manu/mldr-zoomed-100char-total-queries-documents

chunk_id stringlengths 3 9	chunk stringlengths 1 100
35_30	mounting had its own Medium Range System (MRS) 3 radar director. Viscount Hall stated in the House
35_31	of Lords in 1959 that her "automatically controlled" guns were "capable of firing at more than
35_32	twice the speed of manned armament" and the "improvement in guns was ten times better than if the
35_33	ship had been with the original gun armament". However, Tigers 6-inch guns usually jammed after 30
35_34	seconds firing, and couldn't deliver sustained bombardment in support of troops ashore. RN argued
35_35	that the first 30 seconds of engaging jet aircraft and warships was the critical determinant and
35_36	that aircraft would be shot down with short bursts of fire and as such limited magazine capacity
35_37	and gun reliability were less important than instantaneous response. The decision to complete the
35_38	ships was based on the availability of hulls and expectation that the cruisers could be completed
35_39	sooner (three years against 5 years) and cheaper (60% of the cost) than building new [8,000 ton]
35_40	cruisers at a time when the existing cruiser fleet was ageing and its weapons and fire control were
35_41	useless against modern aircraft. The RN had 21 cruisers in 1957, nine in operation and by 1961 the
35_42	cruiser fleet had reduced to nine of which five were in service.
35_43	HMS Tigers revised weapon fit was for immediate post-war requirements and the continued
35_44	reconstruction of the class confirmed the 1957 Defence White Paper as interim anti-aircraft ships
35_45	pending the introduction of guided weapons into the Royal Navy; four County-class destroyers with
35_46	the Seaslug missiles had been ordered by February 1957. In practice, only Tiger would be ready in
35_47	time and perform sufficiently well to serve any length of time as a gun cruiser.
35_48	By the time Tigers legend was accepted by the Board of the Admiralty in July 1954 and the Cabinet
35_49	in November 1954, the cruiser design, hull and machinery were really too old. Her two 6-inch
35_50	turrets were insufficient to guarantee surface fire and were less effective in the anti-aircraft
35_51	warfare role due to improvements in missiles and aircraft; also, the basic fit of three twin 3 inch
35_52	turrets were poor for effective, reliable coverage of the fire arcs. The planned 40mm Bofors guns
35_53	approved in 1954/57 as essential for close-in defence were omitted to give the crew space and
35_54	comfort. Air conditioning was fitted throughout the ship, and a 200-line automatic telephone
35_55	exchange was installed. Her first captain was reported in the House of Lords to have said "that
35_56	H.M.S. Tiger had been designed to cope with nuclear attacks, in that she can steam for up to a
35_57	fortnight through radioactive fallout with remotely controlled boiler and engine and armament
35_58	operating with re-circulating purified air below decks, and could operate as a fighting unit even
35_59	if a nuclear bomb were dropped near by." They were described in Parliament as "effective ships for
35_60	a long period to come, and especially is this true east of Suez, where distances are so gigantic."
35_61	As completed, Tiger carried:
35_62	a Type 992Q surface search radar at the top of the foremast, with a range of ,
35_63	a Type 960 air warning radar at the top of the mainmast, with a range of ,
35_64	a Type 277Q height-finding radar halfway up the mainmast, with a range of ,
35_65	five MRS 3 fire control directors (one for each turret), each fitted with a Type 903 gunnery radar.
35_66	Her sonars were: Type 174 medium range search,
35_67	Type 176 passive search, which shared the same dome as the Type 174, Type 185 underwater telephone.
35_68	The Tigers complement was officially stated as 698 (53 officers and 645 ratings) in peacetime, and
35_69	900 in wartime.
35_70	The Navy Estimates for 1959-60 gave her initial costs as £12,820,000, whereas Jane's Fighting Ships
35_71	gave her initial cost as £13,113,000.
35_72	Tiger was accepted by the Navy in March 1959, and commissioned on 18 March 1959. Early career
35_73	The early part of Tigers first commission was spent, under Captain R. E. Washbourn, on trials of
35_74	her new armament. After workup, now under Captain R. Hutchins, Tiger went on a round of autumn
35_75	flag-showing visits to Gdynia, Stockholm, Kiel and Antwerp. At the end of 1959 she deployed to the
35_76	Mediterranean for a year as the flagship of the Mediterranean Fleet. By late 1960, there were still
35_77	problems with her armament and it was planned to resolve these at her first refit at the end of
