopt a more confrontational approach to the United States to prove his credentials to these Bolivarian elites. "Maybe if he were operating in different circumstances, he could be a pragmatist," Farah says. "I don't think he can be a pragmatist right now."
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Shinkman 4-24-13. Paul D. Shinkman is a national security reporter for U.S. News & World Report. “Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond?” [http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond?page=2] [MG]
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"Each of the Bolivarian states has lifted visa requirements for Iranian citizens erasing any public record of the Iranian citizens that come and go to these countries, Velasquez speaking at a press conference We are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to the threats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism These relationships are controlled by a group of military elites within Venezuela There is going to be a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money Most criminalized elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them it won't be as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with Chavez. U.S. officials might try to engage But Maduro has never been close with the senior military class in his home country, and will likely adopt a more confrontational approach to the United States to prove his credentials
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Lack of alternative economic opportunities will solidify the Iran-Venezuela alliance—
| 1,772 | 85 | 870 | 293 | 10 | 145 | 0.03413 | 0.494881 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,260 |
Over the past year, policymakers in Washington have woken up to a new threat to U.S. security. Since October of 2011, when law enforcement agencies foiled a plot by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the nation’s capital, U.S. officials have begun to pay attention in earnest to Iran’s growing activities and influence in the Western Hemisphere.¶ What they have found has been deeply worrisome. The Islamic Republic, it turns out, has made serious inroads into Latin America since the mid-2000s, beginning with its vibrant strategic partnership with the regime of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez. Today, Iran enjoys warm diplomatic ties not only to Venezuela, but to similarly sympathetic governments in Bolivia and Ecuador as well. It has begun to exploit the region’s strategic resource wealth to fuel its nuclear program. And it is building an operational presence in the region that poses a direct danger to U.S. security.¶ Exactly how significant this threat is represents the subject of a new study released in late November by the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee. That report, entitled A Line In The Sand, documents the sinister synergies that have been created in recent years between Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand, and radical regional regimes and actors—from Venezuela to Mexican drug cartels—on the other. Some of these contacts, the study notes, are financial in nature, as Iran seeks to leverage Latin America’s permissive political and fiscal environments to skirt sanctions and continue to engage in international commerce amid tightening Western sanctions. But these contacts could easily become operational as well. The report suggests that “the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation.”¶ The U.S. response, meanwhile, is still nascent. To date, only one piece of Congressional legislation—the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012—has seriously taken up the issue of Iran’s penetration of the Americas, and the potentially adverse implications for U.S. security. Fortunately, the Act has found a receptive ear among many in Congress, and is now likely to pass the Senate with only minor modifications during the current lame duck session of Congress. Yet, in and of itself, the Act does not constitute a comprehensive strategy for competing with Iran in the Americas—or for diluting its influence there.¶ To the contrary, America’s strategic profile in Latin America is now poised to constrict precipitously. As a result of looming defense cuts, and with the specter of additional, and ruinous, “sequester” provisions on the horizon, the Pentagon is now actively planning a more modest global profile. To that end, back in May, General Douglas Fraser, the outgoing head of U.S. Southern Command, the combatant command responsible for the Americas, told lawmakers that it plans to retract to Central America and focus predominantly on the threats posed by the region’s rampant drug and arms trades. In other words, the United States is getting out of the business of competing for strategic influence in Latin America, and doing so at precisely the time that Iran is getting serious about it.¶ That could end up being a costly mistake. As the findings of the Homeland Security Committee’s study indicate, Iran’s presence south of the U.S. border represents more than a mere annoyance. It is, rather, a potential front for Iranian action against the United States—one that could well be activated if and when the current cold war between Iran and the West over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program heats up in earnest. Washington needs to be prepared should that happen.¶ Better yet, it needs to craft a proactive approach to confronting Iran influence and activity south of our border. That, after all, is the surest way for us to avoid having to face Iran and its proxies here at home.
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Berman ‘12 Ilan Berman, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. “Confronting Iran's Latin American Ambitions.” [http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilanberman/2012/12/04/confronting-irans-latin-american-ambitions/]
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The Islamic Republic, has made serious inroads into Latin America Iran enjoys warm diplomatic ties to Venezuela it is building an operational presence in the region that poses a direct danger to U.S. security Some are financial in nature, as Iran seeks to leverage Latin America’s permissive political and fiscal environments to skirt sanctions and continue to engage in international commerce amid tightening Western sanctions the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation America’s strategic profile in Latin America is now poised to constrict precipitously. the United States is getting out of the business of competing for strategic influence in Latin America, and doing so at precisely the time that Iran is getting serious about it That could end up being a costly mistake Iran’s presence south of the U.S. border represents more than a mere annoyance. It is a potential front for Iranian action against the United States—one that could well be activated if and when the current cold war between Iran and the West over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program heats up in earnest. Washington needs to be prepared should that happen it needs to craft a proactive approach to confronting Iran influence and activity south of our border. That, after all, is the surest way for us to avoid having to face Iran and its proxies here at home.
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Increased Iranian influence in the region significantly increases the chance of U.S.-Iran War. Action in the region is critical to undermine Iranian hegemony globally—
| 4,110 | 167 | 1,562 | 657 | 24 | 256 | 0.03653 | 0.38965 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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NEW YORK, Feb. 6 (UPI) -- That Iran stands today able to challenge or even defy the United States in every sphere of American influence in the Middle East attests to the dismal failure of the Bush administration's policy toward it during the last six years. Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran's reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war's consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapon program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran's nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hezbollah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration's resolve to inhibit Tehran's adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support U.S. efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hezbollah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. President Bush must realize that Damascus' strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran's and the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Bashar Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool; he is, however, the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiation with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria's real intentions which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamic for the better throughout the region. Although ideally direct negotiations between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened, it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration. If we take the administration at its word that it would not tolerate a nuclear Iran and considering these regional implications, Washington is left with no choice but to warn Iran of the severe consequences of not halting its nuclear program.
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Ben-Meir 7 - Professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses in international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies, Alon, “Realpolitik: Ending Iran's defiance”, UPI, 2/6, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2007/02/06/Realpolitik-Ending-Irans-defiance/UPI-69491170778058/
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Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration. I
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Iranian aggression goes nuclear—
| 4,333 | 32 | 718 | 693 | 4 | 106 | 0.005772 | 0.152958 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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WASHINGTON, DC – One of the greatest challen ges that US President Barack Obama will face in his second term is Iran’s pursuit of advanced nuclear technologies. While a nuclear Iran would damage America’s strategic position in the Middle East, action aimed at forestalling Iran’s nuclear progress also carries serious strategic and economic consequences. Armed with nuclear weapons, Iran would be better able to project influence, intimidate its neighbors, and protect itself. As a result, the United States’ allies in the region would need new security guarantees. But an increased American presence could provoke radical groups, while requiring defense resources that are needed to support US interests in East and Southeast Asia. Some of Obama’s conservative critics believe that he will allow Iran to develop an advanced nuclear program, provided that it stops short of actually building a bomb. But no American president would want their legacy to include allowing so unfriendly a regime to acquire such a dangerous weapon – even if doing so meant avoiding greater strategic costs. Indeed, Obama has repeatedly avowed that he will stop Iran from acquiring nuclear-weapons capability, rather than allow the country to develop its nuclear program and then rely on deterrence, as has been done with other nuclear powers. But such tough rhetoric might create a dilemma for Obama. If Iran continues on its path toward nuclear arms, war may well become inevitable, whether instigated by Israel or the US, or provoked by Iran’s erratic foreign policy. Although the costs of a containment strategy would be significant, the costs of fighting a war would be higher. Iran has threatened to seal the Strait of Hormuz – through which 20% of the world’s internationally traded oil passes – if it is attacked. While it would be difficult for Iran to seal the strait for long, if it managed to do so at all, it could easily make passage unsafe with attacks by small boats, sea mines, and missiles launched from coastal mountains. Furthermore, Iran would likely strike the pipelines in the Arabian Peninsula that would otherwise allow oil to bypass the strait. And several strategically crucial oil-processing facilities are within range of Iranian missiles and special forces, including the Saudi oil-stabilization facility at Abqaiq, which processes seven million barrels daily. Such a response would immediately cause oil prices to spike – possibly to $200 per barrel in the short run. A protracted conflict could mean sustained prices of roughly $150 per barrel. Given that Americans consume roughly 18.5 million barrels of oil daily, a mere $8 increase in the price per barrel would sap $1 billion per week from the US economy, jeopardizing its already-fragile recovery. America has already financed two wars on credit, contributing to a significant fiscal deficit. Another war would eliminate what little hope there is of achieving debt stability without drastic – and harmful – spending cuts (or tax increases). Surging oil prices would also threaten Europe and other major oil-importing countries, including China, India, Japan, and South Korea, thereby lowering or reversing their economic growth. Iran’s own economy, which depends heavily on oil exports, would also suffer. The conflict would likely drag on, given that the definition of victory in this scenario is ambiguous. Would America win by destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities, even if reconstruction began immediately? What if Iran incited unrest in its neighbors, jeopardizing US-allied regimes in the region? Is a settlement with Iran’s leaders feasible, or is regime change crucial to an American victory? (And, in the latter case, would the US follow its pattern of ousting a Middle Eastern government without a succession plan?) Regardless of the goal, the end result would be more troops and ships in the region, more resources appropriated to fight new or revitalized terrorist organizations, and more arms for allied countries, many of which are themselves unstable. America’s stake in the Middle East would grow, undermining its attempts to free up assets for its professed “pivot” toward Asia, where it hopes to balance China’s growing influence. Living with a nuclear Iran would require expensive countermeasures and create significant risks. But going to war to impede Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and containing the subsequent chaos – including oil-price spikes, increased regional volatility, and reduced American strategic flexibility – would be far more costly. If Obama stands behind his first-term declarations, the world will pay a very high price.
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Kemp & Gay ‘12. Geoffrey Kemp, Director of the Regional Security Program at the Center for the National Interest & John Allen Gay, assistant editor at The National Interest. “The Price of War with Iran.” [http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-high-cost-of-military-action-against-iran-by-geoffrey-kemp-and-john-a--gay] [MG]
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a nuclear Iran would damage America’s strategic position in the Middle East, action aimed at forestalling Iran’s nuclear progress also carries serious strategic and economic consequences U S allies in the region would need new security guarantees If Iran continues on its path toward nuclear arms, war may well become inevitable whether instigated by Israel or the US, or provoked by Iran’s erratic foreign policy Iran has threatened to seal the Strait of Hormuz through which 20% of the world’s internationally traded oil passes A protracted conflict could mean sustained prices of roughly $150 per barrel ). Surging oil prices would also threaten other major oil-importing countries, including China India Japan nd South Korea lowering or reversing their economic growth the end result would be more troops and ships in the region more resources appropriated to fight new or revitalized terrorist organizations, and more arms for allied countries America’s stake in the Middle East would grow, undermining its attempts to free up assets for its professed “pivot” toward Asia, where it hopes to balance China’s growing influence. going to war and containing the subsequent chaos including oil-price spikes, increased regional volatility, and reduced American strategic flexibility would costly the world will pay a very high price.
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Even if the U.S. were to win the war quickly, it would devastate the world economy and the entirety of U.S. strategic capabilities—
| 4,622 | 131 | 1,332 | 727 | 23 | 206 | 0.031637 | 0.283356 |
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Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attack and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationshipthat existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emergenaturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if governmentleaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival oftheir regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for navalbuildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup ofregional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, andcounterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer inAsia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in amoredog-eat-dog world.What Kind of World will 2025 Be? Perhaps more than lessons, history loves patterns. Despite widespread changes in the world today, there is little to suggest that the future will not resemble the past in several respects. The report asserts that, under most scenarios, the trendtoward greater diffusion of authority and power that has been ongoing for acouple of decades is likely to accelerate because of the emergence of new global players, the worsening institutional deficit, potential growth in regional blocs, and enhanced strength of non-state actors and networks. The multiplicity of actors on the international scene could either strengthen the international system, by filling gaps left by aging post-World War II institutions, or could further fragment it and incapacitate international cooperation. The diversity in both type and kind of actor raises the likelihood of fragmentation occurring over the next two decades, particularly given the wide array of transnational challenges facing the international community. Because of their growing geopolitical and economic clout, the rising powers will enjoy a high degree of freedom to customize their political and economic policies rather than fully adopting Western norms. They are also likely to cherish their policy freedom to maneuver, allowing others to carry the primary burden for dealing with terrorism, climate change, proliferation, energy security, and other system maintenance issues. Existing multilateral institutions, designed for a different geopolitical order, appear too rigid and cumbersome to undertake new missions, accommodate changing memberships, and augment their resources. Nongovernmental organizations and philanthropic foundations, concentrating on specific issues, increasingly will populate the landscape but are unlikely to affect change in the absence of concerted efforts by multilateral institutions or governments. Efforts at greater inclusiveness, to reflect the emergence of the newer powers, may make it harder for international organizations to tackle transnational challenges. Respect for the dissenting views of member nations will continue to shape the agenda of organizations and limit the kinds of solutions that can be attempted. An ongoing financial crisis and prolonged recession would tilt the scales even further in the direction of a fragmented and dysfunctional international system with a heightened risk of conflict. The report concluded that the rising BRIC powers (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) seem averse to challenging the international system, as Germany and Japan did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but this of course could change if their widespread hopes for greater prosperity become frustrated and the current benefits they derive from a globalizing world turn negative.
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Burrows and Harris 9- Mathew J. Burrows is a counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, Jennifer Harris is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, The Washington Quarterly, April, http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf
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Great Depression lessons include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East the angry and disenfranchised become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions conflict over resources, could reemerge if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to supplies this could result in interstate conflicts If the fiscal stimulus focus for countries indeed turns inward of the most obvious funding targets may be military cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult An ongoing financial crisis and prolonged recession would tilt the scales even further in the direction of a fragmented and dysfunctional international system with a heightened risk of conflict. rising BRIC powers (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) seem averse to challenging the international system, but this of course could change if their widespread hopes for greater prosperity become frustrated and the current benefits they derive from a globalizing world turn negative.
