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2,500 |
Thus, it is demonstrably clear that, in the absence of bipartisanship, dealing with the new international system will be difficult at best and at times next to impossible. Friends and foes alike, watching U.S. indecision at home, will not see the United States as a credible negotiating partner, ally, or deterrent against wanton aggression. This is a recipe for increased chaos, anarchy, and strife on the world scene. The appeal, then, to recreate anew as the hallmark of U.S. efforts abroad the predictability and resolve that can only come from bipartisanship at home is as critical as during the perilous days following World War II. Bipartisanship in Context The ease of constructing bipartisanship, however, should not be overstated. Its halcyon years are often idealized. People forget that the golden years from Pearl Harbor to the Tet offensive were the exception rather than the rule. Consensus was not a prevailing characteristic in the first 170 years of the Republic. Critics have noted with justification that it was the clear lack of purpose regarding vigorous U.S. involvement in world affairs that led to the U.S. rejection of membership in the League of Nations. In no small measure, this rejection led to the 20-year crisis that resulted in the rise of Hitler. Proponents of bipartisanship point out its crowning achievements. Unprecedented unity between the two political parties made it possible for President Harry S. Truman and a Republican senator, Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-Mich.), to join forces and create such monumental achievements as the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the United Nations Charter. Despite strains between the two parties over the Korean War and China, to name but two issues, that unity held firm and enabled United States to act with continuity and consistency. Allies saw that the United States was strong and reliable, and the unmistakable message to adversaries was that the United States would abide by its commitments. Some argue that it was the foreign policy consensus prevalent during the Cold War that made possible the tragic U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. But this argument in no way invalidates the benefits of bipartisanship and, in the case of Vietnam, represents an oversimplification of the facts. The failure of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia had as much to do with the unique circumstances of the war itself, which were exacerbated by the then current theories of limited war fighting. These factors, in conjunction with the profound domestic turmoil on both domestic and foreign policy that was tearing at the U.S. political fabric, made a complicated and protracted war abroad virtually impossible to prosecute. More generally, the fact remains that the perception of strength resting on bipartisan unity has been crucial to the United States in times of crisis. This principle was most vividly displayed by the bipartisan support for President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis. Had the Soviets felt the United States was divided, the situation might have ended in tragic defeat or quite possibly in a devastating war. Although history will be the final judge, it could be argued that in the recent Gulf crisis it was precisely the vast chasm that separated the Republicans from the Democrats over whether to use force or to employ sanctions in order to reverse Saddam Hussein's aggression that led him to calculate that the United States would never actually employ significant military power. This encouraged him to ignore the resolutions passed by the United Nations (UN) and wait for the United States to seek a watered-down diplomatic compromise. Certainly Hussein's statements that the American people would have to "face rows of coffins' if there were a war, echoing statements emanating from lengthy Senate hearings and floor debate, were designed to play into the antiwar sentiment that wanted to "give sanctions a chance." Tragically, the perception of division and weakness at home made the necessity for a military solution almost inevitable. Executive-Legislative Relations: The Search for Balance The foundation of sustainable bipartisanship is effective executive-legislative relations. After the Vietnam War, however, the cold war foreign policy consensus, supported by harmonious executive-legislative relations and by both parties in Congress in a manner that minimized conflict over foreign affairs, was rudely shattered. Although it was not completely undone, as is often claimed by the pundits, and central elements of the postwar consensus enjoyed a fair deree of support, it was severely frayed. As a result, a slide began down a slippery slope leading to the balkanization of the U.S. approach to national security, and today this threatens to inject chaos into the foreign policy process. Congress lies at the heart of the issue.
|
Winik, Autumn 1991 (Jay – Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University Foundation, The Quest for Bipartisanship: A New Beginning for a New World Order, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
U S ally deterrent against wanton aggression increased chaos, anarchy, and strife on the world scene effective executive-legislative relations threatens to inject chaos into the foreign policy process
|
Effective executive-legislative relations prevents global conflict and is key to ally credibility.
| 4,884 | 98 | 200 | 774 | 12 | 28 | 0.015504 | 0.036176 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,501 |
Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and prevention of international conflict – and thus the containment of the WMD threat. Future American governments will not ‘police the world’ alone. For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only by enmeshing the capabilities of the United States and other leading powers in a co-operative security management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD.
|
Ross, Winter 1998/1999 (Douglas – professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, Canada’s functional isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction, International Journal, p. Lexis) [MN]
|
prevention of international conflict containment of the WMD threat U S avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD
|
Allies prevent nuclear war.
| 1,039 | 27 | 118 | 154 | 4 | 18 | 0.025974 | 0.116883 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,502 |
When other major states consider whether to work with the United States or resist it, the fact that it is an open, stable democracy matters. The outside world can see American policymaking at work and can even find opportunities to enter the process and help shape how the overall order operates. Paris, London, Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo and even Beijing-in each of these capitals officials can readily find reasons to conclude that an engagement policy toward the United States will be more effective than balancing against U.S. power. America in large part stumbled into this open, institutionalized order in the 1940s, as it sought to rebuild the postwar world and to counter Soviet communism. In the late 1940s, in a pre-echo of today's situation, the United States was the world's dominant state--constituting 45 percent of world GNP, leading in military power, technology, finance and industry, and brimming with natural resources. But America nonetheless found itself building world order around stable and binding partnerships. Its calling card was its offer of Cold War security protection. But the intensity of political and economic cooperation between the United States and its partners went well beyond what was necessary to counter the Soviet threat. As the historian Geir Lundestad has observed, the expanding American political order in the half century after World War II was in important respects an "empire by invitation."(n5) The remarkable global reach of American postwar hegemony has been at least in part driven by the efforts of European and Asian governments to harness U.S. power, render that power more predictable, and use it to overcome their own regional insecurities. The result has been a vast system of America-centered economic and security partnerships. Even though the United States looks like a wayward power to many around the world today, it nonetheless has an unusual ability to co-opt and reassure. Three elements matter most in making U.S. power more stable, engaged and restrained. First, America's mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized way in which U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build long-term, mutually beneficial relations. The governmental separation of powers creates a shared decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states. An active press and competitive party system also provide a service to outside states by generating information about U.S. policy and determining its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of a democracy can, indeed, frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But over the long term, democratic institutions produce more consistent and credible policies--policies that do not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat.
|
Ikenberry, Spring 2001 (John G. – Professor at Georgetown University, The National Interest, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
U S U S more effective than balancing U S unusual ability to co-opt and reassure relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon long-term relations abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states consistent and credible policies
|
Interbranch relations is critical to leadership --- turns hegemony
| 3,000 | 66 | 227 | 463 | 9 | 34 | 0.019438 | 0.073434 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,503 |
This would not only put an unpalatable past behind us, but would lead to more democratic, effective, efficient, and reliable international lawmaking. Unlike the treaty-making process, a congressional-executive agreement involves the House. This not only lends the lawmaking process greater legitimacy, as it includes the legislative body intended to be most representative of the American people. It also precludes the need for separate implementing legislation for treaties that are either not self-executing or that encroach on the House’s traditional scope of authority—requiring, for example, a new appropriation of funds. This in turn leads to more efficient lawmaking (requiring one step rather than two) and at the same time avoids the awkward possibility that the Senate would be willing to give its advice and consent to a treaty, but the House would be unwilling to support legislation to implement it. Moreover, because the lawmaking process would require simple majority votes in both houses rather than a supermajority vote in one house, it would be less likely to be subject to the whims of the unrepresentative political extremes that might command thirty-four votes in the Senate. And commitments once made are more likely to be kept because Congress is likely to have a greater say in undoing agreements that it has had a hand in making through legislation.
|
Hathaway, May 2008 (Oona – Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, Yale Law Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
greater legitimacy most representative of the American people more efficient lawmaking whims of the unrepresentative political extremes more likely to be kept
|
CEAs are critical to empower the House and adds credibility to the policy
| 1,374 | 73 | 158 | 216 | 13 | 22 | 0.060185 | 0.101852 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,504 |
Once we dispel the notion that the congressional-executive agreement has received the approval of historical practice or judicial decision, the genuine reason for its modern use comes into focus. Congressional-executive agreements represented an effort to replace what was seen as an outmoded method for dealing with international affairs, one established in a world of sailing ships, horse-borne couriers, and muskets, with a more efficient, democratic process. New Deal legal scholars and their progeny believed that providing the Senate with a checking role in making international agreements had been a dismal failure. Functionally, the Senate had never assumed the co-equal role in international negotiations that the Framers had hoped for. n66 The Senate's formal role in treatymaking had become one of after-the-fact consent, while the President assumed primary responsibility for setting foreign policy and conducting diplomatic negotiations. Vesting the treaty power partially in the Senate to achieve secrecy and speed no longer seemed compelling, due to the large size of the Senate, the role of the House in foreign affairs, and the nature of modern treaties, which no longer demanded such secrecy. Defects in the Senate's role did not rest just in process. Giving the states a checking role in foreign affairs had led to results that harmed the national interest. With only a small minority needed to block an international agreement, the treaty process allowed isolationism to reign over American foreign policy. n67 Some even suspected that states [*776] would use their voice in the treaty process to win regional or sectional advantages. Sectional controversy, they asserted, originally had forced the Framers to create the two-thirds requirement for senatorial approval in the first place. n68 While some might argue that the constitutional difficulty in making treaties expressed the Framers' bias against international entanglements, the New Deal authors believed that isolationism was simply a disease that threatened to cripple America in a new, interdependent world. Isolationist Senators, after all, had blocked American participation in the League of Nations, to which they attributed the failure of the peace, the rise of Hitler, and the return of world war. New Deal scholars believed that a small minority of Senators should not be able to use the Constitution to foist their isolationist preferences upon the majority's desire for more engagement in the world. Adopting a congressional procedure, without a supermajority, would rid isolationism of its chokehold over American foreign policy.
|
Yoo, February 2001 (John C. – Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, Michigan Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
C e a s isolationism to reign over American foreign policy rid isolationism of its chokehold over American foreign policy
|
CEAs check an isolationist Congress.
| 2,620 | 36 | 121 | 396 | 5 | 20 | 0.012626 | 0.050505 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,505 |
The idea that it is indeed hard work to pass treaties is supported by a recent working paper by Judith Kelley and Jon Pevehouse. Passing a treaty isn’t a simple matter of tallying the votes. The Senate’s agree and consent process takes away legislative time and political capital that could be used for other, perhaps more valuable, legislation. This opportunity cost theory yields some interesting and counterintuitive hypotheses. Presidents should become less likely to advance treaties when their approval ratings are high and when their party controls the Senate because that is the time when they can pass more valuable legislation on domestic issues. Kelley and Pevehouse find strong support for these patterns in their analysis with data from 1967-2008.
|
Voeten, 12/19/2012 (Erik – Peter F. Krogh Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Justice in World Affairs at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Government Department, Why Has the Obama Administration Secured So Few Treaty Ratifications?, The Monkey Cage, p. http://themonkeycage.org/2012/12/19/why-has-the-obama-administration-secured-so-few-treaty-ratifications/) [MN]
|
hard work to pass treaties takes away legislative time and political capital other more valuable, legislation strong support for these patterns
|
Treaty ratification drains capital.
| 760 | 35 | 143 | 120 | 4 | 21 | 0.033333 | 0.175 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,506 |
The supermajority requirement imposed by the Treaty Clause means that treaties that enjoy the support of a strong majority of the population and its political representatives may still not receive approval. This is all the more true because the Senate is extremely malapportioned - far more so today than was the true at the Founding, or even a century ago. 217 Senators representing only about eight percent of the country's population can halt a treaty. 218 Achieving support of a two-thirds majority also requires playing to the polarized extremes of modern American politics. 219 Consider, by way of illustration, the difference in ideological positions of the fifty-first vote in the Senate versus the sixty-seventh. If we array the senators in the 109th Congress from most liberal to most conservative according to a widely used measure of ideological position, we see that in the 109th Congress the sixty-seventh senator was just over twice as conservative as the fifty-first senator. 220 In the [*1311] reverse dimension, the sixty-seventh senator was also just over twice as liberal as the fifty-first. In other words, the supermajority requirement means treaties must gain the support of senators that are twice as conservative or liberal as the so-called median voter in the Senate. 221
|
Hathaway, May 2008 (Oona – Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, Yale Law Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
extremely malapportioned polarized extremes over twice as conservative just over twice as liberal as the fifty-first twice as conservative or liberal
|
The CP solves the link turns --- the link is only a question of mechanism. Ratification requires a supermajority while a CEA only requires a majority which requires less capital. That’s Voeten 12
| 1,297 | 195 | 149 | 207 | 33 | 21 | 0.15942 | 0.101449 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,507 |
A threshold empirical question for the policy wisdom of requiring domestically binding international delegations to be authorized by treaty is whether in fact the process for consenting to a treaty imposes a higher hurdle [*1752] and, if so, to what degree. Only by considering that question can we gauge the policy effect of requiring binding international delegations to be implemented by treaty rather than congressional-executive agreement. Most commentators have believed that it is harder to obtain the two-thirds support in the Senate for an international agreement than to pass a congressional-executive agreement with the support of both houses of Congress and the President. n156 Indeed, it was an assumption that underlay the long historical effort to permit the congressional-executive agreement to be used instead of treaty ratification: proponents believed that the Senate was the graveyard of important international agreements. n157 There is also political science support for this view. The ideological medians of the House and Senate have been quite similar for the last seventy years and their ideological distributions have not been dissimilar. n158 Thus, assuming that it will be harder to get the vote of a representative who is more ideologically predisposed to oppose the international agreement at issue, it is likely to be harder to get the vote of one who is at the sixty-seventh percentile of opposition than one who is at the fifty-first percentile. n159 It should be recognized that the Senate permits filibusters, making the sixtieth senator rather than the fifty-first senator sometimes pivotal even for ordinary legislation. n160 Nevertheless, the filibuster is weaker than an express sixty-vote supermajority rule for at least two reasons. First, senators who engage in a filibuster and thereby prevent legislation from coming to a vote can be portrayed as obstructionist. n161 Second, as the threat of the so-called nuclear option shows, senators are likely to deploy the filibuster more cautiously, [*1753] because a majority can get rid of the filibuster rule. n162 Thus, my best estimate is that the two-thirds ratification requirement in the Senate would generally represent an appreciably, but not hugely, higher hurdle for international delegations of domestic power. n163
|
McGinnis, June 2009 (John – Stanford Clinton Sr. Professor of Law at Northwestern University Law School, Medellin and the Future of International Delegation, The Yale Law Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
harder political science support der to get the vote of one who is at the sixty-seventh percentile than one who is at the fifty-first percentile appreciably higher hurdle
|
There is a comparative difference between the plan and the CP
| 2,313 | 61 | 170 | 354 | 11 | 28 | 0.031073 | 0.079096 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,508 |
Up to this point, there is no difference between the Article II treaty process and the Article I statutory method. The choice of instruments will not affect the type of information communicated about the probability of winning, but rather the strength of its credibility beyond the political costs that a President would suffer for misrepresenting information to Congress. Taking the Article II route requires the President to convince two-thirds of the Senate to agree to the treaty. A blocking coalition of thirty-four Senators need represent the population of only the smallest one-third of states by population. This could be as small as 7.4% of the population (the amount of the nation’s population contained by the seventeen smallest states), or 22.7 million out of the U.S. population of 307 million in 2009.105 By contrast, the minority needed to block legislation in the Senate can be as small as 16% of the population (the population of the twenty-five smallest states). The Article I route, by contrast, requires simple majorities of both the House and Senate. To get through the House, the President need only convince the representatives of 51% of the majority of the population. To get through the Senate, the President must only persuade fifty-one Senators, instead of sixty-seven as with an Article II treaty. This assumes that a simple majority of the Senate does not actually represent 51% of the population. It might. But if the twenty-five smallest states vote together, enactment of a statute requires the other twenty-five to cooperate—84% of the population. In fact, to take account of Senate rules, a minority opposed to a congressional-executive agreement would need the votes of only the smallest twenty states, which represent about 10% of the population—enough votes to sustain a filibuster that would prevent the bill from coming to a vote. Nevertheless, the President will consume more political capital to convince the representatives of 93% of the population, via a treaty, rather than the representatives of 84% of the population, via a statute. In the terminology of our earlier equation, choosing the treaty process over the congressional-executive route will increase audience costs. That increase will be equivalent to the additional political capital needed to win the votes of 9% of the population (the difference between 84% of the population for a statute and 93% of the population for a treaty). It may be the case that this is not a great amount, but the marginal difference allows the United States to increase the cost, and hence the credibility, of its signal. Treaties thus provide a more credible means for the United States to reveal private information to its negotiating partner than the enactment of a statute.
|
Yoo, November 2011 (John – Professor of Law at Berkeley Law School, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining, Cornell Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
only convince the representatives of 51% more political capital increase audience costs additional political capital needed to win the votes
|
Ratification costs more political capital than a CEA.
| 2,762 | 53 | 140 | 446 | 8 | 20 | 0.017937 | 0.044843 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,509 |
The Constitution requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate in order to check the President's negotiating power. The super-majority was a normative requirement that changed the dynamics of the ordinary legislative process. When the President knows that the agreement can be rejected by any thirty-four senators, he must insist on negotiating terms that command broad support; whereas he is not under the same negotiating pressure if he submits the agreement as a congressional-executive or sole executive agreement. In some respects, the President's negotiating position may be strengthened if the foreign government knows that the President needs the votes of two-thirds of the Senate. Often, it is not [*726] easy to persuade a super-majority of senators to support a treaty. The Constitution creates obstructions to forming treaties for good reasons: both to protect state law from being readily overturned by foreign agreements and to discourage entangling alliances. Though the United States plays a larger role in the world today than it did in 1789, there is still wisdom in not undertaking foreign commitments lightly. When two-thirds of the Senate votes to ratify a treaty, our commitments have greater credibility. We are more likely to keep commitments that are endorsed by super-majorities and to stay the course through good times and bad. Finally, because treaties are the supreme law of the land, and are difficult to change without the participation of the other contracting parties, the Constitution requires two-thirds of the Senate to ensure that changes in domestic law reflect the will of a broad majority.
|
Paul 1998 (Joel – Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, California Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
command broad support same negotiating pressure not easy persuade a super-majority
|
Comparative evidence --- the CP costs less capital.
| 1,625 | 51 | 82 | 254 | 8 | 11 | 0.031496 | 0.043307 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,510 |
Bolton and Yoo appear to concede that the 2/3 rule is too strong for financial and economic agreements. They just want to preserve it for agreements that touch on national security or that involve delegation to international institutions (however, that is what happens with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism). Certainly, the framers did not make such a distinction, and Bolton and Yoo do not explain why there should be different rules for different types of treaties. If the Obama administration can further erode the Senate’s role in treatymaking, this will strengthen the president’s hand. John Yoo thinks that the president has the power, and ought to have the power, to make war, control American troops, and dominate American foreign policy; if he can do all that, why shouldn’t he also have the power to make the agreements that America’s foreign policy requires?
|
Posner, 1/5/2009 (Eric – Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, Bolton and Yoo on the Treaty Power, p. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_01_04-2009_01_10.shtml) [MN]
|
too strong economic agreements erode the Senate’s role in treatymaking strengthen the president’s hand dominate American foreign policy
|
CPs strengthens presidential power
| 873 | 34 | 135 | 142 | 4 | 18 | 0.028169 | 0.126761 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,511 |
A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the person who rules the United States influences events far beyond the shores of his own country. Both the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The first impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and growth across the world. A weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world. The Middle East, the conflict between India and Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by the authority the next US president brings to his job. There are those who would welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they would benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the Western alliance, there are those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel that a less assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers of having a weak, insecure US presidency outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be wished away. A president with a shaky mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will be constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about how to use his authority. This brings with it the risks of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens conflict. There are very few conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world needs the United States to use its power deftly and decisively.
|
South China Morning Post, 12/11/2000
|
bad news for the rest of the world U S influences events far beyond the shores felt in global hotspots across the world authority the president risks of miscalculation heightens conflict U S deftly decisively
|
That prevents global instability and miscalculation
| 1,789 | 51 | 208 | 307 | 6 | 35 | 0.019544 | 0.114007 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,512 |
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe’s political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its “non first use” principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
|
The Straits Times, 6/25/2000 (Regional Fallout: No one gains in a war over Taiwan, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries and raise the possibility of a nuclear war. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China Beijing seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war
|
US/China war causes extinction
| 3,020 | 30 | 748 | 496 | 4 | 131 | 0.008065 | 0.264113 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,513 |
Finally, the U.S. makes international legal commitments part of domestic law through Congressional-Executive Agreements. Congressional-Executive Agreements become effective after being "negotiated by the President and submitted to both houses of Congress for simple-majority approval, rather than to the Senate for two-thirds approval." n39 Although they are called Congressional-Executive "Agreements," they are treated "as the equivalent of the treaty form with respect to supremacy over state or prior federal law." n40 Since 1934, the U.S. has favored Congressional-Executive Agreements over Article II treaties as a way of making trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the WTO. n41 In fact, Congressional-Executive Agreements, as opposed to ratification as required by Article II, Section 2, have been the preferred form of entering into international trade commitments. n42 The constitutional propriety of Congressional-Executive Agreements relies on Article I, Section 8, "the broad reach of Congress' power [*20] over foreign commerce, combined with its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause." n43 An alternative viewpoint questions the constitutional propriety of Congressional-Executive Agreements and argues that "structural considerations outside of Article I, 8 limit congressional authority." n44 For example, while the constitution does not expressly mention any role for the House of Representatives in approving international agreements to which the U.S. is a party, Professor Tribe argues: the Constitution's enumeration of other instances in which Congress may give bicameral consent to conduct implicating the nation's foreign relations - is powerful evidence that the Treaty Clause is not simply an optional alternative to treaty approval by Legislation. Indeed, even where 10 of Article I grants Congress the power to approve a specifically identified category of agreements and compacts - between or among the different states, or between states and foreign governments - Congress' approval power extends only to state agreements that do not qualify as "treaties." n45
|
Gathii, Spring 2004 (James – Assistant Professor at Albany Law School, Insulating Domestic Policy Through International Legal Minimalism, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
C E A s rather than to the Senate for two-thirds approval C E A s opposed to ratification
|
B) Ratification and CEAs are distinct mechanisms.
| 2,142 | 49 | 89 | 305 | 7 | 19 | 0.022951 | 0.062295 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,514 |
On February 20, 2012, the governments of the United States and Mexico announced the Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement.122 The agreement is a step toward clarifying relations between the two countries with respect to managing resources in portions of the Gulf of Mexico that straddle their international marine border.123 Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to the Trans-boundary agreement as an example of recent U.S.-Mexican efforts to develop a sustainable energy trading relationship. Before the agreement can take effect, both countries must review and accept it. The Mexican Senate approved the agreement on April 12, 2012, and the Mexican Presidency completed all other domestic requirements to implement the agreement on May 22, 2012.124 Steps toward U.S. review and acceptance are currently underway with the Department of State taking lead responsibility for addressing questions about the agreement during this process. A procedural question has emerged with respect to what actions are needed for the agreement to be accepted in the United States. At issue is whether the agreement should be entered in the form of a treaty (in which case it would need to be submitted to the Senate and approved by a two-thirds majority) or a Congressional-Executive Agreement (in which case congressional authorization would take the form of a statute passed by a majority of both Houses).