35_78	1960. During a visit by the Lord Carrington (the First Lord of the Admiralty), his Naval Secretary
35_79	Rear-Admiral Frank Twiss "made the unpardonable error of shooting down a very expensive target
35_80	aircraft, to the cheers of the ship's company but to a stinging rebuke from their Lordships of the
35_81	Admiralty." The ship took part in operations in the Far East during the Indonesian Confrontation
35_82	in the early 1960s. The Navy in the early 1960s suffered manpower shortages, which resulted in a
35_83	"shortfall in technical personnel" in the Tiger, as a consequence some "items of its equipment
35_84	could not be operated", and "some of its equipment was not operational". In September 1963, the
35_85	Glasgow Herald said that the "Tiger already has a much-reduced crew and is virtually a floating
35_86	office." During the 1964 general election campaign, the leader of the opposition, Harold Wilson,
35_87	criticised the government for this during a speech at Plymouth.
35_88	Rear-Admiral Michael Pollock flew his flag in her as Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Home Fleet,
35_89	from 1965 – 1966. On 10 August 1966 one of the guns accidentally fired a practice shell into
35_90	Devonport Dockyard during material tests of the equipment. "One member of the ship's company was
35_91	slightly grazed, but there were no other casualties." In October 1966, the ship was visiting
35_92	Cardiff at the time of the Aberfan disaster. The crew assisted with the rescue and recovery
35_93	operation.
35_94	From 2 to 4 December 1966, she hosted talks between Prime Ministers Harold Wilson (UK) and Ian
35_95	Smith of Rhodesia. The latter had unilaterally declared independence from Britain due to Britain's
35_96	insistence on the removal of white minority rule before independence. Twenty officers (including
35_97	all twelve midshipmen) were put ashore at Gibraltar before the talks to "make room for the three
35_98	delegations of the Prime Minister, the Governor of Rhodesia and Mr. Smith." When the Rhodesian
35_99	delegation arrived, the Tiger was a few miles off shore, and the delegation was ferried out in a
35_100	small craft. The Tiger then moved out to sea, but moved close to harbour when the Rhodesian
35_101	delegation disembarked. On Wilson's orders, the British and Rhodesian delegations were "separated
35_102	in all activities outside the conference room".
35_103	Conversion and later career
35_104	Tiger was placed in reserve on 18 December 1966, before undergoing conversion to a "helicopter and
35_105	command cruiser" from 1968–72 in HMNB Devonport. This reconstruction included removing the after
35_106	6 inch mount and 3 inch mounts, installing two Seacat missile GWS 22 mounts, and building a flight
35_107	deck and hangar to operate four Westland Wessex (later Westland Sea King HAS 2) helicopters. Tiger
35_108	was given much taller funnels with squared off caps, which was such an improvement that the Blake
35_109	was given similar funnels in 1977.
35_110	Once converted, Tiger carried:
35_111	a Type 992Q surface search radar at the top of the foremast, with a range of ,
35_112	a Type 965M air warning radar with an AKE-1 single bedstead aerial at the top of the mainmast, this
35_113	had a narrower beam than the Type 960, which was needed for air direction and was now the Royal
35_114	Navy standard.
35_115	a Type 278 height-finding radar halfway up the mainmast, which was similar to the Type 277Q, but
35_116	easier to maintain,
35_117	four MRS 3 fire control directors (one for each turret and Seacat mounting, each fitted with a Type
35_118	903 gunnery radar.
35_119	She had excellent command, control, and communications facilities installed, and found use as a
35_120	flagship to task groups.
35_121	When plans were announced to Parliament in March 1964, it was said that the Navy did "not expect
35_122	this conversion work to be difficult or particularly expensive". The reconstruction of Blake and
35_123	Tiger was examined in the third report of the Public Accounts Committee for 1972. Michael Barnes
35_124	said in parliament that the refits "show too lax an attitude towards the way in which the
35_125	taxpayers' money is being spent". "The refits were planned to take 18 months and to cost £5
35_126	million each... The Tiger refit took over five years and cost over £13 million." Rear-Admiral
35_127	Morgan-Giles suggested bringing HMS Eagle back into commission instead of manning the Blake and
35_128	Tiger, which he said were "among the worst abortions which have ever been thrust on the Royal
35_129	Navy."