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Collapse of the economy destabilizes the entire international system—
| 7,451 | 69 | 1,684 | 1,093 | 9 | 243 | 0.008234 | 0.222324 |
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Texas (UTNIF)
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It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America's "backyard"; on the contrary, the continent has arguably never been so united and independent. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his "global war on terror." His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America's sway. China is now Latin America's second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US. India is showing keen interest in the region's energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defence sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela. Similarly, in 2008, Russia's then-President Dmitri Medvedev identified the US war on terror as an opportunity to create strategic partnerships with rising powers such as Brazil, and with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), a Venezuelan-inspired bloc opposed to US designs in the region. The energy giant Gazprom and the country's military industries have spearheaded the Kremlin's effort to demonstrate Russia's ability to influence America's neighbourhood – a direct response to perceived American meddling in Russia's own "near abroad," particularly Georgia and Ukraine. Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America's broadening international relations as marking the end of US pre-eminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century. A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programmes, structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth. As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis. The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40 per cent of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the US's fastest-growing export destination. Mexico is America's second-largest foreign market (valued at $215 billion in 2012). US exports to Central America have risen by 94 per cent over the past six years; imports from the region have risen by 87 per cent. And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent. American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbours. This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy – one that recognises the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran's nuclear programme mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama's recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigour and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.
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Ben-Ami 6-18-13. Shlomo Ben-Ami, Times of Oman. “Is US losing Latin America?” [http://www.timesofoman.com/Columns/Article-1173.aspx][MG]
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It is a mantra increasingly heard US power is in decline nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America China is now Latin America's second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US. India is showing keen interest in the region's energy industry Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela in 2008, Russia's then-President Dmitri Medvedev identified the US war on terror as an opportunity to create strategic partnerships with rising powers such as Brazil, and with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), a Venezuelan-inspired bloc opposed to US designs in the region Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America's broadening international relations as marking the end of US pre-eminence Responsible economic management, , and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbours. This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy – one that recognises the diverse interests of the continent Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigour and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.
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U.S. influence is declining rapidly in Latin America and competition is rising. Increased diplomatic and economic engagement is key to lock in hegemony in the region—
| 4,446 | 166 | 1,630 | 718 | 26 | 258 | 0.036212 | 0.359331 |
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Political instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation, combat narcotics, and protect its economic interests in the region. Democracy Promotion: The United States has worked for decades to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In recent years, Chavez has become increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela's democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day. Regional Cooperation: The United States has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), of which it is a core member. While often disappointing to both the United States and Latin America, the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with democratically elected governments participate. A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization both in the region and in the United States. How the United States manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with Chavez and reacts badly to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that characterized the hemisphere's efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to U.S. relations with the region. Counternarcotics: Venezuela does not cooperate with the United States on counternarcotics, except at the most minimal level. Drug trafficking has, consequently, surged. A number of Venezuelan military officers, including the current minister of defense, have been plausibly accused by the U.S. Treasury of cooperating with the Colombian insurgent group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and facilitating drug shipments through Venezuela, especially from Apure State. Venezuelan recalcitrance in counternarcotics clearly undermines other regional efforts to combat the drug trade. Even low levels of violence would create new opportunities for the FARC and other drug traffickers to retrench and extend their reach. Economic Interests: A significant number of U.S. companies have operations in Venezuela; it remains an important market for U.S. goods and some services, especially oil services. Many of these companies could be at risk if violent internal conflict broke out. Venezuela is consistently among the five largest foreign suppliers of oil to the United States. The United States is Venezuela's largest market, buying up to nine hundred thousand barrels of oil daily, up to 45 percent of Venezuela's total oil exports. Around six hundred thousand barrels of Venezuelan crude per day are refined at CITGO facilities in the United States. Although a cut off of Venezuelan oil to the United States is theoretically possible, it is unlikely given Venezuela's dependence on the U.S. market. The United States is now less vulnerable to a cut off of supply from Venezuela as U.S. domestic production has risen and imports from elsewhere could relatively quickly replace Venezuelan oil. Venezuela's economy, on the other hand, has become more dependent on petroleum. Although production has stagnated since 2003, oil accounts for over 95 percent of Venezuela's export earnings, and export revenue pays for nearly 50 percent of the government's budget. Thus, although Venezuela is vulnerable to pressure via its dependence on its oil exports generally and the U.S. market and refineries specifically, global markets would likely react negatively to either an interruption of Venezuelan production or a crisis in U.S.-Venezuelan relations that threatens the bilateral trade in oil.
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Duddy ‘12. Patrick D. Duddy, visiting senior lecturer in international studies at Duke University and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela. “Political Unrest in Venezuela” Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 16. September 2012. [http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936] [MG]
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Political instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation, combat narcotics, and protect its economic interests in the region The U S should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela's democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta would likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela It already has a close relationship with Iran Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers The U S has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), How the U S manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere, especially Brazil A repetition of the acrimony that characterized the hemisphere's efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to U.S. relations with the region. Venezuela does not cooperate with the United States on counternarcotics, except at the most minimal level. Drug trafficking has surged. A number of Venezuelan military officers , have been plausibly accused by the U.S. Treasury of cooperating with FARC and facilitating drug shipments through Venezuela Venezuelan recalcitrance in counternarcotics clearly undermines other regional efforts to combat the drug trade. Even low levels of violence would create new opportunities for the FARC and other drug traffickers to retrench and extend their reach A significant number of U.S. companies have operations in Venezuela it remains an important market for U.S. goods and some services, especially oil services Many of these companies could be at risk if violent internal conflict broke out The United States is Venezuela's largest market, buying up to nine hundred thousand barrels of oil daily, up to 45 percent of Venezuela's total oil exports Thus, although Venezuela is vulnerable to pressure via its dependence on its oil exports generally and the U.S. market and refineries specifically, global markets would likely react negatively to either an interruption of Venezuelan production or a crisis in U.S.-Venezuelan relations that threatens the bilateral trade in oil.
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Securing these ties with Venezuela represents the most critical internal link to leadership and stability in the entire hemisphere—Oil cooperation is key
| 4,428 | 153 | 2,292 | 669 | 22 | 351 | 0.032885 | 0.524664 |
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For over 150 years, the Monroe Doctrine provided the guiding principles for U.S. policy toward Latin America, asserting U.S. primacy in the foreign affairs of the region. Over the past two decades, those principles have become increasingly obsolete. Washington’s basic policy framework, however, has not changed sufficiently to reflect the new reality. U.S. policy can no longer be based on the assumption that the United States is the most important outside actor in Latin America. If there was an era of U.S. hegemony in Latin America, it is over. In most respects, this shift reflects positive developments within Latin America itself. The region has undergone a historic transformation politically, with military-authoritarian rule giving way to vibrant, if imperfect, democracy in almost every nation. Economically, Latin America is now one of the more open market regions in the world and a crucial global provider of energy, minerals, and food. None of this is to say that Latin America has entirely overcome its history of political tumult or done enough to alleviate poverty, improve competi- tiveness and human capital, or correct extreme inequality. But it does mean that U.S. policymakers must change the way they think about the region. Latin America is not Washington’s to lose; nor is it Washing- ton’s to save. Latin America’s fate is largely in Latin America’s hands. A failure to acknowledge how Latin Americans define their own challenges has created new political strains in recent years. It has also caused U.S. policymakers to overlook the ways in which the United States can meaningfully contribute to Latin America’s progress—fur- thering the United States’ own interests in the process. By truly beginning to engage Latin America on its own terms, Washington can mark the start of a new era in U.S.-Latin America relations. It is a cliche´ to bemoan Americans’ lack of interest in Latin America. Still, this disinterest remains vexing given the region’s proximity to the United States and the remarkable interconnectedness of U.S. and Latin American economies and societies. In recent years, as Washington’s attention has been focused on crises elsewhere in the world, the connec- tions have only deepened. From 1996 to 2006, total U.S. merchandise trade with Latin America grew by 139 percent, compared to 96 percent 1 for Asia and 95 percent for the European Union (EU). In 2006, the United States exported $223 billion worth of goods to Latin American 2 consumers (compared with $55 billion to China). Latin America is the United States’ most important external source of oil, accounting for nearly 30 percent of imports (compared with 20 percent from the Middle East), as well as its main source of illegal narcotics. And as a result of both conditions in Latin America and demand for workers in the United States, migration from the region has accelerated. Latinos now account for 15 percent of the U.S. population, nearly 50 percent of recent U.S. population growth, and a growing portion of the elector- ate—allowing Latino voters increasingly to shape the U.S. political agenda. Cross-border community and family ties, as well as the Spanish- language media, mean that Latin America remains part of many Latinos’ daily lives and concerns. For all of these reasons, Latin America’s well- being directly affects the United States. But even with such integration, the opening of Latin American economies and the globalization of Latin American societies means that U.S. policy is now but one of several competing factors capable of influencing the region. Latin American states, especially the larger ones, do not consider their interests to be primarily determined by diplomatic, trade, or security ties with the United States. Brazil has made inroads into groupings such as the South-South Dialogue with South Africa and India and the Group of 20 (G20), while countries such as Chile and Mexico have struck trade and investment agreements with the EU and a number of Asian countries, China most prominently. The economic and political diversification of Latin America is reflected in Latin American attitudes as well. Esteem for U.S. global and hemispheric leadership is at its lowest level in the region in recent memory. In 2002, according to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 82 percent of Venezuelans, 34 percent of Argentineans, and 51 percent of Bolivians had a favorable view of the United States; those numbers had fallen to 56, 16, and 43 percent by 2007. The percentage of Latin Americans who approved of U.S. ideas on democracy decreased from 3 45 percent in 2002 to 29 percent in 2007. This general distrust of the United States has allowed Presidents Hugo Cha´vez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, and even Felipe Caldero´n of Mexico to bolster their domestic popular support by criticizing Washington. Most Latin Americans still prefer a mutually respectful and productive relationship with the United States, but the factors driving Latin America’s desire for greater independence are likely to shape the region’s posture toward the United States well into the future.
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Barshefsky et al ‘8. Charlene Barshefsky, James T. Hill, and Shannon K. O’Neil, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality” May 2008 [http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-latin-america-relations/p16279]
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For over 150 years, the Monroe Doctrine provided the guiding principles for U.S. policy toward Latin America, asserting U.S. primacy in the foreign affairs of the region. Over the past two decades, those principles have become increasingly obsolete Washington’s basic policy framework has not changed sufficiently to reflect the new reality If there was an era of U.S. hegemony in Latin America, it is over Economically, Latin America is now one of the more open market regions in the world and a crucial global provider of energy, minerals, and food U.S. policymakers must change the way they think about the region By truly beginning to engage Latin America on its own terms, Washington can mark the start of a new era in U.S.-Latin America relations. It is a cliche´ to bemoan Americans’ lack of interest in Latin America. Latinos now account for 15 percent of the U.S. population, nearly 50 percent of recent U.S. population growth, and a growing portion of the elector- ate—allowing Latino voters increasingly to shape the U.S. political agenda But even with such integration, the opening of Latin American economies and the globalization of Latin American societies means that U.S. policy is now but one of several competing factors capable of influencing the region. Esteem for U.S. global and hemispheric leadership is at its lowest level in the region in recent memory
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Success in the region is key to overall foreign policy—
| 5,145 | 55 | 1,377 | 824 | 10 | 226 | 0.012136 | 0.274272 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,267 |
Do Great Powers Care about Status? Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity. Much of this research concerns individuals, but international politics takes place between groups. Is there reason to expect individuals who act in the name of states to be motivated by status concerns? Compelling findings in social psychology suggest a positive answer. Social identity theory (sit) has entered international relations research as a psychological explanation for competitive interstate behavior.26 According to the theory’s originator, Henri Tajfel, social identity is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”27 Tajfel and his followers argue that deep-seated human motivations of self-definition and self-esteem induce people to define their identity in relation to their in-group, to compare and contrast that in-group with out-groups, and to want that comparison to reflect favorably on themselves. In a [End Page 35] remarkable set of experiments that has since been replicated dozens of times, Tajfel and his collaborators found that simply assigning subjects to trivially defined “minimal” in-groups led them to discriminate in favor of their in-group at the expense of an out-group, even when nothing else about the setting implied a competitive relationship. Although sit appears to provide a plausible candidate explanation for interstate conflict, moving beyond its robust but general implication about the ubiquitous potential for status seeking to specific hypotheses about state behavior has proved challenging. In particular, experimental findings concerning which groups individuals will select as relevant comparisons and which of many possible identity-maintenance strategies they will choose have proved highly sensitive to the assumptions made about the social context. The results of experimental research seeking to predict responses to status anxiety—whether people will choose social mobility (identifying with a higher status group), social creativity (seeking to redefine the relevant status-conferring dimensions to favor those in which one’s group excels), social conflict (contesting the status-superior group’s claim to higher rank), or some other strategy—are similarly highly context dependent.28 For international relations the key unanswered question remains: under what circumstances might the constant underlying motivation for a positive self-image and high status translate into violent conflict? While sit research is suggestive, standard concerns about the validity of experimental findings are exacerbated by the fact that the extensive empirical sit literature is generally not framed in a way that captures salient features of international relations. The social system in which states operate is dramatically simpler than the domestic social settings much of the research seeks to capture. Decision makers’ identification with the state is generally a given, group boundaries are practically impermeable, and there are very few great powers and very limited mobility. For states, comparison choice and the selection of status- maintenance strategies are constrained by exogenous endowments and geographical location. Natural and historical endowments—size and power potential—vary much more among states than among individuals [End Page 36] and so play a much larger role in determining hierarchies and influencing the selection of identity maintenance strategies. Assumptions built into most sit research to date generally do not capture these realities of interstate life. In particular, standard sit research designs beg the question of the expected costs of competing for status. Experiments do not generally posit situations in which some groups are endowed with demonstrably superior means with which to discriminate in favor of their own group at the expense of out-groups. Indeed, built in to most experimental setups is an implied assumption of material equality among groups. Yet international politics is notable as a social realm with especially large disparities in material capabilities, and decision makers are unlikely to follow identity-maintenance strategies that are demonstrably beyond their means. Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt the relevance for states of sit’s core finding that individual preferences for higher status will affect intergroup interactions. Individuals who identify with a group transfer the individual’s status preference to the group’s relations with other groups. If those who act on behalf of a state (or those who select them) identify with that state, then they can be expected to derive utility from its status in international society. In addition, there are no evident reasons to reject the theory’s applicability to interstate settings that mimic the standard sit experimental setup—namely, in an ambiguous hierarchy of states that are comparable in material terms. As Jacques Hymans notes: “In the design of most sit experiments there is an implicit assumption of rough status and power parity. Moreover, the logic of sit theory suggests that its findings of ingroup bias may in fact be dependent on this assumption.”29 Status conflict is thus more likely in flat, ambiguous hierarchies than in clearly stratified ones. And there are no obvious grounds for rejecting the basic finding that comparison choice will tend to be “similar but upward” (that is, people will compare and contrast their group with similar but higher status groups).30 In most settings outside the laboratory this leaves a lot of room for consequential choices, but in the context of great power relations, the set of feasible comparison choices is constrained in highly consequential ways. [End Page 37] How Polarity Affects Status Competition sit is often seen in a scholarly context that contrasts power-based and identity-based explanations.31 It is thus put forward as a psychological explanation for competitive behavior that is completely divorced from distributions of material resources. But there is no theoretical justification for this separation. On the contrary, a long-standing research tradition in sociology, economics, and political science finds that actors seek to translate material resources into status. Sociologists from Weber and Veblen onward have postulated a link between material conditions and the stability of status hierarchies. When social actors acquire resources, they try to convert them into something that can have more value to them than the mere possession of material things: social status. As Weber put it: “Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity.” 32 This link continues to find support in the contemporary economics literature on income distribution and status competition.33 Status is a social, psychological, and cultural phenomenon. Its expression appears endlessly varied; it is thus little wonder that the few international relations scholars who have focused on it are more struck by its variability and diversity than by its susceptibility to generalization. 34 Yet if sit captures important dynamics of human behavior, and if people seek to translate resources into status, then the distribution of capabilities will affect the likelihood of status competition in predictable ways. Recall that theory, research, and experimental results suggest that relative status concerns will come to the fore when status hierarchy is ambiguous and that people will tend to compare the states with which they identify to similar but higher-ranked states.35 Dissatisfaction arises not from dominance itself but from a dominance that [End Page 38] appears to rest on ambiguous foundations. Thus, status competition is unlikely in cases of clear hierarchies in which the relevant comparison out-groups for each actor are unambiguously dominant materially. Applied to international politics, this begins to suggest the conditions conducive to status competition. For conflict to occur, one state must select another state as a relevant comparison that leaves it dissatisfied with its status; it must then choose an identity-maintenance strategy in response that brings it into conflict with another state that is also willing to fight for its position. This set of beliefs and strategies is most likely to be found when states are relatively evenly matched in capabilities. The more closely matched actors are materially, the morelikely they areto experience uncertainty about relative rank. When actors start receiving mixed signals—some indicating that they belong in a higher rank while others reaffirm their present rank—they experience status inconsistency and face incentives to resolve the uncertainty. When lower-ranked actors experience such inconsistency, they will use higher-ranked actors as referents. Since both high- and low-status actors are biased toward higher status, uncertainty fosters conflict as the same evidence feeds contradictory expectations and claims. When the relevant out-group is unambiguously dominant materially, however, status inconsistency is less likely. More certain of their relative rank, subordinate actors are less likely to face the ambiguity that drives status competition. And even if they do, their relative weakness makes strategies of social competition an unlikely response. Given limited material wherewithal, either acquiescence or strategies of social creativity are more plausible responses, neither of which leads to military conflict. The theory suggests that it is not just the aggregate distribution of capabilities that matters for status competition but also the evenness with which key dimensions— such as naval, military, economic, and technological—are distributed. Uneven capability portfolios—when states excel in different relevant material dimensions—make status inconsistency more likely. When an actor possesses some attributes of high status but not others, uncertainty and status inconsistency are likely.36 The more a lower-ranked actor matches the higher-ranked group in some but not all key material dimensions of status, the more likely it is to conceive an interest in contesting its rank and the more [End Page 39] likely the higher-ranked state is to resist. Thus, status competition is more likely to plague relations between leading states whose portfolios of capabilities are not only close but also mismatched. Hypotheses When applied to the setting of great power politics, these propositions suggest that the nature and intensity of status competition will be influenced by the nature of the polarity that characterizes the system. Multipolarity implies a flat hierarchy in which no state is unambiguously number one. Under such a setting, the theory predicts status inconsistency and intense pressure on each state to resolve it in a way that reflects favorably on itself. In this sense, all states are presumptively revisionist in that the absence of a settled hierarchy provides incentives to establish one. But the theory expects the process of establishing a hierarchy to be prone to conflict: any state would be expected to prefer a status quo under which there are no unambiguous superiors to any other state’s successful bid for primacy. Thus, an order in which one’s own state is number one is preferred to the status quo, which is preferred to any order in which another state is number one. The expected result will be periodic bids for primacy, resisted by other great powers.37 For its part, bipolarity, with only two states in a material position to claim primacy, implies a somewhat more stratified hierarchy that is less prone to ambiguity. Each superpower would be expected to see the other as the main relevant out-group, while second-tier major powers would compare themselves to either or both of them. Given the two poles’ clear material preponderance, second-tier major powers would not be expected to experience status dissonance and dissatisfaction, and, to the extent they did, the odds would favor their adoption of strategies of social creativity instead of conflict. For their part, the poles would be expected to seek to establish a hierarchy: each would obviously prefer to be number one, but absent that each would also prefer an ambiguous status quo in which neither is dominant to an order in which it is unambiguously outranked by the other. Unipolarity implies the most stratified hierarchy, presenting the starkest contrast to the other two polar types. The intensity of the competition over status in either a bipolar or a multipolar system might [End Page 40] vary depending on how evenly the key dimensions of state capability are distributed—a multipolar system populated by states with very even capabilities portfolios might be less prone to status competition than a bipolar system in which the two poles possess very dissimilar portfolios. But unipolarity, by definition, is characterized by one state possessing unambiguous preponderance in all relevant dimensions. The unipole provides the relevant out-group comparison for all other great powers, yet its material preponderance renders improbable identity-maintenance strategies of social competition. While second-tier states would be expected to seek favorable comparisons with the unipole, they would also be expected to reconcile themselves to a relatively clear status ordering or to engage in strategies of social creativity. General Patterns of Evidence Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. The clearest empirical implication of the theory is that status competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, the1n, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: “The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity.”39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 [End Page 41] These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang’s research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China’s capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems—for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system—appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms
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Wohlforth 9 - William C. Wohlforth is a professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”, World Politics, 61.1, Jan, MUSE
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. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity Tajfel and his followers argue that deep-seated human motivations of self-definition and self-esteem induce people to define their identity in relation to their in-group, to compare and contrast that in-group with out-groups, and to want that comparison to reflect favorably on themselves. In a [End Page 35] remarkable set of experiments that has since been replicated dozens of times, Tajfel and his collaborators found that simply assigning subjects to trivially defined “minimal” in-groups led them to discriminate in favor of their in-group at the expense of an out-group, even when nothing else about the setting implied a competitive relationship. Thus, status competition is unlikely in cases of clear hierarchies in which the relevant comparison out-groups for each actor are unambiguously dominant materially. The more closely matched actors are materially, the morelikely they areto experience uncertainty about relative rank. Uneven capability portfolios—when states excel in different relevant material dimensions—make status inconsistency more likely. These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory
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Hegemony solves status competition—that’s the biggest cause of war.
| 17,605 | 68 | 2,098 | 2,614 | 9 | 304 | 0.003443 | 0.116297 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,268 |
A3: In many ways, the results reflect a disaster for Maduro and likely signify the continued decline of Venezuela’s economy. The results also mean that political divisions within Maduro's coalition will worsen. Maduro’s lack of political experience and weak political base caused many to wonder how he might hold together the numerous factions that make up the PSUV, even with an easy victory. Now, with the elections' close results, how Maduro responds to voters’ frustrations, from high inflation to rising violent crime rates, will come under increasing scrutiny. If Maduro is unable to secure quick improvements in these arenas, he may find himself facing a quick backlash from former supporters. Diosdado Cabello, head of the National Assembly and widely considered Maduro’s main rival, raised eyebrows by tweeting during election night that the PSUV needed to undergo a period of self-criticism. This was viewed by many as Cabello trying to increase his appeal with those moderate Chavistas who voted for Capriles. Lacking the strong base of support and resounding electoral victories that Chávez enjoyed, Maduro is likely to find rival factions within the PSUV more assertive. Add to this a reinvigorated opposition, and prospects for Maduro’s ability to run the state appear poor at best. Maduro's narrow victory also dashes any expectations that he might turn pragmatic when dealing with such issues as the Venezuelan economy. Maduro’s first goal will likely be to show himself in charge and to satisfy Chavistas. This will likely lead to a doubling-down of Chávez’s policies and to profligate spending on social programs within Venezuela. Q4: What does the current situation mean for U.S.-Venezuela relations? A4: These results likely bode ill for U.S.-Venezuela relations as well. Maduro will likely be forced to play the anti-United States card to placate Chavismo’s most ardent supporters and show himself to be a Chavista to the core. Conclusion: Sunday’s result has changed the dynamics of Venezuela’s transition to its next president. The close showing signifies political uncertainty and potential conflict in the short term, as more Venezuelans seem to be tiring of the growing corruption, crime, and inflation that defined the later years of Chávez’s presidency. One thing is certain: while Maduro campaigned on inheriting the mantle from Chávez, the Venezuelan people will not overlook Venezuela’s problems as they did for the former president. Maduro described himself as the “son of Chávez,” while campaigning – but one has to believe Chávez would have been deeply disappointed with Sunday’s outcome.
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Meacham 4-16-13. Carl Meacham, Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Venezuela Post-Election: Can Maduro Govern?” [http://csis.org/publication/venezuela-post-election-can-maduro-govern] [MG]
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the results reflect a disaster for Maduro and likely signify the continued decline of Venezuela’s economy. political divisions within Maduro's coalition will worsen. If Maduro is unable to secure quick improvements he may find himself facing a quick backlash from former supporters. Lacking the strong base of support and resounding electoral victories that Chávez enjoyed, Maduro is likely to find rival factions within the PSUV more assertive Maduro's narrow victory also dashes any expectations that he might turn pragmatic when dealing with such issues as the Venezuelan economy. Maduro’s first goal will likely be to show himself in charge and to satisfy Chavistas These results likely bode ill for U.S.-Venezuela relations as well. Maduro will likely be forced to play the anti-United States card to placate Chavismo’s most ardent supporters and show himself to be a Chavista to the core The close showing signifies political uncertainty and potential conflict in the short term, as more Venezuelans seem to be tiring of the growing corruption, crime, and inflation that defined the later years of Chávez’s presidency the Venezuelan people will not overlook Venezuela’s problems as they did for the former president. Maduro described himself as the “son of Chávez,” while campaigning – but one has to believe Chávez would have been deeply disappointed with Sunday’s outcome.
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Potential for instability is high—
| 2,622 | 34 | 1,380 | 409 | 5 | 215 | 0.012225 | 0.525672 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,269 |
“Things haven’t been going well for Maduro since the election,” says Smilde. “his recent touring of the continent has been a very obvious attempt to demonstrate his legitimacy.” Following the hotly contested election, which many Venezuelans believe was stolen by a socialist government fearing the loss of power, country-wide protests erupted. Riot police fought protesters with tear gas and nightly "cacerolazo" sound protests filled the capital with a cacophony of noise. Although officially victorious, Maduro’s slim win compared to the eleven percent by which Chávez defeated the same opponent last October left the new premier with little mandate to govern.
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Baverstock 5-17-13. Alasdair, CS Monitor. Foreign Correspondent and Guidebook Author. “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition][MG]
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Things haven’t been going well for Maduro his recent touring of the continent has been a very obvious attempt to demonstrate his legitimacy. Following the hotly contested election country-wide protests erupted. Riot police fought protesters with tear gas and nightly "cacerolazo" sound protests filled the capital with a cacophony of noise. Maduro’s slim win compared to the eleven percent by which Chávez defeated the same opponent last October left the new premier with little mandate to govern.
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Election outrage means there’s a high risk of collapse--
| 662 | 56 | 497 | 100 | 9 | 77 | 0.09 | 0.77 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,270 |
And by all indications, Venezuela’s finances aren’t going to hold out for very long. The country is currently running a deficit of over 20 percent, and its national inflation rate fluctuates between 20 and 30 percent. Though it presides over one of the world’s largest oil reserves and is a card-carrying member of OPEC, Venezuela’s oil yields have been dropping throughout the Chavez era due to a lack of foreign investment. The same is true of Venezuela’s food industry. A lack of foreign investment, inefficiency, and costly subsidies have stunted overall output, resulting in food shortages that are now showing themselves in the huge lineups spilling out of government food depots nationwide. A reoccurring theme of Chavez’s economic policy was a willful ignorance regarding the creation of infrastructure and social capital that could drive economic growth beyond the era of direct government handouts. Given the structural challenges that the Venezuelan economy now faces, challenges that will preclude the government’s ability to continue Chavez-era patronage ad infinitum, a Maduro government will inevitably be faced with an economic reckoning of sorts. In the aftermath of this economic reckoning, there will be an opportunity for both domestic opposition forces within Venezuela, and American foreign policy to make inroads. Just to recap: what we are likely to see is a Maduro win, followed by a politico-economic crisis that ushers in either a return to credible multi-party democracy or a descent into conspicuous authoritarianism.¶ But how will this impact US-Venezuelan relations?¶ Given its precarious economic situation, Venezuela will need outside assistance in the near future. And while some would say that China is best suited to step up and bail out Caracas, there are a few reasons to question whether this will actually come to pass. First of all, The Chinese Development Bank has already provided a huge amount of money to the Chavez government, about $40 billion between 2008 and 2012 alone. Thus, if Venezuela were to be faced with a default, it would be Chinese investors with their money on the line. Any debt renegotiations would surely include provisions that didn’t sit well with the Venezuelan public. After all, there have already been agreements reached between Venezuela and the Chinese state-owned company Citic Group that have raised populist alarm bells regarding the signing of mineral rights over to foreign companies.¶ In this context, a limited rapprochement makes sense from a Venezuelan point of view, as it would balance against a preponderance of Chinese economic influence. Now that the “Bolivarian Revolution” is all but discredited, and countries like Brazil have proven that it’s possible to alleviate poverty through trade and keep US influence at arm’s length, a US-Venezuelan thaw is theoretically possible. However, authorities in Washington will likely have to endure another round of vitriol and wait until the dust settles in Venezuelan domestic politics before their window of opportunity presents itself.