|
Seelke, 1/29/2013 (Clare Ribano – Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, Mexico and the 112th Congress, Congressional Research Service, p. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32724.pdf)
|
U S procedural question has emerged U S At issue form of a treaty a Congressional-Executive Agreement
|
4. The core question about the TBHA is ratification or CEA.
| 1,403 | 59 | 101 | 216 | 11 | 17 | 0.050926 | 0.078704 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,515 |
24 In light of such judicial and historical precedents, the General Counsel to the Clerk of the House of Representatives concluded that "the United States may appropriately choose to negotiate an arms accord in the form of a Congressional-Executive agreement, and approve it by legislation, as an alternative to treaty ratification." Memorandum to the Honorable Dante B. Fascell, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, from Steven R. Ross, General Counsel to the Clerk, and Charles Tiefer, Deputy General Counsel to the Clerk, Re: Congressional Approval of an Arms Control Agreement by Legislation Rather than Treaty Ratification (May 23, 1985), reprinted in 134 Cong. Rec. 7323 (1988). See also Memorandum to Ambassador Kampelman, Counselor, from Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, Re: Form of submission of arms control agreements (Apr. 14, 1988), reprinted in 134 Cong. Rec. 7324 ("Neither the [Arms Control and Disarmament Act] nor the Constitution dictates which of these two options the President should exercise with respect to a particular [arms control] agreement," but noting that "[w]ith one exception, the significant arms control agreements of the past few decades have all been submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate as treaties.").
|
Kreczko, 11/25/1996 (Alan – Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, Validity of Congressional-Executive Agreements that Substantially Modify the United States’ Obligations Under an Existing Treaty, p. http://www.justice.gov/olc/treaty.top.htm) [MN]
|
judicial and historical precedents U S an alternative to treaty ratification
|
5. Aff plan wording checks --- they could have said “Congressional-Executive Agreement” in the plan but they chose to say ratify. Allowing this perm kills pre-round prep and makes the aff a moving target. That’s a voting issue for fairness and education.
| 1,273 | 254 | 76 | 195 | 42 | 11 | 0.215385 | 0.05641 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,516 |
In the face of this Senate inaction, UNCLOS supporters are beginning to look at alternative methods to adopt the treaty in lieu of traditional Senate ratification. n163 One such non-traditional method would involve the use of a Congressional-Executive Agreement. n164 A Congressional-Executive Agreement is an alternative to treaty ratification where both the House and the Senate approve a treaty by a majority, rather than a two-thirds Senate approval. n165 While the constitutionality and feasibility of the Congressional-Executive Agreement to ratify a treaty are outside the scope of this Note, the argument demonstrates the seriousness of the lack of ratification.
|
Smith 2010 (Angelle – Associate at Covington & Burling L.L.P., Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Minteral Rights Must Be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War, George Washington International Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
in lieu of traditional Senate ratification C E A an alternative to treaty ratification
|
UNCLOS advocates prove it’s distinct.
| 670 | 37 | 86 | 99 | 5 | 14 | 0.050505 | 0.141414 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,517 |
Despite the fact that the constitutional text includes a specific Treaty Clause but no other means to enter into international agreements, a broad intellectual consensus exists that congressional-executive agreements may serve as full substitutes for treaties. As Professor Louis Henkin, the dean of American foreign relations law scholars, writes, "it is now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty." n6 Declares the Restatement (Third) of United States Foreign Relations Law: "The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance." n7 Under this theory of "interchangeability," congressional-executive agreements and treaties are indistinguishable from one another, with the result that the former may enjoy all of the benefits that accrue to the latter, despite the easier method for enacting statutes. Rather than a supermajoritarian barrier to international agreement-making, the Treaty Clause becomes merely an alternative method for making contracts with other nations. According to this logic, President Bush could now resubmit the Test-Ban Treaty to Congress for approval by majority vote, and President Wilson could have brought the United States into the League of Nations through a statute, even after the defeat of both agreements in the Senate. Few constitutional provisions seem so easily evaded.
|
Yoo, February 2001 (John C. – Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, Michigan Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
broad intellectual consensus full substitutes for treaties wide use complete alternative to a treaty alternative to the treaty method in every instance indistinguishable from one another
|
4. Neg ground – process CPs check 2AC add-ons and unpredictable aff strategy
| 1,499 | 76 | 186 | 220 | 13 | 26 | 0.059091 | 0.118182 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,518 |
Hence, a President who wishes to withdraw from a congressional-executive agreement must convince a majority of Congress to consent. And the supermajority nature of enactment works against breaking the international commitment. The President needs not only 51% of the House, but also fifty-one Senators. If the twenty-five smallest states oppose terminating the congressional-executive agreement, the President may need to persuade Senators who represent as much as 84% of the population to consent. And, taking into account the Senate filibuster rule, the President may even need to win over Senators who represent as much as 90% of the nation’s population. That is not quite the 93% needed for two-thirds of the Senate, but a high political cost nonetheless. The difference between treaty and statutory termination allows the United States to send signals of varying credibility about its commitment to keep an international promise. Treaties will send a lesser signal of commitment than congressional-executive agreements because of the President’s power to unilaterally terminate the former. The President’s main domestic cost will arise from opposition political parties and interest groups that support the policies in the treaty. A President would suffer those same costs in terminating a congressional-executive agreement, but he must go to the greater effort of assembling majorities in both the House and Senate. These audience costs could be significant, especially if opposition aligns along differences in state geography or population. The additional political resources required to terminate a statute provides a credible signal, at the time of the signing of the international agreement, of commitment.
|
Yoo, November 2011 (John – Professor of Law at Berkeley Law School, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining, Cornell Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
against breaking the international commitment high political cost c e a s unilaterally terminate the former credible signal at the time of the signing of the international agreement
|
CEAs send a stronger signal --- the plan can be rolled back.
| 1,717 | 60 | 181 | 255 | 12 | 28 | 0.047059 | 0.109804 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,519 |
Congressional-executive agreements, by contrast, would prove better suited for situations where the United States has less need to reveal private information and more need to show a credible commitment. Economic agreements could fall into this category. As argued earlier, there may be little private information that needs to be revealed to reach an agreement. Commitment, however, may prove the more difficult challenge. Trade agreements will encourage investments, such as in manufacturing plants or distribution and retail facilities, to take advantage of reduced tariffs and other trade barriers. Private actors, however, will have some reluctance to invest if they are unsure about the long-term commitment of the United States to the agreement. Making it more difficult for the President to terminate a trade agreement will increase confidence that the United States will comply with its obligations.
|
Yoo, November 2011 (John – Professor of Law at Berkeley Law School, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining, Cornell Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
U S show a credible commitment Economic agreements could fall into this category more difficult challenge unsure long-term commitment U S more difficult terminate increase confidence U S
|
Only the CP assures investors --- turns the aff (Pemex)
| 907 | 55 | 186 | 135 | 10 | 28 | 0.074074 | 0.207407 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,520 |
Congressional-executive agreements create more reliable international commitments than do Article II treaties. This is an important and perhaps surprising advantage. It is important because the central purpose of an international agreement is to commit states to act in ways consistent with the agreement. It may be surprising, because, as just argued, the bar in Congress is generally higher for Article II treaties - which might be thought to create a stronger assurance of political durability. Indeed, the very limited scholarship on the issue to date has argued that, because of this higher bar, treaties do in fact create a stronger commitment. 236 That scholarship is misguided. Fixated on vote thresholds in the Senate, it has missed the two core reasons why congressional-executive agreements create stronger commitments than do Article II treaties: their stronger domestic legal status and their more stringent rules regarding withdrawal from an enacted agreement. There is a beneficial side effect of a move away from Article II treaties toward congressional-executive agreements. As we shall see, avoiding commitments that are unenforceable or that the President might withdraw from without congressional involvement also promises to bring better balance to the exercise of authority by Congress and the President over international lawmaking, while at the same time more effectively protecting the House's traditional scope of authority.
|
Hathaway, May 2008 (Oona – Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, Yale Law Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
C e a s more reliable international commitments central purpose misguided Fixated on vote thresholds stronger domestic legal status more stringent rules regarding withdrawal from an enacted agreement
|
CEAs signal stronger commitment --- the plan will just be rolled back
| 1,450 | 69 | 199 | 216 | 12 | 28 | 0.055556 | 0.12963 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,521 |
The situation has been further complicated by the control of the Mexican oil market by Mexico’s national oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), and Mexico’s pre-2008 prohibition on foreign oil and gas companies operating within Mexican territory. However, while investment is now permitted, there remains a possibility that Mexico will pass laws which are inconsistent with U.S. interests, and U.S. companies must be protected from this. According to Duncan Wood, Director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico ratified the Agreement as a treaty in April 2012, despite some opposition, who, prior to reviewing the final details of the Agreement, portrayed it as ‘‘selling out to the U.S.’’ That said, the Calderon Administration largely supported the finalization of the Agreement given PEMEX’s longstanding troubles in its deep water endeavors. Additionally, current Mexican President Enrique Pen˜a Nieto, whose six-year term began in December 2012, has indicated his intention to promote legislative changes to allow private companies to partner with PEMEX. Some have viewed this push for collaboration as a clear signal that Mexico wishes to enhance its deep water production given the United States’ vast success in the Gulf of Mexico OCS. The Obama Administration has decided to enact this Agreement as a Congressional-Executive Agreement, rather than a treaty, which requires a simple majority in both houses of Congress rather than a 2/3 majority in the Senate. Despite the difference in approval methods, the Agreement has the same status under international law as Mexico’s ratification.
|
Hastings, 6/6/2013 (Doc – U.S. House of Representatives Chairman of the Committee on Natural Resources, Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act, p. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113hrpt101/pdf/CRPT-113hrpt101-pt1.pdf) [MN]
|
U S C E A rather than a treaty Despite the difference in approval methods same status under international law
|
A CEA will be perceived the exact same as the aff
| 1,649 | 49 | 109 | 249 | 11 | 20 | 0.044177 | 0.080321 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,522 |
In both cases, the international agreement received support from a majority of the Senators, but failed to reach the two-thirds supermajority required by Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution. n2 The failure of the Versailles Treaty resulted in a shattering defeat for President Wilson's vision of a new world order, based on collective security and led by the United States. Rejection of the Test-Ban Treaty amounted to a major setback for the Clinton administration's arms control policies and its efforts to promote American participation in international efforts at regulatory cooperation. In both cases, presidents raised the concern that a minority of the Senate could frustrate an internationalist American foreign policy and thereby turn the nation toward isolationism. According to most international law scholars and authorities, however, both presidents easily could have evaded the Treaty Clause by submitting their international agreements as statutes. Instead of navigating Article II's advice-and-consent process, presidents have sent many international agreements to both houses of Congress for simple majority approval. Known as congressional-executive agreements, these instruments are indistinguishable under international law from treaties in their ability to bind the United States to international obligations. Several recent agreements of significance, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") n3 and the World Trade [*759] Organization ("WTO") agreement, n4 have undergone this statutory process. Not surprisingly, presidents have favored this easier route to making international agreements. While in the first fifty years of American history, the nation concluded twice as many treaties as nontreaty agreements, since World War II the nation has concluded more than ninety percent of its international agreements through a nontreaty mechanism. n5
|
Yoo, February 2001 (John C. – Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, Michigan Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
turn the nation toward isolationism c e a s indistinguishable U S significance
|
CEAs are indistinguishable from treaties
| 1,894 | 40 | 78 | 270 | 5 | 13 | 0.018519 | 0.048148 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,523 |
The bottom line is that while there are some similarities between treaties and ex post congressional-executive agreements at the time of withdrawal, the President is on the whole likely to find it more difficult to withdraw unilaterally from a congressional-executive agreement than an Article II treaty. This is because Congress can, as part of the legislation authorizing the agreement, commit the country to a certain course of action even in the absence of a formalized international commitment. A congressional-executive agreement therefore can create a more reliable commitment than an Article II treaty. [*1337] The claim that congressional-executive agreements establish a stronger international commitment than do treaties runs against the grain of the very limited scholarship on the issue to date. 294 That scholarship is, in my view, misguided. Though the treaty might appear to require a "higher degree of consensus than is needed to pass an ordinary law" because it requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate, 295 it is far from clear that a majority vote in the Senate and House requires any less of a consensus. Moreover, it may be true that foreign governments have in the distant past been wary of accepting a commitment that is not labeled a "treaty," 296 but it seems unlikely that wariness would remain once they understand the nature of the legal framework. Indeed, that foreign states have been entirely willing to enter trade agreements with the United States where a congressional-executive agreement was used rather than an Article II treaty suggests that other countries are perfectly willing to accept agreements concluded outside the Article II process. Moreover, the vast majority of foreign nations make their own international legal commitments in precisely this way (that is, through a process that is identical to that used for domestic lawmaking). 297 It would be passing strange for them to find a similar process in the United States insufficiently reliable. Replacing treaties with congressional-executive agreements would make for better international lawmaking in the United States. The process would be more democratically legitimate, less cumbersome, and less subject to political manipulation, and the United States would be able to make more reliable international legal commitments. The next Part turns to the issue of how [*1338] congressional-executive agreements could come to play this near-exclusive role in U.S. international lawmaking. Far from insurmountable, the legal and practical issues that this change presents are eminently manageable. A better process is within reach.
|
Hathaway, May 2008 (Oona – Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, Yale Law Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
c e a s more difficult to withdraw absence of a formalized international commitment more reliable commitment U S perfectly willing to accept agreements concluded outside the Article II process precisely this way less subject to political manipulation U S more reliable international legal commitments
|
CEAs solve commitment and relations better than the plan
| 2,627 | 56 | 300 | 403 | 9 | 45 | 0.022333 | 0.111663 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,524 |
What should one make of these historical tendencies? Some scholars argue that the Constitution should be interpreted as requiring executive agreements and treaties to occupy “separate spheres”—that is, we should reserve some international subject matters for treaties and perhaps use congressional–executive agreements exclusively in other areas. On its face, this theory is not unreasonable. On questions relating to foreign affairs, where the text of the Constitution does not provide clear guidance, the Supreme Court looks to the actual practice of the President and Congress to help it interpret the Constitution.70 The most complete, current, and persuasive empirical review of U.S. treaty practice to date finds “no persuasive explanation” for when treaties should be used instead of congressional–executive agreements “based on the subject matter, form, topic, or any other substantive difference.”71 Rather, the study finds that any consistency in classifying certain types of agreements lies in historical accident and anachronistic tradition, rather than law and principle.72 Therefore, any existing tendencies to classify certain types of agreements as treaties rather than executive agreements should not and do not bind the President and Congress going forward.
|
Purvis, April 2008 (Nigel – vice president of the Nature Conservancy and deputy assistant secretary of state for Oceans, Environment and Science, and President of Climate Advisers, Paving the Way for U.S. Climate Leadership The Case for Executive Agreements and Climate Protection Authority, p. http://www.cleanair-coolplanet.org/documents/Purvis_RFF.pdf)
|
complete, current, and persuasive empirical review no persuasive explanation historical accident anachronistic tradition
|
The best studies proves that there is no substantive impact to choosing treaties over CEAs.
| 1,275 | 91 | 120 | 183 | 15 | 13 | 0.081967 | 0.071038 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,525 |
This summary of the empirical evidence calls into question the claims of both sides of the interchangeability debate. Scholars who argue that congressionally authorized executive agreements and treaties are (and ought to be) fully interchangeable fail to accurately describe both the past and present practices of the United States. Though there are some areas of law in which treaties and congressionally authorized executive agreements are today used interchangeably, there are also significant areas that are dominated almost entirely by one process or the other. By ignoring the distinct uses to which the two different processes for making international law are put, those who favor interchangeability undermine confidence in their accounts. And in seeing the world as they wish it to be, they fail to recognize that the continuing use of the Treaty Clause has had a disproportionately large effect on U.S. participation in some areas of international law - including human rights - while leaving other areas entirely unaffected. Yet those who argue that the two processes are not interchangeable (and ought not to be) also miss important parts of the story. These scholars correctly note that the Treaty Clause and congressional-executive agreements are not treated as fully interchangeable. They err, however, in providing an incomplete picture of current practices in the United States. They fail to acknowledge, for instance, that the instruments are both used in several areas of law. They also attempt to shoehorn the patterns of practice that they detect into reasoned theories of constitutional law that simply do not fit the facts. And finally, they fail analytically to provide a coherent normative account that justifies the different uses to which the two processes are put. For example, Yoo's claim that congressionally authorized executive agreements are used exclusively for agreements that fall within Congress's Article I powers whereas treaties are used for agreements that extend beyond Article I is contradicted by the evidence. There is little evidence that the two instruments are used exclusively in certain areas of law, much less in the constitutionally guided manner that Yoo suggests. Quite the contrary: in many areas of international law - including investment, maritime matters, education, nuclear safety and technology, judicial and criminal assistance, and trade - Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements are used side-by-side. Moreover, areas of law in which Article II treaties are used extensively, including human rights, dispute resolution, arms control, aviation, the environment, labor, consular relations, taxation, and telecommunications, [*1271] almost never extend beyond Congress's Article I powers. If agreements on human rights, labor, and taxation were beyond Congress's Article I powers, then the Civil Rights Acts, the Labor Department, and the Internal Revenue Service would seem to be unconstitutional exercises of federal power as well.
|
Hathaway, May 2008 (Oona – Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, Yale Law Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
miss important parts of the story several areas of law little evidence many areas of international law side-by-side
|
CEAs can be applied to any area of law
| 3,012 | 38 | 115 | 452 | 9 | 18 | 0.019912 | 0.039823 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,526 |
Similarly, the difficulty of repealing a congressional-executive agreement reinforces the idea that the political branches have forged a durable consensus on the wisdom of a given signal. The President can withdraw from a treaty unilaterally, without congressional consent. 191 But while no court has tested the proposition, the President probably cannot unilaterally terminate congressional-executive agreements. Congressional-executive agreements are international accords that the President has submitted for congressional approval as statutes. That is, congressional-executive agreements represent a form of lawmaking. 192 Since Congress can repeal existing laws only by passing new legislation, 193 presumably Congress must pass a new law to repeal a congressional-executive agreement. Thus, the United States can withdraw from treaties relatively easily, but withdrawal from congressional-executive agreements requires cooperation by both political branches. For example, when the 100th Congress passes a congressional-executive agreement, it becomes difficult for the 101st Congress to undo its handiwork. The use of congressional-executive agreements also reduces the possibility of a capricious President withdrawing haphazardly from international commitments. Presumably Congress will enmesh the country in a congressional-executive agreement only in two cases: first, when the Constitution so requires because the [*354] treaty touches upon Congress' Article I powers; or second, when Congress wishes to underscore the unwavering nature of American commitment. In other words, entrenched congressional-executive agreements must signal learning, rather than tactical adaptation or routine policy changes.
|
Stone 2002 (Christopher – Associate at Sullivan & Cromwell, George Washington International Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
durable consensus without congressional consent cannot unilaterally terminate congressional-executive agreements requires cooperation by both political branches difficult for the 101st Congress to undo its handiwork reduces the possibility of a capricious President withdrawing
|
1. Fiat should be durable --- otherwise inherency proves the plan would be repealed.
| 1,714 | 84 | 277 | 224 | 14 | 33 | 0.0625 | 0.147321 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,527 |
These opinions attempt to catch up to, rather than radically change, constitutional practice. Congressional-executive agreements have become a vital tool of American foreign policy and have surpassed treaties in terms of frequency. After World War II, the United States entered a period of rapid agreement making, entering into as many as 450 agreements per year as compared with the less than fifty per year before World War II.6 According to the Congressional Research Service, nontreaties are responsible. Congressional-executive agreements, for example, accounted for 88.3% of all international agreements between 1946 and 1972.7 From 1939 to 1989, the nation entered into 11,698 nontreaty international agreements and only 702 Article II treaties.8 Oona Hathaway reports that from 1980 to 2000 the United States made 2744 congressional-executive agreements and only 375 treaties.9 Congressional-executive agreements not only are numerous, but also bear on subjects of great importance to the American national interest. The North American Free Trade Agreement10 (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements,11 the two most recent prominent examples, regulate roughly one-quarter of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) related to imports or exports.12
|
Yoo, November 2011 (John – Professor of Law at Berkeley Law School, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining, Cornell Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
vital tool of American foreign policy frequency 88.3% of all international agreements U S 2744 congressional-executive agreements
|
CEAs happen a lot --- the DA is non-unique.
| 1,270 | 43 | 129 | 183 | 9 | 17 | 0.04918 | 0.092896 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,528 |
What do the Russian government and Greenpeace have in common? They both fear the spread of America’s shale gas revolution. The former worries that if shale takes off elsewhere it will weaken its position in the market, while the latter dreads the supposed environmental consequences of global shale production. I’m sure you have all heard about shale gas by now, but just to recap, shale gas is natural gas trapped within shale rock formations. Over the past decade, new drilling methods and a process called hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’), which involves pumping a mix of pressurised water, sand and chemicals underground to crack underground rocks and free the gas. Producers now have access to gas that was once uneconomic to extract. So far the ‘shale revolution’ has been largely confined to the US, where there is so much of the stuff, there has been a glut. This has helped to drive prices of natural gas to new lows in recent years. But attempts to launch it elsewhere have failed. For example, after wasting millions of dollars drilling failed wells in Poland – supposedly Europe’s best shale prospect – ExxonMobil pulled out of the country last year. Fracking is not without its risks In the US, the shale revolution has been nothing short of a miracle. And it promises to grant energy independence to the world’s biggest oil importer. Indeed, thanks to shale, the US is set to overtake Russia as the world’s biggest gas producer in 2015 and Saudi Arabia as the world’s biggest oil producer by 2020. The energy transformation is boosting America’s economy and giving the government new geopolitical strength. It’s even helped to cut the country’s C02 emissions as the country’s power plants switch from coal to gas. So, why aren’t other countries following suit? Well, like most ‘miracles’, shale energy comes with several strings attached. The extraction technique, ‘fracking’, involves pumping millions of litres of water and chemicals at high pressure to fracture underground rock formations to release trapped gas. And not everyone is prepared to do it. For example, the French have banned it over fears that it may contaminate underground aquifers. In the relatively densely populated UK, ‘Nimbyism’ threatens to slow fracking development, as local communities recoil against the idea of heavy industry despoiling quiet rural spots. Even in places like China, where the government is often prepared to ignore environmental worries or Nimbyism, shale gas is far from certain. In this instance, the problem is water scarcity. China has the world’s biggest shale gas reserves and it could sustain a widespread fracking campaign. But experts are uncertain if fracking will take off there. But Russian oil ministers and Greenpeace activists can’t breathe easy just yet. Because Latin America has the perfect conditions for shale gas and I’ve found one company that looks like it’s about to spark the revolution over there.