35_30

mounting had its own Medium Range System (MRS) 3 radar director. Viscount Hall stated in the House

35_31

of Lords in 1959 that her "automatically controlled" guns were "capable of firing at more than

35_32

twice the speed of manned armament" and the "improvement in guns was ten times better than if the

35_33

ship had been with the original gun armament". However, Tigers 6-inch guns usually jammed after 30

35_34

seconds firing, and couldn't deliver sustained bombardment in support of troops ashore. RN argued

35_35

that the first 30 seconds of engaging jet aircraft and warships was the critical determinant and

35_36

that aircraft would be shot down with short bursts of fire and as such limited magazine capacity

35_37

and gun reliability were less important than instantaneous response. The decision to complete the

35_38

ships was based on the availability of hulls and expectation that the cruisers could be completed

35_39

sooner (three years against 5 years) and cheaper (60% of the cost) than building new [8,000 ton]

35_40

cruisers at a time when the existing cruiser fleet was ageing and its weapons and fire control were

35_41

useless against modern aircraft. The RN had 21 cruisers in 1957, nine in operation and by 1961 the

35_42

cruiser fleet had reduced to nine of which five were in service.

35_43

HMS Tigers revised weapon fit was for immediate post-war requirements and the continued

35_44

reconstruction of the class confirmed the 1957 Defence White Paper as interim anti-aircraft ships

35_45

pending the introduction of guided weapons into the Royal Navy; four County-class destroyers with

35_46

the Seaslug missiles had been ordered by February 1957. In practice, only Tiger would be ready in

35_47

time and perform sufficiently well to serve any length of time as a gun cruiser.

35_48

By the time Tigers legend was accepted by the Board of the Admiralty in July 1954 and the Cabinet

35_49

in November 1954, the cruiser design, hull and machinery were really too old. Her two 6-inch

35_50

turrets were insufficient to guarantee surface fire and were less effective in the anti-aircraft

35_51

warfare role due to improvements in missiles and aircraft; also, the basic fit of three twin 3 inch

35_52

turrets were poor for effective, reliable coverage of the fire arcs. The planned 40mm Bofors guns

35_53

approved in 1954/57 as essential for close-in defence were omitted to give the crew space and

35_54

comfort. Air conditioning was fitted throughout the ship, and a 200-line automatic telephone

35_55

exchange was installed. Her first captain was reported in the House of Lords to have said "that

35_56

H.M.S. Tiger had been designed to cope with nuclear attacks, in that she can steam for up to a

35_57

fortnight through radioactive fallout with remotely controlled boiler and engine and armament

35_58

operating with re-circulating purified air below decks, and could operate as a fighting unit even

35_59

if a nuclear bomb were dropped near by." They were described in Parliament as "effective ships for

35_60

a long period to come, and especially is this true east of Suez, where distances are so gigantic."

35_61

As completed, Tiger carried:

35_62

a Type 992Q surface search radar at the top of the foremast, with a range of ,

35_63

a Type 960 air warning radar at the top of the mainmast, with a range of ,

35_64

a Type 277Q height-finding radar halfway up the mainmast, with a range of ,

35_65

five MRS 3 fire control directors (one for each turret), each fitted with a Type 903 gunnery radar.

35_66

Her sonars were: Type 174 medium range search,

35_67

Type 176 passive search, which shared the same dome as the Type 174, Type 185 underwater telephone.

35_68

The Tigers complement was officially stated as 698 (53 officers and 645 ratings) in peacetime, and

35_69

900 in wartime.

35_70

The Navy Estimates for 1959-60 gave her initial costs as £12,820,000, whereas Jane's Fighting Ships

35_71

gave her initial cost as £13,113,000.