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Fillingham 3-10-13. Zachary, Managing Editor and Asia Analyst for Geopolitical Monitor, holds an MA in Chinese Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, England and a BA in International Relations from York University in Toronto, Canada, has studied extensively in China, “Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?” [http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/]
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Venezuela’s finances aren’t going to hold out long Venezuela’s oil yields have been dropping due to a lack of foreign investment Given the structural challenges that the Venezuelan economy now faces Maduro will be faced with an economic reckoning there will be an opportunity for both domestic opposition forces within Venezuela, and American foreign policy to make inroads how will this impact US-Venezuelan relations? Given its precarious economic situation, Venezuela will need outside assistance in the near future rapprochement makes sense from a Venezuelan point of view, as it would balance against a preponderance of Chinese economic influence a US-Venezuelan thaw is possible
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New US investment solves oil production, relations, and stability
| 3,066 | 66 | 684 | 478 | 9 | 103 | 0.018828 | 0.215481 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,271 |
The oil flowing from the El Palito refinery sells for more than five times what it cost when President Hugo Chavez took office in 1999. Yet when Chavez died in March he left Venezuela's cash cow, its state-run oil company, in such dire straits that analysts say $100-a-barrel oil may no longer be enough to keep the country afloat barring a complete overhaul of a deteriorating petroleum industry.¶ The situation is more urgent than ever, analysts say. The price of crude has slumped in recent weeks and Chavez's heir, Nicolas Maduro, appears to have done little to address declining production, billions in debt and infrastructure deficiencies that have caused major accidents including a blaze that killed at least 42 people at Venezuela's largest refinery last year.¶ Maduro has retained Chavez's oil minister and the head of state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A., Rafael Ramirez. And he appears intent on continuing to send cut-rate oil to members of the 18-nation Petrocaribe alliance, for which Venezuela is hosting a summit on Saturday.¶ Ramirez said Friday that Maduro would use the meeting to propose creating a special economic zone for group members.¶ PDVSA, which accounts for 96 percent of the country's export earnings, no longer "generates enough income to cover all its costs and finance its commitments," said Pedro Luis Rodriguez Sosa, an energy expert at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Administration in Caracas.¶ He said that "you can see PDVSA is in trouble" at the $100-a-barrel level because of the many millions lost to gasoline subsidies and spending on domestic social spending and PDVSA's use as a "geopolitical tool" to maintain regional alliances.¶ Venezuela has the world's largest oil reserves but PDVSA's production, earnings and income all appear to be on a downward slide and its debts to suppliers rose 35 percent. Its debt to the Central Bank of Venezuela reached $26.19 billion last year, a nearly eight-fold increase in two years.¶ The government makes no apologies. It says it is employing the country's most important natural resource for the good of the people and promises increased production and revenues in the immediate future.¶ Ramirez said that PDVSA's efforts remained focused on developing the remote Orinoco belt, site of the world's biggest oil reserves, with the aid of oil firms from China, Russia, the U.S., Italy, Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan and Spain. Venezuela hopes to lift overall production to some 3.32 million barrels a day, 200,000 more than last year.¶ "We're in a process of trying to attract investment in dollars other than ours," Ramirez said, assuring reporters that PDVSA would work with private investors to not take on more debt to make new investment.
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Sanchez 3-4-13 [Fabiola, Associated Press, “Outlook Grim in Venezuela's Essential Oil Industry,” [http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/outlook-grim-venezuelas-essential-oil-industry-19108842?singlePage=true#.UY67xKLktX8]
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when Chavez died in March he left Venezuela's cash cow, its state-run oil company, in such dire straits that analysts say $100-a-barrel oil may no longer be enough to keep the country afloat barring a complete overhaul of a deteriorating petroleum industry The situation is more urgent than ever Maduro, appears to have done little to address declining production and infrastructure PDVSA no longer "generates enough income to cover all its costs and finance its commitments Venezuela has the world's largest oil reserves but PDVSA's production, earnings and income all appear to be on a downward slide We're in a process of trying to attract investment in dollars other than ours
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Foreign investment in oil infrastructure is key
| 2,737 | 47 | 680 | 444 | 7 | 111 | 0.015766 | 0.25 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,272 |
The prevailing view of failed states is, to repeat, not wrong, just incomplete—for it ignores the competitive nature of great power interactions. The traditional understanding of power vacuums is still very relevant. Sudan, Central Asia, Indonesia, parts of Latin America and many other areas are characterized by weak and often collapsing states that are increasingly arenas for great power competition. The interest of these great powers is not to rebuild the state or to engage in “nation-building” for humanitarian purposes but to establish a foothold in the region, to obtain favorable economic deals, especially in the energy sector, and to weaken the presence of other great powers. Let’s look at just three possible future scenarios. In the first, imagine that parts of Indonesia become increasingly difficult to govern and are wracked by riots. Chinese minorities are attacked, while pirates prowl sealanes in ever greater numbers. Bejing, pressured by domestic opinion to help the Chinese diaspora, as well as by fears that its seaborne commerce will be interrupted, intervenes in the region. China’s action is then perceived as a threat by Japan, which projects its own power into the region. The United States, India and others then intervene to protect their interests, as well. In the second scenario, imagine that Uzbekistan collapses after years of chronic mismanagement and continued Islamist agitation. Uzbekistan’s natural resources and its strategic value as a route to the Caspian or Middle East are suddenly up for grabs, and Russia and China begin to compete for control over it, possibly followed by other states like Iran and Turkey. In a third scenario, imagine that the repressive government of Sudan loses the ability to maintain control over the state, and that chaos spreads from Darfur outward to Chad and other neighbors. Powers distant and nearby decide to extend their control over the threatened oil fields. China, though still at least a decade away from having serious power projection capabilities, already has men on the ground in Sudan protecting some of the fields and uses them to control the country’s natural resources. These scenarios are not at all outlandish, as recent events have shown. Kosovo, which formally declared independence on February 17, 2008, continues to strain relationships between the United States and Europe, on the one hand, and Serbia and Russia, on the other. The resulting tension may degenerate into violence as Serbian nationalists and perhaps even the Serbian army intervene in Kosovo. It is conceivable then that Russia would support Belgrade, leading to a serious confrontation with the European Union and the United States. A similar conflict, pitting Russia against NATO or the United States alone, or some other alliance of European states, could develop in several post-Soviet regions, from Georgia to the Baltics. Last summer’s war in Georgia, for instance, showed incipient signs of a great power confrontation between Russia and the United States over the fate of a weak state, further destabilized by a rash local leadership and aggressive meddling by Moscow. The future of Ukraine may follow a parallel pattern: Russian citizens (or, to be precise, ethnic Russians who are given passports by Moscow) may claim to be harassed by Ukrainian authorities, who are weak and divided. A refugee problem could then arise, giving Moscow a ready justification to intervene militarily. The question would then be whether NATO, or the United States, or some alliance of Poland and other states would feel the need and have the ability to prevent Ukraine from falling under Russian control. Another example could arise in Iraq. If the United States fails to stabilize the situation and withdraws, or even merely scales down its military presence too quickly, one outcome could be the collapse of the central government in Baghdad. The resulting vacuum would be filled by militias and other groups, who would engage in violent conflict for oil, political control and sectarian revenge. This tragic situation would be compounded if Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two regional powers with the most direct interests in the outcome, entered the fray more directly than they have so far. In sum, there are many more plausible scenarios in which a failed state could become a playground of both regional and great power rivalry, which is why we urgently need to dust off the traditional view of failed states and consider its main features as well as its array of consequences. The traditional view starts from a widely shared assumption that, as nature abhors vacuums, so does the international system. As Richard Nixon once said to Mao Zedong, “In international relations there are no good choices. One thing is sure—we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled.”6 The power vacuums created by failed states attract the interests of great powers because they are an easy way to expand their spheres of influence while weakening their opponents or forestalling their intervention. A state that decides not to fill a power vacuum is effectively inviting other states to do so, thereby potentially decreasing its own relative power. This simple, inescapable logic is based on the view that international relations are essentially a zero-sum game: My gain is your loss. A failed state creates a dramatic opportunity to gain something, whether natural resources, territory or a strategically pivotal location. The power that controls it first necessarily increases its own standing relative to other states. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1915, the anarchy of the world is due to the backwardness of weak states; . . . the modern nations have lived in armed peace and collapsed into hideous warfare because in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Central and South America there are rich territories in which weakness invites exploitation, in which inefficiency and corruption invite imperial expansion, in which the prizes are so great that the competition for them is to the knife.7 The threat posed by failed states, therefore, need not emanate mainly from within. After all, by definition a failed state is no longer an actor capable of conducting a foreign policy. It is a politically inert geographic area whose fate is dependent on the actions of others. The main menace to international security stems from competition between these “others.” As Arnold Wolfers put it in 1951, because of the competitive nature of international relations, “expansion would be sure to take place wherever a power vacuum existed.”8 The challenge is that the incentive to extend control over a vacuum or a failed state is similar for many states. In fact, even if one state has a stronger desire to control a power vacuum because of its geographic proximity, natural resources or strategic location, this very interest spurs other states to seek command over the same territory simply because doing so weakens that state. The ability to deprive a state of something that will give it a substantial advantage is itself a source of power. Hence a failed state suddenly becomes a strategic prize, because it either adds to one’s own power or subtracts from another’s. The prevailing and traditional views of failed states reflect two separate realities. Therefore, we should not restrict ourselves to one view or the other when studying our options. The difference is not just academic; it has very practical consequences. First and foremost, if we take the traditional view, failed states may pose an even greater danger to international security than policymakers and academics currently predict. Humanitarian disasters are certainly tragedies that deserve serious attention; yet they do not pose the worst threats to U.S. security or world stability. That honor still belongs to the possibility of a great power confrontation. While the past decade or so has allowed us to ignore great power rivalries as the main feature of international relations, there is no guarantee that this happy circumstance will continue long into the future. Second, there is no one-size-fits-all policy option for a given failed state. Humanitarian disasters carry a set of policy prescriptions that are liable to be counterproductive in an arena of great power conflict. It is almost a truism that failed states require multilateral cooperation, given their global impact. But the traditional view of failed states leads us not to seek multilateral settings but to act preemptively and often unilaterally. Indeed, it is often safer to seek to extend one’s control over failed states quickly in order to limit the possibility of intervention by other great powers.
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Grygiel ‘9. Jakub Grygiel. Associate Professor of International Relations @ Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University. “Vacuum Wars: The Coming Competition Over Failed States.” American Interest. Jul/Aug 2009. [, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=622]
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parts of Latin America are characterized by weak and often collapsing states that are increasingly arenas for great power competition the anarchy of the world is due to the backwardness of weak states the modern nations have lived in armed peace and collapsed into hideous warfare because in Central and South America there are rich territories in which weakness invites exploitation, in which inefficiency and corruption invite imperial expansion, in which the prizes are so great that the competition for them is to the knife because of the competitive nature of international relations, “expansion would be sure to take place wherever a power vacuum existed. failed states may pose an even greater danger to international security than policymakers and academics currently predict. the traditional view of failed states leads us not to seek multilateral settings but to act preemptively and often unilaterally.
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That ensures great power competition and conflict—
| 8,681 | 50 | 913 | 1,393 | 7 | 142 | 0.005025 | 0.101938 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,273 |
Other observers cite the socialist leader’s continued belligerence toward Washington – Maduro blames the US government’s “dark forces” for the death of Mr. Chávez and has pursued the provocative rhetoric of his predecessor – as a factor in the US’s reluctance to recognize Maduro as president. “You can’t blame the US for not extending their hand,” says Mr. Smilde. “Maduro has been denouncing US conspiracies since the day Chávez died.”
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Baverstock 5-17-13. Alasdair, CS Monitor. Foreign Correspondent and Guidebook Author. “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition][MG]
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observers cite the socialist leader’s continued belligerence toward Washington Maduro blames the US government’s “dark forces” for the death of Chávez and has pursued the provocative rhetoric of his predecessor Maduro has been denouncing US conspiracies since the day Chávez died.”
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Chavez death has decimated relations—
| 437 | 37 | 281 | 70 | 5 | 41 | 0.071429 | 0.585714 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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5,274 |
With Chavez’s death, some have hoped for a change in the US-Venezuela relationship. But just because Chavez is gone it doesn’t mean the tensions in bilateral relations will ease. The U.S. is too useful and tempting a foil for papering over internal disagreements in Chavez’s party and for rallying loyal supporters for the upcoming presidential election to expect any abrupt change. Heir apparent and now interim President Nicolas Maduro’s speech right before Chavez’s death shows this. In it he expelled two U.S. diplomats and even accused the U.S. of causing Chavez’s cancer.¶ But in the longer term, trade, commercial relations and personal ties could shift U.S.-Venezuelan relations for the better. First and foremost are the economic ties between the two nations. Despite the rhetorical animosity of the last decade, trade continued. The U.S. remains the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil—some 40 percent percent of Venezuelan oil exports (and oil makes up over 90 percent of the country’s total exports). In turn, the U.S. has continued to send machinery and cars, and even increased exports of natural gas and petroleum products to the South American nation.¶ The hard currency and goods are vital to the functioning of Venezuela’s economy, government and society, and may become even more so through the anticipated tough economic times ahead.¶ Despite the increased government management of the economy through price controls and the nationalization of hundreds of private companies over the last decade, many well- and lesser-known U.S. companies still work in Venezuela, providing not just goods but ongoing links with the United States. In addition to these commercial links, the more than 200,000 Venezuelans living in the U.S. and the hundreds of thousands more that have ties through family, friends and colleagues, could also bring the two countries together.¶ Finally, as subsequent Venezuelan governments look to adjust their economic policies in the coming months and years, the experience of their neighbors provide incentives to forge a more amicable bilateral relationship. Colombia, Brazil, Peru, along with other Latin American nations, have opened up to the U.S. and the world more broadly in recent years and in the process have benefited tremendously.¶ In the last set of hemispheric elections, a “third way” combining open markets, balanced fiscal accounts, and socially inclusive policies—most closely identified with former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva—became an almost mantra for incumbent and opposition party candidates alike (including Chavez’s 2012 rival, Henrique Capriles Radonski). These nations and leaders illustrate a real and positive path forward, not just economically but also diplomatically.¶ Today Venezuela faces significant political uncertainty, as Mr Maduro works to unite the many factions within Chavez’s party. He does so without Chavez’s charisma nor the deep-seated loyalty he inspired. The next administration also will confront growing economic and fiscal problems, making governing all the harder in the months to come. Still, in most of Latin America anti-U.S. rhetoric is fading, which suggests it can in Venezuela too.