|
McKeigue, 7/8/2013 (James – reporter for Oil and Gas Investor, How to profit from the shale revolution in Latin America, Money Week, p. http://moneyweek.com/new-world-how-to-profit-from-the-shale-revolution-in-latin-america/)
|
fear the spread of America’s shale gas revolution weaken its position in the market largely confined to the US failed can’t breathe easy just yet perfect conditions for shale gas
|
Russia perceives the shale revolution as confined and limited
| 2,935 | 61 | 178 | 477 | 9 | 30 | 0.018868 | 0.062893 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,529 |
Mexico possesses energy reserves so large that they rival Kuwait’s and it is the third-largest oil supplier (following Canada and Saudi Arabia) to the United States. Sitting on top of what may be the world’s fourth-largest reserves of shale gas, it is also well positioned to benefit from the shale revolution. Yet due to nationalistic restrictions that shut out foreign capital and technology, PEMEX has experienced sharp production declines in recent years and is unable to exploit deep-water reserves in the Gulf of Mexico or onshore resources that require hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) to extract. Indeed, a Baker Institute report two years ago warned that without major new investments in exploration and production the company could lose its entire capacity to export crude oil within a decade. PEMEX’s new head sees shale development as a key to the country’s economic future but acknowledges that foreign partnerships are a critical factor. The regional payoff would be profound if Mexico is able to replicate the energy renaissance now unfolding in the other NAFTA countries and act in concert with them to maximize its benefits. A recent Citigroup report argues that surging oil and natural gas output in the three countries “will eventually turn the global geopolitics of energy on its head” and that “the growing continental surplus of hydrocarbons points to North America effectively becoming the new Middle East by the next decade.” A study by the Manhattan Institute concurs, noting that “the total North American hydrocarbon resource base is more than four times greater than all the resources extant in the Middle East.” It also estimates that a NAFTA-style collaboration in the hydrocarbon sector could yield as much as $7 trillion in value to the North American economy over 20 years. Prospective gains like these should start policymakers in Washington, Ottawa and Mexico City thinking in imaginative and cooperative directions. A first step is the implementation of the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement (TBHA), signed a year ago and quickly ratified by Mexico but now awaiting passage by the U.S. Congress.*** The accord will foster joint cooperation in the exploration and development of oil and gas fields sitting astride the maritime border. But an even more important consequence might be symbolic – sending a concrete message about the advantages of bilateral partnership just as Mexico begins to debate the Pena Nieto energy reforms.
|
Karl, 5/7/2013 (David – president of the Asia Strategy Initiative, board of counselors of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, former director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy, Time for a North American Energy Initiative, Monsters Abroad, p. http://monstersabroad.wordpress.com/2013/05/07/time-for-a-north-american-energy-initiative/)
|
rival Kuwait’s fourth-largest reserves of shale gas critical factor T b H A foster joint cooperation
|
The plan exports the shale revolution to Mexico.
| 2,480 | 48 | 100 | 390 | 8 | 16 | 0.020513 | 0.041026 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,530 |
In public statements, however, the Russian company remains defiant (and perhaps in a state of denial) about the implications of the shale gas boom: Speaking on state television on March 30, Gazprom Chief Executive Alexei Miller minimized the impact of gas from U.S. shale fields, extracted using hydraulic-fracturing techniques. He predicted that it was a “bubble that will burst very soon. We are skeptical about shale gas. We don’t see any risks [to us] at all.” Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov acknowledged that shale-gas development “does have an impact” on contract negotiations. “But we don’t see any tragedy here….Our main competitive advantage is that we can guarantee volumes for a long time.” Maybe, maybe not. But the immediate impact on Russia should not be underestimated. Vladimir Putin’s plans for reclaiming Great Power status for Russia are predicated on the country’s continuing strong economic performance, and the energy sector is key. Gazprom accounts for more than 10 percent of the country’s exports, and hits to its bottom line this year, the WSJ speculates, will cause Russia to miss Putin’s target of 5 percent annual growth. Putin’s hardball tactics in his near-abroad when Russia was energy top dog were instrumental in confirming him as an authoritarian bully in the minds of many Westerners. These tactics also inadvertently made Russia more vulnerable to shifts in the global energy market, with many of its main customers desperately seeking out alternative suppliers so that they would never find themselves backed into a corner again. So it’s easy to join the Bulgarians in gloating over this reversal. But everything in moderation. As we’ve said before, a cagey, resentful and frustrated Russia facing economic decline and increasing powerlessness on the world stage is good for no one at all.
|
Mead, 5/1/2013 (Walter Russell, US Shale Gas Boom Undermining Putin’s Gazprom, The American Interest, p. http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/05/01/us-shale-gas-boom-undermining-putins-gazprom/)
|
defiant bubble that will burst very soon reclaiming Great Power status energy sector is key more than 10 percent vulnerable to shifts cagey resentful frustrated increasing powerlessness on the world stage
|
That creates a perception of Russian decline.
| 1,832 | 45 | 204 | 291 | 7 | 31 | 0.024055 | 0.106529 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,531 |
If the "shale breakthrough" expands, it could reduce Russia's forecast exports by as much as 50 million tons a year by 2040, the report said. Russia last year exported 240 million tons of oil. That, in turn, could cause the energy industry's share of Russia's gross domestic product to fall from over one-quarter in 2010 to just over 15% by 2040, it said. About half of Russia's federal budget comes from oil and gas. A spokeswoman for the Energy Ministry had no immediate comment on the report. Russia's largest oil company, OAO Rosneft, also had no immediate comment. Russian officials have berated gas monopoly OAO Gazprom OGZPY +0.77% in recent months for reacting slowly to changes in the global market brought about by soaring shale-gas production in the U.S. Gazprom saw exports to its most lucrative market, Europe, drop nearly 10% last year, as power generators switched to cheap coal that was pushed out of the U.S. by even-cheaper shale gas. U.S. crude production surged to its highest daily level for two decades in November, as new drilling techniques unlocked vast amounts of oil from underground shale-rock formations. The International Energy Agency in November forecast the U.S. would surpass Saudi Arabia and Russia as the world's largest oil producer in 2020. "Given the United States' geopolitical significance, it will effectively turn into the most influential player on the global hydrocarbon market," the report from the Russian Academy of Sciences said. There are, however, threats to the continued expansion of the shale-oil boom, the report noted. Recoverable resources could prove to be smaller than expected, while recovery technology might advance more slowly, it said. In that case, Russia's exports could increase, it said. In a television interview this month, Gazprom Chief Executive Alexei Miller said the U.S. wasn't a competitor and called shale gas "a bubble that will soon burst."
|
Wall Street Journal, 4/10/2013 (Shale Threatens Russia’s Economy, p. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323741004578414582783570350.html)
|
If the "shale breakthrough" expands g d p About half of Russia's federal budget comes from oil and gas smaller than expected advance more slowly bubble that will soon burst
|
Shale is not perceived as a threat --- but an expansion would trigger decline
| 1,919 | 77 | 172 | 309 | 14 | 30 | 0.045307 | 0.097087 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,532 |
Two years ago, following the publication of the EIA April 2011 report a New York Times investigation obtained internal EIA communications showing how senior officials, including industry consultants and federal energy experts privately voiced scepticism about shale gas prospects. One internal EIA document said oil companies had exaggerated "the appearance of shale gas well profitability" by highlighting performance only from the best wells, and using overly optimistic models for productivity projections over decades. The NYT reported that the EIA often "relies on research from outside consultants with ties to the industry." The latest EIA shale gas estimates, contracted to ARI, is no exception. ARI, according to the NYT's 2011 article, has "major clients in the oil and gas industry" and the company's president, Vello Kuuskraa, is "a stockholder and board member of Southwestern Energy, an energy company heavily involved in drilling for gas in the Fayetteville shale formation in Arkansas." Independent studies published over the last few months cast even more serious doubt over the viability of the shale gas boom.
|
Ahmed, 6/21/2013 (Nafeez – Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development, Shale gas won’t stop peak oil, but could create and economic crisis, The Guardian, p. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/jun/21/shale-gas-peak-oil-economic-crisis)
|
exaggerated overly optimistic models for productivity projections no exception more serious doubt viability of the shale gas boom
|
1. The U.S. shale revolution is limited and confined because it has not been exported. That’s the McKeigue 7/8
| 1,128 | 110 | 129 | 171 | 19 | 18 | 0.111111 | 0.105263 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,533 |
Early Pemex studies are more conservative than the EIA estimate and see between 150 and 459 tcf of shale gas in five different geological provinces. "Even in the most conservative scenarios, exploiting these shale gas resources could and should spark the development of a national industry without precedent," Herrera - who directed Pemex Gas before his current post - said at an event shortly after taking office. He said the industry could attract investment of between $7 billion and $10 billion a year. Herrera is confident that Mexico could transform itself from a natural gas importer to a global gas powerhouse if it taps its shale resources. Without shale, national production of natural gas is only expected to grow 0.5 percent over the next 15 years, while demand is seen rising 2.5 percent. That would mean expanding imports at a constant rate of 6.5 percent to keep up, Herrera has said. It is not clear, however, if Pemex is as equally enthusiastic. The company plans to spend 30.5 billion Mexican pesos ($2.36 billion) on shale exploration over the next three years, just 2 percent of its requested budget for that same period. The Eagle Ford formation in Mexico's Burgos basin is by far the most promising with between 27 and 87 tcf of "dry gas" and "liquids-rich" resources, according to a Pemex presentation seen by Reuters. Mexico reported its first production - 2.9 million cubic feet per day - from its first shale well Emergente-1 in March last year. By the end of this year three more wells - Montanes-1, Nomada-1 and Navajo-1 - should be finished. Both Nomada-1 and Navajo-1 are within the region where oil has been discovered in Southern Texas, the presentation showed. In the Tampico-Misantla region further south, Pemex says there is possibly light crude in the formations, but no drilling has been done there yet. Mexico would need a much more aggressive drilling program to fully understand the scale of its shale resources, said Kenneth Medlock, an energy expert at the Baker Institute at Texas' Rice University. "Pemex's exploration and production projects are focused on traditional offshore fields in the Gulf of Mexico, like Chicontepec, and now deep waters. Given the limited resources Pemex has, I doubt they will be able to expand to include more things. Right now, Pemex has other priorities," said Lourdes Melgar, an energy expert at the EGADE Business School in Mexico. Pemex is eager to move into deeper waters of its Gulf Coast but has little experience managing the complicated projects. On Monday, Mexico signed an agreement with the United States to exploit resources in the Gulf of Mexico that straddle maritime boundaries opening up the possibility for more collaboration between U.S. companies and Pemex.
|
Rosenberg, 2/27/2013 (Mica, Analysis: Mexico in no rush to exploit shale oil bonanza, Reuters, p. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/27/us-mexico-shale-idUSTRE81Q20Q20120227)
|
between 150 and 459 tcf of shale gas Even in the most conservative scenarios national industry without precedent global gas powerhouse much more aggressive drilling program deeper waters of its Gulf Coast little experience U S more collaboration between U.S. companies and Pemex
|
The plan expands U.S./Mexico collaboration on shale gas technology --- U.S. firms have the technology and expertise to help Mexico make the transition. That’s Karl 13.
| 2,751 | 167 | 278 | 455 | 26 | 43 | 0.057143 | 0.094505 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,534 |
Mexico’s energy establishment, and increasingly it seems, the government, hope that private investment will occur in unconventional hydrocarbons sector. For Mexico the most interesting plays in the future will be found in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, in the as yet untapped shale reserves that are found throughout the east of the country, and in the geologically-complex fields of Chicontepec, where Pemex has been consistently failing to meet production targets over the past four years. The application of cutting-edge technologies and techniques from U.S. firms would likely be important in all three of these areas, and the experience of American firms in shale plays would provide them with an advantage in the event of an opening in that area. Of particular interest in this regard is the experience of U.S. firms in the hydraulic fracturing (fracking) business. The ability to extract shale oil and gas in areas that suffer from water shortages (such as Texas) will be crucial to developing shale resources in Mexico, particularly in the north of the country. In fact existing knowledge of the geological characteristics of the Eagle Ford formation will also be crucial in exploiting its oil and gas reserves in Coahuila, where the formation extends. One Mexican company, Alfa, has already worked extensively with U.S. partners in the shale industry north of the border, and we can expect higher levels of private sector collaboration to develop. Beyond exploration and production, the pressing need for infrastructure stands out as an area with high potential for bilateral collaboration. First, it is vital that large scale construction of gas pipelines occurs, both within Mexico and across the border. Within Mexico, the Calderon administration identified the need for multi-billion dollar investments in the creation of a truly national gas pipeline network: at the present time the majority of western portion of the country lacks access to natural gas. Secondly, as was made painfully clear to a number of private sector industrial consumers during 2012, during times of short supply, the country lacks the capacity to import extra supplies of gas from the United States due to the limitations of the cross-border pipeline network. In 2012 this led to complaints from companies that they were unable to secure stable and sufficient supplies of gas for their manufacturing processes. The second deficit in energy infrastructure can be found in the refining sector. The much-publicized efforts of the Calderon administration, announced in January 2009, to build a new refinery at Tula in the state of Hidalgo that was designed to process up to 300,000 barrels a day of Mexican heavy crude have thus far come to nothing. The project has been repeatedly delayed, first due to problems in securing the land, then due to bureaucratic problems and political wrangling. At the same time, Mexico’s dependence on imported gasoline has increased in line with rising demand. Mexico therefore needs to find a solution to this issue in the near future, and one option that presents itself is the example of the Deer Park refinery complex in Texas where since 1993 Pemex and Shell have worked together in a joint venture to refine 340,000 barrels a day of crude oil. Part of the production of the refinery heads back to Mexico and has become an important source of income for Pemex as well as helping to satisfy the country’s need for refined products. Lastly, Mexico’s petrochemical sector is in urgent need of investment. For many years now the industry has languished due to a lack of funds and a lack of direction from the government. Despite encouraging signs of new investment interest in recent months, the major Mexican petrochemicals project of the last few years, Ethylene XXI, has suffered repeated delays. When completed in 2015, the project will be a private petrochemical complex for the production of polyethylene, producing up to one million tons of polyethylene, and replace up to $2 billion worth of imports resulting in the creation of thousands of jobs. But the prospect of huge supplies of cheap gas from Mexico and the U.S. shale gas industry offers the tantalizing prospect of turning Mexico into a production and export base for these products, and there will be a major opportunity for joint ventures with foreign firms.
|
Wood 2010 (Duncan – director of the Mexico Institute, Growing Potential for U.S.-Mexico Energy Cooperation, Wilson Center, p. http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/wood_energy.pdf)
|
deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico untapped shale reserves likely be important provide them with an advantage crucial supplies of cheap gas tantalizing prospect production and export base for these products
|
US expertise overcome technical barriers to shale extraction
| 4,355 | 60 | 205 | 709 | 8 | 32 | 0.011283 | 0.045134 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,535 |
The US isn’t the only country with shale reserves; many other countries are keen on replicating America’s shale boom. Mexico might be the country best poised to replicate that success. North American geology is particularly well-suited to horizontal well drilling. Unfortunately, Mexico’s oil monopoly is making this more difficult than it should be. Energy production at the state-owned Pemex, described as one of the most inefficient oil companies in the world, has remained stagnant despite the country’s abundant natural resources. If Mexico wants to emulate America’s shale industry, it’s going to need to open itself up to joint ventures with foreign companies. These companies can support the nascent shale energy industry in Mexico financially and give Pemex valuable experience in both fracking and horizontal well drilling. Mexico has ambitions to be the “new Middle East,” but it can’t get there on its own.
|
Mead, 4/8/2013, (Walter Russell, Foreign Investors Back US Shale Boom, Ignore Mexico, The American Interest, p. http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/04/08/mexico-take-note-foreign-investors-invested-in-us-shale/)
|
best poised to replicate that success well-suited to horizontal well drilling open itself up joint ventures valuable experience but it can’t get there on its own
|
Cooperation is key to provide Mexico the experience and investment for shale.
| 918 | 77 | 161 | 143 | 12 | 26 | 0.083916 | 0.181818 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,536 |
Mexico's increasing appetite for natural gas particularly for power generation bears mentioning. Indeed, natural gas is increasingly replacing oil as a feedstock for electric generation in Mexico. Estimates indicate that almost 50 percent of electric capacity additions in Mexico over the next decade will be gas-fired, combined cycle generation. But all is not lost. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), Mexico has the second largest shale gas potential in Latin America and the fourth largest in the world. Mexico counts around 16 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas reserves but a 2011 Energy Information Administration (EIA) report indicated that Mexico has the second largest shale gas potential in Latin America, second only to Argentina and the fourth largest in the world. The EIA report places Mexico's shale gas potential at 680 TCF. The potential associated with the EIA figures for shale gas in Mexico has not gone unnoticed by Mexican energy officials. Indeed, some have increasingly advocated for a "Shale Revolution" of their own and the possibility for shale gas to jumpstart a lagging petrochemical industry. To wit, some senior government officials have argued that Pemex should create a new subsidiary focused exclusively on natural gas to spur nascent shale exploration and production, particularly given that shale gas technology and expertise differ from that of conventional fields. Figures from Mexico's Energy Ministry indicate that ramping up a shale gas industry could mean investment between $7 billion and $10 billion a year. And many cite the possibility to jumpstart the petrochemical industry. Moreover, without shale, natural gas production in Mexico will not keep up with demand. But with shale gas development, Mexico could position itself to transition from its current status as a natural gas importer to a huge international player when it comes to natural gas. There are issues that policy makers in Mexico, especially in the incoming government, must take into account as they endeavor to seize its shale gas potential. Technology stands out as a key element for the successful development of shale gas in Mexico. Gaining access to the technology and know-how necessary to extract the gas in a cost-effective and environmentally secure manner is critical.
|
Martin, 10/23/2012 (Jeremy – director of the Energy Program at the Institute of the Americas at the University of California, San Diego, Mexico: Shale Gas Becomes Priority, Latinvex, p. http://latinvex.com/app/article.aspx?id=312)
|
E I A fourth largest in the world natural gas importer huge international player when it comes to natural gas shale gas potential key element critical
|
Tech transfers solidify Mexico’s shale revolution.
| 2,321 | 50 | 150 | 361 | 6 | 26 | 0.01662 | 0.072022 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,537 |
Late last month, Alexey Miller, CEO of the Russian energy giant Gazprom, dismissed the energy boom occurring in the U.S. right now as a “soap bubble [that] will burst soon” – and said the United States was “not a competitor” to Gazprom. “Currently, there aren’t any projects that we know of where shale gas production would be profitable,” Miller said. He added that “absolutely all the boreholes” in the U.S. are empty. In the same article, published by Russia’s state-sponsored outlet Russia Today, Vagit Alekperov, president of Lukoil, another huge Russian energy firm, also dismissed the advancements the United States has made in shale drilling. “Of course, it is a great achievement on the part of U.S. engineers that America is now producing oil and gas from shale. In order to do it, they had to drill very tricky wells and do hydraulic fracturing,” he said – then added, “Undoubtedly, this is an achievement, but I wouldn’t call it a revolution.” Coming from a typical business executive, these kinds of comments toward competitors could be dismissed as corporate bluster. It’s the same kind of talk that was heard during the Bush administration, when Russia seemed to celebrate each one of the U.S.’s multiple missteps in European and Iraq relations. Coming from Miller and Alekperov, the comments have weight and deserve attention. But they also show that the tables have turned: Russia had the United States on its heels during the Bush administration. Now, Russia is concerned about how much the U.S. shale gas explosion will hit Russia’s energy industry, the single source of the country’s economic strength.
|
Francis, 4/5/2013 (David, How the U.S. Blew Up the Global Energy Market, The Fiscal Times, p. http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/04/05/How-the-US-Blew-Up-the-Global-Energy-Market.aspx#page1)
|
tables have turned concerned the single source of the country’s economic strength
|
Russia perceives shale expansion as an existential threat.
| 1,622 | 58 | 81 | 267 | 8 | 12 | 0.029963 | 0.044944 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,538 |
The darkness alone may cause a collapse in the aquatic food chain in which sunlight is harvested by phytoplankton, phytoplankton by zooplankton, zooplankton by small fish, small fish by large fish, and, occasionally, large fish by humans. In many nuclear war scenarios, this food chain is likely to collapse at its base for at least a year and is significantly more imperiled in tropical waters. The increase in ultraviolet light available at the surface of the earth approximately a year after the war provides an additional major environmental stress that by itself has been described as having "profound consequences" for aquatic, terrestrial and other ecosystems. n17
|
Sagan 1984 (Carl – Ph.D. from U Chicago and former professor of biology and genetics at Stanford, Nuclear War and Climate Catastrophe, Foreign Affairs, p. Lexis) [MN]
|
collapse in the aquatic food chain major environmental stress profound consequences aquatic ecosystems
|
Nuclear war turns oceans
| 671 | 24 | 102 | 106 | 4 | 13 | 0.037736 | 0.122642 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,539 |
Conversely, a Russia relatively weaker to the United States would have less capability to challenge the United States but can provide less assistance for realizing common U.S.- Russia goals. A weaker Russia may also find it harder to control its WMD assets and become vulnerable to external predators not friendly to the United States (e.g., China and Iran). But in all probability Russia will still have sufficiently strong nuclear forces to ward off external threats. Most worrisome, a Russian leadership that perceived Russia on a slope toward protracted decline might feel compelled to take drastic measures, internally and externally, to reverse its descent. The German Empire, Imperial Japan, and other great powers in the 20th century attempted to reverse their feared decline in ways that helped precipitate disastrous global wars.
|
Weitz, November 2011 (Richard – senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, Can We Manage a Declining Russia, Hudson Institute, p. 80)
|
perceived Russia on a slope toward protracted decline drastic measures reverse its descent precipitate disastrous global wars
|
1. The perception of a declining energy sector will cause Russia to be paranoid and miscalculate --- that’s Mead 13
| 838 | 115 | 125 | 130 | 20 | 17 | 0.153846 | 0.130769 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,540 |
Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $ 6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. n15 n15 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, mouthpiece for the most irredentist elements in the Russian security and military services, constantly articulates this threat. Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult. Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic development in the early 21 st century. The supply of Middle Eastern oil would become precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable, or if Iran or Iraq provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development of the southern NIS. Only with oil revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow and develop modem market economies and free societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were tapped and developed, tens of thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be created.
|
Cohen 96 (Ariel, PhD and Senior Policy Analyst – Heritage, Heritage Foundation Reports, 1-25, Lexis)
|
Attempts to restore will doom Russia's transition to democracy The wars o restore Russian empire would prove costly for world stability these may escalate to include w m d unauthorized launches are especially threatening a Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence throughout the world It would endanger the U.S Europe and Middle East.
|
Russian aggression causes nuclear war
| 2,542 | 37 | 357 | 399 | 5 | 55 | 0.012531 | 0.137845 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,541 |
In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.