35_72

Tiger was accepted by the Navy in March 1959, and commissioned on 18 March 1959. Early career

35_73

The early part of Tigers first commission was spent, under Captain R. E. Washbourn, on trials of

35_74

her new armament. After workup, now under Captain R. Hutchins, Tiger went on a round of autumn

35_75

flag-showing visits to Gdynia, Stockholm, Kiel and Antwerp. At the end of 1959 she deployed to the

35_76

Mediterranean for a year as the flagship of the Mediterranean Fleet. By late 1960, there were still

35_77

problems with her armament and it was planned to resolve these at her first refit at the end of

35_78

1960. During a visit by the Lord Carrington (the First Lord of the Admiralty), his Naval Secretary

35_79

Rear-Admiral Frank Twiss "made the unpardonable error of shooting down a very expensive target

35_80

aircraft, to the cheers of the ship's company but to a stinging rebuke from their Lordships of the

35_81

Admiralty." The ship took part in operations in the Far East during the Indonesian Confrontation

35_82

in the early 1960s. The Navy in the early 1960s suffered manpower shortages, which resulted in a

35_83

"shortfall in technical personnel" in the Tiger, as a consequence some "items of its equipment

35_84

could not be operated", and "some of its equipment was not operational". In September 1963, the

35_85

Glasgow Herald said that the "Tiger already has a much-reduced crew and is virtually a floating

35_86

office." During the 1964 general election campaign, the leader of the opposition, Harold Wilson,

35_87

criticised the government for this during a speech at Plymouth.

35_88

Rear-Admiral Michael Pollock flew his flag in her as Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Home Fleet,

35_89

from 1965 – 1966. On 10 August 1966 one of the guns accidentally fired a practice shell into

35_90

Devonport Dockyard during material tests of the equipment. "One member of the ship's company was

35_91

slightly grazed, but there were no other casualties." In October 1966, the ship was visiting

35_92

Cardiff at the time of the Aberfan disaster. The crew assisted with the rescue and recovery

35_93

operation.

35_94

From 2 to 4 December 1966, she hosted talks between Prime Ministers Harold Wilson (UK) and Ian

35_95

Smith of Rhodesia. The latter had unilaterally declared independence from Britain due to Britain's

35_96

insistence on the removal of white minority rule before independence. Twenty officers (including

35_97

all twelve midshipmen) were put ashore at Gibraltar before the talks to "make room for the three

35_98

delegations of the Prime Minister, the Governor of Rhodesia and Mr. Smith." When the Rhodesian

35_99

delegation arrived, the Tiger was a few miles off shore, and the delegation was ferried out in a

35_100

small craft. The Tiger then moved out to sea, but moved close to harbour when the Rhodesian

35_101

delegation disembarked. On Wilson's orders, the British and Rhodesian delegations were "separated

35_102

in all activities outside the conference room".

35_103

Conversion and later career

35_104

Tiger was placed in reserve on 18 December 1966, before undergoing conversion to a "helicopter and

35_105

command cruiser" from 1968–72 in HMNB Devonport. This reconstruction included removing the after

35_106

6 inch mount and 3 inch mounts, installing two Seacat missile GWS 22 mounts, and building a flight

35_107

deck and hangar to operate four Westland Wessex (later Westland Sea King HAS 2) helicopters. Tiger

35_108

was given much taller funnels with squared off caps, which was such an improvement that the Blake

35_109

was given similar funnels in 1977.

35_110

Once converted, Tiger carried:

35_111

a Type 992Q surface search radar at the top of the foremast, with a range of ,

35_112

a Type 965M air warning radar with an AKE-1 single bedstead aerial at the top of the mainmast, this

35_113

had a narrower beam than the Type 960, which was needed for air direction and was now the Royal

35_114

Navy standard.

35_115

a Type 278 height-finding radar halfway up the mainmast, which was similar to the Type 277Q, but

35_116

easier to maintain,

35_117

four MRS 3 fire control directors (one for each turret and Seacat mounting, each fitted with a Type

35_118

903 gunnery radar.

35_119

She had excellent command, control, and communications facilities installed, and found use as a

35_120

flagship to task groups.

35_121

When plans were announced to Parliament in March 1964, it was said that the Navy did "not expect

35_122

this conversion work to be difficult or particularly expensive". The reconstruction of Blake and

35_123

Tiger was examined in the third report of the Public Accounts Committee for 1972. Michael Barnes

35_124

said in parliament that the refits "show too lax an attitude towards the way in which the

35_125

taxpayers' money is being spent". "The refits were planned to take 18 months and to cost £5

35_126

million each... The Tiger refit took over five years and cost over £13 million." Rear-Admiral

35_127

Morgan-Giles suggested bringing HMS Eagle back into commission instead of manning the Blake and

35_128

Tiger, which he said were "among the worst abortions which have ever been thrust on the Royal

35_129

Navy."