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O’Neil 3-6-13. Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow of Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “New era for US-Venezuela relations?” [http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/03/06/new-era-for-u-s-venezuela-relations/]
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With Chavez’s death, some have hoped for a change in the US-Venezuela relationship just because Chavez is gone doesn’t mean the tensions in bilateral relations will ease trade, commercial relations could shift U.S.-Venezuelan relations for the better. First and foremost are the economic ties between the two nations The U.S. remains the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil 40 percent percent of Venezuelan oil exports the U.S. has continued to send petroleum products hard currency and goods are vital to the functioning of Venezuela’s economy and may become even more so through the anticipated tough economic times ahead as subsequent Venezuelan governments look to adjust their economic policies in the coming months and years, the experience of their neighbors provide incentives to forge a more amicable bilateral relationship. Colombia, Brazil, Peru, along with other Latin American nations, have opened up to the U.S. and the world more broadly in recent years and in the process have benefited tremendously These nations and leaders illustrate a real and positive path forward, not just economically but also diplomatically Venezuela faces significant political uncertainty in most of Latin America anti-U.S. rhetoric is fading, which suggests it can in Venezuela too
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Relations are delicate—Maintaining economic ties is key to success
| 3,199 | 67 | 1,276 | 488 | 9 | 195 | 0.018443 | 0.39959 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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5,275 |
Iran’s closest relationship is with Venezuela. Although both countries have very different ¶ guiding ideologies and political structures, they are bound by a common rejection of US ¶ leadership in the international system and by their significant petroleum exports, signified by ¶ their dual membership in OPEC. The State Department has determined Venezuela to be “not ¶ cooperating fully United States antiterrorism efforts” since 2006. Distinct from the designation ¶ of “state sponsor of terrorism”, this classification nevertheless resulted in an US arms embargo, ¶ which was extended in May 201118¶ . In the past decade Tehran and Caracas have engaged in a ¶ broad spectrum of commitments ranging from mutual diplomatic support to military exchange. ¶ Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has shown himself to be committed to Iranian sovereignty—¶ supporting Iran’s nuclear program at the IAEA—and to Iran’s vision of an anti-Western coalition ¶ of developing states.¶ As long as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez—or some successor with a similar ideology and ¶ hostility to the US—continues to define his role as one of opposition to the US, Washington has little hope of bettering its political position with Caracas or diminishing Iran’s close affiliation. ¶ That being said, US-Venezuelan commercial ties are strong and provide links between both ¶ countries which help maintain an undercurrent of stability in the relationship. At present, the US ¶ need not be too concerned about this Iran-Venezuelan relationship, despite the threatening ¶ language used by both presidents. Mutual US-Venezuelan energy dependence mitigates the possibility of a more serious breach in relations.
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Fite ‘12. Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf]
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Iran’s closest relationship is with Venezuela they are bound by a common rejection of US leadership The State Department has determined Venezuela to be “not cooperating fully U S antiterrorism efforts” since 2006 Tehran and Caracas have engaged in a broad spectrum of commitments As long as Chavez or some successor continues to define his role as one of opposition to the US, Washington has little hope of bettering its political position with Caracas or diminishing Iran’s close affiliation US-Venezuelan energy mitigates the possibility of a more serious breach in relations
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Trade, specifically energy cooperation is key to end the Iran-Venezuela alliance—
| 1,684 | 81 | 577 | 257 | 11 | 91 | 0.042802 | 0.354086 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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By definition, the advent of a “nuclear-armed Iran” means the ¶ failure of one form of U.S. deterrence strategy — the deterrence of ¶ proliferation. Both the Obama administration and its predecessor publicly ¶ committed the United States to keeping Tehran from acquiring nuclear ¶ weapons. So in postulating a nuclear-armed Iran, we must accept up front ¶ that U.S. credibility – a key component of deterrence – had suffered a ¶ serious blow, one that will generally make it harder subsequently to deter ¶ various threats from the Islamic Republic.¶ Of particular concern is nuclear-backed “adventurism,” defined ¶ here as more risk-acceptant Iranian challenges to regional and global order ¶ than currently exist. Examples include heightened levels of: politicalmilitary-economic intimidation, support for terrorism and insurgency, ¶ clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and the proliferation of ¶ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to others. At the end of this ¶ spectrum is the potential for direct combat with U.S. forces and Iranian ¶ nuclear use, most likely arising from conflict escalation.
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Giles ‘11 [Gregory, Assistant Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation and Manager of its Weapons Proliferation Analysis Division, “Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran from Adventurism and Nuclear Use,” May, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/book/chapter5.pdf]
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the advent of a “nuclear-armed Iran” means the failure of one form of U.S. deterrence strategy in postulating a nuclear-armed Iran, we must accept up front that U.S. credibility had suffered a serious blow Of particular concern is nuclear-backed “adventurism,” defined here as more risk-acceptant Iranian challenges to regional and global order than currently exist. Examples include heightened levels of: politicalmilitary-economic intimidation, support for terrorism and insurgency, clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and the proliferation of WMD At the end is direct combat with U.S. forces and Iranian nuclear use, most likely arising from conflict escalation
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Iran War goes Nuclear—
| 1,105 | 22 | 672 | 174 | 4 | 99 | 0.022989 | 0.568966 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Given Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there is concern throughout the region and in the United States as to what role supportive countries like ¶ Venezuela might play in the advancement and proliferation of nuclear ¶ technologies. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has expressed concern saying, “We are very worried and I can’t refrain from saying so, ¶ that nuclear war be brought to our neighborhood. This is very serious, ¶ very worrying,”19 and with seemingly good reason. In September 2009, ¶ “Iran said it test-fired short-range missiles, just days after it confirmed ¶ it is building a second uranium-enrichment facility.”20 Rodolfo Sanz, ¶ Venezuela’s minister of basic industries and mining has indicated that ¶ Venezuela “could have important reserves of Uranium,” and while he ¶ rejects allegations that Venezuela is supplying Iran’s nuclear program, ¶ he did confirm that “Iran is helping us with geophysical aerial probes ¶ and geochemical analyses.”21 In September 2009, Chávez announced an ¶ agreement with Russia for assistance in developing a nuclear energy program and plans for the establishment of a “nuclear village” with technological assistance from Iran.22¶ Asked if Washington is worried, Thomas Shannon, then the top ¶ State Department official for Latin America, responded, “What worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links ¶ to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks that took place in Buenos Aires,” ¶ concluding, “Past is prologue.”23 As far back as November 2007, the ¶ United States House of Representatives passed a resolution “expressing ¶ concern about threats to the U.S. by deepening economic and security ¶ ties between Iran and like-minded regimes in the Western Hemisphere, ¶ including Venezuela.” The resolution had its base in “evidence that ¶ Iranian-backed Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization, raises millions from counterfeit products produced in the tri-border region of ¶ Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, and growing efforts backed by Iran to ¶ foment anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.”24 It is therefore no surprise that in 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Chávez ¶ government of “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah ¶ facilitators and fundraisers.” 25 In a hearing before the Senate Armed ¶ Services Committee, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, then Commander ¶ of the U.S. Southern Command, testified that “We have seen… an increase in a wide level of activity by the Iranian government in this region.” He continued, “That is a concern principally because of the connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of ¶ terrorism, and Hezbollah.”26 It is relevant to note that at the printing of ¶ this publication, there is global controversy over Ahmadinejad’s nomination of Ahmad Vahidi as the minister of defense for Iran. Vahidi is one ¶ of five Iranian officials wanted by Interpol to face charges in Argentina ¶ for alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires.27 Without providing any specifics, Stavridis also ¶ testified, “We have been seeing in Colombia a direct connection between Hezbollah activity and narco-trafficking activity.”28 In October ¶ 2008, following a two-year investigation, 36 suspects were arrested in ¶ Colombia on charges related to cocaine smuggling and money laundering. Gladys Sanchez, the lead investigator for the case said, “The profits ¶ from the sales of drugs went to finance Hezbollah. This is an example ¶ of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal organizations, the FARC, the paramilitaries and terrorists.” 29
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Stubits ‘09 [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin ¶ American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A ¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from The American ¶ University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin ¶ America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the Wilson Center, ¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate ¶ Executive Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners ¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America: Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf]
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Given Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there is concern throughout the region and in the United States as to what role supportive countries like Venezuela might play in the advancement and proliferation of nuclear tech We are very worried that nuclear war be brought to our neighborhood Venezuela “could have important reserves of Uranium Chávez announced an agreement with Russia for assistance in developing a nuclear energy program and plans for the establishment of a “nuclear village” with technological assistance from Iran What worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks that took place in Buenos Aires That is a concern principally because of the connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of terrorism, and Hezbollah
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The alliance ensures prolif and terrorism- causes nuclear war
| 3,649 | 61 | 825 | 570 | 9 | 130 | 0.015789 | 0.22807 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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economics/ energy Expanded trade, investment, and energy cooperation offer the greatest promise for robust US-Latin American relations . Independent of government policies, these areas have seen tremendous growth and development, driven chiefly by the private sector . The US government needs to better appreciate the rising importance of Latin America—with its expanding markets for US exports, burgeoning opportunities for US investments, enormous reserves of energy and minerals, and continuing supply of needed labor—for the longer term performance of the US economy . With Brazil and many other Latin American economies thriving and showing promise for sustained rapid growth and rising incomes, the search for economic opportunities has become the main force shaping relationships in the hemisphere . Intensive economic engagement by the United States may be the best foundation for wider partnerships across many issues as well as the best way to energize currently listless US relations with the region . What Latin America’s largely middle and upper middle income countries— and their increasingly middle class populations—most want and need from the United States is access to its $16-trillion-a-year economy, which is more than three times the region’s economies combined . Most Latin American nations experienced quicker recovery from the financial crisis than did the United States, and they are growing at a faster pace . Nonetheless, they depend on US capital for investment, US markets for their exports, and US technology and managerial innovation to lift productivity . They also rely on the steady remittances from their citizens in the United States . The United States currently buys about 40 percent of Latin America’s exports and an even higher percentage of its manufactured products . It remains the first or second commercial partner for nearly every country in the region . And it provides nearly 40 percent of foreign investment and upwards of 90 percent of the $60 billion or so in remittance income that goes to Latin America .
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InterAmerican Dialogue ‘12 (The Inter-American Dialogue is the leading U.S. center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, “Remaking The Relationship The United States And Latin America”, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, April 2012)
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trade, investment, and energy cooperation offer the greatest promise for robust US-Latin American relations these areas have seen tremendous growth and development, driven chiefly by the private sector . The US government needs to better appreciate the rising importance of Latin America with its expanding markets for US exports, burgeoning opportunities for US investments, enormous reserves of energy and minerals, and continuing supply of needed labor—for the longer term performance of the US economy With Brazil and many other Latin American economies thriving and showing promise for sustained rapid growth and rising incomes the search for economic opportunities has become the main force shaping relationships in the hemisphere . Intensive economic engagement by the United States may be the best foundation for wider partnerships across many issues as well as the best way to energize currently listless US relations with the region Latin American nations depend on US capital for investment, US markets for their exports, and US technology and managerial innovation to lift productivity They also rely on the steady remittances from their citizens in the United States The United States currently buys about 40 percent of Latin America’s exports and an even higher percentage of its manufactured products . It remains the first or second commercial partner for nearly every country in the region And it provides nearly 40 percent of foreign investment and upwards of 90 percent of the $60 billion or so in remittance income that goes to Latin America
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Economic engagement key to leadership and relations—
| 2,057 | 52 | 1,561 | 321 | 7 | 244 | 0.021807 | 0.760125 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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US economic preeminence in Latin America has, however, waned in recent years . Just a decade ago, 55 percent of the region’s imports originated in the United States . Today, the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin America’s imports . China and Europe have made huge inroads . China’s share of trade in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of the United States; it is a close second in Argentina and Colombia . Furthermore, Latin American nations now trade much more among themselves . Argentina, for example, may soon replace the United States as Brazil’s second largest trad - ing partner, just behind China . Still, these changes must be put in perspective . Even as the US share of the Latin American market has diminished, its exports to the region have been rising at an impressive pace . They have more than doubled since 2000, grow - ing an average of nearly 9 percent a year, 2 percent higher than US exports worldwide . US trade should expand even faster in the coming period as Latin America’s growth continues to be strong . But the United States will have to work harder and harder to compete for the region’s markets and resources . While Latin America has been diversifying its international economic ties, the region’s expanding economies have become more critical to US economic growth and stability . Today the United States exports more to Latin America than it does to Europe; twice as much to Mexico than it does to China; and more to Chile and Colombia than it does to Russia . Even a cursory examination of the numbers points to how much the United States depends on the region for oil and minerals . Latin America accounts for a third of US oil imports . Mexico is the second-biggest supplier after Canada . Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia sit among the top dozen, and imports from Brazil are poised to rise sharply with its recent offshore dis - coveries . Within a decade, Brazil and Mexico may be two of the three largest suppliers of oil to the United States .
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InterAmerican Dialogue ’12 (The Inter-American Dialogue is the leading U.S. center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, “Remaking The Relationship The United States And Latin America”, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, April 2012)
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US economic preeminence in Latin America has, however, waned in recent years . Just a decade ago, 55 percent of the region’s imports originated in the United States . Today, the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin America’s imports . China and Europe have made huge inroads China’s share of trade in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of the United States a close second in Argentina and Colombia . US trade should expand even faster in the coming period as Latin America’s growth continues to be strong . the United States will have to work harder and harder to compete for the region’s markets and resources . the region’s expanding economies have become more critical to US economic growth and stability the United States exports more to Latin America than it does to Europe; twice as much to Mexico than it does to China Even a cursory examination of the numbers points to how much the United States depends on the region for oil and minerals . Latin America accounts for a third of US oil imports . Mexico is the second-biggest supplier after Canada Within a decade, Brazil and Mexico may be two of the three largest suppliers of oil to the United States
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U.S. is losing Latin America—
| 2,009 | 29 | 1,183 | 357 | 5 | 209 | 0.014006 | 0.585434 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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2013
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Others are less convinced by Maduro’s bluster, seeing a politician weakened by his lack of mandate at home. “He’d definitely like the US to recognize him,” says Gerardo Munck, a professor of international relations at the University of Southern California. “There’s nothing he can do to pressure the US, but to be seen as having been duly elected would put him in a far stronger position both at home and internationally.” With neither side showing any inclination toward compromise, the standoff between the two countries also shows no sign of ending. But Maduro’s long-term challenges are looming. Inflation in the socialist country is nearing 30 percent, there is public anger over the chronic shortages of basic goods, and the ballooning murder rate exceeds Europe and the United States’s combined. “Maduro is going to have to tackle these problems if he’s going to last as president,” says Mr. Munck. “[U]nless there’s some change in the way he handles the situation, the US isn’t going to budge.”