|
Filger 2009 (Sheldon – Columnist and Founder of Global Economic Crisis, Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contradiction, Huffington Post, p. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html) [MN]
|
intertwined go far beyond sufficient scope and capability destroy the world as we know it virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval
|
Russian economic decline causes political instability and nuclear conflict
| 2,712 | 74 | 146 | 418 | 9 | 22 | 0.021531 | 0.052632 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,542 |
Mexico’s economy is evolving. Its GDP has risen over the past few years, and its people are becoming wealthier. Within five years, Mexican factories could produce up to US$60 billion in output annually, according to the Boston Consulting Group. The business strategy adviser also reported that in 2012, average manufacturing costs in Mexico, adjusted for productivity, dropped below those of China – and are set to keep dropping. Mexico has 44 free-trade agreements, more than any other country. Butch Hensley, president of Amado Trucking in Arizona, knows what Mexico’s growth looks like. “Today I’m seeing freeways built where there were cattle trails 10 years ago,” Hensley says. Amado, which trucks to airports in the Southwestern U.S. and Mexico, is the exclusive Mexican handler for ShipHaus, a freight forwarder based at Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport in Mesa, Ariz. “It’s incredible,” Hensley says. “There’s excess of 100 million consumers in Mexico, and that’s about 30 percent of what we have in the U.S., so it’s a tremendous market.” Tell that to Aeromexico or Lufthansa, American Airlines or United Airlines. These carriers move thousands of tonnes a year between Mexico and the rest of the world. “If you look at what we’re shipping from Mexico, it really runs the gambit,” Tony Randgaard, manager of cargo marketing at United Airlines, says. This includes pet and human remains services into and out of Mexico. The airlines and forwarders interviewed move much of the same cargo to and from Mexico: textiles, consumer electronics, automotive parts, luxury goods and perishables. Many electronics come from Guadalajara, whose nickname is the Silicon Valley of Mexico. In the last few years, major U.S. manufacturers have been providing the raw materials for electronics to China-based companies, who do part of the manufacturing, Hensley explains. Then the parts come back to the U.S. and go to Mexican companies, who complete the value-added features. The electronics then return to the U.S. under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Perishables frequently shipped include mangos, lemons, avocados, limes, papaya, herbs and seafood. “Agribusiness has just grown at an insane rate over the last 10 years,” Hensley says. The array of products goes to places such as Germany, Japan, the U.S. and Canada. Curt Fischer, regional manager for Mexico and Central America for Lufthansa Cargo, says three times as much Lufthansa cargo – 90,000 tonnes a year – goes from Europe to Mexico than vice-versa. This is because Mexico has a strong import market whereas much of the export industry targets nearby markets in North and South America, says Fischer, who is based in Mexico. Lufthansa has worked on ramping up its service in the country, serving Mexico City and Guadalajara to Frankfurt. “Mexico is always full of surprises,” Fischer says when asked of hurdles in transporting airfreight. Benito Juárez International Airport in Mexico City is already crowded and cannot grow any further. “Meanwhile, the city has grown all around it,” Fischer says. “Mexico City is one of the largest cities in the world, and the airport, which used to be out of the city at one time, is now in the middle, more or less. So there’s no way to go any further. There’s no way to put in any additional runways, but also within the warehouse area, there is no space for growth.” Fischer says Mexico’s drug cartel problem presents security challenges for airlines and shippers. “Additional security measures always will hinder the free flow of air cargo. So this is something we have to cope with,” he says. “Especially also our customers that have to cope with longer handling times.” Antonio Gomez Elorduy, Aeromexico Cargo vice president for the U.S., Asia and Canada, says competition from other carriers and rising fuel costs hurt the airline. He also highlights Aeromexico’s move toward E-freight. “One of the issues that we have is the customs side,” Gomez Elorduy says. “There’s a lot of things that in Mexico are done with a lot of paper and involving a lot of people in imports and exports, so I think that now that we are one step ahead with the government to try to develop that process with their help. I think it’s going to be an improvement in Mexico because we’re a little bit late in that – let’s say it that way – against the other carriers.” Randgaard of United says the Mexican air cargo market “hasn’t jumped into E-freight.” He also points out the importance of having specific and precise documentation. “There’s not a lot of tolerance in shipping to and from Mexico. You really have to ensure that your import documents, your pet or your human remains permits or certificates, are exact, and you really need a lot of precision, or you’re going to experience delays, and our customers are not going to be happy with that,” he says. “I think that there’s a number of countries around the world that you need to make sure that you’ve got all your ducks in a row, and certainly Mexico is one of those.” Carmen Taylor, American Airlines managing director for cargo sales for Latin America, and Hensley of Amado Trucking say if you have experience and the proper documentation, it’s a fluid process. “Do I hear about the Mexican Customs holding an important shipment for days and days like I hear in other countries? I haven’t heard that in many years,” Taylor says. “It’s because we have learned to do business.” Mike Barclay, owner and director of business development at ShipHaus, says with the increased flow of goods into and out of Mexico, aircraft will have capacity issues. Some freight will need to sit and wait for additional flights. Barclay and Hensley’s plan is to truck freight from northern Mexico to fly out of U.S. airports. Mexico is a country on the rise – and the airfreight industry knows it. American is looking at Mexico-Seoul service. A few years ago, Lufthansa was flying two freighters into Mexico; now that number has tripled. “Investments in Mexico are very strong, and they are bound to grow,” Fischer says. “We want to be there also to offer air cargo capacity and services as it comes.”
|
Solomon, 7/30/2013 (Adina, Mexico’s economy sprouts wings, Air Cargo World, p. http://www.aircargoworld.com/Air-Cargo-News/2013/07/mexico%E2%80%99s-economy-sprouts-wings/3014703) [MN]
|
evolving insane rate full of surprises on the rise Investments in Mexico are very strong, and they are bound to grow
|
1. Mexico economy is strong and growing
| 6,124 | 39 | 116 | 1,025 | 7 | 21 | 0.006829 | 0.020488 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,543 |
President Enrique Peña Nieto is set to unveil a long-awaited proposal to change the constitution to try to lure back major private oil companies to Mexican oil fields for the first time since the country's 1938 nationalization, a move that could attract billions of dollars in investment and boost Mexico's image as an emerging economy. The stakes are high for the new president, who took power last December for a six-year term. The proposal, expected to be delivered to the Senate on Wednesday, is seen as a make-or-break initiative. If passed, it could strengthen the leader's hand as he seeks to transform the country in other ways, such as overhauling a dysfunctional tax code and judicial system. More broadly, it would showcase Mexico as a dynamic economic opportunity at a time when global growth is slow and other big emerging markets like Brazil have faded in appeal. Economists say it would boost the competitiveness of Mexico's economy and likely reverse declining oil output, returning the country to the big leagues of global oil-exporting nations. "A transformational change in the energy market has the potential to finally place Mexico at the center of the stage among emerging markets," said Nomura Securities strategist Benito Berber in New York. "I would expect a double-digit growth in investment next year if the reform passes." Mr. Peña Nieto's government wants to allow private firms to share the risks involved in developing increasingly complex energy reserves such as deep-water oil deposits by letting them produce oil and gas through profit-sharing deals and joint ventures with state monopoly Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex. Current service contracts have only attracted oil suppliers, such as Schlumberger or Halliburton, which work on behalf of Pemex and can't drill on their own. Chances for the legislation look good; besides the support from his ruling PRI party, the right-wing PAN opposition party within Mexico's divided Congress is also behind the reform.
|
Wall Street Journal, 8/2/2013 (Mexico’s Leader Tackles Historic Oil Law, p. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324635904578644363664634772.html) [MN]
|
lure back major private oil companies to Mexican oil fields Chances for the legislation look good
|
3. PEMEX reform coming
| 1,993 | 22 | 97 | 318 | 4 | 16 | 0.012579 | 0.050314 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,544 |
But, surprisingly, the Mexican economy has so far remained somewhat impervious to all that violence. GDP growth last year was relatively healthy and the expected slowdown during the current year is likely to be a minor dip rather than a steep fall. Domestic consumer demand has held up, supported by nearly $23 billion in remittances during 2011 from Mexicans working abroad. Industrial investments are flowing in from abroad, and last year were estimated by the UN at close to $18 billion. Despite higher consumer prices in recent months, inflation remains under control and has allowed the central bank to maintain interest rates relatively low. It is interesting that much of the economy’s resilience is rooted in the sustained buoyancy in export shipments, especially of manufactured goods, when consumer demand in the U.S., the destination for most of Mexico’s exports, has not been particularly robust. This suggests Mexico’s improved export competitiveness and, in fact, Mexico has been steadily increasing its share in the total import basket of its northern neighbor. The most significant driver of this trend are rising labor and other costs in China and in neighboring Asian countries that are the principal suppliers into the U.S. market. Even though the average wages in Mexico are still higher than most developing countries in Asia, the competitive edge in that Far East region has gradually declined when aggregate costs are considered. The close proximity to the U.S., which allows greater logistical flexibility in response to short-term demand fluctuations, adds to Mexico’s luster in the eyes of large manufacturers.
|
Thomas White International, 1/27/2012 (Mexico: The glow of economic resilience lightens the shadows of violence, p. http://www.thomaswhite.com/world-markets/mexico-the-glow-of-economic-resilience-lightens-the-shadows-of-violence/) [MN]
|
impervious to all that violence minor dip rather than a steep fall significant driver short-term demand fluctuations
|
4. Mexican economy is resilient
| 1,636 | 31 | 116 | 257 | 5 | 17 | 0.019455 | 0.066148 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,545 |
One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.
|
Christopher J. Fettweis, Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College, 10, [“Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld]
|
One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially : the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the U S was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelate
|
6. No relationship between US capabilities and peace
| 2,009 | 52 | 1,222 | 319 | 8 | 198 | 0.025078 | 0.62069 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,546 |
The Mexican economy is set to make a significant comeback next year after reporting weak growth this year, said Bank of America Merrill Lynch in a report. The US investment bank expects Latin America's second largest economy to only grow 2.5% this year, but recover strongly in 2014 when it forecasts growth of 4%. The Mexican economy expanded 3.9% last year and was widely expected at the beginning of the year to grow close to 4% this year again. However there have been several GDP growth downgrades during the first half of the year, with the latest coming from the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac), which this month cut its 2013 growth prediction for Mexico to 2.8% from its earlier April forecast of 3.5%. Bank of America Merrill Lynch sees the main reasons for the Mexican economy's disappointing performance this year as being weak external demand and a domestic fiscal shock. The bank expects Mexico's economic recovery to begin during the second half and continue in 2014 with the main growth drivers being higher growth in the US, increased expenditure by the Mexican government and the first positive effects from several major reforms that are expected to be approved and implemented this year and during 2014.
|
Rindebro, 7/31/2013 (Ulric, Mexican economy poised for significant recovery next year – BofA Merrill Lynch, BN Americas, p. http://www.bnamericas.com/news/banking/mexican-economy-poised-for-signficant-recovery-next-year-bofa-merrill-lynch) [MN]
|
significant comeback recover strongly in 2014 when it forecasts growth of 4% main growth drivers
|
Extend 1NC 1 – Mexican econ high --- increases in imports and a strong agriculture industry is driving strong growth. That’s Solomon 7/30
| 1,259 | 137 | 96 | 211 | 23 | 15 | 0.109005 | 0.07109 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,547 |
Mexico’s economy will gain strength in the second half of this year and finish 2013 with gross domestic product growth of 3.1 percent, Moody’s Investors Service said. The forecast from the U.S. credit-rating agency is in line with the latest projections from Mexican officials, who said domestic and external factors caused the economy to slow in the first half of this year. “The Mexican economy has decelerated recently, but the current softness is more a product of cyclical deceleration and growth should resume toward the second half of this year and will, in fact, be stronger next year,” Moody’s Investors Service said.
|
Latin American Herald Tribune, 7/24/2013 (Moody’s Forecasts GDP Growth of 3.1% in Mexico, p. http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=887467&CategoryId=1409) [MN]
|
gain strength g d p growth of 3.1 percent product of cyclical deceleration
|
More growth coming --- this assumes prior growth dips
| 626 | 53 | 74 | 102 | 9 | 13 | 0.088235 | 0.127451 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,548 |
Reform in Mexico has been talked about for many years, but substantial change that would likely involve some degree of constitutional amendment seems finally at hand, a Mexican energy legal expert said Thursday. With production dwindling and the prospect of becoming a net oil importer inching closer, Mexico must act soon, David Enriquez, a partner in oil and gas/maritime division at Mexico City law firm Goodrich Riquelme Asociados, said during a Credit Suisse conference call on the potential for energy reform in Mexico. A middle-of-the-road approach is more likely than minimal or radical change, he said. "This is the mother of all reforms [in Mexico]," Enriquez said. "The political capital of [President Enrique Pena] will be invested in this one." Because declining production contains what Enriquez called a "public finance element" -- state company Pemex's current revenues fund about one-third of the federal budget -- reform agreements between Pena's ruling PRI party and the conservative PAN party, which was in power during the previous two presidential administrations, are "more likely than not," he said. The most feasible reform, Enriquez said, is not one of extremes but an "intermediate scenario that takes into account political tensions, the technicalities of the industry and the role of [international] supermajors and independents." That scenario "considers a full range of contractual possibilities" and would involve creation of either a new national oil company or a similar entity alongside Pemex with the power to enter into production-sharing agreements and concessions, he said. Enriquez projected that some kind of constitutional amendment would be forged and signed by year end; next year, various government agencies would develop and implement them. "We expect later this year a constitutional amendment and then in 2014, a constitutional design and legislation," he said. "Realistically ... in a year, a year-and-a-half from now, we'd expect to have full implementation of the reform." Oil and gas is currently property of the Mexican state, and while foreign upstream companies do operate in the country, they do so under fee-for-service agreements and are not allowed to book reserves. Most of the handful of operators in Mexico are small, privately held independents. Mexico's oil production is now 2.6 million b/d, down from a peak of 3.4 million b/d less than 10 years ago, Enriquez said. He said the level of capital spending by Pemex needed to raise production to even 3.1 million b/d is $30 billion/year. However, about three-quarters of the country's estimated 115 billion barrels of estimated petroleum reserves are figured to be unconventional -- in deepwater, tight oil and natural gas, and shale oil and gas -- said Enriquez, and are more costly to extract than conventional reserves. Consequently, the amount of funding needed to raise production from unconventional sources to 4 million b/d would likely be triple that amount -- perhaps as high as $100 billion/year, he said. Because of the urgency of production declines, Enriquez said he does not expect fierce political obstacles as in the past. The PRI and PAN have historically been at odds, but given the need for reform he expects them to form a supermajority in Congress to get the measure passed. The left-leaning PRD party would oppose it, but could not muster enough support to block it.
|
Platts, 7/11/2013 (Oil and gas reform in Mexico, once mere talk, appears at hand: legal expert, p. http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/houston/oil-and-gas-reform-in-mexico-once-mere-talk-appears-21268243) [MN]
|
some degree of constitutional amendment more likely than not full implementation of the reform fierce political obstacles form a supermajority in Congress to get the measure passed could not muster enough support to block it
|
Extend 1NC 3 --- PEMEX reform now --- Nieto has support from his party and the right wing to pass major PEMEX reform now. That’s WSJ 8/2
| 3,402 | 136 | 224 | 539 | 27 | 35 | 0.050093 | 0.064935 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,549 |
Mexico’s oil output volumes have been declining for eight straight years and it has been suggested that large reforms are needed to lure foreign investment to the nation’s oil and natural gas fields. The necessary changes are expected to be introduced by President Enrique Pena Nieto by the end of the summer, and it is estimated that they will encourage as much as $50 billion in investments each year. Hector Moreira, who used to work in Mexico’s Energy Ministry, said; “we need far more investment, we need capacity in production and we need technology. We need to transform the energy sector in a very deep way. I think now is the time.” Mexico’s economic growth has been slowing in recent years, and this is putting pressure on Pena Nieto to make changes that will stimulate more growth. According to Bloomberg, Barclays predicts the economy to grow by 2.5% in 2013, the slowest rate since 2009, and JPMorgan predict GDP to increase by 2.8%. the country’s annual growth of 1.7% over the last five years is half the rate of Brazil. Gabriel Casillas, the chief economist for Mexico’s Banorte, stated that “this administration doesn’t only have the willingness, but the political power and political capital” to make the needed changes that could ultimately result in faster economic growth, and a stronger currency.
|
Peixe, 7/10/2013 (Joao, Will an End to Pemex’s Monopoly Boost Economic Growth in Mexico?, Oil Price, p. http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Will-an-End-to-Pemexs-Monopoly-Boost-Economic-Growth-in-Mexico.html) [MN]
|
putting pressure on Nieto willingness political power and political capital make the needed changes
|
Pressure is mounting --- causes reform
| 1,318 | 38 | 99 | 221 | 6 | 14 | 0.027149 | 0.063348 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,550 |
Pena Nieto has said he favors a constitutional reform to revamp Pemex. But he has been very quiet about his plan. To change the constitution, the president needs a two thirds majority in Congress, and the approval of more than half of Mexico's 31 state legislatures. The PRI governs about two thirds of the states - but it lacks a majority in Congress. To get around this, Pena Nieto has brokered his biggest reforms in the "Pact for Mexico", an accord that he announced with the leaders of the two main opposition parties just days after taking office in December. Aimed at revitalizing the economy, the pact has yielded major bills to overhaul the telecommunications industry, the education system and a banking reform still in Congress. But it is likely to run out of steam on energy reform, forcing Pena Nieto to push through his bill with the aid of the conservative National Action Party, or PAN. Both the PAN and the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) have their own visions for oil reform. The PRD's plan aims to give Pemex autonomy and cut its tax burden - ideas which have support across the political spectrum. But the PRD has rejected any changes to the constitution. It argues that the way to make the company thrive is by rooting out corruption, cutting back on waste and giving Pemex operational independence. "The cost of (production) in shallow waters is $5-10 per barrel, the international price is $100. In deep waters it costs $30. Who wants to carve up a business like that? Who in their right mind would say 'come on in' so we get less?", said Luis Chazaro, a PRD energy expert in the lower house of Congress. At the other end of the spectrum, the PAN wants to open up the industry and grant full-blown concessions to oil companies. The PRI is positioning itself between the two parties, but leaning firmly towards the PAN's side of the argument. Rather than ceding ownership of the oil to private firms, the PRI has been exploring a change in article 27 that will enable Mexico to remain sole proprietor of the crude while providing oil majors with the incentives they need. Contracts could be designed that allow oil companies to show crude reserves on their balance sheets without making them the legal owners of the oil, said Jorge Jimenez, an expert on Mexican energy law at law firm Lopez Velarde, Heftye & Soria. "The rules are flexible enough to acknowledge that a company has a right to receive a contractual revenue on the basis of a barrel of oil produced," Jimenez said. "And that that revenue, as opposed to the fixed fee in the current contracts, is linked to the price of a barrel of oil in the market." Without changing article 27, Mexico would only be able to continue offering the so-called service contracts it now operates that pay firms a fee per barrel, Jimenez said. MOMENTUM For the PRD, such changes would be tantamount to privatization. "Nobody takes the risk without sharing in the property," said PRD congressman Chazaro. "They don't do it in Brazil, they don't do it in Norway and they're not going to do it here." Leftists have promised to mobilize millions of Mexicans to oppose Pena Nieto's reform, with Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, twice runner-up for the presidency, aiming to lead the charge. So far, however, the mood has been subdued. Pena Nieto and his cabinet have kept the energy reform out of the headlines by saying next to nothing about it inside Mexico, and the media have followed suit. Some in the PRI worry that the government is not doing enough to lay the groundwork for selling the reform. But people close to Pena Nieto say it is a deliberate ploy to avoid stoking a debate. They are confident he can push through his proposal without kicking off a storm of protest.
|
Graham, 7/25/2013 (Dave, Analysis: Mexico to rewrite ‘sacred’ text in long-awaited energy reform, Reuters, p. http://news.yahoo.com/analysis-mexico-rewrite-sacred-text-long-awaited-energy-050213831.html) [MN]
|
out of the headlines avoid stoking a debate without kicking off a storm of protest
|
Constitutional reform will pass
| 3,753 | 31 | 82 | 659 | 4 | 15 | 0.00607 | 0.022762 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,551 |
The Gulf of Mexico may have a much greater natural ability to self-clean oil spills than previously believed, according to Terry Hazen, University of Tennessee-Oak Ridge National Laboratory Governor's Chair for Environmental Biotechnology. Hazen conducted research following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, which is estimated to have spilled 210 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. His research team used a powerful new approach for identifying microbes in the environment to discover previously unknown and naturally occurring bacteria that consume and break down crude oil. "The Deepwater Horizon oil provided a new source of nutrients in the deepest waters," said Hazen. "With more food present in the water, there was a population explosion among those bacteria already adapted to using oil as a food source. It was surprising how fast they consumed the oil. In some locations, it took only one day for them to reduce a gallon of oil to a half gallon. In others, the half-life for a given quantity of spilled oil was six days." This data suggests that a great potential for intrinsic bioremediation of oil plumes exists in the deep sea and other environs in the Gulf of Mexico. Oil-eating bacteria are natural inhabitants of the Gulf because of the constant supply of oil as food.
|
R&D Magazine, 4/8/2013 (Research shows Gulf of Mexico resilient after spill, p. http://www.rdmag.com/news/2013/04/research-shows-gulf-mexico-resilient-after-spill) [MN]
|
greater natural ability to self-clean oil spills 210 million gallons powerful new approach using oil as a food source only one day intrinsic bioremediation of oil plumes exists natural inhabitants
|
Extend 1NC 4 --- Mexican econ is resilient --- strong manufacturing exports and proximity to the U.S. allows the Mexican econ to adjust and adapt to changing conditions. That’s Thomas White International 12.
| 1,301 | 207 | 196 | 213 | 33 | 30 | 0.15493 | 0.140845 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,552 |
Hazen's team used a powerful new approach for identifying previously recognized kinds of oil-eating bacteria that contributed to the natural clean-up of the Deepwater Horizon spill. In the past, scientists identified microbes by putting samples of water into laboratory culture dishes, waiting for microbes to grow and then using a microscope to identify the microbes. The new approach, called "ecogenomics," uses genetic and other analyses of the DNA, proteins and other footprints of bacteria to provide a more detailed picture of microbial life in the water. "The bottom line from this research may be that the Gulf of Mexico is more resilient and better able to recover from oil spills than anyone thought," Hazen said. "It shows that we may not need the kinds of heroic measures proposed after the Deepwater Horizon spill, like adding nutrients to speed up the growth of bacteria that breakdown oil, or using genetically engineered bacteria. The Gulf has a broad base of natural bacteria, and they respond to the presence of oil by multiplying quite rapidly."
|
Science Daily, 4/8/2013 (Gulf of Mexico Has Greater-Than-Believed Ability to Self-Cleanse Oil Spills, p. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/04/130408152733.htm) [MN]
|
powerful new approach ecogenomics uses genetic more detailed picture more resilient better able to recover from oil spills than anyone thought heroic measures quite rapidly
|
Extend 1NC 1 – the Gulf of Mexico is resilient --- the most recent study on the 2010 Deep Horizon spill proves that the Gulf can adapt and survive. Oil-eating bacteria eliminate the risk of damage. That’s R&D Magazine 2013.
| 1,064 | 223 | 172 | 172 | 40 | 25 | 0.232558 | 0.145349 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,553 |
A spill that started with the tragic loss of life soon wrought major environmental devastation over huge region of the Gulf. Disturbing images appeared daily of oiled wildlife, iridescent surface slicks, overwhelmed cleanup workers, fouled beaches, burning oil fires, and blackened wetlands. The damage from nearly five million barrels of oil was very real, yet many expert predictions missed their marks. Hurricanes didn't drive enormous quantities of oil ashore, giant dead zones didn't materialize, and oil didn't round the tip of Florida to rocket up the East Coast via the Gulf Stream. Fisheries now appear poised to rebound instead of suffering the barren years or decades some feared. And Mother Nature had her own surprises in store, showcasing an ability to fight back against the spill and, later, to bounce back from the damage—at least in the short-term.
|
Handwerk, 4/19/2011 (Brian, Gulf Oil Spill Anniversary: Resilience Amid Unknowns, National Geographic, p. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/04/110420-gulf-oil-spill-anniversary-year-later-science-nation-environment/) [MN]
|
yet many expert predictions missed their marks giant dead zones didn't materialize rebound showcasing an ability to fight back against the spill
|
Worst case predictions of oil spills are wrong
| 866 | 46 | 144 | 138 | 8 | 22 | 0.057971 | 0.15942 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,554 |
Spills, Leaks and Catastrophes. Even with safety protocols in place, leaks and spills are inevitable— each year U.S. drilling operations send an average of 880,000 gallons of oil into the ocean. Then there are the unanticipated catastrophes. In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed 113 of the oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico and damaged 457 pipelines. Hurricane damage caused at least 124 different spills, totaling over 17,700 barrels (743,000 gallons) of petroleum products. Oil is toxic to the plants and microscopic animals that form the basis of the marine food chain. It also poisons birds, mammals and fish. Those not killed outright can suffer a slow death from debilitating illness and injury.
|
DOW ‘12 (DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, "OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING", https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=vandq=cache:0hRYuUTRu6wJ:www.defenders.org/publications/impacts_of_outer_continental_shelf_drilling.pdf+andhl=enandgl=usandpid=blandsrcid=ADGEESimvF33YzLvIENzYCceMo6rbZBgGL_qq52L3lPQbQp9oCH-vySHbDLITJDlQ61o__xCzITqYc56OWssn5OEjL5C7HATlZWYsBP4Ec9SoxALLnh9Rk0NY_ANjAdUgfb3vh0C-e31andsig=AHIEtbSgOUGu_Q4pEWJM2fsBDGMuNjtfvA)
|
Even with safety protocols in place, leaks and spills are inevitable Then there are the unanticipated catastrophes Katrina and Rita destroyed 113 of the oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico Oil is toxic to the plants and microscopic animals that form the basis of the marine food chain. It also poisons birds, mammals and fish. Those not killed outright can suffer a slow death from debilitating illness and injury
|
Safe technology doesn’t check spills
| 713 | 36 | 413 | 114 | 5 | 70 | 0.04386 | 0.614035 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,555 |
Deepwater drilling has made a strong comeback in the Gulf of Mexico only three years after the BP disaster, and it may be the start of a new energy growth cycle there, according to MSN Money. Instead of becoming a drilling wasteland following the BP disaster that created the worst oil spill in U.S. history, Gulf exploration and production apparently is now one of the reasons the nation is moving toward energy independence. The Houston Business Journal reported recently 40 rigs are under contract in the Gulf – only five less than were predicted for 2013 before the BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster – and the count could double by 2017. Editor's Note: “After essentially being left for dead following the devastating (BP) blowout, we believe the deepwater Gulf of Mexico is in the early stages of an extended growth cycle,” a report from the International Strategy & Investment Group LLC said. Those analysts predicted the Gulf of Mexico may be the strongest offshore market in the world through 2015.
|
Morgan, 7/4/2013 (John, Return of Deepwater Rigs Bodes Well for Growth in Gulf of Mexico, Money News, p. http://www.moneynews.com/Economy/Deepwater-Rigs-Gulf-Mexico/2013/07/04/id/513405) [MN]
|
strong comeback in the Gulf of Mexico new energy growth cycle double by 2017 strongest offshore market in the world
|
More drilling is on the way --- predictive evidence
| 1,012 | 51 | 115 | 171 | 9 | 20 | 0.052632 | 0.116959 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,556 |
The idea that offshore drilling safety and spill response have substantially improved is little more than a figment of some people’s imagination. In the question above, Michael Bromwich acknowledges that during the Deepwater Horizon disaster (DWH) safeguards were not effective, preparation was not adequate, and response tools were little better than they were 20 years ago. But what has really changed in the past two years? Sadly, not enough. Even the question itself, what the industry (private sector) can do to reduce risks, misses the point because it sidelines the needed government action to scale back drilling given the lack of sufficient safety and response options. Not to mention the lack of private sector solutions. Let’s look at the categories on the list: safeguards, preparations and response tools. Safeguards have barely changed. The last line of defense at the wellhead, the heavily relied upon blowout preventer (BOP), turns out to be flawed by design according to Det Norsk Veritas – not just the one on the Deepwater Horizon, but possibly the rest. Did the private sector fix that problem? Have BOPs been redesigned to be effective and replaced? No and no. So, there’s something the private sector could do, or rather should have done before resuming drilling. But it hasn’t been required and dangerous deep water drilling is already back in full swing. There are new testing and maintenance regulations for BOPs, but they don’t fix the underlying design flaw. So that means we need real improvements in the second category: preparations. Is industry more prepared now? Of course they are, just ask them. Their exploration plans brag about response times in days now, rather than the months that we are accustomed to. According to BP, if DWH happened again, it could plug a well in 2-3 weeks, much faster than the 3 months it took them last time. But what changed? Well, this time we are to assume the capping device will work -- except we really don’t know that. Just because it eventually worked on DWH doesn’t mean it will work next time on a different blowout with a differently oriented pipe or even a damaged wellhead. Maybe if the companies offered to pre-drill relief wells, then they could credibly promise a faster response. But the private sector isn’t offering that, and again, government hasn’t required it. So be ready for another 3-month ordeal. That takes us to response. It’s impossible to fully respond to a major spill. The DWH caused tremendous impacts on marine life and coastal economies. And the response tools are not much better now than they were 2 or even 20 years ago. We still rely on booms that don’t really work, and surface burns that may remove about 5% of the oil. And then there are always toxic dispersants that can be used to hide the problem, though they create new problems. As a result, the next spill will look like 2010 all over again. Response is little more than damage control.
|
Savitz 12 (Jacqueline, Vice President – North American Oceans at Oceana, “Industry Won't Make Drilling Safe,” National Journal, 4-30, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/04/what-more-can-be-done-to-ensur.php?comments=expandall#comments) [MN]
|
The idea that offshore drilling safety and spill response have substantially improved is little more than a figment of some people’s imagination In Deepwater Horizon safeguards were not effective, preparation was not adequate, and response tools were little better than they were 20 years ago But what has really changed in the past two years? Sadly, not enough the question itself, what the industry (private sector) can do to reduce risks, misses the point because it sidelines the needed government action to scale back drilling given the lack of sufficient safety and response option Not to mention the lack of private sector solutions Safeguards have barely changed The last line of defense at the wellhead the heavily relied upon blowout preventer (BOP), turns out to be flawed by design Did the private sector fix that problem? Have BOPs been redesigned to be effective and replaced? No and no there’s something the private sector could do But it hasn’t been required and dangerous deep water drilling is already back in full swing There are new testing and maintenance regulations for BOPs, but they don’t fix the underlying design flaw Just because it eventually worked on DWH doesn’t mean it will work next time on a different blowout with a differently oriented pipe or even a damaged wellhead So be ready for another 3-month ordeal response tools are not much better now than they were 2 or even 20 years ago We still rely on booms that don’t really work, and surface burns that may remove about 5% of the oil the next spill will look like 2010 all over again. Response is little more than damage control
|
Drilling is not safe even after Deepwater Horizon
| 2,947 | 49 | 1,616 | 499 | 8 | 276 | 0.016032 | 0.553106 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,557 |
Unfortunately, a cooperative solution has not been easy to negotiate or reach. One of the greatest challenges in establishing a regime for joint exploration and exploitation of possible shared petroleum resources in the Gulf is the stark difference between the two countries' petroleum legal regimes. In Mexico, not only is there a state monopoly of the oil industry; but its constitution prevents the Mexican government from authorizing direct exploitation and production of hydrocarbons by private companies from foreign countries, other than through service contracts. n5 In 2008, Mexico passed reforms to federal law in an attempt to remove some of the restrictions that limit private contracting. Calls for further reforms surfaced in the context of the recent presidential elections, but incoming President-elect Enrique Pena Nieto faces difficult political obstacles to passing the necessary constitutional reforms to allow international oil companies to drill within Mexican boundaries. Despite the dramatic differences in their regulatory regimes, on February 20, 2012, the United States and Mexico successfully negotiated an international agreement designed to establish a collaborative relationship for joint development of transboundary reservoirs. Officially known as the "Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican States Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico" (the "Agreement"), it addresses transboundary reservoirs and attempts to set up a unitization framework for their efficient and equitable exploitation, although it leaves many details for future negotiation. n6 The Agreement will enter into force pending its ratification by the U.S. Senate and the establishment of internal regulations regarding permits and licenses for U.S. operators to carry it out. n7 Significantly more thorough legal and regulatory reform is needed in Mexico before the Agreement can be effectively implemented. Once implemented, however, the Agreement will terminate the moratorium on drilling in the Western Gap, which was implemented by the Western Gap Treaty on June 9, 2000. n8
|
Grunstein et. al, November/December 2012 (Miriam – Professor of Law at CIDE University in Mexico, Richard McLaughlin – Endowed Chair for Marine Policy and Law at the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies at Texas A&M University, Corpus Christi, and Luis Anastacio Gutierrez – legal intern at the Mexican Foreign Ministry, Gulf of Mexico Offshore Transboundary Hydrocarbon Development: Legal Issues Between Mexico & the U.S., The Houston Lawyer, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
|
stark difference prevents the Mexican government from authorizing direct exploitation difficult political obstacles Significantly more thorough legal and regulatory reform is needed
|
Mexico can’t cooperate --- it’s unconstitutional
| 2,140 | 48 | 181 | 310 | 6 | 22 | 0.019355 | 0.070968 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,558 |
Concerns about a Potential Conflict Between the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement and Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank While the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement is a good agreement that will aid both the United States and Mexico, one potential problem is a conflict between Article 20 of the agreement and the Security and Exchange Commission’s Rule 13q-1 regarding Resource Extraction Payments. Article 20 states: To the extent consistent with their national laws, the Parties shall maintain confidential, and obligate their Licensees to maintain confidential, all Confidential Data and other information obtained from the other Party or its Licensees in accordance with this Agreement. Together with Rule 13q-1, requiring “resource extraction issuers” to disclose payments made to foreign governments, Article 20 can create an impossible situation for American companies operating on transboundary hydrocarbon resources. For example, Mexican confidentiality requirements may forbid the disclosure of the very information that Rule 13q-1 requires American companies[23] to disclose. This would lead to a situation where companies regulated by the SEC have, at very least, uncertainty about compliance with both Mexican and American disclosure laws. This uncertainty and potential disclosure conflict would place foreign state-owned oil companies, who are not regulated by the SEC, at a competitive advantage to the companies which operate in the United States are regulated by the SEC. Because much of the transboundary area is deepwater, it would require multi-billion dollar investments to produce the hydrocarbon resources. Any legal uncertainty brought about by disclosure law could easily dissuade American companies from undertaking what is already an expensive decision, in turn reducing opportunities for new jobs for Americans.
|
Institute for Energy Research, 4/24/2013 (IER’s Simmons to Testify on Hydrocarbons Agreement, p. http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2013/04/24/testimony-of-daniel-simmons-subcommittee-on-energy-and-mineral-resources/) [MN]
|
T H A impossible situation uncertainty about compliance multi-billion dollar investments Any legal uncertainty dissuade American companies expensive decision
|
US companies won’t participate --- disclosure conflicts
| 1,837 | 55 | 157 | 262 | 7 | 19 | 0.026718 | 0.072519 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,559 |
This article examines the longstanding political and legal obstacles to bilateral cooperation between the United States and Mexico, and it suggests that bilateral cooperation could be improved without antagonizing long-standing political tensions by creating one or more Transboundary Energy Security and Environmental Cooperation Areas (TESECA) in the GOM’s maritime boundary region. Two areas, in particular, that straddle the maritime boundary are especially well suited. The first is known as the Perdido Foldbelt Region, where large quantities of hydrocarbons are known to exist in transboundary reservoirs.9 The second is the area beyond national jurisdiction known as the Western Gap, which is already governed by an international treaty between the two nations.10 Creating a TESECA in these areas will provide a valuable institutional forum for bilateral discussion and development of cooperative management opportunities for transboundary hydrocarbons as well as the protection of the marine environment. In addition to being an important area for oil and gas production, recent scientific studies have shown that the GOM maritime boundary region contains highly productive deep-water chemosynthetic communities as well as a globally important nursery area for blue fin tuna, among other ecologically important attributes.11 A formal bilateral arrangement will improve the ability of both nations to manage, conserve, and monitor the status of the region’s marine biodiversity and habitats. In contrast to some other areas of the world where joint development agreements are commonly negotiated to exploit transboundary hydrocarbon deposits, a new approach is needed in the GOM to overcome the historical barriers to cooperation that exist between the U.S. and Mexico and to protect fragile environmental assets. To some extent, a TESECA would resemble existing MPAs or Transboundary Peace Parks by serving to conserve natural resources and promote political good will.12 There are currently 188 transboundary protected areas worldwide.13 However, the purpose of the proposed TESECA would differ from these existing models by placing priority on the cooperative development of transboundary hydrocarbon resources while preserving multiple uses and protecting the environmental integrity of the region. It is not a question of if, but of when and how the U.S. and Mexico will exploit the hydrocarbon resources in the ultra-deepwater GOM. Creating TESECAs will provide a method to share effective conservation approaches, new technologies and management strategies and lay the foundation for the wise use of transboundary resources. Nations, beyond the GOM, that share transboundary hydrocarbon resources but have longstanding political disagreements with neighbors may learn from the GOM experience and create similar areas and arrangements.
|
McLaughlin 2008 (Richard – Texas A&M University, Establishing Transboundary Marine Energy Security and Environmental Cooperation Areas as a Method of Resolving Longstanding Political Disagreements and Improving Transboundary Resource Management in the Gulf of Mexico, Frontier Issues in Ocean Law: Marine Resources, Maritime Boundaries, and the Law of the Sea, p. Degruyter) [Kreus]
|
the Western Gap cooperative management opportunities for transboundary hydrocarbons protection of the marine environment conserve monitor the status overcome the historical barriers to cooperation protect fragile environmental assets conserve natural resources promote political good will cooperative development of transboundary hydrocarbon resources share effective conservation approaches new technologies and management strategies
|
The United States federal government should establish a Transboundary Energy Security and Environmental Cooperation Area over the Western Gap.
| 2,849 | 142 | 434 | 411 | 19 | 50 | 0.046229 | 0.121655 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,560 |
Given the extraordinary political sensitivity associated with any attempt to open up Mexico’s energy sector to foreign participation, it is unlikely that a formal joint development agreement between Mexico and the U.S. to exploit transboundary hydrocarbons in the Perdido Foldbelt or Western Gap Regions is possible in anything resembling the near term. Longstanding historical and political disagreements will significantly hinder any negotiations. Moreover, submitting the issue to third party mediation or adjudication will be either politically infeasible or non-judiciable. Mutual accommodation is especially difficult when the disagreement, as is the case in the GOM, is based primarily on domestic political and legal concerns rather than being limited to the foreign policy arena. A more realistic approach may be for the two nations to establish TESECAs to provide a framework for cooperation and to address common challenges inherent in managing adjoining deepwater areas in the GOM. In many parts of the world, transboundary protected areas serve to improve regional ecological management, increase economic opportunities, foster peace, and provide a foundation for further collaboration in other, more politically charged areas.52 TESECAs in the GOM could similarly provide an institutional forum to resolve specific bilateral problems.
|
McLaughlin 2008 (Richard – Texas A&M University, Establishing Transboundary Marine Energy Security and Environmental Cooperation Areas as a Method of Resolving Longstanding Political Disagreements and Improving Transboundary Resource Management in the Gulf of Mexico, Frontier Issues in Ocean Law: Marine Resources, Maritime Boundaries, and the Law of the Sea, p. Degruyter) [Kreus]
|
formal joint development agreement establish TESECAs to provide a framework for cooperation
|
The counterplan establishes a transboundary marine protected area over the Western Gap. The CP emphasizes environmental conservation while allowing for cooperative development of hydrocarbon reserves.
| 1,348 | 200 | 91 | 193 | 25 | 12 | 0.129534 | 0.062176 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,561 |
It will not be easy to reduce the deep-seated historical mistrust that the Mexican people have of foreign enterprises exploiting the nation’s natural resources. However, establishing TESECAs in the Gulf of Mexico may represent the best way to develop a foundation of trust between the two nations. It is in both nations’ strong self-interest to find a framework to efficiently and effectively develop and manage the transboundary hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Mexico. Collaboration using a TESECA approach represents a template upon which a complex set of relationships can evolve. It will allow the nations to jointly develop goals and priorities; produce baseline geo-seismic and environmental studies; and begin the process of setting up the institutional and legal mechanisms necessary to jointly develop their shared transboundary resources as mandated by norms of international law. Future research will be necessary to determine the most effective way to institutionally structure, administratively implement, and sustainably fund any proposed TESECA.
|
McLaughlin 2008 (Richard – Texas A&M University, Establishing Transboundary Marine Energy Security and Environmental Cooperation Areas as a Method of Resolving Longstanding Political Disagreements and Improving Transboundary Resource Management in the Gulf of Mexico, Frontier Issues in Ocean Law: Marine Resources, Maritime Boundaries, and the Law of the Sea, p. Degruyter) [Kreus]
|
best way to develop a foundation of trust between the two nations jointly develop their shared transboundary resources
|
2. The CP is functionally different than the plan --- it includes a marine-protected area and the plan does not.
| 1,056 | 112 | 118 | 156 | 20 | 18 | 0.128205 | 0.115385 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,562 |
The TESECA framework may also provide a valuable forum for binational scholarly exchange on legal and policy issues. For instance, it is currently unsettled how these co-owned transboundary hydrocarbon deposits should be treated under Mexican domestic law generally and within the meaning of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution more specifically.55 It could be persuasively argued that fungible resources such as transboundary hydrocarbons do not fall within the ambit of Article 27. Shared transboundary resources have always been given unique legal status under international law and perhaps the same approach would apply under Mexico’s domestic law. Answers to these unsettled legal questions could profoundly change the political dynamics that currently exist in the region.
|
McLaughlin 2008 (Richard – Texas A&M University, Establishing Transboundary Marine Energy Security and Environmental Cooperation Areas as a Method of Resolving Longstanding Political Disagreements and Improving Transboundary Resource Management in the Gulf of Mexico, Frontier Issues in Ocean Law: Marine Resources, Maritime Boundaries, and the Law of the Sea, p. Degruyter) [Kreus]
|
binational scholarly exchange on legal and policy issues profoundly change the political dynamics
|
TESECA cooperation spills over to legal reform of Mexico’s constitution.
| 781 | 72 | 97 | 114 | 10 | 13 | 0.087719 | 0.114035 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,563 |
A more realistic approach may be for the two nations to establish TESECAs to provide a framework for cooperation and to address common challenges inherent in managing adjoining deepwater areas in the GOM. In many parts of the world, transboundary protected areas serve to improve regional ecological management, increase economic opportunities, foster peace, and provide a foundation for further collaboration in other, more politically charged areas.52 TESECAs in the GOM could similarly provide an institutional forum to resolve specific bilateral problems. For example, Mexican officials have publicly expressed concern that commercial production on the U.S. side of the maritime boundary in the Perdido Foldbelt area scheduled to begin by 2010 may deplete transboundary reservoirs within Mexico’s territory.53 The validity of this assertion is currently unknown because no detailed surveys have been conducted to determine the “unity of deposit” along the maritime boundary.54 One of the principle functions of the TESECA could be to facilitate a detailed bi-national survey of the precise location and potential size of transboundary reservoirs. A well-planned bi-national survey of this kind would reduce the mistrust between the parties and legitimize any future decisions regarding commercialization of transboundary reservoirs. Similarly, joint scientific expeditions to understand, manage, conserve, and monitor critical marine habitats within designated TESECAs would be highly beneficial. Once again, the TESECA structure could be used as an institutional framework to stimulate and organize bilateral scientific collaboration between the nations. This scientific effort could provide very useful baseline data and guide future decisions to commercialize transboundary resources with as little damage to the marine environment as possible.
|
McLaughlin 2008 (Richard – Texas A&M University, Establishing Transboundary Marine Energy Security and Environmental Cooperation Areas as a Method of Resolving Longstanding Political Disagreements and Improving Transboundary Resource Management in the Gulf of Mexico, Frontier Issues in Ocean Law: Marine Resources, Maritime Boundaries, and the Law of the Sea, p. Degruyter) [Kreus]
|
improve regional ecological management further collaboration more politically charged areas resolve specific bilateral problems reduce the mistrust legitimize any future decisions regarding commercialization of transboundary reservoirs joint scientific expeditions organize bilateral scientific collaboration between the nations with as little damage to the marine environment as possible
|
The CP creates a marine protected area over the Western Gap and the subsequent transboundary areas. This allows for environmental protection through safety regulations and monitoring. That’s McLaughlin 2008.
| 1,851 | 207 | 388 | 261 | 29 | 46 | 0.111111 | 0.176245 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,564 |
A House GOP bill to implement a U.S.-Mexico offshore energy accord exempts oil companies operating under the pact from controversial federal rules that force energy producers to disclose their payments to foreign governments. The provision could become a sticking point in enacting the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement, a 2012 accord to enable cooperation in development of oil-and-gas along a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico. “I don’t see how that provision can be taken out,” said Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.), the chairman of a House subcommittee that reviewed the bill Thursday. The U.S.-Mexico energy accord has strong support from Republicans and the Obama administration. Backers note it will open a substantial offshore region to oil production and enable new cooperation between U.S. companies and PEMEX, Mexico’s state-owned oil giant. But Interior and State Department officials declined, at Thursday's hearing, to weigh in on the GOP implementing bill’s limited exemption from Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure rules. The legislation appears to be the first bill introduced to alter the resource payments disclosure provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial law, a provision that faces heavy opposition from oil industry and business groups. Dodd-Frank requires SEC-listed oil, natural gas and mining companies to disclose payments to foreign governments related to projects in their countries, such as money for production licenses, royalties and so forth. On Thursday, Republicans and officials with oil industry groups said the exemption in the GOP bill is needed to prevent a collision with confidentiality provisions in the U.S.-Mexico accord. “The treaty that we are hammering out with Mexico does address confidentiality and allows for it for competitive reasons for both their company and American companies, so that right there puts that agreement at odds with Dodd-Frank,” Lamborn, chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, told reporters. Daniel Simmons of the Institute for Energy Research (IER) told the subcommittee that the U.S.-Mexico accord and the Dodd-Frank mandate could together “create an impossible situation for American companies” weighing expensive deepwater projects in the transboundary region. “Any legal uncertainty brought about by disclosure law could easily dissuade American companies from undertaking what is already an expensive decision, in turn reducing opportunities for new jobs for Americans,” said Simmons, director of regulatory and state affairs for IER, which receives fossil fuel industry backing. Obama administration officials declined to weigh in on the exemption. Tommy Beaudreau, the Interior Department’s acting assistant secretary for land and minerals management, said during the hearing that he doesn’t have a view of the provision at this point and wants more information. “It is something that we are going to have to talk with the committee about, try and understand what the committee is getting at there, and work with them on it,” he told reporters after his appearance before lawmakers. But Oxfam America, which is a major backer of the SEC rules, criticized the exemption and is concerned the bill is part of a wider effort to repeal the Dodd-Frank provision. “We agree with the SEC that no exemptions to the payment reporting requirements of [Dodd-Frank] Section 1504 are warranted and believe that oil industry arguments in favor of exemptions are groundless. The exemptions language in this proposed legislation implementing a US-Mexico transboundary hydrocarbons agreement is irrelevant and unnecessary,” said Ian Gary, senior policy manager of Oxfam America’s oil, gas and mining program, in a statement. The American Petroleum Institute, which also backed the exemption Thursday, is currently challenging the SEC rule in court, and has said it may seek legislation to thwart the regulation. Lamborn, for his part, suggested the provision in the U.S.-Mexico energy bill could be a “model” going forward, and expressed concern that similar conflicts could arise between the Dodd-Frank provision and confidentiality laws in other nations. The Dodd-Frank disclosure provision is aimed at undoing the “resource curse,” in which some impoverished countries in Africa and elsewhere are plagued by corruption and conflict alongside their energy and mineral wealth. Human rights and anti-poverty groups say greater transparency will help ensure the public in these nations benefits from their natural resource wealth. Backers also argue the disclosure will provide greater information to investors. Rep. Raul Grijalva (D-Ariz.) criticized the exemption is the transboundary bill during Thursday's hearing, stating that the Dodd-Frank mandate “goes to the core” of the SEC’s investor protection mission.