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Baverstock 5-17-13. Alasdair, CS Monitor. Foreign Correspondent and Guidebook Author. “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition][MG]
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He’d definitely like the US to recognize him There’s nothing he can do to pressure the US, but to be seen as having been duly elected would put him in a far stronger position both at home and internationally.” With neither side showing any inclination toward compromise, the standoff shows no sign of ending Maduro’s long-term challenges are looming. Inflation is nearing 30 percent, there is public anger over the chronic shortages of basic goods, and the ballooning murder rate exceeds Europe and the United States’s combined. “Maduro is going to have to tackle these “[U]nless there’s some change in the way he handles the situation, the US isn’t going to budge.”
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Maduro will cave under economic pressure & desire for recognition
| 1,002 | 65 | 666 | 165 | 10 | 112 | 0.060606 | 0.678788 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
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According to Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank, Maduro has offered “conflicting signals”. “Maduro has so far shifted in his position toward the U.S. between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one,” Shifter told IPS. The new president’s waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro lacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez, who enjoyed military backing as well as fervent support from the lower classes. In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavez’s own former political base. Shifter pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support is given to Diosdado Cabello, currently head of Venezuela’s parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the presidency. Maduro’s legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to “emulate” his predecessor and makes rapprochement with the United States less probable. Still, ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the issue. Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high inflation.
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Metzker 6-17-13. Jared Metzker, Inter Press Service “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations” [http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuela-relations/][MG]
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Maduro has offered “conflicting signals”. The waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power , Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavez’s own former political base. Maduro’s legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Still, ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the issue. Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high inflation.
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Maduro’s rhetoric is irrelevant—Economic pressure will overcome ideology
| 1,448 | 73 | 531 | 222 | 8 | 83 | 0.036036 | 0.373874 |
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CARACAS, Venezuela — After months of tensions between the United States and Venezuela, Secretary of State John Kerry met on Wednesday with the Venezuelan foreign minister, Elías Jaua, in Antigua, Guatemala, and announced the start of talks aimed at improving relations between the two countries. The overture came after another hopeful sign, Venezuela’s release from jail and subsequent expulsion of an American documentary filmmaker who had been accused of seeking to undermine the government. The filmmaker, Tim Tracy, was put on a commercial flight to Miami on Wednesday morning. “We agreed today, both of us, Venezuela and the United States, that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship,” Mr. Kerry said after meeting with Mr. Jaua on the sideline of a session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States. American officials said Venezuela had requested the meeting.
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Nueman & Archibold 6-5-13. WILLIAM NEUMAN and RANDAL C. ARCHIBOLD “Kerry Meets With Official of Venezuela to Set Talks” [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/world/americas/venezuela-frees-tim-tracy-jailed-us-filmmaker-and-expels-him.html] [MG]
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After months of tensions Secretary of State John Kerry met on Wednesday with the Venezuelan foreign minister, Elías Jaua, in Antigua, Guatemala, and announced the start of talks aimed at improving relations between the two countries “We agreed today, both of us, Venezuela and the United States, that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship,” American officials said Venezuela had requested the meeting.
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Reset is possible—Diplomatic meetings
| 964 | 37 | 478 | 152 | 4 | 75 | 0.026316 | 0.493421 |
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After three months in office, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, the handpicked successor of the late Hugo Chavez, has put aside left rhetoric to seek accommodation with Venezuela’s biggest capitalists as well as with the Obama administration in Washington. Maduro has repeatedly charged in recent months that US imperialism was conspiring to bring down his government and was the guiding hand behind a wave of political violence that followed his narrow election victory against right-wing candidate Henrique Capriles in April. Yet Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Elias Jaua was all smiles Wednesday, following a 40-minute meeting in Guatemala with US Secretary of State John Kerry. The two, who met privately on the sidelines of the Organization of American States General Assembly meeting in Antigua, Guatemala, declared their commitment to, in Kerry’s words, “establish a more constructive and positive relationship.” This is to include resuming the exchange of ambassadors, which has been suspended since late 2010. It was Venezuela that requested the meeting. “We agreed today there will be an ongoing, continuing dialogue between the State Department and the Foreign Ministry, and we will try to set out an agenda by which we agree on things we can work together,” said Kerry. For his part, Jaua declared that “A good relationship between the government of President Nicolas Maduro and the government of President Barack Obama is what suits both peoples, it’s the guarantee of peace and stability for our peoples.” Just last month, Maduro referred to Obama in a public speech as “the big boss of the devils” and accused him of backing the “fascist right” in attacking the Venezuelan people. In Guatemala, Jaua said that he had presented Kerry with a report on the violence that followed the April 14 election to choose Chavez’s successor in which 11 people were killed and 80 injured, most of them Maduro supporters. He gave the US secretary of state an extract of the report prepared on the incidents by Venezuela’s Public Advocate’s office. He said that the discussion had “alerted Kerry to the actions of anti-democratic groups in Venezuela, which threaten Venezuelan democracy, stability and which often are being supported by political and economic sectors of other countries.” In point of fact, the most significant “sectors” seeking to destabilize the Venezuelan regime have long been the CIA and the US State Department. Maduro’s turn toward accommodation with US imperialism has been accompanied by a similar approach to both foreign and domestic capital. Among the most significant deals in terms of foreign capital was reached late last month with Chevron Corp. Chevron is providing $2 billion in financing for Petroboscan, a joint venture between the US oil giant and Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, to boost heavy crude production in the northwestern state of Zulia. Shortly beforehand, PDVSA secured a $1 billion credit line with Houston-based Schlumberger Ltd., the world’s largest oilfield services company. While oil exports to the US have declined to about 900,000 barrels a day, it remains Venezuela’s chief customer for oil, responsible for 95 percent of the country’s export earnings and roughly half of its federal budget revenue. From the standpoint of the US-based energy conglomerates, securing dominance over Venezuela’s oil reserves, the largest in the world, remains a strategic objective. The investments by Chevron and Schlumberger make clear that they see the potential for major profits, the Venezuelan government’s rhetoric about “Bolivarian socialism” notwithstanding. Domestically, after charging for months that major Venezuelan capitalists, backed by the US, were waging an “economic war” against his government, Maduro invited the country’s second-richest individual, Lorenzo Mendoza, the head of the country’s largest food company, Polar, to meet with him last month at the Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas. Both Chavez and Maduro had singled out Polar and Mendoza for attack over the country’s increasingly severe shortages and rising food prices. Holding them responsible for hoarding and waging an “economic war,” they threatened to nationalize the firm. For his part, Mendoza, who is worth some $4.5 billion, was an enthusiastic supporter of the US-backed coup that briefly unseated Chavez in April 2002. This history had contributed to his keeping a fairly low profile under Chavez, but it was noted in the Venezuelan media that he mounted a vigorous public defense of his company in the face of Maduro’s recent charges. Mendoza described the meeting as “very cordial, direct, sincere,” adding, “The president was very kind in listening to us and communicating the need to keep investing, producing and supplying markets. That is our lifelong commitment, passion and vocation.” He said that the two had reached an agreement “not to politicize” the issue of food. Vice President Jorge Arreaza provided a similar description of the encounter between the “working class” president and the billionaire. “The problem’s been overcome,” he said. The meeting with Mendoza was only the most visible of a series of talks between the government and prominent Venezuelan capitalists. Among the deals reached is the lifting of certain price controls and the easing of currency restrictions. “In another sign of the rapprochement, the hallways of the finance ministry for the first time in years are filled with businessmen in sharp suits,” Reuters reported. “Many carry folders stuffed with requests for greater flexibility in the currency control system and an easing of price controls.” The news agency quoted Finance Minister Nelson Merentes stating after one meeting with business executives: “We’ve entered a phase of creating closer ties with the private sector, without ignoring the new socialist economy.” After months of charging the big bourgeoisie in Venezuela with “sabotage,” the Maduro government is now currying its favor and begging it to increase production. This turn is driven by a deepening economic crisis characterized by a decline in growth, soaring inflation and widespread shortages. Venezuela’s inflation rate is now near 30 percent, with the bulk of it reflecting the sharp rise in the price of food. Meanwhile, the growth rate for the first quarter of 2013 amounted to just 0.7 percent. This overall figure, however, masks the severity of the situation. Venezuela’s financial sector, which continues to enjoy some of the highest profit rates in the world, saw a 31 percent growth during this period, while manufacturing declined by 3.6 percent and construction by 1.2 percent. The scarcity index, which tracks the amount of products missing from store shelves, has hit its highest level since the Central Bank began tracking these figures. The accommodation between the Maduro government and Venezuelan capitalists, on the one hand, and Washington, on the other, has taken the political wind out of the sails of the rightist candidate Henrique Capriles, who has continued to charge electoral fraud and condemn Maduro as an illegitimate president. While the Obama administration has yet to formally recognize Maduro’s close election victory, it has turned a cold shoulder to demands for OAS sanctions against Venezuela. And Mendoza’s visit to Miraflores indicates that the billionaire accepts Maduro as legitimate. Clearly, both domestic and foreign capital recognize that behind the left rhetoric and the limited social reforms of “Bolivarian Socialism,” Maduro’s government defends capitalism and they can do business with it. More fundamentally, continued agitation by the right wing and a further weakening of the government under conditions of deepening economic crisis and rising popular discontent poses the danger of provoking a social explosion in the working class.
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Van Auken 6-7-13. Bill Van Auken, International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI) “Venezuela’s Maduro reaches out to big business and Washington” [http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/07/vene-j07.html][MG]
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Maduro has put aside left rhetoric to seek accommodation with Venezuela’s biggest capitalists as well as with the Obama administration in Washington. Among the most significant deals in terms of foreign capital was reached late last month with Chevron Corp. Chevron is providing $2 billion in financing for Petroboscan, a joint venture between the US oil giant and Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, to boost heavy crude production in the northwestern state of Zulia The accommodation between the Maduro government and Venezuelan capitalists, on the one hand, and Washington, on the other, has taken the political wind out of the sails of the rightist candidate Henrique Capriles, who has continued to charge electoral fraud and condemn Maduro as an illegitimate president
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Maudro is actively reaching out to maintain oil security—It’s a critical time for U.S. engagement
| 7,860 | 97 | 781 | 1,218 | 15 | 121 | 0.012315 | 0.099343 |
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Introduction Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.
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Çelik 11 – Arda Can Çelik, Master’s Degree in Politics and International Studies from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11
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Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations "
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“Economic engagement” expanding economic ties
| 1,725 | 45 | 547 | 249 | 5 | 77 | 0.02008 | 0.309237 |
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During the U.S.-ASEAN Summit last month, President Obama and ASEAN leaders also launched what we called the “U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement” Initiative to promote economic cooperation between the United States and ASEAN. This initiative, which we called the “E3,” will focus on enhancing ASEAN members’ capacity for advancing cooperation in many areas that we think will further enhance trade.¶ In addition, an exciting new area for our outreach is in the energy sector. At the East Asian Summit, President Obama and his counterparts from Brunei and Indonesia announced the U.S.-Asia Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership. The Partnership will offer a framework for expanding energy and environmental cooperation to advance efforts to ensure affordable, secure, and cleaner energy throughout the region. We will foster active private sector involvement in the partnership, which will focus on the four key areas of renewable and clean energy, markets and interconnectivity, the emerging role of natural gas, and sustainable development.
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Hormats 12. [Robert, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, "US Economic Engagement with the Asia Pacific" US Department of State -- December 7 -- www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2012/201746.htm]
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Obama launched Economic Engagement to promote economic cooperation an exciting new area for our outreach is in the energy sector The Partnership will offer a framework for expanding energy and environmental cooperation to advance efforts to ensure affordable, secure, and cleaner energy throughout the region.
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Economic engagement includes energy cooperation.
| 1,048 | 49 | 309 | 154 | 5 | 45 | 0.032468 | 0.292208 |
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Attacks on the U.S. are integral to the strategy of Maduro and the inner Chavista circle. Their current course aims to inflame the nationalistic militancy of Chavez’s followers. It is a calculated effort to distract Venezuelan voters from grave violations of the constitutional order and stark domestic challenges—inflation, fiscal deficits, devaluations, crime, and increasing food shortages—that have worsened since Maduro took de facto control of the government in early December 2012. Governability and stability in Venezuela before and after the elections could become a major challenge. The Miami Herald’s veteran Venezuela watcher Andres Oppenheimer suggests that the April 14 elections will be neither fair nor genuinely free. Maduro’s wild accusations also lower expectations for swift improvement in relations with the U.S. The limited leverage that the U.S. still poses over Venezuela resides in its commercial, financial, and energy links and in the frayed democratic consensus in the inter-American community. Like it or not, the Obama Administration finds itself drawn into Venezuela’s growing crisis of governability caused by the increasingly irresponsible behavior of Chavez knock-offs like Maduro.