|
Geman, 4/25/2013 (Ben, House GOP moves to shield oil companies from disclosure rule, The Hill, p. http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296235-house-gop-moves-to-shield-oil-companies-from-disclosure-rules) [Kreus]
|
implement exempts oil companies Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement I don’t see how that provision can be taken out alter the resource payments disclosure provision wider effort to repeal the Dodd-Frank provision model” going forward similar conflicts could arise between the Dodd-Frank provision and confidentiality laws in other nations undoing the “resource curse plagued by corruption and conflict goes to the core
|
Ratifying the TBHA unravels the Dodd-Frank disclosure provision.
| 4,817 | 64 | 418 | 719 | 8 | 60 | 0.011127 | 0.083449 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,565 |
Additionally, the disclosure of corporate profits on a country-by-country-basis would aid civil society groups and donors in the fight against corruption and cronyism in Afghanistan. Extractive industry experts will be able to estimate whether the revenue figures disclosed by a corporation are accurate based on their knowledge of the deposits and the industry. Relatively accurate revenue figures will in turn support better estimates of government revenue, which outside parties can then compare to figures released by the government on its receipts and expenditures—as discrepancies between the two sources could suggest corruption. The net result of a country-by-country reporting standard is the potential for more of the wealth generated by Afghanistan’s mineral resources to actually reach and benefit the general population. Transparent management and reporting of Afghanistan’s natural resources would be a win-win situation for all the parties involved. The central government will have more revenue, which can then be spent on development; infrastructure; and proper, timely payment of government employees (including the military and police). The happier, wealthier populous will generate greater legitimacy for political leaders, which contributes to improved government and social stability. Mining companies will, in turn, benefit from a stable and lawful environment in which to operate eventually improving their bottom line. Allied governments—and their people—would then transition from the role of donor to a desperate country into investors in a dynamic and rapidly developing country. Significant progress was made towards country-by-country reporting this past month when the United States Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Zct. The legislation included the Energy Security Through Transparency (ESTT) provision, which requires all companies working in the extractive industries and registered with the SEC (i.e. 90% of all major international companies working in the extractive industries) to disclose all payments made to host governments on an on-going basis. That’s major progress, and it will significantly help curtail corruption in resource-rich countries like Afghanistan. However, it’s not until we report corporate profits on a country-by-country basis, that we’ll achieve full transparency in this crucial sector.
|
Clough, 8/3/2010 (Christine – coordinator of the Task Force on Financial Integrity & Economic Development, Using Transparency to Avoid the Resource Curse in Afghanistan, Financial Transparency Coalition, p. http://www.financialtransparency.org/2010/08/03/using-transparency-to-avoid-the-resource-curse-in-afghanistan/) [Kreus]
|
the disclosure of corporate profits fight against corruption and cronyism in Afghanistan win-win situation generate greater legitimacy for political leaders social stability That’s major progress significantly help curtail corruption
|
Dodd-Frank solves corruption in Afghanistan --- the impact is stability.
| 2,369 | 72 | 233 | 336 | 10 | 29 | 0.029762 | 0.08631 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,566 |
However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.
|
Morgan 2007 (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, “Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?”, 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive .com/article/_Better_another_Taliban_Afghanistan__than_a_Taliban_NUCLEAR_Pakistan___/99961/0/) [Kreus]
|
As the war intensifies the current autonomy may burgeon into a separatist movement a Taliban Pashtun caliphate would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan the break up of Afghanistan could lead to the break up of Pakistan, as well Pakistan could be faced with civil wars and fundamentalist uprisings including a coup an arc of civil war would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean Undoubtedly, this would spill over into India Border clashes would break out. A nuclear war could not be ruled out Such deep chaos would open a “Pandora's box” for the world With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America a nuclear war could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US
|
Afghanistan collapse escalates to global nuclear war
| 3,067 | 52 | 1,069 | 495 | 7 | 181 | 0.014141 | 0.365657 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,567 |
A few weeks ago, a few House Republicans introduced H.R. 1613, the innocuous sounding “Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement Act”. A little over four pages long, H.R. 1613 is primarily designed to provide Congressional approval to a US-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement (TBA) signed by both governments over a year ago. Oxfam has no problem with the approval of the US-Mexico TBA which simply lays out the rules for how hydrocarbons reserves in the Gulf of Mexico that straddle our maritime borders would be developed. We do have a big problem with an irrelevant provision inserted into the bill designed to weaken the payment disclosure requirements in Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, also known as the Cardin-Lugar provision. That law provides for the annual disclosure of payments made by oil, gas and mining companies to host governments around the world – final rules were issued by the SEC in August last year. H.R. 1613 would exempt any covered company from reporting payments from in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbons agreement anywhere in the world.
|
Gary, 5/9/2013 (Ian – Senior Policy Manager for Extractive Industries at Oxfam America, A back door attack on oil payment transparency, Oxfam America, p. http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2013/05/09/a-back-door-attack-on-oil-payment-transparency/) [Kreus]
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weaken the payment disclosure requirements any transboundary hydrocarbons agreement anywhere in the world
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1. Extend Geman 13 --- the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement will include exemptions for Dodd-Frank provisions. This spills over to the collapse of transparency measures.
| 1,108 | 172 | 105 | 175 | 24 | 13 | 0.137143 | 0.074286 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,568 |
Don't think Wall Street reform has much to do with Afghan corruption? Think again, says Congress, President Obama, and a broad coalition of human rights and sustainable development NGOs. As we all know by now, the landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act passed in July 2010 contains a slew of new rules to rein in abuses in the financial sector. One of its most interesting features, however, is aimed not at wrongdoing by American commodities traders, but at corruption and conflict in the countries where commodities themselves are extracted from the ground. Packed into the bill's 2,300-odd pages is a somewhat overlooked but nonetheless far-reaching provision that requires publicly traded oil, gas and mining companies to disclose the payments they make to foreign governments in exchange for the rights to drill and dig. From Congolese gold mines and Nigerian oilfields to the rainforests of Borneo and soon -- if the Pentagon is to be believed -- the mountains of southern Afghanistan, natural resource abundance is too often linked to corruption, conflict, and human rights abuses. One promising strategy to help lift this so-called "resource curse" involves natural resource revenue transparency. The idea is simple: force international companies to disclose what they pay -- and to whom -- and then let local stakeholders and international NGOs make use of this information to hold corrupt leaders accountable.
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Firger, 9/28/2010 (Daniel, Lifting the Resource Curse: Will Dodd-Frank Do the Trick?, The Huffington Post, p. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-firger/post_945_b_741761.html) [Kreus]
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Think again corruption disclose the payments natural resource abundance is too often linked to corruption conflict human rights abuses involves natural resource revenue transparency hold corrupt leaders accountable
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1. Implementation of the TBHA results in creating an exemption for Mexican companies under the Dodd-Frank act. It is not possible for the provision to be taken out. That’s Geman 13
| 1,423 | 180 | 214 | 225 | 31 | 28 | 0.137778 | 0.124444 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,569 |
Russia remains heavily involved in the Central Asian republics. It has worked to oust the United States from the air base at Manas, Kyrgyzstan. It remains interested in the huge energy reserves in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Russia may be wary of significant involvement in Afghanistan proper, unwilling to repeat the Soviet Union’s epic blunder there. But a US withdrawal from Afghanistan followed by Kabul’s collapse would likely embolden Russia to assert its influence more aggressively elsewhere in Central Asia or Eastern Europe, especially in the Ukraine. A US departure from Afghanistan will also continue to resonate for years to come in the strength and purpose of NATO. Every American president since Harry Truman has affirmed the centrality of the Atlantic Alliance to US national security. The war in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Alliance’s first out-of-area operation in its sixty-year history, was going poorly until the US troop surge. Even with the limited success that followed, allies have complained that the burden in Afghanistan has been distributed unevenly. Some, like the British, Canadians, and Poles, are fighting a shooting war in Kandahar and Helmand, while others, like the Lithuanians and Germans, are doing peacekeeping in Ghor and Kunduz. The poor command and control—split between four regional centers—left decisionmaking slow and poorly coordinated for much of the war. ISAF’s strategy was only clarified in 2008 and 2009, when Generals David McKiernan and Stanley McChrystal finally developed a more coherent campaign plan with counterinsurgency-appropriate rules of engagement. A bad end in Afghanistan could have dire consequences for the Atlantic Alliance, leaving the organization’s future, and especially its credibility as a deterrent to Russia, in question. It would not be irrational for a Russian observer of the war in Afghanistan to conclude that if NATO cannot make tough decisions, field effective fighting forces, or distribute burdens evenly, it cannot defend Europe. The United States and Europe must prevent that outcome by salvaging a credible result to its operations in Afghanistan—one that both persuades Russia that NATO is still a fighting alliance and preserves the organization as a pillar of US national security.
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Miller, March/April 2012 (Paul D. – former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Bush and Obama, assistant professor of the International Security affairs at the National Defense University, director for the Afghanistan-Pakistan program at the college of International Security Affairs, It’s Not just Al-Qaeda: Stability in the Most Dangerous Region, World Affairs Journal, p. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/it%E2%80%99s-not-just-al-qaeda-stability-most-dangerous-region) [Kreus]
|
Russia remains heavily involved in the Central Asian republics Kabul’s collapse would embolden Russia to assert its influence aggressively elsewhere in Central Asia or Eastern Europe, especially in the Ukraine A bad end in Afghanistan could have dire consequences for the Atlantic Alliance, leaving the organization’s credibility as a deterrent to Russia, in question. It would not be irrational for a Russian observer to conclude that if NATO cannot make tough decisions, field effective fighting forces, or distribute burdens evenly, it cannot defend Europe. The U S must prevent that outcome by salvaging a credible result in Afghanistan that persuades Russia that NATO is still a fighting alliance
|
Afghanistan collapse causes Russian/Ukraine conflict and NATO collapse
| 2,330 | 70 | 701 | 354 | 8 | 108 | 0.022599 | 0.305085 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,570 |
Russia: Russia seeks to influence the weakened Ukraine, inflaming ethnic-Russian separatism; Crimea declares independence; Ukraine resists, perhaps seeing an external war as a distraction from internal strife; Russia comes to the aid of Crimea/ethnic-Russians resulting in open warfare between Russia and Ukraine. The West: The West also suffers from the global recession, but (perhaps following a period of inward looking protectionism) realizes that it cannot allow Russian success in Ukraine; open hostilities erupt between Russian and NATO forces triggering World War III and the strong possibility of nuclear war, or at least the drawing in of many other countries.
|
Kingston, February 2009 (Brian, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs – CIFP, “Ukraine: A Risk Assessment Report”, p. http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1214.pdf) [Kreus]
|
inflaming ethnic-Russian separatism open warfare open hostilities erupt between Russian and NATO forces triggering World War III and the strong possibility of nuclear war
|
Ukraine intervention sparks global nuclear war.
| 670 | 47 | 170 | 99 | 6 | 24 | 0.060606 | 0.242424 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,571 |
Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important factors that have helped to ensure the alliance's enduring relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which external threats sufficient to help justify the preservation of the alliance would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a number of actual or potential dangers emanating from outside their territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the relatively new concerns raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second, the pessimists failed to consider NATO's capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two important new functions. NATO is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the former Soviet bloc. Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe— as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies — remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.
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Duffield 1994 (John, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs – University of Virginia, Political Science Quarterly, 109, p. 766-767) [Kreus]
|
external threats justify the preservation of the alliance These include not only Russian military power, but conflicts in neighboring regions pessimists failed to consider NATO's institutional adaptation NATO is containing and controlling conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe it works to prevent such conflicts from arising NATO has contributed to making the use of force in the region virtually inconceivable the U S could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons
|
NATO collapse causes nuclear wars
| 2,281 | 33 | 607 | 352 | 5 | 95 | 0.014205 | 0.269886 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,572 |
If the situation in the country continues as it is and the power of the US army ebbs, the loss of Afghanistan would be devastating for both the region and the whole world. Above all, Pakistan is very much vulnerable to the changes in Afghanistan. Pakistan, whose demographical structure is composed of many tribes, is one of the largest Muslim countries in the world. The geographical features of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s borders preclude offensive security arrangements. In regard to ethnic, social, linguistic and religious structure, there are lots of similarities between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is a country which could not tackle even its own problems, because of its fledgling democracy, economy and other disadvantages. In the case of Pakistan, it could be said that the country would face the process of “Afghanistanization” if the problems of Afghanistan are added on to its own. Apart from Pakistan, Afghanistan is a key country for the Central Asia as well. Uzbeks, Tajiks and other societies are widespread in Afghanistan, and the changes in this country would inevitably affect the neighboring Muslim Central Asian republics. Besides most of Central Asian republics, especially Uzbekistan would not be able to resist the extremist and radical movements in Afghanistan. Under these circumstances, there is the risk that Afghanistan’s problems would spread not only on the direction of Southern Asia but also to Central Asia. In addition to Pakistan and Central Asia, the failure of the reforms and moderate groups in Afghanistan will add another Palestine, Iraq or Chechnya issue for the Muslim world. All these problems increased the victimization feeling of the Muslims and deepened the mistrust between Muslims and the West by luring many Muslims to the extremist ideas. In another word, if the world cannot solve the Afghanistan problem, Afghanistan will spread all over the world.
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Akbulut, 2007 (Isil, International Strategic Research Organization, “If Afghanistan Collapses?”, Afghan Profile, 7-19, http://afghanprofile.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=163&Itemid=27) [Kreus]
|
he loss of Afghanistan would be devastating for the whole world Pakistan is very vulnerable Pakistan would face Afghanistanization” if the problems of Afghanistan are added Afghanistan is a key country for Central Asia changes would inevitably affect neighboring Central Asian republics Afghanistan’s problems would spread to Central Asia. the failure of the reforms in Afghanistan will add another issue for the Muslim world these problems increase the victimization feeling of the Muslims and deepen mistrust between Muslims and the West by luring many Muslims to extremist ideas Afghanistan will spread all over the world
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Afghan collapse destabilizes Central Asia
| 1,911 | 42 | 624 | 302 | 5 | 95 | 0.016556 | 0.31457 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,573 |
But abetting the continuing destabilization of Eurasia is not in the West's interests. NATO enlargement has not consolidated anti-Western forces in the region, as some Western experts had feared, but it has encouraged the division of Eurasia and the shattering of the Russian Federation. There will likely be further attempts at secession, although not necessarily according to the bloody model of Chechnya. Central Asia and the Caucasus are rife with flash points that could ignite several nations and draw in outside powers. And with regional destabilization and the slackening of central control, the nuclear threat is perhaps greater now than during the Cold War. [Continues…] The scramble for the spoils of the Soviet heritage could cause serious conflict between major geopolitical players and threaten the very foundations of established security systems. When a tenant in a building falls ill or dies, if the tenants in the other apartments begin knocking down walls to expand their own space, they could end up destroying the entire building. Any "world order" is stable only when everyone knows his place in it and there is sufficient collective and individual power, and the willingness to use it, to maintain the whole. The challenge for Europe and the world in the post-Soviet space is averting further disintegration and keeping disorder and conflict from spilling out of the region and setting the globe ablaze. It is clearly to the West's advantage to promote certain kinds of regional integration in Eurasia. The rapid rise of any player, especially China or Iran, or a radical Islamic revolution could harm Western interests. Western unity would be shaken if one or more of its own, whether Germany, Turkey, or Japan, tried to secure its own zone of influence. The intervention of NATO forces in future conflicts in the region, probably at the request of the parties involved, could cause further disintegration, perhaps resulting in loss of control over weapons of mass destruction.
|
Tsepkalo 1998 (Valery V., Belarussian Ambassador to the U.S., Foreign Affairs, March/April, Lexis) [Kreus]
|
Central Asia and the Caucasus are rife with flash points that could ignite several nations and draw in outside powers. the nuclear threat is greater now than during the Cold War The scramble for the spoils of the Soviet heritage could cause serious conflict between major geopolitical players The challenge is averting disintegration and keeping conflict from spilling out of the region and setting the globe ablaze intervention of NATO could cause further disintegration resulting in loss of control over w m d
|
Central Asian conflict escalates to global nuclear war
| 2,001 | 54 | 511 | 321 | 8 | 83 | 0.024922 | 0.258567 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,574 |
It is possible that scaling back American influence in the country merely to that of an advisory and arms dealing role—much as the Soviet Union did post-1989—might be effective. Indeed, it very well might… for a little bit. But this is where it becomes impossible to ignore Pakistan (and not just for the shallow reason that al Qaeda is hiding in an ungoverned space in the Northwest). Pakistan has not lost its fundamental strategic rationale for supporting the original Taliban: a hedge against Iran, “strategic depth” against India, and a training ground for Kashmiri insurgents. In fact, it could be easily argued that a big reason Kashmir has calmed down is that all the crazies were too busy fighting in Miram Shah and Kandahar and Khost and Ghazni to go plant bombs in Srinagar. And lest anyone think it is appropriate to write off the India-Pakistan conflict as somebody else’s problem, it is never somebody else’s problem when nuclear weapons are involved. As Jari Lindholm reminded, India and Pakistan have come a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. And like it or not, it is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in some way also a vital American interest. Regional security is one of those topics that gets mentioned casually by many pundits but never really articulated. It is by far Ahmed Rashid’s most convincing argument, that supporting stability in Central and South Asia is a compelling interest not just for the U.S., but for the West in general. When it comes to Pakistan, the big danger is not in a Taliban takeover, or even in the Taliban seizure of nuclear weapons—I have never believed that the ISI could be that monumentally stupid (though they are incredibly stupid for letting things get this far out of hand). The big danger, as it has been since 1999, is that insurgents, bored or underutilized in Afghanistan, will spark another confrontation between India and Pakistan, and that that confrontation will spillover into nuclear conflict. That is worth blood and treasure to prevent. When Afghanistan was a sanctuary for destabilizing elements—whether Chechens training to go fight Russia, Juma Namangani training to go fight Tashkent, or even Osama bin Laden training his men to go fight America—the region as a whole was a serious security concern. The reason why so many books and articles condemning the Clinton administration’s stand-offish attitude have been so popular is because that message resonates—how could you not have seen this coming? While things have undoubtedly become more violent, they are also, in a way, more ordered. The insurgency in Afghanistan is a difficult and frustrating enemy to fight, more so the insurgency in Pakistan. But both are identifiable, and are capable therefore of being defeated or delegitimized. The fact that the U.S. has chosen not to do this is the topic for another post (and the source of the tremendous frustration and borderline burnout I’ve been struggling with the last few months). But right now, the major security concerns are compelling, they are fairly clear to me at least, and I am completely baffled as to why even the war supporters cannot articulate them. So, let us summarize the strategic goals of the Afghanistan War: A basic minimal stability in Afghanistan, such that neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda is likely to develop a staging ground for international attacks, whether against neighboring countries or the United States and Europe; The permanent delegitimization of Pakistan’s insurgents, such that they can no longer push Pakistan and India toward nuclear conflict; I find both of those convincing reasons to stay and do things right.
|
Foust 9 (Joshua, Fellow – American Security Project, Military Intelligence Analyst, and Author – Afghanistan Journal, “The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations,” Registan, 8-27, http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/08/27/the-case-for-afghanistan-strategic-considerations/) [Kreus]
|
it becomes impossible to ignore Pakistan it is appropriate to write off the India-Pakistan conflict nuclear weapons are involved India and Pakistan have come a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir it is a compelling interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia which makes “fixing” Afghanistan vital supporting stability in Central and South Asia is a compelling interest When it comes to Pakistan the big danger is not in a Taliban takeover The big danger is that insurgents, bored or underutilized in Afghanistan, will spark another confrontation between India and Pakistan, and that that confrontation will spillover into nuclear conflict The insurgency in Afghanistan is a difficult and frustrating enemy to fight both are capable therefore of being defeated or delegitimized let us summarize the strategic goals of the Afghanistan War minimal stability in Afghanistan such that neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda is likely to develop a staging ground for international attacks against neighboring countries The permanent delegitimization of Pakistan’s insurgents, such that they can no longer push Pakistan and India toward nuclear conflict
|
Afghanistan instability causes insurgency – ignites Indo-Pak nuclear war
| 3,739 | 72 | 1,168 | 613 | 9 | 178 | 0.014682 | 0.290375 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,575 |
The Afghanistan Study Group, a collection of scholars and former policymakers critical of the current intervention, argued in 2010 that al-Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan and is unlikely to return, even if Afghanistan reverts to chaos or Taliban rule. It argued that three things would have to happen for al-Qaeda to reestablish a safe haven and threaten the United States: “1) the Taliban must seize control of a substantial portion of the country, 2) Al Qaeda must relocate there in strength, and 3) it must build facilities in this new ‘safe haven’ that will allow it to plan and train more effectively than it can today.” Because all three are unlikely to happen, the Study Group argued, al-Qaeda almost certainly will not reestablish a presence in Afghanistan in a way that threatens US security. In fact, none of those three steps are necessary for al-Qaeda to regain its safe haven and threaten America. The group could return to Afghanistan even if the Taliban do not take back control of the country. It could—and probably would—find safe haven there if Afghanistan relapsed into chaos or civil war. Militant groups, including al-Qaeda offshoots, have gravitated toward other failed states, like Somalia and Yemen, but Afghanistan remains especially tempting, given the network’s familiarity with the terrain and local connections. Nor does al-Qaeda, which was never numerically overwhelming, need to return to Afghanistan “in strength” to be a threat. Terrorist operations, including the attacks of 2001, are typically planned and carried out by very few people. Al-Qaeda’s resilience, therefore, means that stabilizing Afghanistan is, in fact, necessary even for the most basic US war aims. The international community should not withdraw until there is an Afghan government and Afghan security forces with the will and capacity to deny safe haven without international help. Setting aside the possibility of al-Qaeda’s reemergence, the United States has other important interests in the region as well—notably preventing the Taliban from gaining enough power to destabilize neighboring Pakistan, which, for all its recent defiance, is officially a longstanding American ally. (It signed two mutual defense treaties with the United States in the 1950s, and President Bush designated it a major non-NATO ally in 2004.) State failure in Pakistan brokered by the Taliban could mean regional chaos and a possible loss of control of its nuclear weapons. Preventing such a catastrophe is clearly a vital national interest of the United States and cannot be accomplished with a few drones. Alarmingly, Pakistan is edging toward civil war. A collection of militant Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), among others, are fighting an insurgency that has escalated dramatically since 2007 across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan. According to the Brookings Institution’s Pakistan Index, insurgents, militants, and terrorists now regularly launch more than one hundred and fifty attacks per month on Pakistani government, military, and infrastructure targets. In a so far feckless and ineffectual response, Pakistan has deployed nearly one hundred thousand regular army soldiers to its western provinces. At least three thousand soldiers have been killed in combat since 2007, as militants have been able to seize control of whole towns and districts. Tens of thousands of Pakistani civilians and militants—the distinction between them in these areas is not always clear—have been killed in daily terror and counterterror operations. The two insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked. Defeating the Afghan Taliban would give the United States and Pakistan momentum in the fight against the Pakistani Taliban. A Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, on the other hand, will give new strength to the Pakistani insurgency, which would gain an ally in Kabul, safe haven to train and arm and from which to launch attacks into Pakistan, and a huge morale boost in seeing their compatriots win power in a neighboring country. Pakistan’s collapse or fall to the Taliban is (at present) unlikely, but the implications of that scenario are so dire that they cannot be ignored. Even short of a collapse, increasing chaos and instability in Pakistan could give cover for terrorists to increase the intensity and scope of their operations, perhaps even to achieve the cherished goal of stealing a nuclear weapon. Although our war there has at times seemed remote, Afghanistan itself occupies crucial geography. Situated between Iran and Pakistan, bordering China, and within reach of Russia and India, it sits on a crossroads of Asia’s great powers. This is why it has, since the nineteenth century, been home to the so-called Great Game—in which the US should continue to be a player. Two other players, Russia and Iran, are aggressive powers seeking to establish hegemony over their neighbors. Iran is seeking to build nuclear weapons, has an elite military organization (the Quds Force) seeking to export its Islamic Revolution, and uses the terror group Hezbollah as a proxy to bully neighboring countries and threaten Israel. Russia under Vladimir Putin is seeking to reestablish its sphere of influence over its near abroad, in pursuit of which it (probably) cyber-attacked Estonia in 2007, invaded Georgia in 2008, and has continued efforts to subvert Ukraine. Iran owned much of Afghan territory centuries ago, and continues to share a similar language, culture, and religion with much of the country. It maintains extensive ties with the Taliban, Afghan warlords, and opposition politicians who might replace the corrupt but Western-oriented Karzai government. Building a stable government in Kabul will be a small step in the larger campaign to limit Tehran’s influence.
|
Miller, March/April 2012 (Paul D. – former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Bush and Obama, assistant professor of the International Security affairs at the National Defense University, director for the Afghanistan-Pakistan program at the college of International Security Affairs, It’s Not just Al-Qaeda: Stability in the Most Dangerous Region, World Affairs Journal, p. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/it%E2%80%99s-not-just-al-qaeda-stability-most-dangerous-region) [Kreus]
|
The Afghanistan Study Group argued in 2010 that al-Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan and is unlikely to return It argued that three things would have to happen none of those steps are necessary for al-Qaeda to regain its safe haven and threaten America. The group could find safe haven there if Afghanistan relapsed into chaos Militant groups have gravitated toward other failed states, like Somalia and Yemen, but Afghanistan remains especially tempting, given the network’s familiarity with the terrain and local connections. Nor does al-Qaeda need to return in strength Terrorist operations are typically planned and carried out by very few people. Al-Qaeda’s resilience means that stabilizing Afghanistan is necessary the U S has other important interests in the region preventing the Taliban from gaining power to destabilize Pakistan State failure in Pakistan brokered by the Taliban could mean regional chaos and loss of control of its nuclear weapons Pakistan is edging toward civil war. A collection of militant Islamist groups are fighting an insurgency that has escalated dramatically According to the Brookings Institution’s Pakistan Index, insurgents now regularly launch more than one hundred and fifty attacks per month The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked. Defeating the Afghan Taliban would give the U S and Pakistan momentum fight against the Pakistani Taliban. A Taliban takeover in Afghanistan will give new strength to the Pakistani insurgency, which would gain an ally safe haven to train and arm and launch attacks into Pakistan, and a huge morale boost increasing chaos and instability in Pakistan could give cover for terrorists to steal a nuclear weapon Afghanistan occupies crucial geography. Situated between Iran and Pakistan, bordering China, and within reach of Russia and India, it sits on a crossroads of Asia’s great powers the US should continue to be a player Russia and Iran, are aggressive powers seeking to establish hegemony Iran is seeking to build nuclear weapons, has an elite military organization and uses Hezbollah as a proxy to threaten Israel. Russia under Putin is seeking to reestablish its sphere of influence Iran continues to share a similar language, culture, and religion with much of the country. It maintains extensive ties with the Taliban who might replace Karzai Building a stable government in Kabul will limit Tehran’s influence
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Afghanistan collapse leads to the break up of Pakistan
| 5,899 | 54 | 2,409 | 918 | 9 | 378 | 0.009804 | 0.411765 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,576 |
Were Pakistan to collapse, it is unclear what the United States and like-minded states would or should do. As with North Korea, it is highly unlikely that “surgical strikes” to destroy the nuclear weapons could be conducted before extremists could make a grab at them. The United States probably would not know their location – at a minimum, scores of sites controlled by Special Forces or elite Army units would be presumed candidates – and no Pakistani government would likely help external forces with targeting information. The chances of learning the locations would probably be greater than in the North Korean case, given the greater openness of Pakistani society and its ties with the outside world; but U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation, cut off for a decade in the 1990s, is still quite modest, and the likelihood that Washington would be provided such information or otherwise obtain it should be considered small. If a surgical strike, series of surgical strikes, or commando-style raids were not possible, the only option would be to try to restore order before the weapons could be taken by extremists and transferred to terrorists. The United States and other outside powers might, for example, respond to a request by the Pakistani government to help restore order. Given the embarrassment associated with requesting such outside help, the Pakistani government might delay asking until quite late, thus complicating an already challenging operation. If the international community could act fast enough, it might help defeat an insurrection. Another option would be to protect Pakistan’s borders, therefore making it harder to sneak nuclear weapons out of the country, while only providing technical support to the Pakistani armed forces as they tried to quell the insurrection. Given the enormous stakes, the United States would literally have to do anything it could to prevent nuclear weapons from getting into the wrong hands. India would, of course, have a strong incentive to ensure the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. It also would have the advantage of proximity; it could undoubtedly mount a large response within a week, but its role would be complicated to say the least. In the case of a dissolved Pakistani state, India likely would not hesitate to intervene; however, in the more probable scenario in which Pakistan were fraying but not yet collapsed, India’s intervention could unify Pakistan’s factions against the invader, even leading to the deliberate use of Pakistani weapons against India. In such a scenario, with Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty on the line and its weapons put into a “use or lose” state by the approach of the Indian Army, nuclear dangers have long been considered to run very high.
|
O’Hanlon 2006 (Michael – senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, Dealing with the Collapse of a Nuclear-Armed State, The Princeton Project Papers, p. 11-12) [Kreus]
|
Were Pakistan to collapse it is highly unlikely that “surgical strikes” to destroy the nuclear weapons could be conducted before extremists could make a grab at them. The U S would not know their location – at a minimum, scores of sites controlled by Special Forces and no Pakistani government would likely help external forces U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation is still quite modest, and the likelihood that Washington would be provided such information should be considered small the only option would be to try to restore order Given the embarrassment associated with requesting help, the Pakistani government might delay asking until quite late India would have a strong incentive to ensure the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. It would have the advantage of proximity In the case of a dissolved Pakistani state, India likely would not hesitate to intervene in the more probable scenario in which Pakistan were fraying India’s intervention could unify Pakistan’s factions against the invader leading to the deliberate use of Pakistani weapons against India with Pakistan’s sovereignty on the line and its weapons put into a “use or lose” state by the approach of the Indian Army, nuclear dangers have been considered to run very high
|
Attempts to contain Pakistani weapons will fail and escalate to Indo/Pak nuclear war.
| 2,765 | 85 | 1,246 | 442 | 13 | 199 | 0.029412 | 0.450226 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,577 |
The history of the FCPA suggests that when the United States takes the lead in the effort to tackle foreign corruption, it sets a high bar that other countries will replicate. For example, the United States played a key role in the enactment of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which now has 38 member [*70] countries. n133 While no other country had a law analogous to the FCPA when it was enacted in the United States, the main trading partners of the United States now do. Indeed, other countries explicitly take the FCPA as a baseline from which to establish stringent anti-corruption laws. For example, the United Kingdom recently enacted the UK Bribery Act, n134 which one commentator nicknamed "the FCPA on steroids." n135 The UK Bribery Act is tougher than the FCPA in several ways. n136 In addition to corrupt payments involving a foreign official, the Act encompasses bribery between private individuals and companies. The Act also punishes the acceptance of bribes as well as the offer and payment of corrupt outlays, and the Act does not exempt facilitation payments unlike the FCPA. n137 Additionally, in May 2011 China amended its Criminal Law to prohibit bribery of foreign officials for the first time. n138 This should help to address concerns about the rise of China and other emerging economies, which are more likely to lack anti-corruption laws similar to those of the United States. Section 1504 will also generate beneficial consequences in the extractive industries more widely. The provision fits squarely within a growing trend of increasing transparency requirements for resource issuers. In early 2010, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) amended its listing rules to establish clear criteria that mineral companies must meet if they wish to list on HKEx, including disclosing payments made to governments on a country-by-country basis. n139 [*71] Although Section 1504 goes beyond the HKEx standard by requiring companies to disclose financial information at a project level in regular annual reports rather than country level disclosure limited to initial listing applications, n140 it already appears to be influencing key international actors. For example, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), an independent accounting standard-setter, is currently considering whether to develop a new standard on accounting for extractive activities. n141 In addition, in 2010 the European Commission (EC) opened up a public consultation to receive feedback on a proposed law requiring a greater level of detail in the financial reporting of multinational companies (MNCs), n142 which would affect all twenty-seven EU member states. n143 In October 2011, the European Commission announced its proposed regulations, n144 which are "tougher than expected," n145 and reach beyond Section 1504 "by extending the scope of the rules to forestry groups and big unlisted companies, which are currently exempt from US provisions." n146 The FCPA suggests two important lessons for Section 1504. First, tackling foreign corruption is of vital importance to US national interests, [*72] which are more broadly defined than US business interests. Second, US leadership in anti-corruption efforts has the potential to influence global transparency standards. The recent developments in Asia and Europe are indicative of a growing trend of increasing transparency in the extractive industries by targeting resource issuers, and Section 1504 is a bold step forward in the global movement towards advancing transparency in the extractive industries. By establishing a high bar for such transparency, the SEC may enhance the reputational value of being a publicly traded company in the United States, which could be a net asset for SEC-registrants. If the European Union adopts the proposed transparency requirements for listed companies, then transparent reporting for resource issuers will become an inherent condition for participating in globally dominant American and European financial markets. n147
|
Hunt, Spring 2011 (Sinead – J.D. Yale University, Refining Black Gold: The Dodd-Frank Act and Corruption in the Oil Industry, UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs, p. Lexis-Nexis) [Kreus]
|
U S other countries will replicate U S more widely already appears to be influencing key international actors vital importance influence global transparency standards bold step forward in the global movement towards advancing transparency in the extractive industries
|
Dodd-Frank creates a model of transparency globally.
| 4,152 | 52 | 267 | 632 | 7 | 38 | 0.011076 | 0.060127 |
Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM.html5
|
Dartmouth DDI
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
2,578 |
We have a new opportunity to be seen by Cuba’s people and its future leaders supporting their efforts to build a new economy and to help the Cuban people lead more prosperous lives. The greatest contribution our country can make now is to demonstrate we want the reforms to succeed, because we want the Cuban people to succeed. If this were a core principle of our democratic policy, a series of logical steps could then follow. My criterion is that if there are measures being taken within Cuba that benefit Cubans that should be recognized and encouraged. First, President Obama and other U.S. policy makers should acknowledge that Cuba’s reforms are real; that this program opens the way to a greater role for the market, and the changes are likely to exact great hardships on the Cuban people. They should also acknowledge that the reforms represent an important beginning. Until that all happens, our ambivalence plays into the hands of hardliners in Cuba who oppose reform or rapprochement with the United States.
|
Laverty 11 – (Collin Laverty is a Cuba consultant at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy”. 2011. http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)
|
The greatest contribution our country can make now is to demonstrate we want the reforms to succeed, because we want the Cuban people to succeed. . First, President Obama and other U.S. policy makers should acknowledge that Cuba’s reforms are real; that this program opens the way to a greater role for the market, and the changes are likely to exact great hardships on the Cuban people. They should also acknowledge that the reforms represent an important beginning. Until that all happens, our ambivalence plays into the hands of hardliners in Cuba who oppose reform or rapprochement with the United States.
|
US support for Cuban Reforms and loosening travel restrictions solve Cuban economy, but keeps the embargo in place
| 1,019 | 115 | 609 | 172 | 18 | 101 | 0.104651 | 0.587209 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,579 |
Cuba is changing, however, as I learned on my recent fact-finding visit. Cuba has embarked on meaningful economic reforms, which deserve encouragement by the United States, not continued isolation. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have a window of opportunity to engage and encourage reform in Cuba and should act now.
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Castor 13 (Kathy Castor. Representative for the 14th district of Florida. 5/19/13. “What I learned from my trip to Cuba.” http://castor.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=334653)
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Cuba has embarked on meaningful economic reforms, which deserve encouragement by the United States, not continued isolation. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have a window of opportunity to engage and encourage reform in Cuba and should act now.
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US acknowledgement of Cuban reforms would improve Cuban reforms and the Cuban economy
| 343 | 85 | 270 | 54 | 13 | 42 | 0.240741 | 0.777778 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,580 |
The importance of this argument cannot be overstated. The fact that economic reforms will precede political reforms means at least two things. First, given this ordering, any quid pro quo from Washington should provide due credit to any economic liberalization that the island may implement, however piecemeal. For example, when the Cuban government privatizes parcels of agricultural land, or when it allows its tourist industry to engage in the dollar economy, or when it allows its taxi drivers to charge their own rates, these reforms should be seen as the economic equivalent of allowing small-scale political pluralism. When economic reforms are implemented, they should be praised – not belittled – and followed by positive reinforcement by Washington.
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Perez 10 (David A. Perez, Yale Law School, JD, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, Spring, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, p. 196-7)
|
First, given this ordering, any quid pro quo from Washington should provide due credit to any economic liberalization that the island may implement, however piecemeal. For example, when the Cuban government privatizes parcels of agricultural land, or when it allows its tourist industry to engage in the dollar economy, or when it allows its taxi drivers to charge their own rates, these reforms should be seen as the economic equivalent of allowing small-scale political pluralism. When economic reforms are implemented, they should be praised – not belittled – and followed by positive reinforcement by Washington
|
US should support any Cuban economic reform
| 759 | 43 | 615 | 117 | 7 | 95 | 0.059829 | 0.811966 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,581 |
Today, the principal peril that Cuba faces comes not from the United States’ ineffective threat but from its own crushing economic realities. The country’s government is struggling with both demographic burdens and pressures from global creditors. It cannot ignore either. Cuba’s nearly intractable problems stem from the limited ways in which its economy produces wealth, its heavy reliance on imports to feed its population, growing domestic economic inequality, and the lack of opportunities for citizens to productively use knowledge acquired through advanced education.
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Laverty 11 (Collin Laverty is a Cuba consultant at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy”. 2011. http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)
|
Today, the principal peril that Cuba faces comes not from the United States’ ineffective threat but from its own crushing economic realities Cuba’s nearly intractable problems stem from the limited ways in which its economy produces wealth, its heavy reliance on imports to feed its population, growing domestic economic inequality, and the lack of opportunities for citizens to productively use knowledge acquired through advanced education
|
Cuba’s internal economic failures outweigh US impacts on Cuban Economy-reliance on imports, inequality, lack of opportunities
| 574 | 125 | 441 | 83 | 16 | 65 | 0.192771 | 0.783133 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,582 |
Rhetoric in a top-down society matters. The fact that the Cuban leadership no longer primarily blames the U.S. for all of its economic problems, publicly recognizes the importance of private entrepreneurs, and openly, if imperfectly, engages in a public debate about ambitious changes to the Cuban system, all demonstrate a new direction to the Cuban public. I think this moment is different…The bureaucracy resists and will continue resisting, that is evident, but it is also very evident that the people in the government want to continue moving forward with the reforms. I think that the process is unstoppable. —Orlando Márquez, spokesman for Cuba’s Catholic Church110The policies speak as loudly as the words. As several scholars, including Philip Peters of the Lexington Institute and Archibald Ritter at Carleton University have noted, Raúl is not simply “tinkering around the edges” of the system. Most Cubans are convinced that their lives are going to change and not necessarily for the better. While disavowing “shock therapy,” the Cuban government is taking steps to reduce the size of the state in ways that remind Cubans of the privations they endured during the Special Period and the impact of the Eastern Bloc’s reforms when economies shrank by as much as 40% and took over a decade to recover.111A long era of economic targets and production goals based on ideology or high aspirations is giving way to the discipline of the market. A range of enterprises will have greater autonomy to hire and fire, set wage structures and prices, and obtaining financing, but also face bankruptcy. The replacement of the ration book with a system of targeted benefits is being sold to the population as a work incentive, but on a practical level, it means that the majority of Cuban families have to work even harder to make ends meet. The government layoffs announced but not yet implemented will cost 1 million workers their jobs and also signal that Cuba’s promise of employment for all is finished. To absorb state workers, the new agenda relies on market-friendly reforms to create jobs and growth for the Cuban economy, placing a large bet on the emerging private sector to hire and pay unemployed workers Although small businesses, especially so many nascent enterprises, cannot absorb this number of workers without significant additional reforms, hundreds of thousands of Cubans have already stepped up with their own wagers by forming businesses, hiring other Cubans as workers, and making independent decisions about how they will earn their livelihoods. In turn, consumers will have expanded choices as competition raises the quality of goods and spurs innovations. Cuba is creating a retail sector with little government control. Because the new work largely involves services and not production, the experiment “will not remake the entire economy,” notes the Chicago Tribune, “but it’s an important start.”112
|
Laverty 11 – (Collin Laverty is a Cuba consultant at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy”. 2011. http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)
|
Rhetoric in a top-down society matters. The fact that the Cuban leadership no longer primarily blames the U.S. for all of its economic problems, publicly recognizes the importance of private entrepreneurs, and openly, if imperfectly, engages in a public debate about ambitious changes to the Cuban system The bureaucracy resists and will continue resisting, that is evident, but it is also very evident that the people in the government want to continue moving forward with the reforms ,” the Cuban government is taking steps to reduce the size of the state in ways that remind Cubans of the privations they endured during the Special Period and the impact of the Eastern Bloc’s reforms when economies shrank by as much as 40% and took over a decade to recover.111A long era of economic targets and production goals based on ideology or high aspirations is giving way to the discipline of the market , the new agenda relies on market-friendly reforms to create jobs and growth for the Cuban economy, placing a large bet on the emerging private sector to hire and pay unemployed workers Although small businesses, especially so many nascent enterprises, cannot absorb this number of workers without significant additional reforms, hundreds of thousands of Cubans have already stepped up with their own wagers by forming businesses, hiring other Cubans as workers, and making independent decisions about how they will earn their livelihoods. In turn, consumers will have expanded choices as competition raises the quality of goods and spurs innovations. Cuba is creating a retail sector with little government control. Because the new work largely involves services and not production the experiment “will not remake the entire economy, but it’s an important start
|
Cuban reforms are liberalizing the economy
| 2,927 | 42 | 1,762 | 469 | 6 | 283 | 0.012793 | 0.603412 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,583 |
Tourism eventually became more important because it represented a significant group of investments that could generate hard currency. The 1997 Cuban Economic Resolution spells out the necessity to develop hard currency-earning sectors of the economy to finance other important activities, making explicit the role tourism could play in the country's economic future. To achieve this, it set a goal: to attract more than two million tourists to the country by the year 2000 and earn more than $2,600 million from the tourist trade.
|
Castillo and Gaspar 02 (Orlando Guitierrez Castillo and Nelida Gancedo Gaspar. Nelida Gancedo Gaspar is aprofessor at the Center for Studies of the Cuban Economy at the University of Havana. She has carried out several studies on the impact of tourism on the Cuban economy. Orlando Gutierrez Castillo is an associate professor at the University of Havana and has a PhD in Economics. “Tourism Development for the Cuban Economy”. 2002. http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/publications/revistaonline/winter-2002/tourism-development-cuban-economy)
|
Tourism eventually became more important because it represented a significant group of investments that could generate hard currency. The 1997 Cuban Economic Resolution spells out the necessity to develop hard currency-earning sectors of the economy to finance other important activities, making explicit the role tourism could play in the country's economic future.
|
Tourism is a structural factor to the Cuban economy – high investments, high growth rates, stimulates other sectors
| 530 | 115 | 366 | 83 | 18 | 52 | 0.216867 | 0.626506 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,584 |
If it affects negatively all the sectors3, the embargo directly impedes - besides the exportations - the driving forces of the Cuban economic recovery, at the top of which are tourism, foreign direct investments (FDI) and currency transfers. Many European subsidiaries of US firms had recently to break off negotiations for the management of hotels, because their lawyers anticipated that the contracts would be sanctioned under the provisions of the "Helms-Burton law". In addition, the buy-out by US groups of European cruising societies, which moored their vessels in Cuba, cancelled the projects in 2002-03. The obstacles imposed by the United States, in violation of the Chicago Convention on civil aviation, to the sale or the rental of planes, to the supply of kerosene and to access to new technologies (e-reservation, radio-localization), will lead to a loss of 150 million dollars in 2003. The impact on the FDI is also very unfavourable. The institutes of promotion of FDI in Cuba received more than 500 projects of cooperation from US companies, but none of them could be realized - not even in the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry, where Cuba has a very attractive potential. The transfer of currencies from the United States is limited (less than 100 dollars a month per family) and some European banks had to restrain their commitment under the pressure of the US which let them know that indemnities would be required if the credits were maintained. In Cuba, the embargo penalizes the activities of the bank and finance, insurance, petrol, chemical products, construction, infrastructures and transports, shipyard, agriculture and fishing, electronics and computing…, but also for the export sectors (where the US property prevailed before 1959), such as those of sugar, whose recovery is impeded by the interdiction of access to the fist international stock exchange of raw materials (New York), of nickel, tobacco, rum.