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Walser 3-18-13. Ray Walser was a career Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State for 27 years and is a Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America @ Heritage “Beware of Venezuela’s Paranoid Anti-Americanism” [http://blog.heritage.org/2013/03/18/beware-of-venezuelas-paranoid-anti-americanism/]
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Attacks on the U.S. are integral to the strategy of Maduro and the inner Chavista circle. Their current course aims to inflame the nationalistic militancy of Chavez’s followers. It is a calculated effort to distract Venezuelan voters from stark domestic challenges Governability and stability could become a major challenge Maduro’s wild accusations also lower expectations for swift improvement in relations The limited leverage resides in its commercial, financial, and energy links and in the frayed democratic consensus in the inter-American community
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Utilizing energy & economic ties is the only chance at maintaining leverage over the country—Leadership is failing now
| 1,215 | 118 | 555 | 176 | 18 | 81 | 0.102273 | 0.460227 |
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U.S.-China economic interdependence has significantly changed Beijing’s perception of national interests, and thus, has shaped U.S.-China relations. A commentary in the Renmin Ribao in May 2001 pointed out, “The fast-developing Sino-U.S. economic cooperation and trade has become the main stabilizing factor and driving force in bilateral relations.”54 An international relations scholar in Beijing expounded, “Some criticized Beijing was too weak in dealing with the U.S. and Japan. But those critics did not see a historical change. China is heavily interdependent with the U.S. and West. The interdependence has significantly constrained Chinese foreign relations. China can not comprehensively antagonize the At a joint meeting with members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on March 6, 2001, Vice Premier Qian Qichen said that it was impossible to change the U.S. basic standpoint on the Taiwan and human rights issues, but China and the United States had common economic interests. He emphasized that China should bring the contradictions between China and the United States “under control and not have an outburst. We should reason things out and, if we fail, we should put aside minor differences so as to seek common ground [economic interests].”56 An international relations senior scholar in Beijing stressed, “Sino-U.S. relations reflect the importance of economic development to China. China makes every effort to maintain stable Sino-U.S. relations. It is impossible for China to face off with the United States. The Sino-U.S. relationship is not an issue of face, but of economic development.”57 An American studies senior scholar in Beijing elaborated, “The Sino-U.S. economic relationship is very important for China. Trade accounts for 40 percent of China’s GDP, and 40 percent of China’s trade goes to the United States. As a result, China must maintain a good relationship with the United States. The importance of the U.S. to China is much greater than China’s importance to the United States. If Sino-U.S. relations worsen, it will bring severe damage to China.”58 In the two case studies, Beijing tried to minimize the impact of surging nationalism and public overreaction on its overall economic development and U.S.-China relations. In the case of the embassy bombing, Beijing only allowed “controlled” demonstrations and protests for two days, and then strictly prohibited any follow-up demonstrations. Afterward, Beijing tried to control the damage by reassuring the foreign investors and diverting the people’s focus back to economic development. Moreover, Beijing pragmatically and gradually normalized relations with the United States, despite its tough gesture of rejecting U.S. explanation of the bombing incident and demanding the U.S. severely punish the perpetrators. In the case of the reconnaissance plane incident, the U.S. government obviously did not meet China’s three demands: apologizing, taking responsibility, and stopping reconnaissance flights in airspace off China’s coastal areas. However, China strictly prohibited protests against the United States for fear of damaging its economic development. Furthermore, China frequently publicly expressed that China took a calm, restrained, and responsible attitude in handling the incident. In order to minimize a possible backlash from the Chinese public, Beijing twisted the language of a U.S. letter of regret into a fully-fledged apology, and thus, declared it a victory for Chinese dignity. Regarding the sharp contrast between Beijing’s rhetoric assertiveness and actual prudence, a Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing frankly stated, “The most important priority for China is economics. This is a prevailing consensus among the public and elite. Beijing should have acted stronger against the United States, Japan, and Taiwan, but Beijing had economic interests in mind.”59 Since Beijing was not willing to sternly respond to Washington because of economic interest concerns, Beijing had to at least rhetorically assure the Chinese people of its firm position, and then prudently minimize the impact of the incidents on U.S.-China relations. In the reconnaissance plane incident, because Washington did not meet any of three initial demands Beijing raised, Beijing finally twisted the language and declared a moral victory in order to bolster its domestic position, as well as to normalize U.S.-China relations. Many other Chinese scholars had the same perspective. For instance, an American studies senior scholar in Beijing emphasized, “Regarding the issue of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy and the airplane collision, China does not want conflict. All China wants is to develop its economy!”60 Four international relations senior scholars in Beijing and an international relations senior scholar in Shanghai all agreed that economic interest is the essential consideration for China to deal with the issues of the U.S. bombing of both the Chinese embassy and the airplane collision.61 An U.S. senior official explained, “Since the mid-1990s, Taiwanese President Lee Teng- hui’s visit to the States, the U.S. mistaken bombing incident of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the collision incident between an U.S. reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter jet, all stirred strong reaction from Chinese officials and scholars. Nevertheless, with the prerequisite of maintaining U.S.-China economic interests, President Jiang Zemin finally intervened and emphasized that China had to do its best to maintain friendly relations with the United States. Beijing clearly recognized that Chinese economy heavily depended on U.S. economy. Sometimes, Washington reminded Beijing of this fact.”62 Looking into the future, Chinese U.S. policy would continue to be moderate and cooperative, in order to preserve the interests of bilateral economic interdependence. In the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in November 2002, Chinese leaders announced that, for the next twenty years, China would continue to focus on economic development. Beijing believes that a peaceful and stable international environment, particularly a stable U.S.-China relationship, is essential to China’s economic development. As a result, it is a consensus within China that Beijing will continue adopting cooperative attitudes and policies toward the United States in the future.63
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Tung 3 – PhD, Center for IR @ National Chengchi University, Chen-Yuan, The Impact of Bilateral Economic Interdependence on US-China Relations,
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U.S.-China economic interdependence has significantly changed Beijing’s perception of national interests trade has become the main stabilizing factor and driving force in bilateral relations.” China is heavily interdependent with the U.S. and West. The interdependence has significantly constrained Chinese foreign relations Qichen said that it was impossible to change the U.S. basic standpoint on the Taiwan and human rights issues, but China and the United States had common economic interests. He emphasized that China should bring the contradictions between China and the United States “under control and not have an outburst The Sino-U.S. relationship is not an issue of face, but of economic development Trade accounts for 40 percent of China’s GDP, Beijing tried to minimize the impact of surging nationalism and public overreaction on its overall economic development and U.S.-China relations. In the case of the embassy bombing, Beijing only allowed “controlled” demonstrations and protests for two days, and then strictly prohibited any follow-up demonstrations Beijing pragmatically and gradually normalized relations with the United States, despite its tough gesture of rejecting U.S. explanation of the bombing incident and demanding the U.S. severely punish the perpetrators. In the case of the reconnaissance plane incident, Furthermore, China frequently publicly expressed that China took a calm, restrained, and responsible attitude in handling the incident China does not want conflict. All China wants is to develop its economy!”
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Interdependence makes China relations resilient.
| 6,407 | 49 | 1,549 | 949 | 5 | 225 | 0.005269 | 0.237092 |
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Unfortunately, this high-flying rhetoric has never matched up to the reality of U.S.-China relations. There are serious bilateral structural issues that inhibit real cooperation and long-term stability between the two powers. These include the lack of shared values that stem from the differences between America's democratic system versus China's authoritarian regime, and a lack of common understanding about the causes of and solutions to global problems from Iran to climate change. Chinese leaders also remain ambivalent about the degree to which China is prepared to take on global responsibilities, either directly or in concert with the U.S.
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Currie 5-23-10 – Ms. Currie is a senior fellow with the Project 2049 Institute, a Washington-based think tank, Kelley, “Prick the China Policy Bubble”, Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704852004575257703318986606.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines
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rhetoric has never matched up to the reality of U.S.-China relations. There are serious bilateral structural issues that inhibit real cooperation These include the lack of shared values that stem from the differences between America's democratic system versus China's authoritarian regime, and a lack of common understanding about the causes of and solutions to global problems from Iran to climate change. Chinese leaders also remain ambivalent about the degree to which China is prepared to take on global responsibilities, either directly or in concert with the U.S.
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US-China cooperation does nothing.
| 649 | 34 | 569 | 97 | 4 | 87 | 0.041237 | 0.896907 |
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Texas (UTNIF)
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Venezuela will maintain its oil industry tax and legal framework under the leadership of acting President Nicolas Maduro, the OPEC nation's oil minister said on Friday to reassure foreign investors after the death of President Hugo Chavez.¶ Rafael Ramirez told Reuters that Venezuela would continue to push for a minimum price of $100 per barrel at the next OPEC meeting, and that he did not expect Chavez's death to push up crude prices.¶ "The tax and legal framework were set out clearly by President Chavez," the oil minister said outside the National Assembly, where Maduro was being inaugurated as acting leader on Friday ahead of a new presidential election due in weeks.¶ "While our government is here and the people remain in charge, our oil policy will remain unchanged."¶ Ramirez said he expected the South American country to increase its oil output by 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) this year, bringing its total production to 3.5 million bpd.¶ The government says it is pumping 3.0 million bpd, but many industry experts question those figures. Analysts say Venezuela produced just 2.34 million bpd last month.¶ Ramirez said state oil company PDVSA invested $22 billion in 2012, and expected to invest $25 billion this year.¶ He said foreign energy companies working with PDVSA in Venezuela sent condolences following Chavez's death after a two-year battle with cancer, but had expressed no concerns about the political situation in the country with the world's biggest oil reserves.¶ "Everything is normal in the oil industry. We're guaranteeing fuel supplies," Ramirez said. "We will keep our oil policy the same, internally and in OPEC ... we will defend a minimum price of $100 per barrel (at the next meeting)."¶ The next gathering of the oil producers' cartel is scheduled to take place in Vienna on May 31.
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Parraga 3-8-13 [Marianna, Reuters, “Exclusive: Venezuela to maintain oil industry framework under Maduro,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/09/us-venezuela-oil-idUSBRE92803720130309]
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Venezuela will maintain its oil legal framework under Maduro our oil policy will remain unchanged." Ramirez said he expected the South American country to increase its oil output by 500,000 barrels per day this year PDVSA invested $22 billion in 2012, and expected to invest $25 billion this year Everything is normal in the oil industry. We're guaranteeing fuel supplies," Ramirez said. "We will keep our oil policy the same
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Venezuelan oil is stable- reforms are unecessary
| 1,826 | 48 | 426 | 300 | 7 | 70 | 0.023333 | 0.233333 |
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The 1990s were an era of great hopes for Latin America. After the demise of authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and the early 1990s. major economic reforms were undertaken in most Latin American countries in order to reduce chronic inflation and promote sustained growth. For many contemporary observers, the confluence of democracy and free markets signaled a break with the past, the dawn of a new era of civil liberties, prosperity, and political stability. More than a decade later, it is hard to look back at this period without a mixture of nostalgia and sarcasm. The legacies of the 1990s varied from country to country, but they can be generally described as notable achievements overshadowed by missed opportunities. In the economic realm, hyperinflation was eventually defeated, but economic growth remained elusive and poverty resilient. In the political arena, the military eventually withdrew from politics (not a minor feat), but elected governments, surprisingly, continued to collapse. Starting in the early 1990s, presidents were removed from office in Brazil, Venezuela, Guatemala, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia – in some countries recurrently. This outcome frequently represented the triumph of an indignant society over a corrupt or allusive executive, but it seldom prevented the occurrence of new abuses in later administrations. By the early years of the twenty-first century, it was clear that the particular circumstances of each crisis represented only parts of a broader puzzle – a new pattern of political instability emerging in the region. This book explores the origins and the consequences of this novel pattern of instability, emphasizing the critical events that defined the new trend between I992 and 2004. During this period, civilian elites realized that traditional military coups had become for the most part unfeasible and experimented with the use of constitutional instruments to remove unpopular presidents from office. Presidential impeachment thus became a distinctive mark of the new political landscape in Latin America. The recurrence of presidential crises without democratic breakdown challenged many dominant views among ong political scientists. Latin American democracies proved to he simultaneously enduring and unstable, willing to punish presidential corruption but unable to prevent it, and responsive to popular demands only in the context of massive protests and widespread frustration, My attempts to understand these facts initially relied on well-delimited theoretical perspectives that proved rather disappointing, and I was forced to embark on a long exploration across the disciplinary boundaries of political sociology, communication, political behavior, institutional analysis, democratization, and the study of social movements. Others who hay studied these topics more thoroughly than I may he reluctant to recognize their subject in the chapters that follow, but I hope that they will forgive my intrusion. In the course of this exploration I have wandered through the academic fields of many colleagues and collected a large numher of intellectual debts along the way.
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Perez-Linan, 2007 (Anibal, Professor in the Political Science department at the University of Pittsburgh, Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America, Pages xiii-xiv)
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After the demise of authoritarian regimes major economic reforms were undertaken in Latin America to reduce chronic inflation and promote sustained growth the confluence signaled the dawn of a new era of political stability In the political arena, the military eventually withdrew from politics but elected governments continued to collapse This represented triumph over corrupt executive The recurrence of presidential crises without democratic breakdown challenged many dominant views among political scientists. democracies proved to he simultaneously enduring and unstable, willing to punish corruption but unable to prevent it, and responsive to popular demands in the context of massive protests and widespread frustration
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Latin American political instability won’t escalate
| 3,162 | 51 | 728 | 471 | 6 | 102 | 0.012739 | 0.216561 |
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Thus far terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists on the issue, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.It is highly improbable that a would-be atomic terrorist would be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state because the donor could not control its use and because the ultimate source of the weapon might bediscovered. Although there has been great worry about terrorists illicitly stealing or purchasing a nuclear weapon, it seems likely that neither “loose nukes” nor a market in illicit nuclear materials exists. Moreover, finished bombs have been outfitted with an array of locks and safety devices. There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were utterly to fail, collapsing in full disarray. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory, would still have locks, and could probably be followed and hunted down by an alarmed international community. The most plausible route for terrorists would be to manufacture the device themselves from purloined materials. This task requires that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered in sequence, including the effective recruitment of people who at once havegreat technical skills and will remain completely devoted to the cause. In addition, a host of corrupted co-conspirators, many of them foreign, must remain utterly reliable, international and local security servicesmust be kept perpetually in the dark, and no curious outsider must get consequential wind of the project over the months or even years it takes to pull off. In addition, the financial costs of the operation could easily become monumental. Moreover, the difficulties are likely to increase because of enhanced protective and policing efforts by self-interested governments and because any foiled attempt would expose flaws in the defense system, holes the defenders would then plug. The evidence of al-Qaeda’s desire to go atomic, and about its progress in accomplishing this exceedingly difficult task, is remarkably skimpy, if not completely negligible. The scariest stuff—a decade’s worth of loose nuke rumor—seems to have no substance whatever. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan: “Make use of that which is available ... rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In part because of current policies—but also because of a wealth of other technical and organizational difficulties—the atomic terrorists’ task is already monumental, and their likelihood of success is vanishingly small. Efforts to further enhance this monumentality, if cost-effective and accompanied with only tolerable side effects, are generally desirable
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Mueller 9 – Prof Political Science @ Ohio State University, John, “The Atomic Terrorist?”, Paper Prepared for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, April 30, http://www.icnnd.org/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf
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seem to have and even less progress . This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. highly that would-be atomic or sold by a generous like-minded nuclear state because because ultimate of the weapon nuclear . Moreover, been outfitted with an array of . be to manufacture the device themselves from purloined materials. This task requires that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered in sequence, including the effective at once will remain completely In addition, a host of co- , many of them foreign, utterly , international and local perpetually , and no curious outsider must get consequential wind of the project over the months or even years it takes to pull off. In addition, the of the operation easily . are likely to and policing self-interested and because any foiled attempt would expose flaws in the defense system evidence of al-Qaeda’s desire to go atomic, and about its progress in accomplishing this exceedingly difficult task, is remarkably skimpy, if not completely negligible their likelihood of success is vanishingly small.