|
CETIM ‘3 (Centre Europe Tiers Monde, independent research and political organization working at the UN, THE EFFECTS OF THE US EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA AND THE REASONS OF THE URGENT NEED TO LIFT IT, http://www.cetim.ch/oldsite/2003/03js04w4.htm)
|
- the driving forces of the Cuban economic recovery, at the top of which are tourism
|
Tourism is key to the Cuban Economy – their 1AC authors say so
| 1,951 | 62 | 84 | 308 | 13 | 16 | 0.042208 | 0.051948 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,585 |
As both Raul and Fidel acknowledge that their economic system no longer works, we have an opportunity to respond in kind, to make a full market transition more probable. If we acknowledge that our 50-year embargo has been ineffective (never strangulating the Castro regime to the point of collapse) and signal to the Cuban government that we are supportive of their effort to restructure their economy, we will be working in our best interests as well as Cuba’s. U.S. business will benefit from new investment and trade opportunities, and we will minimize the likelihood of another mass exodus from Cuba, of un- and under-employed Cubans who envision their future prospects far better in the U.S. than in their ailing economy.
|
Eckstein 10 (Susan Eckstein. Professor at Boston University and past president of the Latin American Studies Association. “A Helping Hand to Cuba’s Market Reform?” 9/29/10. http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2010/09/29/a-helping-u-s-hand-to-cuba%E2%80%99s-market-reform/)
|
. If we acknowledge that our 50-year embargo has been ineffective (never strangulating the Castro regime to the point of collapse) and signal to the Cuban government that we are supportive of their effort to restructure their economy, we will be working in our best interests as well as Cuba’s. U.S. business will benefit from new investment and trade opportunities, and we will minimize the likelihood of another mass exodus from Cuba, of un- and under-employed Cubans
|
Perm do both solves the Counterplan
| 728 | 35 | 471 | 120 | 6 | 77 | 0.05 | 0.641667 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,586 |
The document persistently emphasizes Gen. Castro's militaristic themes of increased efficiency, discipline and control. It insists, for example, on setting prices according to the dictates of central planning. It also insists that any new "nonstate" (private sector) economic activities not be allowed to lead to the "concentration of property" (that is, the accumulation of wealth). There is no interest in introducing the market socialism of a Deng Xiaoping, who famously told China's people in 1984 that "to get rich is glorious."
|
Azel 11 (Jose Azel is a senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. 01/10/11. “So Much For Cuban Economic Reform.” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203418804576039640218425926.html)
|
The document persistently emphasizes Gen. Castro's militaristic themes of increased efficiency, discipline and control.
|
Reforms aren’t real – continued government control and permitted private sector activities fail
| 533 | 95 | 119 | 81 | 13 | 14 | 0.160494 | 0.17284 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,587 |
The Transition Indicators gauge progress in six policy areas: 1. large scale privatization, 2. small scale privatization, 3. governance and enterprise restructuring, 4.price liberalization, 5. trade and foreign exchange system and 6. competition policy. A measurement scale of 1 to 4+ is set for these areas indicating movement between little progress (1) and standards of advanced market economies (4 or 4+ in some areas). I used the methodology of the EBRD in gauging progress in each of the six areas. The table above shows the scoring with a succinct explanation of its meaning taken directly from the EBRD methodology.[ii]
|
Luis 13 (Luis R. Luis is an editor for the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy. May 2013. “Gauging Cuba’s Economic Reforms”. http://www.ascecuba.org/blog/post/Gauging-Cubas-Economic-Reforms.aspx)
|
The Transition Indicators gauge progress in six policy areas: 1. large scale privatization, 2. small scale privatization, 3. governance and enterprise restructuring, 4.price liberalization, 5. trade and foreign exchange system and 6. competition policy
|
Cuban Reforms are failing now - ERBD Transition Indicators prove
| 630 | 64 | 252 | 99 | 10 | 34 | 0.10101 | 0.343434 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,588 |
(Reuters) - In what has become an annual ritual, the United States on Thursday kept Cuba on its list of "state sponsors of terrorism" and Havana reacted angrily, calling it a "shameful decision" based in politics, not reality.¶ Cuba said in a statement that the U.S. government was pandering to the Cuban exile community in Miami against its own interests and the wishes of the American people. The terrorism designation comes with a number of sanctions, including a prohibition on U.S. economic assistance and financial restrictions that create problems for Cuba in international commerce, already made difficult by a U.S. trade embargo imposed against the island since 1962.
|
Franks 13 (Jeff, writer for Reuters, 5/31/13, “Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list 'shameful'”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUSBRE94U05020130531//NZ)
|
the United States on Thursday kept Cuba on its list of "state sponsors of terrorism" and Havana reacted angrily, calling it a "shameful decision" based in politics, not reality The terrorism designation comes with a number of sanctions, including a prohibition on U.S. economic assistance and financial restrictions that create problems for Cuba in international commerce
|
Removing Cuba from the list solves relations with Cuba and the region- not justified
| 676 | 84 | 371 | 108 | 14 | 56 | 0.12963 | 0.518519 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,589 |
Of all the components to the United States hostile strategy against Cuba, nothing raises the ire of the Castro government more than its inclusion on the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism. The designation is seen by Havana as an impediment towards improving relations and as a cruel hypocrisy that provides political cover for Washington to justify the imposition of economic penalties along with the perpetuation of anti-revolutionary propaganda.
|
Bolender 13 (Keith, Guest Scholar at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 4/22/13, “The Terrorist List, and Terrorism as Practiced Against Cuba”, http://www.coha.org/22355/#sthash.7PR9MyMs.dpuf//NZ)
|
Of all the components to the United States hostile strategy against Cuba, nothing raises the ire of the Castro government more than its inclusion on the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism The designation is seen by Havana as an impediment towards improving relations
|
Inclusion on the list is the biggest obstacle of U.S-Cuban relations- unable to obtain loans, military items, and medicine
| 469 | 122 | 288 | 71 | 19 | 46 | 0.267606 | 0.647887 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
2,590 |
Let us ask one final time: Who would benefit from the abrogation of the legislation enabling the U.S. embargo on Cuba? Unquestionably, such a move would be greatly advantageous to Castro’s personal purposes and would also favor those who seek to obtain commercial gains from doing business in Cuba, heedless of the costs of their unbridled ambition to the Cuban people. What would constitute a gross deception, however, would be to advance the claim, as some do, that such a policy change would contribute to Cuba’s freedom or to its economic development. No doubt, Cuba after Castro will experience very serious difficulties in resuming its process of economic development and rejoining the world economy. Nothing short of a complete ideological turnaround and wholesale restructuring of its political, social, and economic systems would allow the country to begin to face the arduous tasks lying ahead. The Cuban nation has suffered enormously under Castro. The reconstruction process will inevitably be costly and laborious. The last thing the Cuban people need is to be visited by another plague. Spare them the sanctimonious chicanery and knavery of those who abuse and misuse the market for their own greed. Piñatas and mafias are not the way to build free and prosperous societies. Vide Nicaragua and Russia. Let Cuba not follow suit.
|
Jorge 2k (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000).Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers.Paper 28. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)
|
Who would benefit from the abrogation of the legislation enabling the U.S. embargo on Cuba? Unquestionably, such a move would be greatly advantageous to Castro a gross deception would be to claim a policy change would contribute to Cuba’s freedom or to its economic development. Nothing short of a complete ideological turnaround and wholesale restructuring of its political, social, and economic systems The last thing the Cuban people need is to be visited by another plague.
|
Increases the regime’s power and turns case
| 1,341 | 43 | 477 | 216 | 7 | 76 | 0.032407 | 0.351852 |
Advantage CPs - Michigan7 2013 PCFJV.html5
|
Michigan (7-week)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
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2,591 |
It follows, from all of the above, that a lifting of the embargo at this time would only serve the purpose of facilitating to Castro desperately needed resources, mainly in the form of credit lines extended by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, and also by private banking and other financial institutions. This financial influx would serve to strengthen his 40-year stranglehold on the Cuban people. Furthermore, to those who believe that greater contacts between the United States and Cuba would further the cause of democratization, it should be pointed out that such hopes definitely have not been validated by the experience of Marxist societies from the inception of the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union, which followed the stage of War Communism, up to the last efforts at reforming socialism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. In these countries, trade, foreign investment, and loans led hermetic lives of their own, oblivious to and unaffected by the rest of society. There is no historical precedent for drawing hope from the Cuban experience. As a matter of fact, it could be realistically argued that the opposite has happened. As the Cuban regime succeeds in solidifying itself, as a result of the legitimacy conferred upon it by other nations and by an augmented flow of resources, its repressive proclivities have increased in parallel fashion. Trade and investment with totalitarian states have not weakened or eroded those states; rather, the contrary has always been the case. Castro’s regime is certainly no exception to the rule and, in fact, categorically confirms it. Only pressure has led Castro temporarily to implement some timid reforms that he subsequently has either partly rescinded or revoked altogether. Cuba has established for all to see a system of apartheid — which is openly and vigorously enforced — between foreigners and Cuban nationals.
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Jorge 2k (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000).Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers.Paper 28. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)
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lifting of the embargo at this time would only serve the purpose of facilitating to Castro desperately needed resources in credit lines This financial influx would serve to strengthen his stranglehold There is no historical precedent for drawing hope from the Cuban experience Trade and investment with totalitarian states have not weakened or eroded those states; rather, the contrary has always been the case. Only pressure has led Castro temporarily to implement some timid reforms that he either rescinded or revoked
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Castro influence is the problem, not the embargo
| 1,976 | 48 | 520 | 315 | 8 | 81 | 0.025397 | 0.257143 |
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News reports continued to indicate that the State Department is considering removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. U.S. Cuba policy has been codified into law, and ending the U.S. embargo or the travel ban requires congressional action. But there are many steps that the President and the Secretary of State can take on their own (both President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry have previously expressed and demonstrated their commitment to changing U.S. policy toward Cuba). Removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is one of the most significant changes that do not require congressional approval. It would reflect the reality that Cuba is not a sponsor of terrorist groups, thus helping to improve relations, and it would deprive congressional hardliners of a powerful tool in their efforts to harden U.S. policy toward Cuba. At a time when Cuba is playing a key role in the Colombia peace talks (which are making real progress), taking Cuba off the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would also send a message throughout the Western Hemisphere that the United States is serious about improving its relationship with Latin America.
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Thale and Boggs 13 (Geoff, authored Forging New Ties, M.S. Industrial Relations, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Clay, worked at Casa de los Amigos, in Mexico City, first as a volunteer and later as Peace Programs Coordinator, B.A. History, Temple University, 3/28/13, “Three Harbingers of Change in U.S. Cuba Policy”, http://www.wola.org/commentary/three_harbingers_of_change_in_us_cuba_policy // NZ)
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News reports continued to indicate that the State Department is considering removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism ending the U.S. embargo or the travel ban requires congressional action Removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is one of the most significant changes that do not require congressional approval. It would reflect the reality that Cuba is not a sponsor of terrorist groups, thus helping to improve relations, At a time when Cuba is playing a key role in the Colombia peace talks ), taking Cuba off the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would also send a message throughout the Western Hemisphere that the United States is serious about improving its relationship with Latin America.
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The reality is that Cuba shouldn’t be on the list- Rubio doesn’t matter, removal does not require Congress
| 1,177 | 106 | 736 | 193 | 18 | 122 | 0.093264 | 0.632124 |
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On May 30, the State Department submitted its annual report on terrorism (“Country Reports on Terrorism 2012”) to Congress, notably maintaining Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism along with Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism on March 1, 1982. It has remained ever since on the list of states that Washington accuses of repeatedly providing support for international acts of terrorism. The justification for Cuba’s presence on the list—that it is providing a safe haven for wanted fugitives and particularly for Assata Shakur—is flimsy at best. [1] Upon closer examination this assertion fails to be convincing. Cuba’s unfounded listing as a state sponsor of terrorism undermines U.S. credibility abroad, hampering its efforts to counteract authentic terrorism around the world.
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Lullo and Rueckert 6/28 (Rebecca and Phineas, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 6/28/13, “Shakur, Snowden, and the State Department: Is Cuba a State Sponsor of Terrorism?”, http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror // NZ)
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the State Department submitted its annual report on terrorism to Congress, notably maintaining Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism along with Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism on March 1, 1982. It has remained ever since on the list of states that Washington accuses of repeatedly providing support for international acts of terrorism The justification for Cuba’s presence on the list—that it is providing a safe haven for wanted fugitives Upon closer examination this assertion fails to be convincing. Cuba’s unfounded listing as a state sponsor of terrorism undermines U.S. credibility abroad, hampering its efforts to counteract authentic terrorism around the world
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Cuba’s unjustified listing undermines U.S credibility- all connections have been cut
| 831 | 84 | 722 | 129 | 11 | 112 | 0.085271 | 0.868217 |
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Each spring, the U.S. State Department releases a report indicating which countries the United States considers “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” Currently the list consists of four countries: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. This year, John Kerry’s ascent to U.S. Secretary of State generated a discussion about taking Cuba off the list. Given Kerry’s generally reasonable position on Cuba in the past, it was perhaps not surprising that he considered this option.
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Lopez-Levy 13 (Arturo, Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate, University of Denver, 5/7/13, “It's Time to Delist Cuba”, http://www.fpif.org/articles/its_time_to_delist_cuba)
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the U.S. State Department releases a report indicating which countries the United States considers “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” Currently the list consists of four countries: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria Given Kerry’s generally reasonable position on Cuba in the past, it was perhaps not surprising that he considered this option.
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Cuba on the list undermines credibility of the list- corrodes U.S leadership and hinders strategic vision
| 459 | 105 | 332 | 71 | 16 | 50 | 0.225352 | 0.704225 |
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Muse, who spoke Tuesday at CSIS, claimed the first two reasons were void because the countries concerned actually condone Cuba's relationship with their adversaries. Cuba is currently host to negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government, and Spanish leaders prefer that Basque rebels remain in Cuba – and out of Spain.
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According to Robert L. Muse, a specialist on the legality of U.S. policy toward Cuba, there are currently three ostensible reasons for Cuba's inclusion in the most recent list: that it has allowed Basque separatists to reside within its borders, that it has dealings with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and that it harbours fugitives wanted for crimes committed in the United States.
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Muse claimed the first two reasons were void because the countries concerned actually condone Cuba's relationship with their adversaries. Cuba is currently host to negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government, and Spanish leaders prefer that Basque rebels remain in Cuba
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Removing Cuba from the list damages credibility- makes a huge concession
Metzker 13 (Jared, reporter for the Inter Press Service News Agency, 6/13/13, “Pressure Building for U.S. to Remove Cuba from ‘Terror Sponsor’ List”, http://www.globalissues.org/news/2013/06/13/16803//NZ)
| 328 | 277 | 280 | 51 | 35 | 41 | 0.686275 | 0.803922 |
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HAVANA (AP) — Cuba and the United States may be longtime enemies with a bucket overflowing with grievances, but the fast return of a Florida couple who fled U.S. authorities with their two kidnapped children in tow shows the Cold War enemies are capable of remarkable cooperation on many issues.
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Haven 13 (Paul Haven is the bureau chief at the Associated Press. 4/10/13. “Under the radar, Cuba and US often work together”. http://www.kob.com/article/stories/S2993416.shtml?cat=646)
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Cuba and the United States may be longtime enemies with a bucket overflowing with grievances, but the fast return of a Florida couple who fled U.S. authorities with their two kidnapped children in tow shows the Cold War enemies are capable of remarkable cooperation on many issues.
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US can increase relations with Cuba – collaboration through science, judicial factors, disaster relief, and government officers
| 295 | 127 | 281 | 50 | 17 | 47 | 0.34 | 0.94 |
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1. (C) Summary: After a briefing by the Charge',¶ Congressman Delahunt discussed bilateral relations alone with Foreign Ministry (MFA) officials and ALBA Bank President and former Ambassador to the United States Bernie Alvarez on March 19. He also met alone with President Chavez and Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicholas Maduro during the night¶ of March 19. Delahunt told the Charge afterward that he encouraged Chavez to push the "reset" button on bilateral¶ relations. Chavez told Delahunt he would mention this idea during his March 22 "Alo, Presidente" broadcast and would¶ like an "appropriate" USG response. Chavez and MFA officials reportedly expressed interest in renewing counternarcotics cooperation, but did not specify a way forward. Chavez is interested in restarting informal inter-parliamentary¶ dialogue (the "Boston Group"), to which Delahunt responded that members of Venezuela's opposition need to be included. Delahunt said he also urged that the Venezuelan government cease harassing U.S. Embassy operations and fire the problematic MFA Protocol Director. End Summary.
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Lawton 9 (Daniel Lawton, Venezuelan political counselor for the Caracas Embassy, “CODEL DELAHAUNT MEETINGS WITH CHAVEZ AND FOREIGN MINISTRY – MARCH 19,” 20 March 2009, http://www.semana.com/documents/Doc-2218_2011628.pdf)
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Congressman Delahunt discussed bilateral relations alone with Foreign Ministry (MFA) officials and ALBA Bank President and former Ambassador to the United States Bernie Alvarez on March 19. He also met alone with President Chavez and Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicholas Maduro Chavez told Delahunt he would mention this idea during his March 22 "Alo, Presidente" broadcast and would like an "appropriate" USG response. Chavez and MFA officials reportedly expressed interest in renewing counternarcotics cooperation Chavez is interested in restarting informal inter-parliamentary dialogue (the "Boston Group"), to which Delahunt responded that members of Venezuela's opposition need to be included.
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Even Chavez wanted Boston Group
| 1,092 | 32 | 700 | 160 | 5 | 98 | 0.03125 | 0.6125 |
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Michigan (7-week)
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2013
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2,598 |
As required by law, the U.S. government annually publishes several reports in which it designates, or identifies, countries failing to comply with certain international standards governing narcotics trafficking, support for terrorism, and regard for human rights. Designations can be a tool for persuading countries to change their policies and practices, as sanctions often accompany designations. For example, in 2006, State designated Venezuela as a country that had “virtually ceased its cooperation in the global war on terror.”33 As a result, the U.S. government imposed—as required by law—a military equipment embargo against Venezuela, prohibiting the sale or license of defense articles and services.34 The United States has renewed both the designation and the embargo every year since 2006. As figure 4 shows, in addition to the annual designation for not cooperating with the United States on antiterrorism efforts, State has also annually designated Venezuela as failing to comply with minimum human trafficking standards since 200335 and with human rights standards, since at least 2002. Furthermore, every year since 2005, the President has designated Venezuela as a major drug transit country that has “failed demonstrably” to meet its international counternarcotics obligations and responsibilities by taking sufficient action against the rising drug trafficking problem both within and along its borders. Venezuelan officials have questioned the accuracy of these various reports. In particular, they maintain the narcotics designation is not a technical assessment and that the United States has politicized drug trafficking in Venezuela. In addition, Venezuelan officials said these multiple annual designations hinder not only an improved bilateral relationship with the United States, but also the resumption of counternarcotics cooperation. Both U.S. and Venezuelan officials pointed out that the sanctions from designations, particularly the embargo on defense articles and services, hinders Venezuela from cooperating on counternarcotics even if it desired to do so.36 This embargo not only prohibits Venezuela from procuring defense articles and services directly from the United States, but it also prevents Venezuela from buying defense articles from a third country if they have U.S.-origin content. For example, the head of ONA told us Venezuela wanted to buy Super Tucano airplanes from Brazil to intercept suspicious drug trafficking aircraft, but it was unable to do so because the planes contain U.S.-origin parts. Instead, Venezuela is in the process of buying 18 Chinese-made K8 planes.
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Ford et. al. 9 [Tess, Director of International Affairs and Trade for the Government Accountability Office, July 2009, Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate “Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with Venezuela has Declined” page 21-22, LZ]
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As required by law, the U.S. government annually publishes several reports in which it designates countries failing to comply with certain international standards governing narcotics trafficking, support for terrorism, and regard for human rights. sanctions often accompany designations in 2006, State designated Venezuela as a country that had “virtually ceased its cooperation in the global war on terror.” The United States has renewed the designation every year since 2006. in addition to the annual designation for not cooperating with the United States on antiterrorism efforts, State has also annually designated Venezuela as failing to comply with minimum human trafficking standards since 2003 and with human rights standards, since at least 2002 every year since 2005, the President has designated Venezuela as a major drug transit country that has “failed demonstrably” to meet its international counternarcotics obligations and responsibilities by taking sufficient action against the rising drug trafficking problem both within and along its borders. Venezuelan officials have questioned the accuracy of these various reports they maintain the narcotics designation is not a technical assessment and that the United States has politicized drug trafficking in Venezuela. Venezuelan officials said designations hinder not only an improved bilateral relationship with the United States, but also the resumption of counternarcotics cooperation. U.S. and Venezuelan officials pointed out that the designations, hinders Venezuela from cooperating on counternarcotics even if it desired to do so. it prevents Venezuela from buying defense articles from a third country if they have U.S.-origin content. Venezuela wanted to buy airplanes to intercept suspicious drug trafficking aircraft, but it was unable to do so because the planes contain U.S.-origin parts
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Removing designations is key to reviving US-Venezuela relations and counternarcotics cooperation
| 2,622 | 96 | 1,865 | 383 | 11 | 269 | 0.028721 | 0.70235 |
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Under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FAA), the President is required each year to notify Congress of those countries he determines to be major illicit drug-producing countries or major transit countries that "significantly affect the United States." A country’s presence on the list does not necessarily reflect its counternarcotics efforts or its level of cooperation on illegal drug control with the United States. The designation can reflect a combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow narcotics to be produced and/or trafficked through a country. When a country on the list does not fulfill its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and conventions, the President determines that the country has "failed demonstrably" to meet its counterdrug obligations. Such a designation can lead to sanctions. However, the President may also execute a waiver when he determines there is a vital national interest in continuing U.S. assistance. Even without such a waiver, humanitarian assistance and counternarcotics assistance may continue. List of countries on the black-list. This year the President has identified 22 countries as major producing or transit countries: Afghanistan, the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Belize and El Salvador are new to the list this year.
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Haiti Libre 12 [Haiti Libre is a Haitian news organization, “Haiti - USA: Obama keeps Haiti on the "black list" of drug trafficking”, Sept 19 2012, http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-6681-haiti-usa-obama-keeps-haiti-on-the-black-list-of-drug-trafficking.html, LZ]
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Under the FAA the President is required each year to notify Congress of those countries he determines to be major illicit drug-producing countries or major transit countries When a country on the list does not fulfill its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and conventions, the President determines that the country has "failed demonstrably" to meet its counterdrug obligations. Such a designation can lead to sanctions. However, the President may also execute a waiver when he determines there is a vital national interest in continuing U.S. assistance List of countries on the black-list. This year the President has identified 22 countries as major producing or transit countries Venezuela
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President has authority to waiver Venezuela
| 1,499 | 43 | 717 | 215 | 6 | 107 | 0.027907 | 0.497674 |
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