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No risk of nuclear terrorism—
| 3,099 | 29 | 1,179 | 479 | 5 | 189 | 0.010438 | 0.394572 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
|
Texas (UTNIF)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
5,292 |
The US’s reluctance to accept the new leader affects little in economic terms; the heavy crude is still flowing steadily from the Venezuelan oil fields into US refineries, a trading relationship upon which Venezuela relies heavily, particularly following the recent slump in global oil prices. In fact, many believe the US’s reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more than a message to other regional observers. “Maduro is certainly now the president of Venezuela,” says Mark Jones, professor of political science at Rice University in Texas. “The US’s refusal to recognize him is more symbolic than anything else. Ignoring Maduro’s win sends a signal to other Latin American countries that these elections didn’t meet minimum democratic standards.”
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Baverstock 5-17-13. Alasdair, CS Monitor. Foreign Correspondent and Guidebook Author. “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition][MG]
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US’s reluctance to accept the leader affects little in economic terms heavy crude is still flowing steadily from Venezuelan oil fields into US refineries, a trading relationship upon which Venezuela relies heavily, particularly following the recent slump in global oil prices the US’s reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more than a message to other regional observers. The US’s refusal to recognize him is more symbolic than anything else. Ignoring Maduro’s win sends a signal to other Latin American countries that these elections didn’t meet minimum democratic standards.”
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Trade relations are high—Rhetoric is irrelevant
| 761 | 47 | 589 | 117 | 6 | 89 | 0.051282 | 0.760684 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
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Texas (UTNIF)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
5,293 |
Other observers cite the socialist leader’s continued belligerence toward Washington – Maduro blames the US government’s “dark forces” for the death of Mr. Chávez and has pursued the provocative rhetoric of his predecessor – as a factor in the US’s reluctance to recognize Maduro as president. “You can’t blame the US for not extending their hand,” says Mr. Smilde. “Maduro has been denouncing US conspiracies since the day Chávez died.” Maduro reacted publicly to President Obama’s announcement that the US was withholding recognition of his victory by describing the US president as the “Grand chief of devils” and threatening to cut off oil exports to the country.“That’s an entirely hollow threat,” says Professor Jones, “96 percent of Venezuela’s export revenues come from oil, so Maduro is not going to do anything to upset that.”
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Baverstock 5-17-13. Alasdair, CS Monitor. Foreign Correspondent and Guidebook Author. “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition] [MG]
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observers cite the leader’s continued belligerence toward Washington Maduro blames the US government’s “dark forces” for the death of Chávez and has pursued the rhetoric of his predecessor as a factor in US’s reluctance to recognize Maduro as president. Maduro reacted publicly to Obama’s announcement that the US was withholding recognition of his victory describing the US president as the “Grand chief of devils” and threatening to cut off oil exports to the country.“That’s an entirely hollow threat,” “96 percent of Venezuela’s export revenues come from oil, so Maduro is not going to do anything to upset that.”
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No chance Venezuela flies off the handle— They won’t sever relations with the U.S.
| 836 | 82 | 618 | 134 | 14 | 98 | 0.104478 | 0.731343 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
|
Texas (UTNIF)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
5,294 |
How much leverage this gives each side is ultimately unclear. Matching refineries to crude supplies is more a matter of relative suitability than of absolute compatibility. Venezuelan crude, for example, can be processed in less sophisticated refineries than those in the Gulf of Mexico, but the products it yields will be less valuable; similarly, complex U.S. refineries that are built to handle Venezuelan oil can process lighter, sweeter supplies. In each case, though, the shift would be economically painful for the companies involved (precisely how much so is unclear), which is why they tend to prefer the stable status quo. Scholars of U.S.-Venezuela relations who look at this situation conclude that although both countries would like to diversify away from their dependence on each other, both are too compelled by the economics (including sunk costs) of the current relationship to let a frosty political situation get in the way.12
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Levi and Clayton ’12 [Michael Levi is the Michael A. Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy and National Security at the CFR, “The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence,” Survival, Vol. 54, No. 6, online]
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Matching refineries to crude supplies is more a matter of relative suitability than of absolute compatibility complex U.S. refineries that are built to handle Venezuelan oil can process lighter, sweeter supplies the shift would be economically painful for the companies involved Scholars of U.S.-Venezuela relations who look at this situation conclude that although both countries would like to diversify away from their dependence on each other, both are too compelled by the economics of the current relationship to let a frosty political situation get in the way
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Oil relations are resilient
| 945 | 27 | 565 | 149 | 4 | 87 | 0.026846 | 0.583893 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
|
Texas (UTNIF)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
5,295 |
During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, Barack Obama maintained that his Administration ¶ would use principled bilateral diplomacy to engage with such adversaries in the region as ¶ Venezuela under populist President Hugo Chávez. Nevertheless, tensions continued in U.S.-¶ Venezuelan relations, with President Chávez continuing “to define himself in opposition to the ¶ United States, using incendiary rhetoric to insult the U.S. Government and U.S. influence in Latin ¶ America.”68 While in mid-2009, Ambassadors were returned, in late 2010, the Chávez ¶ government revoked an agreement for U.S. Ambassador-designate Larry Palmer to be posted to ¶ Venezuela. The Obama Administration responded by revoking the diplomatic visa of the ¶ Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States. Despite tensions in relations, the State Department maintains that the United States remains committed to seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and counter-terrorism efforts.
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Sullivan 1-10-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf]
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Obama maintained that his Administration would use diplomacy to engage with Venezuela Despite tensions in relations, the State Department maintains that the U S remains committed to seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and counter-terrorism
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Tensions don’t kill relations- cooperation is resilient
| 1,005 | 55 | 288 | 144 | 7 | 40 | 0.048611 | 0.277778 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
|
Texas (UTNIF)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
5,296 |
What did Mr. Maduro do to earn this assistance from Mr. Kerry? Since Mr. Chávez’s death in March, the Venezuelan leader has repeatedly used the United States as a foil. He expelled two U.S. military attaches posted at the embassy in Caracas, claiming that they were trying to destabilize the country; he claimed the CIA was provoking violence in order to justify an invasion; and he called President Obama “the big boss of the devils.” A U.S. filmmaker, Timothy Tracy, was arrested and charged with plotting against the government — a ludicrous allegation that was backed with no evidence. Though Mr. Tracy was put on a plane to Miami on the day of the Kerry-Jaua encounter, Mr. Kerry agreed to the meeting before that gesture. There’s nothing wrong, in principle, with diplomatic meetings or even in dispatching an ambassador to a country such as Venezuela. The State Department has also been meeting with senior opposition leaders and has yet to say it recognizes the presidential election results. But Mr. Kerry’s words amounted to a precious endorsement for Mr. Maduro — and the Obama administration appears bent on cultivating him regardless of his actions. Perhaps the increasingly desperate new leader has secretly promised concessions to Washington on matters such as drug trafficking. But with senior government and military officials involved in the transhipment of cocaine to the United States and Europe, he is unlikely to deliver. In short, this looks like a reset for the sake of reset, launched without regard for good timing or the cause of Venezuelan democracy.
|
Washington Post 6-11-13. “Venezuela gets a lifeline from the United States” [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-11/opinions/39896975_1_henrique-capriles-two-u-s-military-attaches-regional-group-unasur][MG]
|
Maduro has repeatedly used the United States as a foil. He expelled two U.S. military attaches posted at the embassy in Carac claimed the CIA was provoking violence in order to justify an invasion; and called Obama “the big boss of the devils.” There’s nothing wrong with diplomatic meetings But Mr. Kerry’s words amounted to a precious endorsement for Mr. Maduro Perhaps the increasingly desperate new leader has secretly promised concessions on matters such as drug trafficking. But with senior officials involved in the transhipment of cocaine he is unlikely to deliver. this looks like a reset for the sake of reset, launched without regard for good timing or the cause of Venezuelan democracy.
|
Relations won’t solve crime—it’s too embedded
| 1,578 | 46 | 699 | 259 | 6 | 114 | 0.023166 | 0.440154 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
|
Texas (UTNIF)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
5,297 |
Iran is "struggling" to cultivate ties with Latin American countries that are wary of the United States, and Tehran's influence in the region is on the decline, a top US general said Tuesday.¶ "The reality on the ground is that Iran is struggling to maintain influence in the region, and that its efforts to cooperate with a small set of countries with interests that are inimical to the United States are waning," General John Kelly, head of US Southern Command, told lawmakers.¶ In Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Argentina, Iran has sought to expand diplomatic and economic links to counter international sanctions and to promote anti-US sentiment, Kelly told the Senate Armed Services Committee.¶ But the bid has only been "marginally successful" and the broader region "has not been receptive to Iranian efforts," the general said.
|
Agence France-Presse 3-19-13 [ “Iran's influence 'waning' in Latin America: US general,” http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130319/irans-influence-waning-latin-america-us-general]
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Iran is "struggling" to cultivate ties with Latin American countries that are wary of the U S and Tehran's influence in the region is on the decline In Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Argentina, Iran has sought to expand links But the bid has only been "marginally successful" and the broader region "has not been receptive to Iranian efforts
|
Iran’s presence is declining—
| 836 | 29 | 342 | 135 | 4 | 58 | 0.02963 | 0.42963 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
|
Texas (UTNIF)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
5,298 |
Therefore, Latin American nations won´t allow the US to dictate their foreign policy on the issue of their relations with Iran or any other country. In fact, Washington has already had a sign of this when it tried to pressure these countries to vote against Palestine´s bid to gain the status of a non-member state at the United Nations. Only one country, Panama, whose government has strong links with the Zionist entity and the local Zionist lobby voted against it.
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Fernandez 1-11-13 [Yusuf, journalist and the secretary of the Muslim Federation of Spain. He started to work for Radio Prague. He has been editor of several Islamic sites in Spanish and English and is currently editor of the Spanish site of Al Manar, “Why Latin America Will Not Bow to US Pressure over Iran,” http://alethonews.wordpress.com/2013/01/11/why-latin-america-will-not-bow-to-us-pressure-over-iran/]
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Latin American nations won´t allow the US to dictate their foreign policy on the issue of their relations with Iran or any other country Washington has already had a sign of this when it tried to pressure these countries to vote against Palestine´s bid to gain the status of a non-member state
|
US action can’t solve it—
| 467 | 25 | 293 | 80 | 5 | 52 | 0.0625 | 0.65 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
|
Texas (UTNIF)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
5,299 |
One of the more remarkable features about the endless drumbeat of alarm about Iran is that it pays virtually no attention to Iran's actual capabilities, and rests on all sorts of worst case assumptions about Iranian behavior. Consider the following facts, most of them courtesy of the 2010 edition of The Military Balance, published annually by the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies in London: GDP: United States -- 13.8 trillion Iran --$ 359 billion (U.S. GDP is roughly 38 times greater than Iran's) Defense spending (2008): U.S. -- $692 billion Iran -- $9.6 billion (U.S. defense budget is over 70 times larger than Iran) Military personnel: U.S.--1,580,255 active; 864,547 reserves (very well trained) Iran-- 525,000 active; 350,000 reserves (poorly trained) Combat aircraft: U.S. -- 4,090 (includes USAF, USN, USMC and reserves) Iran -- 312 (serviceability questionable) Main battle tanks: U.S. -- 6,251 (Army + Marine Corps) Iran -- 1,613 (serviceability questionable) Navy: U.S. -- 11 aircraft carriers, 99 principal surface combatants, 71 submarines, 160 patrol boats, plus large auxiliary fleet Iran -- 6 principal surface combatants, 10 submarines, 146 patrol boats Nuclear weapons: U.S. -- 2,702 deployed, >6,000 in reserve Iran -- Zero One might add that Iran hasn't invaded anyone since the Islamic revolution, although it has supported a number of terrorist organizations and engaged in various forms of covert action. The United States has also backed terrorist groups and conducted covert ops during this same period, and attacked a number of other countries, including Panama, Grenada, Serbia, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq (twice), and Afghanistan. By any objective measure, therefore, Iran isn't even on the same page with the United States in terms of latent power, deployed capabilities, or the willingness to use them. Indeed, Iran is significantly weaker than Israel, which has roughly the same toal of regular plus reserve military personnel and vastly superior training. Israel also has more numerous and modern armored and air capabilities and a sizeable nuclear weapons stockpile of its own. Iran has no powerful allies, scant power-projection capability, and little ideological appeal. Despite what some alarmists think, Iran is not the reincarnation of Nazi Germany and not about to unleash some new Holocaust against anyone. The more one thinks about it, the odder our obsession with Iran appears. It's a pretty unloveable regime, to be sure, but given Iran's actual capabilities, why do U.S. leaders devote so much time and effort trying to corral support for more economic sanctions (which aren't going to work) or devising strategies to "contain" an Iran that shows no sign of being able to expand in any meaningful way? Even the danger that a future Iranian bomb might set off some sort of regional arms race seems exaggerated, according to an unpublished dissertation by Philipp Bleek of Georgetown University. Bleek's thesis examines the history of nuclear acquisition since 1945 and finds little evidence for so-called "reactive proliferation." If he's right, it suggests that Iran's neighbors might not follow suit even if Iran did "go nuclear" at some point in the future).
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Walt, 2010 (Stephen M., genius and Harvard professor, “More hype about Iran?” Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/20/more_hype_about_iran)
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alarm pays no attention to Iran's actual capabilities Iran hasn't invaded anyone since the Islamic revolution The U S backed terrorist groups and attacked a number of countries Iran isn't even on the same page in terms of latent power, deployed capabilities, or willingness to use them the danger that a Iranian bomb might set off some arms race seems exaggerated Bleek's thesis examines the history of nuclear acquisition since 1945 and finds little evidence for reactive proliferation
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No Impact to Iran War—
| 3,234 | 22 | 486 | 504 | 5 | 78 | 0.009921 | 0.154762 |
Venezuela Starter Pack - UTNIF 2013.html5
|
Texas (UTNIF)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
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